U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Sino-U.S. Rapprochement in the Early 1970s:

A Study of Secrecy in Bureaucratic Politics

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Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
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June 2005
For my parents, Koki and Mieko Komine, and my brother, Yukihiro Komine
Declaration

This thesis is submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of Lancaster University.

I confirm that the views expressed in this thesis are solely my own except where otherwise indicated and that no part of the entire thesis has ever been submitted to higher degree of any other academic institution.

Signed:

Yukinori Komine

Date: January 13, 2005
Acknowledgements

During the research for and writing of this thesis from October 1997 to January 2005, I have benefited from assistance and generosity of a number of people in Britain, America, and Japan.

I would like to express my appreciation to the former and present members of the Department of Politics and International Relations at Lancaster University. I am indebted to Professor Ian Bellany, Mr. Gordon Hands, Dr. Gerd Nonneman, Dr. Alan Warburton, and Dr. Peter Wilkin for their comments on my research plans and draft chapters.

I am indebted to the former Directors of Research Studies at the Department of Politics and International Relations, Lancaster University, Professor Michael Dillon and Professor Ian Bellany, and the current Director Professor Mark Duffield. For granting me teaching assistantship, my special thanks go to the former Heads of the Department, Mr. Gordon Hands and Dr. Peter Wilkin, and the current Head of the Department, Professor David Denver. I am grateful for the Departmental Secretaries, Mrs. Clare Coxhill, Mrs. Trish Demery, and Mrs. Susan Riches, and the Departmental Officer Mrs. Maureen Worthington for their assistance and encouragement. I would like to record my gratitude to Ms. Eve Edmonds, Miss Ann McAleer, and Miss Becky Richards for proof-reading the manuscripts of my thesis and for offering me invaluable suggestions.

I would like to express my appreciation to Dr. Paul Stares, Director of Research and Studies Program, the United States Institute of Peace, who provided me a crucial opportunity of consultation which materialized a series of interviews with former U.S. officials. I am indebted to Dr. Gareth Davies, St Anne’s College, Oxford University, who has given me a number of advices for fieldwork in Oxford and Washington D.C.

I owe a special debt of gratitude to the following academic experts and former U.S. officials for their cooperation for interviews and correspondences: Professor Rosemary Foot, Dr. Evelyn Goh, Dr. Morton Halperin, Mr. Charles Kennedy, Ambassador Winton Lord, Mr. Peter Rodman, Professor David Shambaugh,
Ambassador Richard Solomon, Professor Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, and Professor Allen Whiting.

I would like to express my thanks to the support of a number of archivists and librarians in the following institutes: the National Archives, Archives II, Maryland; the Manuscript Division, the Library of Congress, Washington D.C.; the Special Collection Division, the Lauinger Library, Georgetown University, Washington D.C.; and The Rothermere American Institute, Vere Harmsworth Library, Oxford University, Oxford; the inter-library loans, Lancaster University Library.

I have benefited from the support and encouragement given by my friends and colleagues. My thanks go to: Cem Birsay, John Boyle, Jim Bowey, Estevao Cabral, Tom Colombino, Stewart Fraser, Ozge Girit, Juan Hall, Radhika Kanchana, Philipe Larcher, Al Lawson, Luis Lobo-Guerrero, Lillian Lopez, Vince Miller, Rob Moore, Beth Rempe, Athanasia Rodaki, Tracy Sartin, Graham Smith, Lee Smith, John Wiser, Ghulam Yar.

Finally, a special word of thanks must be reserved for my parents, Koki and Mieko Komine, and my brother, Yukihiko Komine, for their support over the last nine years in America, Britain, China, and Japan.

Yukinori Komine
Lancaster
June 27, 2005
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Abstract

This thesis examines the pursuit of strict secrecy by Nixon and Kissinger as the key feature of the U.S. rapprochement with China in the early 1970s. It was Nixon’s presidential leadership that drove the new China initiative, together with Kissinger as a skilful operator and negotiator. The centralization of power in the White House and the exclusion of the State Department from the direct decision-making process was a ‘diplomatic coup.’ Nixon and Kissinger over-emphasized the speed and effectiveness of the transformation in the China policy to counteract the danger of bureaucratic leaks and the possibility of a conservative backlash in American domestic politics.

At policy planning level, however, Nixon and Kissinger were still dependent on interdepartmental policy studies by the bureaucracy, mainly the NSC staff and the State Department in order to develop and implement the new China initiative. The National Security Study Memoranda (NSSMs) papers from 1969 to 1971 on the China policy were much more comprehensive and detailed than were previously estimated. Owing to the excessive secrecy, however, Nixon and Kissinger did not sufficiently use the multiple intelligence sources from the State Department to more effectively operate the China policy.

The resumption of the Warsaw Ambassadorial Talks in January and February 1970 was the first major breakthrough during the U.S. opening to China, officially clarifying the U.S. intention to promote a new dialogue with the People’s Republic of
China. On the other hand, the preparation for the Warsaw talks also revealed the difference between the White House and the State Department; while Nixon and Kissinger wanted to move faster to send a special envoy to Beijing and discuss major security issues directly with the Chinese leaders, the State Department’s Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs remained cautious, still seeking to obtain more substantial concessions on the Taiwan issue. From late 1970, without the State Department’s expertise, the White House sought to focus on the U.S.-Soviet-China triangular relationship and pursued back-channel communications with the Chinese through third parties, such as Pakistan and Romania.

In direct talks in July and October 1971, and February 1972, Nixon and Kissinger gave an assurance to the Chinese leaders for the U.S. withdrawal from Taiwan in relation to the negotiated settlement in Indochina. Simultaneously, Nixon and Kissinger sought to persuade the Chinese leaders that the remaining U.S. military presence in Asia would serve China’s security interests in order to contain the emergence of any other states, such as the Soviet Union, Japan, and India. This thesis concludes by assessing the rapprochement as the beginning of a long process to pursue pragmatic co-existence between the United States and China, neither as enemies nor as friends.
**Acronyms**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADST</td>
<td>Association of Diplomatic Studies and Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CF</td>
<td>Country Files</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>U.S. Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chicom</td>
<td>Chinese Communists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CWIHP</td>
<td>Cold War International History Project, Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>U.S. Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAOHC</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPF</td>
<td>For the President’s Files</td>
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<tr>
<td>FPF/Lord</td>
<td>For the President’s Files (Winston Lord)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRUS</td>
<td><em>Foreign Relations of the United States</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>Haig-File</td>
<td>Alexander M. Haig Special File</td>
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<tr>
<td>HAK</td>
<td>Henry A. Kissinger</td>
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<tr>
<td>HAK-ASF</td>
<td>Henry A. Kissinger Administrative &amp; Staff Files</td>
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<tr>
<td>HAKOF</td>
<td>Henry A. Kissinger Office Files</td>
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<tr>
<td>INR</td>
<td>Bureau of Intelligence and Research, U.S. Department of State</td>
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<tr>
<td>Memcon</td>
<td>Memorandum of Conversation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MemforP</td>
<td>Memoranda for the President</td>
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<tr>
<td>NA</td>
<td>U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, Archives II, College Park, Maryland</td>
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<tr>
<td>NF</td>
<td>Name Files</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPMS</td>
<td>Nixon Presidential Materials Staff</td>
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<td>NSA</td>
<td>National Security Archive, George Washington University, Washington D.C.</td>
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<td>NSC</td>
<td>U.S. National Security Council</td>
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<td>NSCF</td>
<td>National Security Council Files</td>
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<td>NSCIF</td>
<td>National Security Council Institutional Files</td>
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NSDM  National Security Decision Memorandum
NSSM  National Security Study Memorandum
P/HAK Memcons  Presidential/Henry A. Kissinger Memorandum of Conversations
POF  President’s Office Files
PPF  President’s Personal Files
PPS  Policy Planning Staff
PSF  President’s Speech Files
PTF  President’s Trip Files
RG 59  Record Group 59, General Records of the U.S. Department of State
RN  Richard M. Nixon
PRC  People’s Republic of China
ROC  Republic of China
ROM  Records of Meetings
SALT  Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SF  Subject Files
SNF  Subject-Numeric Files
STATE  U.S. Department of State
Telcon  Telephone Conversation
WHCF  White House Central Files
WHSF  White House Special Files
WSAG  Washington Special Action Group
A Note on Transliteration of Chinese Terms

In general, this study has used the Pinyin system of transliteration of most Chinese names and places. It uses the original forms regarding Wade-Giles spelling in direct quotations from primary documents. For example, the declassified transcripts and policy analysis papers wrote ‘Peking,’ ‘Mao Tse-tung,’ and ‘Chou En-lai,’ which the Pinyin transliteration system has rendered as ‘Beijing,’ ‘Mao Zedong,’ and ‘Zhou Enlai,’ respectively.

A Note on References and Footnotes

Following University Regulations, this study has chosen the system of references and footnotes of thesis in the style of Parenthetical References and References Lists as described in Kate L. Turabian’s *A Manual for Writing of Term Papers, Thesis, and Dissertation*, Sixth edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996). Quotation marks and inverted commas are used for direct quotations, unless otherwise noted. Underlinings are as in the originals. All the materials cited in footnotes are listed in the bibliography.
Introduction

1. The location of this study

This study examines the pursuit of strict secrecy by President Nixon and the National Security Adviser Kissinger in foreign policy decision-making as a principal characteristic in the U.S. rapprochement with China.\(^1\) It differs from previous major works because it makes substantial use of new archival materials in the Nixon Presidential Materials Staff and the State Department files in the National Archives and documents in the Library of Congress.\(^2\) Equally important, this study is also based on Komine’s interviews with former U.S. officials, and with senior academic experts on U.S.-China relations, and on oral histories, newspaper articles, and new website materials. The sources used in this work shed new light on the complexity and dynamism of the evolution of the new China initiative and demonstrate the existence of many policy options and different perspectives among U.S. officials.

From a theoretical point of view, Graham Allison examined the decision-making process of the Cuban Missile Crisis as a case study in crisis management. This study perceives the foreign policy decision-making mechanisms in the U.S. rapprochement with China as a case study of a ‘diplomatic coup’ by Nixon and Kissinger. Together, they centralized power within the White House and sought to exclude the State Department from the direct decision-making process. While the so-called ‘rational

\(^1\) ‘Rapprochement’ is a term of French origin, which implies 1) a coming together again in friendship of former enemies, and 2) the reconciliation, restoration, and renewal of relations, especially between states. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, New edition (Essex: Longman, 1991). In particular, the term ‘rapprochement’ is often used to describe the U.S. opening to China, namely the development of U.S. initial diplomatic contact with China from January 1969 to June 1971, which resulted in Kissinger’s trips to Beijing in July and October 1971, and Nixon’s trip to China in February 1972. ‘Normalization’ implies a much longer political process toward the establishment of U.S. official diplomatic relations with China in January 1979.

\(^2\) The year 1997 marked the 25th anniversary of Nixon’s trip to China. Therefore, historians anticipated that U.S. official documents on the opening to China would be declassified in the following years. This study (from October 1997 to January 2005) has examined both new publications and declassified documents. A survey of published works and new documents are conducted in the following sections.
actor model" perceives the government as a unitary actor with agreed-goals to be attained, the alternative "bureaucratic politics model" emphasizes government as the representative of diverse interests. On the basis of the rational actor model, the conventional interpretation of the U.S. rapprochement with China emphasizes the importance of the strategic and geopolitical calculations for the development of the balance of power between the U.S., the Soviets, and China. On the basis of the bureaucratic politics model, this study examines how the pursuit of strict secrecy by Nixon and Kissinger affected the rivalry between the White House and the State Department over the devising and implementing the new China initiative.

Owing to personal distrust of the Washington bureaucracy and their high sensitivity to the danger of leakages (especially by the State Department and also by U.S. allies), Nixon and Kissinger centralized power and operated foreign policy from the White House. They were also afraid of the conservative backlash by the pro-Nationalist China lobby in Congress against a new initiative toward Beijing. Following the Korean War and two decades of mutual hostility, the only formal communication between the United States and China was via ambassadorial talks in Warsaw. Thus, in addition to the exchange of a number of public signals, Nixon and Kissinger privately used the so-called "back-channel" - "a direct negotiation through White House communications, bypassing regular diplomatic channels and forums" - through third

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3 Graham Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Little Brown, 1971), pp.4-7. Allison suggests three models for the analysis of foreign policy decision-making analysis: 1) the rational actor model - an examination of purposive and reasonable actions by a unified national government; 2) the organizational model - an exploration of the pattern and operating procedure of organizational behavior; and 3) the bureaucratic politics model - an analysis of a resultant of various bargaining process among players within national government. Chapter 2 of this thesis examines these concepts within the context of the revitalization of the National Security Council system.

4 Strengths and weaknesses of specific examples are reviewed in the following section. Kissinger's views on the balance of power in theory and in practice are discussed in Chapter 1.
parties, such as Pakistan and Romania, to communicate with the Chinese leaders. In essence, Nixon and Kissinger valued the efficiency and speed of these back-channel communications.

On a global level, Nixon and Kissinger believed that because of the deepening Sino-Soviet rift, the opening to Beijing would make Moscow become more cooperative with Washington in arms control talks. On a regional level, they sought to explore the opportunity to use China’s influence on North Vietnam to promote a negotiated settlement in the Vietnam War. As Kissinger repeatedly stressed, the U.S. rapprochement with China marked the beginning of a new relationship, the so-called ‘strategic triangle’ between the United States, the Soviet Union, and China, which they saw as a means of restoring stability in the international system.

Nixon and Kissinger operated within a certain time frame – they wanted to see the realization of rapprochement with China before the presidential election in 1972. They sought to obtain credit for an historic breakthrough, dramatically ending two decades of hostility with Beijing. Nixon envisioned that the opening to China would earn him international credit as a peace-maker, and thus significantly enhance his domestic political support. At the same time, after his secret trip to Beijing in July 1971, Kissinger sought to establish international prestige as a great diplomat in an era of negotiation. Together, Nixon and Kissinger wanted the China breakthrough to come as a “great headline,” calculating that “public excitement would sweep away a lot of the uncertainty, suspicion, hostility, [and] criticism that might otherwise have accrued.”

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Nixon stressed the need for secrecy because "the more we had to put things into words, the less freedom of movement we would have in our dealings with the Chinese." Kissinger also explained defensively that owing to the "delicacy of the event," the "uniqueness of the opportunity," and the unforeseeable outcome, it was essential for the United States to be in control of the presentation of the China initiative. "[W]e did not want to risk inflating expectations, generating pressures, and forcing the two sides to take public positions before the results were known." Thus, as Bundy and Isaacson suggest, the pursuit of secrecy for the China initiative was necessary and could be justified because of the danger of leaks, possible conservative opposition, and finally bureaucratic pressure to seek concessions.

In reality, however, Nixon and Kissinger's strict secrecy caused a number of serious problems, both internally and externally. At the operational level, Nixon and Kissinger reformed the National Security Council as the President's principal forum for foreign policy decision-making. However, as Allen Whiting suggests, the revitalized NSC system was "very secretive at the top" and thus highly personalized. Nixon did not share some information with Kissinger. Together, Nixon and Kissinger did not share their intentions and agenda with other senior officials within the administration. Kissinger's NSC staff was "very small" and "closely held." On the other hand, Nixon and Kissinger still relied on bureaucratic expertise, especially that of State Department officials and NSC staff members. However, owing to the

12 Ibid.
obsession with secrecy and the resulting limitation of expert advice in the decision-making mechanism, Nixon and Kissinger failed to understand the subtle and symbolic signals that China was sending in the attempt to promote a new dialogue.  

Nixon and Kissinger, because of their highly personalized use of the foreign policy decision-making machinery, also caused unnecessary confusion and friction within the bureaucracy. Former NSC staff member, Morton H. Halperin, recalls that Kissinger “manipulated” the NSC staff and “dealt with each one separately and instructed them not to tell anyone else what they were doing. Often he had two people working on the same issue without telling them.”\textsuperscript{14} The problems arose as Nixon and Kissinger “wanted to operate without talking to the cabinet members.”\textsuperscript{15} Thus, Nixon and Kissinger did not make sufficient use of multiple intelligence resources to develop and operate the China policy more effectively. As Rosemary Foot argues, it also appears that Nixon and Kissinger introduced a number of ideas without attempting “to discover the kinds of policies toward China that had [previously] been advocated.”\textsuperscript{16} Finally, the lack of sufficient communication between the White House and the State Department increased the perception gap between them for a new China policy.

On the international level, Nixon and Kissinger, because of their desire for secrecy, underestimated the importance of the U.S.’s regular diplomatic channels with its allies, especially the Republic of China and Japan. In comparison, while the White House was principally interested in improving relations with its adversaries, the State Department was concerned about coordinating U.S. relations with its allies, especially the Republic of China and Japan. Finally, despite the initial excitement created, the

\textsuperscript{13} David Shambaugh, Interview with Komine, October 8, 2003. Specific examples are discussed in Chapters 3, 4, and 5.
\textsuperscript{14} Morton Halperin, Interview with Komine, May 11, 2004.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{16} Rosemary Foot, Interview with Komine, July 13, 2004.
opening to China did not necessarily bring as many positive outcomes as Nixon and Kissinger had hoped: Beijing’s ability to influence Hanoi to accept a negotiated settlement in the Vietnam War was limited, and the U.S.-Soviet arms control talks made relatively limited progress. In essence, Nixon and Kissinger tended to impose the simplified global framework of a U.S.-Soviet-PRC strategic triangle on complex and subtle regional issues, such as the future of Taiwan’s status, the future of Japan’s role, and the India-Pakistan rivalry.

Accordingly, in order to establish the basis of synthesis, it should be clarified how the advantages and disadvantages of the pursuit of secrecy by Nixon and Kissinger in U.S. rapprochement with China have been examined so far.

2. Literature review

For almost three decades, a number of former officials, scholars, and journalists have attempted to present a more rounded and informative picture of the U.S. rapprochement with China. The existing literature can be divided into the following categories17:

- Chronological descriptions of the opening to China (including chapters in early biographies of Nixon and of Kissinger) by journalists and by former

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officials, based on unidentified interviews and leaks, published during the 1970s.


- Critical analyses of the opening process by journalists, based on extensive interviews with former officials and other unidentified leaks, published during the 1980s.

- Scholarly analyses of the U.S. rapprochement with China in relation to the concept of détente, published from the late 1970s to the late 1980s.

- Memoirs of former officials, published since the early 1990s.

- Highly critical accounts of the U.S. opening to China (including chapters in new biographies of Nixon and of Kissinger) by journalists, based on limited private access to classified primary documents and the private papers of former officials, published since the early 1990s.

- Scholarly reassessments of the long-term importance of U.S. rapprochement with China beyond the Cold War context, published since the early 1990s.

- Recent publications on the Chinese side based on new archival materials.18

During the 1970s, journalists and former U.S. officials, such as Marvin Kalb and Bernard Kalb (1974), Safire (1975), Price (1977), Morris (1977), Szulc (1978),

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Haldeman (1978), and Walters (1978), all contributed to the chronological description of the U.S. rapprochement with China within the Cold War context. The main focus of these works was the exploration of the secret diplomatic process of U.S. rapprochement with China from January 1969 to July 1971. The early works in the 1970s revealed many facts, such as the exchange of subtle diplomatic signals from 1969 to 1971, the back-channel communications with the Chinese through Pakistan and Romania, as well as Kissinger's secret trip to Beijing via Pakistan. It was Kissinger's role as a policy operator and negotiator in secret diplomacy that formed the focus for the literature that followed in the 1980s.

However, without substantive access to primary documentary sources, the studies in the 1970s were mostly journalistic descriptions based on unidentified interviews and leaks. There were no detailed and precise references to where the information was obtained, and so these works were challenged on the ground of reliability. For example, it was not entirely clear how accurate some accounts of conversations between Nixon and Kissinger were. In particular, these studies acknowledged the importance of Nixon's presidential leadership; however, they did not stress it, perhaps owing to the continuing negative impact of the Watergate scandal. These works also pointed out Kissinger's unfamiliarity with China, but failed to provide sufficient evidences to back this up. Finally, owing to their emphasis on Kissinger's operational role and his secret trip to Beijing, these early works overlooked the importance of Nixon's presidential trip to China in February 1972. This study overcomes these limitations by examining the direct negotiations between the two sides in July and

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October 1971 and February 1972, on the basis of substantial direct access to new archival materials.

In their respective memoirs, Nixon and Kissinger both claim credit for initiating the U.S. rapprochement with China. Nixon (1978) stressed his presidential leadership in making a decision to "pull China back into the community of nations." He emphasized his role in making public statements and giving interviews with the media as subtle diplomatic signals toward Beijing. Nixon also stressed his personal initiatives to establish the backchannels through Pakistan and Romania in October 1970 to communicate with the Chinese leaders. In particular, he selectively revealed the contents of private letters exchanged between the U.S. and the Chinese through the Pakistan backchannel from late 1970 to mid-1971. Finally, Nixon put strong emphasis on his leadership in the breakthrough in July 1971 and his presidential trip to China in February 1972. These were the trips that ended two decades of mutual hostility between the U.S. and China.

However, the China section in Nixon's memoirs is very short (only 36 pages), and ignores possible contributions from other senior officials in his administration. Nixon stated only that the Chinese "ignored the low-level signals" which the United States sent during 1969 and that it was not until 1970 that the U.S. "began a serious approach" to open dialogue with China. Thus, the Nixon memoirs failed to explore his administration's early efforts, especially those by the State Department from early 1969 to the resumption of the Warsaw ambassadorial talks in January and February 1970, to develop policy options in order to begin communications with the Chinese. He completely ignored NSC meetings on China policy and consultations with his

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21 Ibid., p.545.
advisors, and even failed to refer to most of Kissinger’s briefings and memos. Finally, he failed to describe any details about his own private preparations for his trip to China. Overall, Nixon’s memoirs stress the importance of his presidential leadership without going into details of the policy development process within his administration. This thesis examines the development of Nixon’s view on China before 1969 in greater depth, and the roles of other important officials and details of the development of America’s China policy from 1969 to 1971 will also be analyzed.

Kissinger (1979) analyzes the U.S. rapprochement with China within the context of the development of strategic triangular relations between the United States, China, and the Soviet Union. He repeatedly stresses the importance of Realpolitik and the balance of power. Kissinger criticizes China experts (both in the bureaucracy and in academia) and the liberals who failed to recognize the opportunity for the U.S. to exercise leverage within the Sino-Soviet relationship. His memoirs provide the most detailed chronological description of the evolution of a highly centralized National Security Council system. He discusses the public and secret signal-exchange processes between the U.S. and the Chinese from January 1969 to June 1971; his trips to Beijing in July and October 1971; and the February 1972 summit. In particular, Kissinger emphasizes the importance of the Sino-Soviet border clashes from March to September 1969. He also describes the possible impact of the U.S. opening to China on the promotion of a negotiated settlement in Vietnam. The first volume of Kissinger’s memoirs, followed by the second volume (1982) which covers Nixon’s

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second term, presented the overall geo-strategic context, as well as the detailed operational process of the U.S. rapprochement with China.\textsuperscript{23}

However, Kissinger over-states the importance of his role in the opening to China. He creates the impression that he independently came to realize the necessity and possibility of the opening to China during the early period from 1968 to 1969.\textsuperscript{24} He exaggerates his contribution in the exploration of U.S. leverage in Sino-Soviet hostilities, and he over-stresses the speed and degree of his understanding of the implications of the Sino-Soviet border clashes. Moreover, Kissinger downgrades other senior officials' contributions to the issues, such as Taiwan and the resumption of the Warsaw ambassadorial talks in January and February 1970. He also understates the NSC staff members' expertise in drafting briefing papers before his trips to Beijing in July and October 1971, as well as Nixon's trip to China in February 1972. Overall, he over-exaggerates his intellectual and operational input without sufficiently assessing the importance of contributions from other officials within the administration. This thesis adopts a more comprehensive approach by examining the development of Kissinger's views on China before 1969. The influence of bureaucratic and academic expertise on Kissinger's views on the Sino-Soviet border clashes of 1969 will be examined by means of a comparative analysis of the published memoirs of former U.S. diplomats, oral history collections, interviews, and new archival materials.

\textsuperscript{23} In the third volume of his memoirs, Kissinger (1999) presents his latest reflections on the Nixon presidency, including the development of the National Security Council system and the China initiative. He also conducts detailed and often defensive descriptions of the Ford administration's China policy from August 1974 to January 1977. In short, Kissinger's third volume of memoirs is intended partly to counter the anticipated criticisms from new publications. Henry A. Kissinger, \textit{Years of Renewal} (New York: Little Brown, 1999).

\textsuperscript{24} In reality, however, Kissinger was originally an expert on European power politics. Therefore, it could be argued that Kissinger's interests, knowledge, and experience on China were limited in 1969. This subject is discussed in detail in Chapter 1, Section 2.
Since the early 1980s, what Nixon and Kissinger over-estimated, under-valued, and omitted in their respective memoirs has been widely publicized by journalists and former officials. Hersh (1983) provides a highly critical account of the development of the National Security Council system, revealing how Nixon and Kissinger secretly sought to centralize the power in the NSC system and to run foreign policy from the White House. Hersh’s detailed description of the rapprochement with China is highly critical of Kissinger’s role, as it gives some examples of his intellectual insecurity regarding Asia, and particularly China. Having interviewed a number of former officials, including NSC staff members and State Department diplomats, Hersh shows how other senior officials and bureaucrats made contributions to the development of the U.S. initiative toward China from January 1969 to July 1971. For example, he points out the development of the differences between the Kissinger NSC and the State Department on the speed in establishing direct communication with the Chinese after the Warsaw ambassadorial talks in February 1970.

Garthoff (1985, 1994) provides a detailed survey of the process of the U.S. opening to China from January 1969 to July 1971, which is much clearer than Kissinger’s lengthy and often confusing account. Importantly, the signal-exchange process was even more complicated than Nixon and Kissinger had previously explained. Because of the exclusion of the State Department’s expertise from the policy-making process, resulting in an unbalanced analytical basis, key U.S. officials occasionally misunderstood Chinese intentions and sometimes even failed to grasp implications of messages from Beijing. Consequently, Nixon and Kissinger delayed the process of

upgrading the diplomatic communications with the Chinese, especially after the collapse of the Warsaw Ambassadorial talks in early 1970.

On the other hand, neither Hersh nor Garthoff had sufficient access to primary documentary sources, as this study will demonstrate. Hersh too often stresses the negative aspects of the Nixon-Kissinger pursuit of secrecy, and thus creates an impression that is journalistic, and even sensational, rather than historical and analytical. Although more balanced in his analysis and highly revealing regarding the behind-the-scenes preparations for the opening initiative, Garthoff fails to analyze NSC policy studies in sufficient details. Because their main focus is on criticizing the problems of Kissinger's memoirs, neither Hersh nor Garthoff conducts sufficient analysis of Nixon's presidential role in the opening to China; they are especially weak on the process by which Nixon's interest in China policy developed. Being principally based on private interviews, and occasionally on some unidentified sources, their studies are weak in the analysis of precise examples of the expertise contributions from the State Department and NSC staff members. Hersh and Garthoff reveal important issues which were the subject of Kissinger's secret talks with Zhou in July 1971, such as the intelligence briefings of Soviet military deployment along the Sino-Soviet border areas; however, Hersh and Garthoff give little coverage of Kissinger's official visit to Beijing in October 1971 and Nixon's trip to China in February 1972. Overall, despite the lack of substantial access to primary documents, Hersh and Garthoff created a counterargument against what is claimed in Kissinger's memoirs. This study will re-examine specific points in their criticism of Kissinger's memoirs on the basis of new sources.
From the late 1970s to the late 1980s, many scholars, such as Bell (1977), Hoffmann (1978), Gaddis (1982), Litwak (1984), and Schulzinger (1989), have conducted more systematic and critical analyses of the Nixon-Kissinger global strategy of political-military retrenchment, including détente and the Nixon Doctrine, and the rapprochement with China. In order to assess the key concepts in Kissinger’s political realism, such as legitimacy, equilibrium, and balance of power, these scholars conduct a detailed analysis of his early writings. Within the changing international system, characterized by the loosening of rigid military and ideological bipolarity and the development of political and economic multipolarity, Kissinger urged the need to recognize the multidimensional nature of power in the world and the limits of U.S. power resources to continue an open-ended containment of Communism. These scholars critically analyzed Kissinger’s conceptual approach toward the U.S. opening to China, which was still weak in military, political, and economic terms, rather than details of the opening process. Within the Cold War context, these scholarly studies made a useful contribution to the clarification of the conceptual framework underlying the U.S. opening to China.

The limitation of these scholarly works is that they examine the opening to China mainly in relation to Sino-Soviet mutual hostility, and thus fail to address the China policy independently in a broader historical context. Although they refer to the U.S. withdrawal from Indochina, they do not fully examine the implications of the U.S. rapprochement with China in the context of East Asian regional security. In particular, these works do not analyze specific security issues between the two sides. Finally,

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owing to their main focus on Kissinger, they fail to analyze the importance of Nixon’s presidential leadership.

In the 1990s, many more former U.S. officials, such as Haig (1992), Green, Stokes, and Holdridge (1994), Haldeman (1994), and Holdridge (1997) began to describe their experiences in more detail; they provided a more comprehensive understanding of the operational process of U.S. rapprochement with China.\textsuperscript{27} Despite the deliberate and systematic exclusion of the State Department, Nixon and Kissinger depended heavily on it, especially the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, headed by Assistant Secretary Marshall Green, for a number of policy studies. Moreover, a number of officials and regional experts directly and indirectly contributed to the formulation of China policy without knowing the real intentions of Nixon and Kissinger. The memoirs of former diplomats reveal some of the ways in which Nixon and Kissinger secretly made use of bureaucratic studies within the National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) process.

Though he was the dominant intellectual on the NSC staff, Kissinger was less at home as an administrator. Thus, while Nixon preferred to avoid face-to-face meetings with other senior officials, Kissinger greatly benefited from Haig’s bureaucratic experience as well as from Haldeman’s role as intermediary in dealing with the State Department. As the White House Chief of Staff, Haldeman was present when Nixon and Kissinger held private discussions about China policy. Thus, Haldeman’s diaries

provide very useful records about precisely when Nixon and Kissinger discussed China policy.

While maintaining low profiles, NSC staff members such as Winston Lord played a crucial role in the day-to-day operation of the China policy. NSC staff regional experts, such as John Holdridge, Richard Smyser, and Richard Solomon, provided expertise in policy studies; they prepared detailed briefing papers prior to Kissinger’s trips to Beijing and Nixon’s trip to China. There was bureaucratic rivalry among U.S. officials with different views on the priority of issues in the U.S. relations with China. For example, there was disagreement between the NSC staff and State Department officials, and also between China experts and Soviet experts within the State Department over the timing and agenda of a new China initiative.28

The memoirs published in the 1990s, however, had only limited access to primary documentary materials. Haig’s memoirs are principally based on his interpretation of events about U.S. China policy. In the Haldeman diaries, the China issue began to appear from late 1970 to early 1971, and it is not entirely clear how the China policy was discussed in the period from early 1969 to early 1970. The memoirs of NSC staff members and of State Department officials are partly based on the edited excerpts of the Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection of the Association of Diplomatic Studies and Training (ADST).29 Thus, the originals of the collection should be examined to develop a more detailed and balanced analysis of the U.S. rapprochement with China.

In particular, crucial meetings on major events during the U.S. opening to China, such as the Nixon-Kissinger private meetings in the Oval Office and NSC meetings also needs to be examined on the basis of new archival materials, such as memoranda of conversations and the Nixon White House Tapes. The development of Nixon’s

28 Specific examples are examined in the main chapters.
29 Details are discussed in the Section 3.1.
personal interest in China prior to 1969 as well as the uncertainty of Kissinger about Asia and China in 1968 and 1969 should be examined in more detail. Equally important, much more substantial analysis needs to be conducted on concrete examples of bureaucratic and operational problems during the opening to China. There should also be an analysis of the specific roles and contributions of the NSC staff members and the State Department officials.

Since the early 1990s, a growing number of journalists and historians, such as Isaacson (1992), Bundy (1998), Mann (1999), and Tyler (1999), have examined new documentary sources on the U.S. rapprochement with China, creating more critical and revealing studies. Isaacson (1992) described Kissinger's personality, including a critique of his secretive operational and negotiating style. Isaacson's work was based on a number of interviews, including one with Kissinger himself. Moreover, Bundy (1998), a historian and former Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs in the Johnson Administration, conducted a critical analysis of Nixon-Kissinger foreign policy. Bundy's work is based on extensive personal interviews as well as on the Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection of the ADST. In particular, Bundy stresses the importance of the question of Japan's strategic position in East Asia as one of the major issues during the Kissinger-Zhou talks in July and October 1971. Mann (1999) examines the evolution of the U.S.-PRC relations as tacit allies in the 1970s. Mann's work is based on the declassified documents collected at National Security Archive (NSA), some excerpts of Nixon's handwritten notes before and

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31 Bundy served as the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs from March 1964 to May 1969.
during his trip to China in February 1972 collected from the National Archives, and the Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection of ADST. Tyler (1999) conducted a more detailed analysis of the development of Sino-Soviet border clashes in 1969 and the subsequent development of U.S.-USSR-PRC strategic triangle. Tyler’s work is based on declassified documents obtained through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, document files at the NSA (a collection of 15,000 pages), and the State Department’s record entitled: “Private Statements Made by PRC Leaders to Secretary Kissinger or President Nixon Regarding the Peaceful Liberation of Taiwan” which covers the period from 1971 to 1974.

The above listed works from the 1990s, however, fail to explore adequately the security environment of the Asia-Pacific region in the late 1960s and the early 1970s. Moreover, although these authors have conducted interviews and had access to archival sources, more substantial research needs to be done on the originals of the so-called ‘Nixon Papers’ at the National Archives. More research is also needed on the updated originals of the Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection of ASDT.

One of the major trends among scholars, such as Harding (1992), Ross (1995), Foot (1995), and Garver (1997), since the 1990s has been to re-assess Nixon’s opening to China within the context of the long-term development of U.S.-PRC relations from the early 1970s to the late 1990s.\(^\text{32}\) As the Cold War ended, the triangular relationship between the U.S., the USSR, and the PRC decreased its importance as the principal issue in the study of U.S.-China relations. Instead, Taiwan’s status became more

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significant as a major conflicting issue between the U.S. and China. For example, using primary sources on the U.S. as well as the Chinese side, Ross (1995) argued that Kissinger’s underestimation of Taiwan obscured the reality of Sino-U.S. relations. Taiwan was the most contentious issue in U.S.-PRC relations throughout the 1970s and 1980s, requiring continuous negotiations and adjustment. Garver (1997) examined how relations with Chinese Nationalists played an important role in U.S. strategy for splitting the Sino-Soviet bloc and containing the revolutionary expansion of Communist China from the 1950s to the 1960s. Foot (1995) emphasized the importance of a much wider conceptual framework in the U.S. attempt to integrate China into the international community through the practice of “structural power” – the establishment of multiple international interactions with China strategically, commercially, intellectually, and militarily.33

However, substantial primary documents on the rapprochement issue were not available for those scholars. Because of this, there has not been sufficient analysis of aspects of the policy-making process, such as the contributions from the NSC staff and the State Department in drafting policy option papers, as well as the bureaucratic rivalry between the two institutions regarding the China initiative. Thus, more analysis is needed of other major security issues discussed by U.S. and Chinese officials, such as the Vietnam War, the Soviet military threat, Japan’s future role, and India-Pakistan rivalry.

The most recent works by biographers and historians, such as Reeves (2001), Ross and Jiang (2001), Hanhimaki (2004), and Goh (2004), are based on new archival materials. The volume by Ross and Jiang includes some chapters on the development of American domestic debate on China and the resumption of the Warsaw ambassadorial talks. Their works are based on archival materials declassified up to 2001. Reeves sought to provide a detailed chronological description to "reconstruct the Nixon presidency as it looked from the center." He examined Nixon’s talks with foreign leaders and senior officials in his administration during the opening to China. He also emphasizes how preoccupied Nixon was with the White House staff’s news summaries of major events, such as his trips to Asia and Romania in 1969, the Ping Pong diplomacy in April 1971, and the presidential announcement for his trip to China in July 1971. Hanhimaki’s new biography of Kissinger, the first major reassessment since Isaacson’s work, conducted a comparative analysis of Kissinger on the one hand as a skilful diplomat and on the other as a bureaucratic manipulator obsessed with secrecy. Regarding U.S. China policy, Hanhimaki’s interest is in Kissinger’s role in the development of the Washington-Moscow-Beijing strategic triangle. Thus, he overlooks the roles of the State Department and of the NSC staff members; he also fails to examine sufficiently the impact of the new China initiative in the Asia-Pacific region. While Reeves and Hanhimaki reassessed the political careers of the respective leaders in a broad context, this study examines the similarities and differences between Nixon and Kissinger regarding their China initiative in particular.


35 Reeves, President Nixon, p.13.
Goh’s work is the latest study on the U.S. rapprochement with China, based on archival materials declassified up to 2001.\textsuperscript{36} She argues that as Sino-U.S. relations were restored, China moved from being regarded as America’s most implacable enemy to a friend and tacit ally. Goh claims further that although the previously existing accounts of the rapprochement focus on the shifting balance of power between the U.S., the Soviet Union, and China, they cannot sufficiently explain the timing and policy choices related to Washington’s decisions for reconciliation with Beijing. Instead, she demonstrates that ideas of reconciliation with China were already being debated widely within U.S. official circles during the 1960s. Realizing the importance of that broad political context suggested by Goh, this study pays particular attention to the development of Nixon’s early view on China. While sharing the view that the U.S. and China became tacit allies in the 1970s, this study disagrees with Goh’s argument that China became a friend of the United States. In spite of the development of a cordial atmosphere, U.S. relations with China remained based on unsentimental calculations of utility for the maintenance of U.S. centrality in the international security.

Overall, it is possible to undertake a more detailed analysis of U.S. rapprochement with China than the above works because this study has substantial access to new archival materials which had been declassified until December 2004.

\textsuperscript{36} This study has conducted a comparative analysis of its approach and Goh’s approach by accessing the following sources: Evelyn (Chui-Ling) Goh, “From ‘Red Menace’ to ‘Tacit’ Ally: Constructing the Rapprochement with China, 1961-1974,” PhD thesis, Nuffield College, Oxford University, 2001; and Evelyn Goh, Correspondence with Komine, August 2, 2004.
3. Sources

3.1. Overview

In November and December 1976, Henry Kissinger donated his papers from his time at the White House and the State Department to the Library of Congress. He requested that they be classified either until 5 years after his death or 25 years later – 2001, whichever came later. Over 90 percent of the papers in the so-called ‘Kissinger Papers’ are the copies of the originals from the files of the State Department, the Nixon Presidential Materials Staff at National Archives II, and the Ford Library. The only exceptions are the transcripts of Kissinger’s telephone conversations, which the U.S. Supreme Court in 1980 ruled to be private.

On August 9, 2001, the State Department announced that Kissinger returned to them the copies of approximately 10,000 pages of the transcripts of his telephone conversations conducted during his term as Secretary of State (September 1973-January 1977). On February 11, 2002, Kissinger returned to the National Archives and Record Administration’s custody the copies of the transcripts of telephone conversations from his earlier years as the National Security Adviser to President Nixon (January 1969-September 1973). In May 2002, the National Archives released 107,200 pages of documents from the National Security Council Files of the Nixon Presidential Materials Staff. In July 2003, the National Archives also released

37 Bruce Kirby, Manuscript Reference Librarian, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Discussion with Komine, October 7, 2003. See also Burr (ed.), The Kissinger Transcripts, pp. x-xi.
38 It was the years of efforts made by the NSA that encouraged the State Department to seek this return. See Archive Hails Turnover of Kissinger Papers: GWU Group Persuades State Department to Recover Telephone Transcripts, NSA. (http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/news/20010809)
39 Archive Hails Turnover of Kissinger Telecons: GWU Group Persuades National Archives to Recover Telephone Transcripts, NSA. (http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/news/20020211/index2.html)
the National Security Council Institutional Files. In May 2004, the National Archives released approximately 20,000 declassified pages of Kissinger’s private collection at the Library of Congress.

In October 2004, the CIA’s Historical Review Group released a number of National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) concerning China. The National Intelligence Council (NIC) produced and published this collection. Its works ranged from brief analyses of current issues to broader estimates of major trends in the world.

At the current stage of writing (January 2005), the U.S. official documentary records during the Nixon Presidency (1969-1974) *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)* have not been published in their entirety with the exception of some volumes, such as *FRUS, Volume I: Foreign Policy Foundations of the Nixon administration from 1969 to 1972; and Volume V: United Nations, 1969-1972.* This study has also used *FRUS* volumes on China covering periods from the late 1940s to the late 1960s.

Other U.S. Governmental publications, such as *Public Papers of the President of the United States* and *Bulletins of the Department of State* include record of speeches, press releases, press conferences, and interviews. President Nixon’s and Kissinger’s background briefings to the press are very useful information sources on the intellectual assumptions underlying U.S. China policy. Finally, newspaper sources,

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42 The Kissinger Telcons, NA. (http://www.archives.gov/nixon/kissinger/index.html)
43 The China Collection, Central Intelligence Agency. (http://www.foia.cia.gov/china_collection.asp)
44 Tracking the Dragon: Selected National Intelligence Estimates on China, 1948-1976, National Intelligence Council, CD-ROM (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004). This study also obtained the NIEs' documents, which were transmitted to the NSC files and the State Department files, at National Archives.
45 For the proposed list of the volumes, see U.S. State Department, Office of the Historian, *Foreign Relations of the United States Series, 1969-72, The Nixon Administration.* (http://state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon_em/)
such as *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post*, are used to follow the media’s coverage of major policy announcements and developments.

3.2. Published declassified documents

An increasing number of declassified primary documents collected and published by historians have made contributions to the development of a more comprehensive description of the U.S. rapprochement with China.\(^4^6\)

William Burr, an archivist of the National Security Archive, has had access to the State Department Files (Record Group 59, especially Winston Lord’s files) at the National Archives; and he had collected a number of cables as well as some transcripts of the conversations between Kissinger and Chinese officials from 1971 to 1977 (including the transcript of the Nixon-Mao talks on February 21, 1972).\(^4^7\)

The NSA possesses the copies of some of the now declassified documents on the Sino-Soviet border clashes from March to September 1969, the development of back-channels with China through the intermediaries, namely Pakistan and Romania, the transcripts of the Kissinger-Zhou talks in July and October 1971, the transcripts of the Zhou-Haig talks in January 1972, and the transcripts of the Nixon-Zhou talks in February 1972.\(^4^8\) Taking into account the release of the above-listed copies and excerpts, this study has made direct access to a number of originals at the U.S. National Archives.


\(^4^8\) See the Bibliography, Section 4. ‘Published Documentary Materials on Websites.’
3.3. A survey of new archival materials

The principal archival source of this study is the National Archives and Records Administration (NA), Archives II, College Park, Maryland.49

Nixon Presidential Materials Staff (NPMS)

The National Security Council Files (NSCF)

Subject Files (SF) include National Security Study Memoranda (NSSMs), the subsequent NSSM papers, and National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDMs). The files also include memoranda from Kissinger to Nixon as well as memoranda of conversations involving Nixon and Kissinger.

President’s Trip Files (PTF) include records of Nixon’s trip to Europe from February to March 1969, including meetings with De Gaulle in March 1969; and records of Nixon’s trip to Asia from late July to early August 1969, including his

49 For Nixon’s pre-presidential papers, and post-presidential papers, the Nixon Library & Birthplace is the only presidential library which is not U.S. government-sponsored, owing to Nixon’s resignation as a result of the Watergate scandal. The materials on China policy in the Nixon Library are rather thin. Julian Kirstin, Archivist, The Richard Nixon Library & Birthplace, Correspondence with Komine, May 11, 2004; Nancy Tucker, Interview with Komine, October 1, 2003; Rosemary Foot, Interview with Komine, July 13, 2004; and Evelyn Goh, Correspondence with Komine, August 2, 2004. Documents on Nixon’s pre-presidential period were thus obtained from the Transition Files in the National Security Council Files, Nixon Presidential Materials Staff, National Archives. FRUS volumes on China include a number of documents from Nixon’s Vice-presidency era. For Nixon’s speeches and interviews on China during the 1960s, this study consulted newspaper articles. Komine’s interviews with former NSC staff members also provide new evidence for Nixon’s interest in China before 1969. Finally, the Congressional bill signed by President George W. Bush in earlier 2004 will allow for the move of President Nixon’s White House papers and records from the National Archives’ storage facilities in Maryland to the Nixon Library in Yorba Linda in February 2006. The transfer will christen the Nixon Library as part of the official system of Presidential libraries. Bulletin from Yorba Libra: Nixon Papers On The Road To Yorba Linda, December 10, 2004. On March 10, 2005, however, sixteen historians asked Congress to suspend plans for the transfer of the Nixon tapes and files from the National Archives in College Park, Maryland to the Yorba Linda facility. The historians informed the members of the U.S. Senate and House committees on appropriations that “The unprofessional behavior of the Nixon Library leadership calls into question that institution’s fitness to join the Presidential Library system.” “Historians Ask Congress to Suspend Nixon Transfer,” National Security Archive Update, March 10, 2005.
announcement of the Nixon Doctrine on July 25, 1969. The files also include the records of the preparations for Nixon’s trip to China from July 1971 to January 1972, and the records of Nixon’s trip to China in February 1972.

**Country Files (CF)** include records regarding South Asia, especially the development of India-Pakistani mutual hostility from the early 1971 to the outbreak of war in December 1971. The files on Poland include the preparation of the Warsaw ambassadorial talks in February 1969, and in January and February 1970.

**Name Files (NF)** include individual records of such important academic experts and officials as Allen Whiting and Marshall Green. The folder on China includes Kissinger’s memoranda to Nixon prior to his visit to China in February 1972.

**For the President Files (Winston Lord) – China Trip/Vietnam (FPF/Lord)** include; the briefing papers, the so-called ‘Books’ for Kissinger’s trips to Beijing in July and October 1971; the State Department’s briefing papers for Nixon’s trip to China; the records of Nixon’s conversations with Chinese leaders in February 1972; exchanges with China from July 1971 to December 1972; and the records of Kissinger’s trip to Beijing from June 19 to 23, 1972.

**Alexander M. Haig Special File (Haig-File)** includes the preparation for Haig’s advance trip to China, especially the ‘Books’; the original transcripts of Haig’s talks with Premier Zhou in January 1972; and Haig’s daily cables to Kissinger from China.

**Presidential/HAK Memcons (P/HAK Memcons)** include the memoranda of conversations between Nixon and foreign leaders, including De Gaulle (February 28 to March 2, 1969), (March 31, 1969), and Ceausescu (August 2 to 3, 1969), (October 26 to 27, 1970).

**For the President Files (FPF) – China/Vietnam Negotiations** include the records of exchanges from December 1969 to July 1971; and the transcripts of Kissinger’s with
the Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Ch’iao Kuan-hua regarding the drafting of the joint communique in February 1972.

Henry A. Kissinger Office Files (HAKOF) include: General Goodpaster’s memoranda on the new NSC system; Transition Books; the NSC Planning Material; the NSC staff material; and the chronological details of U.S. China Policy 1969-1972.

National Security Council Institutional Files (NSCIF)

This collection, declassified in July 2003, includes briefing papers for Nixon and Kissinger (NSC staff summary and Talking Points) and the NSC records (Senior Review Group Meeting Minutes, National Security Council Meeting Minutes, Washington Special Action Group Meeting Minutes).

White House Central Files (WHCF)

Confidential Files (CF) include the records of writings by and about the President (Books and Articles) as well as the President’s News Analysis.

White House Special Files (WHSF)

President’s Office Files (POF) include summaries of Nixon’s meeting with Cabinet members and with Congressional leaders on foreign policy issues (including the briefing after Kissinger’s July and October 1971 trips, and before and after the
Nixon's February 1972 trip). The White House staff member, Patrick Buchanan, kept notes on Nixon's talks with foreign leaders.

**President's Personal Files (PPF)** include Nixon's handwritten notes on a yellow pad taken to prepare for foreign trips and major speeches.

**General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59 (RG59)**

**Subject-Numeric Files (SNF)** include Intelligence Note, Research Study, Memcon (Memorandum of Conversation), Telegram (incoming/outgoing), embassy cables Chinese officials' public statements, Memoranda for the President, Secretary of State, the Under Secretary, Kissinger, Weekly Reports on China, and media/newspapers analysis. The major issues in these documents includes the policy options on the opening to China from December 1968 to February 1972, the development of Sino-Soviet mutual hostility from 1968 to 1972, and the preparation for the resumption of the Warsaw ambassadorial talks from late 1968 to mid 1970.

Winston Lord kept records while he was the director of the Policy Planning Staff in the State Department from 1973 to 1977. **Lord Files** include the record of Kissinger's meetings with Chinese leaders from 1973 to 1977; the 'Books' prepared for Kissinger's trips to China from 1973 to 1975; and the 'Books' prepared for Ford's visit to China in December 1975.

**Lot Files (LF)** include documents maintained by the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Marshall Green, and his office in the State Department. In particular, the collection covers such files as Background of Sino-U.S.
Relations; Lifting of Trade and Travel Restrictions; Public correspondence from 1971 to 1972; Nixon’s visit to China in February 1972 (Background, Plans, and Meetings).

