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Suppression of the Nazi Past, Coded Languages, and Discourses of Silence: Applying the Discourse-Historical Approach to Post-War Anti-Semitism in Austria

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I Setting the Agenda

In this essay I discuss some aspects of the revival/continuance of Austrian anti-Semitism since 1945. First, a short summary of the history of post-war anti-Semitism in Austria is necessary in order to allow a contextualization of specific utterances from the Vienna election campaign of 2001 which will be analysed in detail below. Secondly, I will elaborate the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) which should allow readers to follow and understand the in-depth discourse analysis of specific utterances by Jörg Haider, the former leader of the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ), during the 2001 election campaign. Finally, the question of whether we are dealing with ‘new–old’ anti-Semitism in Europe or just ‘more of the same’ will be raised. This topic is constantly

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debated in the media and by politicians in relation to the events of 11 September 2001, the war in Iraq, and the current crisis in the Middle East.

The research presented here was undertaken at the Department of Applied Linguistics at the University of Vienna in the context of a number of interdisciplinary projects (involving linguists, historians, psychologists, and political scientists). The strategies and linguistic realizations of anti-Semitic discourse, the discourse of justification, are presented in this essay taking the notion of ‘syncretic anti-Semitism’ as a point of departure. This concept suggests that the traditional boundaries between a racist, ethnic, or Catholic anti-Semitism are no longer valid; instead, anti-Semitic stereotypes are produced and functionalized whenever a political context seems suitable. In all of these studies, the theoretical framework of the DHA was applied (see below). This implies problem-oriented, interdisciplinary research while focusing on verbal and non-verbal expressions of meaning in context, that is, discourse. The DHA was developed in the course of our first research project on anti-Semitic discourse, which investigated the so-called Waldheim Affair of 1986. The data came from the media (TV, news broadcasts, newspapers, and journals) on the one hand and speeches by politicians and everyday conversations on the street on the other. Thus different strata of the Austrian public sphere were studied.

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When necessary and available, data from opinion polls was also analysed and integrated into our research.\(^5\)

II Anti-Semitism in Austria after 1945

1. General Perspectives

At the ‘zero hour’ of 1945, the Second Austrian Republic’s main concern, in contrast to Germany, was whether Austria’s ruling elite could and would do ideological, constitutional, and political justice to the various demands it faced, demands that frequently arose out of opposing values, and if so, how.\(^6\) The result was the construction of a self-image in which the ‘Jewish question’ was not so much denied as concealed. As result, there was ‘silence’. A number of critical studies attribute this lack of public debate (in comparison to Germany) about the ‘Jewish question’ to the remains of anti-Semitic hostility among the political elites.\(^7\) However, if we consider the conditions (such as occupation, reservoir of anti-Semitic prejudices from the first Austrian Republic, and commitment to becoming a ‘Western democracy’) under which a new collective or public memory was to be constituted, one can hardly be surprised by the outcome. In the end, the ‘Jewish question’ took a subordinate place in Austria’s official public memory of the Nazi period. Ultimately, this new policy, as described in detail by Richard Mitten,\(^8\) resulted in the creation of a new community of ‘victims’ in which the Jews occupied an insignificant place: they were just victims like everyone else, and

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Nazi policy concerning the Jews was minimized or concealed. This silence was first broken by the Waldheim Affair of 1986 and the commemorative year of 1988. Since the beginning of the 1990s Austrian politicians have been debating the question of Austrian responsibility, and the two exhibitions of 1995 and 2001 about the crimes of the German Wehrmacht have further contributed to the lifting of the taboo.

Austria became a democratic state in 1918 (first Republic), and had to survive the change from a large multi-ethnic and multicultural monarchy to a small state. Between 1938 and 1945, Austria was occupied by the Nazis and became part of the Third Reich. Since 1945, Austria has undergone many political and sociological changes: occupation by the Allied forces until 1955, the signing of the State Treaty in 1955, attaining the status of neutrality although clearly retaining a pro-Western orientation, and the creation of a social welfare society on the Swedish model. A major qualitative change occurred in 1989–90 when the so-called Iron Curtain fell and new immigrants from the former Eastern Communist countries crossed Austria’s borders. In 1994 politics in Austria were dominated by two events, both of which represented major breaks with the post-war era. In June, Austrians voted by an overwhelming 66.4 per cent majority to join the European Union (EU). By October, however, the reigning euphoria among the governing parties, the Social Democratic Party (SPÖ) and the People’s Party (ÖVP), over the EU referendum had turned into the opposite, to despair as they contemplated the implications of their disastrous general election results. Both parties suffered massive losses, primarily to the populist Freedom Party (FPÖ), a party similar to Le Pen’s party in France. Although they formed a new coalition government, the SPÖ and the ÖVP no longer possessed the two-thirds majority necessary to pass constitutional laws in parliament.

The election on 3 October 1999 finally brought the FPÖ 27 per

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cent of the vote. The coalition broke down, and a new one between the ÖVP and the FPÖ was formed on 4 February 2000. This was followed by an immediate reaction on the part of the fourteen other member states of the European Union, and ‘sanctions’ against the Austrian government were established which led to a new nationalistic wave in Austria. An exit strategy for the EU fourteen was created by the so-called ‘report of the three wise men’, which established that Austria was still a democratic country like all other Western states. Under this international pressure, restitution towards slave labour and Jewish survivors was resolved in January 2001.

2. A New Anti-Semitism in Austria?

The year 1945 undoubtedly also represented a qualitative break in the history of anti-Semitism in Austria. All discriminatory measures against Jews introduced by the Nazis were rescinded, and the open profession of anti-Semitic beliefs lost its previous normative legitimacy. It would be wrong, however, to assume that these measures necessarily eroded the long tradition of anti-Semitic prejudice in the Austrian population. There are both historical and theoretical arguments that strongly suggest a continuity rather than discontinuity in anti-Semitic prejudice in Austria.

The collapse of the Third Reich forced many, in Austria as well as in Germany, to confront the extent of the Nazis’ crimes. Doubts, guilt feelings, and the need to justify or rationalize one’s behaviour encouraged the development of strategies for ‘coming to terms with this past’. The facts of the persecution were frequently mitigated, while the victims of Nazi persecution were—again—made into the causes of present woes.

