Information disclosure to employees and rational expectations: a game theoretical perspective - a comment

Pope, P F and Peel, David (1997) Information disclosure to employees and rational expectations: a game theoretical perspective - a comment. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 24 (9). pp. 1433-1435. ISSN 1468-5957

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Abstract

In this comment we identify the key features of the Frantz and Walker (1997) game theoretic model that drive the non-disclosure equilibrium result in their paper. We argue that, although technically correct, their model fails to capture certain aspects of real-world wage bargaining that will be important in determining optimal disclosure strategies in practice. However, Frantz and Walker's paper illustrates the potential of analytical techniques to contribute to the employee disclosure debate.

Item Type:	Article
Journal or Publication Title:	Journal of Business Finance and Accounting
Uncontrolled Keywords:	wage bargainin ; employee disclosure
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HG Finance H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Departments:	Lancaster University Management School > Accounting & Finance Lancaster University Management School > Economics
ID Code:	43420
Deposited By:	ep_importer_pure
Deposited On:	11 Jul 2011 18:59
Refereed?:	Yes
Published?:	Published
Last Modified:	26 Jul 2012 18:47
Identification Number:
URI:	http://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/id/eprint/43420

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