The Nixon White House Tapes (NWHT)

This collection, beginning in February 1971, covers Nixon’s conversations with his staff on major foreign policy developments, such as the Ping Pong diplomacy in April 1971; Nixon’s presidential announcement for his trip to China in July 1971; the briefing of Kissinger’s secret trip to China to Congressional leaders; and the briefing of Nixon’s China trip to Congressional leaders.  

H.R. Haldeman Diaries (HRHD) (Tapes and CD-ROMs)

The chief of staff in the White House, H.R. Haldeman, kept diaries from January 1969 to June 1973. The written and recorded diaries reveal the development of Nixon’s thinking on the China initiative. The major events covered in the diaries include Ping-Pong diplomacy, Kissinger’s secret trip to China in July 1971, the Cabinet meetings on China policy, the briefings to the Congressional leaders after

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50 In early 1971, Nixon told the White House Chief of Staff, H.R. Haldeman, that he needed a record of his decision making to protect himself in the eyes of history. Nixon wanted Oval Office and Cabinet Room meetings recorded on tape. Hence, the Technical Services Division of the U.S. Secret Service installed a voice-activated system in the Oval Office and a switch-activated system in the Cabinet Room starting on February 16, 1971. The entire system, which was completed during the next four months, recorded conversations between President Nixon, his staff, and visitors at locations in the Oval Office; the President’s Executive Office Building hideaway office; the Cabinet Room; various White House telephones in the Oval Office and the Lincoln Sitting Room; and at various Camp David locations. History of the Nixon White House Tapes, Audiovisual Research Room, NPMS, NA.

51 While the book version of the diaries is 700 pages, the CD-ROM version’s vast capacity allows the full publication of 2,200 diary pages.
Kissinger’s trips to Beijing in July and October 1971, the preparation of Nixon’s presidential trip to China, and the briefing on the Nixon trip to the Congressional leaders. Importantly, Haldeman recorded the day-to-day development of events during the China trip from the departure on February 17 to the arrival in Washington on February 29, 1972.

**Library of Congress, Manuscript Division (LCMD)**

**Elliot Richardson Papers**

This collection of Elliot Richardson, Under Secretary of State (1969 to 1970), includes Richardson’s handwritten notations and memoranda of important conversations, discussions, and meetings, which show the variety of policy options presented by the State Department. Particularly important, the speech files include Richardson’s handwritten notes of his major speech on September 9, 1969, which clarified the U.S. policy towards the Sino-Soviet border clashes.

**Papers of the Nixon White House, Part 5, H.R. Haldeman: Notes of White House Meetings, 1969 - 1973**

This collection includes Haldeman’s handwritten notes during Nixon’s meetings with his advisors and Congressional leaders. The meeting notes began on January 12, 1969, and they were kept for Haldeman’s use only. Haldeman was at almost every
major meeting in the Oval Office. The notes show the President’s directives as well as describe the atmosphere of the meetings. The collection helps the examination of the Nixon White House Tapes, where it is often difficult to understand what is being discussed. The main issues in the Haldeman notes will be examined in conjunction with his written and tape-recorded diaries.

3.4. Oral history collections

A number of interviews have been conducted with former Nixon administration officials. Gerald S. Strober and Deborah Hart Strober published one of the first comprehensive oral history collections of the Nixon era, *Nixon: An Oral History of His Presidency* (1994), which includes chapters on Nixon’s character, personality, administrative style, and foreign affairs (including the China policy). However, its main aim is to reassess the Nixon era as a whole rather than to examine his foreign policy in particular. The CNN documentary series entitled *The Cold War* provided full episode scripts as well as transcripts of interviews with former U.S. officials regarding the U.S. opening to China and the U.S. détente with the Soviet Union. Important interviews with senior officials were conducted, including former Secretary of Defense, Melvin Laird, and former Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Marshall Green. A Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) documentary entitled *Nixon’s China Game* provided transcripts of interviews with Kissinger as well

as with General Haig. However, TV broadcasting means that the questions of the interviews on both CNN and PBS are general rather than investigative.

The Brookings Institution’s National Security Council Project has conducted a series of oral history roundtables with former NSC staff members and State Department officials. These include *The Nixon Administration National Security Council, China Policy and the National Security Council*, and *The Role of the National Security Adviser.* This study re-examines specific materials from these collections.

Nancy Bernkopf Tucker has edited an extensive oral history collection of former U.S. officials entitled *China Confidential.* She has participated in the development of the Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection at the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training (ADST) at the National Foreign Affairs Training Center, Arlington, Virginia. The quotations in the volume are edited and shortened for publications. In particular, Tucker explains that one of the main reasons why the Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection was established was because a former State Department official, Marshall Green, was “bitter” about Kissinger’s underestimation of other officials’ contributions to the Nixon foreign policy. Green thus provided some of the funding for the ADST to develop a collection which would help to advance a more balanced

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understanding of important initiatives, including the opening to China.\textsuperscript{56} Significantly, the collection of interviews has been added to and updated every year.

This study has made extensive use of the updated originals in the Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection in the Special Collection Division of Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training at Lauinger Library, Georgetown University.\textsuperscript{57} Finally, this study is also based on Komine’s interviews with former U.S. officials and senior academics on U.S. relations with China.\textsuperscript{58}

4. Main research questions

In light of the above literature review and the new archival materials which have become available, the major objectives of this study are to examine the following research questions in order to fill gaps in knowledge and advance new interpretations:

1. When, why, and how did Nixon and Kissinger come to convince themselves of the necessity and possibility of the rapprochement with China? How did Nixon develop his personal interest in China as Vice President in the Eisenhower administration during the 1950s and as a private citizen during the 1960s? How did Kissinger overcome his earlier uncertainty about the opening to China? What differences and similarities were there between their respective views on China policy?

2. What kind of difficulties did Nixon and Kissinger anticipate for a new China initiative, both internally and externally? How did they seek to overcome those difficulties? For example, how did Nixon and Kissinger attempt to manage

\textsuperscript{56} Nancy Bemkopf Tucker, Interview with Komine, October 1, 2003. The Foreign Affairs Oral History Program was established in 1988 and housed in the Lauinger Library of Georgetown University and at the Foreign Service Institute. Charles Stuart Kennedy, the Director of the ADST Oral History Program, conducted most of the interviews. Tucker and Green also conducted some interviews respectively.

\textsuperscript{57} For the list of country files and individual files, see the Bibliography.

\textsuperscript{58} For the list of interviewees and correspondences, see the Bibliography.
possible opposition from the so-called 'China lobby' in Congress? How serious was the fear that China would enter into the Vietnam War during the late 1960s? How important was Nixon’s long-term public reputation as an anti-Communist Cold War warrior for his new initiative toward China?

3. How does the bureaucratic politics model enhance the understanding of the diversity among U.S. officials? What were the roles of the NSC staff members and of the State Department for the development of policy options during the opening towards China? What were the differences between the White House and State Department over the method, timing, and agenda for the promotion of a new dialogue with the Chinese? How important was the resumption of the Warsaw ambassadorial talks from December 1969 to February 1970 to the rivalry between the White House and the State Department?

4. Why did Nixon and Kissinger pursue strict secrecy during the opening to China? Why did Nixon and Kissinger use third parties, specifically the Pakistan, Romania, and France backchannels? Did they consult any other officials for an appropriate alternative to approaching the Chinese? What mistakes did Nixon and Kissinger make as a result of their secrecy?

5. What did Nixon and Kissinger mean by the emergence of the multipolar balance of power in the early 1970s? How did Kissinger develop his understanding of the notion of balance of power both in theory and in practice? How important were Nixon’s public statements on the re-emergence of China as a great power? How did Nixon and Kissinger assess China’s geopolitical importance in Asia and the world?

6. How did Nixon and Kissinger develop agendas for direct talks with Chinese leaders in July and October 1971 and in February 1972? Who made contributions to the development of agenda? Which issues proved to be difficult? In particular, this study examines the following five major issues:

6.1. The Taiwan question. Regarding the question of U.S. credibility in world politics as well as the possible backlash from the so-called ‘China lobby’ in America’s domestic politics, how did U.S. officials (not only Nixon and Kissinger, but also the NSC staff and the State Department) analyze the importance of the Taiwan issue? How did
U.S. officials assess the Chinese position on the Taiwan issue during the opening process?

6.2. Conflicts in Indochina. What were the interrelationships between the development of the so-called ‘Nixon Doctrine’ and the U.S. opening to China? Who made contributions to develop policy options for the new doctrine? How did Nixon and Kissinger come to conclude that the Chinese would respond to their new initiative despite the on-going conflicts in Indochina?


6.4. The India-Pakistan rivalry. How did the White House and State Department assess the implications of the India-Pakistan rivalry? How important for the opening to China was the interrelationship between the India-Pakistan rivalry and the deepening Sino-Soviet hostilities?

6.5. The growth of the Soviet military threat. What were the views of Nixon and Kissinger on the development of the Sino-Soviet rift before they entered office? How did the White House and the State Department analyze the implications of the escalation of Sino-Soviet border clashes from March to September 1969? How did U.S. officials assess the impact of the U.S. opening to China on the deepening Sino-Soviet hostilities?

7. How did the Nixon administration prepare for the China summit in February 1972? What were the main concerns of Nixon and Kissinger in their thinking about the summit? What were the results of the talks? How did Nixon and Kissinger reassess the significance of the China initiative after the summit? Overall, did the U.S. rapprochement with China meet its original aims?
5. The structure of this thesis

This thesis consists of three major parts and eight chapters. Part I (chapters 1 and 2) examines the conception of U.S. rapprochement with China. Chapter 1 reassesses how Nixon and Kissinger developed their respective perceptions of the China policy before President Nixon entered office. Chapter 2 analyzes the revitalization of the National Security Council system during the transition period from November 1968 to January 1969. It examines the advantages and disadvantages of the highly secretive and centralized foreign policy decision-making machinery. In particular, the chapter compares the respective roles in the new China initiative played by the NSC staff and State Department officials.

Part II (chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6) examines the implementation of the U.S. rapprochement with China. This study divides the U.S. opening to China into four major stages. Chapter 3 analyzes the initial development of strategic perspectives and policy options for a new China initiative that emerged in the first half of 1969. Chapter 4 explores the bureaucratic reassessments of the U.S. China policy in the latter half of 1969. Chapter 5 examines the resumption of the Warsaw Ambassadorial talks from December 1969 to January and February 1970, and their collapse as a result of the Cambodian military operation in May 1970. Chapter 6 analyses the development of back-channel communications with the Chinese via Pakistan and Romania from June 1970 to December 1970, and also the breakthrough from April to June 1971 in terms of the further pursuit of secrecy by the White House in order to exclude the State Department.
Part III (chapters 7 and 8) analyzes the direct talks between the U.S. and China. Chapter 7 begins by examining the development of policy option studies for Kissinger’s secret trip to Beijing in July 1971. It analyses the five major issues which arose during the Kissinger-Zhou talks in July and October 1971: the Taiwan question; the conflicts in Indochina; Japan’s future role; the India-Pakistan rivalry; and the growth of the Soviet military threat. Finally, it examines how Nixon and Kissinger assessed the implications of a new China initiative in briefing meetings with Cabinet officials, Congressional leaders, and foreign leaders from July 1971 to January 1972.

Chapter 8 begins by examining the final preparations for the Nixon trip, such as Haig’s advance trip to China in January 1972 and the briefing papers for the President. The chapter mainly examines how Nixon and the Chinese leaders discussed the five major issues in February 1972. Finally, it analyses how Nixon and Kissinger assessed the implications of the China summit in briefing meetings with Cabinet officials and Congressional leaders.

The Epilogue briefly discusses how U.S. officials continued to discuss the remaining conflicting issues with the Chinese leaders, such as the conflicts in Indochina, Japan’s future role, the Soviet military threat, and the treatment of Taiwan’s status during the middle of the 1970s.

The Conclusion summarizes and evaluates the major issues raised in this study and assesses what the U.S. rapprochement with China in the early 1970s achieved, and what it left unresolved.
Part I. The Foundations of Foreign Policy Decision-Making

Chapter 1. The Nixon-Kissinger Leadership for a New China Initiative

This chapter investigates both the similarities and differences between Nixon and Kissinger on their respective views on U.S. China policy. The first half of this chapter examines the development of Nixon’s view on China from the late 1940s to the late 1960s. The latter half of this chapter analyses the development of Kissinger’s view on the balance of power in theory and in practice. It also examines how Kissinger developed his view on U.S. China policy. Finally, this chapter assesses the Nixon-Kissinger leadership for the opening to China.

1. Richard M. Nixon as the architect of U.S. rapprochement with China

1.1 The development of Nixon’s early view on China

This study perceives Richard Nixon as the architect of the U.S. opening to China. Richard Solomon, a former NSC staff member, and China expert, emphasizes the importance of distinguishing between Nixon as a politician and Kissinger as an academic.1 Nixon had “a lot more exposure to Asia and foreign policy decision-making than Kissinger did.” Solomon argues that because of his life-long involvement

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in politics, Nixon was an "expert on a policy and political issue." It is thus important to take into consideration the "self-confidence" of successful politicians - the ability to understand the "political dynamics" of the international situation.\(^2\)

The development of Nixon's view on China needs to be re-examined within the broader context of change and continuity in the U.S. relations with China. There are three major angles in America's historical view on China from the mid 19th century to the mid 20th century:

- From an idealistic point of view, to transform China into a friendly and stable nation in Asia,
- From a realist point of view, to create China as a central political force to maintain stability in Asia,
- From a commercial point of view, to foresee China as a potentially huge market in Asia.\(^3\)

The origins of Nixon's interest in China policy can be traced back to his political career in the late 1940s and the early 1950s.\(^4\) During his early career as congressman, Nixon built up his political reputation as a strong anti-Communist cold warrior by

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2 Ibid.
criticizing the Truman administration's 'Loss of China' to the Communists.\textsuperscript{5} It was a result of the establishment of the People's Republic of China in October 1949, the formulation of the Sino-Soviet alliance in February 1950, the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, and Chinese volunteer troops' entry into the war in October 1950.\textsuperscript{6} Within the United States, while the pro-Nationalist China Lobby exerted heavy pressure on Congress and influenced public opinion, the State Department was under sharp criticism.\textsuperscript{7} The United States pursued an open-ended containment policy towards the monolithic threat from Communism without clarifying a distinction between vital interests and peripheral interests.\textsuperscript{8} The main elements of U.S. policy toward Beijing during the two decades of mutual hostility were the following:

- Military containment of Chinese Communist expansionism embodied in the renewed support for the Chinese Nationalists on Taiwan, the stationing of the Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Straits, and the maintenance of a web of military security treaties with non-Communist Asian states.

\textsuperscript{5} In spring 1949, the Truman Administration published the so-called 'White Paper,' which claimed the inevitable course of the fall of the mainland under the control of the Chinese Communists. Nixon accused Secretary of State, Dean Acheson of heading a "Cowardly College of Communist Containment." See U.S. Department of State, \textit{United States Relations with China} (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1949); and Richard M. Nixon, \textit{RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon} (New York: Grissett & Danlap, 1978), p.110. During his campaign for a Senate seat in 1950, Nixon declared: "All that we have to do is to take a look at a map and we can see that if Formosa falls the next frontier is the coast of California." A Speech by Richard M. Nixon during the California Senate Campaign, September 18, 1950, in \textit{China and US Foreign Policy} (Congressional Quarterly Service, 1971), p.19. While running for Vice President in 1952, Nixon charged that: "China wouldn't have gone Communist – if the Truman Administration had had backbone." Ibid.


\textsuperscript{8} This subject is discussed by John Lewis Gaddis, \textit{Strategies of Containment} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982).
• Political isolation of the Beijing regime in the international community as reflected in the sustained U.S. effort to keep the People's Republic of China from membership in the United Nations and associated agencies.
• Economic embargo imposed by the United States on any trade with Communist China.9

During the 1950s, as the Vice President in the Eisenhower administration, Nixon publicly maintained his firm political attitude towards the threat of Communist China. In the late spring of 1953, Nixon took his first official trip to Asia, which became a highly "educational" influence on Nixon's thinking, establishing the basis of his foreign policy experience.10 In particular, the trip gave him a crucial opportunity to "assess" Asian attitudes toward the "emerging colossus" of Communist China.11 Nixon concluded that Communist China was the "major new and unfathomable factor" in Asia, and that its influence was already "spreading throughout the area."12 During the NSC meeting on December 23, 1953, Nixon emphasized that there was "very little chance" for the U.S. policy of "containment and economic blockade" of the Beijing regime on the basis of the hope of "overthrowing the government from within instead of from without."13 Nixon suggested the alternative "to continue the policy of containment and isolation but to allow trade," which could be a "good

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10 Nixon, *RN*, p.134. Nixon recalls that throughout his political career, as Vice President, as a private citizen, and as President, he often dealt with people whom he had already met during his early trips, including the 1953 trip.

11 Ibid., p.119.

12 Ibid., p.136.

cover" without necessarily recognizing Beijing. Nixon concluded that although it was important to "retain Formosa" as a "symbol," the United States should tell Chinese Nationalists that "they can't go back to the mainland."

The U.S. Government publicly maintained its policy of nuclear deterrence against any aggression from Communists. On March 17, 1955, Vice President Nixon argued in Chicago that: "tactical atomic weapons are now conventional and will be used against the targets of any aggressive force." During the Taiwan Straits Crises in 1954-55 and in 1958-59, Nixon continued to suggest firm response to pressure and contain the expansionism of Chinese Communists. For example, on September 12, 1955, in the National Security Council meeting, Nixon insisted on paying close attention to any sign of miscalculation from Beijing. Nixon suggested that "the only practical choice" would be to "play poker" in order to "keep the Communists guessing" and to "take a chance on the possible consequences."

On the other hand, Vice President Nixon suggested the easing of trade and travel

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14 Ibid., p.349. On the other hand, in December 1953, Vice President Nixon already privately expressed his interest in Communist China: "Someday I'll go to China...mainland China." In 1960, Nixon sought to obtain the permission to visit the People's Republic of China. This was refused by the State Department. Summers with Swan, The Arrogance of Power, p.163.

15 Ibid.


sanctions on Communist China as means of unwind its political and ideological rigidity. During an NSC meeting on August 18, 1954, Nixon argued that Communist China was "the key problem" for the U.S. policy in Asia.\textsuperscript{19} Nixon remained cautious, suggesting that any decision to change the policy of containment and isolation towards Communist China "should be postponed for the time being."\textsuperscript{20} Nixon presented three specific points to consider: 1) how much the U.S. was willing to trade with Communist China; 2) whether the U.S. would recognize China; and 3) whether and when Communist China would be admitted to the United Nations.\textsuperscript{21} Nixon claimed that the U.S. would have to face the final decision whether to adopt "a hard or a soft policy" toward Communist China.\textsuperscript{22} He went on to suggest that the U.S. should explore "an area of action between war and appeasement" because "in the long run," the Soviet Union and Communist China "can and must be split apart."\textsuperscript{23} Thus, Nixon entered into the policy debate on the possibility of a rift between China and the Soviet Union. Foot argues that Nixon was "less influenced by the ideological tenor" of the Beijing government, and "more concerned about power issues - the balance of power issue - even in those days."\textsuperscript{24}

During the presidential debate in October 1960, while condemning the Eisenhower-Dulles team for their "brinksmanship" in the Taiwan Strait crises, Democrat candidate John F. Kennedy insisted that the small offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu were "not strategically defensible" or "essential to the defense of Formosa [Taiwan]."\textsuperscript{25}

\textsuperscript{19} Memorandum of Discussion at the 211\textsuperscript{th} Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, August 18, 1954, \textit{FRUS, 1952-54 vol. XIV}, p.529.
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., p.535.
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid. p.536.
\textsuperscript{24} Foot, Interview with Komine, July 13, 2004.
\textsuperscript{25} Robert W. Barnett, Oral History Interview, March 2, 1990, p.9, Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection (FAOHC), Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, Lauinger Library, Georgetown
Nixon sought to defend the Eisenhower administration’s handling of the offshore island crisis of 1958 by emphasizing that if the United States drew a “line” at the island of Formosa itself, it would lead to a “chain reaction” of aggression by Chinese Communists. On October 13, Nixon emphasized Communist China’s expansionist threat: “Now what do the Chinese Communists want? They don’t want just Quemoy and Matsu. They don’t want just Formosa. They want the world.”

Importantly, Nixon became “very fascinated with China”: his main concern was the Soviet threat, and his interest in the China issue grew out of the Quemoy-Matsu discussion during the campaign debates. Solomon emphasizes the long-term importance of the Nixon-Kennedy debate in 1960 on the Quemoy-Matsu crisis of 1958, which “set off some interesting trends that took over a decade to fully play themselves out.”

1.2. Changes and Developments of the China issue during the 1960s

The development of Nixon’s view on China took place within the context of the gradual development of academic and bureaucratic discussion on relaxation and subsequent reconciliation with Beijing.

From the late 1950s to the early 1960s, a fragmentation emerged in Sino-Soviet relations. One of the major causes of the split was the Soviet attempt to seek détente
with the West, which was against China’s anti-capitalist united front strategy. Hence, the Chinese were “competing against” the Russians, “making a deliberate, direct challenge for the leadership of the world communist movement.”

Since the first nuclear explosion in October 1964, which was a major symbol of her self-reliance, China began to pursue a revolutionary dual strategy towards the two superpowers. Throughout the 1960s, however, Chinese leaders had an increasing sense that they were surrounded by hostile enemies. In the north, the Soviet Union, with its satellite state, Mongolia, increased hostilities along the long disputed border areas with China. In the east, China faced the U.S. network of allied relations with Japan and South Korea with their extensive bases. Moreover, the regular U.S. navy patrolling in the Taiwan Straits indicated Washington’s continuing support for the Chinese Nationalists in Taiwan. In the southwest, after the Sino-Indian border conflict in October 1962, there was a continuing increase of tension between Beijing and New Delhi leading India to move towards the Soviets. In the southeast, U.S. military intervention in Indochina increased tension in China’s southern hemisphere. Thus, Beijing came to face with the danger of full “encirclement.” In 1966, Mao launched the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, terminating all diplomatic relations with other states (except with Egypt) and bringing about China’s political isolation.

During the 1960s, the Cold War still “hindered the whole image of China as a

33 Chen, Mao’s China and the Cold War, p.240.
positive element in the international community." Public opinion polls showed that some 90% of Americans still had a negative image of China, and approximately 70% saw China as the greatest threat to the world peace. Within the U.S. government, the China threat was "seen in a domino sense." Thus, there was a "huge debate" about the question of "whether China would intervene in the Vietnam War." Equally important, there were "heated and bitter" arguments about the Sino-Soviet rift. On the one hand, a group of opinion insisted that the Chinese had very deep "anti-foreign feelings," especially toward the West, and that they would move back toward the Soviet Union if it suited their national purposes. However, another school of thought insisted that China was "not aggressive" as previously estimated, and could be a "bulwark" against the Soviet Union, and thus the United States should "open up relations" with China.

On a bureaucratic level, since the early 1960s, State Department officials had discussed the beginning of a "task force" approach on the "broad-scale rethinking exercise" of China policy. By the mid 1960s, although Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, "resisted very strongly" any moves toward China, a change in China policy was

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34 Whiting, Interview with Komine, October 19, 2003.
35 Ibid.
36 Solomon, Interview with Komine, September 24, 2003. Solomon argues further that what the U.S. government did not fully understand at that time was that Mao needed the army within China to support the Cultural Revolution politically, rather than to send it off to fight in Vietnam.
38 Ibid.
"debated in bureaucracy." Rusk was also "extremely reluctant to acknowledge" the Sino-Soviet split because he emphasized the monolithic threat from the Sino-Soviet alliance to "rationalize the deeper engagement in Vietnam." There still remained rigidity at the top level of the foreign policy decision-making machinery, while middle rank officials in the State Department were reassessing U.S. China policy.

During the twenty years of mutual hostility, despite harsh exchanges in public, Washington and Beijing attempted to develop and preserve a communication line at Ambassadorial level, firstly in Geneva from 1955 to 1957, and then in Warsaw from 1958 to 1968. Although the talks did not reconcile profound political and ideological differences, the two sides continued to communicate in order to prevent any misunderstanding of the degree of threat in the case of crisis. As a former State Department official, Donald Anderson, recalls, U.S. officials kept informing the Chinese in Warsaw that "we seek no wider war in Vietnam," which was intended as an "assurance" that the United States did not intend to invade North Vietnam. Anderson argues further that State Department officials also attempted to "promote

41 Paul Kreisberg (Director, Office of Asian Communist Affairs, Policy Planning, Department of State, 1965-81), Oral History Interview, p.3, in A China Reader, Volume III, January 1995, FAOHC. The creation of the Office of Asian Communist Affairs in 1965—the separation of the ROC from the mainland led to turn the focus of policy attention much more on the People's Republic. Ibid. Moscow supplied more advanced weaponry to Hanoi than Beijing, which could only advise the pursuit of guerrilla warfare and provide rifles and bullets. However, Hanoi had no intention of being Moscow's puppet, and exploited Sino-Soviet hostility, obtaining military aid from both, but taking sides with neither. Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975 (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000), pp.3-5.
some sort of informal non-official contact,” such as to get journalists into China in order to “improve the atmosphere” and “lower the tension levels” between the two sides.\textsuperscript{44}

Overall, the State Department officials in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations prepared a list of policy items to move towards a “civil dialogue with China,” in an attempt to “open up travel and trade.”\textsuperscript{45} In reality, however, the possible flexibility of the Johnson administration’s policy in East Asia was tied down by the combination of the escalation of the Vietnam War, the Chinese refusal to ease tension with three major adversaries, such as the United States, the Soviet Union and India, and the outbreak of Cultural Revolution.\textsuperscript{46}

During the 1960s, it was academic experts who led the public argument about the need to move toward China.\textsuperscript{47} For example, during the height of the Cultural Revolution, William Bundy, then the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs of the Johnson administration, “set up sort of a Wise Men’s Group of some academic scholars,” such as A. Doak Barnett, Alexander Eckstein, John King Fairbanks, Lucian W. Pye, and Robert Scalapino, to discuss periodically “whither China”?\textsuperscript{48} In reality, however, Whiting points out that the Vietnam War had “broken the sense of community” in America, and thus, there was no “academic community”

\textsuperscript{44} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{45} Ralph Clough (Deputy Chief of Mission American Embassy Taipei, Taiwan, 1961-65), Oral History Interview, p.19, in \textit{A China Reader}, Volume III, January 1995, FAOHC.
\textsuperscript{46} Foot, \textit{The Practice of Power}, pp. 262-263; and Robert D. Schulzinger, “The Johnson Administration, China, and the Vietnam War,” in Ross and Jiang (eds.), \textit{Re-examining the Cold War}. President Johnson remarked that “lasting peace” could never come to Asia, “as long as 700 million people of mainland China are isolated by their rulers from the outside world.” \textit{The New York Times}, March 14, 1966.
\textsuperscript{47} As for academic activities on the re-assessment of China policy during the 1960s, see Foot, “Redefinition,” pp.278-279, and Idem, \textit{The Practice of Power}, pp.93-103.
\textsuperscript{48} Anderson, Oral History Interview, p.15, in \textit{A China Reader}, Volume III, January 1995, FAOHC.
as a whole.\textsuperscript{49} Thus, there had to be "some public form that could legitimise the consideration of China as a normal power."\textsuperscript{50}

From March 8 to 30, 1966, the Hearings for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee entitled "U.S. Policy with Respect to Mainland China" broadcasted a number of views of China experts as well as International Relations experts in academia.\textsuperscript{51} A. Doak Barnett urged the shift of America's China policy from "containment plus isolation" to "containment without isolation."\textsuperscript{52} John King Fairbank advocated an open policy to promote "international contact with China on many fronts," in order to encourage its leaders to "reshape" their worldview and to bring China into "the international order."\textsuperscript{53} Thus, the Hearings provided the most comprehensive discussion of China policy ever given to the American people.

Foot, Shambaugh, Tucker, and Whiting all emphasize the importance of the mid 1960s as a crucial "turning point" which promoted the American domestic political attitude of the necessity of new relations with China.\textsuperscript{54} The American public came to realize that the existence of Communist China was a fact of life. Foot suggests that a broad "consensus" of opinion emerged in America regarding the integration of China; and this consensus became a powerful "inheritance" for Nixon and Kissinger to take an initiative toward China.\textsuperscript{55}

\textsuperscript{49} Whiting, Interview with Komine, October 19, 2003. Whiting explains further that among academic experts on China, A. Doak Barnett was the "foremost progressive speaker" who was a "cautious, optimistic, forward-looking, but he was not advocating any radical move." Robert Scalapino supported the Vietnam War, and "took a lot of abuse because of that." Ibid.

\textsuperscript{50} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{51} "U.S. Policy with Respect to Mainland China," Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 89 Congress, 2nd session, March 8, 10, 16, 18, 21, 28, 30, 1966.

\textsuperscript{52} A. Doak Barnett statement, Ibid., p. 306.

\textsuperscript{53} John King Fairbank statement, Ibid., p.309.

\textsuperscript{54} Foot, Interview with Komine, July 13, 2004; Shambaugh, Interview with Komine, October 8, 2003; Tucker, Interview with Komine, October 1, 2003; Whiting, Interview with Komine, October 19, 2003.

Nixon, as a private citizen, paid close attention to the U.S. policy and public opinion toward China during the 1960s. In public, Nixon maintained his anti-Communist hardliner stance by describing the Vietnam War as a manifestation of Communist China's expansionism, namely a "confrontation" between the U.S. and China. In private, however, there were signs of development in Nixon's view on China. During his private trip to Europe in June 1963, Nixon met French President Charles De Gaulle and discussed "whether it might not be wise to develop lines of communications with the Soviets and the Chinese." Nixon argued that there was "considerable sentiment" in the U.S. State Department, not only in favor of a "Soviet-U.S. détente" but also of a "lineup of the Soviets, Europe and the U.S. against Chinese." Nixon judged that while this might be a "good short-range policy," it was more important in the longer run to recognize that China and the USSR were "two great powers," and to develop "parallel relationships with them."

In March 1967, Nixon again took a trip to Europe, during which the China issue came up regularly. The West German Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer urged, "as had de Gaulle four years before," that in order to "counterbalance" the growth of the Soviet military threat, the United States should lean toward China. Nixon's initial reply to Adenauer was that the West should not unilaterally exploit the Sino-Soviet dispute. However, Nixon continued to argue that if the situation developed, the United States

56 Speech to the Commonwealth Club of California by Richard M. Nixon, _The New York Times_, April 2, 1965. For the Johnson administration, Communist China and North Vietnam were still inevitably "linked." In response to Nixon's recommendation to take a hard line in Vietnam, President Johnson stated that: "China's the problem... We can bomb the hell out of Hanoi and the rest of that damned country, but they've got China right behind, and that's a different story." Nixon, _RN_, pp.280-281.
57 During his presidential visit to France in March 1969, Nixon reviewed the China issue of their 1963 talk with De Gaulle. Memcon, Nixon and De Gaulle, March 1, 1969 [Morning session], p.6, Presidential/HAK MemCons Box 1023, Nixon Presidential Materials Staff (NPMS), National Archives (NA). In his memoirs, Nixon fails to mention the specific contents of his private talk with De Gaulle in June 1963. See Nixon, _RN_, p.248.
58 Ibid.
might benefit from the expansion of differences between the two communist states.

During his talk with the Romanian President, Nicolae Ceausescu, Nixon expressed his doubt whether any true détente with the Soviet Union could be achieved until "some kind of rapprochement" was reached with Communist China. Nixon felt that if China remained isolated, within twenty years, it could pose a grave threat to world peace. In the short run, Nixon remained cautious, expressing doubt about the possibility of establishing effective communications with China until the Vietnam War had ended. Nixon argued that after that, the United States could "take steps to normalize relations" with China.

In April 1967, Nixon took a trip to Asia and consulted with Asian leaders and U.S. diplomats regarding the development of recent changes in the region. Nixon recognized that there was a "growing concern" about China's emergence among Asian leaders who came to agree that some "new and direct" relations between the United States and China were "essential" for the restoration of stability in the post-Vietnam era.

In Indonesia, Nixon met the U.S. Ambassador, Marshall Green, with whom he had a long private conversation on events in East Asia, especially China. Green emphasized the development of new nationalism in Asia and suggested that it would

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60 Ibid. See also James H. Mann, About Face: A History of America's Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to Clinton (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1999), p.17.
61 Ibid.p.282.
62 Ibid, pp.282-283. Nixon's speechwriters, Raymond Price and William Safire, recall that Nixon had a great knowledge on foreign affairs. For example, while they were preparing for briefing books for Nixon's trip to Asia in April 1967, Nixon made his own preparation, asking specific questions on leadership and political situation of Asian countries. See William Safire, Before the Fall: An Inside View of the Pre-Watergate White House (DaCapo Press, 1975), pp.367-368.
63 Solomon, Interview with Komine, September 24, 2003; and Marshall Green, Evolution of U.S.-China Policy 1956-1973: Memoirs of An Insider, p.25, FAOHC. Nixon "took down notes on key points" and also tape-recorded his talks with Green. Green recalls: "When I asked him what he did with all these notes and tapes, he replied that he had them transcribed, filed and cross-filed for later reference." Green remembers Nixon as the "best informed on foreign affairs" of all the luminaries who visited Jakarta during his four years there. Ibid. However, in his memoirs, Nixon did not mention his conversation with Green.
be wise to limit the U.S. presence and promote each Asian country’s initiative in dealing with Asian problems. In particular, Green recalls Nixon’s much more “realistic” and “strategic” remarks on the development of the Sino-Soviet split: “We must not line up with China or with the Soviet Union against the other; we must always play it even-handed.” As Solomon explains, Nixon was assessing “policy alternatives based on domestic concerns” by consulting with many American people and other experts on Asia, and his approach to China policy was driven by the concern about the Soviet Union and the Vietnam War. Overall, Nixon’s trips overseas during the mid-1960s provided crucial opportunities for him to assess geopolitical changes in Asia, especially the re-emergence of China.

1.3. “Asia After Viet Nam” in October 1967

Nixon’s article entitled “Asia After Viet Nam” appeared in Foreign Affairs of October 1967. As the two decades of containment of China became an increasingly heavy burden for the U.S., Nixon urged the need to comprehend the reality of China’s re-emerging geopolitical dynamism in Asia and the world:

64 Ibid.
Taking the long view, we simply cannot afford to leave China forever outside the family of nations.... There is no place on this planet for a billion of its potentially most able people to live in angry isolation.... The world cannot be safe until China changes. Thus our aim, to the extent we can influence the events, shall be to induce change.\textsuperscript{67}

Nixon suggested that: 1) in the short term, "a policy of firm restraints of no reward, of a creative counterpressure designed to persuade Peking that its interest can be served only by accepting the basic rules of international activity" and 2) in the long term, "pulling China back into the world community – but as a great and progressing nation, not as the epicenter of world revolution."\textsuperscript{68} Reflecting the re-emergence of Japan and Western Europe as economic great powers, Nixon also urged that the United States should coordinate its relations with its major allies in order to reduce its burden for the open-ended containment of Communism. Finally, Nixon encouraged the U.S. continuing presence in Asia, as an "Asian power," and emphasized that U.S. leadership should be exercised "with restraints," and there was a need for American "subtle encouragement" of the Asian initiatives.\textsuperscript{69}

When the \textit{Foreign Affairs} article was first published, it was generally considered as Nixon's political attempt to moderate his anti-Communist image and acquire the nomination for the Republican Presidential Candidacy in 1968.\textsuperscript{70} After the announcement of the Nixon Doctrine on July 25, 1969, the article captured public attention as the framework of the Nixon administration's foreign policy. However, the importance of the Nixon article should not be over-stated. Nixon's suggestions were "not entirely new" because his views reflected the debate which were taking place

\textsuperscript{67} Ibid., p.121.
\textsuperscript{68} Ibid., p.123.
\textsuperscript{69} Ibid., p.124. In this article, Nixon perceived the Soviet Union as a European power.
among Democrats and also among Republicans during the 1960s.\textsuperscript{71}

In the short run, Nixon still preserved his hard-liner stance, criticizing that the “containment without isolation” covered “only half the problem.”\textsuperscript{72} In particular, Nixon was still against any short-term change to allow trade with China. He also advocated pressuring China by the build-up of Asian allies’ military capabilities. Finally, it was not the U.S. but China that had to change.

On the other hand, David Shambaugh assesses that the article was a “crucial piece of evidence” regarding Nixon’s interest in China. Shambaugh emphasizes the importance of Nixon’s “intentional” selection of terms in his writing, which avoided direct criticism of China’s ideology or expansionist tendency.\textsuperscript{73} Nixon clearly had a political intension to present his personal interest in opening a new dialogue with the Chinese leaders. In particular, the phrase of Nixon’s article, especially China being “outside the family of nations” suggests that there was a broader and “multitiered conceptualisation” of engaging China “as a society and as an economy, not simply strategically playing it off against the Soviet Union.” Finally, Nixon’s proposal of integrating China into the world community was an origin of the policy of engagement.\textsuperscript{74}

More particularly, Foot stresses the importance of the U.S. long-term practice of its “structural power” to embrace China into an international pattern of behavior.\textsuperscript{75} In the

\textsuperscript{71} Foot, Interview with Komine, July 13, 2004.

\textsuperscript{72} Nixon, “Asia, After Viet Nam,” p.123. For example, in October 1967, Secretary Rusk warned of the danger of billions of Chinese armed with nuclear weapons. See Warren Cohen, Dean Rusk (Totowa, New Jersey: Cooper Square, 1980), pp.283-289.

\textsuperscript{73} Shambaugh, Interview with Komine, October 8, 2003.

\textsuperscript{74} Ibid. See also David Shambaugh, “Containment or Engagement of China,” International Security vol.21, no. 2, (Fall 1996), p.182.

\textsuperscript{75} Foot, The Practice of Power, pp.9-21, pp.262-265. Foot refers to Nye, who introduces distinctions between “hard” and “soft” power and between “the coercive and visible forms and the consensual and less visible aspects.” In particular, “soft” power refers to more indirect ways of getting others to do what one wants by “the attractiveness of one’s culture and ideology” or “the ability to manipulate the agenda of political choices.” Hence, the issue of legitimacy, drawn from a recognized authority,
historical perspective, the integration strategy reflects a very long lasting tradition in the U.S. approach to China, which could be traced back to the end of nineteenth century, namely the idea that the U.S. could "tutor" China to "either protect it or modify it or change it."  

Former NSC staff members, such as Lord, Rodman, and Solomon, and China experts, such as Foot, Shambaugh, and, Tucker all emphasize that, after his trip to Asia in April 1967, Nixon’s views on Asia and China were already very developed. Nixon had become aware of the need to shift the course of foreign policy with more restraints of power. By the late 1960s, it was widely recognized that Washington's non-recognition policy to Beijing became largely stalemated because of the major changes in the international situation, such as the Sino-Soviet rift, the U.S. over-involvement in the Vietnam War, and the prolonged Sino-American hostility. Hence, realizing the major shifts in “American conceptions of what needed to be done in terms of China policy,” Nixon assessed the political advantage of promoting accommodation with China. In his meeting with Premier Zhou on February 24, 1972, President Nixon remarked:

[M]y goal is normalization with the People’s Republic.... I started down this road in 1967 in an article in Foreign Affairs, with some rhetoric. And now we are trying to follow it with action. The goal of normalization is the one which I alone at the outset initiated and it’s my intent to realize this goal.


Solomon, Interview with Komine, September 24, 2003; Winston Lord, Interview with Komine, October 15, 2003; and Peter Rodman, Interview with Komine, October 21, 2003; Foot, Interview with Komine, July 13, 2004; Tucker, Interview with Komine, October 1, 2003; and Shambaugh, Interview with Komine, October 8, 2003.

Foot, *The Practice of Power*, p.103.

Memcon, Nixon and Zhou, February 24, 1972, p.10. Memoranda for the President, “Beginning February 20, 1972,” Box 87, President’s Office Files (POF), NPMS, NA. During the height of the
In essence, Nixon viewed the materialization of diplomatic normalization as the beginning of long and complex process to integrate China into the international system.

1.4. China issue during the 1968 Presidential Election Campaign

During the presidential campaign in 1968, Nixon’s public statements on the China issue reflected two contradictory aspects of his view. On the one hand, Nixon continued to maintain a firm attitude towards China’s aggression, and thus denied any immediate possibility of recognizing the Beijing regime. In October 1968, Nixon remarked that:

I would not recognize red China now and I would not agree to admitting it to the U.N. and I would not go along with those well-intended people that said, “Trade with them, because that will change them.” Because doing it now would only encourage them, the hardliners in Peking and the hardline policy that they’re following. And it would have an immense effect on discouraging great numbers of non-communists elements in Free Asia that are now just beginning to develop their strength and their own confidence.\(^8^0\)

On the other hand, Nixon expressed the view that, in the long run, Washington should begin a new dialogue with Beijing. On August 9, 1968, after obtaining the Cultural Revolution, Chairman Mao had not only already read Nixon’s writings, including the October 1967 *Foreign Affairs* article, but also followed a number of America’s newspaper accounts of the policy reassessment progressing in the State Department. See Richard H. Solomon, *Chinese Negotiating Behavior: Pursuing Interests Through ‘Old Friends’* (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1999), p.48; and Chen, *Mao’s China*, pp.238-239.

nomination for the Republican Presidential candidacy, Nixon stated that: “We must not forget China. We must always seek opportunities to talk with her, as with the USSR.... We must not only watch for changes. We must seek to make changes.”

Since the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, the tension between Beijing and Moscow increased further along their shared border areas. On September 17, 1968, the United States proposed a resumption of the Warsaw ambassadorial talks. On November 8, New China News Agency (NCNA) article described U.S. election as “cut-throat competition” between various cliques of “Monopoly Capitalism,” and all these groups are “jackals of the same lair” and equally incapable of saving U.S. “from fate of utter defeat.” On November 15, 1968, the U.S. government proposed postponing the next Warsaw meeting until next February after being unable to obtain any answer from the Chinese on their intentions with respect to the scheduled November 20 meeting. On November 26, 1968, Beijing responded by proposing a Sino-U.S. Ambassadorial talk at Warsaw to take place on February 20, 1969. Beijing added a “very significant” statement in the eyes of U.S. officials: “It has always been the policy of the People’s Republic of China to maintain

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81 U.S. News & World Report, September 16, 1968, p.48. Reflecting the policy review within the Johnson administration for “containment without necessarily isolation,” Democrat presidential candidate, Herbert Humphrey also advocated such specific moves as 1) the lifting of the ban on exports of non-strategic goods, 2), the promotion of exchange of scholars, journalists, and technicians, and 3) the clarification of the U.S. intention to welcome China’s participation in the international community. Herbert Humphrey, Interview with Asahi Shim bun, October 22, 1968, Translated and transmitted by American Embassy in Tokyo, October 31, 1968 to Bryce Harlow, Office of President Elect Nixon, The Pierre Hotel, New York, HAK Administrative & Staff Files, Box 1, Transition, Nov 1968 - Jan 1969, Henry A. Kissinger’s Office Files (HAKOF), NSCF, NPMS, NA.

82 As for China’s criticism of the Soviet Union after its invasion of Czechoslovakia as a “social-imperialist” state, see Chen, Mao’s China and the Cold War, pp.242-243. Shambaugh explains that there are two types of rules in Chinese governance, benevolent rule “Wan” and coercive rule “Ba.” The Soviet Union was announced as “Ba” - hegemon. The difference between hegemony and imperialism is that while hegemony is a “type of behavior,” imperialism is a “stage of government’s governance system.” Thus, one can have a “socialist state that is hegemonic.” And one can also have a “capitalist state that is hegemonic.” However, one cannot have a “socialist state that is imperialist theoretically.” Nevertheless, the Chinese called the Soviets “social-imperialists” because when they charged, they realized that the real meaning was “social hegemonism.” Shambaugh, Interview with Komine, October 15, 2003.

friendly relations with all states, regardless of social systems, on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence." Finally, the Chinese urged the United States to "withdraw all its armed forces from China's Taiwan Province and the Taiwan Straits."

During the meeting with Kissinger on November 25, 1968, Nixon mentioned his concern about the "need to re-evaluate" U.S. policy toward China, and urged Kissinger to read the October 1967 *Foreign Affairs* article. Winston Lord assesses that China was one of the "three real priorities" of Nixon, along with Vietnam and Russia. By 1968, Nixon had a personal interest in seeking an opening towards China, though he had not yet formulated the precise methods and timing of a new initiative. It is likely that Nixon tactically manipulated his political image and utilized ideological rhetoric with a practical aim. In reality, although many of its older generation passed away, the China Lobby still had influence, particularly in the Republican Party. Thus, Nixon was still concerned about the "backlash" from pro-Taiwan conservative supporters, such as Anna Chennault, the widow of Claire L.

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86 Nixon, *RN*, p.341. In his memoirs, however, Kissinger does not refer to Nixon's suggestion to read his *Foreign Affairs* article. Lord recalls that: "I don't know whether Kissinger talked about China with Nixon during the transition. I suspect they did. Before he took office, Kissinger independently saw the advantages of opening to China. Nixon certainly saw the value of it. And, in fact, they may have talked about it. I would think they would have." Lord, Interview with Komine, October 15, 2003.

87 Lord, Interview with Komine, October 15, 2003. After the victory in the presidential election on November 5, 1968, Nixon held private talks and telephone conversations with President Johnson on the succession of the policy issues and options. On December 12, 1968, Johnson and Nixon met alone in the Oval Office – the only occasion during November and December when they met alone. Document 331, *FRUS, 1964-1968 Volume XIV, Soviet Union* (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 2001). Although no official record of the talk is found by the State Department's historians, William Bundy introduces an episode (which presumably took place in their December 12 talk) from his personal files: "Johnson had told Nixon that he was prepared to go ahead with these measures [the resumption of Warsaw Ambassadorial talks and the lifting of travel and trade restrictions] on his own responsibility, but that if Nixon preferred, he would refrain from taking action and simply turn them over to the incoming administration to use as it saw fit. Nixon replied that he preferred the latter course." Bundy, *A Tangled Web*, p. 103.

Chennault, an adviser to Chiang Kai-shek during the Second World War, Walter Judd, former medical missionary in China and Congressman, and Ray Cline, former CIA officer and CIA station chief in Taipei.8 9

Finally, there is one interesting point, which is related to Nixon’s long experience of foreign affairs. During the 1950s and 1960s, Nixon had already met almost all the major political leaders in the world, and he had visited most Asian countries. China remained the only major state which Nixon had not visited, and Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai were two of the few world leaders whom Nixon had not met. Thus, before entering the office, Nixon had developed a strong personal interest in obtaining the sole credit for the historic opening to China.

2. Henry A. Kissinger’s role in U.S. rapprochement with China

2.1. Kissinger as a theorist for new administration’s foreign policy philosophy

Henry A. Kissinger came to office with his experiences as an academic over 15 years at Harvard and also as a consultant to the Democrat administrations during the 1960s. In essence, he provided the fundamental “intellectual framework” for the new administration’s foreign policy.90

In his early writings, Kissinger defines an international order as “legitimate” if all the major states agree about the “nature of workable arrangements and about the permissible aims and methods of foreign policy”; he defines it as “revolutionary” if

89 Lord, Interview with Komine, October 15, 2003; and Foot, Interview with Komine, July 13, 2004.
one or more of the major dissatisfied states refuses to cope with other states in accordance with the conventional rules of state relations. In a legitimate international order, status quo states are principally concerned with their security, and there is a tendency for the pursuit of equilibrium on the basis of the practice of balance of power. Hence, stability is a consequence of generally accepted legitimacy. A legitimate international order does not prevent conflicts, but it limits the scope of them.

By the late 1960s, owing to the prolonged open-ended containment policy of the monolithic threat of Communism, the United States was in relative economic, military, and psychological decline. In his article of 1968, a year before he entered the government, Kissinger presented his perspective on the newly emerging political multipolarity. He argued that military bipolarity caused rigidity: "A bipolar world loses the perspective for nuance; a gain for one side appears as an absolute loss for the other. Every issue seems to involve a question of survival." Political multipolarity would not necessarily guarantee stability, but it would reduce rigidity and provide greater opportunities for developing "an agreed concept of order" in the contemporary international system. The great powers had to exercise power with restraint, and also restrain the actions of less cooperative states in order to maintain the stabilizing equilibrium of the system. Kissinger believed that although overwhelming military strength would remain with the two superpowers, a pluralistic world was in U.S. long-

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93 Ibid., p.57.
term interest.

In order to re-adjust U.S. power resources to a new international situation, Kissinger urged a pragmatic conception of foreign policy, namely the re-assessment of the national interests in military, political, economic, and psychological terms. Accordingly, the Nixon administration advocated that America’s new initiative should be based on “a realistic assessment of our and others’ interests,” proclaiming: “Our interests must shape our commitments, rather than the other way around.”94 The Nixon administration sought to promote “mutual self-restraint” among states to accommodate conflicting national interests “through negotiation rather than confrontation.”95 It was this particular issue of self-restraint that was the fundamental requirement for the balance of power among states.

2.2. Kissinger’s balance of power in theory

Kissinger has often explained the U.S. opening to China in terms of maintaining a balance of power: “It was not to collude against the Soviet Union but to give us a balancing position to use for constructive ends – to give each Communist power a stake in better relations with us. Such an equilibrium could assure stability among the major powers.”96 He argues that the traditional criteria of balance of power were

territorial; military power was considered as the final recourse. However, he
maintains that in a nuclear age, power cannot automatically be translated into
influence, and it is difficult to use power diplomatically. Managing a military
balance of power required vigilance on two levels: “being strong enough not only
strategically with nuclear power but also locally with conventional arms.”