Moreover, Austria’s officially recognized status as the first victim of Hitlerite aggression provided many Austrians with an important argument to deflect any responsibility that went beyond the commission of individual crimes. The search for a new identity emphasized Austrian distinctiveness, which at the same time became a negation of all ties with the Nazi (that is to say, German) past. This, in turn, reinforced a specific definition of insiders and outsiders, of ‘us’ and ‘them’, of ‘the others’ at all levels of discourse.

13 See Michael Kopeinig and Christoph Kotanko, Eine europäische Affäre (Vienna, 2000).
Anti-Semitism in post-war Austria must therefore be viewed chiefly in relation to the various ways of dealing with alleged or real guilt, with alleged or actual accusations about the Nazi past. Discursive remedies may be found not only in the large, traditional reservoir of anti-Semitic prejudice and in a general discourse of collective experiences and attitudes, but in several new argumentative topoi as well. The forms of expression chosen vary significantly: they may be manifest or latent, explicit, or indirect. But each and every one appears to be embedded in a discourse of justification.

In this context, therefore, ‘silence’ relates to at least three different issues: first, the coding of anti-Semitic beliefs through insinuations, analogies, and other implicit and vague pragmatic devices; secondly, the silence of large sections of the elites when anti-Semitism is instrumentalized for political reasons; and thirdly, the explicit denial through justification discourses that prejudiced utterances could be identified as such accompanied by vehement counter-attacks against the elites, media, intellectuals, and laypeople. The new wave of anti-Semitism was basically triggered by public debates on restitution, which was finally decided upon, more than fifty years after the Shoah, by the new government at the beginning of 2001. Specifically, the topos of ‘we are all victims’ became common usage; many did not, and still do not, understand that it depends on who was a victim why, where, and under what circumstances.

3. The Waldheim Affair

The Waldheim Affair is the term conventionally applied to the controversy surrounding the disclosure of the previously unknown past of Kurt Waldheim, former Secretary General of the United Nations, which started during his campaign for the Austrian

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14 For the definition of argumentative ‘topoi’, see Reisigl and Wodak, *Discourse and Discrimination*, 60ff. Briefly put, a topos functions like a warrant in a condensed argument without making the evidence (‘datum’) explicit, thus relying on common-sense and shared knowledge of the participants of the interaction.


16 See Wodak, ‘Discourses of Silence’.

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presidency in 1986. The affair not only focused international attention on Waldheim personally, but also raised broader questions relating to the history of anti-Semitism in Austria. It also drew attention to the alleged Nazi pasts of prominent politicians, officials, and prominent scholars in other countries as well as to the attitudes and policies of Allied and other nations which knowingly accepted and protected former Nazis. Moreover, employing a coded idiom more appropriate to ‘post-Auschwitz’ political debate, the Waldheim camp (the ÖVP, which had nominated him) helped to construct an enemy-picture (Feindbild) of Jews. This served both to deflect criticism of Waldheim’s credibility and to explain the international ‘campaign’ against him. The central assumption of this Feindbild was that Waldheim (=Austria) was under attack from an ‘international Jewish conspiracy (coded as das Ausland’). 18

The relatively uneventful early phase of the election campaign ended abruptly in March 1986, when the Austrian weekly Profil published documents revealing details of Waldheim’s unknown past during the Second World War. Profil’s disclosures were followed on 4 March by almost identical revelations by the World Jewish Congress (WJC) and the New York Times. Waldheim had always denied any affiliation with Nazis of any kind, and had claimed in his memoirs that his military service had ended in the winter of 1941–2, when he was wounded on the Eastern Front. The evidence made public by Profil, the WJC, and the New York Times suggested the contrary: Waldheim had been a member of the Nazi Student Union and he had also belonged to a mounted unit of the Sturmabteilung, or SA, while attending the Consular Academy in Vienna between 1937 and 1939. Other documents revealed that Waldheim had served in the Balkans after March 1942 in Army Group E, commanded by Alexander Löhr; this Army Group was known for its involvement in the deportation of Jews from Greece and for the savagery of its military operations against Yugoslav partisans. Hence the official and international ‘history’ of Waldheim up to that point was seen to have silenced the actual anti-Semitism of his acts. These assumed a wider significance when it was realized that the actor had become the

18 Ausland is used as an insinuation for ‘Jews living outside of Austria’, and implies the meaning of ‘international Jewish conspiracy’. For details see Mitten, The Politics of Antisemitic Prejudice.
Secretary General of the United Nations. This old silencing and denial then produced a new silencing to justify the original silencing of an officially disapproved past.

For his part, Waldheim first denied any membership in any Nazi organization and claimed to have known nothing about the deportation of the Jews of Thessaloniki. The general strategy of the Waldheim camp was to brand any disclosures as a ‘defamation campaign’, an international conspiracy by the foreign press and the Jews (im Ausland). Waldheim, meanwhile, stated that he had simply forgotten to mention such minor events in his life because his injury had been the major caesura at that time. In the course of the election campaign, the WJC became the major object of abuse, and the political invective directed against it by the politicians of the ÖVP helped to promote and legitimize anti-Semitic prejudice in public discourse to an extent unseen since 1945. Waldheim also attempted to identify his own fate with that of his generation and country by claiming that he, like thousands of other Austrians, had merely been doing his ‘duty’ (Pflichterfüllung) under Nazi Germany. This appeal gained a positive response from many Austrian voters of his generation, but also from younger generations (such as from some children of the Wehrmacht soldiers). Waldheim finally won the second round of the elections on 6 June 1986 with 53.9 per cent of the vote.

However, contrary to Waldheim’s expectations, interest in the unanswered questions about his past did not disappear after the election. Waldheim received no official invitation from any country in Western Europe, and some official visitors even avoided travelling to Vienna because they did not want to call on him. In April 1987, the US Department of Justice announced that it was placing Waldheim on the so-called ‘watch list’, thus reinforcing his pariah status. More broadly conceived, the Waldheim Affair symbolizes the post-war unwillingness or inability adequately to confront the implications of Nazi crimes.

