Archard, David (2004) Wrongful Life. Philosophy, 79 (3). pp. 403-420. ISSN 0031-8191Full text not available from this repository.
I argue that it is wrong deliberately to bring into existence an individual whose life we can reasonably expect will be of very poor quality. The individual's life would on balance be worth living but would nevertheless fall below a certain threshold. Additionally the prospective parents are unable to have any other child who would enjoy a better existence. Against the claims of John Harris and John Robertson I argue that deliberately to conceive such a child would not be to exercise the right to procreate. For this right is internally constrained by the requirement that any resultant child has the reasonable prospect of a minimally decent life.
|Journal or Publication Title:||Philosophy|
|Additional Information:||The final, definitive version of this article has been published in the Journal, Philosophy, 79 (3), pp 403-420 2004, © 2004 Cambridge University Press.|
|Subjects:||B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)|
|Departments:||Faculty of Arts & Social Sciences > Politics & International Relations (Merged into PPR 2010-08-01)|
|Deposited By:||Professor David Archard|
|Deposited On:||28 Feb 2008 09:11|
|Last Modified:||21 Feb 2017 01:13|
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