In theory, Kissinger’s concept of balance of power evolved from the intellectual
base of the traditional/classical realist school. Realists perceive states as the main
actors in international relations, and the international system as the most important
level of analysis. On the international level, the most crucial factor is the permanent
existence of the struggle for power among states. In the absence of any central
authority maintaining order, states seek to maintain and enhance power, especially
militarily, to secure their survival. States also practice balance of power in order to
prevent the emergence of a predominant state in the international system. Hans
Morgenthau suggests that the balance of power takes four forms: 1) a policy aimed at
certain state affairs, 2) an actual state of affairs, 3) an approximately equal distribution
of power, and 4) any distribution of power. Balance of power functions only when
states recognize “the same rules of the game” and act “for the same limited stakes” in

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98 Ibid., pp.61-62.
99 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 62.
order to achieve "international stability and national independence." Finally, it is necessary to distinguish between the balance of power as a policy of a state to prevent the emergence of predominant power and the balance of power as a system within which the state interactions prevent the predominance of any one state.

Reflecting the diffusion of power resources and the emergence of economic interdependence among states from the late 1960s and the early 1970s, the neo-realist school advanced the analysis of balance of power by emphasizing "structure." Structure is defined as the interrelationship of states composing the international system. The international political system is defined by anarchy and differentiated by the distribution of power capabilities in military, political, and economic terms among sovereign states. There is a strong tendency towards balance within the system, and the expectation is that balance, once disrupted, will be restored in one way or the other. A state thus reacts to the emergence of a more powerful state by counterbalancing - either to enhance its own power or to align itself with an opposing state or group of states. Structure imposes constraints on states' behavior.

In sum, the balance of power is a rule-based system, inseparable from diplomatic practice as a policy, which restrains the sources of instability, limits the scope of conflicts, and brings relative stability in which no single state or group of states would be in a permanent position to determine the fate of others. Kissinger's concept of balance of power system evolved as a central characteristic of the loosening military bipolarity and the emerging political multipolarity from the late 1960s to the early 1970s. Kissinger's concept of balance of power regarding the U.S. rapprochement

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102 Ibid., pp.189-190.
103 Ibid.
with China can be defined as the application of realist logic to exploit the deepening Sino-Soviet hostility, which led to the development of triangular relations between the U.S., USSR, and China. Accordingly, Kissinger’s practice of balance of power policy toward U.S. rapprochement with China needs to be clarified.

2.3. Kissinger’s balance of power in practice

Kissinger has been very critical of academic experts on China. For example, during the transitional period, a group of academic experts from Harvard and Massachusetts Institute of Technology sent a memorandum to President-Elect Nixon. These experts examined the implications of the U.S.-Soviet-PRC relations:

Implicit in the foregoing suggestions is the hope that the new Administration will attempt to view Sino-American relations as a separate problem from Soviet-American problem, though inevitably a related problem. The Sino-Soviet split provides us with an opportunity to treat each party separately and to scrutinize our national interests in each relationship with care. We urge that the new Administration, in its proper concern with the bilateral super-power balance, avoid judgments about China and its development that derive from Moscow’s views of Peking. A Soviet-American alliance against Peking may serve Russian’s interests; but it may not automatically serve U.S. national interests.

Kissinger criticizes that these experts missed the geopolitical perspective “with respect to the Soviet Union that the Chinese might have an incentive to move toward

106 Ibid., p. 30765.
us without American concessions but their need for American counterweight to the Soviet Union.” In other words, Kissinger condemned their proposal for its failure to explore the linkage among the three states and the possible U.S. leverage within the context of Sino-Soviet hostility.

In October 1969, Kissinger’s NSC staff assessed that the diffusion of independent political activity among states had encouraged the loosening of Cold War military bipolarity. For example, Western Europe and Japan, sought much more independence from the superpowers in policies and national will. However, this diffusion had not yet taken the “form of the emergence of significant new centers of military power,” such as the destruction of alliances, major realignments or the consolidation of new groupings among states. The only notable exception, the Sino-Soviet alliance, had become a deep rivalry and created a “tripolar relationship” in which (a) the U.S., USSR, and the PRC respectively had an interest in preventing the other two states cooperating, (b) the Soviets had parallel interests with the U.S. in containing China, (c) the U.S. ability to achieve closer relations with China and to exploit Moscow’s fear of a U.S.-Chinese rapprochement was limited.

The most comprehensive explanation of the multipolar balance of power came from President Nixon during his interview with Time magazine in January 1972:

107 Kissinger, White House Years, p.165. Italic in original. Despite his personal antipathy toward academia, Kissinger was still “interested in what the scholars thought” on China. Levin, “China Policy and the National Security Council,” p.9, NSCP-OHR. For example, in April 1969, Kissinger and the NSC staff organized a meeting with 48 scholars. As for the options for China policy, a NSC staff member Richard Sneider sought to obtain expertise view on: 1) what the long-range U.S. objective on dealing with China should be; and 2) what concrete steps the U.S. might take toward these objectives. Memo from Sneider to Kissinger, “Tentative Schedule for April 12 Meeting,” April 9, 1969, p.1, Box H-299, NSC Vol. II, 4/1/69-5/30/69 [2 of 2], NSCIF, NPMS, NA.

We must remember the only time in the history of the world that we have had any extended periods of peace is when there has been balance of power. It was when one nation becomes infinitely more powerful in relation to its potential competitor that the danger of war arises. So I believe in a world in which the United States is powerful. I think it will be a safer world and a better world if we have a strong, healthy United States, Europe, Soviet Union, China, Japan each balancing the other, not playing one against the other, an even balance.  

On February 14, 1972, three days before Nixon’s departure to China, Kissinger provided his assessment of the future role of China within the triangular diplomacy:

For the next 15 years we have to lean the Chinese against the Russians. We have to play this balance of power game totally unemotionally. Right now, we need the Chinese to correct the Russians, and to discipline the Russians. …Our concern with China right now, in my view Mr. President, is to use it as a counterweight to Russia, not for its local policy. …The fact that it doesn’t have a global policy is an asset to us, the fact that it doesn’t have global strength yet—and to prevent Russia from gobbling it up. If Russia dominates China, that would be a fact of such tremendous significance.

In sum, Kissinger’s practice of the balance of power policy toward the U.S. rapprochement with China can be defined as the diplomatic practice of using the weaker China as a counterweight against the stronger Soviet Union in the Sino-Soviet rivalry, while publicly seeking to create an appearance of taking an even-handed political approach toward the two communist giants. Accordingly, it should be examined how Kissinger developed his view on U.S. China policy before 1969.

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109 President Richard M. Nixon, Interview with Time, January 3, 1972, p.3. As Secretary of State, Kissinger came to realize the emergence of the balance of power at different levels: “In the military sphere, there are two superpowers. In economic terms, there are at least five major groupings. Politically, many more centers of influence have emerged.” Henry A. Kissinger, Address to the Pacem in Terris III Conference, Washington, October 8, 1973, Cited in Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, p.282.

110 Conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, February 14, 1972, 4:09-6:19p.m., Oval Office, OVAL 671-1, White House Tapes, NA.
2.4. Kissinger’s early views on China

Kissinger was originally not an Asia or China expert, and thus he approached China “from his experience as a European politics specialist.”111 In his memoirs, although admitting: “China had not figured extensively in my own writings,” Kissinger still emphasizes the importance of his role in the composition of the draft of Nelson Rockefeller’s presidential campaign speech of May 1, 1968 which proposed “a dialogue with Communist China.”112 In particular, the speech suggested the possible development of a “subtle triangle” of relations between Washington, Beijing, and Moscow: “we improve the possibilities of accommodation with each as we increase our options toward both.”113 Former NSC staff members, Lord and Rodman point out the importance of this speech.114 Rodman perceives Kissinger’s suggestion as “independent of Nixon’s.”115

In reality, however, Kissinger’s early writings failed to show depth on the changing nature of the Sino-Soviet relations, and America’s China policy was never discussed independently. In the late 1950s, Kissinger considered China as a “revolutionary”

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113 Kissinger, White House Years, p.165; and Idem, Diplomacy, p.721. The intellectual origins of Kissinger’s policies toward Sino-Soviet relations, what was to be known as the triangular diplomacy on the basis of the balance of power concept, can be traced back to his early writings. In a study of the European balance of power after the Napoleonic upheavals, Kissinger praised Metternich for placing Austria in a position among its rivals where it served as “the pivotal state” so that “the differences of the major powers among each other were greater than their respective differences with Austria.” Henry A. Kissinger, A World Restored, p.247. Kissinger also analysed Bismarck’s proposal to “manipulate the commitments of the other powers so that Prussia would always be closer to any of the contending parties than they were to each other.” Henry A. Kissinger, “White Revolutionary: Reflections on Bismarck,” Daedelus, XCVII (Summer 1968), pp.912-913.
114 Lord, Interview with Komine, October 15, 2003; and Rodman, Interview with Komine, October 21, 2003.
115 Rodman, Interview with Komine, October 21, 2003.
power along with the Soviet Union. He referred to the U.S. primary task of “dividing” the Sino-Soviet alliance: the Sino-Soviet relations might become “cooler,” if the U.S. sought to pressure the two communist states to take risks where only one stood to benefit.

In the early 1960s, Kissinger cautiously argued that the possibility of a “rift” between Communist China and the U.S.S.R “must not be overlooked.” He hinted that “if it [a rift] occurs we should take advantage of it rather than force the erstwhile partners into a new alliance through intransigence. Our diplomacy cannot have as a goal what we can only treat as a fortunate event.” Therefore, Kissinger had failed to explore sufficiently the seriousness and complexity of Sino-Soviet hostility.

By the mid-1960s, Kissinger acknowledged the fact of a Sino-Soviet split; he suggested that it was “insoluble” owing to the two parties’ conflicts over doctrinal issues. It was De Gaulle who sought to play off the weaker Communist China as a “counterweight” to the stronger Soviet Union. However, Kissinger still tended to regard China as an “objective threat” to U.S. “global responsibilities.”

In his memoirs, Kissinger argues that there was a tendency in the new administration to view China as an aggressive power:

Originally, we had not thought reconciliation possible. We were convinced that the Chinese were fanatic and hostile. But even though we could not initially see a way to achieve it, both Nixon and I believed in the importance of an opening to the People’s Republic of China.

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117 Ibid., pp.148-149.
119 Ibid.
121 Ibid., pp.59-60. In 1964, France became the first Western state which recognized the People's Republic of China.
122 Kissinger, *White House Years*, p.163.
However, the above statement is misleading, because as previously suggested, it was Nixon who came to suggest the importance of opening a dialogue with China by 1967. In Solomon’s assessment, Nixon estimated that the Soviet Union was a “much greater threat” than China. Moreover, Nixon was coming to power at the time when the country was “torn apart by Vietnam.” And he did “not want to fall into the trap where Lyndon Johnson was trapped, and his presidency was destroyed by the Vietnam conflict.” Thus, when Nixon was talking about the “secret plan for ending the Vietnam War, a critical element of that was including the relations with China.” On the contrary, Kissinger saw China as a “real threat” to the U.S. and regarded the Vietnam War as a “trap drifting resources and political attentions away from the Soviet problem.” Thus, Solomon concludes that: “Nixon was several years ahead of Kissinger.”

In February 1972, Kissinger admitted to Mao and Zhou that: “We thought all socialist/communist states were the same phenomenon. We didn’t understand until the President came to the office the different nature of revolution in China and the way revolution developed in other socialist states.” Thus, in 1968 and 1969, Kissinger still viewed China as much more aggressive than the Soviet Union.

Kissinger claims that, despite some differences in opinion, he and Nixon came to realize that the development of triangular relations between the United States, the

124 Ibid.
125 Memcon, Mao, Zhou, Nixon, and Kissinger, February 21, 1972, p.8, CHINA – President’s Talks with Mao&Chou En-lai, February 1972, Box 91, Country Files – Far East, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
Soviet Union and China would provide "a great strategic opportunity for peace."\textsuperscript{126} Lord argues that: "Each one came to office, considering the benefits of opening to China with respect to primarily the Soviet Union and Vietnam, and Asia in general."\textsuperscript{127} In reality, however, Kissinger was not initially interested in China, and remained "skeptical" about any quick move toward China during the early months of the new administration. Kissinger perceived the China issue in terms of its short and mid term relationship to Sino-Soviet rift. Thus, for Kissinger, China policy was initially a part of a much broader Soviet policy.\textsuperscript{128} Nixon believed that "ending the isolation of 800 million Chinese itself removed a great threat to peace."\textsuperscript{129} Thus, Nixon was convinced that, even without the growing Soviet military threat, it was still "essential" to open towards China, while China was still physically weak rather than waiting until later when China would have less need of a relationship with the United States.\textsuperscript{130} It was Nixon's determination that drove the initiative, and Kissinger brought the initiative to fruition and fit into a triangular global balance framework.\textsuperscript{131}

3. The Nixon-Kissinger Leadership

One of the main reasons why the opening to China was conducted "very secretly" was because Nixon and Kissinger were afraid that if it became public, the "public and political reaction could have killed off the initiative before it began."\textsuperscript{132} Paradoxically,

\textsuperscript{126} Kissinger, \textit{White House Years}, p.164.
\textsuperscript{127} Lord, Interview with Komine, October 15, 2003.
\textsuperscript{128} Rodman, Interview with Komine, October 21, 2003; and Tucker, Interview with Komine, October 1, 2003.
\textsuperscript{129} Kissinger, \textit{White House Years}, p.164.
\textsuperscript{131} Tucker, Interview with Komine, October 1, 2003.
\textsuperscript{132} Solomon, Interview with Komine, September 24, 2003.
it was Nixon’s life long background as a “staunch anti-Communist” that provided a strong basis within the U.S. domestic political context to open a new dialogue with Communist China.\textsuperscript{133} On the other hand, Kissinger admits the relative weakness of his position in the early period: “I did not have the political strength or bureaucratic clout to pursue such a fundamental shift of policy on my own.”\textsuperscript{134} Moreover, as the briefing books for his October 1971 trip to Beijing indicated, Kissinger anticipated that domestic political reactions to a new China initiative would be “manageable.”\textsuperscript{135} With his past credentials and his following from the right and center, Nixon was “much less vulnerable to attack than would be more leftist figures” in American society. Thus, the President was probably the “only leader who could carry through this policy.”\textsuperscript{136} Kissinger explained to Zhou in October 1971 that Nixon asked him to “reaffirm in the strongest terms his personal commitment” to the improvements in relations between the U.S. and China.\textsuperscript{137} Finally, during the Nixon-Mao meeting on February 21, 1972, Kissinger admitted that: “It was the President who set the direction and worked out of the plan.”\textsuperscript{138}

Regarding the actual policy operational process, Kissinger emphasizes that once the President set “a policy direction,” he left it to the National Security Adviser “to implement the strategy and manage the bureaucracy.”\textsuperscript{139} Ambrose evaluates Kissinger’s role “as agent, tool, and sometimes adviser, not as a generator of ideas”:

\textsuperscript{133} Ibid; and Lord, Interview with Komine, October 15, 2003.
\textsuperscript{134} Kissinger, \textit{White House Years}, p.163.
\textsuperscript{135} Opening Meeting, HAK Talking Points, p.6, Briefing book for HAK’s Oct. 1971 trip POLO II [Part I], For the President’s Files (Winston Lord) – China Trip/Vietnam, Box 850, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
\textsuperscript{136} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{137} Memcon, Kissinger and Zhou, October 20, 1971, 4:40-7:10 p.m., p.3, HAK visit to PRC October 1971 Memcons - originals, For the President’s Files – China/Vietnam Negotiations, Box 1035, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
\textsuperscript{138} Memcon, February 21, 1972, p.3, CHINA – President’s Talks with Mao & Chou En-lai February 1972, Box 91, Country Files – Far East, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
\textsuperscript{139} Kissinger, \textit{White House Years}, p.163. See also Kissinger, \textit{Years of Renewal}, p.47, pp.61-62.
"The basic thrust of Nixon's innovations came from the President, not the National Security Adviser." Haig assesses Nixon as a "strategic thinker of historic dimensions" and Kissinger as a "brilliantly gifted diplomatic tactician carrying Nixon's ideas forward."

Interestingly, Edgar Snow's interview with Premier Zhou shows that the Chinese knew about Kissinger through their intelligence system and through reading of his writings. "Kissinger?" Zhou said, "There is a man who knows the language of both worlds - his own and ours. He is the first American we have seen in his position. With him, it should be possible to talk." Finally, during a meeting with Zhou in February 1972, President Nixon described Kissinger's role:

I think that one thing which Dr. Kissinger has greatly contributed in his services to my administration is his philosophic views. He takes the long view, which is something I try to do also, except sometimes my schedule is so filled with practical matters and decisions on domestic and foreign policy that I don't have as much time to take the long term view as he does.

In Winston Lord's assessment, Nixon and Kissinger "divided labor very skilfully; Nixon was providing fundamental guidance. Kissinger was a skilful negotiator and an operator, as well as a strategist."

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141 Haig, *Inner Circles*, p.204.

142 Zhou Enlai, Interview with Edgar Snow (conducted on November 5, 1970), *Life*, July 30, 1971 p.3. After the July 1971 secret talks, Zhou privately commented on Kissinger, "very intelligent - indeed a Dr."

Chen, *Mao's China and the Cold War*, p.266.

143 Memcon, February 26, 1972, p.16, Box 87, POF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.

144 Lord, Interview with Komine, October 15, 2003.
China relations.\textsuperscript{145} Based on his vision, Nixon held ultimate authority, making the final decision for a new initiative. Kissinger was a dynamic theorist and tactician, very skillfully conducting a series of crucial negotiations. In reality, however, Nixon and Kissinger still needed the foreign policy decision-making machinery and bureaucratic expertise on America's China policy, as the following chapter examines.

\textsuperscript{145} Ibid; Solomon, Interview with Komine, September 24, 2003; and Isaacson, \textit{Kissinger}, p.353. Holdridge recalls that: "I'm sure Nixon respected Kissinger for his intellectual capabilities, but the respect did not necessarily mean a warm and intimate friendship." John Holdridge, Oral History Interview, p.108, July 20, 1995, FAOHC.
Chapter 2. Foreign Policy Decision Making Machinery for the U.S.

Rapprochement with China

This chapter examines the revitalization of the National Security Council system as the principal decision-making machinery for the pursuit of strict secrecy by Nixon and Kissinger. In particular, it analyses the development of the systematic control of policy study papers by the Kissinger NSC and the subsequent exclusion of the State Department from the direct decision-making process. Finally, this study compares and contrasts the roles of the NSC staff and State Department officials for the U.S. policy towards China in greater detail. The existing diversity on policy options among foreign policy decision makers will be analyzed not as the mere extension of conflicting bureaucratic interests but as a more dynamic interplay among different geo-strategic perceptions reflecting a broader debate within the foreign policy decision-making circle.

1. Organization and Procedure for a New NSC System

1.1. Problems of the previous NSCs

During the transition period from November 1968 to January 1969, President-elect Nixon and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs designate Kissinger sought to re-vitalize the function of the National Security Council to identify the U.S.'s capabilities, interests, and objectives. In their meeting on

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1 The functions and responsibilities of the National Security Council were set forth in the National Security Act of 1947, and amended by the National Security Act Amendments of 1949. Its membership included the President, Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and other high officials, such as the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency as appropriate. See, for example,
November 25, 1968, President-elect Nixon talked with Kissinger about a “massive organizational problem.” Nixon did not trust the State Department bureaucracy because of his personal experiences: the Foreign Service disdained him as Vice President during the 1950s and ignored him as a private citizen during the 1960s. Nixon also believed that the State Department would “not hold secrets” and had some very conservative views in some areas that would “resist change.” In response, Kissinger recommended that if the President-elect intended to operate foreign policy on a “wide-ranging basis,” he would need to establish the best possible national security machinery within the White House that could plan, analyze, and review “policy options” systematically for him before making decisions.

Nixon and Kissinger wanted to establish a system which would enable them to be presented with all sides of any issues in the presence of all concerned. The President needed to understand not only the substantive background of the issues but also their bureaucratic histories and political implications because he would inevitably be surrounded “by advocates with strong, often institutional, and nearly always conflicting views.” The new administration thus needed a mechanism that would establish “clear, consistent, and feasible goals” in the national security field, which


5 As for the development of the Nixon-Kissinger NSC system, see NSC History: The Nixon Administration 1969-74 (http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/history.html#nixonn); Prados, Keepers of the Keys, pp.265-267, pp.277-283; and Kegley and Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy, pp.351-353.

would “translate” these goals into “specific programs” and “monitor the progress” of these programs.\(^7\)

Before entering office, Nixon and Kissinger already showed their respective views towards a highly bureaucratized foreign policy decision-making process. During the 1968 campaign, Republican Presidential candidate Nixon promised to “restore the National Security Council to its pre-eminent role in national security planning.”\(^8\) Kissinger criticized the combination of abstractness and rigidity resulting from traditional American idealism, insisting that foreign policy had to be based not on sentiment but on an assessment of strength. When policy became identified with the consensus of a committee, it was fragmented into a series of *ad hoc* decisions which made it difficult to achieve a sense of overall direction.\(^9\) Thus, the National Security Council was “less concerned with developing measures” in terms of “a well-understood national purpose than with adjusting the varying approaches of semi-autonomous departments.”\(^10\) In particular, Kissinger emphasized the importance of secrecy in the decision-making machinery:

One reason for keeping the decisions to small groups is when an unpopular decision may be fought by brutal means, such as “leaks” to the press or to congressional committees. The only way secrecy can be kept is to exclude from the making of the decision all those who are theoretically charged with carrying it out. In consequence, the relevance of the bureaucracy might continue to send out cables with great intensity, thereby distorting the effort with the best

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intentions in the world. You cannot stop them from doing this because you do not tell them what is going on.11

Hence, the Nixon transition staff reassessed the main problems of the National Security Council during previous administrations.12 President Truman was suspicious of congressional intent in establishing the NSC system, which might have restricted his flexibility of action. Thus, he initially restricted its policy role and began to pay substantive attention to its function only after the outbreak of the Korean War.13

President Eisenhower institutionalized the NSC into a large and highly structured body, with formal procedures, staff systems, and interdepartmental relationships.14 It appeared, however, that the Eisenhower administration’s NSC mechanism became very formalized, especially during its second term, because the machinery spent a long time to reach an interdepartmental consensus, which resulted in delays in getting staff papers to the Council, and many staff papers without clearly defining policy alternatives. As Vice President, Nixon was frustrated by Eisenhower’s practice of encouraging a consensus among the NSC principals before an issue reached the President for the final decision. Nixon wanted a system that was formal and orderly but not as rigid as the Eisenhower system and which moved authority from the departments to the White House.15

The Kennedy and Johnson Administrations maintained the NSC system in “name only,” downgrading its role as a continuing, objective entity and relying only on a few personal advisors. The Kennedy NSC was relatively informal, more flexible, and, in many respects, action rather than policy-oriented. The Johnson NSC was a combination of informal, issue-oriented committee, individual advisers, and the so-called “Tuesday Lunches” at the White House where current concerns were discussed in an unstructured and highly personalized manner. The Kennedy-Johnson national security policies thus relied too much on ad hoc planning which did not sufficiently engage the resources of the bureaucratic experts on the Council. In consequence, Kennedy-Johnson national security decision-making suffered from the “absence of systematic policy planning,” the “weakness of procedures for inter-agency coordination,” and the “lack of continuous assessment of short and long range objectives.”

1.2. Goodpaster’s memoranda

As for actual planning of a new NSC system, at Nixon’s request, Kissinger consulted General Andrew Goodpaster, Eisenhower’s NSC Staff Secretary, and asked him to produce option papers. Goodpaster recommended strengthening the NSC as

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18 Halperin, Interview with Komine, June 10, 2004. See also Kissinger, White House Years, pp.41-44; and Idem, Years of Renewal (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999), pp.72-76. As Staff Secretary of the NSC during the Eisenhower administration, Goodpaster was responsible for the flow of matters on security and international activities between the President and the departments and agencies. The roles of Staff Secretary and National Security Adviser were combined during the Kennedy-Johnson NSCs. Goodpaster to Kissinger, “Security Affairs Staff Responsibilities Under President Eisenhower,” December 12, 1968, pp.1-2, HAK-ASF, Box 1, Transition, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
the President’s “highest deliberative, advisory and policy-formulating body.”\textsuperscript{19} The system should formulate “broad and far-reaching conceptions of a long-range character” and provide the “main structure of the nation’s approach to its international and security problems.”\textsuperscript{20} Its policy process should provide “coherence and reasoned dynamism, together with a sense of direction, to the whole complex of policy and action.”\textsuperscript{21} Goodpaster recommended that in order to decrease bureaucratic friction, the control of agenda creation should be managed by the White House, and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs should run the key committees.\textsuperscript{22} It was crucial to impose some degree of order on the flow of information and action papers to and from the President and to have that supervised by the National Security Adviser who should be fully familiar with the President’s views, priorities, and interests.

The new NSC structure appeared similar to the one Eisenhower used in terms of its structure for systematic analysis of policy options. Goodpaster recalls Eisenhower’s statement: “Plans are nothing, but planning is everything” which emphasized the importance of preparatory work, giving all departments and agencies concerned a chance to present respective positions and bringing together all of the relevant facts.\textsuperscript{23} Regarding Nixon’s view, Goodpaster assesses that: “he put a real value on the way


\textsuperscript{20} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{22} The idea of White House control of the NSC agenda was reinforced when Goodpaster and Kissinger consulted with former President Eisenhower at Walter Reed Army Hospital in December 1968. Eisenhower insisted that the Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG) structure (which was established in 1967 and chaired by the Under Secretary of State) should be abolished because the Defense Department would never like taking orders from the State Department. Kissinger, \textit{White House Years}, p.43; and Idem, \textit{Years of Renewal}, p.75.

that had been done during the Eisenhower time.” While Eisenhower “intended to maintain control through laying down the policies, main guiding policies, and then allowing that to evolve as the years went on,” Nixon “personally intended to take an active part in major initiatives that could reshape the relationships – major relationships in the world – particularly the relationships among the great powers.”

Goodpaster thus emphasizes that it was not just a Presidential control of foreign policy, but that Nixon was going to “direct” it and “engage” himself in it.

1.3. Halperin’s memorandum

Kissinger also asked Morton Halperin to produce a memorandum on how the analysis of bureaucratic politics could be applied to national security and foreign policy decision-making.

In theory, bureaucratic politics analysts focus on the politics of a government, where foreign policy decision-making is characterized as a resultant of a bargaining process among a multitude of bureaucracies with competing viewpoints and possessing different amounts of power within the national governmental hierarchy. Thus,

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24 Ibid., pp.4-5.
policy-making is a matter of widening the base of support within the executive branch through the constant modification of the proposed policy. Concessions are made toward potential allies to satisfy their interests and overcome their objections to establishing a majority intradepartmental coalition. A major characteristic of policy-making is its time-consuming nature.

In practice, there were two fundamental issues to the new NSC system: who would control the agenda and the flow of policy papers; and who would chair key NSC subcommittees. Halperin proposed two major changes. The first proposal, also reflecting General Goodpaster's view, was to eliminate the Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG), which was chaired by the Undersecretary of State and was in charge of reviewing all options and proposals before they reached a formal NSC meeting. It would be replaced by a Review Group, chaired by the National Security Adviser, which would give Kissinger: the power to approve any papers submitted to the President by departments and agencies; and the control of the agenda for NSC meeting. Halperin's other proposal was to give the National Security Adviser the power to direct National Security Study Memorandum (NSSMs, which were pronounced NIZ-ums) to departments and agencies. These directives would become a key tool for Kissinger to decide which policies should be reconsidered, when they would be placed on the agenda, and how they would be discussed. It would also allow him to use the bureaucracy without revealing his real purposes as well as to conduct negotiations secretly. In short, the new NSC system emphasized two principal objectives of the President: the retention of control over foreign policy decision-

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28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
making at the top of the system; and the systematic development of clear policy analysis and alternative choices.

1.4. Objections from the Defense Department and the State Department

Kissinger sent his memorandum on the new NSC system to Nixon, which he privately approved. On December 28, 1968, Nixon summoned Secretary of State-designate William Rogers and Secretary of Defense-designate Melvin Laird to Key Biscayne to discuss the Kissinger Plan. After the discussion, Nixon gave the final approval of the plan. On December 28, 1968, the New York Times reported that President-elect Nixon intended to “enlarge the role of National Security Council.” In his memorandum to departments and agencies on January 16, 1969, Kissinger made clear the flow of policy papers under the control of NSC:

All communication directed to the President originating in executive departments and agencies, including those from department and agency heads, should be delivered to the office of the Assistant for National Security Affairs. The NSC office under the direction of the Assistant to the President will establish secretariat control of all incoming papers prior to forwarding them to the office of the President. National security papers which the president asked upon or otherwise disposed of will be preceded out of the President Secretariat to the NSC office. Any subsequent actions required, such as the relay of Presidential decisions, return of signed correspondence or follow-up on Presidential comments will be accompanied under the direction of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

31 Memorandum for Executive Departments and Agencies, Attached to Memo from Kissinger to Haldeman, “Arrangements for Secretariat Control of National Security Papers,” January 16, 1969, HAK-ASF, Box 1, Transition, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
In reality, however, the State Department and the Defense Department were not entirely convinced of the newly increased role of the National Security Adviser.

Secretary of Defense-designate Laird objected to a “closed loop” in which “all intelligence inputs would be channelled through a single source” - the Assistant and his NSC staff. Such an arrangement would isolate not only the President from direct access to intelligence community outputs, but also the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and other key members of the President’s team. Laird also objected that the proposal would place in the hands of the Assistant and his NSC staff the primary right of initiating studies and directing where they would be performed as well as determining which policy issues should be placed on the agenda for NSC meetings. Laird thus suggested that there should be some “consultation” with the NSC principals to establish the priorities of these studies. The principals should be able to place policy issues on the agenda subject only to the veto of the President.

Secretary of State-designate Rogers had agreed to the general outline in Key Biscayne. However, “in light of the objections of his Foreign Service subordinates,” Rogers wanted to reserve judgement, which Kissinger commented: “It would not be helpful to begin the Administration with a bureaucratic disagreement.” In their memorandum to the President-elect, State Department officials insisted that it should be the principal responsibility of the State Department to define and formulate the issues, and to bring them to the attention of the President. In foreign policy decision-making, the Secretary of State must have authority not only over the State Department, but also over other departments. In particular, State Department officials

33 Kissinger to Nixon, “NSC Procedures,” January 7, 1969, p.1, HAK-ASF, Box 1, Transition, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
insisted that policy papers prepared by NSC Interdepartmental Groups for the NSC should be transmitted through the Secretary of State to the NSC Review Group.\textsuperscript{34} The Secretary of State, through the Under Secretaries Committee, must review papers on their way to the NSC to ensure all options were adequately examined, and the NSC should be seen primarily as an appeal board for when departments disagreed. In essence, the basic studies for NSSMs should be conducted at the assistant-secretary level of the State Department on an interagency basis, and then sent directly to the NSC Review Group.

Kissinger criticized that the State Department was unable to take the lead in managing interagency affairs because the Foreign Service, in training and background, was “inadequate” to the task of long-range planning and management, and that their forte was in “compromising differences,” and “avoiding a confrontation of conflicting point of view.”\textsuperscript{35} In particular, Kissinger argued that the State proposal would restrict the Interdepartmental Groups in preparing policy papers to the scope and context of State Department functions, rather than fully and directly giving them the broader perspective of Presidential security concerns.\textsuperscript{36} The only way the President could ensure that all options were examined, and all the arguments fairly presented, was to “have his own people” who were “responsive to him, and with a Presidential rather than departmental perspective” to oversee the preparation of the papers.\textsuperscript{37} Overall, the fundamental question was whether Nixon was going to have a State Department oriented system or an NSC oriented system. If the President wanted

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\textsuperscript{34} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{35} Ibid. As for State Department’s organizational and operational problems, see, for example, Kissinger, “Bureaucracy and Policymaking,” in Halperin and Kanter (eds.), \textit{Readings in American Foreign Policy}, p.89, pp.95-96; Spanier and Uslaner, \textit{American Foreign Policy Making and the Democratic Dilemmas}, pp.51-65; and Kegley and Wittkopf, \textit{American Foreign Policy}, pp.379-387.

\textsuperscript{36} Kissinger and Goodpaster to Nixon, (No date), p.1, HAK-ASF, Box 1, Transition, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.

\textsuperscript{37} Ibid.
to control policy, he had to control the policy-making machinery. Kissinger thus recommended to Nixon that the State proposal should be “rejected.”

Goodpaster had a meeting with Under Secretary of State-designate Elliot Richardson and the Under Secretary for Political Affairs-designate U. Alex Johnson. The fundamental confrontation with the State Department was “over control of the agenda and the exercise of chairmanship of the principal committees that would be established.” Finally, the conflict was resolved by enforcing Nixon’s decision, “overruling” the position of the State Department.

2. The Structure and Procedure of the New NSC System

The new National Security Council became the “principal forum” for consideration of policy issues requiring Presidential determination. The issues ranged from current crises and immediate operational problems to middle and long-range planning. At the Presidential direction and in consultation with the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, as the chief supervisory officer, was responsible for “determining” the agenda and

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38 Ibid.
40 Ibid., pp.3-4. Nixon urged that anyone who opposed his decision for the new NSC system “should submit his resignation.” See Kissinger, White House Years, p.46.
42 The Council met regularly, and discussions were limited to agenda subjects except in unusual circumstances. At the first NSC meeting, President Nixon stated that the NSC would meet two times a week during January. After January, meetings would be once a week. Within approximately four months, meetings should be conducted on a bi-monthly basis. NSC Meeting, January 21, 1969, Box H-300, NSC Organization [2 of 3], NSCF, NPMS, NA.
"ensuring" that the necessary papers were prepared.\textsuperscript{43} There was a continual flow of memoranda to and from the President, and Presidential requests to Kissinger fell into two main categories: 1) directives and 2) requests for more information. The Nixon-Kissinger NSC system was structurally three-tiered with the Council at the top, the NSC Review and Operational Groups in the middle, and the Interdepartmental Groups at the base.\textsuperscript{44}

Once the President, with recommendation from his National Security Adviser, determined that an issue involving interdepartmental considerations required analysis and Presidential decision, the NSC staff prepared a National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) to "direct" a study of the issue to one of the Interdepartmental Groups (IGs) chaired by the Assistant Secretary of State.\textsuperscript{45} The IGs drafted the basic paper for consideration by the NSC, defining the issue requiring Presidential decision, setting forth U.S. objectives, and outlining the advantages and disadvantages of the alternative courses of action.\textsuperscript{46} As a former NSC staff member, Winston Lord, recalls, at the beginning of the administration, there was a number of NSSMs being sent out asking for studies for two main reasons: one was a "genuine search for an intellectual path, analysis and preparation of options for policy by the various agencies," and the

\textsuperscript{43} NSDM2, "Reorganization of the National Security Council System," January 20, 1969, p.1, NSDMs, Box 363, SF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.

\textsuperscript{44} History of the NSC, (No date), p.1, NSC History Files (NSC-HF), Box H-314 [1 of 2], NSCIF, NPMS, NA.

\textsuperscript{45} National Security Decision Memorandum 1 (NSDM1), "Establishment of NSC Decision and Study Memoranda Series," January 20, 1969, p.1, NSDMs, Box 363, SF, NSCF, NPMS, NA. There were six Interdepartmental Regional Groups, such as Africa, Latin America, East Asia, Near and Middle East, Europe, Politico-Limitary - each chaired by the appropriate Assistant Secretary of State. History of the NSC, (No date), p.4, NSC-HF, Box H-314 [1 of 2], NSCIF, NPMS, NA.

\textsuperscript{46} NSDM2, "Reorganization of the National Security Council System," January 20, 1969, p.4, NSDMs, Box 363, SF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
other reason was to "put so much work on the bureaucracy and keep them so busy" that enabled Nixon and Kissinger to establish their control over U.S. foreign policy.47

After an IG meeting, the NSC staff prepared a Review Group meeting book which included the following items:

- Cover Memo, which briefly stated the subject of the meeting and pointed out any special problems of particular points;
- HAK Review Group Talking Points, which was in outline form including all the issues Kissinger should raise at the meeting. (The views of the NSC staff on the answer and the likely responses of other Review Group members was also indicated);
- Review Group paper, which was the paper as it was distributed to the other members of the Review Group. A summary was prepared and placed on top;
- Background Papers;
- NSSM;
- Memo Requesting NSC Briefings, which was a draft of a memorandum to relevant agencies requesting briefing for the NSC discussion of this subject;
- Issues for Decision.48

After the papers were examined in Pre-Review Group meeting, the Review Group, chaired by the National Security Adviser, met as a "planning board" to examine policy study papers "prior to" their submission to the NSC.49 The role of the Review Group was to "assure" that the issue under consideration was worthy of NSC attention; "all realistic alternatives" were presented; and the "facts" and "all

department and agency views” were fairly and adequately presented.\textsuperscript{50} In September 1970, the Review Group was re-named the Senior Review Group and raised from the Assistant to the Under-Secretary level.\textsuperscript{51} The Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG), chaired by the Assistant to the President, drafted contingency plans for possible crises, integrating the political and military requirements of crisis action on a daily basis.\textsuperscript{52} Solomon emphasizes the importance of the “preparatory activity” that preceded a formal NSC meeting “where the issues of who really trusts whom, and who’s really relying on whose judgment, and the pre-planning of positions gets worked out.”\textsuperscript{53}

Prior to the NSC meeting, the NSC staff prepared a briefing book for the President including:

- HAK Memo to the President - A brief memo summarizing what the issue was and calling any special problems to the attention of the President;
- Issues for Decision - An analytical paper summarizing the issues for decision from the Review Group paper, with recommendations on the issues;
- RN Talking Points - A brief memo including an introductory sentence, a list of the briefings, and an indication that Kissinger should be called on to discuss what the issues were;

\textsuperscript{50} NSDM2, “Reorganization of the National Security Council System,” January 20, 1969, p.2, NSDMs, Box 363, SF, NSCF, NPMS, NA. The membership of the Review Group included: The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Chairman); a representative of the Secretary of State; a representative of the Secretary of Defense; a representative of the Director of Central Intelligence; and a representative of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

\textsuperscript{51} National Security Decision Memorandum 85, “The National Security Council Senior Review Group,” September 14, 1970, Box 363, SF, NSCF, NPMS, NA. The Senior Review Group comprised: the Under Secretary of State; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Chairman). As for other interagency review groups in this category, the Verification Panel was formed to gather the essential facts relating to a number of important issues of strategic arms limitation, such as Soviet strategic capabilities. The Vietnam Special Studies Group (VSSG) examined the factors which would determine the course of Vietnamization.

\textsuperscript{52} The WSAG consisted of the Review Group (later the Senior Review Group), enlarged by additional military and intelligence specialists.

\textsuperscript{53} Richard Solomon, “The Nixon Administration National Security Council,” p.34, NSCP-OHR.
At the NSC meeting, with the President in the chair, the National Security Adviser outlined the issue and the alternative courses of action, and the President requested comments and recommendations from each NSC member. In addition to arguing for his own favored course of action, each NSC member had the opportunity to disprove the arguments of the other members with whom he did not agree. Nixon encouraged a “free give and take discussion” at NSC meeting, because he wished to hear “all” points of view rather than a “consensus recommendation.”

A former NSC staff member Helmut Sonnenfeldt explains that the roles of the NSC meetings were mainly to “keep the President’s options open” without allowing any officials to formulate a majority position, so that the President would not have to overrule other officials. Nixon and Kissinger were also “very careful not to show their cards” in the meeting. Thus, the President would “never decide at the meeting.” Nixon and Kissinger were also sensitive to the dangers of leakage. During the first NSC meeting on January 21, 1969, President Nixon emphasized the
importance of maintaining "the strictest security" with respect to the deliberation of the NSC and directed its members to inform their subordinates that "press leaks must be avoided."\textsuperscript{60}

After each NSC meeting, the NSC staff reviewed the records of it and presented their views and suggestions for a "follow-up" consideration by Nixon and Kissinger.\textsuperscript{61} Kissinger summarized the main issues of the staff recommendations as well as his views in a memorandum to the President. After his private talks with Kissinger, the President made his final decision. At this stage, the NSC staff prepared a National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDM) to "report" the contents of the Presidential decision to the departments and agencies.\textsuperscript{62} In response to NSDMs, the Under Secretaries Committee (USC), chaired by the Deputy Secretary of State, with representation at the Deputy or Under Secretary level, developed operational plans and recommendations to implement policy decisions.\textsuperscript{63}

In essence, three levels of meetings in the new NSC system emerged: 1) State-chaired interdepartmental working group meetings at the Assistant Secretary level; 2) Kissinger-chaired meetings (where the basic decisions were essentially either made or prepared for the President); and 3) the NSC meetings. As Lord points out, the "crucial" factor in the Nixon-Kissinger NSC system was that many of the subcommittees were chaired by Kissinger or his staff, which Kissinger himself was "very conscious about."\textsuperscript{64} Besides, reflecting Nixon's personal reluctance to settle

\textsuperscript{60} NSC Meeting, January 21, 1969, Box H-300, NSC Organization [2 of 3], NSCIF, NPMS, NA.
\textsuperscript{61} Lord, "The Nixon Administration National Security Council," p.33, NSCP-OHR.
\textsuperscript{62} NSDM1, "Establishment of NSC Decision and Study Memoranda Series," January 20, 1969, p.1, NSDMS, Box 363, SF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
\textsuperscript{63} History of the NSC, (No date), p.3, NSC-HF, Box H - 314 [1 of 2], NSCIF, NPMS, NA.
disagreements directly with Cabinet members and heads of departments and agencies, the new NSC system came to rely heavily on "memoranda rather than face-to-face meetings." In this new NSC system, the President became almost inaccessible or even isolated from the head of each department and agency. It was only Kissinger who had full access to the President, and thereby Secretary of State Rogers and the State Department were decreased their influence in foreign policy decision-making.

3. Other Key Players in the New China Policy

3.1. NSC staff

3.1.1. NSC staff procedures

Kissinger, as the executive secretary of the National Security Council staff, outlined the problems and options and managed the day-to-day policy process. In December 1968, General Goodpaster produced the outline of new NSC staff procedures, stressing the importance of its supporting role for the President's consideration of "broad, far-reaching conceptions of the central importance in guiding policy and operations." The President would need a strong NSC staff that could present him with clear-cut alternatives, explain to him the implications of choosing between alternatives, and help him to articulate his chosen policies. Goodpaster suggested that the NSC staff should also prepare for, conduct, and take further action on the meetings, and to manage the NSC supporting structure. Hence, during the transition

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65 Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, p.68.
67 Ibid., p.1.
period, Kissinger sought to recruit the best available young experts from the State Department, the Defense Department, the intelligence community, and academia. The newly emerged National Security Council Staff was divided into three main groups, plus the military assistant:

- Assistant for Program - three or four Assistants, such as Morton Halperin (1969), and Anthony Lake (1969-1970), integrating planning and operations by bringing a long-range (five-year) perspective to current operations.

- Operations Staff - approximately five senior staff members, each senior staff member responsible for certain geographic regions and functional activities (such as East Asia, Europe, Near East, South Asia, Latin America, Africa). Its main roles were to follow day-to-day matters, attend inter-agency meetings, and bring to the attention of the National Security Adviser matters requiring Presidential attention. Its senior members on East Asia included: John H. Holdridge (1969-1973), Richard Smyser (Vietnam expert, 1970-1971 and 1973-1975), Richard L. Sneider (Japan expert, 1969), Richard Solomon (China expert, 1971-1976). Holdridge explains that the “geographical line” of the NSC staff was organized more or less “corresponding to the same bureau that would be in the Department of State.” In particular, Kissinger highly valued Solomon’s expert insight regarding the implications on Chinese public statements and private messages, and on China’s domestic political situation. Solomon assesses that Kissinger worked by “departmentalizing different people in little boxes.”

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70 John Holdridge, Oral History Interview, July 20, 1995, p.81, FAOHC.

71 Peter Rodman, Interview with Komine, October 21, 2003.

• Planning Staff - approximately three senior staff members, such as Richard V. Allen (1969) and Winston Lord (1969-1973; also special assistant to Kissinger for China policy, 1970-1973), and five junior staff members, such as Peter Rodman (1969-1977). Its roles included: preparing NSC agenda papers on planning matters, producing necessary follow-up papers, supporting Assistants for Programs, participating in inter-agency planning studies, and providing alternative thinking to the National Security Adviser. Lord explains that: “Our job was also to help manage the paper flow, working with the relevant regional honcho or functional honcho on the staff.”

• The Military Assistant - helped the National Security Adviser in developing staff papers on military matters, including judgements on military questions, and in monitoring and assembling intelligence material. Colonel Alexander M. Haig Jr. (Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, 1969-1973) and Lawrence S. Eagleburger (1969) were in the Office of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

Rodman recalls that Kissinger “wanted to have all this sort of diversity of opinion,” and contrary to the usual image of him, Kissinger “liked to have debates” and “respected people who stood up to him.” Overall, the NSC staff had “coherence and competence.” It was “bureaucratically very complex and very personalized.” Kissinger “kept everything very tightly controlled inside the White House” and the NSC staff practically operated as a “separate State Department.”

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74 Rodman, Oral History Interview, July 22, and August 22, 1994, p.51, FAOHC. Rodman states further that Kissinger’s NSC staff was “surprisingly liberal, moderate, and intellectual,” especially for a Nixon administration. Ibid.
75 Lord, Interview with Komine, October 15, 2003.
76 Rodman, Oral History Interview, July 22, and August 22, 1994, p.51, FAOHC.
77 Ibid.
3.1.2. Drafting of policy papers

Kissinger valued and benefited from the individual contributions of the NSC staff members. Sonnenfeldt comments that: "the quality of a paper drafted by one individual with a couple of assistants is bound to be better than a State Department internally negotiated document, or a Defense Department internally negotiated document." As for actual drafting of policy studies, Holdridge recalls that Kissinger "would have three different groups working on a problem in the National Security Council, which might even include China. Not one of the members of those groups knew that the others were working on the same problem." Kissinger’s style of operation in a sensitive negotiation was to have both the “substantive experts” from the NSC staff and one of his “special assistants” to be his private secretaries. For example, Winston Lord was Kissinger’s principal special assistant, and thus was very much involved in preparations for the China initiative. Lord also kept notes of Kissinger’s talks with Chinese officials. Peter Rodman was a junior special assistant, and there was a division of labor between Lord and Rodman. In his own operational role in particular, Lord explains that “I was working as part of a team for a variety of issues. I was always paired with a Vietnam expert on Vietnam, a China expert on China, and a Russia expert on Russia. I was the only one who was involved in all these in addition to Kissinger himself.” Overall, the NSC staff’s role included “setting up meetings where various agencies submitted their views. And NSC papers

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80 Rodman, Oral history interview, July 22, and August 22, 1994, p.9, FAOHC.
81 Rodman, Interview with Komine, October 21, 2003.
usually summarized those views, trying to present them fairly but also often presenting Kissinger’s views on top. These were usually drafted either by the regional experts concerned or by people like myself or some combination.”

Kissinger took speeches “very seriously, demanding many drafts” from his NSC staff. In particular, during the transition period, Kissinger proposed to Nixon an idea to produce a document that would serve as a “conceptual outline of the President’s foreign policy, as a status report, and as an agenda for action.” Kissinger expected that the report would also “guide our bureaucracy and inform foreign governments about our thinking.” Nixon approved the proposal on January 30, 1969. Richard Allen recalls the drafting of Nixon’s Foreign Policy Report to Congress (February 1970, February 1971, February 1972 and May 1973) as one of the “great exercises” for the NSC staff, which was in a sense a “challenge to long-range planning.” Rodman agrees that the drafting of the report “educated” the NSC staff, because Kissinger “spent a lot of time on it with his staff in shaping...what should be our approach, what is the philosophy of our policy in this area, what are our real goals and interests.” Holdridge emphasizes the drafting of the first report of February 1970 as the “turning point” because it was drafted “entirely inside” the National Security Council without any “clearances” or “input” from the State Department. After the NSC staff issued the first report in late 1969, President Nixon called all of the NSC staff members in the Cabinet Room, and expressed his personal distrust of Career

83 Ibid.
84 Ibid.
85 Kissinger, White House Years, p.158.
86 Ibid. However, Kissinger complains that although changes in U.S. attitude toward China were "foreshadowed" in the reports, the media covered only the section on Vietnam. Ibid., p.159.
88 Rodman, Oral History Interview, July 22, and August 22, 1994, p.47, FAOHC.
89 Holdridge, Oral History Interview, July 20, 1995, p.79, FAOHC.
Foreign Service officials that: "If the State Department has had a new idea in the last 25 years, it is not known to me." Nixon thus made it very clear that his administration's foreign policy would be "run" by the NSC: "we were to keep our distance from State and not in fact do anything more than to ask inputs, but certainly not for advice."  