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19 Wodak, Menz, Mitten, and Stern, *Die Sprachen der Vergangenheiten*.
20 For more details see ibid.
III. **Critical Discourse Analysis and the Discourse-Historical Approach**

1. *Text and Context*

Like other approaches to discourse analysis, critical discourse analysis (henceforth CDA) analyses instances of social interaction that take a (partially) linguistic form. CDA sees discourse—language use in speech and writing—as a form of ‘social practice’. To describe discourse as social practice implies a dialectical relationship between a particular discursive event and the situation(s), institution(s), and social structure(s) that frame it: the discursive event is shaped by them, but it also shapes them. That is, discourse is socially constitutive as well as socially conditioned; it constitutes situations, objects of knowledge, and the social identities of, and relationships between, people and groups of people. Since discourse is so socially consequential, it gives rise to important issues of power.

Discursive practices may have major ideological effects; that is, they can help produce and reproduce unequal power relations (between, for instance, social classes, women and men, and ethnic/cultural majorities and minorities) through the—frequently implicit and latent—ways in which they represent things and position people. CDA aims to make these opaque and latent aspects of discourse more visible.

The distinctive feature of the DHA is its attempt to integrate all available background information systematically into the analysis and interpretation of the many layers of a text. Relating individual utterances to the context in which they were made, in this case, to the historical events that were being written or talked about, is crucial in decoding the discourses of racism and anti-Semitism, for example, during the above-mentioned Waldheim Affair. Otherwise, current metaphors and allusions referring to ‘the past’, Nazism, and anti-Semitism would remain incomprehensible.

It is important to emphasize that ‘anti-Semitic language behaviour’ may, though not necessarily, imply explicitly held and/or
articulated hostility towards Jews, but it does imply the presence of prejudicial assumptions about the Jews as a group. For example, the slogan ‘Kill Jews’ painted on the Sigmund Freud monument in Vienna (1988) clearly does contain an explicit, though anonymous, imperative call for the most hostile of actions against Jews. On the other hand, a Jewish joke, which can have various meanings depending on such things as the setting, the participants, and the function of the utterance, also forms part of what we termed ‘anti-Semitic language behaviour’, but only in circumstances where the joke expresses anti-Jewish prejudices. Thus, analysing the context of an utterance is indispensable in determining whether that utterance expresses anti-Semitic prejudice or not. Which anti-Semitic contents are expressed depends, among other things, on the setting (public, private, or media), the formality of the situation, the participants, the topic, and the presence or absence of Jews. Anti-Semitic language behaviour, moreover, covers a wide range of speech acts, from explicit remarks or appeals for action to mere allusions. Anti-Semitic language behaviour includes all levels of language, from text or discourse to the individual word, or even sounds, for example, the Yiddish intonation of certain words or phrases (in specific contexts, as mentioned above). Official disapproval or prohibition of anti-Semitic discourse, the attempt to suppress it in all contexts, is an important factor which presents a further important layer in deconstructing the specifically Austrian context. It influences both the coded style of its current expression and the metadiscursive issues of reproduction of discourse and the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of silencing and denial in general.23

To illustrate this context-dependent approach, I list some of the many layers of discourse we investigated in the study of the Waldheim Affair:

- There were Wehrmacht documents concerning the war in the Balkans in general, as well as documents relating specifically to Waldheim’s activities there.
- There were also statements and interviews with other Wehrmacht veterans who had served with Waldheim.

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One step removed from these was research by historians on the Balkan war in general, and on Waldheim’s wartime role in particular.

At another level again, there was the reporting in Austrian newspapers on the Balkan war, on Waldheim’s past, and on the historical research on war and Waldheim’s role.

There were newspaper reports on Waldheim’s own explanation of his past; on the other hand, there was the reporting of all these previously mentioned aspects in foreign newspapers, especially the New York Times.

Simultaneously, the press releases and documents of the World Jewish Congress provided an autonomous informational and discursive source.

Finally, in addition to these, there were statements by, and interviews with, politicians as well as the vox populi on all these topics.

Though sometimes tedious and very time consuming, such an approach allows the varying perceptions, selections, and distortions of information to be recorded. As a result, we were able to trace in detail the constitution of an anti-Semitic enemy-picture of ‘the others’ as it emerged in public discourse in Austria in 1986.

Although the specific linguistic methods applied were dependent on the genre (for example, story, newspapers, conversation), all data was analysed along three dimensions: the anti-Semitic contents expressed; the discursive strategies employed; and the linguistic realizations at all levels of language.

2. Contents: Anti-Semitic Stereotypes

With the exception of those dealing with sexuality, virtually every imaginable prejudice against Jews appears in our data. In the following only a few of those are elaborated that appeared most frequently from 1986 to 2001; I also indicate the contexts in which they were most often expressed.

The first group is subsumed under the category ‘Christian Anti-Semitism’. According to this prejudice, Jews are regarded as murderers of Christ, and/or as traitors. The character of ‘Judas’ provides everlasting ‘proof’ of the unreliability and lack of credibility of Jews. In 1986, Christian anti-Semitic motifs were found most frequently in newspapers and in the semi-public realm.

Although the stereotype of the ‘dishonest’, ‘dishonourable’, or
the ‘tricky Jew’ originated in Judas’ betrayal of Christ, corollary to this are the economic stereotypes that date from the Middle Ages. Jews were forced into certain occupations, such as lending money, principally because they were excluded from most others. The clichés about the Jewish commercial spirit as well as the suspicion that Jews did business dishonourably in principle were both employed in varying ways from 1986 to 2001.

The most pervasive anti-Jewish cliché, however, was and is that of the ‘international Jewish conspiracy’. The Jews, so it is said, dominate or control the international press, the banks, political power, and capital, and they amass awesome power against their foes. In the Waldheim election rhetoric, the term ‘campaign’ became virtually synonymous with an international Jewish conspiracy against Waldheim and/or Austria.

Yet another prejudice is that Jews are ‘more privileged than others’. Although such a belief was traditionally identified with the belief that all Jews were rich, this particular cliché has taken on additional significance since the Holocaust. Those Jews who ‘emigrated’ and thereby escaped a far worse fate, so the argument goes, especially the many ‘rich ones’, had no reason to complain: nothing had happened to them anyway.

As mentioned above, the collapse of the Third Reich in 1945 gave rise to a number of additional reasons for fearing the anger of the ‘vengeful Jew’. One was fear of the discovery of war crimes and the persecution and conviction of war criminals. Another was fear that stolen (so-called ‘Aryanized’) property could be demanded back. Finally, there was fear that the former refugees would want to return to their homeland. Not only might they want their property back, or take legal action against their former persecutors, but they might ‘take over’ certain professions or reclaim their previous jobs and positions.

