Lancaster EPrints

The effect of incentives on sabotage: The case of Spanish football

del Corral, J and Prieto-Rodriguez, J and Simmons, R (2010) The effect of incentives on sabotage: The case of Spanish football. Journal of Sports Economics, 11 (3). pp. 243-260. ISSN 1527-0025

[img]
Preview
PDF (The effect of incentives on sabotage: The case of Spanish football) - Draft Version
Download (177Kb) | Preview

    Abstract

    A growing literature examines adverse behavior as unintended consequences of incentives. We test Lazear’s hypothesis that states that if rewards were dependent solely on relative performance then an increase in rewards would induce agents to engage in sabotage activity to reduce rivals’ output. We test this hypothesis using the natural experiment of a rule change in Spanish football, the increase in points for winning a league match from two to three. We find, consistent with Lazear’s hypothesis, that teams in a winning position were more likely to commit offences punishable by dismissal of a player after this change.

    Item Type: Article
    Journal or Publication Title: Journal of Sports Economics
    Uncontrolled Keywords: incentives ; sabotage ; rules ; red cards ; football
    Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
    Departments: Lancaster University Management School > Economics
    ID Code: 45328
    Deposited By: ep_importer_pure
    Deposited On: 11 Jul 2011 19:30
    Refereed?: Yes
    Published?: Published
    Last Modified: 16 Apr 2013 16:17
    Identification Number:
    URI: http://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/id/eprint/45328

    Actions (login required)

    View Item