3.1.3. The Kissinger-NSC staff relations

Within the White House, Kissinger himself was "an object of considerable suspicion throughout those early months," because he was originally a "Rockefeller man." In addition, most of the newly recruited members of NSC staff Kissinger had appointed turned out to be Democrats, which greatly increased the suspicion of the White House political staff. Thus, as Holdridge recalls, members of the NSC staff were 'always treated and sneered at as "the intellectuals" by the rest of the White House staff." Lewis assesses that Kissinger was also "quite deliberately downgrading the staff in order to upgrade himself." Finally, in trying to avoid antagonizing other departments and also to prevent leaks, Kissinger ordered the NSC staff not to have contacts with outsiders, especially the press. In reality, however, Solomon reveals that he "developed a dialogue with some press people," particularly on the Asia issues, because what Kissinger was telling the NSC staff was usually very
different from what he saw going on and he had to know the difference between Kissinger’s “inside” game and his “outside” game in order to fulfill his roles.96

Moreover, there were private communications that occurred outside of the official lines between the NSC and the CIA. Solomon emphasizes that Kissinger’s excessive secrecy caused “compartamentalization of the policy process.”97 Kissinger could not even turn to the CIA for support in learning about senior Chinese leaders for his first trip to Beijing in July 1971. Thus, Solomon personally developed a covert “off-line” arrangement with CIA analysts to “draw on the intelligence community’s expertise and grasp of history.”98

The NSC staff rarely saw the President because Kissinger gathered the information from his staff and did all the briefing of the President himself, even on subjects on which he was not necessarily an expert. Lord argues that Kissinger “did keep the staff from having access,” and that NSC staff would sit in on meetings with foreigners at times, however, no NSC staff would sit in “when he [Kissinger] was consulting with the President.”99 Lord also recalls that “When Nixon and Kissinger talked alone, he [Kissinger] would generally keep us informed.”100

Both foreign and U.S. ambassadors tended to deal directly with the NSC, and Kissinger developed his own channels of communication with the ambassadors.101 However, Kissinger “continued to mistreat and ignore most [U.S.] ambassadors,” although there were exceptions during the opening to China, especially Ambassador

97 Ibid. The U.S. government had previously dealt with the Chinese Communist leaders during the 1940s in Chungking and Yenan, and therefore there were a number of documents on these contacts in the CIA files. However, as Solomon recalls, “no one was tasked to go look at this material, we never drew on our past experience.” Ibid.
98 Ibid.
100 Lord, Interview with Komine, October 15, 2003.
Walter Stoessel to Warsaw, Poland, and Ambassador Joseph Farland to Rawalpindi, Pakistan.102

During the early months of the new administration, diplomatic observers already began to speculate that Kissinger inevitably would be over-burdened in his new staff function. Kissinger himself was reported to have stated that “it may not be possible to handle both planning and coordination of operations in this job.” 103

At the beginning of the day, Kissinger did not necessarily give briefings to the President by himself, as Harry R. Haldeman (The White House Chief of Staff) or John Ehrlichman (Nixon’s top domestic affairs adviser) was usually in Oval Office. Kissinger had a “hard time” with their presence, because he was “not comfortable with it.”104

Very importantly, however, Rodman assesses that Haldeman did not “interfere in foreign policy,” because he believed that Nixon was the “master” in foreign policy; Haldeman had “no claim” to know the foreign policy, and thus the most important substantive discussions were conducted between Nixon and Kissinger “just alone.”105 Haldeman also “backed up” Kissinger when there was a bureaucratic fight between the NSC and the State Department; Haldeman would sometimes ring up Secretary of State Rogers and say, “The President wants this.”106 Haldeman would play an

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104 Moore and Sonnenfeldt, “The Nixon Administration National Security Council,” p.14, NSCP-OHR. Philip Odeen (member of the NSC staff, 1971-1973) recalls that: ‘when we’d be in a meeting and Haldeman would walk in, Henry would get “visibly nervous.” ...It was different with Ehrlichman – Ehrlichman was less threatening. But Haldeman – everybody got nervous when Haldeman was around. He was, at least from my perspective, kind of a fierce guy. I would see Henry seemingly act differently when Haldeman was around.’ Ibid., p.13. Quotation marks in original.
105 Rodman, Oral History Interview, July 22, and August 22, 1994, p.16, FAOHC.
106 Ibid., p.17. Kissinger recalls that: “Because Nixon’s method of governing guaranteed incessant bureaucratic competition and disagreements, he was obliged to institute ad hoc procedures for adjusting
intermediate role between Kissinger and Rogers on the China initiative after Kissinger’s secret trip to Beijing in July 1971. Overall, Haldeman was a “totally loyal person who did things because of what the boss wanted.” Haldeman was a “gatekeeper” of any access to the Oval Office because Nixon preferred interacting with a minimum number of people.¹⁰⁷

There was “competition within Kissinger’s sphere over who would be his deputy.”¹⁰⁸ The White House staff, especially Haldeman and Ehrlichman did not want too many liberal academics on the NSC. The argument was that in order to “balance experience and perspective,” a military person should be Kissinger’s deputy.¹⁰⁹ Alexander M. Haig Jr. was thus appointed as the deputy, however in reality this was also to “keep an eye on Kissinger.”¹¹⁰

As the deputy to the NSA, Haig would advise Kissinger on questions involving military considerations and help to produce policy memoranda and other papers on foreign affairs to be placed before Nixon for his decision.¹¹¹ Haig was “very disciplined,” making the machinery work and dealing with the NSC staff, as Kissinger had less and less contact with them owing to his tight schedule. Haig was thus the “manager of the staff” and “master of the bureaucratic process” in the Nixon-Kissinger NSC system.¹¹²

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., pp.17-18. As for the importance of a strong Chief of Staff, see Kegley and Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy, pp.346-347.
¹⁰⁹ Solomon, Oral History Interview, September 13, 1996, p.35, FAOHC. Goodpaster recalls that Kissinger asked him to call Alexander Haig, who was then serving at West Point, to serve as his military assistant in the new NSC staff. “The Nixon Administration National Security Council,” p.3, NSCP-OHR.
¹¹⁰ Ibid., p.36.
¹¹² Rodman, Oral History Interview, July 22, and August 22, 1994, p.23, FAOHC.
Importantly, Haig knew "how to smooth the rough edges" between Kissinger and Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird. Laird was a "more wily bureaucratic operator," in Kissinger's words, a "better guerrilla fighter" than senior officials in the State Department. When it came to specific defense issues, Kissinger did not have the "competence to press hard" because he did not have the "depth of background or experience." In particular, as for the pace of Vietnamization, which Laird himself defines as a program to "turn over the war in Vietnam to the South Vietnamese and give them the responsibility," there was a bureaucratic struggle between the NSC and Defense. Lord assesses that where Kissinger wanted on "the whole to go slower," Laird wanted to "speed it up." To put it another way, while Laird, being a Congressman in the past, was familiar with the "congressional and domestic mood," Kissinger was more concerned with U.S. capability to "maintain military balance" and "leverage" with the North Vietnamese. Secretary of Defense Laird thus established direct "communications channels" between Kissinger's office and his own office regarding all official Department of Defense (DOD) elements which would be involved in NSC matters. As a result, the Kissinger-Laird rivalry became a significant example where the new NSC system did not necessarily defeat bureaucratic politics.

113 Ibid., p.24.
116 Melvin Laird, Interview in CNN Cold War, Episode 15: China. Interview Transcript, National Security Archive.
118 Ibid. Laird had his own information sources, such as the National Security Agency, learning that Kissinger often used the military's cable network. For example, to coordinate messages involving the secret opening to China, which was arranged with Pakistan as an intermediary, a secure channel was set up through the U.S. Navy's attaché in Karachi. Secretary Laird and Navy Chief Admiral Elmo Zumwalt knew what was happening each step of the way, even if the CIA and the State Department did not. See Isaacson, Kissinger, p.201; and Kissinger, White House Years, pp.32-33.
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Department of Defense highly valued the intermediate role of Alexander Haig, Jr. between the DOD and the NSC. The “authoritative source” in the absence of Kissinger owing to his busy schedule was Colonel Haig who had “direct and continuing access” to Kissinger and the entire NSC staff. Haig was often able to “reflect the views of the President himself.”¹²⁰

Most importantly, Haig “had increasingly direct contact” with Nixon when Kissinger was away on trips, which made Kissinger “very sensitive.”¹²¹ Thus, there emerged a triangular dynamic between them: Kissinger sought to gain Haig’s support and to co-opt him; Haig operated between Kissinger and Nixon, maintaining his good working relations with the President, and also working closely with Kissinger.¹²² Overall, Haig presented himself as the President’s man, an “enforcer,” to make certain that the President’s orders were followed.¹²³

3.2. The State Department

3.2.1. Secrecy in bureaucratic politics

As previously explained, one of the main reasons for the pursuit of strict secrecy by Nixon and Kissinger during the opening to China was their personal distrust of bureaucracy, especially the State Department.¹²⁴ For Secretary of State, Nixon appointed his long-term friend and colleague, former Attorney General of the

¹²⁰ Lemnitzer to Admiral Johnson, September 29, 1969, p.1, Box H - 300 NSC System, NSC Organization [1 of 3], NSCIF, NPMS, NA.
¹²² Solomon, Oral History Interview, September 13, 1996, p.36, FAOHC.
¹²³ Ibid.
¹²⁴ Lord, Interview with Komine, October 15, 2003; and Solomon, Interview with Komine, September 24, 2003. During his visit to China, Nixon stated to Zhou that: “our State Department leaks like a sieve. Also within our bureaucracy there is great opposition to some of the positions I have taken.” Memcon, February 22, 1972, p.3, CHINA – President’s Talks with Mao & Chou En-lai February 1972, Country Files-Far East, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
Eisenhower administration, William P. Rogers.\textsuperscript{125} By taking advantage of Rogers' unfamiliarity asset, Nixon intended to assure his control of foreign policy decision-making from the White House.\textsuperscript{126} Kissinger, on the other hand, had uneasy relations with Rogers. Sonnenfeldt argues: "Henry wasn’t exactly sure where he was going to fit in this close friendship and long-time association. I think it became a total surprise to Henry that Nixon didn’t want Rogers to play a major role, except publicly."\textsuperscript{127} However, Secretary Rogers himself did not fight hard in the rivalry over the control of foreign policy, which resulted in the "demoralization of the State Department and its expertise."\textsuperscript{128} Lord confirms that Kissinger "mistreated Rogers, although a lot of this was President Nixon’s fault, not his. But he would admit he didn’t resist the Nixon approach."\textsuperscript{129} Whiting assesses that the State Department was "ready to serve," however, they had no access and were consequently "under-used."\textsuperscript{130} Whiting emphasizes that it was "not a mobilization of expertise and knowledge" which one expects in a government.\textsuperscript{131}

In reality, however, Nixon and Kissinger still needed help from the State Department. Levin points out that: "their work was the mortar and the bricks of what happened when the grand policy designs actually took form. They heavily influenced policymaking by the information and analysis they provided, through they had little

\textsuperscript{125} Isaacson, \textit{Kissinger}, p.197; and Kissinger, \textit{White House Years}, pp.26-32.  
\textsuperscript{126} Solomon, Interview with Komine, September 24, 2003; and Marshall Green (Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific, 1969-1973), Oral history interview, March 2 and 17, 1995, pp.10-11, FAOHC.  
\textsuperscript{127} Sonnenfeldt, "The Nixon Administration National Security Council," p.25, NSCP-OHR.  
\textsuperscript{128} Lord, Interview with Komine, October 15, 2003; and Rodman, Oral history interview, July 22, and August 22, 1994, p.12, FAOHC. As for the general rivalry between the Secretary of State and the National Security Adviser, see Kegley and Wittkopf, \textit{American Foreign Policy}, pp.351-353; and Spanier and Uslaner, \textit{American Foreign Policy Making and the Democratic Dilemmas}, pp.49-54.  
\textsuperscript{129} Lord, “The Nixon Administration National Security Council,” p.44, NSCP-OHR.  
\textsuperscript{130} Allen S. Whiting, Interview with Komine, October 19, 2003.  
\textsuperscript{131} Ibid.
opportunity for formal policy advocacy." On China policy, Nixon and Kissinger "benefited from all the thinking in the administration." In particular, Nixon and Kissinger "used the interagency process" to obtain what they thought was the "best of the technical knowledge" of the bureaucracy, especially the State Department. Thus, there was "a whole menu of steps" that was developed, namely a series of steps, which the United States could take toward China, such as opening up trade and lifting travel restrictions. Thereafter, Nixon and Kissinger would form the strategy themselves, deciding "how to play it" on their own initiative and schedule. Nixon and Kissinger "did everything to minimize the risk of leak by dealing only with a very few officials," and therefore, most of the early cable instructions went through CIA or Navy channels rather than the State Department’s regular channels.

3.2.2. Senior State Department officials

As Lord reassesses, despite their pursuit of secrecy, Nixon and Kissinger still could have brought in a few key State Department officials on the China policy and "sworn them to secrecy and used their expertise and had more bureaucratic support." During the early months of the new administration, Kissinger still sought to smooth the relations between the NSC and the State Department and held regular meetings

133 Rodman, Interview with Komine, October 21, 2003.
134 Rodman, Oral History Interview, July 22, and August 22, 1994, p.13, FAOHC. Kissinger admits in his third memoirs that: “The interdepartmental process produced option papers from among which Nixon and I were able to select the course of action most compatible with our overall strategy without necessarily informing the authors of the decision until we had achieved a diplomatic breakthrough.” Kissinger, Years of Renewal, p.83.
135 Ibid.
136 Ibid.
with Under Secretary of State Elliot Richardson (January 1969 - June 1970), who chaired the Undersecretaries' Committee. Kissinger did not have intellectual uncertainties about "being overrun by the Foreign Service," as Rodman recalls, "[H]e knew that he could provide intellectual leadership; he found that they provided a lot of expertise."

Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs U. Alex Johnson (February 1969 - February 1973) developed a close working relationship with Under Secretary of State Richardson and also with Secretary of State Rogers. Johnson also acted as an intermediary between the White House and the State Department. In particular, Johnson, a former U.S. Ambassador to Japan, kept emphasizing the importance of coordination between the U.S. and its major allies in Asia, especially Japan and the Republic of China (ROC) regarding the linkage between their respective sensitivities to possible U.S. withdrawal from Asia in the post-Vietnam era and U.S. moves toward China.

Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Marshall Green (May 1969 - May 1973) was a "very astute" career Foreign Service Officer who got along very well with both Secretary of State Rogers and Congress. Green chaired an Interdepartmental Group: East Asian and Pacific Affairs (IG/EA&P/NSC-10), including the "China Working Group," which performed the following functions:

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139 Rodman, Oral History Interview, July 22, and August 22, 1994, p.14, FAOHC.
141 Arthur W. Hummel Jr., Oral History Interview, 1994, pp.134-135, FAOHC.
• discussion and decision on interdepartmental issues which could be settled at
the Assistant Secretary level, including issues arising out of implementation of
NSC decisions;
• preparation of policy papers for consideration by the NSC;
• preparation of contingency papers on potential crisis areas for review by the
NSC.\textsuperscript{142}

In reality, however, Green did not get along well with Kissinger, and remained very
bitter about Kissinger's handling of East Asian issues and deliberate undermining of
the roles of the State Department in the opening to China.\textsuperscript{143} Green criticizes that:
"Kissinger had lots of gaps in his knowledge of the world," and that "his failure to
draw upon the expertise of people who had spent their lives working on East Asia was
a great mistake on his part."\textsuperscript{144} Green, who was the State Department's main
counterpart toward Kissinger on East Asia, especially suffered from the secrecy
surrounding the China initiative. Green recalls that:

When you are "cut out" of things, you begin to lose confidence in yourself.
...Kissinger knew that you didn't have the complete picture, and therefore he
tended to discredit your views accordingly. It ended up by nobody really
knowing what the other person knew or didn't know. ...We had a wonderful
opportunity but, of course, a lot of that was not properly used. We could have
done much better.\textsuperscript{145}

\textsuperscript{142} Interdepartmental Group: East Asia and Pacific Affairs (IG/EA&P/NSC-10), Chartered by NSDM 2
(January 20, 1969), NSC Organization [2 of 3], Box H-300, NSCIF, NPMS, NA.
\textsuperscript{143} Tucker, Interview with Komine, October 1, 2003.
\textsuperscript{144} Green, Oral History Interview, March 2 and 17, 1995, p.56, FAOHC.
\textsuperscript{145} Ibid. Quotation marks in original.
Despite his unpleasant experiences with Kissinger, Green continued to remain loyal to President Nixon, whom he greatly admired for his knowledge and understanding of foreign affairs. During the early months of the new administration in 1969, Green held some significant conversations with Nixon regarding possible options and steps of opening a new dialogue with China. Overall, despite the exclusion from the direct decision making-process, the State Department’s Bureau of East Asia and Pacific played a crucial role in the National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) process.

3.2.3. Intelligence sources

The Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) is the State Department’s representative in the U.S. intelligence community. The INR is the unit through which the State Department makes its input into various interagency committees that seek to guide intelligence operations. The INR draws on multiple intelligence source input from other agencies and also from overseas posts and provides value-added independent analysis of events to the Department’s senior officials. In particular, its staff drafts very insightful intelligence analyses, such as the ‘Intelligence Note’ and the ‘Research Study,’ which are among the most highly valued within the government.

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146 The main issues in their talks are examined in the following chapters.
147 Bureau of Intelligence and Research, U.S. Department of State, (http://www.state.gov/s/inr/); United States Intelligence Community, Department of State: Bureau of Intelligence and Research (http://www.intelligence.gov/1-members_state.shtml); and Kegley and Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy, pp.400-401.
148 The following chapters examine the BINR's Intelligence reports.
In addition to U.S. embassies abroad, the State Department had an intelligence base in the Consulate General in Hong Kong, which was a very vital place for China watchers.\textsuperscript{149} A former State Department official and China watcher, Herbert Horowitz, recalls that: “people who came out of China as refugees or escapees would come to Hong Kong, and people who were going into China for business or trade would enter via Hong Kong and come out via Hong Kong.”\textsuperscript{150} Thus, Hong Kong was essentially a “gateway in and out of China” where China watchers obtained information from many different parts of Mainland China.\textsuperscript{151} As for China’s American policy, a former Deputy Chief of Station in the U.S. Consulate General in Hong Kong, James Lilley, explains that: “we were dealing with the Chinese who were passing us messages from the Chinese Communists. They were telling us that they were reasonable and were coming out of this very bad experience during the Cultural Revolution. They said that they wanted to open up to the United States. …We reported this in some detail to Washington.”\textsuperscript{152}

3.2.4. The State Department-NSC staff relations

There was a question of rivalry between the NSC staff and the State Department. As early as January 1969, there was already media coverage on Nixon’s centralization of foreign policy decision-making within the White House. On January 29, President Nixon called upon the State Department to re-affirm his confidence in the nation’s

\textsuperscript{149} Kreisberg, Oral History Interview, p.4, in \textit{A China Reader}, Volume III, January 1995, FAOHC.

\textsuperscript{150} Herbert Horowitz (China watching, American Consulate General Hong Kong, 1965-1969), Oral History Interview, p.1, in \textit{A China Reader}, Volume III, January 1995, FAOHC.

\textsuperscript{151} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{152} James R. Lilley, Oral History Interview, 1996, pp.54-55, FAOHC. The following chapters examine cables and intelligence studies from the U.S. Consulate General in Hong Kong.
foreign policy establishment. Nixon denied the media’s speculation that Kissinger and his NSC staff began to seize authority from Secretary Rogers. Although Nixon’s exact plans for the new NSC had not yet been made public (until the publication of Nixon’s Foreign Policy Report to Congress in February 1970), and Kissinger’s staff kept silent about its rules and procedures, it was widely speculated that the NSC had been “re-vitalized.”

Kissinger initially requested that the State Department conduct a number of policy studies, and thus State Department officials could express their views. However, after a while, the State Department officials became cynical because they felt that they were just doing a “make-work,” and their views were not being taken seriously. Without having a strong influence of its own, the State Department’s bureaucracy “often would look for the NSC to take the lead on an issue in order to bring the other agencies into a workable sort of arena.”

In reality, as Solomon points out, most regional experts in the NSC staff were originally recruited from the State Department, and thus still kept “secret dealings” with their former colleagues “without telling Kissinger.” Holdridge emphasizes that: “Those of us who were on detail from the State Department had to be very cautious. We tried to be as open as we possibly could, to keep in good, personal contact with Marshall Green, [U.] Alexis Johnson.” Levin also confirms that

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154 Ibid.
Johnson and Green “never pressured me to do anything or tell them anything when I was on the NSC staff, but we did meet privately.”

3.2.5. The question of geopolitical perspective

There was a significant difference of geopolitical perspective between the White House and the State Department. In the first place, the State Department had a “weak organizational base,” and that it was “very hard to get the State geopolitical view into a NSSM.” The State Department was also “much more anxious to try to keep some control of the regional issues,” and it never fought nearly as hard on the “functional” issues. Hence, there was a diversity of views on China within the State Department.

First, as Lord emphasizes, some officials in the State Department initially insisted that the United States would “alienate the Russians” if it “opened up with the Chinese.” The so-called “Slavophile” opinion group, especially Ambassadors Charles Bohlen and Lyewellyn Thompson, both specialists on the Soviet Union, claimed that Moscow was very suspicious of a Washington-Beijing “collusion,” and therefore any effort to improve U.S. relations with China would cause serious trouble for the promotion of Soviet-American relations. Sonnenfeldt recalls that: “until the Nixon administration, the State Department insisted on briefing the Soviets on every conversation that Alex Johnson and others had with the Chinese in Prague and

161 Ibid., p.32.
163 Rodman, Interview with Komine, October 21, 2003. See also Kissinger, Diplomacy, p.720. After a meeting with Thompson and Bohlen in summer 1969, Nixon mocked “the incorrigible softheadedness” of the Foreign Service. The Soviet desk was not entirely unitary within the State Department. Finally, it was presidential authority that excluded the Sovietologists. Kissinger, White House Years, p.182.
Warsaw. ...Thompson religiously called Dobrynin [Anatoly Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to the United States] in and gave him a full briefing. The suggestion that we might have a relationship with the Chinese without reassuring or telling the Soviets would not have occurred to anybody in the State Department."  

Regarding a positive course for the new China policy, the so-called “Sinophile group” had long favored a “broad policy review.” Thomson stresses the importance of “a decade-old ‘laundry list’ of possible U.S. initiatives towards China and a great deal of internal paper to support them.” For the public, the U.S. government continued to express its support for the Republic of China on Taiwan. Rodman argues that China experts in the government insisted that: “Taiwan was such an overwhelming problem, and we could never have contact with China without sacrificing Taiwan.” Simultaneously, within the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, there were a number of policy study papers that had been written on the recognition of Beijing. As a former Taiwan Desk officer, Thomas P. Shoesmith points out, there was increasing pressure to bring the People’s Republic of China into the United Nations, and thus the State officials’ main concern was to try to find a way to “retain the Republic of China in the General Assembly.” Thus, having assessed that the so-called “China Lobby” in Congress by the late 1960s was “no longer a significant factor,” and that Taipei would be “increasingly isolated, diplomatically and

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164 Sonnenfeldt, “The Nixon Administration National Security Council,” p.17, NSCP-OHR. Dobrynin recalls that Llewellyn Thompson told him confidentially in mid-June 1971 that there were two camps of views within the American leadership: one side leaned toward giving priority to agreements with the Soviet Union; and other view gave precedence to an opening to China, believing that China could help end the Vietnam war soon, partly by “bringing pressures to bear upon the Soviet Union.” Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence: Moscow’s Ambassador to America’s Six Cold War Presidents (1962-1986) (New York: Times Books, A Division of Random House, Inc, 1995), p.224.  
internationally,” State Department officials examined possibilities of pursuing “a two-China policy.” In military-security terms, as Shoesmith stresses, the Republic of China was “very cooperative in allowing us to use their bases in support of our activities in Vietnam.” Nevertheless, even the U.S. Embassy in Taipei came to share a prevailing view within the State Department that “sooner or later relations [with China] should be normalized.”

From Kissinger's perspective, however, those within the State Department who supported the opening towards China appeared to be concentrated on “trade and cultural exchanges” with the Chinese, which was “secondary” compared to the “geopolitics and the Russian and Vietnamese dimensions.” As for a Soviet dimension, namely the U.S. policy towards the Sino-Soviet rift, Paul Kreisberg, the former director of the Office of Asian Communist Affairs (ACA), recalls that one of the key differences of between the State Department and the NSC was that while the State Department saw the normalization with China as being “beneficial to us in an Asian context,” the NSC, especially Kissinger saw it in “Soviet terms” and regarded the Asian context as “minor.” Overall, Kreisberg reassesses: “We saw the Soviet Union as one factor, but not the driving one. He [Kissinger], obviously, saw it as the driving one.”

As for the Vietnam dimension, the Kissinger NSC expected that the opening to China would influence North Vietnam to end the war. Lord explains that: “If we were dealing with both of Hanoi’s patrons, Beijing and Moscow, it would help to isolate

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169 Ibid., pp.2-3.
172 Paul Kreisberg (Director, Office of Asian Communist Affairs, Policy Planning, Department of State), 1965-81, Oral History Interview, p.8, in A China Reader, Volume III, January 1995, FAOHC.
173 Ibid.
them and put pressure on them to be more reasonable at the negotiating table."\textsuperscript{174} Kissinger interprets that Nixon regarded the opening toward China as "a somewhat great opportunity" in order to "squeeze" the Soviet Union "into short-term help on Vietnam."\textsuperscript{175} Although the subject never came up in any official instructions, Nixon may also have thought that: "if we were able to improve relations with China, we would indirectly diminish the Chinese interest in supporting the Vietnamese."\textsuperscript{176}

On the other hand, the State Department was principally concerned about reassuring the Chinese in the Warsaw ambassadorial talks that the U.S. military operation in Indochina was "not designed to threaten China."\textsuperscript{177} Thus, the State Department underestimated the degree of China's support for North Vietnam. Kreisberg explains that: "most of us were surprised as we found out to what degree the Chinese had engaged themselves. ...we all saw the Vietnam-China issue as one that was, essentially, peripheral."\textsuperscript{178} The State Department perceived the Beijing-Hanoi relations in regional security term. Kreisberg recalls that: "most of us at the EA Bureau level saw the Chinese, at most, as wanting to use the Vietnam War as a lever to weaken the United States, but not to expand the war and not to risk war with us. And when we talked about it in Warsaw, they never wanted to say very much about it other than to support the Vietnamese."\textsuperscript{179}

In summary, the re-vitalization of the NSC system was much more systematic and complex than was previously estimated. The NSSMs and NSDMs were planned to

\textsuperscript{174} Lord, Interview with Komine, October 15, 2003.
\textsuperscript{175} Kissinger, \textit{White House Years}, p.164.
\textsuperscript{176} Kreisberg, Oral History Interview, p.11, in \textit{A China Reader}, Volume III, January 1995, FAOHC.
\textsuperscript{177} Ibid., p.13.
\textsuperscript{179} Ibid.
provide a broad range of policy alternatives and perspectives. The fundamental source of Kissinger’s power was his control of the flow of policy study papers by chairing the key subcommittees, such as the Review Group and the Washington Special Action Group.

On the other hand, the State Department lost its chairmanship of key committees for policy planning. However, it still remained the principal provider of ideas and recommendations in the NSSM process. The State Department obtained information from a number of sources, such as U.S. embassies, foreign officials, and journalists and conducted a day-to-day analysis of change and development in Chinese foreign policy. Moreover, despite Kissinger’s pursuit of strict secrecy, State Department officials and the NSC staff members maintained informal communication to exchange views and develop policy studies.

The NSC meeting became a formal occasion for departments and agencies to present their respective views and issues rather than acting as a decision-making body. Nixon’s preference to avoid face-to-face meeting enhanced the development of communication by memoranda between the Oval Office and other senior officials in his administration. The President, accompanied by Kissinger, maintained the authority for making the final decision in a highly confidential way. Together, Nixon and Kissinger would pursue strict secrecy during the U.S. opening to China. It was on the basis of the presidential initiative and highly centralized foreign policy decision-making machinery that the U.S. rapprochement with China would evolve as the following chapters demonstrate.
Part II. The Evolution of the Opening Policy

Chapter 3. The Development of Policy Options from January to July 1969

This chapter explores the evolution of a new China policy during the first half of 1969. First, it examines President Nixon's initiatives from January to March 1969. Second, it analyses the implications of the outbreak of the Sino-Soviet border clashes in March 1969. Third, it conducts a detailed analysis of the policy option studies, including the State Department's recommendations and the inter-departmental studies, namely the National Security Study Memoranda (NSSMs). This study interprets the initial development of the U.S. China policy as a much more complex and dynamic political process than previously considered, on the basis of a number of policy option studies within the administration.¹

1. First development

1.1. Inaugural address

In his Inaugural address on January 20, 1969, President Nixon emphasized the entry into an "era of negotiation" after the long period of confrontation: "Let all nations know that during this Administration our lines of communication will be open. We seek an open world - open to ideas, open to the exchange of goods and people, a

¹ "U.S.-China Policy 1969-72," Far East, Box 86, Countries Files (CF), HAK Office Files (HAKOF), National Security Council Files (NSCF), Nixon Presidential Materials Staff (NPMS), National Archives (NA). The date and issue of internal studies, policy statements, and public steps in the following analysis are based on a detailed chronological survey of this document. Media sources, such as the New York Times and the Washington Post are also used where appropriate. Finally, there remains the so-called "black-box," namely private exchanges between Nixon and Kissinger. Allen Whiting, Interview with Komine, October 19, 2003. This study examines the exchange of memoranda between Nixon and Kissinger as well as the record of their conversations.
world in which no people, great or small, will live in angry isolation."² The use of the phrase "angry isolation" reflected his message in the October 1967 *Foreign Affairs* article. In his memoirs, Nixon emphasized that he had intended to send a diplomatic signal toward Beijing.³

Nixon took drafting of presidential addresses very seriously, reviewing the NSC staff's draft and adding phrases reflecting his own thoughts. For his inaugural address, Nixon approved of the inclusion of some statement to the effect that the new administration believed in "open lines of communication," which Kissinger intended "toward Moscow."⁴ Kissinger recommended to Nixon that the overall attempt in the inaugural address was to present a new message of "sober, precise, methodical, and un-dramatic progress."⁵ On January 21, 1969, however, the New China News Agency strongly denounced Nixon as the "puppet" of the "monopoly bourgeois clique" attempting to implement the "vicious ambition of US imperialism to continue to carry out aggression and expansion in the world."⁶ Renmin ribao (People's Daily) and Hongqi (The Red Flag) also jointly published an editorial essay characterizing Nixon's address as nothing but "a confession in an impasse," which demonstrated that "the U.S. imperialists...are beset with profound crises both at home and abroad."⁷

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² For Immediate Release, Office of the White House Press Secretary, The White House, "Inaugural Address of President Richard M. Nixon" The Capitol, January 20, 1969, p.5, HAK Administrative & Staff Files, Box 1, Transition, Nov 1968 - Jan 1969, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA. Nixon reviewed his predecessors' inaugural addresses, especially Kennedy's.


⁴ Kissinger to Nixon, January 8, 1969, Transition, Nov 1968 - Jan 1969, HAK Administrative & Staff Files (HAK-ASF). Box 1, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA. Kissinger thus reminded Nixon that he would pass this implication to his "Soviet contact" on January 17.

⁵ Kissinger to Nixon, "Proposed Foreign Policy Section of Your Inaugural Address, January 14, 1969, p.2, HAK-ASF, Box 1, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.


⁷ Ibid.
1.2. Nixon’s memorandum to Kissinger and the directive of NSSM 14

During early months, Nixon’s public statements still included two contradictory elements. On January 27, 1969, in his first press conference at the White House, President Nixon stated that it was up to the Chinese Communist representatives at the forthcoming Warsaw meeting on February 20 to clarify “whether any changes of attitude on their part on major substantive issues may have occurred.”8 In addition, Nixon also reiterated that the United States would “continue to oppose Communist China’s admission to the United Nations.”9

On February 1, 1969, Nixon sent a confidential memorandum to Kissinger, directing that: ‘I think we should give every encouragement to the attitude that this administration is “exploring possibilities of rapprochement [sic] with the Chinese.” This, of course, should be done privately and should under no circumstances get into the public prints from this direction.’10 In his memoirs, Kissinger explains that Nixon’s memorandum did not ask him to do anything toward the Chinese; it only urged him to create the “impression” that the United States was “exploring a move toward China.”11

In reality, however, Nixon’s memorandum was much more important as the beginning of substantial policy studies on China during 1969. On February 5, 1969, the National Security Study Memorandum 9 (NSSM9) entitled “Review of International Situation” examined the deepening strains in Sino-Soviet relations: “It is possible that each will become more active in seeking to prevent the other from aligning too closely with the U.S., and to use its own relations with the U.S. as a means of checkmating the other’s policies.” Cited in Patrick E. Tyler, *A Great Wall: Six Presidents and China, An Investigative story* (New York: Public Affairs, 1999), p.55.

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9 Ibid.
10 Nixon to Kissinger, February 1, 1969, Quotation marks in original, White House Confidential Files (WHCF), White House Special Files (WHSF) Co (Countries), [Ex] Co 32 Chad, Republic of [1969-70] to [Gen] Co 34 China [1969-70], Box 17, NPMS, NA.
11 Henry A. Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston: Little Brown, 1979), p.169. Italic in original. On January 29, 1969, the National Security Study Memorandum 9 (NSSM9) entitled “Review of International Situation” examined the deepening strains in Sino-Soviet relations: “It is possible that each will become more active in seeking to prevent the other from aligning too closely with the U.S., and to use its own relations with the U.S. as a means of checkmating the other’s policies.”
Kissinger issued National Security Study Memorandum 14 (NSSC14) directing an inter-departmental study to examine:

- The current status of U.S. relations with Communist China and the Republic of China;
- The nature of the Chinese Communist threat and intentions in Asia;
- The interaction between U.S. policy and the policies of other major interested countries toward China;
- Alternative U.S. approaches on China and their costs and risks.\(^\text{12}\)

It was still a general directive to review the U.S. policy toward China. Kissinger’s directive requested that the paper should be forwarded to the NSC Review Group by March 10. It would be submitted on April 30, 1969, and throughout 1969 there were crucial review meetings to discuss and improve the main issues and contents of NSSM 14. Winston Lord, a former NSC staff member and Kissinger’s special assistant, emphasizes that Nixon was privately “very quick” to move to a new China initiative.\(^\text{13}\) At this early stage, however, Kissinger still remained sceptical for both necessity and possibility of opening toward China.\(^\text{14}\)

On February 17, the first official meeting between President Nixon and Soviet Ambassador to the U.S., Anatoly Dobrynin, was held. The pursuit of secrecy by Nixon and Kissinger was already emerging, and thus Secretary Rogers was not

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\(^\text{12}\) National Security Study Memorandum 14 (NSC14), Subject Files (SF), Box 365, NSCF, NPMS, NA.

\(^\text{13}\) Winston Lord, Interview with Komine, October 15, 2003.

\(^\text{14}\) Alexander Haig recalls that Kissinger was very bewildered by Nixon’s directive to reassess U.S. China policy: “Our Leader has taken leave of reality... He thinks this is the moment to establish normal relations with Communist China. He has just ordered me to make this flight of fancy come true.” He grasped his head in his hands, “China!” Alexander Haig Jr. (with Charles McCarry), *Inner Circle: How America Changed the World, A Memoirs* (New York: Warner Books, 1992), p.257; Alexander Haig Jr., Interview Transcript, *Nixon’s China Game*, PBS American Experience; and PBS Correspondence with Komine, September 1, 2004.
invited to attend. Nixon told Dobrynin that Kissinger was the one to be his counterpart in a confidential channel. Calling for serious negotiations at various levels, Dobrynin delivered a letter from Moscow, which agreed to move forward on issues of the two superpowers’ concern, such as Arms Control and Vietnam. Nixon in turn hinted that if U.S.-Soviet relations did not develop well, he could explore opening to “others,” which Dobrynin interpreted as China.15

1.3. The cancellation of the Warsaw Ambassadorial talks in February 1969

The immediate major issue between the United States and China was the resumption of the Warsaw Ambassadorial talks scheduled on February 20, 1969. Although Kissinger’s memoirs do not explain any particular issues, the preparation for the Warsaw talk provided an important opportunity for the new administration to re-examine the agenda for its China policy. As for possible Chinese motivations, both an airgram from the U.S. Consulate General in Hong Kong and Kissinger’s memorandum to President Nixon examined the following possibilities:

- Internal difficulties, caused by the Cultural Revolution, which might increase the desire for an easing of external relations;

• The continuing U.S.-North Vietnamese Paris peace talks in accordance with the declining military outlook of the North Vietnam;
• A reaction to increased Sino-Soviet tensions, caused by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia – the Chinese might believe in a U.S.-USSR collusion and perceive the resumption of the Warsaw talks as a means to counter-pressure Moscow;
• An effort to explore the views of the new Administration of President Nixon;
• An effort to detect U.S. positions, particularly in its relations with the Republic of China in Taiwan.\textsuperscript{16}

Kissinger was still unfamiliar with China policy, and thus relied heavily on the NSC staff's recommendations.\textsuperscript{17} In his memorandum to Nixon, Kissinger argued that the Warsaw talks could offer an opportunity to shift the focus of U.S. policy and to promote a dialogue with the Chinese which would provide "greater stability" for East Asia a) "without abandoning our commitments to Taiwan or undermining its position" or b) "damaging the interests of our Asian allies, principally Japan."\textsuperscript{18} Kissinger's memorandum suggested three major approaches toward China. Option 1 was to indicate that the United States was "prepared to negotiate a normalization of relations" with Beijing. However, the memo suggested that this option would involve "considerable risk" because it could make the Chinese interpret "softness" on the U.S., cause a "crisis of confidence" in Taiwan and "seriously upset" Japan.\textsuperscript{19} Option 2


\textsuperscript{17}Prior to Nixon's inauguration, NSC staff member Richard Sneider wrote to Kissinger that the Warsaw ambassadorial talks scheduled for February 20 would provide the "first clear opportunity" for the new Administration to "signal its own policy." Sneider argued that: "At this stage I would be inclined to move very cautiously with the Chinese" and wait until they respond with "any specific proposals for peaceful co-existence but leaving the door open for reconsideration of our policies with the exception of our commitment to Taiwan." Finally, Sneider recommended that the China policy required a comprehensive NSC consideration in mid-term (four to five months) rather than short-term (within the next two months). Sneider to Kissinger, January 7, 1969, "Major Issues Anticipated During the Next Six Weeks in East Asia," pp.1-2, HAK Administrative & Staff Files, Box 1, Transition, Nov 1968 - Jan 1969, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.

\textsuperscript{18}Kissinger to Nixon, "Warsaw Talks," February 11, 1969, p.2, CF-Europe, Box 700 [1 of 2], NSCF, NPMS, NA.

\textsuperscript{19}Ibid., pp.3-4.
was to indicate that the U.S. was "prepared to enter into serious discussions or negotiations with respect to our policies" except U.S. commitment to Taiwan.\(^{20}\)

However, this approach was likely to leave Japan and other Asian countries nervous if there was no immediate positive response from Beijing, and there would be a "quick and negative response" from Taipei. Option 3 suggested that the United States would pick up the Chinese reference to "peaceful coexistence" and "ask whether they have any specific proposals to make," without taking any initiatives.\(^{21}\) Kissinger recommended the risk-free position of option 3.

In a memorandum to President Nixon, State Department officials recommended that the United States adopt a "firm posture" on its commitments to the Republic of China coupled with a "general expression of willingness to negotiate all other issues," as well as work toward peaceful coexistence with Beijing.\(^{22}\) In particular, the "mutual hostility and suspicion" between Beijing and Moscow had led each side to regard any possibility of the other's rapprochement with the United States with the "greatest concern" and to do what they could to "prevent it."\(^{23}\)

State Department officials declared that: "Here is an opportunity for us to determine how far Peking may be prepared to move from its current positions."\(^{24}\) The ultimate premise for any U.S. move was that "it symbolizes the emphasis and direction in which the new Administration wishes to proceed."\(^{25}\) The initial proposal represented a combination of (a) the U.S. proposal for "renunciation of the use of force", and (b) "our desire not to prejudice our defense commitments on Taiwan." The key new element was an "explicit expression of willingness to negotiate normalization" with

\(^{20}\) Ibid., p.4.
\(^{21}\) Ibid.
\(^{23}\) Ibid.
\(^{24}\) Ibid.
\(^{25}\) Ibid., p.2.
Beijing while “not changing our present normal relations with the Republic of China.” The State Department proposal was thus mainly concerned with the impact of the Warsaw ambassadorial talks on U.S. relations with the Republic of China. Very importantly, moreover, State Department officials recommended that for the “first time,” the United States offer to “send a special US representative” to Beijing.

On February 18, however, the Chinese cancelled the planned 134th Warsaw meeting, because of the fact that a Chinese diplomat in the Netherlands defected and was given political asylum at the U.S. Embassy in The Hague in late January 1969. On February 18, following President Nixon’s instruction, Secretary of State Rogers expressed U.S. regret at the Chinese cancellation of the Warsaw talks and declared that the United States wanted to engage in a broad program of cultural and scientific exchange with China. On March 4, however, Nixon himself stated at a news conference that: “Looking further down the road, we could only think in terms of a better understanding with Red China. But being very realistic, in view of Red China’s breaking off the rather limited talks that were planned, I do not think that we should hold out any great optimism for any breakthroughs in that direction at this time.”

26 Ibid., pp.7-8.
28 “U.S. China Policy 1969-1972,” Box 86, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
29 President Richard M. Nixon, News Conference, March 4, 1969, Box 88, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
1.4. The Nixon-De Gaulle talks

It was during his first official European trip from February 23 to March 2, 1969 that Nixon met French President Charles De Gaulle in Paris and discussed the need for a new China initiative. Both the NSC staff's briefing paper and Nixon's Talking Points reveal that U.S. officials paid particular attention to the appointment of a new French Ambassador to Beijing, Etienne M. Manach - their top Southeast Asian expert. It was anticipated that De Gaulle would be likely to ask about U.S. China policy, and the NSC staff suggested that the President inform the French leaders that the United States would "seek maximum contact" with mainland China.

In their talk on February 28, 1969, it was Nixon who initially asked for De Gaulle's evaluation on China. De Gaulle suggested that Nixon put himself in the position of the Soviet leaders to see China:

This is an enormous country which has a common frontier thousands of miles long with Russia. The Chinese have always detested the Russians and will probably detest them tomorrow more than at any other time in the past. Chinese ambitions are directed mainly against Russia. ...The Russians know this and China is their main preoccupation. ...They are thinking in term of a possible

31 Talking Paper for European Trip, China, p.1, General Background Papers, President Nixon's Trip to Europe - Feb.-March 1969, Box 442, President's Trip Files (PTF), NSCF, NPMS, NA.
32 Talking Paper on European Trip, France - General Talking Points, p.9, General Background Papers, Box 442, PTF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
clash with China tomorrow. They cannot face both China and the West (the U.S. in particular) at the same time. ...they would like in the light of their growing quarrel with China to be sure that the West would not act against their back. They know that you and they are rivals. ...the Russians were willing to meet with the US to secure a détente, it was partly because of the fear of China.34

It was the growing Sino-Soviet mutual hostility within which the two Presidents came to share the idea of the Russian “primary fear” of China.35 In their second talk on March 1, it was De Gaulle who raised the China issue by indicating that: “Some said that one should try and play the Chinese off against the Soviets and try to divide them. Others felt that it was worth trying to improve relations with both.”36 De Gaulle suggested:

We should have exchanges at all levels and we might eventually see the beginnings of a détente. How this would affect the Soviets was difficult to know. ...The West should try to get to know China, to have contacts and to penetrate it. We should try to get them to sit at the table with us and offer them openings. ...If the U.S. began to have relations with China this would mean that China would probably get into the UN.37

In his response, Nixon assessed a long-range policy toward China:

[I]n looking down the road towards talks with the Soviet Union we might keep an anchor to windward with respect to China. This did not mean that we would do anything so crude as to suggest we play China off against the Soviet Union. The Soviets would resent this bitterly. In 10 years when China had made

34 Ibid., pp.1-2.
35 Ibid., p.4.
36 Memcon, Nixon and De Gaulle, Grand Trianon, Versailles, March 1, 1969 [Morning session], p.7, P/HAK Memcons Box 1023, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
37 Ibid., p.8. See also Nixon, RN, pp.373-374.
significant nuclear progress we would have to have more communications than we had today.\textsuperscript{38}

De Gaulle agreed with Nixon by urging that: "it would be better for the U.S. to recognize China before they were obliged to do it by the growth of China."\textsuperscript{39}

In his memoirs, Kissinger assesses that Nixon did not ask for any specific assistance on March 1; it was De Gaulle who "initiated" the China issue by stressing its importance as a "huge entity with great resources," and Nixon appeared to be "skeptical" of it.\textsuperscript{40} Kissinger thus argues that the new administration had "no clear-cut plan."\textsuperscript{41} In reality, however, as a result of two decades of assessment, there was a solid basis for Nixon to realize that it would be better to resume a dialogue with China before it became too strong to deal with. Finally, it was during the Nixon-De Gaulle talk on March 2 in which Nixon proposed to establish a confidential direct channel with De Gaulle: "if either of them wished to communicate directly with the other they could do so by private letters and such relations need not necessarily pass through the usual diplomatic channels."\textsuperscript{42}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid., p.9.
\textsuperscript{40} Kissinger, \textit{White House Years}, p.170.
\textsuperscript{41} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{42} Memcon, Nixon and De Gaulle, General De Gaulle's Office – Elysee Palace, Paris, March 2, 1969, p.1, P/HAK MemCons, Box 1023, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
\end{flushleft}
2. The outbreak of the Sino-Soviet border clashes

2.1. The Sino-Soviet border clashes in March 1969

On March 2, 1969, the Sino-Soviet border dispute worsened when Chinese and Soviet patrolling troops exchanged fire at Chenpao (in Chinese)/Damansky (in Russian), an island on the Ussuri River. The *New York Times* reported that: “Soviets and Chinese Clash on Border; Each Lists Deaths in Siberian Encounter.” The State Department’s intelligence analysts estimated that the clash was the result of “persistent efforts by both sides to establish control” over the islands in the Ussuri and was not likely to lead to “wider fighting in the near future,” however, that similar incidents could be expected from time to time. Beijing had launched its “most extensive anti-Soviet denunciation campaign since January-February 1967.”

On March 4, 1969, during a briefing to the Congressional leaders on his trip to Europe, Nixon expressed that to side with the Soviets against the Chinese might be good short-range policy. However, it would be a suicidal long-range policy, for the Russians were “extremely sensitive” about this possibility. It was his experience that

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"fights between members of the same ideologies were more severe usually than fights between members of differing ideologies or religions."\(^{47}\)

On March 15 and 17, the second and third Sino-Soviet border clash erupted at Chenpao/Damansky in a much larger scale. The State Department’s intelligence officials judged that Beijing responded to the March 15 and 17 border clashes with a "less threatening tone and far less internal propaganda exploitation."\(^{48}\) It appeared that Beijing sensed a "greater danger of military escalation" than it did immediately after the March 2 clash and was assessing the problem in a "much more sober fashion."\(^{49}\)

Moreover, CIA intelligence officers concluded that it was the Chinese side that "triggered the initial clash" and thus the battle was the Chinese attempt to "contest" the Soviet presence.\(^{50}\)

\(^{47}\) Patrick Buchanan to Nixon (Buchanan’s notes of the second bipartisan leadership meeting), March 4, 1969, pp. 18-19, Box 77, Memoranda for the President (MemforP), Records of Meetings, President’s Office Files (POF), White House Central Files (WHCF), NPM, NA.

\(^{48}\) Intelligence Note, INR, “Sino-Soviet Border: “Has Peking Bitten Off More Than It Can Chew?” March 18, 1969, p.1, POL. Chicom-USSR, 1967-69, Box 1975, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA. Initially, the Chinese leadership, Mao and Zhou were “very poorly informed.” The Chinese Foreign Ministry ceased its function during that period. There was only an element of the intelligence apparatus, which later became the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR). At that time, CICIR was a part of the investigation department of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, and was the only institute that functioned. After the Sino-Soviet border clashes of March 1969, several members of that institution were brought back to Beijing to “brief Mao and the leadership specifically on world affairs, including the Soviet Union, the United States, and Japan.” David Shambaugh, Interview with Komine, October 15, 2003. In late February, following Mao’s instructions, Zhou told the four Marshals to meet “once in a week” to discuss “important international issues” and provide the Party Central Committee with their options. On March 18, they finished their first report, “An Analysis of War Situation in the World”; eleven days later they had completed their second report, “The Zhenbao Island as a Tree in the Forest of the Whole World.” Chen, *Mao’s China and the Cold War*, p.246.

\(^{49}\) Ibid., pp.2-3.

Kissinger recalls that after the Ussuri River clashes, "ambiguity vanished, and we moved without further hesitation toward a momentous change in global diplomacy."51 Kissinger's memoirs thus create a misleading impression that the March border clashes were the decisive events for the administration to comprehend the depth of Sino-Soviet mutual hostility. In reality, however, since January 1969, the State Department, the Defense Department, and the CIA had already engaged in a series of research studies on the Sino-Soviet border dispute.52 In contrast, at this stage, Kissinger was still sceptical of a new China initiative.