As a whole, the discourse about the ‘Waldheim Affair’ ‘spread’ to different fields of political action, involving many different genres and different discourse topics.\(^{24}\) (See Fig. 14.1. \textit{facing page}.)

\(^{24}\) Reisgl and Wodak, \textit{Discourse and Discrimination}. 

\textbf{Fig. 14.1. The discourse about the Waldheim Affair}

IV Case Study: The 2001 Election Campaign in Vienna

1. The Broader Context

In spring 2001, during the mayoral election campaign for the city of Vienna, which has a SPÖ majority, the FPÖ and its former leader, Jörg Haider, began a campaign which again stimulated anti-Semitic beliefs and prejudices. Old stereotypes were used as political weapons. This campaign was characterized by vehement attacks on the president of the Jewish Community, Ariel Muzicant. The campaign came as no surprise. Restitution negotiations had just come to an end, and the new government had decided to pay back some of the ‘Aryanized’ monies and goods to Jewish victims. This time, the ‘play’ with insinuations or allusions did not work as well as in 1986. The FPÖ lost at this election, mostly because the Mayor of Vienna, Michael Häupl, explicitly opposed the anti-Semitic ideologies expressed. The political debate was extremely revealing: it centred on the issues of ‘freedom of opinion’ and ‘possible criticism of Jews’. These new strategies can be seen as part of the above-described justification discourse. The topos of criticism has been taken up elsewhere as well. Recent studies have illustrated that these discourses have spread out across other European nation-states (‘Haider effect’, ‘Haiderization of Europe’; see below).

Here, I focus on the following three utterances by Jörg Haider, made during the election campaign of 2001 (see Appendix 14.1 for the entire debate during the 2001 election campaign).

Haider, 21 Feb. 2001, opening of the election campaign:

‘Mr Häupl has an election strategist: he’s called Greenberg [loud laughter in the hall]. He had him flown in from the East Coast. My friends, you have a choice: you can vote for Spin Doctor Greenberg from the East Coast, or for the Heart of Vienna’

(‘Der Häupl hat einen Wahlkampfstrategen, der heißt Greenberg [lauter Lachen in der Halle]. Den hat er sich von der Ostküste einliegen lassen! Liebe Freunde, ihr habt die Wahl, zwischen Spindoctor Greenberg von der Ostküste, oder dem Wienerherz zu entscheiden!’)


26 Wodak, ‘Pragmatics and Critical Discourse Analysis’.

27 Pelinka and Wodak (eds.), ‘Dreck am Stecken’; and Wodak and Pelinka (eds.), The Haider Phenomenon.
‘We don’t need any proclamations from the East Coast. Now we’ve had enough. Now we’re concerned with another part of our history, reparations to those driven from their homes.’


Haider, 28 Feb. 2001, Ash Wednesday Speech:

‘Mr Muzicant: What I don’t understand is how someone called Ariel can have so much dirty linen . . . I do not understand this at all, but I mean . . . he will certainly comment this tomorrow, right? . . . But, I am not timid in these matters.’

(‘Der Herr Muzicant: Ich verstehe überhaupt net, wie ana, der Ariel haßt, so viel Dreck am Steckn haben kann . . . des verstehe ich überhaupt net, aber i man . . . das wird er schon morgen kommentieren, nicht . . . aber ich bin da nicht sehr schreckhaft, in diesen Fragen.’)

In order to be able to understand, analyse, and explain such utterances systematically, I draw on the DHA, presented above. The linguistic analysis of these utterances in the Austrian multi-layered context thus has to draw on, inter alia:

- historical analysis of anti-Semitism and its verbal expressions (i.e. ‘coded language’).
- socio-cognitive analysis of collective memories and frames guiding the acquisition of specific knowledge to be able to understand the ‘coded language’.
- socio-political analysis of the election campaign, the ongoing debates, and the political parties taking part; these two dimensions form the broader context.
- genre theory; the functions of political speeches (persuasive strategies; positive self-presentation/negative other-presentation; populist rhetoric, etc.).
- the setting, speakers, etc. of the concrete utterances; this is the narrower context.
- the co-text of each utterance.
- and finally, verbal expressions have to be analysed in terms of linguistic pragmatic/grammatical approaches (presuppositions; insinuations; implications; etc., as characteristics of the specific ‘coded anti-Semitism’).

These devices are embedded in discursive macro-strategies of positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation as
defined in the DHA.\textsuperscript{28} Such strategies employ various other linguistic features, rhetorical tropes, and patterns of argument/legitimization.\textsuperscript{29} Moreover, we have to situate this election campaign in other discourses about foreigners, Jews, minorities, and marginalized groups in Austria and Europe in order to be able to grasp the interdiscursivity, intertextuality, and re-contextualization of certain topoi and arguments in the wider context. In this essay, it is impossible to analyse the entire election campaign in detail.\textsuperscript{30} In what follows, I will highlight the essential recurrent anti-Semitic topics, topoi, stereotypes, and the linguistic devices used in the speech given in Ried on 28 February 2001.

2. Relevant Linguistic Notions

As ‘allusions’ (insinuations) are of central importance in the case we are concerned with, they should be defined in more detail: through allusions one can suggest negative associations without being held responsible for them. Ultimately the associations are only suggested. The listeners must make them in the act of reception.\textsuperscript{31} Allusions thus depend on shared knowledge. The person who alludes to something counts on resonance, that is, on the preparedness of the recipients consciously to associate the facts that are alluded to.

In the area of politics, those making allusions may have the intention, and achieve the result, of devaluing political opponents, without accepting responsibility for what is implicitly said. In the case of allusions, what is not pronounced creates a kind of secrecy, and familiarity suggests something like: ‘we all know what is meant.’ The world of allusion thus exists in a kind of ‘repertoire of collective knowledge’. Allusions frequently rely on topoi and linguistic patterns already in play and with a clear meaning content,\textsuperscript{32} or on topoi which point to well-established and perhaps even anti-Semitic stereotypes (such as ‘Jewish speculators and crooks’).\textsuperscript{33}

\textsuperscript{29} See Reisigl and Wodak, \textit{Discourse and Discrimination}, ch. 2.
\textsuperscript{30} See Wodak and M. Reisigl, ‘... wenn einer Ariel heist ...’
\textsuperscript{32} See the notion of ‘East Coast’; for discussion Mitten, \textit{The Politics of Antisemitic Prejudice}.
\textsuperscript{33} Wodak and de Cillia, \textit{Sprache und Antisemitismus}, 15.
In accusing Ariel Muzicant, Jörg Haider frequently made allusions. By using this kind of discourse strategy, he (and others) implied certain presuppositions, which many people saw as ‘common sense beliefs’ or ‘shared truth’. This is, of course, not a new linguistic strategy in prejudiced discourse. Allusions, as mentioned above, enable politicians and other speakers to deny the possible meaning attributed to the allusion and refer to the beliefs of the readers or listeners projected onto the utterance.

