Archard, David (2008) You have full text access to this contentInformed Consent: Autonomy and Self-Ownership. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 25 (1). pp. 19-34. ISSN 1468-5930Full text not available from this repository.
Using the example of an unconsented mouth swab I criticise the view that an action of this kind taken in itself is wrongful in respect of its being a violation of autonomy. This is so much inasmuch as autonomy merits respect only with regard to ‘critical life choices’. I consider the view that such an action is nevertheless harmful or risks serious harm. I also respond to two possible suggestions: that the action is of a kind that violates autonomy; and, that the class of such actions violates autonomy. I suggest that the action is wrongful in as much as it is a bodily trespass. I consider, and criticise, two ways of understanding how morally I stand to my own body: as owner and as sovereign. In respect of the latter I consider Arthur Ripstein's recent defence of a sovereignty principle. Finally I criticise an attempt by Joel Feinberg to explain bodily trespass in terms of personal autonomy.
|Journal or Publication Title:||Journal of Applied Philosophy|
|Subjects:||B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)|
|Departments:||Faculty of Arts & Social Sciences > Politics & International Relations (Merged into PPR 2010-08-01)|
|Deposited By:||Mrs Yaling Zhang|
|Deposited On:||08 Sep 2010 10:29|
|Last Modified:||25 May 2016 00:00|
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