Pope, P F and Peel, David (1997) Information disclosure to employees and rational expectations: a game theoretical perspective - a comment. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 24 (9). pp. 1433-1435. ISSN 1468-5957Full text not available from this repository.
In this comment we identify the key features of the Frantz and Walker (1997) game theoretic model that drive the non-disclosure equilibrium result in their paper. We argue that, although technically correct, their model fails to capture certain aspects of real-world wage bargaining that will be important in determining optimal disclosure strategies in practice. However, Frantz and Walker's paper illustrates the potential of analytical techniques to contribute to the employee disclosure debate.
|Journal or Publication Title:||Journal of Business Finance and Accounting|
|Uncontrolled Keywords:||wage bargainin ; employee disclosure|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HG Finance|
H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
|Departments:||Lancaster University Management School > Accounting & Finance|
Lancaster University Management School > Economics
|Deposited On:||11 Jul 2011 18:59|
|Last Modified:||04 Nov 2015 03:17|
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