The concept of presuppositions is central to linguistic pragmatics. The analysis of presuppositions within speech act theory makes it possible to make explicit the implicit assumptions and intertextual relations that underlie text production.34

Many linguistic phenomena have been related to presuppositions. Here I shall follow the survey given in Yule, which concentrates on six types (see Table 14.1).

Table 14.1. Types of presupposition

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Example</th>
<th>Presupposition</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>existential</td>
<td>The X</td>
<td>• X exists.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>factive</td>
<td>I regret having done that</td>
<td>• I did it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non-factive</td>
<td>He claimed to be a teacher</td>
<td>• He was not a teacher.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lexical</td>
<td>She managed to escape</td>
<td>• She attempted to escape.</td>
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<tr>
<td>structural</td>
<td>Who is coming?</td>
<td>• Someone is coming.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>counter-factual</td>
<td>If I were not ill</td>
<td>• I am ill.</td>
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In the case of anti-Semitic allusions, at least since 1945, no enclosed ideological edifice of anti-Semitism is completely addressed and spelled out. Rather, an amalgam of ideological tenets is invoked by linguistic ‘clues and traces’ in order to relate to a particular set of beliefs and a ‘discourse space’—irrespective of where the ‘roots’ of this ‘discourse space’ may lead.

Finally, I would like to consider the term ‘word play’. In his infamous remark during the election campaign, Haider made a word play on ‘Ariel’, Muzicant’s first name. This was then relativized as a ‘joke’, as ‘irony’, and so on, in the sense of ‘why not have a bit of fun during the carnival’?

Word play (‘play on words’) refers to playful use of words, the humorous effect of which depends particularly on the ambiguity of the words used or on the identical or similar pronunciation of two related words with different meanings: a funny or silly word.

3. Discourse Strands

The topic of compensation in relation to the criminalization of Muzicant was triggered at the New Year’s meeting on 22 January 2001 (see Appendix 14.1). There it was claimed that Muzicant had piled up debts and that the compensation would partly serve his own interest (that of paying off debts). These first utterances imply many presuppositions: first, that Muzicant had actually made criminal moves, exploiting the interests of the survivors for himself and his business. Secondly, a chain of anti-Semitic insinuations is triggered off by further presuppositions: Jews are rich, are businessmen, etc. At the same time, compensation is, in general terms, devalued as not a very important ‘problem’. This topic is pursued at the start of the election campaign, when there is an attack on the ‘East Coast’, and the apparent influence of the ‘East Coast’ (this is related both to the Mayor of Vienna, Michael Häupl, and to the SPÖ, as well as to the compensation negotiations). The use of the insinuation ‘East Coast’ goes back at least as far as the Waldheim Affair of 1986 (see above). The latent meaning implies that the SPÖ is dependent on these ‘powerful Jews’; thus the ‘World Conspiracy stereotype’ is presupposed. Moreover, in this speech the extermination of the Jews and the matter of compensation are explicitly set against the expelled Sudeten Germans (a well-known argument of both the FPÖ and Haider). In the Ried statement that has been closely analysed elsewhere the criminalization of Muzicant is pursued in the form of an allusion (‘dirty linen’). However, its vagueness is removed and clarified in the following statements. On 8 March 2001 there are further suggestions of Muzicant’s criminal activity, and this is continued in the News interview of 14 March 2001 (see Appendix 14.1).

This entire discourse strand serves to present Dr Ariel Muzicant as a criminal, in order to focus on his role in the compensation negotiations. Ultimately, however, what also seems important is to devalue the compensation of Jewish victims of the Holocaust and to set it against the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans.
The second discourse strand concerns the sub-division of Austrian citizens into those with a ‘true Viennese heart’, and those who allow themselves to be influenced by the ‘East Coast’. In the 2 April 2001 issue of *Profil*, Peter Sichrovsky himself, general secretary of the FPÖ, provides this interpretation and thereby contradicts Haider’s defence of 16 March 2001 that ‘East Coast’ is a ‘purely geographical description’.

Stanley Greenberg, adviser to the Mayor of Vienna, Dr Michael Häupl, is presented as, among other things, a Jew who is employed by the SPÖ as a spin doctor. The characterization of a person primarily as a ‘Jew’ serves exclusively to arouse anti-Semitic attitudes, because this characteristic is irrelevant for Greenberg’s work. Jews are therefore contrasted with ‘real’ Austrians. The topos of the ‘real Austrian’ is not new. This attribution was already used in the 1970s when Bruno Kreisky, later Chancellor of Austria, a Social Democrat and of Jewish origin, campaigned against the People’s Party. The use of ‘real Austrians’ appeared again in the election campaign 1999 (Haider was and is a ‘real’ Austrian) and alludes to the fallacious argument that Jews or Austrians of other ethnic origins are not ‘on the same level’, even if they have Austrian citizenship. The Austrianess (or citizenship) of Austrian Jews is thereby implicitly denied. This exclusion is also extended to Muzicant, who is described as having been an ‘immigrant’; as a ‘guest’ in a host country, it is suggested that he ought to behave (*Zeit im Bild*, 2, 16 March 2001). In this way, Haider is introducing a racial concept: citizenship is not enough to be a ‘real’ citizen. These utterances, therefore, presuppose racist attitudes. At the same time he emphasizes the Nazi era: emigration, immigration, and re-immigration of Jews are viewed as a ‘voluntary’ decision and not as determined by the Holocaust. Finally, Haider presupposes that Jews should actually be grateful to Austria, the country from which they had had to flee in order not to be deported and murdered (and where their entire property was Aryanized).