On March 31, the day after Eisenhower's funeral in Washington D.C., President Nixon held talks with French President De Gaulle.53 Nixon asked De Gaulle to play the role of a go-between and inform the Chinese of the U.S. decision for a withdrawal from the Vietnam War and of Washington's desire to improve its relations with Beijing.54 Accordingly, on April 23, De Gaulle instructed the French Ambassador in Beijing, Etienne M. Manach to deliver Nixon's private message to the Chinese leaders at the highest official level.55

Hereafter, Nixon and Kissinger spent until September 1969 to assess the nature of Sino-Soviet relations and their possible impact on U.S. policy toward Asia. Therefore,

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52 For example, the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research initiated an intelligence study series entitled "Sino-Soviet Affairs." *Sino-Soviet Affairs*, BIR, POL Chicom-USSR, 1967-69, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA.
54 Ibid. Regarding Vietnam, De Gaulle stated that "the sooner it was clear the U.S. was leaving, the greater would be the willingness of the Thieu regime and the NLF to get together and work out some sort of a solution." In other words, "the longer they believed the U.S. would remain, the less likely they were to arrive at some solution." Ibid. On March 17, 1969, the United State secretly began to bomb the so-called Ho Chi Minh Trail through Laos and Cambodia - the North Vietnamese' supply road. The bombings, which became public knowledge on May 9, 1969, continued until May 1970. As for the Nixon administration's military operation of the Vietnam War, see Jeffrey Kimball, *Nixon's Vietnam War* (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1998); and Larry Berman, *No Peace, No Honor: Nixon, Kissinger, and Betrayal in Vietnam* (New York: The Free Press, 2001).
55 With De Gaulle's support, Nixon might have considered the "French backchannel" as a possible main means of communication with the Chinese. In reality, however, De Gaulle resigned the presidency on April 28, 1969 and died on November 9, 1970.
the March border clashes should be regarded as the beginning of substantial White House assessment of Sino-Soviet mutual hostility.

2.2. The first official initiatives by the State Department

The first official signal of the Nixon administration’s policy toward China since Nixon’s inaugural address and the cancellation of the Warsaw talks came from the State Department. On April 21, in an address in New York, Secretary Rogers made clear the U.S. intention to promote a new dialogue with China:

One cannot speak of a future of Pacific community without reference to China. The United State Government understands perfectly well that the Republic of China on the island of Taiwain and Communist China on the mainland are both facts of life. ... Not even a nation as large as mainland China can live forever in isolation from a world of inter-dependent states. Meanwhile, we shall take initiatives to re-establish more normal relations with Communist China and we shall remain responsive to any indication of less hostile attitides from their side.56

56 Address by Secretary of State William Rogers, before the Associated Press Annual Luncheon Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, New York, April 21, 1969, pp.5-6, Extra Copies of Memo to President on Asia Trip [27Jun.-23July 1969] [Part I], Box 465, PTF, NSCF, NPMS, NA. Nixon and Kissinger did not refer to Rogers’ speech in their respective memoirs. From April 1 to 24, 1969, the Ninth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party was held, and Lin Biao was named Chairman Mao’s heir-designate. Lin’s speech reiterated that China would not attack unless it was attacked and criticized U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism as equal threats to China. “Mao Zedong’s Addition to Lin Biao’s Political Report at the Party’s Ninth Congress,” April 1969, p.162, in Chen and Wilson (eds.), “All Under the Heaven is Great Chaos,” CWIHP. The State Department’s intelligence officials analysed that while the party Congress promised “little change in the substance” of Beijing’s foreign policy, it left “room for a normalization in the conduct of Chinese diplomacy.” Intelligence Note, BINR, “Communist China: Lin Piao’s Report to Party Congress Published,” April 28, 1969, p.1; and Intelligence Note, BINR, “Communist China: Lin Piao Charts China’s Foreign Policy Course,” April 30, 1969, p.1, POL Chicom-US. 1967-69, Box 1962, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA.
In a broad sense, the State Department shared the general objective of improving relations with China with the White House. During 1969, senior officials in the State Department would give public statements on the China policy. However, the State Department was not entirely informed of the real intentions of Nixon and Kissinger. Therefore, the State Department operated independently in assessing a new China policy until the re-activation of the Warsaw channel in late 1969. The Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs principally conducted interdepartmental studies on U.S. policy toward China.

Particularly important, during his trip to Asia in March and April 1969, the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs-designate, Marshall Green informed many of the Asian leaders that the United States "would make moves from time to time designed to prove that it is Peking, not Washington, that is isolating China." On his return, Green produced a long report to the President. Green assessed that there was "less of a consensus" among Asian leaders on "whether Peking's growing nuclear capability would lead to adventurism." In particular, Green emphasized that: "No one seemed to share the Soviets' concern that the U.S. was contemplating normalization of relations with Peking." Green concluded that: "Moscow may not have any clear idea as to how to proceed in Asia. Moscow must have been left in a deep dilemma by the widening Sino-Soviet rift, the upheaval in


Indochina, and the costs and risks of supporting Hanoi and Pyongyang in the years ahead."\(^59\)

"This is Great," Nixon commented on the top page of Green's report, and Kissinger sent the copies of the report to Secretaries of State and Defense, the administrator of the Agency for International Development, and the director of the U.S. information agency.\(^60\) In reality, however, Kissinger was not pleased with Green's direct contact with Nixon, which had bypassed the National Security Adviser and his NSC staff. After this earlier contact, the relationship between Kissinger and Green began to deteriorate.

On April 16-17, April 25, and May 2, more clashes broke out along the Sino-Soviet border areas, about two thousand five hundred miles to the west of the frontier between Sinkiang and Kazakhstan. On April 26, Moscow publicly proposed to Beijing the resumption of the Sino-Soviet meetings of the Joint Commissions for Navigation on Boundary Rivers, which had been suspended since 1967. On May 11, Beijing accepted the Soviet proposal. The State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research interpreted Beijing's response in a May 24 government statement on the Soviet proposal as the affirmation of the Chinese desire to take the dispute off the battlefield to the conference table.\(^61\)

However, more fighting erupted along the Amur River on May 12, 15, 25, and 28; and further clashes occurred on May 20 and June 10 in the Sinkiang border area. The State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research concluded that the recent

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\(^{59}\) Ibid.  
\(^{60}\) Ibid.  
Sino-Soviet border incidents suggested that the Chinese were the provocateurs. In the short term, Beijing was trying to "agitate" the Soviets and "test" from the reaction to these counter-pressures "how far the Soviets may be prepared to go." Beijing's tactics had been developed "out of fear to offset a position of weakness."

In his memoirs, Kissinger recalls that the Sinkiang clash convinced him that the Soviet Union was "the aggressor." However, this statement is misleading because, as new evidence in this study shows in the following sections, until late 1969, Kissinger remained uncertain about the Sino-Soviet rivalry.

2.3. NSC Review Group Meeting on NSSM 14 in May 1969

On April 30, 1969, the East Asian and Pacific Interdepartmental Group completed the first comprehensive study entitled "United States China Policy" in response to NSSM 14 of February 5, 1969. The paper explored the nature of the Chinese threat to U.S. interests and the range of U.S. objectives and options vis-à-vis the PRC. The paper also examined wide-ranging specific issues, such as the impact of U.S. policy toward China on Communist states and Non-Communist states, U.S. relations with Republic of China (ROC) as a U.S. military base, Sino-U.S. normalization, the Chinese representation issue in the United Nations, and trade.

64 Ibid., p. 3.
65 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 177.
The paper assessed that the PRC wanted to extend its influence in Asia and to be treated as a major world power as well as the primary source of revolutionary ideological leadership. In particular, the PRC would seek the removal of the U.S. military presence from both the Taiwan Strait area and Taiwan, and simultaneously a U.S. acceptance of its long-term claim that Taiwan was an internal matter. As for China's security environment, the U.S.-USSR bipolar situation that characterized Asia in the previous two decades was shifting toward a "four-sided relationship among the US, the Soviet Union, Japan and Communist China." It was therefore likely, the paper judged, that China's leaders genuinely felt threatened by a US-USSR-Japan-India "encirclement." Their charges of US-Soviet "collusion" and Japan's alleged intention to re-establish the "greater East Asia co-prosperity sphere" were, in Chinese eyes, more than just propaganda. The possible impact of current Sino-Soviet tensions on US policy toward the Soviet Union and China would be discussed in detail in NSSM 63.

At the time, U.S. strategy consisted of two elements: deterrence of any possible direct Chinese threat; and limited efforts to suggest to the Chinese the desirability of changing their policies. The paper suggested two alternative strategies: movement toward intensified deterrence and isolation; and movement toward reduction of points of conflict and international isolation. To encourage the reduction of tension, while continuing necessary measures to deter any possible overt Chinese attack against US allies in Asia, the United States (a) could gradually de-emphasize the military aspect of its containment of the PRC; (b) could unilaterally reduce or eliminate economic

67 NSSM14: United States China Policy, p.2, Senior Review Group Meetings, Box H-037, Review Group China [Part 2], 5/15/69, NSCIF, NPMS, NA.
68 Ibid., p.2.
69 Ibid., p.5.
70 Ibid., Annex A-10.
71 Ibid.pp.10-11.
and political measures designed to isolate Beijing; or (c) could acquiesce to the PRC's fuller participation in the international community.\textsuperscript{72}

In their summary paper of NSSM 14, State Department officials recommended that decisions were required on three specific issues: 1) the future use of Taiwan as a military base; 2) U.S. policy toward the Offshore Islands; and 3) trade with Communist China.\textsuperscript{73} In particular, the U.S. military presence on Taiwan had increased in support of operations in Vietnam, and therefore a decision on the "over-all question of Taiwan as a military base" was required before these specific policy issues could be decided upon.\textsuperscript{74} Thus, the principal interest of the State Department remained the Taiwan issue.

The NSC staff commented on NSSM 14 that there was not a sufficient treatment of the "broader Asian context" and of possible effects upon relationships with Japan and the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{75} The NSC staff recommended that that alternative strategy option of the "Gradual Reduction in Tension" represented the "most prudent course towards China at the moment."\textsuperscript{76} In particular, immediate decisions could be made on (a) relaxing trade controls and (b) lifting travel restrictions. Finally the NSC staff recommended further studies on (a) steps and program for the gradual relaxation of trade controls, and (b) alternative UN scenarios. In essence, the NSC staff sought to reassess the China policy within a broader geopolitical context. These recommendations would be the basis of NSSMs 106 and 107 in late 1970.

\textsuperscript{72} Ibid., p.5.
\textsuperscript{73} NSSM14: United States China Policy, Summary Paper on Major Issues for Decision Regaining US China Policy (Summary by State at May 2 RG Meeting), p.1, Senior Review Group Meetings, Box H-037, Review Group China [Part 2], 5/15/69, NSCIF, NPMS, NA.
\textsuperscript{74} Ibid., p.2
\textsuperscript{75} Review Group Meeting, May 7, 1969, NSSM14: United States China Policy, HAK Talking Points, p.2, Review Group China [Part 2], 5/15/69, Box H-037, Senior Review Group Meetings, NSCIF, NPMS, NA.
\textsuperscript{76} Ibid., pp.2-3.
On May 15, 1969, a Review Group meeting on China policy was held. Kissinger, who chaired the meeting, presented his fundamental questions: “what do we want from China over the longer term and what can we reasonably expect to do to influence that outcome?” Kissinger believed that a “nation of 700 million people, surrounded by weaker states, could be a security threat no matter what type of policy it pursued.” The question was whether U.S. policy toward China should be framed by security considerations, such as a balance of power approach, or by desire for a more conciliatory attitude. There was general agreement that U.S. policy could have little impact on Chinese behavior over the short term. Kissinger asked: “whether we care if China maintains her policy of isolation so long as this is coupled with a relatively low level of aggression.” In response to Kissinger’s questions, a NSC staff member, Morton Halperin, suggested that the basic choice was between status quo and some easing. CIA officer, Jack Smith, also argued that the essential issue was how to bring China into the world community in the long term, which might make her “more manageable.”

Suggesting Sino-Soviet difficulties as a “key issue,” Kissinger asked: “What is our view of the evolution of Sino-Soviet relations, how much can we influence them, should we favor one or the other?” Kissinger noted that “the Soviets and Chinese each think we are playing with the other.” The so-called “Kremlinologists” believed that “any attempt to better our relations with China will ruin those with the Soviet Union.” However, Kissinger counter-argued that history suggested to him that “it is better to

78 Ibid.
79 Ibid., p.6
80 Ibid., pp.6-7.
81 Ibid., p.8.
align yourself with the weaker, not the stronger of two antagonistic partners,” because it would function as a restraint on the stronger.82 Kissinger thus criticized the NSSM 14 paper for not making clear what the desirable role of China in the world should be, nor fully exploring “the US-China-Soviet triangular relationship,” to which a NSC staff member Richard Sneider added Japan.83

Kissinger appeared to remain sceptical of a new China initiative. Kissinger reiterated an alternative formulation that “it is not our interest – or at least our task – to bring China in. We need not strive to isolate her, but may not be worth great investment in US policy to move positively.”84 A State Department official Winthrop Brown disagreed, suggesting that the question remained how “we might be able to bring about better Chinese behavior as they emerge from present isolation.”85 Sneider also argued that “China policy is difficult because the short term threat is much less than the longer term threat; we have more flexibility in the short term because of the nature of the threat but we have less flexibility because of the Chinese attitude.”86

Under the option of “reducing tensions,” there was consensus on the three sets of issues: a) those that could be taken immediately if it were decided to change the China policy – trade and travel; b) those dependent on other decisions – use of Taiwan as a base; c) longer range problems – overall policy toward Taiwan, Offshore Islands, United Nations and possibly diplomatic recognition.87

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82 Ibid., p.9.
83 Ibid., p.10. However, it is likely that Kissinger read only the NSC staff’s summary rather than the entire NSSM 14 papers, which explored the question of U.S.-USSR-PRC-Japan relationship. China experts, such as Tucker and Whiting also argue that Kissinger did not carefully read policy study papers. Nancy Tucker, Interview with Komine, October 1, 2003; and Allen Whiting, Interview with Komine, October 19, 2003.
84 Ibid., p.11.
85 Ibid., p.12.
86 Ibid., p.13. Owing to a number of recommendations for further studies at the interdepartmental level, the consideration of the China paper at the NSC meeting was postponed (materialized on August 14, 1969). See Chapter 4, Section 2.1 of this study.
2.4. The Sino-Soviet border clashes in June and July 1969

On June 8, 1969, Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev delivered an address to the International Conference of Communist parties in Moscow: "We are of the opinion that the course of events is also putting on the agenda the task of creating a system of collective security in Asia." On June 19, Beijing criticized that the USSR and the US were unifying their efforts to encircle China militarily and incite India against China's southwestern frontier, thereby "gravely threatening the security of China."\(^8\)

On June 22, 1969, the State Department's Bureau of East Asian and Pacific affairs estimated that the present Sino-Soviet border tension was "serious," and there remained a possibility that the Soviets might launch a "surgical strike against the Chinese nuclear installations."\(^9\) On June 26, Kissinger requested NSC staff a NSSM on "U.S. Posture with respect to the Sino-Soviet Split and Our Role in the Triangle."\(^9\)

On July 9, 1969, a Sino-Soviet border incident on an island in the Amur River had evoked the most direct Soviet threat to date towards China. A Soviet Foreign Ministry note of July 8 informed China that the USSR was "compelled to take additional measures against the actions of the Chinese authorities." The State Department's

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\(^9\) U.S. State Department, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Office of Asian Communist Affairs, "Implications of Sino-Soviet Developments: Meeting of June 21," Pol 32-1, Chicom-USSR, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA. Nixon showed continuing interest in achieving a breakthrough in the frozen U.S. relationship with the PRC. On a return from his meeting with Vietnamese President Thieu at Midway Island in early June 1969, Nixon invited Green to his cabin on Air Force One where for nearly two hours they discussed China and other Asian issues. The President was "interested in the history of our efforts to achieve some thaw in U.S.-China relations." Green, Evolution of U.S.-China Policy 1956-1973, p.27, Oral history interview in A China Reader, Volume II, January 1995, FAOHC.

Bureau of Intelligence and Research assessed that the wording of this threat was deliberately ambiguous. However, Moscow might then be persuaded that the credibility of its warning would be at stake if Beijing was allowed to continue to provoke border incidents. On July 15, 1969, Premier Zhou Enlai portrayed to foreign officials the Soviet threat as a replacement of U.S. efforts rather than “collusion” with the U.S.

On July 14, in National Security Study Memorandum 69 (NSSM 69) circulated to Secretary of State William Rogers, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, and CIA Director Richard Helm, Kissinger stated that: “the President had decided on the preparation of a study” to examine “U.S. strategic nuclear capability against China” and “a range of possible situations in which a U.S. strategic nuclear capability against China would be useful.” In other words, Kissinger asked Rogers, Laird, and Helm to consider how to prevent China from becoming a fully-developed nuclear power by targeting its nuclear facilities.

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92 Ibid., p.2.
93 Intelligence Note, INR, “Communist China: Chou En-lai Hits Moscow’s Asian Collective Security,” July 15, 1969, p.1, POL Chicom-US. 1967-69, Box 1973, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA. In their July 1969 report, the four Chinese marshals warned of the danger of collusion and contention between the superpowers: “U.S. imperialists and the Soviet revisionists collaborate with each other while at the same time fighting each other. The contradictions between superpowers, however, are not reduced because of collaboration between them; rather, their hostilities toward each other are more fierce than ever before.” Report by Four Chinese Marshals – Chen Yi, Ye Jianying, Xu Xiangqian, and Nie Rongzhen – to the Central Committee, “A Preliminary Evaluation of the War Situation,” July 11, 1969, in Chen and Wilson (eds.), “All Under the Heaven,” pp.166-167; and Chen, Mao’s China and the Cold War, p.247.
94 National Security Study Memorandum 69: U.S. Nuclear Policy in Asia, July 14, 1969, SF, Box 365, NSCF, NPMS, NA. Tyler argues that there was an option for the United States to agree or cooperate with the Soviet Union to wipe out China’s nuclear capability in return for Soviet help in Vietnam. Tyler, A Great Wall, p.63. However neither Nixon nor Kissinger referred to this study in their respective memoirs.
2.5. NSSM 35: Easing trade and travel restrictions

During June and July 1969, following the review of trade restrictions ordered by NSSM 35 on March 28, the U.S. government publicly began to modify its two decade-old trade embargo against China. On June 26, Kissinger signed a directive to the agencies: "The President has decided, on broad foreign policy grounds, to modify certain of our trade controls against China." Accordingly, the NSC Under Secretaries Committee, chaired by Elliot Richardson, was asked to prepare detailed recommendations to implement the Presidential decision. In their respective memoranda to Nixon, Richardson and Kissinger pointed out the implications for the presidential decision at this particular time:

- The decision would "demonstrate the flexibility" that the President now had in administering trade controls.
- A delay might lead the United States into a period where "unforeseen circumstances," such as changes in Indochina and worsening of the Sino-Soviet border situation, could prevent the announcement and thus cause the President to lose the diplomatic benefits. Such a delay would also increase the likelihood of a press leak.
- If the President waited to announce this decision until his return from Bucharest [a friend of China], it would probably be tied in with speculation regarding a presumed anti-Soviet purpose in the Bucharest stopover. This would give his decision an "overly overt anti-Soviet significance."

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96 National Security Decision Memorandum 17, June 26, 1969, Box 363, SF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
97 Richardson to Nixon, "NSDM 17: China Trade," July 10, 1969, pp.1-2, Quotation marks in original; and Memo from Kissinger to Nixon, "Relaxation of Economic Controls Against China," July 11, 1969, p.1, China, Box 839, Name Files (NF), NSCF, NPMS, NA. It was initially assumed that actual implementation had to await passage by Congress of the revised Export Control Act anticipated in September. Quotation marks in original.
On July 21, 1969, two days before Nixon's departure for his official trip to Asia and Romania, the State Department announced a partial lifting of trade and travel sanctions on China. The *New York Times* reported the announcement as "the first sliver of a break in the total embargo" against China. In his memoirs, regarding economic issues as secondary, Kissinger argues that the actual change itself was not important, however, the "symbolism" was vast. Lord recalls that: "These [The relaxation of trade and travel restrictions] were modest unilateral steps which did not require any response from the Chinese." Overall, therefore, officials in the Nixon administration regarded unilateral actions as a diplomatic tool to send a low-key signal that the United States was willing to improve its relations with China.

In summary, it was Nixon's presidential leadership that launched the new China initiative during the first half of 1969. Fearing bureaucratic leak and U.S. domestic conservative backlash, Nixon took the lead very secretly, directing Kissinger to conduct a series of NSSMs on the China policy. Nixon believed that a nuclear-armed China outside of the international community would be a great threat in the long run and thus that it would be important to initiate a new dialogue with Beijing before Washington would be forced to do so. In contrast, Kissinger did not have any particular interest in China and thus remained sceptical about a new China initiative.

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98 Department of State, July 21, 1969, A Matter of Record – No. 8, Public Statements on China by U.S. officials, Box 86, U.S. China Policy 1969-1972 [2of 2], Country Files (CF) – Far East, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA. The decision permitted tourists and residents abroad to purchase 100 dollars of Chinese goods and authorizing automatic validations of U.S. passports for travel to China for certain categories of persons, such as members of Congress, journalists, scholars, scientists, medical doctors, and representatives of the American Red Cross. There was a brief delay for the announcement. On July 16, two American yacht men were captured by the Chinese when their lifeboat drifted into Chinese waters off Hong Kong. Chinese remained silent without playing the incident into any anti-American campaign. On July 24, the Chinese released the yachtmen.


100 Kissinger, *White House Years*, p.179.

It was the State Department, especially the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research that conducted a number of studies. In particular, the first comprehensive inter-departmental policy study, NSSM 14, provided a broad range of policy alternatives for a new China initiative. Finally, the outbreak of the Sino-Soviet border clashes in March 1969 marked the beginning of the long process for U.S. officials to assess the nature of Sino-Soviet relations throughout the remainder of 1969.
Chapter 4. The Reassessment of the China Policy from July to November 1969

This chapter explores the bureaucratic reassessment of the U.S. China policy within the Nixon administration during the latter half of 1969. First, it examines President Nixon’s initiative to send both public and private signals towards Beijing for a new dialogue, such as the U.S. redefinition of its policy toward Asia, symbolized by the Nixon Doctrine in July 1969, and the opening of the backchannels, such as Pakistan and Romania. Second, it analyzes the escalation of the Sino-Soviet border clashes from August to September 1969 and the first full NSC meeting on the China policy. Finally, this study examines the further development of policy option studies by the NSC staff and the State Department in late 1969.

1. Nixon’s trip to Asia and Romania in July and August 1969

1.1. The Nixon Doctrine

By the late 1960s, realizing the limitation of power resources, the United States was reassessing its open-ended containment policy toward the monolithic threat from Communism.¹ A major opportunity arrived when President Nixon took an around-the-world trip from July 23 to August 3, 1969. On July 25, on his first stop in Guam, President Nixon announced major changes in U.S. policy in Asia, in what came to be known as the ‘Nixon Doctrine’:

¹ On this subject, see John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), Chapters 9 and 10.
• The United States will keep its treaty commitments.
• We shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us, or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security and the security of the region as a whole.
• In cases involving other types of aggression we shall furnish military and economic assistance when required and as appropriate, but we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.2

On July 26, the New York Times reported that: "Nixon Plans Cut in Military Roles for U.S. in Asia."3 Nixon’s announcement brought about anxiety among U.S. allies that the United States would withdraw from Asia. Kissinger and the NSC staff members were not informed of Nixon’s plan in advance. Winston Lord recalls that the pronouncement was “accidental.”4 John Holdridge also emphasizes it as a “complete and utter surprise.”5 In his memoirs, Kissinger admits that the Nixon speech was “quite to my surprise.”6 Kissinger insists further that: “To this day, I do not think that Nixon intended a major policy pronouncement in Guam.”7

In reality, however, some evidence shows how the fundamental themes of the Nixon Doctrine were outlined in advance. Marshall Green co-authored with Winthrop Brown and Robert Barnett the so-called “scope paper,” which turned out to be the basis of the Nixon Doctrine.8 In particular, the scope paper analysed the growing ability of most East Asian countries to assume “greater burdens for their own defense.” The paper thus urged that the U.S. position in Asia should “not be one of

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5 John Holdridge, Oral History Interview, July 20, 1995, p.90, FAOHC.
7 Ibid., p.224.
trying to solve East Asia’s problems but rather of helping East Asia’s problem-solvers." On July 22, 1969, during a meeting with Congressional leaders, Nixon emphasized the continuing U.S. presence: “We must play a role in Asia if we are to avoid being dragged into the future war in Asia. ...Our role essentially should be to provide a nuclear shield for the Asian countries.” Nixon’s handwritten-notes show his preparation for the main contents of the Guam announcement. Nixon was fully aware that many Asians wondered “what our role is to be,” and was thus determined to emphasize that: “we are [a] Pacific power.” Nixon wrote that: “Our Goal”: 1) “Encourage Asia responsibility (Japan e.g.)”; 2) “Keep commitments – but don’t extend them”; and 3) “Support their initiative.”

Solomon argues that the Nixon Doctrine was initially an “effort to avoid another Vietnam.” Rodman also assesses that the Nixon Doctrine was “not a formula for withdrawal” from Asia but the means of ensuring that the United States “stay engaged” in a greater cooperation with its allies and non-involvement in the internal affairs of other states. In essence, the Nixon administration sought to re-define the U.S. role as “behind-the-scenes encouragement.” In other words, the Nixon Doctrine

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9 Ibid. Since his first meeting with Nixon in April 1967, Green had been an advocate of a low-profile U.S. policy in Asia. Lord objects to Green’s suggestion: “It [the Nixon Doctrine] was not the introduction of low-profile policy in the Pacific. We wanted to preserve a high-profile in the Pacific.” Lord, Interview with Komine, October 15, 2003.
10 Buchanan to Nixon, July 22, 1969, POF, Box 78, NPMS, NA.
11 Notes Guam Press Conference, Box 50, President’s Speech Files, July-August 1969, Asia Trip [1 of 2] President’s Personal Files (PPS), NPMS, NA. Kissinger recalls that while preparing for Nixon’s trip in the summer of 1969, Nixon and he often discussed the problems of the U.S. over-involvement in the world and the question of the U.S. role in post-Vietnam Asia. Kissinger, White House Years, p.223.
12 Ibid.
14 Peter Rodman, Interview with Komine, October 24, 2004. See also Nixon, RN, p.395; and Melvin Laird, Interview in CNN, Cold War, Episode 15, China.
was intended to encourage U.S. allies' further burden sharing as a substitute for U.S. direct intervention to maintain regional stability. Importantly, State Department officials later learned that the Chinese followed the presidential statement closely.\textsuperscript{16}

In particular, at almost every stop, Nixon sought to leave positive signals of U.S. readiness to open communication with the Chinese.\textsuperscript{17} On the day of departure from Washington, Nixon said to Kissinger: “By the time we get through with this trip the Russians are going to be out of their minds that we are playing a Chinese game.”\textsuperscript{18}

John Holdridge, who had recently joined the NSC staff after replacing Morton Halperin in July 1969, outlined an initial secret message to China. On Air Force One flying between Jakarta and Bangkok, Kissinger asked Holdridge to “draft a cable to the Chinese,” proposing that the United States and China get together to talk about an improvement in relations.\textsuperscript{19} Holdridge wrote in his draft that: “we should not look to the past, but look to the future. ... There were many issues that were of mutual value, and we should address them.”\textsuperscript{20} Holdridge recalls that: “I gave the draft to Henry. He

\textsuperscript{16} The Chinese expressed privately to foreign diplomats that the U.S. was going to “withdraw the bulk of its forces” from Vietnam. U.S. officials interpreted that the Chinese appeared to have believed that the U.S. posed a “significantly diminished threat” to Chinese security. Memo from Rogers to Nixon “Next Moves in China Policy and Bargaining Moves Toward the Soviet Union,” October 21, 1969, pp.1-2, Attached to Memo from Green and Martin J. Hillenbrand to Richardson, POL Chicom-US. 1967-69, Box 1973, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA.
\textsuperscript{19} Holdridge, Oral History Interview in \textit{A China Reader}, Volume II, pp.25-26, January 1995, FAOHC.
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid.
looked at it, gave his characteristic grunt, said nothing. ...That is the last I saw or heard of it.”

Nixon’s handwritten-notes show his extensive preparation for meeting with leaders before and during the trip. Nixon wrote that U.S. policy should not be “a Soviet-U.S. Collusion against China” and that although there should be “no proposal of change now,” the United States “Hope[s] to see [the] time when China changes.” On July 29, Nixon met with U.S. Ambassadors to Asian countries in Bangkok. Regarding the U.S. policy toward Sino-Soviet mutual hostility, Nixon stated that: “I don’t think we should rush quickly into [an] embrace with USSR to contain China. Best US stance is to play each - not publicly. US-USSR-Europe lined up against rest of Asia not a pretty prospect. US-USSR security pact would invite Soviet adventurism in area; can let people talk about it but not do anything about.”

1.2. The Nixon-Yahya talks and the opening of the Pakistani channel

Toward the end of the trip, President Nixon made very significant private moves to establish back-channel communication with the Chinese through third parties, namely Pakistan and Romania. On August 1, 1969, Nixon visited Pakistan and held talks with Pakistani President Yahya Kahn. Historically, owing to a prolonged rivalry with

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21 Ibid. Holdridge estimated that the message was sent to the Chinese either through Pakistan or Romania. Ibid.
22 Notes Guam Press Conference, Box 50, President’s Speech Files (PSF), July-August 1969, Asia Trip [1 of 2] President’s Personal Files (PPF), NPMS, NA.
23 Memcon, Nixon and American ambassadors, U.S. Embassy, Bangkok, Thailand, July 29, 1969, p.5, P/HAK MemCons Box 1023, NSCF, NPMS, NA. The meeting was a gathering of regional Chief of Mission held during Nixon’s trip to several Asian countries and Romania.
24 Nixon’s visit on August 1, 1969 had been to Lahore rather than Rawalpindi as the official capital Islamabad had not yet been completed.
India, Pakistan valued military and economic aid from China and remained supportive of Beijing even during the chaotic period of the Cultural Revolution. U.S. officials were aware of Pakistan's unique historical position vis-à-vis China. In the Cabinet meeting on June 3, 1969, reporting on his around-the-world trip [of May 1969], Secretary Rogers explained that Yahya Khan, who was taking over in Pakistan, "has had considerable contact" with Mao, Zhou and other leaders of China. 25 Nixon's handwritten-notes show that the President personally admired and respected the "strong vitality" and "friendship" of Pakistan. 26 In particular, Nixon was aware that what he would say to the Pakistani leader would be said to the Chinese.

In his memoirs, without revealing any specific issues, Nixon states only briefly that he and Yahya discussed the idea [Yahya's help as intermediary] in "general terms." 27 In reality, however, the Nixon-Yahya talk was much more substantial. During a strictly confidential talk on August 1, 1969 (even Kissinger was not present), Nixon stated that: "the U.S. would welcome accommodation with Communist China and would appreciate it if President Yahya would let Chou Enlai know this." 28 Nixon did not consider passing this thought as "urgent," however he explained that President Yahya might convey this message "at some natural and appropriate time" in a "low key factual way." 29 The two Presidents also discussed China's view of the world. Yahya stated that China felt "surrounded by hostile forces - India, Soviet Union and

25 Memo from Jim Keogh, Cabinet Meeting, June 3, 1969, p.5, Box 7, MemforP, Records of Meetings, POF, WHCF, NPMS, NA.
26 Nixon's handwritten notations, Box 50, July-August 1969, Asian Trip [2 of 2], PSF, PPF, NPMS, NA. In his memoirs, Nixon recalls his favorable impression of Pakistan during his previous visits as Vice President in 1953 and as a private citizen in 1964. See Nixon, RN, p.133, and pp.256-257.
27 Nixon, RN, p.546. Former Pakistani President Ayub Khan had once unsuccessfully tried to mediate between the U.S. and China in 1965. Department of State Telegram, STATE 154461(Extract), Attached to Memo from Holdridge to Kissinger, "Sino-American Contacts via Pakistan," September 16, 1969, Pakistan, Vol. 1, 01Jan.-30Nov.69, Box 623, Country Files (CF) - Middle East, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
29 Ibid.
the United States in Southeast Asia," and thus suggested a "dialogue with China to bring China back into the community of nations."\(^{30}\) Nixon agreed that "Asia can not move forward if a nation as large as China remains isolated."\(^{31}\) Nixon stated further that the U.S. should "not" participate in "any arrangements designed to isolate China."\(^{32}\) In the end, Yahya noted that: "it might take a little time to pass this message."\(^{33}\)

Later in the same day, Yahya arranged a briefing meeting between Kissinger and Air Marshal Sher Ali Khan, who had visited China in July.\(^{34}\) Kissinger asked if there was any perceptible change in the Chinese attitude toward the United States. Nur Khan explained that Zhou insisted that the Soviets were "deliberately provoking" China by trying to extend their territory beyond recognized boundaries."\(^{35}\) Thus, Nur Khan confirmed that Beijing feared the Soviets might try a "preemptive attack on China."\(^{36}\)

Nixon's trip to Pakistan was a huge success. The largest Pakistani daily newspaper, *JANG*, called on President Nixon to review U.S. China policy in order to "reduce the threat to peace."\(^{37}\) Haldeman recorded in his diaries that during the flight from Lahore, Pakistan to Bucharest, Romania, Nixon explained how impressed he was by the Pakistani leader who showed a great insight into the relations between the Soviet

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30 Ibid., p.2.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid. Nixon's handwritten-notes further show that Yahya personally informed Nixon of his two-hour talk with Mao regarding the Cultural Revolution and the Sino-Soviet rift. Mao and Zhou said to Yahya: "if Russia atomize [sic] us we will break out all over Asia – what are they going to do – atomize [sic] all over Asia?" Nixon's handwritten notations, Box 50, July-August 1969, Asian Trip [2 of 2], PSF, PPF, NPMS, NA.
34 Telegram, American Embassy Rawalpindi, Pakistan, August 1, 1969, Pakistan Vol. 1, 01Jan.-30 Nov.69, Box 623, CF-Middle East, NSCF, NPMS, NA. See also, Kissinger, *White House Years*, p.181.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Special Memorandum, Foreign Radio and Press Reaction to President Nixon's Trip to Asia and Romania, 23 July – 3 August 1969, 6 August 1969, p.6, East Asian Trip 1969 [Part 3], Box 464, PTF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
Union - an Indian ally, and China - maintaining close relations with Pakistan. Nixon said to Kissinger: “He could be a valuable channel to China – maybe Russia, too.”

On August 6, 1969, James S. Spain, American Chargé d'affaires in Rawalpindi, sent a letter of enquiry to Kissinger, after having discovered the substantial difference between the notes of the Nixon-Yahya talks provided by both the U.S. side and the Pakistani side. Spain pointed out that President Nixon was supposed to have told President Yahya that the U.S. wished to seek an accommodation with China, wanted Zhou to know this, and would appreciate the Pakistani passing the word and using their influence to promote it. President Yahya was supposed to have agreed on the desirability of this arrangement but stressed that Pakistan’s relationship with Beijing “tended to be overrated in the West.” He was reportedly debating whether to utilize the local Chinese Ambassador to convey the message or to wait for a still unscheduled visit to Pakistan by Zhou – which might be months off.

On August 19, 1969, Kissinger sent a reply to Spain emphasizing that the Nixon-Yahya talks were conducted on a “strictly head-to-head basis” and the President contemplated that the contents of these discussions would go “no further than Yahya and himself.” Consequently, it was the President’s personal desire that there be “no written record or further reference” to his private discussions with Yahya and that “no official communications refer to them.”

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39 Ibid.
40 Spain to Kissinger, August 6, 1969, Pakistan, Vol. 1, 01Jan.-30 Nov.69, Box 623, CF-Middle East, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
41 Kissinger to Spain, August 19, 1969, Pakistan, Vol. 1, 01Jan.-30 Nov.69, Box 623, CF-Middle East, NSCF, NPMS, NA. On his return to Washington, Nixon asked for information about the U.S. Embassy staff in Pakistan. Letter from Assistant Secretary of Commerce to Nixon, August 11, 1969 Pakistan, Vol. 1, 01Jan.-30 Nov.69, Box 623, CF-Middle East, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
42 Ibid.
On September 16, 1969, Holdridge reported to Kissinger that President Nixon's interest in “using the Pakistanis as a line of communication” to the Chinese had become “known to a number of people in State.” In particular, Holdridge attached a State Department cable, which reported a conversation between Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Joseph J. Sisco and Pakistani Ambassador Agha Hilaly. The cable showed that Hilaly referred to the Nixon-Yahya talks on “Pakistan’s possible usefulness in communicating” with Beijing and reiterated Pakistan’s willingness to “help” Washington’s communication with Beijing. At this stage, therefore, the pursuit of strict secrecy by Nixon and Kissinger was not as complete as they expected.

On August 28, under Kissinger’s instruction, NSC staff member Harold Saunders met Pakistani Ambassador Agha Hilaly and reiterated U.S. interests in improving relations via Pakistan. In particular, Saunders explained that the U.S. wished to establish “a single channel” between Hilaly and Kissinger as “the two points of contact” for any further discussion of U.S.-PRC relations. Hilaly explained that Zhou accepted an invitation to Pakistan without specifying the timing. Hence, President Yahya might initially convey that the U.S. had “no hostile intent” toward China. However, Yahya would wait until his meeting with Zhou to “convey President Nixon’s specific views.” In November 1969, Yahya finally delivered Nixon’s messages to Zhou. Thus was the origin of the so-called Pakistan backchannel, which

43 Holdridge to Kissinger, “Sino-American Contacts via Pakistan,” September 16, 1969, Pakistan, Vol. 1, 01Jan.-30 Nov.69, Box 623, CF-Middle East, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
44 Ibid. Joseph J. Sisco was Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs from 1969-1974.
46 Ibid., p.2
would play the crucial role of “intermediary” in delivering secret messages between Washington and Beijing, especially from October 1970 to June 1971.47

1.3. The Nixon-Ceausescu talks and the opening of the Romanian channel

On August 2 and 3, 1969, Nixon visited Bucharest and met with Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu whom he personally respected for his strong presidency and a long-term preservation of his country’s independence in Soviet dominated Eastern Europe. In 1967, Nixon as a private citizen had already met Ceausescu and thus was aware that the Romania leader was one of the few Eastern European leaders who had reached out to Beijing despite Moscow’s displeasure.48 Importantly, as the “first state visit by an American President” to the capital of a communist country in Eastern Europe since the end of the World War II, Nixon’s visit to Romania caused media sensation.49

Nixon was fully aware of the long-term importance of this trip. For example, on July 22, Nixon explained his decision to Congressional leaders: “We do not go there to antagonize the Soviets. ...We go there to offer hope to the people of Eastern


48 See Nixon, RN, pp.281-282, pp.395-396; and Kissinger, White House Years, pp.155-158.

49 Nixon’s handwritten-notes, Box 50, July-August 1969, Asian Trip [1 of 2], PSF, PPF, NPMS, NA. The Romania trip was Nixon’s idea. In early June, Nixon wrote to Kissinger: “I believe we could needle our Moscow friends by arranging more visits to the Eastern Europe countries.” On June 21, Kissinger met with Romanian Ambassador Corneliu Bodgan and conveyed the President’s interest in visiting Romania. On June 28, 1969, the White House announced that the President had accepted an invitation from Romania, which surprised both the press and the public. See Kissinger, White House Years, p.156.
Europe." In particular, Nixon’s handwritten-notes before his arrival to Bucharest show that the President prepared his personal messages to Ceausescu regarding U.S. attitude toward Sino-Soviet relations: 1) “We don’t want Soviet v. China hostility” and 2) “We will not gang up with one against another.”

During his confidential talk with Ceausescu on August 2, 1969, being aware that his statement would be passed on to the Chinese, Nixon made clear that: “We have no interest in creating a bloc or other arrangements in Asia which can be interpreted as fencing off Communist China.” In the short term, Nixon explained that: “We do not recognize Communist China and we oppose its entry into the UN, not because of China’s internal policy but because of its policies toward its neighbors.” In the long term, however, Nixon expressed his hope that: “Our policy is to have good relations with the Soviet Union and eventually, when China changes its approach to other nations, we want to open communications channels with them to establish relations.” Nixon concluded that: “China is a reality and no real peace is possible without China’s playing a role.”

In response, Ceausescu commented that “ideology was not crucial” in the Sino-Soviet dispute; the real issues were “national,” because the Soviets were “reluctant to concede China its proper place in international affairs.” Ceausescu insisted therefore that the U.S. and the USSR eventually would have to recognize that China could “not occupy a second class position internationally.” As for the growing tension in Sino-

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50 Buchanan to Nixon, July 22, 1969, MemforP, Records of Meetings, Box 78, POF, WHCF, NPMS, NA.
51 Nixon’s handwritten-notes, Box 50, July-August 1969, Asian Trip [2 of 2], PSF, PPF, NPMS, NA.
52 Memcon, Nixon and Ceausescu, Bucharest, Romania, August 2, 1969, p.7, P/HAK MemCons Box 1023, NSCF, NPMS, NA. See also Nixon, RN, p.546; and Kissinger, White House Years, p.181.
53 Ibid., p.7.
54 Ibid., p.8.
55 Ibid., p.9.
56 Ibid., p.11.
Soviet border areas, Ceausescu did not think that the Beijing-Moscow antagonism would lead to war, but admitted that “the unexpected could always happen.”\textsuperscript{57}

Finally, Nixon asked Ceausescu to convey a confidential message to the Chinese regarding his willingness to restore U.S.-PRC relations: “Frankly, if it serves your interest and the interest of your government, we would welcome your playing a mediating role between us and China.”\textsuperscript{58} Ceausescu replied by affirming Romania’s willingness to “mediate” between the U.S. and China that: “we shall tell our opinion to the Chinese, and of your opinion of this problem. We shall act to establish relations on the basis of mutual understanding.”\textsuperscript{59}

In his memoirs, Haldeman recalls his exchange with Kissinger before the departure from Romania: “You know, he [Nixon] actually seriously intends to visit China before the end of the second term.”\textsuperscript{60} “Fat chance,” answered Kissinger.\textsuperscript{61} In particular, Nixon was considering the promotion of trade in order to open up communist countries. Aboard Air Force One (on his way from Pakistan to Romania), Nixon told Marshall Green that trade might be a good means to draw the Chinese out of their international isolation, since China’s trade relations with the Soviets had already collapsed.\textsuperscript{62}

Overall, the Romanian trip was very successful, illustrating the Nixon administration’s policy to ease tensions with the Communist bloc and to promote a

\textsuperscript{57} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{59} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{61} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{62} Green, Oral History Interview, March 2 and 17, 1995, FAOHC; and Memo from Green to Richardson, “Next Steps in China Policy,” October 6, 1969, p.1, POL Chicom-US. 1967-69, Box 1973, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA.
new dialogue. The Romanian media gave extensive news coverage to all phases of the President’s Bucharest visit while seeking to limit comment in evident deference to Soviet sensitivities. Thereafter, Nixon regarded Romania as one of the major back-channels in U.S.-PRC relations. It turned out however that the Chinese did not prefer Romania as the main backchannel. Solomon explains that the Chinese distrusted Communist states, especially those in Eastern Europe and remained suspicious that Romanians were probably “penetrated by the Soviet intelligence.” In comparison, Lord reassesses that: “Pakistan was more attractive to China, because China always had a problem with India, and Pakistan had a close relationship with China. The Romanians, although they had independence from the Russians, were still in Eastern Europe, so it made the Chinese feel uncomfortable.”

1.4. Reactions to the Nixon trip

The White House and the State Department carefully monitored the local media in the countries which the President visited, and noted that mostly favorable coverage with considerable comment was provided.

The Soviet media “played down” the President’s visit to Bucharest, “refraining from any direct comment.” However, it described the aim of the Asia trip as restoration of American influence in Asia in the wake of the damage by the Vietnam War. It pressed

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63 Special Memorandum, Foreign Radio and Press Reaction to President Nixon’s Trip to Asia and Romania, 23 July – 3 August 1969, 6 August 1969, p.17, East Asian Trip 1969 [Part 3], Box 464, PTF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
64 Solomon, Interview with Komine, September 24, 2003.
66 Special Memorandum, Foreign Radio and Press Reaction to President Nixon’s Trip to Asia and Romania, 23 July – 3 August 1969, 6 August 1969, p.i, East Asian Trip 1969 [Part 3], Box 464, PTF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
67 Ibid.
the USSR's Asian Collective Security proposal as the proper alternative to U.S.-
sponsored "military blocs." There had been "only brief mention of U.S. China policy"
in Soviet comment on the tour. However, none of the Soviet comment was at an
authoritative level.68

Beijing's comment at a low level sought to "undercut any tendency to credit" the
Nixon Administration with a new approach to Asian affairs, denouncing both the
United States and the Soviet Union for practicing "imperialism in Asia." 69 In
particular, Beijing had "remained silent" on the State Department's June 21
announcement of a relaxation of trade and travel restrictions, and had also "avoided
mentioning" the President's visits to Pakistan and Romania.70 Importantly, Beijing's
comment on the President's trip did "not raise the question of Taiwan or other issues
directly affecting Sino-American relations."71

On August 4, 1969, President Nixon gave a briefing on his recent trip to the
legislative leaders of both parties, including Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield
and the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator J. William Fulbright.
Nixon began to articulate that: "American policy in Asia is in a transition stage... The
U.S. must move away from a monolithic approach to a country-by-country
approach."72 Nixon reiterated his strong belief in the continuation of the U.S. presence
in Asia, because the U.S. withdrawal "would leave a vacuum of power in Asia which
would be filled only by the Chinese or the Soviets."73 Regarding the Soviet proposal

68 Ibid., p.iii.
69 Ibid, p.iv; and Intelligence Note, INR, "Communist China: Peking's Reaction to the President's
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid., p.27.
72 Buchanan to Nixon (Notes of Legislative Leadership Meeting August 4, 1969), August 5, 1969 p.1,
MemforP, Records of Meetings, Box 79, POF, WHCF, NPMS, NA.
73 Ibid., p.3.
of an Asian Collective Security System, Nixon emphasized that he sought to assure "every Asian leader" that the United States would not enter into an "anti-Chinese security pact with the Soviets in Asia," because it would "enormously enhance Soviet influence" in Asia. Finally, Nixon concluded that: "We should not go along with the Soviet-American condominium on Asia"; and that "We have to find a way to communicate with the Chinese."

In the meanwhile, the State Department took its initiative to clarify the new direction of U.S. policy toward China. On July 31, Secretary Rogers stated in Tokyo that the Nixon administration had indicated "several times and in many ways" that "we would like to improve relations with Communist China." On August 8, 1969, Secretary Rogers gave a speech at Canberra, Australia, expressing that China had been "too isolated from world affairs," and thus the United States had been seeking to "open up channels of communication." The Rogers speech caused media sensation in the United States, and the foreign media's treatment of the speech was also favorable.

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74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
2. The escalation of the Sino-Soviet border clashes in August and September 1969

2.1. NSC Meeting on NSSM 14: U.S. China Policy in August 1969

During the summer of 1969, tension along the Sino-Soviet border areas continued to increase. After a particularly violent clash at the Xijiang province border on August 13, 1969 (the largest scale fighting since March), the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research reported that both the USSR and China were “determined to assert what they regard as their rights along the entire length of the frontier” and that, consequently, sharp border clashes were “likely to continue for some time.”

Although the two sides probably intended to “contain these incidents and prevent them from getting out of hand,” “unintended escalation might take place.” The National Intelligence Estimate also reported that “for the first time” it was possible to ask if a “major Sino-Soviet war” could take place in the near future. The report estimated that Moscow might consider it could “launch a strike against China’s nuclear and missile facilities” without getting involved into a “prolonged and large-scale conflict.”

On August 14, 1969, the first NSC meeting fully devoted to China policy was held in order to discuss NSSM 14 paper. Given Nixon’s recent Asian trip, it was a useful time to focus on U.S. relations with China and to “develop a new policy toward Asia,

79 Ibid., p.2.
81 Ibid.
and the Sino-Soviet dispute." The unilateral steps which the U.S. announced on July 23 with regard to travel and tourist purchases were designed to show Washington's "willingness to have a more constructive relationship" with Beijing while maintaining its commitments to Taipei. Nixon reiterated that he made these points clear throughout his recent trip. There was a general agreement within the administration that U.S. policy could have little impact on Chinese behavior in the short term. In the long term, however, there was a concern that an "isolated and excessively insecure" China would increase the danger of "miscalculation and irrational behavior." Therefore, while a more moderate China was not necessarily less of a threat, it could be "more manageable and predictable."

The revised NSSM 14 paper issued by the NSC staff (after the Review Group on May 15) included an updated reassessment of the deepening Sino-Soviet mutual hostility. Both Beijing and Moscow were "extremely suspicious" of U.S. relations with the other. Thus, there were a few different angles within the administration about the U.S. relations with each communist giant. One view argued that the Soviets were so suspicious of U.S.-Chinese "collusion" that any U.S. efforts to improve relations with China would make better U.S.-USSR relations impossible. Those who held this view believed that Washington should give top priority to improving relations with

83 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid., p.5.
88 Ibid.
Moscow and, for this reason, should avoid any efforts to increase contact with Beijing. An opposing view argued that the Soviets were more likely to be conciliatory if they feared that the United States would otherwise pursue a rapprochement with China. Those who held this view (the so-called "Realpolitik" approach in Kissinger's words) would urge that the United States expand its contacts with China as a "means of leverage against the Soviet Union." A third view held that consideration of U.S. relations with the Soviet Union should "not be a major factor" in shaping America's China policy. Those who held this view believed that: a) the United States did not fully understand how its China policy would affect Soviet behavior; b) by talking to the Soviets, the U.S. could decrease any fears they might have; and c) marginal actions to increase Soviet nervousness might be useful, however, fundamental changes in the US-China relationship should be guided by determining on its own merits what America's China policy should be.

