Crawford, Sean (2004) Pure Russellianism. Philosophical Papers, 33 (2). pp. 171-202. ISSN 0556-8641Full text not available from this repository.
According to Russellianism, the content of a Russellian thought, in which a person ascribes a monadic property to an object, can be represented as an ordered couple of the object and the property. A consequence of this is that it is not possible for a person to believe that a is F and not to believe b is F, when a=b. Many critics of Russellianism suppose that this is possible and thus that Russellianism is false. Several arguments for this claim are criticized and it is argued that Russellians need not appeal to representational notions in order to defeat them. Contrary to popular opinion, the prospects for a pure Russellianism, a Russellianism without representations, are in fact very good.
|Journal or Publication Title:||Philosophical Papers|
|Subjects:||B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)|
|Departments:||Faculty of Arts & Social Sciences > Politics & International Relations (Merged into PPR 2010-08-01)|
|Deposited On:||03 Mar 2009 12:02|
|Last Modified:||08 May 2016 00:00|
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