On the basis of criticism by opposition politicians, the media, and politicians and scholars from abroad, a discourse of justification and legitimization began. The attacks on Jews, like Greenberg and Muzicant, now had to be given a ‘real’ foundation in Haider’s perception and discourse, or they had to be simultaneously played down.
On the one hand, therefore, the insinuations are described as ‘criticism’ and thereby shifted on to a rationally factual level. The relevant topos is: ‘why can’t one criticize Jews?’ The underlying argument for the ‘criticism’ is as follows: Muzicant has denigrated Austria, is a ‘denouncer’ who has ‘declared war on a democratically elected government’. Muzicant, therefore, is ‘not a good Austrian’. On the other hand, the anti-Semitic stereotype of the ‘traitor’ is alluded to, the ‘betrayal of the fatherland’. The presupposition runs: anyone who is not satisfied with the government and who voices criticism is a ‘traitor’ and ‘not a good Austrian’. This means that the government is equated with the state and that there is no longer room for plurality of opinion, unless, of course, one criticizes such ‘traitors’, for Haider does claim this freedom of opinion for himself and defends himself against the ‘left-wing thought-police’ (Zeit im Bild, 16 March 2001, and Presse Kommentar, 17 March 2001). The stereotype of ‘traitor’, which at that time embraced all critics of the government in Austria and also elsewhere, presupposes, in the case of Muzicant—and in the context of an anti-Semitic discourse—the additional meaning of the Christian anti-Semitic stereotype of ‘traitor’ (it is ‘not acceptable to denigrate one’s own country’: Muzicant displays an ‘anti-Austrian mentality’, 22 March 2001).

The fourth discourse strand is concerned with Muzicant’s ‘motives’: on the one hand, to pay off the debts that he has accumulated in an apparently criminal fashion; on the other, he is ‘filled with hatred’, ‘vengeful’ (‘he refuses to give his signature’), and ‘greedy for recognition’ (‘the applause of the enemies of Austria [was] apparently more important’). This alludes to another familiar anti-Semitic stereotype: the ‘vengeful Jew’ (where the Old Testament is often—inaccurately—quoted: ‘an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth’).

V ‘New–Old’ Anti-Semitism in Austria and Europe?

These examples demonstrate the extent to which Jörg Haider has used and spread anti-Jewish stereotypes since the FPÖ’s New Year meeting in 2001. The linking of the Vienna election campaign with restitution becomes obvious. The defamation of Ariel Muzicant, and, thereby, the whole of the Jewish community and
the Austrian Jews, did not, in fact, bring any electoral gain in the
Vienna election, but discourses take on a life of their own.

Anti-Semitic rhetoric has also gained new dimensions: through
the redefinition of ‘abuse’ and ‘insult’ as ‘legitimate criticism’, anti-
Semitic clichés have become acceptable. Many people reiterate
Haider’s explanations and legitimizations. As in 1986, during the
Waldheim affair, the familiar Iudeus ex machina strategy was again
introduced: scapegoats are ideal for constructing enemy-images
and thereby reinforcing the ego of the in-group.

After Auschwitz, as T. W. Adorno already noted, nothing has
remained the same and nothing should remain the same.\textsuperscript{35}
Adorno labelled anti-Semitism as the ‘archetypical prejudice’, the
‘Jew as the archetypical other’. Whenever a scapegoat is needed,
‘Jews’ are functionalized as scapegoats.

Exclusionary rhetoric has been re-contextualized and projected
onto many other minorities in recent years in Europe—Roma
and Sinti, foreigners from the former Eastern bloc after 1989, and
Turks and Muslims. Nowadays, however, we can observe a re-
emergence of explicit anti-Semitic rhetoric in several EU coun-
tries; old stereotypes which had been kept in the realm of latency
(coded) for a long time are uttered explicitly again. The triggers
for such a re-emergence differ from country to country because of
past and present policies, political goals, and functions.

Moreover, we notice an abundance of analogies and compar-
isons between the past and the present in the media and in polit-
ical and everyday discourses.\textsuperscript{36} Comparisons are drawn between
the Holocaust and ‘Holocaust-farms’, meaning chickens which
are kept in very small cages; or between the extermination policies
of the Nazis and the politics of the Israeli government (which is
frequently generalized to ‘Israelis’ or ‘Jews’ worldwide). Such
comparisons serve to deny guilt in the sense that ‘all of them are
doing or did terrible things, thus nobody is worse than “the
Jews”’.\textsuperscript{37}

\textsuperscript{35} T. W. Adorno, \textit{Studien zum autoritären Charakter} (Frankfurt am Main, 1973; 1st pub.
1950).
\textsuperscript{36} See Ruth Wodak and Gertraud Auer-Borco (eds.), \textit{Memory and Justice} (Vienna, 2009).
\textsuperscript{37} See e.g. Stephen Byers, ‘Anti-Semitism is a Virus and it Mutates’, \textit{Guardian}, 15 Mar.
2004, who states: ‘Of course, criticism of Israel’s policy is not, of itself, anti-Semitic. But it
can become so when it involves applying double standards, holds all Jews responsible for
the actions of the Israeli government or reveals a demonisation of Jews . . . If Chinese
restaurants in London were firebombed by angry mobs, would it be right to withhold sym-
In an interesting and controversial article, András Kovács claims that the existing, unofficial but recognized, post-war contract between Jews and non-Jews in Europe after 1945 has been de-legitimized:

In place of the unwritten contract between the European Jews and the European states, which came into being after the Second World War, a gap yawns today. For the Jews, there is a question about what constitutes their place in Europe if they do not see themselves as a collective in their religious community, and if they have doubts about whether Europe will accept them as they define themselves. Beyond this, not insignificant forces are active in the most diverse positions of the political spectrum, whose interests are not served if something new takes the place of the contract which has lost its validity, and the Jews feel at home in Europe . . . If we look soberly at the situation today, then it must seem most likely that a new ‘contract’ will not come about in response to political pressures, for these work against it. It will require a courageous decision on the part of Jewish and non-Jewish public figures and politicians in Europe . . . for harmony to be restored between Europe and its Jews.38

Taking the arguments of Kovács even further, the post-war taboo on anti-Semitism has, in my view, changed and been lifted; one of the most important functions seems to be getting rid of alleged or subjective/collective guilt. Former victims (of the Shoah) have turned into perpetrators; historical contexts are conflated and de-historicized. Specifically, six elements can be detected which might explain these developments.