Nixon emphasized that he made clear to Asian leaders during his trip that the U.S. did not intend to join the Soviets in any plan to "gang up" on China. Particularly important, Nixon judged the Soviet Union as the more aggressive party in the Sino-Soviet conflict, stressing that it was against the U.S. interest to let China be "smashed." Overall, as Lord assesses, the Sino-Soviet border clashes in the summer

89 Ibid.
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid., pp.4-5.
92 NSC Meeting, August 14, 1969, Talking Points (The President): China, p.1, Box H-023, NSC Meeting (San Clemente) Briefing Korea/China [2 of 3] 8/14/69, Minutes of Meetings (1969-1974), NSCIF, NPMS, NA. The NSC would meet again early in autumn to consider the Sino-Soviet conflict in greater detail, after Review Group consideration of NSSM 63 that was completed.
of 1969 "made clear the potential for triangular diplomacy" of U.S.-USSR-PRC relations.\footnote{Lord, Interview with Komine, October 15, 2003.}

2.2. The Kissinger-Whiting consultation in August 1969

On August 16, 1969, Kissinger, accompanied by NSC staff member Holdridge, met with a distinguished academic expert on China, Allen Whiting.\footnote{Allen Whiting, Interview with Komine, October 19, 2003.} Whiting stressed the arrival of an "historic opportunity" for the United States to explore the Chinese perception of a "common cause" with the U.S. against the growing Soviet military threat. Whiting explained that the Chinese would have a "tendency to exaggerate the threat" and that "we could exploit and move forward to the Chinese but not on their terms but with our terms." The question was "not the literal threat" but it was a "perceived threat, as the Chinese perceived it."\footnote{Ibid.}

After the meeting, Whiting drafted a detailed memorandum in which he analyzed the massive Soviet military deployments along the Sino-Soviet border areas and warned of the danger of a Soviet military attack (including the use of nuclear weapons) on China possibly “aimed at destroying China’s nuclear capability.”\footnote{Letter from Whiting to Kissinger, August 16, 1969, and an enclosed report, “Sino-Soviet Hostilities and Implications for U.S. Policy,” p.1, China, Box 839, NF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.}
Perceiving the outbreak of a larger scale clash on the Sinkiang border on August 13 as a deliberate Soviet initiative, Whiting suggested that the U.S. objectives should be: "(1) to deter a Soviet attack on China, (2) to inhibit the use of nuclear weapons in a Sino-Soviet war, and (3) to maximize the possibility of China identifying Russia as its sole antagonist, in contrast with the rest of the world and particularly with the United States." Finally, Whiting urged that by taking such concrete steps as to resume contacts with the Chinese in Warsaw and through third parties and to lift the trade embargo with China, the U.S. should assure the Chinese of its opposition to a Soviet attack.

Holdridge, however, was not convinced of Whiting's assessment of the possible Soviet air strike against China. The Soviets would be "appalled at the magnitude of the situation" which would develop if they entered a war with China, with its vast territory and strong resistance from its large population. Hence, Holdridge concluded that the Soviets were going to be "very careful about what kind of decision they make." On the other hand, Whiting recalls that Kissinger's (and Holdridge's) understanding of the nature of Sino-Soviet mutual hostility and the Soviet military deployment along the Sino-Soviet border was still "very little" in August 1969.

After that meeting, Whiting received no feedback from Kissinger and the NSC staff. In November 1971, Kissinger explained to Whiting that: "you know until you brought that memo [of August 1969], we had a laundry list of things we would do, individual kind of signals. But we didn't have it in a strategy. And your presentation put the

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98 Ibid., p.8.
99 Ibid., p.10.
100 Holdridge, Oral History Interview, July 20, 1995, p.105, FAOHC. See also Holdridge, Crossing the Divide, p.34.
101 Ibid.
whole thing into a strategic context.” Overall, despite Kissinger’s omission in his memoirs, the consultation with Whiting in August 1969 provided a crucial opportunity for Kissinger to improve his understanding of the nature of Sino-Soviet relations.

In the meantime, the Soviets remained highly suspicious of a possible Sino-U.S. collusion against them. On August 18, 1969, during a meeting with State Department official William L. Stearman, Soviet Embassy official Boris N. Davydov raised the question of possible U.S. reactions in the case of their direct air-strike against China’s nuclear installations: “Wouldn’t the US try to take advantage of this situation?” Accordingly, on August 28, William Hyland, Soviet expert in the NSC staff, estimated that a limited Sino-Soviet war would involve Soviet strikes to destroy China’s nuclear facilities, and consequently become a “solution” to China’s nuclear problem.

On August 29, a group of outside consultants to the State Department reviewed an on-going interdepartmental policy study - NSSM 63 ‘U.S. Policy on Current Sino-Soviet Differences.’ Among them, the Asian experts, such as A. Doak Barnett, Ralph Clough, and Fred Greene, counter-argued that “any Soviet punitive strike at China or an effort to take out Chinese nuclear facilities would result in strengthening Chinese

\[103\] Ibid.

\[104\] There still remains ambiguity as to what extent Kissinger and the NSC staff came to realize the subtleness of Chinese diplomatic practice in 1969, because they occasionally failed to grasp the implications of China’s diplomatic signals in 1970.

\[105\] Memcon “US Reaction to Soviet Destruction of CPR Chinese People’s Republic Nuclear Capability; Significance of latest Sino-Soviet Border Clash,” August 18, 1969, p.2, Def 12, Chicom, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA.

nationalism and unity, and would solidify Mao’s position." Finally, all the consultants agreed that the NSSC 63 paper “underestimated the danger in a Soviet preemptive strike” and that “even a non-nuclear Soviet strike would have a vast destabilizing effect in Japan, elsewhere in Asia, and in Western Europe.” These experts urged that the U.S. should make clear to the Chinese that the U.S. was “not colluding” with the Soviets. Overall, Rodman recalls that the Soviets “tested us and asked us if we would object to a Soviet attack on the Chinese nuclear facilities.” In consequence, the U.S. government would privately send a “very important signal” toward Beijing that “we would not welcome a Soviet attack on China.”

2.3. The Zhou-Kosygin talks in September 1969

On September 3, 1969, Premier Zhou visited Hanoi to attend Ho Chi Min’s funeral. The event provided a crucial opportunity for U.S. officials to assess the current situation in Beijing-Hanoi-Moscow triangular relations, and President Nixon ordered a large-scale intelligence operation. The State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research estimated that Premier Zhou and Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin were “likely to cross paths for the first time since February 1965” at funeral ceremonies in Hanoi, however that their “separate consultations” with the North Vietnamese would highlight their different views on the Vietnam War. Hanoi in turn would question

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107 Miriam Camps (State Department Planning and Coordination Staff) to Richardson, “NSSM 63 – Meeting with Consultants,” August 29, 1969, p. 2, Freedom of Information Act release to the National Security Archive.
108 Ibid., pp.2-3.
109 Rodman, Interview with Komine, October 21, 2003.
110 Ibid.
the Soviets and the Chinese on their respective “intentions in the Sino-Soviet dispute.” State Department officials anticipated that the Chinese might have felt that it would provide an opportunity for conveying to the Soviets their growing concern about the “danger of war” by emphasizing Chinese “determination to resist if attacked.”

In public, the State Department took a major step. On September 5, 1969, Under Secretary of State Elliot Richardson made a speech at a convention of the American Political Science Association in New York. Richardson stated that the “long-run improvement” of relations with China was “in our own national interest.” In particular, Richardson made it clear that the United States would “not seek to exploit” the hostility between the Soviet Union and “the People’s Republic” and that ideological differences between the two Communist giants were “not our affair.” The speech was crucial because it officially clarified the U.S. attitude toward the Sino-Soviet border problem during the peak of its tension. Richardson’s handwritten notes show that he personally prepared the speech combining a set of recommendations from his staff. Particularly important, it was Richardson himself who changed the terms “Communist China” in the draft speech to “the People’s Republic.” Media coverage was generally very favorable to the Richardson speech. For example, the *New York Times* described the Richardson speech as “one of the most explicit public statements” on the Nixon Administration’s position regarding the

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112 Ibid.
113 Ibid., p.4
114 Address by Under Secretary of State Elliot L. Richardson, September 5, 1969, p.15, Box 102, Folder speeches (1), Elliot Richardson Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.
115 Ibid.
116 Richardson’s notation in Ibid.
rift between Beijing and Moscow. It also reported that diplomatic observers in Washington viewed the speech as the State Department’s “opposition” to those who argued that it would be a good idea for the two Communist states to “engage into a full-scale war.” The State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research assessed that, despite its public harshness toward the Nixon administration, since July Beijing had “privately exhibited increased curiosity about US Asian policy,” which appeared to be influenced by a series of policy statements by Nixon as well as by other senior officials, such as Rogers and Richardson.

On September 11, 1969, after their separate trip to Hanoi, Premier Zhou and Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin held talks at the Beijing airport. Although rhetoric continued to remain harsh in public, especially from Chinese side, the talks prevented rapid escalation of tension along the Sino-Soviet border areas. On September 12, the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research estimated that this first meeting between Zhou and Kosygin since February 1965 may have been suggested by the Soviets, and accepted belatedly by the Chinese unwilling to appear as the obstacle to Communist unity and peaceful reduction in Sino-Soviet tensions. However, the meeting probably “produced no breakthrough in the dispute” between Beijing and Moscow. On September 18, Bureau of Intelligence and Research also reported that

the recently published slogans for China’s 20th anniversary celebrations on October 1 warned explicitly of “atomic war.”

On October 7, 1969, the New China News Agency announced that Beijing had agreed to resume border talks with Moscow at the Deputy Foreign Minister level in Beijing. The State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research judged that China had been motivated by a combination of “fear” over a Soviet preemptive attack on its nuclear installations which had surfaced in propaganda in the previous few months. On October 8, the Chinese Foreign Ministry called for a mutual withdrawal from disputed border areas.

The same day, Under Secretary of State Richardson sent a memorandum to President Nixon describing the decision for the resumption of Sino-Soviet border negotiations as a “new phase in Sino-Soviet and perhaps ultimately Sino-US relations” and as a “practical move demonstrating a flexible approach” in Beijing’s external behavior. State Department officials noted particularly that the Chinese statement of October 7 declared that “irreconcilable differences of principle” should not hinder the “maintenance of normal state relations” between China and the Soviet Union on the basis of the “five principles of peaceful coexistence.” The Chinese further stated that even if no border agreement could be reached, the “status quo” should be maintained, and there should be “no resort to force.”

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125 Ibid., p.3.
126 Richardson to Nixon, “Significance of Peking’s Agreement to Talk with the Soviets,” October 8, 1969, p.1, POL Chicom-USSR, 1967-69, Box 1975, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA. On October 20, Sino-Soviet border negotiations were finally resumed in Beijing between the Chinese and Soviet Deputy Foreign Ministers Ch’iau Kuan-hua and Vasily V. Kuznetsov.
3. Two lines of policy studies – the NSC and the State Department

3.1. Drafting of NSSM 63: Sino-Soviet Differences

Meanwhile, the interdepartmental study on Sino-Soviet conflict was in progress, and the Review Group (September 25 and November 20, 1969) and the Washington Special Action Group (September 4, 17, 29, and October 20, 1969) met to review NSSM-63: ‘U.S. Policy on Current Sino-Soviet Differences.’ The paper examined the “triangular relationship” between the U.S., the USSR, and China, especially the “problems and opportunities” for U.S. policy under two sets of circumstances: 1) the Sino-Soviet dispute continuing mainly in non-military ways, and 2) the outbreak of a major war. The paper considered four broad strategies:

- To collaborate with China in its efforts to avoid Soviet-imposed political-economic isolation;
- To collaborate with the Soviets in isolating China;
- To adopt a “hands-off” attitude, refusing to have anything to do with either opponent that could be interpreted by the other as tilting the balance;
- To improve relations with both opponents, gaining “leverage” from the dispute where the U.S. could in pursuit of its own interests.

127 The Chinese side was also conducting a series of policy option analyses. From July 29 to September 16, a committee of four Marshals met 10 times. On September 17, they submitted a report, suggesting that the Sino-U.S. ambassadorial talks should be resumed when the timing was proper. Report by Four Chinese Marshals, “Our View about the Current Situation,” September 17, 1969 in Chen and Wilson (eds.), “All Under the Heaven,” p.170; and Chen, Mao’s China and the Cold War, p.249.


129 Ibid. Quotation marks in original.
The "most important benefit" to Washington from the Sino-Soviet rivalry was that the growing dissidence between Beijing and Moscow had "limited both countries in the pursuit of policies basically antagonistic to U.S." In other words, both sides genuinely feared the "possibility of the U.S. siding with the other."130 Importantly, however, the "triangular relationship" between the U.S., USSR, and China was "markedly unequal." It was therefore important "not to relieve Soviet concern about a possible improvement in Sino-American relations" in order to preserve the U.S. leverage in the Sino-Soviet dispute.131 Hence, the paper suggested that the U.S. longer-term purposes toward the USSR and China required a continuous effort to improve relations with both sides even-handedly, namely while exerting pressure on the Soviets in the short-run, "keeping the door open" to China in the long-run.132

However, Soviet specialists, such as former Ambassador to the Soviet Union Llewellyn Thompson and Charles Bohlen, still insisted that U.S. overtures to China might introduce "irritants" into the U.S.-Soviet relations, and thus the Soviets might adopt a "harder line both at home and in international affairs."133 Hence, these experts argued for "caution in making moves toward better relations" with China.134

Overall, the NSSM-63 paper outlined the anticipated consequences which the dispute would have on Chinese and Soviet policy, and thus no specific policy options emerged directly from it.135

In his memorandum to Nixon on September 29, 1969, Kissinger again raised the question of U.S. reactions toward "a possible Soviet air-strike against China's

130 Ibid., p.3.
131 Ibid., p.4.
132 Ibid.
133 Ibid., p.5.
134 Ibid.
135 Ibid., p.2.
nuclear/missile facilities or toward other Soviet military actions," including the use of nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{136} Kissinger estimated that the Soviets might be "using" the U.S. to create an impression in China and the world that the U.S. was "being consulted in secret and would look with equanimity on their military actions." Thus, the U.S. should continue to "avoid the appearance of siding with the Soviets."\textsuperscript{137} Finally, Kissinger estimated that the Chinese were willing to put U.S.-Chinese relations on "a more rational and less ideological basis."\textsuperscript{138}

3.2. State Department’s Policy Studies in October 1969

On October 6, 1969, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Marshall Green completed a detailed memorandum, reviewing U.S. relations with China in the first 9 months of the new administration, and recommending the next public and private steps toward China.\textsuperscript{139} The Nixon administration had indicated its "willingness to seek friendlier and more normal relations" through a series of public steps, such as modification of trade and travel restrictions on China and its repeatedly expressed "willingness to renew" its bilateral talks with the Chinese in Warsaw.\textsuperscript{140} Despite public attacks against the administration in general and the President


\textsuperscript{137} Ibid. The Soviet attitude toward Chinese representation in the UN was showing a sign of change. In his UN speech at the annual meeting of the General Assembly, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko for the first time did not refer to Beijing’s admission. On September 22, 1969, Nixon sent a memorandum to Kissinger urging that: "I think that while Gromyko is in the country would be a very good time to have another move to China made." Confidential Files, 1969-71, Box 6, CO 34, WHCF, NPMS, NA.

\textsuperscript{138} Ibid., p.2.

\textsuperscript{139} Green to Richardson, "Next Steps in China Policy," October 6, 1969, POL Chicom-US. 1967-69, Box 1973, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA. In their respective memoirs, neither Nixon nor Kissinger referred to Green’s memoranda in late 1969.

\textsuperscript{140} Ibid., p.1,
specifically, the Chinese privately had told a number of foreigners that they were “aware” that U.S. policy toward China was “under review” and noted that the “trade and travel moves” were made within the context of this broad review. However, the Chinese had stressed that these moves were “insufficient” and that “some move relating to Taiwan was necessary.” Green assessed that the Chinese had conveyed “mixed signals”: while some reports suggested Beijing was seeking only some “symbolic” gesture such as a minor troop withdrawal from Taiwan or pull-back of the patrol ships in the Taiwan Strait, other reports focussed on Beijing’s long-term large objectives of complete U.S. “withdrawal” from Taiwan.

Importantly, Green emphasized that Beijing had privately expressed its understanding (through Premier Zhou to the French Ambassador to China, Etienne M. Manach) that the U.S. had “not attempted to take advantage” of the Sino-Soviet dispute and that the U.S. did not perceive a Sino-Soviet war as in its interest. Green indicated that there had been an internal Chinese “debate” over policy toward the U.S. over the last year.

As for particular new steps, the United States had decided privately to withdraw, for budgetary reasons, the two US Navy destroyers which had regularly patrolled the Taiwan Strait. Green recommended that the Administration attempt to use the opportunity presented by the withdrawal to “improve the atmosphere” for US-PRC talks in “Warsaw or elsewhere.” In particular, Green recommended informing the Chinese of the U.S. move through a CIA contact in Hong Kong, which Nixon approved as a diplomatic signal toward the Chinese.

141 Ibid.
142 Ibid.
143 Ibid., pp.2-3.
144 Ibid., p.3.
145 Ibid., p.2. Taipei had not been informed of this decision in advance.
146 Ibid., p.4
On October 10, 1969, during his trip to Washington, the Pakistani Minister of
Information and National Affairs, Sher Ali Khan, told Kissinger that the Chinese had
been informed that Yahya was ready to talk about U.S. intentions in Asia when
Premier Zhou visit Pakistan, presumably early in the next year. In response, Kissinger
informed Sher Ali and Hilaly that if Yahya was communicating with the Chinese
Ambassador to Pakistan, he might say “confidentially” that U.S. would remove two of
its destroyers from Taiwan Strait.\footnote{Kissinger to Nixon, “President Yahya and Communist China,” October 16, 1969, p.1, “Exchange
Leading Up to HAK Trip to China, December 1969-July 1971, 2 of 2,” Box 1031, FPF-China/Vietnam
Negotiations, NSCF, NPMS, NA.} Kissinger emphasized, however, that it did “not
affect our basic position on Taiwan but it was an effort to remove an irritant.”\footnote{Ibid.} After
reviewing the report of the meeting, Nixon wrote his comment on the margin of the
memorandum: “K, also open trade possibilities.”\footnote{Ibid.}

On November 7, the State Department announced the U.S. decision to terminate
active routine patrolling by two destroyers of the Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Straits.
Their presence was a symbolic remainder of President Truman’s decision to re-
intervene in Chinese Communist-Nationalist relations at the outbreak of the Korean
War in June 1950. Therefore, State Department officials anticipated that Beijing
might interpret the decision as a “further indication of a diminished U.S. threat” to

\footnote{Ambassador Dobrynin conveyed Soviet readiness to open SALT talks and also formally warned
against any attempt to exploit Sino-Soviet tensions. Nixon made it clear that U.S. policy toward China
was “not directed against the Soviet Union.” Anatoly Dobrynin, \textit{In Confidence: Moscow’s Ambassador
to America’s Six Cold War Presidents (1962-1986)} (New York: Times Books, A Division of Random
House, Inc, 1995), p.202. Dobrynin assesses that the Soviet Union was making a mistake from the
beginning by “displaying our anxiety over China” to the Nixon administration. Ibid.}
Chinese security.\textsuperscript{150} Washington also reiterated publicly that the U.S. defense commitment to the Government of the Republic of China would “remain unaltered.”\textsuperscript{151}

The State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research also assessed that since October, the Chinese media had “increased its abuse” directed at the U.S. military presence in Asia in general and President Nixon in particular. Importantly, however, State Department officials noticed that the difference between Beijing’s public and private attitude towards the United States had widened during the past few weeks.\textsuperscript{152}

Simultaneously, State Department officials continued to monitor developments in Sino-Soviet relations. On October 21, in his memorandum to Under Secretary of State Richardson, Green emphasized that the U.S. interest was served by taking “parallel actions” and highlighting a general posture of “evenhandedness” regarding its relations with China and the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{153}

On November 6, 1969, the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research reported that the Sino-Soviet border talks were already “deadlocked” after only three weeks of negotiations in Beijing.\textsuperscript{154} In short, while Beijing demanded disengagement along the border areas as a “prerequisite to further progress,” Moscow insisted that disengagement could “only be part of the final settlement” and was seeking to “broaden the talks” to include political and economic issues.

\textsuperscript{151} Ibid. On November 26, this decision was conveyed to the Chinese through the CIA contact in Hong Kong.
\textsuperscript{154} Intelligence Note, INR, “Sino-Soviet Border Talks Reach An Early Impasse,” November 6, 1969, p.1, POL Chicom-USSR, 1967-69, Box 1975, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA.
3.3. NSC Review Group Meeting on NSSM 63: Sino-Soviet Differences in November 1969

On November 20, 1969, a Review Group meeting was held to examine Sino-Soviet differences. While there were no immediate operational decisions to be made, the NSC staff members, including Holdridge and Sonnenfeldt carefully reviewed the NSSM 63 paper in advance to discuss any proposed restatements with the State Department's representatives. Kissinger commented that if the U.S. actively supported the Chinese, the Soviets would be provoked, but he was still uncertain what the U.S. could do operationally. All-out support for the Soviets might also make Moscow consider this as a "signal" of a U.S. support for them to make a preemptive move. Hence, Kissinger asked what the U.S. attitude would be in the event of a Soviet preemptive strike. A State Department official, William I. Cargo, suggested a minor injection of U.S. support for China would only irritate the Soviets, and that massive U.S. support of China, with the implication of military support, was not thinkable as a U.S. policy.

Kissinger explained that the President thought "opening up certain exchange possibilities would not necessarily mean giving up neutrality." For example, the U.S. could still take steps toward China by promoting "maximum trade with China without getting involved in the Sino-Soviet dispute." Overall, there was consensus among the participants that the U.S. should distinguish between neutrality on the dispute and

156 Ibid., p.4.
157 Ibid., p.6.
neutrality in its relations with China and the USSR. In particular, Kissinger emphasized that neutrality on the dispute would not necessarily prelude the U.S. leaning toward one or the other and that if there were such reciprocity, it would mean a “diplomatic revolution.”

In summary, the latter half of 1969 saw the development of a broad range of policy options within the Nixon administration for its opening to China. Nixon continued to lead the initiative, using his long-term personal relations with foreign leaders, such as Yahya and Ceausescu, to test and develop his ideas for a new China policy. In particular, Nixon established his private backchannels thorough these foreign leaders to begin sending secret signals to the Chinese leaders.

The escalation of the Sino-Soviet border clashes during the summer of 1969 provided crucial opportunities for U.S. officials to reassess the seriousness of Sino-Soviet mutual hostility. By August, Nixon came to grasp the short-term importance of preventing China from being destroyed in the border conflicts with the Soviets. On the other hand, Kissinger perceived the China policy as a part of the U.S. policy toward the Soviets. Throughout 1969, Kissinger was preoccupied with the danger of a Soviet preemptive military attack on China. Thus, he heavily depended on his NSC staff and academics for expertise on China. Kissinger’s understanding of both the necessity and the possibility of a new China initiative was still limited in 1969.

During the latter half of 1969, the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research and the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs continued to produce a number of intelligence analyses and policy recommendations. NSSM 63 provided a detailed assessment of the deepening difference in Sino-Soviet relations. Moreover,

158 Ibid., p.7.
contrary to Kissinger’s underestimation in his memoirs, the State Department was also in charge of the public presentation of a new China initiative, including easing trade and travel restrictions and ending the Seventh Fleet’s regular patrol in the Taiwan Strait. Overall, during 1969, a wide range of policy options and issues were presented within the administration.

As the following chapter demonstrates, it was the resumption of the Warsaw Ambassadorial talks from December 1969 to January and February 1970 that provided concrete opportunities for both the White House and the State Department to have direct talks with the Chinese.
Chapter 5. The Resumption of the Warsaw Ambassadorial Talks from December 1969 to May 1970

This chapter examines the implications of the resumed Warsaw Ambassadorial talks. First, it analyses the initial direct contact between the U.S. and Chinese ambassadors in December 1969. Second, it examines the main issues during the Warsaw Ambassadorial talks in January and February 1970. Third, this study conducts a detailed analysis of the escalation of the bureaucratic rivalry between the Kissinger NSC and the State Department during March and April. Finally, this chapter explores the implications of the Cambodian military operation of May 1970.

It was Kissinger who had principally tended to "downgrade" the bureaucratic efforts which provided the groundwork for the development of a new dialogue with the Chinese.¹ This study counter-argues Kissinger's underestimation and interprets that the resumption of the Warsaw Ambassadorial talks was a more substantial event during the U.S. opening to China.

1. Initial Contact with the Chinese at Warsaw in December 1969

1.1. Nixon's instructions to Stoessel

From September to December 1969, the White House secretly sought to make direct contact with the Chinese. On September 9, 1969, President Nixon asked Walter Stoessel, U.S. Ambassador to Poland who returned to Washington for consultations, to "pass a message to the Chinese privately" suggesting that he attempted to talk

¹ Rosemary Foot, Interview with Komine, July 13, 2004.
directly with the Chinese Charge at a diplomatic reception at one of the neutral embassies in Warsaw. Nixon requested for Stoessel to convey that the President was seriously interested in concrete discussions with China. Finally, Nixon emphasized that if the press noted Stoessel’s conversation with the charge d’affaires, he should be "noncommittal" in his comments.

Without knowing the intentions of the White House, the State Department was also sending cable messages to Ambassador Stoessel in order to resume the Warsaw ambassadorial talks, which the Chinese had previously cancelled in February 1969. On October 27, 1969, Ambassador Stoessel sent a cable to Paul H. Kreisberg, the Director of Asian Communist Affairs in the State Department, explaining that he had not yet managed to contact the Chinese because there had not yet been a reception at a mission that maintained relations with them both. Stoessel also anticipated that an attempt to talk with the Chinese at a reception would be noticed by other diplomats present and would quickly be picked up by journalists. Despite Nixon’s warning in September, Stoessel had an impression that the President might prefer that his effort to talk with the Chinese should "become public." Stoessel thus asked for more specific instructions from Washington regarding the handling of the press.

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2 Memcon, Nixon, Kissinger, and Stoessel, “Conversation with the President Concerning China and U.S.-Chinese Contacts,” September 9, 1969, 3:00pm, The White House, p.1, POL Chicom-US. 1967-69, Box 1973, Subject-Numeric Files (SNF), General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59 (STATE-RG59), National Archives (NA). A former State Department official, Walter Jenkins recalls that: 'I think the first experience of how we worked together was a cable that came in from Henry Kissinger in early 1969 that said: "It's time to reopen our China talks. I want you to make contact with the Chinese ambassador to reopen these talks."' Walter Jenkins, (Deputy Chief of Mission, United States Embassy, Warsaw, Poland, 1966-1970), Oral History Interview, p.6, Poland, Country Collection, 1996, Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection (FAOHC), Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, Special Collections Division, Lauinger Library, Georgetown University.

3 Stoessel to Kreisberg, October 27, 1969, p.1, Country File (CF)-Europe, Box 700 [1 of 2], The National Security Council Files (NSCF), Nixon Presidential Materials Staff (NPMS), NA.

4 Ibid., p.2.

5 Ibid.
On November 21, 1969, the State Department’s Bureau of Research and Intelligence reported that in late October or early November, a Chinese diplomat suggested to a Czech journalist that if Washington was to propose an agenda, Beijing might be “receptive to a resumption of the Warsaw talks” – the first specific hint since the cancellation of the meeting in February 1969. In public, the Chinese still maintained a consistent ideological posture against the United States. State Department officials interpreted that by reminding the Soviets of the possible option of closer Sino-American relations, the Chinese wanted to worry the Soviets.

Meanwhile, State Department officials were considering possible public moves. On December 2, 1969, Secretary Rogers sent a set of recommendations to President Nixon to proceed with the remaining measures to relax economic controls against China on the basis of NSDM-17 (which Nixon approved in June). State Department officials estimated that the Sino-Soviet negotiations in Beijing might lead to a “partial rapprochement,” which might take the form of some restoration of normalcy in state-to-state relations. Simultaneously, Soviet agreement to negotiate both with China on border problems and with the U.S. on SALT would enable the U.S. to maintain its posture of “non-involvement in the Sino-Soviet dispute.”

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7 Ibid., pp.2-3.
9 Ibid., p.1.
1.2. The December 1969 contacts in Warsaw

On December 3, direct contact with China was finally made when U.S. Ambassador Walter Stoessel spotted the Chinese Chargé d'affaires Lei Yang at a Yugoslav fashion show at Warsaw's Palace of Culture. Stoessel conveyed a message to Lei's interpreter that: "I was recently in Washington and saw President Nixon. He told me he would like to have serious concrete talks with the Chinese." Lei agreed to pass the message to Beijing. On December 7, 1969, without any public explanation, China released two Americans who had been held since February 16 when their yacht had strayed into Chinese waters off Kwangtung province. On December 10, the Chinese suddenly proposed that Stoessel visit the Chinese embassy the next day. The State Department's instructions to Ambassador Stoessel directed that he should make a "generalized statement of US desire for improved relations" and suggest a date and arrangements for formal meetings but avoid any specific discussions on other issues.

The State Department's Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs interpreted the Chinese proposal within the context of Sino-Soviet difficulties. Green wrote to Rogers, arguing that Beijing's motives reflected a change in November as a result of

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10 Richard Solomon, Interview with Komine, September 24, 2003; and Jenkins, Oral History Interview, p.6, Poland, Country Collection, FAOHC. Jenkins recalls that Ambassador Walter Stoessel "kept things on an even keel, and very, very professionally. He developed very good relationships with other diplomats and Polish officials, because they really recognized him as a competent professional." As for initial Warsaw contact see also Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little Brown, 1979), pp.188-189; and Patrick E. Tyler, A Great Wall: Six Presidents and China, An Investigative History (New York: Public Affairs, 1999), pp.74-75.


12 Stoessel to Rogers, "Return of American Yachtsmen; Contact with Communist Chinese," December 7, 1969, p.1, POL Chicom-US. 1967-69, Box 1973, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA. This was a different from the July incident, which is previously described in p.140, footnote no. 98.

“deteriorating Sino-Soviet relations” and the beginning of U.S.-USSR SALT talks.\textsuperscript{14} On the other hand, Kissinger wrote to Nixon, suspecting that the Chinese may have called the meeting “primarily to get a feeling for your Administration’s attitude toward them.”\textsuperscript{15} Hence, Kissinger remained cautious: “I do not believe that we should be under any illusions that a whole new era in Sino-US relations is opening.”\textsuperscript{16} Kissinger judged that Beijing might regard contact with the U.S. as a “tactical step designed to put pressure on Moscow” by showing that the Chinese “have options open which are unpleasant to the Soviets.”\textsuperscript{17} Kissinger concluded that a “contact of even a limited nature could turn into something more significant if it can be maintained.”\textsuperscript{18}

On December 11, Ambassador Stoessel visited the Chinese Embassy in Warsaw and held talks with Lei Yang. Following the State Department’s instructions, Stoessel formally proposed the resumption of ambassadorial talks at the U.S. Embassy in mid-January, stressing that: “We believe China has an important role in Asia, and that in the last analysis Asian decisions must be taken by Asian nations themselves, a process in which China should take part.”\textsuperscript{19} Lei agreed to deliver the message to Beijing. On December 12, a State Department spokesman, Robert McCloskey gave a press statement, describing the contact as being held in a “cordial” atmosphere.\textsuperscript{20} On December 14, 1969, \textit{The Washington Post} ran the headline that “China Sees Leverage

\textsuperscript{15} Kissinger to Nixon, “Warsaw Talks, [December 10, 1969],” p1, CF-Europe, Box 700 [1 of 2], NSCF, NPMS, NA.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., p.2.
in U.S. Talks" and that although the details of the meeting had been “kept secret,” Chinese suspicion that the United States was “colluding” with the Soviet Union was still speculated.21

The State Department sent its general account of the Stoessel-Lei meeting of December 11 to the U.S. Embassies in Moscow, Tokyo, Taipei, and to the U.S. Consulate General in Hong Kong.22 The State Department also briefed the governments of Australia, Britain, Canada, France, Italy, and New Zealand before the announcement of the Stoessel-Lei meeting.23 In particular, the only governments which were “informed in advance” (a few hours before the December 11 meeting) were those of the Republic of China and Japan, and no leaks came from either capital.24 However, Nixon and Kissinger became very concerned about “wide dissemination” and the danger of leaks which could undermine a new China initiative.25 When Kissinger reported what had been done by the State Department, Nixon sighed: “We’ll kill this child before it is born.”26

Senior State Department specialists on U.S.-Soviet relations, such as Llewellyn Thompson strongly insisted that the U.S. government keep Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin informed of all contact with the Chinese. On December 12, Kissinger wrote to Secretary Rogers, who initially recommended against advising Ambassador Dobrynin of the U.S. talks with the Chinese, that the President had asked that “under no circumstance should we inform Dobrynin of the talks or their content.”27

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23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Kissinger to Nixon, “Memorandum from Secretary Rogers on Handling of Warsaw talks,” December 20, 1969, p.1, CF-Europe, Box 700 [1 of 2], NSCF, NPMS, NA.
27 Kissinger to Rogers, “Ambassador Thompson’s Recommendation that We Inform Dobrynin of Talks with the Chinese,” December 12, 1969, p.1, POL Chicom-US. 1967-69, Box 1973, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA. In his memoirs, Kissinger argues that since the Soviets never informed the U.S. of its
Accordingly, the increasing concern about leak would become a major reason for Nixon and Kissinger to almost completely cut off the State Department from China policy from the mid 1970.

Meanwhile, the U.S. government continued to take unilateral public actions. On December 15, the State Department announced that the United States would remove all of its nuclear weapons from Okinawa, Japan, by the end of 1969. The weapons were originally installed for the containment of China and were reportedly still aimed at the Chinese mainland. On December 16, 1969, Kissinger informed Under Secretary Richardson that President Nixon had approved the implementation of Secretary Rogers’ December 2 memorandum in a “low-key manner” in order to “minimize public speculation.” On December 19, the State Department thus announced that it would 1) remove financial restraints on foreign subsidiaries of United States firms engaged in “non-strategic” transactions with China; 2) eliminate the present restrictions on U.S. business participation in “third-country trade in presumptive Chinese goods” and; 3) allow the “non-commercial purchase of Chinese goods by American travelling or resident abroad.” Importantly, the State Department emphasized that: “It is with this same spirit that we have resumed discussions with Communist China in our talks at Warsaw.”

Contact with the Chinese or any other country, there was no point of giving the Russians an opportunity which might increase Beijing’s suspicion from the beginning of the resumption of Warsaw meeting. Kissinger, White House Years, p. 190.

31 Ibid.
1.3. The Kissinger-Hilaly backchannel exchanges

On December 18, 1969, in an end of the year backgrounder to the press, Kissinger outlined the U.S. general approach toward China:

We have always made it clear that we have no permanent enemies and that we will judge other countries, including Communist countries, and specifically countries like Communist China, on the basis of their actions and not on the basis of their domestic ideology. And we hope we have started a process towards Communist China, that over a period of years, will permit a more calibrated relationship to develop, and one in which such a large part of humanity will not be excluded from the international community.\(^{32}\)

On December 19, 1969, Kissinger had a meeting with Pakistani Ambassador Hilaly. Hilaly briefed Kissinger that shortly after November 5, President Yahya explained to the Chinese Ambassador in Rawalpindi that U.S. interest in normalization with China and its withdrawal of the two destroyers from the Taiwan Straits (on November 7) should be seen “as a gesture.”\(^{33}\) Beijing appreciated Pakistan’s role and explained that a recent Chinese decision to release two American yachtsmen (on December 7) was a direct response to the U.S. initiative.\(^{34}\) Kissinger asked Hilaly to convey a secret


\(^{33}\) Saunders to Kissinger, “Your Meeting with Ambassador Hilaly,” December 22, 1969, Box 624, CF-Middle East, Pakistan, Vol II, 01Dec.69-Sep.1970, NSCF, NPMS, NA. On December 17, 1969, Romanian’s First Deputy Foreign Minister Gheorghe Macovescu briefed Kissinger in general terms on the Chinese reaction to Nixon’s talk with Ceausescu. Kissinger interpreted this as a signal that the Chinese were ready to have contact with the U.S., however it did not necessarily through the Romanian channel. See Kissinger, *White House Years*, p.191.

\(^{34}\) Ibid.
message to the Chinese that the U.S. was “serious” in wishing to have conversations with them and if they wanted to have the talks “in a more secure manner than Warsaw or in channels that are less widely disseminated within the bureaucracy,” President Nixon would be prepared to proceed. In the end, Kissinger and Hilaly agreed that they would “keep the channel between them active.”

On December 23, Kissinger met Hilaly and handed over President Nixon’s letter to President Yahya (dated on December 20) in which Nixon reiterated his “interest in trying to bring about a more meaningful dialogue with Chinese leaders.” Nixon’s letter also noted that it was a “slow process at best,” but he had “not abandoned it,” and therefore the United States was still “exploring the possibilities of contact.” Kissinger re-emphasized to Hilaly that Nixon “wanted to stay in communication with the Pakistani President.” In response, Hilaly explained that soon after their previous meeting on December 19, he received a letter from Yahya (dated December 14). The letter explained that the Chinese appeared to be “willing for a resumption of talks at Warsaw at the Ambassador level without insisting on any preconditions”; they were still worried about the revival of Japanese militarism as a threat not only to China but also to the whole of Southeast Asia.

35 Memcon, Kissinger and Hilaly, December 19, 1969, Exchange Leading Up to HAK Trip to China, December 1969 – July 1971 (1 of 2), Box 1031, FPF-China/Vietnam Negotiations, NSCF, NPMS, NA. In his memoirs, Kissinger fails refer to the U.S. willingness to communicate with the Chinese in a more confidential channel.
36 Ibid., p.3.
38 Ibid.
40 Ibid; and “Direct and Indirect Specific Messages Between The U.S. and PRC,” p.1, in Exchange Leading Up to HAK Trip to China, December 1969 – July 1971 (2 of 2), FPF-China/Vietnam Negotiations, NSCF, NPMS, NA. In his memoirs, however, Kissinger fails to explain specific issues of the Yahya message.
1.4. The State Department’s Instructions to Ambassador Stoessel

Without knowing about the secret messages passed from the White House to the Chinese through Pakistan and Romania, the State Department’s Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs had begun to prepare detailed instructions to Ambassador Stoessel. 41 On December 23, 1969, the Director of Asian Communist Affairs, Paul H. Kreisberg wrote to the Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Marshall Green, estimating that the main U.S. objectives for the Warsaw talks were to “test the Chinese air [and] to keep the door open for subsequent meetings.” 42 It was anticipated that the Chinese would be more interested in listening to the U.S. position, especially regarding: U.S. military presence on Taiwan; and Agreement on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (which was proposed on November 25, 1968). The Chinese might also raise the following issues: a) U.S.-USSR collusion; b) Vietnam and the U.S. presence in Southeast Asia; c) Trade and Travel; and d) Chinese representation in the United Nations.

More particularly, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research estimated that the Chinese were interested in how the U.S. would apply the Nixon Doctrine to Taiwan. The report thus emphasized that the U.S. would be “dangerously misunderstood” if it failed to make it clear that “we have no intention of weakening our commitment to

41 In his memoirs, Kissinger misleadingly claims that the Stoessel-Lei contact of December 11, 1969 was the “first operational involvement of regular State Department machinery” in China policy since the beginning of the Nixon administration. See Kissinger, White House Years, p.189. In reality, however, contrary to Kissinger’s omission, the State Department already prepared a set of policy options and instructions to Ambassador Stoessel for the Warsaw talk of February 1969, which was cancelled. See Chapter 3, Section 1.3 of this study.

defend the Republic of China against attack from the Mainland."43 Finally, the INR recommended that the Chinese would take note if the U.S. made it clear that the degree of U.S. presence in Taiwan depended on the development of the Vietnam War and that "we will phase down our presence in Taiwan as the war in Vietnam subsides."44

Overall, the State Department’s draft opening statement for Ambassador Stoessel was designed to "set a positive tone" for the resumption of ambassadorial talks as a "new beginning." The draft had avoided any concrete proposals, and instead had emphasized that "this is a new Administration with a sincere desire to improve Sino-U.S. relations."45

Importantly, despite Kissinger's criticism on the lack of a geopolitical perspective, the State Department continued to analyze the implications of Sino-Soviet hostilities on the Warsaw talks. The Bureau of Intelligence and Research judged that while there might be "some gesture of interest in testing current US intentions," Sino-Soviet considerations had been the "predominating motive." The Chinese willingness to talk with the U.S. was almost surely intended as a "reminder to the Soviets that the Chinese have other options" regarding the "potential interplay among the US, USSR, China, and even Japan."46 In comparison, the Chinese might "adopt enough flexibility to keep the talks going."47 On the other hand, the Soviets might make a "minor

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44 Ibid., p.4.
concession in the border negotiations,” but the basic Russian response would more likely to “continue the gradual build-up of military strength in border area.”

2. The 135th Warsaw Ambassadorial Talks in January 1970

2.1. The development of the perception gap between the White House and the State Department

On January 8, 1970, there was an informal meeting between Walter Stoessel and Lei Yang at the American Embassy in Warsaw at which the date for the formal resumption of the Warsaw talks was set for January 20, 1970 in the Chinese Embassy. The preparation for the 135th Warsaw talk, however, caused bureaucratic friction between the White House and the State Department. On the one hand, Nixon and Kissinger were willing to use the January meeting to reassure the Chinese directly that the U.S. did “not propose to take sides in Sino-Soviet differences or to join any condominium against China” and that the U.S. would “not participate in or encourage any Soviet sponsored security arrangement in Southeast Asia.” Moreover, Nixon and Kissinger wanted to propose sending a special envoy to Beijing. On the other hand, the State Department’s Bureau of East Asian and Pacific affairs, especially Assistant Secretary Green emphasized a “new beginning in Sino-U.S. relations and this Administration’s new approach to Asian policy.” In particular, State

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48 Ibid., p.3.
49 Haig to Theodore Elliot (Executive Secretary), “Rationale for Inclusion in Instructions to Ambassador Stoessel,” January p.1, CF-Europe, Box 700 [1 of 2], NSCF, NPMS, NA.
Department officials insisted that the Taiwan issue was the "key to any improvement of relations with the PRC." 51

In comparison, while the White House was principally interested in assuring the Chinese of the U.S. non-committal attitude toward the Sino-Soviet hostilities, State Department officials believed that it was important to emphasize that progress would depend on resolving long-standing issues, such as getting China join in arms control talks and the renunciation of the use of forces to resolve the Taiwan issue. While the White House wanted to move fast, the State Department wanted to take the East Asian reactions into consideration in a step-by-step manner. Overall, the White House and the State Department had made a bureaucratic compromise by having accepted and combined the main interests of the respective sides.

2.2. The January talks

On January 20, 1970, during the 135th Warsaw Ambassadorial talk, Stoessel reiterated the U.S. official position that "it did not seek to stand in isolation from China or to join in any condominium with the Soviet Union directed against China." 52 As the "single most complex problem," Stoessel also made clear that the U.S. would continue to "honor its commitment" to the Republic of China by defending Taiwan from "military attack," and that its only concern was that this issue "not be resolved by force of arms." In this same spirit, the U.S. would also "oppose any offensive

Taiwan Strait. The ROC desk opposed Green, saying that the U.S. would lose influence on Taiwan, and thus a sentence — "we intend to interfere in whatever the settlement may be reached." — was deleted from the original instructions to Stoessel.

51 Ibid.

military action from Taiwan against the mainland." On the other hand, Stoessel assured that the limited U.S. military presence on Taiwan was "not a threat to the security of your Government, and it is our hope that as peace and stability in Asia grew, we can reduce those facilities on Taiwan that we now have." Importantly, this assurance was intended to reduce China's long-term concern of the U.S. using of Taiwan as a prelude to encircle and attack the mainland. Finally, Stoessel proposed that the United States "would be prepared to consider sending a representative to Peking for direct discussions with your officials or receiving a representative from your government in Washington for more through exploration of any of the subjects I have mentioned in my remarks today or other matters on which we might agree."

In response, without calling for any specific U.S. actions, Lei Yang reiterated that there had long existed "serious disputes" between the two sides on Taiwan which was an "inalienable part of China's territory" and a "province of the People's Republic of China." Lei Yang also stressed that the discussion between the two sides should be promoted "in accordance with the five principles of peaceful coexistence" in order to "reduce tensions." Finally, Lei Yang suggested that the bilateral talks might be continued "at the ambassadorial level" or "at a higher level or through other channels acceptable to both sides." The January Warsaw talk thus played a crucial role in the breakthrough from the frozen Sino-American bilateral relations that had existed over two decades. In particular, the January talk was the origin of the U.S. proposal to send

53 Ibid, p.3.  
54 Ibid., pp.3-4. In his memoirs, Kissinger fails to refer to this crucial statement on the Taiwan issue. Kissinger, *White House Years*, p.687. This is a very serious omission.  
55 Ibid., p.4. The State Department's instructions to Ambassador Stoessel for the cancelled Warsaw meeting of February 1969 already included an explicit proposal of sending a presidential representative to Beijing. See Chapter 3, Section 1.3 of this study.  
56 Ibid., p.5.  
57 Ibid.  
58 Ibid., p.6.
a special representative to Beijing, which the White House would keep raising in backchannels until the Chinese acceptance on December 9, 1970.

On January 21 and 22, 1970, the State Department gave a briefing on the 135th Warsaw meeting in general terms to the governments of Japan, the Republic of China, Australia, Canada, and Britain, feeling it “essential” to do so promptly to maintain U.S. “credibility” with them. In particular, State Department officials considered that the briefing served to minimize Taipei’s concern by reassuring that U.S. defense commitments to the Republic of China would “remain unaltered.” On the other hand, the Soviets impatiently showed their anxiety. On January 21, Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin visited Kissinger, demanding a briefing on the Warsaw talks. Dobrynin emphasized his hope that the United States was not “using” China as a military threat against the Soviets. However, Kissinger remained non-committal.

2.3. The Game Plan for the February talks

Meanwhile, the preparation for the 136th Warsaw meeting was proceeding. On February 3, 1970, Kissinger sent to the State Department a presidential request for a “game plan” to outline U.S. objectives and the tactics in the following talks. The Assistant Secretary Green wrote to Secretary Rogers the next day, anticipating that the Chinese might “put this issue [Taiwan] to one side” to proceed to discuss other

59 Eliot to Kissinger, “Discussing Warsaw Meeting with Other Governments,” January 21, 1970, p.1, CF-Europe, Box 700 [1 of 2], NSCF, NPMS, NA.
60 Ibid., p.2.
61 Kissinger, White House Years, pp.687-688.
bilateral Sino-U.S. issues. On February 7, Secretary Rogers sent the State Department’s proposed guidance for the 136th Warsaw meeting to President Nixon. The memorandum outlined U.S. objectives in the talks as being to reduce U.S.-PRC tensions and to indicate the U.S. interest in dealing even-handedly with Beijing as well as Moscow. In particular, the memorandum emphasized that during all previous negotiations, the Taiwan issue had “blocked any progress.” Hence, the key new elements in the State Department’s instructions included:

- To state that the U.S was prepared to discuss with the Chinese a joint declaration incorporating the position on Taiwan in accordance with the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence;
- To indicate U.S. intention to reduce those military facilities in Taiwan as tensions in the area diminished, but gave no indication of the timing of such moves or how far they would be taken.

The preparation of instructions for the 136th Warsaw meeting, however, caused more friction between the White House and the State Department regarding the U.S. proposal of sending its emissary to Beijing or receiving a Chinese one in Washington. Kissinger strongly objected to Secretary Rogers’ memorandum suggesting that “we pull slightly back from our proposal in January.” Thus, Kissinger wrote to Under

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65 Ibid., 2.
Secretary Richardson, emphasizing that "the President believes that it would be preferable to take a more positive approach to a favorable Chinese response."67

On February 18, 1970, in the first Foreign Policy Report to Congress, the Nixon Administration officially expressed that:

The Chinese are a great people who should not remain isolated from the international community. In the long run, no stable and enduring international order is conceivable without the contribution of this nation of more than 700 million people.68

The above statement was designed to give a diplomatic signal to the Chinese and to enhance a positive political atmosphere for "improved practical relations" with Beijing.69 The report also explicitly claimed that the U.S. interest in improving relations with China was "not a tactical means of exploiting" the Sino-Soviet dispute: nor was the United States interested in "joining any condominium or hostile coalition of great powers" against either of the Communist giants.70 Finally, the Kissinger NSC sought to take a lead in bureaucratic politics. As previously discussed, it was the NSC staff that drafted the entire report, and the State Department was completely excluded from its process.71

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70 Ibid., p.106.
71 See Chapter 2, Section 3.1.2 of this study.
3. The 136th Warsaw Ambassadorial Talks in February 1970

On February 20, 1970, at the 136th Warsaw talks, the PRC Chargé d'affaires Lei Yang stressed that the “fundamental improvement” in Sino-U.S. relations and the “settlement of other questions” could come about only when the Taiwan question was resolved. He then added that: “We are fully aware that the settlement of the Taiwan question requires making every effort to create the conditions.” After reiterating Chinese willingness to discuss the relaxation of tensions in the Far East, especially in the Taiwan area, Lei made it clear that: “if the U.S. Government wishes to send a representative of ministerial rank or a special envoy of the U.S. President to Peking for further exploration of questions of fundamental principles between China and the United States, the Chinese Government will be willing to receive him.”