(a) The conflict in the Middle East leads to a new rhetoric equating Israeli with Nazi politics (‘if they are doing this, then we do not have to feel guilty anymore’). European Jews are made responsible for whatever is happening in Israel. This implies an anti-Semitic fallacious argument: if one Jew is said to have done something ‘bad’, this is attributed to all Jews—they are now ‘all bad’; the feature is generalized.

Suppression of the Nazi Past

(b) *Realpolitik* in Western European countries supports the new Muslim communities because they represent future voters. Conflicts on asylum laws and migration policies are apparent; the integration of multi-cultural communities has rarely succeeded. In France and Belgium, for example, these phenomena have led to a transformation of the position of right and left. The left support Arab and Muslim refugees and sometimes merge anti-Israeli politics with anti-Jewish beliefs, whereas the right proposes strict anti-immigration policies and thus seemingly supports the Jewish population.

(c) The restitution to Jews of ‘Aryanized’ monies and belongings in Austria, Switzerland, and Germany has resulted in new stereotypes: ‘The emigrants are rich anyway, the victims are all dead’; ‘Why should “our tax money” be given to them?’; ‘They exploit the Shoah’; and so forth. Committees composed of historians, lawyers, and other experts have explored and investigated these issues in detail.

(d) The two *Wehrmacht* exhibitions 1995 and 2001 have challenged the German and Austrian post-war consensus that a small group around Hitler, comprising the SS and SD, was guilty, but certainly not the millions of soldiers in the *Wehrmacht*. Discourses of justification have re-emerged and have led to a victim–perpetrator reversal.

(e) EU enlargement has triggered a comeback of right-wing populist parties in Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania, frequently discriminating against Roma minorities and employing blatant anti-Semitic rhetoric. These debates relate to the complex problem of coping with the Nazi and Communist pasts in Europe.

(f) Such controversies (as illustrated above) lead to a new rhetoric: one should finally be allowed to criticize ‘bad Jews’. The fallacious (straw-man) argument continues: ‘Immediately, if criticism is made explicit, one is labelled anti-Semitic.’ Of course, this sometimes occurs because some people do not distinguish between anti-Zionism, criticism of the policies of the Israeli

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40 Adorno, *Studien zum autoritären Charakter*. 
government, and anti-Semitism. A differentiated, rational debate is thus unfortunately rendered impossible.

We are thus confronted with a very mixed bag of motives, arguments, stereotypes, and policies. The past is related in an irrational way to the present and functionalized for many different political aims. We detect both ‘de-historicization’ and de-contextualization/re-contextualization. Such discourses have been reinforced by anti-American sentiments and the conflict in the Middle East.

Jews have a long tradition as scapegoats, and apparently still lend themselves to this role: anti-Semitism without Jews and without anti-Semites. Bunzl and Marin identified this tendency almost thirty years ago. In fact, what the case study illustrates in the specific Austrian context can be experienced in a similar way in a much larger European context. Political calculation still clearly finds a wide measure of support for irrational claims and prejudices under the cloak of ‘criticism’.

Appendix 14.1

Quotations from Vienna election campaign, 2001: Jörg Haider verbatim (chronologically from 21 Jan. to 22 Mar. 2001)

Report in Der Standard, 22 Jan. 2001, on the FPÖ’s New Year Meeting of 21 Jan. 2001:
‘We have other problems than constantly negotiating about how we ought to carry out the reparations’, said Haider. ‘Some time there has to be an end.’

(‘Wir haben andere Probleme, als ständig zu verhandeln, wie wir Wiedergutmachung zu leisten haben’, sprach Haider, ‘einmal muss Schluss sein.’)

‘Mr Muzicant will be satisfied only when the debt of 600 million Schillings that he has run up in Vienna has been paid for him.’

(‘Der Herr Muzicant ist erst zufrieden, bis man ihm auch jene 600 Millionen Schilling Schulden bezahlt, die von ihm in Wien angehäuft worden sind.’)

41 J. Bunzl and B. Marin, Antisemitismus in Österreich (Innsbruck, 1983).
Haider on 21 Feb. 2001 at the opening of the electoral campaign in Oberlaa:

'Mr Häupl has an election strategist: he’s called Greenberg [loud laughter in the hall]. He had him flown in from the East Coast. My friends, you have a choice: you can vote for Spin Doctor Greenberg from the East Coast, or for the Heart of Vienna!'

('Der Häupl hat einen Wahlkampfstrategen, der heisst Greenberg [loud laughter in the hall]. Den hat er sich von der Ostküste einfliegen lassen! Liebe Freunde, ihr habt die Wahl, zwischen Spindoctor Greenberg von der Ostküste, oder dem Wienerherz zu entscheiden!')

'We don’t need any proclamations from the East Coast. Now we’ve had enough. Now we’re concerned with another part of our history, reparations to those driven from their homes.'


Haider on 28 Feb. 2001, Ash Wednesday Speech:

'Mr Muzicant: What I don’t understand is how someone called Ariel can have so much dirty linen . . . I do not understand this at all, but I mean . . . he will certainly comment this tomorrow, right? . . . But, I am not timid in these matters.'

('Der Herr Muzicant: I versteh überhaupt net, wie ana, der Ariel haßt, so viel Dreck am Steckn haben kann . . . des versteh i überhaupt net, aber i man . . . das wird er schon morgen kom- mentieren, nicht . . . aber ich bin da nicht sehr schreckhaft, in diesen Fragen.')

Haider, in a campaign speech on 8 Mar. 2001 in the Gösser brewery:

'Someone [Muzicant] who, together with the Vienna City Council, and because of his good contacts there as an estate agent and speculator, carries out rebuilding projects in protected areas, where no one else gets permission—that is something that’s not right.'

('Jemand [Muzicant], der im Verbund mit der Wiener Stadtregierung und aufgrund seiner guten Kontakte dorthin als Immobilienmakler und -spekulant hier in Schutzgebieten
Sanierungen durchführt, wo kein anderer eine Bewilligung bekommt, dann ist das etwas, was nicht in Ordnung ist.’

Haider interview in News, 14 Mar. 2001:

‘In my Ash Wednesday speech I referred to his [Muzicant’s] role concerning Austria during the EU sanctions. I have kept back a few more things.’