In response, Ambassador Stoessel stated that: “It is our Government’s intention to reduce those military facilities which we now have on Taiwan as tensions in the area diminish.” Significantly, the U.S. side altered the previous utilization of the term ‘hope,’ used in January, to ‘intention,’ used in February. Therefore, contrary to Kissinger’s brief reference in his memoirs, the resumption of the Warsaw talks in January and February 1970 was the first major breakthrough in the U.S. rapprochement with China. First, the State Department developed a new formula for the Taiwan issue and for the first time officially indicated the future possibility of U.S. military withdrawal. Nixon and Kissinger would follow this formula in their

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73 Ibid.
74 Ibid., p.3.
75 Ibid., p.5. In his memoirs, Kissinger fails to refer to the new formula for the Taiwan issue, and thus undermines the significance of the State Department’s contribution. See Kissinger, White House Years, p.689.
direct talks with the Chinese leaders. Second, the timing and issues for a special representative mission became the major concern for the White House and the State Department during the contacts with Beijing until June 1971.

On February 22, 1970, Hilaly relayed to Kissinger Yahya’s assessment of Chinese thinking about U.S.-PRC relations. Yahya claimed that U.S. initiatives had encouraged the Chinese, who no longer saw U.S.-Soviet “collusion,” and emphasized that the U.S. should not regard Chinese readiness for meaningful dialogue as a sign of “weakness” or of “fear” of U.S.-Soviet collaboration against China. The possibility of the expansion of the Vietnam War was seen as having “lessened,” and thus a China-U.S. war was now seen as a “remote possibility.” Kissinger stated to Hilaly that Yahya should tell the Chinese that it was difficult to control press speculation, and thus the President would be prepared to “open a direct White House channel” to Beijing. On the margin of Kissinger’s memorandum reporting on the meeting, Nixon wrote “Good.”

4. Attempts for the third Ambassadorsial talk

4.1. The March proposal

In the meantime, however, the perception gap between the White House and the State Department expanded further regarding the question of a higher-level meeting

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76 Kissinger to Nixon, “Message from President Yahya on China,” February 23, 1970, “Direct and Indirect Specific Messages Between the U.S. and PRC,” Box 1031 (2 of 2), FPF-China/Vietnam Negotiations, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
77 Ibid., p.2.
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid.
80 Nixon’s handwritten notations in Ibid.
with the Chinese. While Kissinger wanted to proceed with sending a high-level representative to Beijing, the State Department’s Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs still remained cautious. Kissinger regarded the Chinese general acceptance of Washington’s willingness to send a representative of “ministerial rank or a special Presidential envoy” to Beijing as the “most dramatic development” in terms of its effect on the outside world, such as its impact on Hanoi. After months’ of assessment, Kissinger finally came to believe that the Chinese were serious, as a collapse of such a high-level contact might encourage the Soviets to believe that a Chinese rapprochement with the U.S. had failed. Kissinger thus recommended to Nixon that: “We need not move immediately in naming a representative. However, we should not delay over long, so as to avoid creating a negative impression.”

Rogers and Green wanted to uncover exact Chinese intentions for accepting the U.S. proposal of sending or receiving a representative mission. As Kreisberg recalls, State Department officials were not sure “how far they were going to go. We were cautious in how far we wanted to go on our next step than the White House was.” In reality, Green was “shocked at the pace at which this was moving,” considering incorrectly that the State Department was “pushing faster than the White House was pushing.” He was also “very reluctant” to move one step further unless it was clear that the U.S. government was going to “inform the Japanese, because he saw this as seriously damaging our relationship with Japan.”

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82 Ibid., p.2.
83 Paul Kreisberg, Oral History Interview, p.6, in A China Reader, Volume III, January 1995, FAOHC, ADST.
84 Ibid., p.7. The Kissinger NSC insisted that: “We can’t trust the Japanese, so we don’t want them to know.” Thus, State Department officials had a number of arguments on the possibility of leakage by Japan. However, as Kreisberg recalls, “None of us recall a single instance where we had ever told the Japanese anything really secret which they had then leaked.” Ibid., pp.7-8.
On March 10, 1970, Rogers sent a memorandum to Nixon, suggesting March 19 as the date for the next Warsaw meeting. The memo outlined that U.S. objectives were to "put the issue of Taiwan to one side" and to improve U.S.-PRC relations in other areas, such as agreement on non-use of force, trade, and cultural exchanges. On the other hand, State Department officials suspected that Beijing might wish to give the "appearance of movement" in its discussion with the U.S. in order to increase its pressure on the Soviets, and to damage U.S. relations with the Republic of China without giving Washington anything in return. Therefore, a higher-level meeting in Beijing or Washington "should only come after progress at the ambassadorial-level talks in Warsaw." Moreover, the memo suggested that the U.S. should "only reaffirm its willingness" to consider a higher-level meeting. Finally, the memorandum recommended testing Beijing's positions on the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issues between Beijing and Taipei. On March 16, the State Department announced validation of U.S. passports for travel for any legitimate purpose, which was aimed at sending a more positive diplomatic message to Beijing for the improvement of U.S.-PRC relations.

4.2. The April proposal

In reality, however, the continuing friction between the White House (especially Kissinger) and the State Department (especially Green) delayed a formal U.S. proposal for the date of the 137th Warsaw meeting. On March 20, 1970, Kissinger

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85 Green to Rogers, "How to Deal with the Question of a Higher-Level Meeting with the Chinese - Action Memorandum," March 5, 1970, p.1, POL Chicom-US. 1970-73, Box 2188, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA.
86 Ibid., p.2.
87 Ibid., p.3.
strongly urged the State Department to propose an immediate Warsaw meeting and to draft instructions to Ambassador Stoessel which would take a positive approach toward higher-level meeting. Accordingly, in their revised instructions for the April meeting, State Department officials proposed the explicit statement that the United States had no intention of imposing "Two Chinas" or "One China, One Taiwan." The memorandum also suggested that the U.S. emphasize its firm belief that "matters other than Taiwan can and should be discussed."

On April 1, 1970, the U.S. government finally proposed that the next Warsaw meeting take place on April 20 or any date thereafter. On April 28, the Chinese replied by suggesting May 20. State Department officials estimated that because of the military situation in Southeast Asia, the Chinese might have been having "second thoughts" between late March and early April on the desirability of pursuing their "high-level meeting" with the U.S.

Overall, State Department officials considered that Beijing's interest in exploring the limits of U.S. policy toward Taiwan would persuade the Chinese leaders to continue along the same track as the January and February meetings. However, NSC staff member Holdridge wrote to Kissinger, suspecting that the "real motive" of the

88 Theodore L. Eliot, Jr. (Executive Secretary, Department of State) to Kissinger, "Revised Warsaw Instructions, March 31, 1970, p.6, POL Chicom-US. 1970-73, Box 2188, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA.
90 Elliot to Kissinger, "May 20 Sino-U.S. Talk in Warsaw, April 28, 1970," p.1, CF-Europe, Box 700 [2 of 2], NSCF, NPMS, NA.
91 Ibid., p.3.
State Department could be to “soften him [Kissinger] up” for a new attempt to take a “more cautious line” in responding to the Chinese invitation to meet in Beijing.92

Meanwhile, intelligence analysts in various departments and agencies were closely continuing to monitor developments in Chinese foreign policy. On April 9, 1970, the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research reported that the Chinese and the Soviets seemed to have made some progress in “lowering the tensions” between them: the Soviets had unilaterally withdrawn some troops from their disputed border areas.93 The INR officials particularly noted that the Chinese and the Russians had agreed to exchange ambassadors “for the first time since 1967” and that there was enough confirmation from the Chinese side to suggest a limited break in the stalemate of the last six months.94 On April 11, having grasped the “signs of life” in recent Chinese foreign policy, China watchers in the CIA estimated that a “new period” was underway and that anxiety about a “Soviet threat” encouraged China’s “diplomatic offensive.”95 In particular, CIA analysts reported that Premier Zhou had signed a secret directive ordering a “limited flexible approach” toward the United States in order to put the Soviets off balance.96

92 Holdridge to Kissinger, “Chinese Attitude on the Warsaw Talks, May 1, 1970,” p.1, CF-Europe, Box 700 [2 of 2], NSCF, NPMS, NA.
94 Ibid.
95 “Signs of Life in Chinese Foreign Policy,” April 11, 1970, Secret, No Foreign Dissem, Directorate of Intelligence, Office of Current Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, Electric Reading Room.
96 Ibid. During his state trip to North Korea from April 5 to 7, 1970, Premier Zhou sought to ensure continued North Korean “neutrality” in the Sino-Soviet dispute and emphasized the revival of Japanese militarism as no longer just a “danger” but a “reality.” Zhou’s trip to North Korea was his first state visit outside China since June 1966 (except a brief trip to Hanoi to pay respects before Ho’s funeral). Intelligence Note, INR, “Communist China/North Korea: Chou Courts The North Koreans,” April 14, 1970, p.1, POL Chicom, 1970-73, Box 2180, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA.
5. The Cambodia military operation and the collapse of the Warsaw channel in May 1970

On April 30, 1970, believing in the need for a “bold move,” President Nixon made public his decision to order military operations into Cambodia to destroy the supply lines of the North Vietnamese. As Holdridge recalls, the principal objective of the Cambodian operation was to “preserve the concept of Vietnamization,” however, it “intensified the sentiment” against the war on the U.S. domestic front. On May 4 and 5, China strongly condemned the U.S. for its “flagrant provocation” by quoting Mao’s statement that the United States was a “paper tiger.” The White House sent a secret message to the Chinese via Major General Vernon Walters in Paris, informing that the U.S. had “no aggressive intentions” concerning China.

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97 Kissinger to Nixon, April 22, 1970, Box 2, Memoranda from the President, 1969-74, President’s Personal Files (PPF), White House Special Files (WHSF), NPMS, NA. The presidential decision was made against the oppositions from Secretary of State Rogers and Secretary of Defense Laird. The so-called “Cambodia incursions” lasted from May 1 to June 29, 1970. NSC staff members, such as Anthony Lake, Roger Morris, and William Watts resigned in protest. See Richard Reeves, President Nixon: Alone in the White House (New York: Touchstone, 2001), pp.179-181, pp.192-227, and pp.232-234; Bundy, A Tangled Web, pp.145-164; Isaacson, Kissinger, pp.256-284; Nixon, RN, pp.445-469; and Kissinger, White House Years, pp.483-505. Former State Department official Michael Rives explains the Cambodian-Vietnamese historical rivalry: “I think the Cambodians have always hated the Vietnamese. They look down on them because, after all, Vietnam was part of the Cambodian Empire at one time. …They rather admired the Chinese.” Michael Rives (Charge d’Affairs, Phnom Penh, 1969-1970), Oral History Interview, p.10, Cambodia, Country Collection, 1996, FAOHC.

98 Holdridge, Oral History Interview, July 20, 1995, p.87, FAOHC. Congress placed unprecedented restriction on the executive branch, namely the Supplemental Foreign Aid Authorization Act of December 1970: “no funds were to be used to introduce ground combat troops into Cambodia or to provide U.S. advisors to Cambodian military forces in Cambodia. Nor should the provision of military aid be considered as a U.S. commitment to Cambodia for its defense.” Emory C. Swank, Ambassador, Phnom Penh, 1970-1973, Oral History Interview, p.6, A Cambodia Reader, Country Collection, 1996, FAOHC. The Cambodian operation ended the war in the southern half of South Vietnam. Peter Rodman, Oral History Interview, July 22, and August 22, 1994, p.28, FAOHC.

99 Kissinger, White House Years, p.694. During a meeting with North Vietnamese officials, Chairman Mao criticized the U.S. for being “overextended” and affirmed the continual struggle against its interventionism. Importantly, however, Mao also hinted at the possibility of having a “shortened war.” Mao Zedong and Le Duan; Beijing, the Great Hall of the People, May 11, 1970, CWIHP.

100 Message to be Passed to the Chinese, Box 333, Policy Planning Staff (Director’s File – Winston Lord), STATE-RG59, NA.
The State Department was still preparing instructions for the 137th Warsaw meeting. On May 12, following Green's recommendations, Secretary Rogers sent a memorandum to President Nixon with a set of alternative courses of action. The State Department recommended separating Southeast Asia and the Warsaw talks by avoiding raising the question and continuing to focus on bilateral issues.\(^{101}\) The guidance also suggested delaying detailed discussion of a higher-level meeting. Ambassador Stoessel should limit his opening remarks to a request for confirmation on whether or not Beijing still felt that a higher-level meeting would be useful.\(^{102}\) Finally, the memorandum recommended that the U.S. government brief the governments of the Republic of China and Japan "at the higher level very candidly as soon as possible after the meeting."

Kissinger wrote to Nixon criticizing the State Department as still preoccupied with the question as to "whether, and at what pace, we should press" for the higher-level meeting in Beijing.\(^{104}\) In particular, Kissinger argued that: "State believes that if we push forward, we might risk a total - and embarrassing - Chinese rebuff."\(^{105}\) Finally, Kissinger suggested to revise the State Department guidance in order to make sure that "our reference to reducing tensions in the Far East does not appear to be restricted to the Taiwan area and to avoid setting a time limit for the period during which we would engage in higher-level talks" in Beijing.\(^{106}\)

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\(^{102}\) Ibid., p.3.

\(^{103}\) Ibid., p.5.


\(^{105}\) Ibid., p.2.

\(^{106}\) Ibid.
On May 18, 1970, the New China News Agency issued a statement that in view of the "brazen" invasion of Cambodia, the Chinese government considered it "no longer suitable" for the 137th Warsaw Ambassadorial Talk to be held on May 20, and that the date for a future meeting would be decided "through consultation by the liaison personnel" of the two sides. On May 19, Secretary Rogers sent a memorandum to President Nixon, comparing the previous day's cancellation with the Chinese handling of the cancellation of the meeting scheduled for February 20, 1969. The memorandum assessed that the Chinese: (a) clearly implied a continuing interest in the Warsaw dialogue; (b) attacked the U.S. actions in Indochina in milder terms than circumstances might have permitted; and (c) issued their public statement more routinely as an announcement by the New China News Agency rather than by the Foreign Ministry. State Department officials thus argued that because of the "relatively moderate tone," the recent Chinese move should be seen as a "tactical psychological warfare." Overall, the memorandum estimated that with this cancellation, Beijing might be seeking to "warn" Washington that U.S. military actions in Indochina would have a "negative impact" on developing Warsaw talks and on prospects for an early higher-level meeting in Beijing. In addition, Beijing welcomed this opportunity to subject the Nixon administration to U.S. domestic criticism for the entry into Cambodia.

On May 20, in the name of Chairman Mao Zedong, Beijing called for "People of the World, Unite and Defeat the U.S. Aggressors and All Their Running Dogs." The

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107 Chen, Mao's China and the Cold War, p.252.
109 Ibid.
110 Ibid., p.2.
111 Ibid. This statement enraged President Nixon. He thus ordered every element of the Seventh Fleet not needed for Vietnam into the Taiwan Strait. Kissinger and other close associates quietly ignored it. Kissinger, White House Years, pp.695-696.
State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research assessed that Mao’s “rare pronouncement” was clearly intended to “convey Chinese concern at the highest level over the US military incursion into Cambodia and the bombing of North Vietnam.”\textsuperscript{112} On May 26, the \textit{New York Times} ran the headline that: “Cambodia War Said to Cause Major Peking Shift.”\textsuperscript{113}

On May 28, the Special National Intelligence Estimate reported that Beijing had been both “cautious and prudent,” and its decision “not to intervene” overtly into the Vietnam War was “consistent” with its policy of not risking any major hostilities with either the U.S. or the Soviets.\textsuperscript{114} In his memorandum to Nixon, Kissinger commented that the “low-key nature” of the Chinese action had served to reduce the impact of this particular ploy.\textsuperscript{115} As for the implications of Mao’s statement, Kissinger interpreted that the announcement made no direct threat, offered no commitments, and was not abusive toward President Nixon himself.\textsuperscript{116}

Thereafter, both the White House and the State Department respectively followed foreign governmental and media reactions to the Cambodian operation. U.S. officials concluded that despite the harsh rhetorical attack in the Chinese press and government statements surrounding the Cambodian incursions, the Chinese still showed restraint in Sino-U.S. relations in order to avoid a complete break in dialogue with the Nixon administration. In comparison, however, there was a widening gap between the White House and the State Department on both the pace and the agenda regarding the

\textsuperscript{112} Intelligence Brief, INR, “Communist China,” May 20, 1970, p.1, POL Chicom-US. 1970-73, Box 2188, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA.


\textsuperscript{115} Kissinger to Nixon, “Secretary Rogers’ Evaluations of the Chinese Cancellation of the May 20 Warsaw Meeting,” May 28, 1970, p.1, CF-Europe, Box 700 [2 of 2], NSCF, NPMS, NA.

\textsuperscript{116} Kissinger, \textit{White House Years}, p.695.
resumed dialogue with the Chinese. The White House was willing to move faster within a strategic context of formulating tacit cooperation with Beijing against Moscow. The State Department, however, remained cautious, still regarding the Taiwan issue as the main problem to be discussed at ambassadorial-level talks before proceeding to higher-level meetings. During the middle of 1970, the White House thus sought to find ways to convey its intention of military withdrawal from Indochina and to reactivate a dialogue with Beijing through intermediaries. The following chapter examines how both the White House and the State Department would seek to explore respective channels of communication with the Chinese in order to send a special envoy to China.
Chapter 6. The Development of Backchannel Communications from June 1970 to July 1971

This chapter explores the development of secret diplomacy between the White House and the Chinese leaders. First, it examines the search for a channel of communication with the Chinese, conducted by the White House and the State Department. Second, it analyses President Nixon’s secret initiative to re-activate the Pakistani and Romanian backchannels. Moreover, it examines the policy studies conducted by the Kissinger NSC and the State Department. Finally, this study assesses the final breakthrough via the Pakistan channel in the spring of 1971.

1. The exploration of the channels of communication with the Chinese in late 1970

1.1. The State Department’s attempt to preserve the Warsaw channel

During the mid and late 1970, the State Department was still seeking to re-activate the Warsaw channel with the Chinese, preparing a list of new instructions for Ambassador Stoessel. On June 20, U.S. officials in Warsaw had an informal liaison meeting with Chinese diplomats. However, the Chinese postponed the Warsaw talks, stating that their resumption would be “discussed later at the proper time.” On July 10, Secretary Rogers stated publicly in Japan that China was the key to the future of Indochina and that a settlement in Vietnam could be achieved “very quickly” if

1 U.S. Embassy, Warsaw to Rogers, “Sino-US Talks: ChiCom Propose Liaison Officer Meeting,” June 18, 1970, POL Chicom-US, 1970-73, Box 2188, Subject-Numeric Files (SNF), General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59 (STATE-RG59), NA.
Beijing was willing to make an effort. On the same day, the Chinese suddenly released Bishop James Edward Walsh who had been imprisoned since 1958 on charges of spying and sabotage.

On July 21, 1970, the American Consulate General in Hong Kong sent Washington its assessment that China's approach to Sino-U.S. relations had not fundamentally changed since the beginning of the year. On June 27, on the 20th anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War, Beijing reiterated that Taiwan was the crucial issue in Sino-U.S. relations, charging that the U.S. had continuously refused to withdraw its armed forces from Taiwan. However, China had not recently insisted on the abrogation of the ROC-U.S. mutual security treaty. Hence, the China watchers in Hong Kong assessed that the definition of how the Taiwan question could be settled was "still open." One complicating factor in Beijing's view was Japan's relations with Taiwan, particularly the link between Japanese security and the security of Taiwan and South Korea drawn in the Nixon-Sato Communiqué of November 1969. Finally, the memo emphasized that it was the Soviet military threat that still motivated the Chinese to continue its renewed dialogue with the United States.

On July 23, 1970, the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research completed its mid-year assessment of China's policy towards America. The memorandum argued that the Chinese attitude toward the Warsaw talks was designed to "play on Soviet fear of a Sino-American accommodation" in East Asia and to "undermine Soviet confidence in the U.S. neutrality" in the event of a Soviet attack on

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3 *The New York Times*, July 13, 1970. The State Department was also obtaining information from U.S. embassies abroad. In early July, the Romanian Vice President privately informed the American Ambassador to Bucharest, Leonard Meeker that Mao was still interested in resuming a dialogue with the United States.
5 Ibid., p.2.
6 Ibid., p.5. This subject will be discussed further in Chapter 6, Section 2.3.
China. As for the Chinese view on the U.S. threat, State Department officials estimated that while the Nixon Doctrine provided the first real hope of reduction of U.S. military presence in Asia since the end of the Korean War, Japan would replace the United States as the “principal obstacle to the recovery of Taiwan.” As for the diversion over Cambodia, the U.S. actions announced on April 30 probably caused “temporary uncertainty” in Beijing about the overall direction of U.S. policy in Indochina. To maintain their flexibility, the Chinese emphasized that they wanted “only a temporary postponement of the session, not a cancellation,” and Zhou Enlai dropped hints to Eastern European diplomats that the talks “would soon be resumed.” Accordingly, on July 27, without knowing the real intentions of the White House, the State Department publicly expressed U.S. willingness to resume the Warsaw talks. On December 23, Secretary of State Rogers still expressed the hope that the Warsaw talks would be resumed, indicating that the China policy was under review. In reality, however, from late 1970, the State Department was cut off from the White House’s initiative to enhance back-channel communication with Beijing.

1.2. The search for backchannels by Kissinger and the NSC staff

After the Chinese cancellation of the 136th Warsaw ambassadorial talks on May 20, 1970, the White House kept silence, waiting for emotions aroused by the Cambodian incursions to subside and making various secret plans to explore new and more

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8 Ibid., p.2.
9 Ibid., p.3.
10 Ibid., p.4.
restricted means of communication with the Chinese. On June 15, under Kissinger’s instructions, Haig gave a message to Major General A. Vernon Walters to deliver to his Chinese contact in Paris (a defense attaché named Fang Wen). The message stated that the U.S. government wished to continue exchanges through the Warsaw ambassadorial talks. However, owing to its formal nature (namely the number of officials having been involved in the Warsaw channel and the publicity surrounding the talks), it was difficult to maintain “complete secrecy.”

The message thus suggested the establishment of an alternative channel “for matters of the most extreme sensitivity” with knowledge of the talks “confined to the President, his personal advisors and his personal representative unless otherwise agreed.” Finally, the message proposed the opening of a channel through General Walters and indicated the White House’s readiness to send a “high-level personal representative of the President to Paris, or some other mutually convenient location for direct talks.”

Meanwhile, the White House continued its assessment of Seno-Soviet relations. For example, according to Haldeman’s diaries, on August 15, 1970, Kissinger concluded that in their disputed border areas, the Soviets were moving forward and the Chinese were responding. The Soviets intended to use nuclear weapons to destroy Chinese missile installations and were positioning troops to defend against the possibility of

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11 Haig to Walters, June 15, 1970, enclosing a message to be delivered by Major General Vernon Walters to the Chinese Communist Government (approved by Nixon but unsigned), “Exchange Leading Up to HAK Trip” [1of2], Box 1031, FPF-China/Vietnam Negotiations, NPMS, NA.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 The Haldeman Diaries, August 15, 1970. In his memoirs, Kissinger even claims that the collusion against China was the “real Soviet price” for a U.S.-USSR summit and that the U.S. was being asked to give the Soviets a “free hand” against China. Kissinger, White House Years, p.554. Former Soviet Ambassador to America Dobrynin argues in his memoirs that: “I do not remember any such demands about an alliance [by Moscow and Washington] against China.” Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence: Moscow’s Ambassador to America’s Six Cold War Presidents (1962-1986) (New York: Times Books, A Division of Random House, Inc, 1995), p.207.
the Chinese retaliatory land invasion. The idea seemed absurd to Nixon.\textsuperscript{15} Even at this stage, there still remained a difference between Nixon and Kissinger.

On September 12, 1970, Kissinger sent a memorandum to Nixon, explaining the current situation of U.S.-China relations.\textsuperscript{16} There had been no response from the Chinese yet; it appeared that if there was to be any success, it would be “through Paris.”\textsuperscript{17} At that moment, Kissinger thus argued: “we have no choice but to wait and see if they are willing to respond.”\textsuperscript{18} Moreover, on September 27, Kissinger had a private meeting with French diplomat Jean Sainteny in Paris, asking him to play an intermediary role to “set up a channel” with the Chinese Ambassador in Paris, Hung Chen.\textsuperscript{19}

1.3. Nixon’s reactivation of the Pakistani and Romanian backchannels

On October 1, 1970 - China’s National Day - as a symbolic diplomatic gesture, Chairman Mao invited American journalist Edgar Snow to stand next to him to watch the public parade in the Tiananmen Square.\textsuperscript{20} As China experts, such as Chen Jian and

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{15} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{17} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{18} Ibid. The secrecy for Kissinger’s back-channel communication was not entirely preserved. In mid August 1970, the Joint Chiefs of Staff placed a spy on Kissinger’s staff, a Navy yeoman, Charles Radford, officially a stenographer. He was assigned to copy and send on every piece of paper he saw to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In mid January 1974, the \textit{Chicago Tribune} reported the story. See Richard Reeves, \textit{President Nixon: Alone in the White House} (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001), p.244.
  \item \textsuperscript{19} Memcon, Kissinger and Sainteny, at Sainteny’s apartment in Paris September 27, 1970, p.3, Box 1031, Exchange Leading Up to HAK Trip (1of 2), FPF-China/Vietnam Negotiations, NSCF, NPMS, NA. Sainteny had previously served in Hanoi, and his wife was a student of Kissinger at Harvard.
  \item \textsuperscript{20} Edgar Snow, \textit{The Long Revolution} (London: Hutchinson & CO Publishers LTD., 1973), pp.10-12. From August 23 to September 6, 1970, the Second Plenum of the Ninth Congress of the Party Central Committee had been held at Lushan. Mao revealed his readiness to accept a U.S. proposal for a representative to visit China. Accordingly, Mao’s support for the opening to the U.S. temporarily
David Shambaugh point out, Beijing intended to send a symbolic diplomatic signal to improve its relations with Washington. However, as Kissinger defensively admits in his memoirs, U.S. officials were slow to comprehend the implication of the Chinese gesture: “we have missed the point when it mattered. Excessive subtlety had produced a failure of communication.”

Coincidently, President Nixon was looking for public and private opportunities to reiterate his continuing interest in China. In a *Time* magazine interview published on October 5, 1970, Nixon stated that: “If there is anything I want to do before I die, it is to go to China. If I don’t, I want my children to.” Nixon also sought to renew secret communications with the Chinese through the Pakistani and Romanian channels. On October 25, 1970, after the twenty-fifth anniversary celebrations of the establishment of the United Nations, the President held a private meeting with Pakistani President Yahya Khan in the Oval Office (at which even Kissinger was not present). Having read Kissinger’s memorandum in advance, Nixon was aware that Yahya was scheduled to visit Beijing in the following month (which took place from November 10 to 15). Nixon briefed Yahya that the U.S. had been disappointed at the lack of response from the Chinese as well as the failure to resume the Warsaw talks; however it was gratified at the release of Bishop Walsh. In particular, Nixon asked Yahya to postponed the deepening rivalry between the moderate faction led by Zhou Enlai and the military faction led by Lin Biao (supported by Mao’s wife Jiang Qing). Philipe Short, *Mao: A Life* (New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1999), pp.592-594; and Chen Jian, *Mao’s China and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), pp.253-254.


23 Rodman to Kissinger, “Who Invited Whom?” October 13, 1971, Box 13 China, HAKOF, NPMS, NA.

24 Kissinger to Nixon, “Your Talk with President Yahya – October 25, 1970,” p.1, Memoranda for the President, Records of Meetings, Box 82, President’s Office Files (POF), White House Central Files WHCF), NPMS, NA.

25 Ibid., p.2.
convey a message to the Chinese that it was “essential” for the United States to “open negotiations with China” and that the U.S. would make “no condominium” with the Soviets against China. Finally, Nixon made it clear that the U.S. was willing to send a high-level personal representative, such as retired diplomat Robert Murphy, or the senior Republican leader Thomas E. Dewey to Beijing to “establish links secretly.”

On October 26, Nixon met Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu and explained his willingness to improve relations with both China and the Soviet Union. In particular, Nixon asked Ceausescu’s assistance in informing Beijing that the U.S. would bear them “no hostility” and would “welcome a more normal relationship.” Ceausescu replied that he believed China wanted to improve relations with the United States. Finally, Nixon declared U.S. readiness for talks with China and for the exchange of high-level special representatives. During the state dinner, Nixon used his toast for a public expression of U.S. interest in improved relations with the “People’s Republic of China,” which was, very importantly, the first use of China’s official name by a U.S. President.

On October 27, at Nixon’s instruction, Kissinger held a private talk with Ceausescu and reiterated the U.S. interest in establishing diplomatic communications with the

27 Ibid.
29 Kissinger to Nixon, “Your Meeting with Romanian President Ceausescu, October 26, 1970,” p.6, Memoranda for the President (MemforP), Records of Meetings (ROM), Box 82, POF, WHCF, NPMS, NA.
30 In his memoirs, Nixon recalled that he intended to send a “significant diplomatic signal” to Beijing. Nixon, RN, p.546.
People's Republic of China. Kissinger explained that such communications could be “free from any outside pressures or questions of prestige” and stressed that such communications would be restricted to the White House. Ceausescu re-confirmed that he would inform the Chinese leaders of their conversation and would pass on any communication from them as he had done in the past. Accordingly, in early November, Romanian Deputy Premier Gheorghe Radulescu visited Beijing and delivered Nixon’s message to the Chinese.

2. Progress in backchannel communications

2.1. NSSMs 106 and 107: The Chinese Representation issue in the UN in November 1970

On November 7, 1970, Kissinger received a letter from Jean Sainteny regarding his contact with the Chinese Ambassador in Paris, Huang Chen. Huang passed Kissinger’s message (which he conveyed to Sainteny in September) to his leaders, which indicated the White House’s desire to set up a secret channel. Sainteny reported that Hung had been a member of the Central Committee and thus his view “must be listened” to in Beijing. NSC staff member Richard Smyser assessed that Sainteny’s information was still basic; however, he added that the Chinese were recently expressing their interest in “being admitted to the UN.”

32 Ibid.
34 Ibid., p.2.
interpreted the Sainteny-Huang contact as Beijing’s confirmation on the use of other backchannels.\textsuperscript{35}

Regarding the major issues in Washington’s relations with Beijing, Kissinger and his NSC staff were now paying more attention to Chinese representation issue in the United Nations. On November 19, 1970, the day before the UN vote, Kissinger initiated two inter-departmental studies, NSSM 106: “China Policy” and NSSM 107: “Study of Entire U.N. Membership Question: U.S.-China Policy.”\textsuperscript{36} Coincidently, on November 22, President Nixon sent a memorandum to Kissinger to launch a study of the Chinese representation issue in the UN:

On a very confidential level, I would like for you to have prepared by your staff – without any notice to people who might leak – a study of where we are to go with regard to the admission of Red China into the UN. It seems to me that the time is approaching sooner than we might think when we will not have the votes to block admission.

The question we really need an answer to is how we can develop a position in which we can keep our commitments to Taiwan and yet will not be rolled by those who favor admission of Red China.

There is no hurry on this study but within two or three months I would like to see what you come up with.\textsuperscript{37}

As former CIA official James Lilley recalls, in the following four months, the NSC

\textsuperscript{35} Kissinger, \textit{White House Years}, p.703.


\textsuperscript{37} Nixon to Kissinger, November 22, 1970, Memoranda from the President, 1969-74, Box 2, President’s Personal Files (PPF), White House Special Files (WHSF), NPMS, NA.
It was the State Department officials who took the principal initiative to develop concrete issues for the technically complicated UN representation question.

2.2. Initial invitation through the Pakistani channel

Meanwhile, the Pakistan backchannel began to function actively. On December 9, Nixon and Kissinger received Zhou's reply (approved by Mao and Lin) through Yahya. The letter stated that in order to discuss the subject of "the vacation of Chinese territories called Taiwan," a "special envoy" of President Nixon would be "most welcome" in Beijing. Zhou also noted that it was "the first time the proposal had come from a Head, through a Head, to a Head" and that China attached special importance to this message because the U.S. knew that Pakistan was "a great friend of China." Yahya commented that it was important that Zhou had consulted Mao and Lin before his reply and that during his recent contact with the Chinese, there was no direct rhetorical criticism of the United States. Thus, these were some additional signs of the "modification" in the Chinese approach to their relations with the United States.

In his memoirs, Kissinger downgrades the Chinese continuing reference to Taiwan as a "standard formula," insisting that the Chinese were "driven by some deeper

39 Kissinger to Nixon, "Chinese Communist Initiative," December 10, 1970, enclosed draft note of verbal message and message from Zhou, as conveyed by Hilaly, and with comments by Yahya. Exchange Leading Up to HAK Trip (1 of 2), Box 1031, FPF-China/Vietnam Negotiations, NSCF, NPMS, NA. See also Nixon, RN, pp.546-547.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid., p.4
imperative,” namely the security of China itself rather than the future of one province. However, this interpretation is misleading, given China’s persistence on Taiwan throughout the Warsaw ambassadorial talks in the 1950s and 1960s. While over-emphasizing the Soviet military threat toward China, Kissinger underestimated Chinese long-term sensitivity to the Taiwan question as the symbol of U.S. intervention into the Chinese civil war.

At a press conference on December 10, 1970, President Nixon stated that no change in the Chinese representative issue in UN would be made at this time. However, Nixon reiterated explicitly that: “we are going to continue the initiative that I have begun, an initiative of relaxing trade restrictions and travel restrictions, an attempting to open channels of communication with Communist China, having in mind the fact that looking long toward the future we must have some communication and eventually relations with Communist China.”

On December 16, 1970, Kissinger handed to Hilaly an unsigned memorandum for delivery to Yahya, which stated that the U.S. government would be prepared to proceed to a higher-level meeting in Beijing in order to discuss not only the Taiwan question, but also “other steps designed to improve relations and reduce tensions.” Very importantly, the message made clear that the U.S. policy was to “reduce its military presence in the region of East Asia and the Pacific as tensions in this region

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43 Kissinger, *White House Years*, p.701.
diminish." In his memoirs, Kissinger explains that the last sentence, a product of many interagency studies, was designed to induce Chinese interest in a negotiated settlement in the Vietnam War by "tying" the U.S. military withdrawal from Taiwan to the ending of conflicts in Indochina.

On December 18, 1970, Mao Zedong received American journalist Edgar Snow for a five-hour interview. Mao explained that the Chinese Foreign Ministry was considering the matter of admitting Americans, including the President, into China. Mao made clear his preference that "at present the problems between China and the U.S.A. would have to be solved with Nixon." Therefore, Mao would be "happy to talk with him either as a tourist or as President." As Bundy interprets, the Chinese grasped two major aspects of the U.S. Presidential initiative: Nixon's personal willingness for a "large and visible" role in the rapprochement, and the "political timing" in his desire to present the new China initiative in public. In his memoirs, Nixon recorded that: "We learned Mao's statement within a few days after he made it." On the contrary, in his memoirs, Kissinger states that neither Nixon nor he knew of Mao's comments until Snow's report of the interview was published in Life magazine on April 30, 1971.

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46 Ibid., pp.1-2.
47 Kissinger, White House Years, p.702.
48 Edgar Snow, "A Conversation with Mao Tse-Tung," Life, April 30, 1971, p.3, in Book V-a, The President, Briefing Papers for the China Trip, For the President's Files (Winston Lord) (FPF/Lord)--China Trip/Vietnam, Box 847, NSCF, NPMS, NA. Mao made it clear to Snow that he would not object to publication of his comments without the use of direct quotation several months later. Snow received the notes of the talk taken by Chinese interpreter Nancy T'ang. For a detailed account of the entire talk, see Snow, Long Revolution, pp.160-163, pp.172-176; and Tyler, A Great Wall, pp.83-86. In May 1971, Mao ordered the complete transcript of his interview with Snow be relayed to the entire party and the whole country. Chen, Mao's China and the Cold War, p.262.
49 Ibid.
51 Nixon, RN, p.547.
52 Kissinger, White House Years, pp.702-703.
On December 24, 1970, in his end-of-the-year backgrounder, Kissinger stated that: "We are in the process now of reviewing the still existing restrictions. We remain prepared, at Warsaw, or elsewhere, to talk to the Communist Chinese about differences that divide us." Kissinger concluded that despite the interruption of the Warsaw talks, the U.S. principles would remain the same as to "seek, on the basis of equality, to remove the causes that have produced the tensions" with China.

2.3. Another invitation through the Romanian channel

From the beginning of 1971, the Romanian backchannel also became active. On January 11, 1971, Romanian Ambassador Corneliu Bogdan brought an oral message to Kissinger, which was passed from Vice Premier Gheorghe Radulescu, who had visited Beijing in late November 1970. It was a message from Premier Zhou, "reviewed by Chairman Mao and Lin Biao," expressing that if the U.S. had a desire to settle "one outstanding issue" - "the U.S. occupation of Taiwan" - the PRC would be prepared to receive a U.S. special envoy in Beijing. Zhou also suggested that since President Nixon had already visited Bucharest and Belgrade, he would also be welcome in Beijing. The message had two particularly important implications. First, the Chinese emphasized the fact that because of their independence from Moscow, Nixon had already visited these two communist capitals. Second, apart from an informal comment by Nixon in an October 1970 Time interview, the first reference to

54 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
a Presidential visit to China came from the Chinese side. Kissinger interpreted that importantly, Zhou’s message did not refer to Indochina and that the Chinese interest was the Soviet military threat regardless of their public statement on the Taiwan issue. On January 29, Kissinger gave an oral message to Bogdan, which stated that the United States was prepared to discuss the whole range of international issues, including Taiwan. The message was given orally in an attempt to indicate preference for the Pakistani channel, the White House being wary of possible Russian eavesdropping in Romania. Moreover, on January 18, 1971, Kissinger received a message from Sainteny. Sainteny explained that acting upon Kissinger’s letter of November 9, he held a talk with his Chinese counterpart and asked to transmit the message to Beijing on December 23.

2.4. The State Department’s reassessments of China Policy

Meanwhile, without knowing of the White House’s reactivation of back-channel communications, the State Department was conducting its own assessment of the present nature of U.S.-PRC relations. The Bureau of Intelligence and Research assessed Edgar Snow’s interview with Premier Zhou of December 1970, seeking to detect any change regarding Beijing’s position on the Taiwan issue. Snow reported

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57 The Chinese would reiterate this issue on April 21, 1971 after Nixon’s public remark about his daughter’s honeymoon, possibly to China.
61 Intelligence Note, INR, “Communist China/US: Did Chou Tell Snow Anything New About Taiwan?” January 4, 1971, p.1, POL Chicom-US, 1970-73, Box 2189, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA. This record suggests that some evidence of Edgar Snow’s interview with the Chinese leaders in December
Zhou's remarks on the importance of "respect for territorial integrity."62 Thus, Zhou demanded U.S. recognition of Taiwan as an inalienable part of the PRC; U.S. withdrawal of its forces from the island and from the Strait of Formosa; and U.S. recognition of the five principles of peaceful coexistence.63 The BINR concluded therefore that: "The door is open."64

On January 20, 1971, the American Embassy in Taipei reported to Secretary Rogers that the Republic of China's evaluation of the Beijing-Moscow relations had been "largely shaped by propaganda considerations and wishful thinking rather than by dispassionate objectivity."65 The airgram stated that Taipei dismissed the increasing signs of the Sino-Soviet rift as a "Communist trick to deceive the Free World."

On January 25, 1971, the American Consulate General in Hong Kong also sent an airgram to Washington, assessing a "continuing fluidity" in Beijing's triangular relationship with Washington and Moscow. China watchers argued that although the U.S.'s capacity for influencing the course of this relationship with the PRC might be "limited," Beijing would still need to promote Sino-U.S. rapprochement as a "counter to Soviet military pressure."66 In other words, the Soviet Union still constituted a "far greater military threat" to the PRC than the U.S. did.67

1970 reached the Oval Office before the publication of Life magazine in April 1971. Kissinger might have overlooked the Snow record.

62 Ibid., p.2.
64 Ibid.
67 Ibid., p.2.
2.5. The Laos military operation in February 1971

Meanwhile, the situation in Indochina was showing developments. In early February 1971, the U.S. supported the South Vietnamese strike against the North Vietnamese main land-supply line along the Ho Chi Minh Trial in Laos. On February 4, without attacking President Nixon directly, China’s People’s Daily denounced the U.S. military operation in Laos. On February 9, 1971, the New York Times ran the headline: “Red China Warns on Move in Laos.”68 The Special National Intelligence Estimate judged that Beijing probably saw the U.S. and its allies “still bogged down” in a war that offered “no graceful exit.”69 CIA officials estimated that Beijing would thus continue to “publicly and privately encourage Hanoi to persist in its protracted people’s war.”

On February 17, President Nixon clarified in a press conference that: “this action is not directed against Communist China. It is directed against the North Vietnamese who are pointed toward South Vietnam and toward Cambodia. Consequently I do not believe that the Communist Chinese have any reason to interpret this as a threat against them or any reason therefore to react to it.”70 Nixon also sought to re-assure Beijing via Pakistan backchannel on Washington’s continuing commitment to promoting a new bilateral dialogue and that the military operation in Laos would last

68 The New York Times, February 9, 1971. In private, however, Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua told the Norwegian Ambassador in Beijing, Ole Aalgard that China was aware of a new trend in U.S. foreign policy and that sooner or later, direct Sino-U.S. meeting would resume. Chiao implied that he was interested in meeting with Kissinger. Kissinger, White House Years, p.706.
70 The New York Times, February 17, 1971. See also Nixon, RN, p.548; Kissinger, White House Years, pp.706-707; and Reeves, President Nixon, p.300. From March 5 to 8, Premier Zhou visited Hanoi and expressed moral support to North Vietnam. Importantly, however, Zhou avoided criticizing Nixon directly.
only six weeks. Finally with regard to domestic criticism of the conflicts in Indochina, the President assured Congressional leaders that: "we must not lose sight of the main objective – to continue U.S. withdrawals on schedule and develop a self defense capability of our South Vietnamese friends." Overall, as Holdridge argues, Laos was a "side show" until the U.S. discovered that the Ho Chi Minh Trail ran into its very significant areas.

The time was ripe for another public gesture. On February 25, 1971, the Nixon administration published its second Foreign Policy Report to Congress, encouraging China's participation in the international community:

It is a truism that an international order cannot be secure if one of the major powers remains largely outside of it and hostile toward it. In this decade, therefore, there will be no more important challenge than that of drawing the People's Republic of China into a constructive relationship with the world community, and particularly with the rest of Asia.

Very importantly, the United States used China's official name for the first time in an official document, intending to send a diplomatic signal to the Chinese. Compared with the first report, the February 1971 report more explicitly emphasized the importance of the restoration of diplomatic relations with China for the promotion of stability and peace in Asia and the world. The New York Times reported that: "Mr Nixon prepared to establish dialogue with Peking."

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71 The Laos operation lasted from February 8 to March 25, 1971.
72 Notes from the GOP Congressional Leadership Meeting with the President, Tuesday, February 23, 1971, p.4, MemforP, ROM, Box 84, POF, WHCF, NPMS, NA.
73 Holdridge, Oral History Interview, July 20, 1995, p.85, FAOHC.
The foreign policy report, however, also caused apprehension in Taipei regarding the possibility of a two-China policy. On March 3, 1971, the American Embassy in Taipei reported that the Republic of China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs had instructed "a strong representation" with the U.S. government, opposing the President's use of term "People's Republic of China." On March 4, during the press conference, President Nixon reiterated that: "under no circumstances will we proceed with a policy of normalizing relations with Communist China if the cost of that policy is to expel Taiwan from the family of nations."

On March 15, as a diplomatic signal to Beijing, the State Department announced the termination of all restrictions on the use of American passports for travel to the People's Republic of China. Equally important, the State Department also announced that the U.S. was seeking private channels to resume the Warsaw talks. On March 16, 1971, *The New York Times* reported the decision: "U.S. Lifts Ban on China Travel."

2.6. NSC meeting on NSSMs 106 and 107: The Chinese Representation issue in the UN in March 1971

From November 1970 to February 1971, interdepartmental studies on the U.S. China policy (NSSM 106) and the Chinese representation question in the UN (NSSM 107) had been proceeding.

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76 American Embassy, Taipei to Rogers, "GRC To Protest Use of Term "PRC" by President Nixon, March 3, 1971, p.1, POL ChiNat-U.S., 1970-73, Box 2205, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA.
On March 12, 1971, a Senior Review Group meeting was held on NSSMs 106 and 107. The prevailing estimation, especially among China experts in the State Department was that before improving U.S.-PRC relations, Washington would have to recognize Beijing as the sole government of China or at least allow it into the United Nations. The State Department thus pursued the so-called dual-representation formula, namely while preserving Taipei’s seat in General Assembly, Washington would also admit Beijing’s entry into the UN. In reality, however, both Beijing and Taipei had made it clear that they would not tolerate any kind of a ‘two-Chinas’ resolution.

On March 25, 1971, the NSC met to discuss NSSMs 106 and 107. The purposes of the meeting were to examine policy options to deal with a “growing sentiment” in the General Assembly for admission of Beijing, and to “protect” the U.S. relationship with Taiwan. In the NSSM 107 paper, the central argument was whether to maintain the U.S. present Chinese representation policy, or to work for a dual representation formula, seating both Chinese entities. On the one hand, the Republic of China’s expulsion from the UN would erode international support for Taipei and would make Washington vulnerable to the charge that its defense treaty with the Republic of China constituted interference in Chinese internal affairs. On the other hand, Beijing’s

79 Senior Review Group, March 12, 1971, National Security Council Institutional Files (NSCIF), NPMS, NA. In short, from 1961, the U.S. had pursued a resolution making any proposal to change the representation of China an “Important Question,” which required a two-thirds majority of the General Assembly for approval. In November 1970, although having failed for two-thirds, the majority had voted for the first time for in favor of the so-called ‘Albanian Resolution’ to seat Beijing and to expel Taipei (51 votes for, 49 against, and 25 abstentions). See Foot, The Practice of Power, pp.45-48; and Kissinger, White House Years, pp.770-774.


entry into the UN would enable Washington to maintain regular and high-level contacts. In the end, Nixon and Kissinger still favored continuing the existing policy of keeping Taipei in and Beijing out. However, Nixon was reluctant to overrule Rogers, and thus delayed his decision by allowing the State Department to handle the UN issue.

Another crucial issue was the U.S.-Republic of China defense relationship. The fundamental question in the NSSM 106 paper was to determine “how far” Washington should go in improving its relationship with Beijing and making it possible for Beijing to “play a constructive role in the family of nations.” Particularly important, the reduction of the U.S. military presence in Taiwan would be a “useful test” of Beijing’s willingness to improve relations with the U.S. One view was that Taiwan was so strategically located that U.S. facilities there were “essential” to fulfilling its regional defense commitments in the Western Pacific. Another view was that a reduction in the U.S. military presence on Taiwan would be “consistent with the Nixon Doctrine” without seriously damaging the morale of America’s Asian allies or its ability to meet its defense commitments to them.

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83 Ibid.
84 Mr. Kissinger’s Talking Points, NSC Meeting, China-UN Representation and China Policy, March 25, 1971, National Security Council Meeting, UN Membership and China (NSSMs 106 and 107), March 25, 1971, Box H-031 UN Representation and China [Part I], Minutes of Meetings (1969-1974), NSCIF, NPMS, NA. See also Kissinger, White House Years, p.723.
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid., p.3. The Defense Department insisted that the removal of the U.S. military presence should be linked to the renunciation of the force agreement with Beijing. The U.S. withdrawal from Taiwan would also impact on other areas in East Asia where the U.S. was phasing down its military presence in accordance with the Nixon Doctrine. Jeanne W. Davies (Staff Secretary) to Agnew, Rogers, and Laird, “DOD Papers for NSC Meeting on China,” March 24, 1971, pp.2-3, Box H-031, NSCIF, NPMS, NA. As the following chapters demonstrate, the handling of the U.S.-ROK defense relations would remain highly complex in the Washington-Beijing talks.
On April 9, 1971, Kissinger sent a memorandum to Nixon on the Chinese Representation at the UN. 89 Nixon’s main concern was to prevent Taipei’s expulsion from the United Nations. However, Kissinger was very pessimistic that the U.S. would not be able to prevent Taipei’s “expulsion” – “probably this year, certainly next.” 90 Thus, Kissinger recommended to Nixon that he should be prepared to lessen his problems with Chiang kai-shek by: (a) reaffirmation of the U.S.-ROC Defense Treaty; (b) assurance on the maintenance of U.S. force levels in Taiwan; and (c) sympathetic consideration of his military assistance needs. 91

3. Breakthrough from April to June 1971

3.1. Ping Pong Diplomacy

After the Chinese denouncement of the Laos operation in early February 1971, back-channel communications between Washington and Beijing became quiet for about eight weeks. Meanwhile, the State Department assessed that Beijing’s diplomatic offensive was “gaining momentum” through “increased flexibility.” State Department officials estimated, however, that Beijing still appeared to be “in no hurry” to resume the Warsaw talks. 92

89 Kissinger to Nixon, “Chinese Representation at the United Nations, April 9, 1971, p.1, Memcons-President/HAK Jan.-April, 1971, Box 1025, President/HAK MemCons, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
90 Ibid., p.2.
91 Ibid., p.3. On June 1, at the news conference, Nixon announced that: “a significant change has taken place among the members of the United Nations on the issue of admission of mainland China. …After we have completed our analysis, which I would imagine would take approximately six weeks, we will then decide what position we, the Government of the United States, should take at the next session of the United Nations this fall, and we will have an announcement to make at that time with regard to that participation problem.” The President’s News Conference, June 1, 1971, Public Statements on China by U.S. officials, U.S. China Policy 1969-1972 [2of 2], Country Files – Far East, Box 86, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA. Chapter 7, Section 2.1 further examines the Chinese representative issue in UN.
92 Eliot to Kissinger, “Peking’s Increasingly Activist Diplomacy,” April 1, 1971, p.1, POL Chicom-US. 1970-73, Box 2188, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA.
On April 7, 1971, to the surprise of U.S. officials, China took a major public initiative to indicate the changes in its policy toward America. During the world table tennis championship game in Nagoya, Japan, the Chinese team invited the American team to Beijing. Accordingly, the so-called "Ping Pong Diplomacy" produced media sensation. On April 10, *The New York Times* reported that: "15-Man U.S. Table Tennis Team Crosses Into China From Hong Kong." On April 14, Premier Zhou welcomed the American team (which stayed in China from April 10 to 17), describing their visit as an opening for a "new page" in Sino-American relations.