(‘Ich habe bei meiner Aschermittwochsrede auf seine [Muzicants] Rolle gegenüber Österreich während der EU-Sanktionen Bezug genommen. Da behalte ich mir noch ein paar Dinge vor.’)

‘In addition he has made explicit use of his political connections to benefit his business affairs.’

(‘Dazu kommt, dass er seine politischen Beziehungen durchaus ausnützt, um geschäftlich seine Dinge unter Dach und Fach zu bringen.’)

‘And then he and the religious community have debts of around 600 million Schillings and in Washington he stabbed Austria in the back.’

(‘Und dann noch, dass er mit der Kultusgemeinde rund 600 Millionen Schilling Schulden hat und Österreich in Washington in den Rücken gefallen ist.’)

‘I really do not see why the taxpayer should cough up a single Schilling because of Mr Muzicant’s sloppy business-dealings.’

(‘Ich sehe wirklich nicht ein, warum der Steuerzahler für die schlampige Wirtschaft des Herrn Muzicant nur einen Schilling berappen soll.’)

‘And in the end his business connections will have to be exposed.’

(‘Und schließlich wird man seine Geschäftsverbindungen durchleuchten müssen.’)

‘He [Muzicant] is the personification of irreconcilability and therefore has relatively little place in the spectrum of the forces of democracy.’

(‘Das [Muzicant] ist ein Mensch, der die personifizierte Unversöhnlichkeit ist und daher im Spektrum der demokratischen Kräfte relativ wenig Platz hat.’)

‘In a difficult period for this country’, Muzicant ‘proved not to be a good Austrian.’ Abroad, he behaved as if his Jewish co-citizens were endangered again, and denounced the country.

(Muzicant ‘hat sich in einer schwierigen Phase nicht als guter Österreicher erwiesen.’ Er habe im Ausland so getan, als ob die jüdischen Mitbürger wieder gefährdet seien und habe das Land schlecht gemacht.)

H: ‘It was a light-hearted word play. That, I think, is absolutely acceptable in politics. The deeper background, however, should not be hushed up. And that is simply the criticism of Mr Muzicant who has not behaved like an Austrian during a difficult phase for the Republic.’

(H: Es war ein scherzhaftes Wortspiel. Das glaube ich, ist in der Politik absolut zulässig. Der tiefere Hintergrund soll aber nicht verheimlicht werden. Und der ist einfach die Kritik am Herrn Muzicant, der in einer schwierigen Phase der Republik sich nicht als guter Österreicher erwiesen hat.)

H: ‘So, you know, thank God, that we live in a democracy where there are no thought-polic e of politically correct people to prescribe what we are allowed to say. The East Coast is a geographical expression, and that’s where the political centre is in America. Everyone knows that, and that’s where Greenberg comes from, and he is to advise Mr Häupl.’

(H: Also, Sie wissen, dass wir Gott sei Dank in einer Demokratie leben, in der es keine Gedankenpolizisten der politisch korrekten Gutmenschen gibt, die uns vorschreiben, was wir noch formulieren dürfen. Die Ostküste ist eine geographische Bezeichnung, und dort liegt das politische Zentrum in Amerika. Das weiß jedermann und von dort kommt der Greenberg, der den Herrn Häupl beraten soll.)

‘What I want to ensure in Austria is simply that people can express their opinion freely. And that there is no ban on thinking. When the government was being formed I also signed a preamble in which we recognize that we reject every form of racism and anti-Semitism. And those people will have to look very hard to find anything negative in what I said. Because I have already told
you: someone like Mr Muzicant who, firstly, is always trying to get rid of the FPÖ, and then has given this country a bad name, demonstrably run it down—he was one of the “chief denouncers” of Austrians and Austria in the course of forming the government. He will have to put up with criticism. That is simply the most essential thing in a democracy, and if he can’t cope with that, he’s worth nothing to a democracy.’


Haider, comment in Presse, 17 Mar. 2001:
‘I will not allow them to prevent me from criticizing a representa­tive of a religious community, when he declares war on a dem­ocratically elected government.’

(‘Ich lasse mir nicht verbieten, einen Repräsentanten einer Religionsgemeinschaft zu kritisieren, wenn dieser einer demo­kratisch gewählten Regierung den Krieg erklärt.’)

‘Dr Ariel Muzicant was one of those most responsible for the intolerable witch-hunt against our country after the formation of the FPÖ–ÖVP coalition.’

(‘Dr Ariel Muzicant war einer der Hauptverantwortlichen für die unerträgliche Hetze gegen unser Land nach Bildung der FPÖ/ÖVP-Koalition.’)

‘He has given interviews to foreign newspapers in which he passes judgement on Austria with incomprehensible rage and anger.’
(‘Er hat ausländischen Zeitungen Interviews gegeben, in denen er mit unverständlicher Wut und Zorn über Österreich urteilte.’)

‘He is cited as a witness in hate-mail against Austria from the World Jewish Congress.’
(‘Er wird in Hassbriefen des World Jewish Congress gegen Österreich als Zeuge zitiert.’)

‘He refuses to give his signature to an agreement which would finally make it possible to achieve just compensation for the victims of the Nazi period.’
(‘Er verweigerte seine Unterschrift auf einer Vereinbarung, die endlich den Opfern der NS-Zeit eine gerechte Entschädigung ermöglicht.’)

‘[Dr Muzicant] is not ashamed of writing off as “indecent” and insulting the majority of the people who gave him and his family a home when they were immigrants.’
(‘[Herr Dr. Muzicant] schämt sich nicht, die Mehrheit eines Volkes, das ihm und seiner Familie als Einwanderer eine Heimat gab, als “unanständig” abzuqualifizieren und zu beleiden.’)

‘For Mr Muzicant the applause of the enemies of Austria was more important.’
(‘Herrn Muzicant war der Applaus der Österreich-Feinde wichtiger.’)

Haider, 22 Mar. 2001 (reported in Der Standard, 23 Mar. 2001):
It is ‘unacceptable to denigrate one’s own country’. . . . It is precisely this, according to Haider, that Ariel Muzicant, the president of the Jewish religious community, has done, thereby showing an ‘attitude hostile to Austria’.
(Es sei ‘unstatthaft, das eigene Land schlecht zu machen’. . . . Ebendies, so Haider, habe der Präsident der israelitischen Kultusgemeinde, Ariel Muzicant, getan und so ‘österreichfeindliche Gesinnung’ demonstriert.)