Both the White House and the State Department were carefully monitoring the developments. The State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research analyzed that this move toward "people's diplomacy" altered Beijing's longstanding refusal to accept American visitors and revived the more flexible policy toward the U.S. which initially developed in late 1969.

On April 14, President Nixon announced additional travel and trade initiatives. On April 16, during a statement to the American Society of Newspaper Editors in Washington, President Nixon reiterated his administration's interest in achieving a normalization of relations with the government of the People's Republic of China. In particular, Nixon also introduced a conversation with his daughters on the possibility of their going to China some day: "I hope they do. As a matter of fact, I hope...

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93 The ping-pong diplomacy was Chairman Mao's initiative. See Chen, Mao's China and the Cold War, pp.259-261.
95 Chen, Mao's China and the Cold War, p.261; and Kissinger, White House Years, p.710.
97 Statement by the President, April 14, 1971, pp.1-2, Box 1031, Exchange Leading Up to HAK Trip to China December 1969 - July 1971 (1 of 2), and "U.S. China Policy, 1969-1972," p.3, HAKOF, CF-Far East, Box 86, NSCF, NPMS, NA. Thereafter, the Chinese could get visas to visit America, the U.S. dollar could be used to purchase Chinese goods, U.S. oil companies could sell fuel to ships and planes en route to China, and U.S.-owned ships under foreign flags could visit China.
sometime I do."

Despite the strict secrecy, there were some unexpected interruptions in the Nixon-Kissinger back-channel communication with Beijing from other cabinet officials. On April 19, 1971 Vice President Spiro Agnew publicly expressed his disagreement with any opening to China, which, in the eyes of Nixon and Kissinger, almost undermined the secret preparation of direct talks with the Chinese. According to Haldeman's diaries, Nixon argued that Agnew did not understand the "big picture," explaining further to Haldeman that: "the whole China initiative was about the Russian game – using the thaw with China to shake up the Russians." On April 27, 1971, The New York Times reported that administration officials disclosed that Romania was acting as an "intermediary" in communications between Washington and Beijing. The Times also disclosed that the Romanian Deputy Premier informed Premier Zhou of the American desire to improve relations with China during meetings in November 1970 and in March 1971. Solomon recalls that despite Kissinger's worries, the public did not pay much attention to media disclosers, because secret diplomacy toward China was "too unthinkable" during that period.

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98 Statement by President Nixon to American Society of Newspaper Editors, April 16, 1971, China - Public and private moves toward a Presidential visit 1970-71, p.2, Box 1031, FPF-China/Vietnam Negotiations, NSCF, NPMS, NA. During Kissinger's secret trip to Beijing in July 1971, Zhou stated that Nixon's remark about his daughter's honeymoon "prompted the invitation." Rodman to Kissinger, October 13, 1971, "Who Invited Whom?" HAK-ASF, Box 13, China, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA. In his private talks with Kissinger, Nixon argued that the American public opinion was "still against Communist China." In terms of the U.S. relations with Taiwan, however, "the story change" was going to take place. Kissinger replied that: "we have to be cold about it." Nixon and Kissinger, April 16, 1971, p.2, Box 29, Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts (Telcons), NPMS, NA, in William Burr (ed.), "History Declassified: Nixon in China," NSA.


3.2. Breakthrough via the Pakistani channel

Behind the dramatic public scene, there was a development in U.S. China policy through backchannels. On April 27, Hilaly delivered Zhou’s message (dated on April 21, responding to Nixon’s message of December 16, 1970) to Kissinger. The message reaffirmed the Chinese willingness to publicly receive in Beijing “a special envoy of the President of the U.S. (for instance, Mr. Kissinger) the U.S. Secretary of State or even the President of the U.S. himself for direct meeting and discussions.” On April 28, Kissinger asked Hilaly to deliver an oral message. The message showed Nixon’s appreciation to Zhou for his “positive, constructive and forthcoming” message of April 21 and promised an early response. Kissinger asked Hilaly to convey a separate message to Zhou reflecting Yahya’s personal view that: “President Nixon is very anxious to handle these negotiations entirely by himself and not let any politicians come into a picture until a government-to-government channel is established.”

On April 27 and 28, Nixon and Kissinger discussed the selection of a special envoy to Beijing, and Nixon finally decided to send Kissinger. Very importantly, during

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103 Message from Zhou to Nixon, April 21, 1971, (delivered on April 27, 1971), Exchange Leading Up to HAK Trip (1 of 2), Box 1031, NSCF, NPMS, NA. Hilaly called at 3: 45p.m. and delivered message to Kissinger at 6:12p.m. See Haldeman, The Haldeman Diaries, April 28, 1971; and Kissinger, White House Years, p.713.
106 Record of Nixon-Kissinger Telephone Conversation, Discussing Zhou’s message and Possible Envoy to China, April 27, 1971, Exchange Leading Up to HAK Trip to China December 1969 – July 1971 (1 of 2), Box 1031, FPF-China/Vietnam Negotiations, NSCF, NPMS, NA; and Conversation 2-
the spring of 1971, Nixon and Kissinger increased their confidence in the Chinese seriousness of direct talks. Lord recalls that: "Once the Chinese agreed to broaden the agenda for the secret trip, they [Nixon and Kissinger] became more confident that they were really interested in a serious opening of relations. And, we didn't think they would humiliate us. Therefore, I don't think Nixon and Kissinger were overly nervous about the trip."\textsuperscript{107}

Meanwhile, without knowing of the secret exchanges between the White House and the Chinese, State Department officials made contradictory public statements. On April 28, 1971, in a recorded interview with the BBC, Secretary Rogers stated that President Nixon's visit to China might be possible if relations continued to improve. Rogers said that he was "very much in favor of an exchange of journalists, students, and non-professional people with mainland China in the near future."\textsuperscript{108} On April 28, a State Department spokesman, Charles W. Bray, stated that it might be possible to resolve the status of Taiwan through negotiations between Nationalist China and Communist China. "Mainland China," Bray stated, "has been controlled and administrated by the People's Republic of China for 21 years and for some time we have been dealing with that government on matters affecting our interests."\textsuperscript{109}

On April 29, Nixon urged Haldeman to warn Secretary Rogers regarding the administration's current relations with the media on the China policy. Haldeman's handwritten notes record the messages to Rogers: 1) he should be "very careful" that "we'll not indicate any further decision"; and 2) if pressed, he should state "we are not


\textsuperscript{107} Lord, Interview with Komine, October 15, 2003. From the spring of 1971, the NSC staff began to prepare briefing papers for the upcoming meeting with the Chinese. An analysis of the briefing papers is conducted in the following chapter.

\textsuperscript{108} "U.S. China Policy, 1969-1972," p.3, CF, Box 86, Far East, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.

\textsuperscript{109} Ibid.
in any way trying to irritate [the] Soviet[s] by our own China policy.”

On the same day, in a news conference, President Nixon called the ‘two-Chinas’ idea “unrealistic” and emphasized that some recent speculation about the State Department officials’ statements was “not useful.” Instead, Nixon expressed that: “I hope, and, as a matter of fact, I expect to visit Mainland China sometime in some capacity – I don’t know what capacity. But that indicates what I hope for the long term.”

On May 4, the official Chinese newspaper Jenmin Jih Pao denounced Bray’s statement of April 28 as “brazen interference in China’s internal affairs.” The article spoke of the continuing friendship between the Chinese and American people, but added that Nixon’s expressed desire for better relations with China had proven “fraudulent” in light of Bray’s remarks.

On May 10, 1971, Kissinger sent Nixon’s unsigned message to Zhou via Hilaly (a reply to Zhou’s message of April 21). Nixon made clear that he was “prepared to accept” the Premier’s suggestion that he visit Beijing for direct conversations with the leaders of the People’s Republic of China. Nixon proposed a preliminary “secret” meeting between Kissinger and Zhou or another appropriate high-level official to exchange views on “all” issues of mutual concern and to prepare for a presidential visit. In addition, the message suggested that the technical arrangements be done through Pakistani President Yahya Kahn. Finally, the message emphasized strongly that: “it is essential that no other channel be used. It is also understood that this first

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11 Ibid.
12 Rodman to Kissinger, “Who Invited Whom?” October 13, 1971, p.3, HAK-ASF, Box 13, China, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
13 “U.S. China Policy 1969-1972,” p.3, Box 86, CF-Far East, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
meeting between Dr Kissinger and high officials of the People’s Republic of China be strictly secret” (The message was received by the Chinese on May 17).  

3.3. Final invitation

On May 31, 1971, Nixon received a message from Pakistani President Yahya Khan via Ambassador Hilaly. Yahya added his latest assessment of Sino-U.S. relations:

- There is a very encouraging and positive response to the last message.
- Please convey to Mr. Kissinger that the meeting will take place on Chinese soil for which travel arrangements will be made by us.
- Level of meeting will be as proposed by you.
- Full message will be transmitted by safe means.  

On June 2, 1971, Hilaly met with Kissinger and delivered a message from Zhou to Nixon (dated May 29). It was a comprehensive reply to Nixon’s previous messages on April 29, May 17, and May 22. Zhou’s letter clarified that Chairman Mao “welcomes President Nixon’s visit.” Particularly important, the Chinese treated the idea of a Presidential visit for direct conversations with Chinese leaders as Mao’s

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115 Ibid. Italic in original. The Chinese initially resisted the idea of secrecy because they suspected the Americans were ashamed to be seen with them. Solomon, Interview with Komine, September 24, 2003. On May 20, 1971, Kissinger handed a note to Farland (to be delivered to the Chinese via Pakistani President Yahya), informing the Chinese of the May 20 SALT announcement, assuring that the U.S. would make “no agreement which would be directed against” China. Memo from Kissinger to Farland, enclosing message to the People’s Republic of China on SALT announcement, May 20, 1971, Exchanges Leading Up to HAK Trip [1 of 2], Box 1031, FPF-China/Vietnam Negotiations, NSCF, NPMS, NA.

116 Assessment of Zhou message by Yahya Khan, conveyed by Hilaly to Nixon on May 31, 1971, Exchanges Leading Up to HAK Trip [1 of 2], Box 1031, FPF-China/Vietnam Negotiations, NSCF, NPMS, NA.

117 Message from Zhou to Nixon, May 29, 1971, with commentary, conveyed by Hilaly to White House, Exchanges Leading Up to HAK Trip [1 of 2], Box 1031, FPF-China/Vietnam Negotiations, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
“suggestion” which Nixon was prepared to “accept.” The Chinese agreed that during Nixon’s visit, the two sides could raise “the principal issues of concern.” However, Zhou re-emphasized that “the first question to be settled” was “the withdrawal of all U.S. armed forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait Area.” Finally, Zhou welcomed Kissinger’s visit to China as the U.S. representative for a preliminary secret meeting with high-level Chinese officials to prepare and make necessary arrangements for Nixon’s presidential visit. On June 4, Kissinger met with Hilaly and delivered Nixon’s reply to Zhou. Nixon’s message approved that Kissinger would be authorized to meet with Zhou Enlai in China from July 9 to 11. Nixon finally stated that he looked forward to “the opportunity of a personal exchange” with the leaders of the People’s Republic of China.

On June 10, 1971, President Nixon authorized the export of a wide range of non-strategic items to China and lifted all controls on imports from China, ending the “21-Year Embargo” on trade with China.

In summary, during the final stage of the opening process from June 1970 to June 1971, it was Nixon’s even stronger conviction for the importance of the historic breakthrough with Beijing that drove the White House’s secret diplomacy. Nixon and Kissinger sought to completely cut off the State Department from their highly personalized attempt to send a special envoy to China. Only a very restricted number of officials within the White House, such as Haig, Haldeman, Holdridge, and Lord,

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118 Ibid.
119 The Chinese initially preferred the date from June 15 to 20. On June 21, Hilaly transmitted a short message from Zhou (dated June 11) which accepted the July 9 date. Letter from Hilaly to Kissinger, June 19, 1971, with message from Yahya on Kissinger’s travel arrangement, Exchanges Leading Up to HAK Trip [1 of 2], Box 1031, FPF-China/Vietnam Negotiations, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
120 Message for the Government of the People’s Republic of China, (From Nixon to Zhou handed to Hilaly on June 4), Exchanges Leading Up to HAK Trip [1 of 2], Box 1031, FPF-China/Vietnam Negotiations, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
were involved in this final stage. The power balance between the White House and the State Department's Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs shifted toward the Kissinger NSC for the planning and implementation of the new China initiative. Without knowing of the exchange of back-channel messages between the White House and the Chinese leaders, the State Department operated in its own initiative to continue to assess change and development in Chinese foreign policy, still seeking to resume the Warsaw Ambassadorial talks.

In comparison, while the Kissinger NSC mainly focused on the deepening Sino-Soviet hostilities, State Department officials considered Taiwan as the central issue in U.S. relations with China. Moreover, while the White House sought to establish direct new talks with the Chinese and discuss major security issues within the broader international context, the Taiwan issue dominated the main contents of the Chinese backchannel messages. Finally, the White House repeatedly stressed the importance of strict secrecy for higher-level meetings with the Chinese leaders. It was the above-examined signal exchange process that resulted in Kissinger's trips to Beijing in July and October 1971, the PRC's admission to the United Nations in October 1971, and finally, Nixon's trip to China in February 1972.
Part III. Direct Talks

Chapter 7. Kissinger’s Trips to Beijing in July and October 1971

This chapter investigates the major issues between the United States and China during Kissinger’s trips to Beijing in July and October 1971. First, it examines the preparation for the direct talks with the Chinese, including the interdepartmental study NSSM 124, the NSC staff’s briefing books, and the Nixon-Kissinger private talks. In the main analysis of the Kissinger-Zhou talks, this chapter conducts five case studies: 1) the Taiwan issue; 2) the conflicts in Indochina; 3) Japan’s future role; 4) the India-Pakistan rivalry; and 5) the growth of the Soviet military threat. Finally, this chapter assesses foreign reactions to the U.S. opening to China as well as Nixon’s briefings on the domestic front.

1. The preparations for the secret meeting with the Chinese

In order to explore the motives behind the U.S. determination to pursue direct talks with the Chinese at a higher official level, it is necessary to examine policy option studies at various levels within the Nixon administration.

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1.1. NSSM 124

On April 19, 1971, soon after Premier Zhou's dramatic invitation of the American table tennis team to Beijing, Kissinger directed an inter-departmental study, the National Security Study Memorandum 124 (NSSM 124): "Next Steps Towards the People's Republic of China." In short, NSSM 124 attempted to explore the major objectives of furthering the improvement in relations with China in terms of the following aspects:

- anticipated reaction or response by the PRC;
- the advantages and disadvantages of the initiative;
- an assessment of the possible effects on our relations with and the anticipated reactions of the Government of the Republic of China (GRC), the USSR, Japan and other nations as appropriate;
- an illustrative scenario by which the initiative could be pursued.

The NSC Interdepartmental Group for East Asian and Pacific Affairs produced a policy study paper. The NSSM 124 paper proposed three groups of alternative actions. Group 1 suggested a collection of relatively modest steps, such as permission for an American flag ship at China's coasts and the reduction of close-in intelligence and reconnaissance flights. Group 2 suggested "greater inducements" for the Chinese,

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2 National Security Study Memorandum 124 (NSSM124): "Next Steps Toward the People's Republic of China," April 19, 1971, p.1, National Security Study Memoranda, Subject Files (SF), Box 365, National Security Council Files (NSCF), Nixon Presidential Materials Staff (NPMS), National Archives (NA). NSSM 124 directed that this study be submitted to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs by May 15, 1971, for consideration by the Senior Review Group. At the same time, the Chinese were also preparing for direct talks with the U.S., which was summarized in the official document: "The Central Committee Politburo's Report on the Sino-American Meeting," on May 26, 1971. Chen Jian, Mao's China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001), pp.264-265.

3 Ibid.
including (1) "an offer to establish a Washington-Peking hotline"; and (2) "the reduction of U.S. forces on Taiwan consonant with the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Viet-Nam." More detailed Group 3 suggested important changes in the U.S. policy on the Taiwan question, such as: "(a) some form of U.S. presence in Peking; (b) an indication of U.S. willingness to regard Taiwan as part of China; [and] (c) removal of U.S. forces from the Taiwan area" on the basis of an assurance that the PRC government would not cause a crisis in the Taiwan Strait area.

The first issue to address was whether and how soon the United States should take further steps after announcing the easing of trade with the PRC. Accordingly, the question was whether the U.S. should "limit" its policy to the modest steps of Group 1 in order to "test" the Chinese willingness to move ahead without substantial change in U.S. policy toward Taiwan. The study further questioned whether the U.S. should "directly proceed" toward a more active initiative from Group 2, and possibly Group 3, in order to "persuade" the Chinese leaders to begin to resolve the major problems before formulating any "basic and lasting accord" between the two sides.

Importantly, the Taiwan issue remained fundamental. The memo expressed doubt over whether or not Beijing would make a major move towards governmental contacts without U.S. "flexibility" on 1) the question of Taiwan's legal status, 2) the U.S.'s "political involvement" with the Taipei government, and 3) the U.S. "military presence" in Taiwan. The memo also estimated that China might "renew and

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4 Memorandum for the Chairman, NSC Senior Review Group, "NSSM124: Next Steps Toward the People's Republic of China," p.1, SF, Box 365, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
5 Ibid., p.2.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid., p.4.
progressively broaden contacts” with the U.S. at the governmental level in order to explore “leverage” against the Soviets.⁹

The memorandum suggested that the U.S. long-term objective should be “to draw the PRC into a serious discussion of the problems” not only in the bilateral relations but also in a broader “relaxation of tensions in East Asia.”¹⁰ The study also estimated that because of the continuing difficulties with the Soviets and the fear of Japan’s re-emergence, Beijing might see its interests improved by a dialogue with Washington. Hence, the memorandum suggested that the US-PRC contacts should move forward “as rapidly as possible” at an official level.¹¹

1.2. The ‘Books’

Parallel with the interdepartmental study, there was another analysis at a more restricted level. In the early spring of 1971, soon after the decision for direct talks with the Chinese at a higher official level was confirmed, Kissinger ordered to the NSC staff: “I want you to start working on a book…. Start working up position papers on all the issues that would be discussed with the Chinese.”¹² The NSC staff thus began to produce the so-called “Books” – “a detailed set of briefing papers in loose-leaf binders” for an eventual trip to China.¹³

⁹ Ibid.
¹⁰ Ibid.
¹¹ Ibid., p.3.
On May 12, 1971, NSC staff member Winston Lord sent a memorandum to Kissinger regarding the on-going drafting of the "Books." The "Books" included the estimation of the situation in China at that period, the major objectives of the trip, the opening statement of Kissinger, and a number of position papers covering every possible major issue which might be raised. Each position paper consisted of an explanation of specific issues, a brief description of the conceivable Chinese position and response, and the U.S.'s response. Kissinger prepared the Soviet papers with Winston Lord and the Vietnam papers with Richard Smyser, and John Holdridge prepared other East Asian issues, including Japan, Korea, and Southeast Asia.

1.3. The Nixon-Kissinger private talks

Behind the policy studies at bureaucratic and highly restricted levels, Nixon and Kissinger held their own talks prior to the July 1971 secret meeting with the Chinese. About a week before his departure to Beijing, Kissinger showed Nixon the completed briefing book, code name 'POLO.' Nixon studied the book, underlining significant points and writing comments on its cover page. In his 'Scope Paper' to Nixon, Kissinger proposed that a major task of his trip was to concentrate on the fundamentals of the international situation. Within that broader framework, Kissinger argued, the Chinese would anticipate that the PRC's prestige would increase.

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14 Lord to Kissinger, "Exchanges with China," May 12, 1971, China – Communiqué & memorabilia July 1971 HAK visit, For the President Files (FPF) - China/Vietnam Negotiations, Box 1033, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
15 Winston Lord, Interview with Komine, October 15, 2003; and Holdridge, Oral History Interview in A China Reader, Volume II, p.34, January 1995, FAOHC. In addition, Kissinger read widely on Chinese history, culture, and philosophy. Details of the ‘Books’ are examined in the following sections.
16 Kissinger recalls that he is not sure how carefully Nixon reviewed ‘POLO,’ because Nixon’s usual procedure was to concentrate on the cover memorandum and ignore the backup paper. Kissinger, White House Years, p.735.
enormously in becoming unequivocally one of the “big five”; the ROC’s international position would erode very considerably; the PRC’s chances of getting into the UN this year on its terms (especially the expulsion of the ROC) would rise; and the Soviets would be faced with a “new complexity in their confrontation with the Chinese.” Overall, the Chinese might be hoping that the U.S. would end all its defense treaties with its allies and “get out of Asia.”

Regarding the question of Chinese seriousness toward direct talks, Kissinger estimated that they were acting partly in response to the Soviet military threat along their borders, and “it would not help them to humiliate us if they want to use us in some way as a counterweight to the Soviets.” Hence, years of Chinese propaganda calling for a total U.S. withdrawal from Asia might not benefit China’s interests, since it would inevitably “leave areas of vacuum” into which the Soviets would “move quickly.” Kissinger argued further that there was a possibility to explore the value of the U.S. presence in Asia to “exercise restraints” on Japan, which was increasingly seen to China as a “rival and potential threat.”

The Chinese would almost certainly focus upon Taiwan as the first order of any substantive talks. Kissinger would therefore seek to develop Washington-Beijing relations while the U.S. at the same time would “retain” its diplomatic ties and mutual defense treaty with the ROC. Regarding Indochina, Kissinger was determined to seek indications firm enough to be taken as “assurances” that the Chinese would “use their influence on the North Vietnamese to move them toward a peaceful and

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18 Ibid.
19 Ibid., p.2.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
acceptable settlement of the Vietnam War." Finally, Kissinger would seek to assure
the Chinese that the U.S. would accept China as a "great power with a legitimate role
to play in international and particularly Asia affairs."24

On July 1, Nixon and Kissinger (accompanied by Haig) reviewed Nixon's
comments on 'POLO.' Concerning the question of U.S. credibility, Nixon wrote: "Put
[the Chinese] in fear."25 In particular, Nixon wanted Kissinger to stress that, if
pushed, he would "turn hard" on Vietnam.26 Nixon also suggested that Kissinger play
up a U.S. "possible move" toward the Soviet Union.27 Thus, Nixon wanted a
somewhat "heavier emphasis" on the Soviet threat and directed Kissinger to state to
the Chinese that there were more Soviet divisions on the Chinese border than those
arrayed against all of the NATO pact countries. Overall, Nixon instructed that
Kissinger should build on three fears: 1) the fear of what the President might do in the
event of continued stalemate in the Vietnam War; 2) the fear of a resurgent and
militaristic Japan in the case of U.S. withdrawal; and 3) the fear of the Soviet Union
on their flank.28

Nixon also emphasised that U.S.-PRC dialogue could not appear to be a "sellout" of
Taiwan.29 On the basis of the Nixon Doctrine, Nixon thus believed, it would "not be
essential" for the U.S. military presence to "remain in some areas forever." However,
the current U.S. presence in Taiwan was "directly related" to the U.S. military
conduct in South Vietnam. Essentially, therefore, Nixon wanted to make the U.S.

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23 Ibid., p.6.
24 Ibid., p.8.
25 Nixon's notations on the cover page, Briefing book for HAK's July 1971 trip, POLO I, FPF/Lord -
China Trip/Vietnam, Box 850, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 "Meeting between President, Dr. Kissinger, and General Haig, Thursday, July 1, 1971, Oval Office,"
p. 2, China - general - July-Oct. 1971, FPF, Box 1036, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
29 Ibid., p.3.
“overall willingness” on the Taiwan issue to be somewhat “mysterious.” Finally, as it had already conveyed through the Pakistani channel, Nixon told Kissinger to make it very clear to the Chinese that he expected them to institute a “severe limit on political visitors” prior to any presidential trip itself.30

1.4. The emergence of multipolarity in the world

The U.S. government publicly continued to illustrate the re-emergence of China’s great power dynamism in the world. In his speech in Kansas City on July 6, 1971, just three days prior to Kissinger’s secret arrival in Beijing, President Nixon outlined the emergence of the multipolar image of the world, referring to the five great economic powers, such as the United States, Western Europe, the Soviet Union, China, and Japan: “these are the five that will determine the economic future and, because economic power will be the key to other kinds of power.”31

Nixon’s handwritten notes show that he drafted the main theme of the Kansas City speech.32 Nixon questioned: “After Vietnam – What kind of a world?” He saw that the U.S. position in world politics had changed over past two decades: “We live in world which is totally different from world of 25 years ago – even 5 years ago – U.S. was pre-eminent – in 1946…. U.S. was superior militarily + economically.” As a result of U.S. relative economic decline; “Today we see: 5 great powers playing a

30 Ibid., p.2.
32 Kansas City, July 6, 1971, Speech Files, Box 67, President’s Personal Files (PPF), White House Special Files (WHSF), NSCF, NPMS, NA. The quotations in this paragraph are all from Nixon’s handwritten notations in preparation for his Kansas City speech.
major role.” As for China, Nixon reiterated the long-term theme from his *Foreign Affairs* article of October 1967: “We must end isolation – or risk danger.” In other words, China outside of international communication was a great source of instability. Thus, the U.S. moved to develop dialogue with China: 1) “We have taken steps trade and travel”; and 2) “Normalization – essential.” Overall, Nixon sought co-existence with China, moving beyond the previous two decades of mutual hostility: “We enter competition. We shall welcome challenge.”

The Nixon speech, however, was a surprise for other officials in the administration. For example, during the first meeting on July 9, 1971, Premier Zhou expressed his general agreement with the concept which Nixon outlined in his speech, especially “China as a country with potential strength.”33 However, as Solomon argues, the speech was made while Kissinger was travelling to China. Thus, Kissinger did not even know about it and was “embarrassed.”34 Kissinger admits in his memoirs that: “This put me at some disadvantage since I was unaware of either the fact or the content of the speech.”35 Lord argues that the multipolar world itself was “already there before the Kansas speech,” and the main concept of the speech was “a reflection of the basic worldview” of Nixon and Kissinger.36 Foot assesses that while realizing the re-distribution of power resources in military, political, and economic terms in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Nixon and Kissinger still viewed the United States as the most powerful state.37

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33 Kissinger and Zhou, Memorandum of conversation (Memcon), July 9, 1971, Afternoon and Evening (4:35p.m.-11:20p.m.), p.38, China-HAK memcons July 1971, FPF, Box 1033, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
2. Kissinger’s trips to Beijing in July and October 1971

From July 6 to 12, 1971, Kissinger took what was announced as a fact-finding trip to Asia during which he secretly travelled to Beijing (July 9 to 11) and held extensive talks with Premier Zhou. At the beginning of the talks, Kissinger emphasized the importance of secrecy: “The President asked that this mission be secret until after we meet, so we can meet unencumbered by the bureaucracy.”

After two decades of mutual hostility, one of the most fundamental issues between Washington and Beijing was the reduction of tension and the restoration of stability in Asia. Kissinger encouraged that the People’s Republic of China “participate” in all matters affecting “the peace in Asia and peace in the world” and play an “appropriate role in shaping international arrangements.” In response, Premier Zhou argued that: “the world outlook and stands of our two sides are different,” however, the two sides should formulate “a channel for co-existence, equality, and friendship.” Finally, Kissinger and Zhou discussed the language and contents of a joint announcement for the respective domestic audiences and the rest of the world. These talks became a

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38 As for Kissinger’s cover-up trip, see, Walter Isaacson, *Kissinger: Biography* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1992), pp.343-344. Foreign Minister Zhang Wenjin [1971-72] “flew from Beijing to pick up Kissinger and take him back.” From 1969 to 1971, there were “next-to-know America specialists working in Beijing.” In the spring of 1971, the Foreign Ministry had brought back some officials from the countryside, one being Zhang Wenjin, the other being Ji Chauzhu to help Zhou and Mao to prepare for Kissinger’s visit. Ji Chaozhu was the interpreter for that visit, Nixon’s visit, and subsequent visits. David Shambaugh, Interview with Komine, October 15, 2003.

39 Memcon, July 9, 1971, Afternoon and Evening (4:35p.m.-11:20p.m.), p. 3, China memcons & memos - originals July 1971, FPF, Box 1033, NSCF, NPMS, NA. In the following sections, unless otherwise noted, only the date of the memcons of the July 1971 and October talks is indicated.

40 Ibid., p.4.

41 Ibid., p.7.
substantial "mutual learning process" regarding decreasing the degree of direct threat between the two sides.\textsuperscript{42}

From October 20 to 26, 1971, Kissinger took an interim visit to Beijing to make arrangements for the Presidential trip.\textsuperscript{43} Compared with the July secret trip, the October trip was widely covered in the media. The NSC staff composed another set of "Books," code name "POLO II" on not only "grand political-military strategy" but also what was to be included in the joint communique for the Nixon's trip.\textsuperscript{44} In addition to the NSC staff members, State Department officials, such as Alfred L. Jenkins, office director of the Office of Mainland China and Mongolian Affairs, and his associates were brought into the preparation. Marshall Green, the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, was the chief liaison between the NSC staff and the State Department.

President Nixon principally sought to enhance his presidential leadership. During Kissinger's official trip to Beijing in October 1971, Nixon (via Haldeman) asked Haig to transmit a message by wire to Kissinger on an urgent basis. The message explained that the President wished Kissinger to "insure" that a "specific time" was arranged for "two private head-to-head meetings" between the President and Mao with no one in attendance other than interpreters; and in the second instance, with Zhou "under

\begin{verbatim}
\textsuperscript{42} Solomon, Interview with Komine, September 24, 2003. Solomon recalls further that: "after the secret trip, there were very few people who could say they had met Zhou Enlai." Thus, Kissinger felt that he was "ahead of everybody else." Kissinger later admitted to Zhou that: "I had no idea what we would find here when I came." Memcon, Kissinger and Zhou, June 19, 1972, p.1, Box 97, CF-Far East, HAKOF, NPMS, NA.

\textsuperscript{43} On August 16, Kissinger discussed with Chinese Ambassador Huang Chen his plan to pay a four-day "interim" visit to China in late October. Kissinger also proposed to Huang a possible date for the presidential visit, suggesting two ideas, February 21 and March 16, 1972. The Chinese accepted February 21, 1972. Memcon, Huang Chen and Kissinger, August 16, 1971, pp.8-9, China exchanges – July-Oct 20, 1971, FPF/Lord, Box 849, NSCF, NPMS, NA.

\textsuperscript{44} Holdridge, Crossing the Divide, pp.67-68.
\end{verbatim}
identical circumstances."\textsuperscript{45} As the next chapter demonstrates, Nixon's talks with the key Chinese leaders would be the highlight of his trip to China in February 1972.

2.1. The Taiwan issue

The question of Taiwan remained the most sensitive issue between Washington and Beijing. The briefing book "POLO" listed the Taiwan issue on the top of its agenda, which involved political considerations, and could "not be lightly set aside."\textsuperscript{46} Kissinger anticipated that apart from Taiwan, there was basically no great conflict between PRC and U.S. national interests.\textsuperscript{47}

It was on the Taiwan issue that Kissinger and his NSC staff particularly depended on the State Department's past efforts and expertise, but without revealing their specific intentions. The most difficult task was how to find an acceptable language to express the U.S.'s official position on Taiwan. In short, since the period of the Warsaw ambassadorial talks in the 1950s and 1960s, Beijing maintained that the Taiwan issue was part of China's internal affairs, which allowed the use of force for its resolution, if necessary. However, Washington insisted on "peaceful means" to resolve the differences.\textsuperscript{48} Throughout the back-channel exchanges, Beijing still attempted to create the impression that it was Washington that desired a direct Sino-American meeting in order to discuss the Taiwan question. On the other hand, after

\textsuperscript{45} Haig to Kissinger, October 20, 1971, p.1, China-HAK October 1971 visit, FPF, Box 1035, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
\textsuperscript{46} Taiwan, p.1, Briefing book for HAK's July 1971 trip, POLO I (hereafter referred to as Taiwan, POLO I), FPF/Lord, Box 850, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid.
the Warsaw talks in January and February 1970, the White House reiterated that the agenda for direct talks between the two sides consisted of the broad range of issues of mutual concern, "including, but not limited to" the Taiwan question.\(^{49}\)

In his memoirs, Kissinger states very misleadingly that: "Taiwan was mentioned only briefly during the first session."\(^{50}\) A participant in the July 1971 meeting, John Holdridge argues that: "the sole declared reason that Zhou Enlai had agreed to talks was to discuss the Taiwan question, even though pressing strategic considerations growing out of the Sino-Soviet dispute would surely be involved as well."\(^{51}\) Holdridge recalls further that the Taiwan question was presented "to diminish, if not entirely eliminate, for the time being its role as an item of contention in Sino-US relations."\(^{52}\) In reality, however, the record of the talks between Kissinger and Zhou show that the two sides held extensive exchanges on Taiwan.

Although the two sides agreed not to mention Taiwan in a following joint announcement, Zhou repeatedly stressed that Taiwan was the "first" and "crucial" issue, and had to be regarded as "a part of China."\(^{53}\) In response, as "POLO" suggested, Kissinger made a crucial statement that: 'we are not advocating a "two Chinas" solution or a "one-China, one-Taiwan" solutions.'\(^{54}\) The statement immediately brought about Zhou's positive response: "the prospect for a solution and the establishment of diplomatic relations between our two countries is hopeful."\(^{55}\)

\(^{49}\) Summit, p.3, Briefing book for HAK's July 1971 trip, POLO I, FPF/Lord, Box 850, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
\(^{50}\) Kissinger, White House Years, p.749.
\(^{51}\) Holdridge, Crossing the Divide, p.58.
\(^{52}\) Ibid.
\(^{54}\) Ibid; and Taiwan, p.2, POLO I.
\(^{55}\) Ibid. On the afternoon of July 10, 1971, Zhou proposed Kissinger to tape-record their discussions. The Chinese wanted all the promises on tape, especially Kissinger's assurances concerning Taiwan.
Kissinger brought a major concession on the "eventual removal" of all U.S. armed forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait. Within "a specified brief period of time after the ending of war in Indochina," Kissinger explained, the U.S. was prepared to remove "two-thirds of our force." Moreover, one-third of it was related to the defense of Taiwan itself, however, Kissinger argued, its reduction depended on the general state of the Sino-American relations in the following years. Kissinger made it clear to Zhou that the U.S. was prepared to materialize diplomatic normalization during "the first two years" of Nixon's second term.

Equally important, regarding the so-called "Taiwan Independence Movement," Kissinger clarified that the U.S. would not try to "encourage, support, finance, or give any other encouragement." Zhou showed anxiety that after Washington's opening to Beijing, Chiang kai-shek might collude with Tokyo or Moscow. Zhou was also preoccupied with Japan's possible re-entry into Taiwan before and after the U.S. withdrawal. Hence, Kissinger repeatedly assured that the U.S. would "strongly oppose" any Japanese military presence in Taiwan.

Finally, as the briefing book emphasized, Kissinger reiterated: "We hope very much that the Taiwan issue will be solved peacefully." In essence, Kissinger was trying to link the U.S. withdrawal from Taiwan to Chinese renunciation of force in order to resolve the question. However, Zhou reiterated China's long-term principle - the use of force as the ultimate means to deal with its internal issue. Hence, Kissinger

The two sides later agreed that there was no need for a tape recording. James H. Mann, About Face: A History of America's Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to Clinton (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1999), p.32.
56 Taiwan, p.2, POLO I.
57 Memcon, July 9, 1971, p.12.
58 Memcon, July 10, 1971 (12:10p.m.-6:00p.m.), p.16, and p.19.
59 Memcon, July 11, 1971 (10:35.m.-11:55a.m.), p.11.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid., p.10; and Taiwan, p.4, POLO I.
reported to Nixon, regarding Taiwan, “we can hope for little more than damage limitation by reaffirming our diplomatic relations and mutual defense treaty.”

In “POLO II,” the briefing book for Kissinger’s trip to Beijing in October 1971, the NSC staff argued that during the July 1971 talks, the Chinese had “not set any specific time-frame” for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Taiwan, and therefore that the question remained “open-ended.” Accordingly, the NSC staff suggested that Kissinger “avoid committing the President to any kind of a formal stand on normalization and troop withdrawals.” Nixon himself wished to “avoid the appearance of selling out an ally.” Therefore, the NSC staff recommended that what should be stressed to the Chinese was U.S. “intention, not the formality.”

During the talks with Zhou, Kissinger thus reiterated that: “We recognize that the People’s Republic of China considers the subject of Taiwan an internal issue, and we will not challenge that.”

Importantly, Kissinger and Zhou held intensive negotiations on the language of Taiwan’s status to be included in the joint communiqué for the upcoming summit. Lord explains that the NSC staff prepared a draft of what was to be known as the Shanghai Communiqué. It was originally a typical diplomatic draft with two sides agreeing on issues. After consulting with Mao, Zhou rejected it criticizing that: “We haven’t talked to each other for 25 years. It’s dishonest. It will make our allies

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62 Kissinger to Nixon, “My Talks with Chou En-lai,” July 14, 1971, p.27, Miscellaneous memoranda relating to HAK’s trip to PRC, July 1971, FPF, Box 1033, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
63 Taiwan, p.5, Briefing book for HAK’s Oct. 1971 trip POLO II [Part I], For the President’s Files (Winston Lord) - China Trip/Vietnam, Box 850, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
64 Ibid., p.7.
65 Ibid., p.9.
66 Memcon, October 21, 1971, 10:30a.m.-1:45p.am., p.20, HAK visit to PRC October 1971 Memcons - originals, FPF, Box 1035, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
suspicious, and it won’t make any sense to our publics. So let each side state its own positions, and then we can state where our views converge.” Accordingly, Kissinger and Lord re-drafted the entire communiqué overnight, producing the revised version in which the U.S. and Chinese sides independently stated their respective positions on ideology and on specific issues. Moreover, Lord admits that: “we did draw on State’s ideas for the Taiwan portion.” In reality, however, Lord’s statement is only a limited explanation. More particularly, it was during the preparations for the January and February 1970 Warsaw talks that State Department officials, especially the Director of Asian Communist Affairs, Paul Kreisberg, and a China Desk official, Donald Anderson, developed the whole “conceptual approach.” These officials drafted “the new formulations” to describe U.S. “acceptance of the idea of the unity of China” as well as the removal of U.S. forces. On the basis of these bureaucratic inputs, the U.S. draft statement of October 25, 1971 read as follows:

The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Straits maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a province of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position.... The United States accepts the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of its armed forces from the Taiwan Straits, and pending that will progressively reduce them as tensions diminish.

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68 Ibid. In his memoirs, Kissinger admits only in general terms that he adapted the Taiwan language from a State Department’s planning document. Kissinger, White House Years, p.783.
70 Memcon, October 26, 1971, 5:30-8:10a.m., p.2.
Throughout the talks, Zhou stressed that the Chinese side was “exercising great restraint” on the Taiwan issue and that it would not demand “an immediate solution” but that it would be resolved “step by step.” However, Zhou still sought private reassurance that the U.S. would withdraw not only from Taiwan Strait but also from Taiwan as a whole.

Kissinger reported to Nixon that Taiwan remained the “single most difficult issue.” On the other hand, Kissinger interpreted that the PRC was “in no a hurry” to have all U.S. armed forces removed from Taiwan but wanted the “principle of the final withdrawal” established; China was most interested in “global acknowledgement that Taiwan is part of China.”

In late 1971, the Nixon administration had faced one delicate problem, namely the Chinese representation issue in the United Nations which showed a perception gap between the White House and the State Department. In short, as previously discussed, the Nixon administration adopted the so-called “dual position”: while supporting Beijing’s new entry into the Security Council and General Assembly, it continued to support the representative of the Chinese Nationalists of Taiwan in the General Assembly. Since Kissinger’s October trip coincided with the UN General Assembly’s annual debate on Beijing’s representation issue, U.N. Ambassador George H.W. Bush requested that President Nixon delay Kissinger’s schedule, because it would “not be helpful at all.” Nixon considered that Taiwan still received

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71 Memcon, October 24, 1971, 10:28 a.m.—1:55 p.m., p.25.
72 Memcon, October 26, 1971, p.2.
74 Ibid., p.4.
76 The Nixon White House Tapes, Conversation 581-1 and 582-2, NA; and Transcript of “Conversation between President Nixon and National Security Adviser Kissinger, followed by Conversation among
important support in America, however the rapprochement with Beijing had priority over Taipei’s status in the UN. Nixon thus advised Bush to “fight hard” and did not alter Kissinger’s schedule. On October 25, 1971, as a consequence of a vote of substantial majority, the General Assembly admitted the People’s Republic of China to the UN and expelled the Republic of China. On October 26, The New York Times reported that: “U.S. Seats Peking And Expels Taipei; Nationalists Walk Out Before Vote.” In the end, Nixon and Kissinger privately regarded Beijing’s entry into the UN as a matter of inevitability.

2.2. Conflicts in Indochina

It has been pointed out that by opening to China, the U.S. sought to induce a co-operative attitude from the Chinese to promote a negotiated settlement in the Vietnam War. In his memoirs, however, Kissinger describes only that: “I would seek some moderating influence on Indochina, bearing in mind that the mere fact of the meeting and the substantial summit was bound massively to demoralize Hanoi.” Kissinger therefore fails to show what he precisely sought to obtain from Zhou. In fact, it is Kissinger himself who has repeatedly denied the U.S. specific interest in inducing...
Chinese “pressuring of Hanoi.”\textsuperscript{81} Moreover, Holdridge states only that the Vietnam issue was “sidestepped.”\textsuperscript{82} In reality, however, the Indochina issue required a number of intensive exchanges between the two sides.

In the briefing book ‘POLO,’ the NSC staff made it clear that the U.S. wanted to end the war in Vietnam through negotiations, however that “we will not purchase its ending at the price of our humiliation.”\textsuperscript{83} Kissinger was therefore mainly concerned about the question of U.S. credibility. The longer the war continued, the less influence the U.S. would have in Saigon, and the less impact the U.S. would have on a political settlement.\textsuperscript{84}

During the talks with Zhou, Kissinger explained that the U.S. was willing to end the Vietnam War through “negotiations,” and would be interested in setting a “date” for the withdrawal.\textsuperscript{85} On the other hand, Kissinger insisted that it would be crucial for the U.S. to make a settlement “consistent” with its “honor” and “self-respect.”\textsuperscript{86} Thus, Kissinger argued that the U.S. and China should take a “great” country point of view rather than seeing the issue in terms of a “local” problem.\textsuperscript{87}

Zhou was not convinced, insisting that “all” foreign troops, including the U.S. military installations, should be withdrawn from Indochina, and the three countries

\textsuperscript{81} During an interview with CNN, Kissinger states that: “We did not expect that China would bring pressure on Vietnam to settle. ...We never expected China to do anything active to help us.” CNN, The Cold War, Episode 15, China, Interview transcript collected at NSA.
\textsuperscript{82} Holdridge, Crossing the Divide, p.60.
\textsuperscript{83} Indochina, p.1, Briefing book for HAK’s July 1971 trip, POLO I, FPF/Lord, Box 850, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
\textsuperscript{84} Ibid., p.4.
\textsuperscript{86} Memcon July 9, 1971, p.17.
\textsuperscript{87} Ibid., p.26.
(Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos) should be "left alone" to determine their own political path.\textsuperscript{88} Kissinger claimed that the U.S. would eventually withdraw unilaterally.\textsuperscript{89} He also admitted that there should be a ceasefire, but North Vietnam should not demand for the U.S. military withdrawal and its complete departure from South Vietnam simultaneously. Zhou thus criticized the U.S. policy for being a conditional withdrawal, questioning that if the U.S. took a "broad" perspective, why it still wanted to leave a "tail" (implying Thieu in South Vietnam and Lon Nol-Sirik Matak in Cambodia).\textsuperscript{90}

Importantly, the U.S. pursued a political settlement in Indochina. As the briefing book advised, Kissinger thus emphasized that the U.S. required a "transition" period between the "military withdrawal" and the "political evolution."\textsuperscript{91} During this "interim" period, Kissinger argued, Washington would be prepared to accept "restrictions" on the types of assistance that could be provided to the states in Indochina.\textsuperscript{92} Zhou replied that as long as the war did not stop, Beijing would "continue" its own support for the peoples in Indochina. However, Zhou made it clear that China would not "intervene" or negotiate on their behalf. Hence, Kissinger claimed that the U.S. was "not" asking China to "stop" giving aid to its friends.\textsuperscript{93}

In his report to Nixon, Kissinger stated that the current peace talks in Paris were blocked by the remaining differences between Washington's proposal for a "ceasefire" and Hanoi's insistence on the "overthrow" of Thieu.\textsuperscript{94} Kissinger claimed that Zhou's attitude reflected the "ambivalence" of Beijing's position on the possible

\textsuperscript{88} Ibid., pp.24-25.
\textsuperscript{89} Ibid., pp.32-33.
\textsuperscript{90} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{91} Memcon, July 10, 1971, p.22; and Indochina, p.5, Briefing book for HAK's July 1971 trip, POLO I, FPF/Lord, Box 850, NSCF, NPMS, NA. Nixon's handwritten comments on the briefing book read: "We want a decent interval. You have our assurance." Ibid.
\textsuperscript{92} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{93} Ibid., p.26.
"escalation" of the war.95 Henceforth, Kissinger concluded that the mere fact of U.S.-
PRC talks would bring about an "impact" in North Vietnam, anticipating that Beijing
might "exert some influence" on Hanoi.96

In 'POLO II,' the NSC staff estimated that the China initiative was a positive factor
for negotiations in Indochina "because of the ricochet effect on Moscow, giving it
more incentive to get into the act; and the greater likelihood that Hanoi would
substantively honor the terms of a settlement (at least in the short run) given her
allies' stake in it."97

During the October 1971 talks, Kissinger prepared to give specific assurance that
the President was prepared: (1) to withdraw completely from Indochina and give a
fixed date, and (2) leave the political solution to the Vietnamese people alone.98 More
particularly, Kissinger explained to Zhou that: "We have offered new elections six
months after a peace is signed. We have offered that all American troops withdraw
one month before the election. We have offered that the President and Vice President
of Vietnam resign one month before the election so that they do not run the
election."99

As for the Soviet threat in Indochina, the NSC staff estimated that the Soviets
might favor North Vietnamese dominance of Indochina as a counterweight to the

95 Ibid.
96 Ibid., p.16. Three days after Kissinger's departure from Beijing in July 1971, Zhou flew to Hanoi and
attempted to emphasize China's continual support. However, the North Vietnamese believed that the
Chinese used the Vietnam issue to settle the Taiwan question. See Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam
97 Indochina, pp.9-10, Briefing book for HAK's Oct. 1971 trip POLO II [Part I], FPF, Box 850, NSCF,
NPMS, NA.
98 Ibid., p.2.
United States. Because of both Hanoi’s consistent streak of independence and the small percentage of Beijing’s military aid, the Chinese influence in Hanoi might “not be very substantial.” The NSC staff thus pointed out the Chinese fear of “enlarged Soviet prestige generally and influence in Southeast Asia in particular.” On the other hand, the Chinese had made it clear that they did not want to play an intermediary role in Indochina. In conclusion, the NSC staff recommended that: “we should downplay any potential Soviet role.”

In reality, however, Kissinger exaggerated that the “continuation” of war in Indochina would only help “outside forces,” implying the Soviets. As for the question of Beijing’s influence on Hanoi, Kissinger stated only that Washington would “appreciate” Beijing’s “telling its friends its estimates of the degree of our sincerity in making a just peace.” Kissinger reported to Nixon that the Chinese could be “helpful, within limits” on Indochina.

2.3. Japan’s future role

Most previous major works on the U.S. opening to China have explained the negative impact of Nixon’s sudden announcement of his trip to China on July 15, 1971 on Japan. Until recently, therefore, the question of how Kissinger and Zhou

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100 Indochina, p.11, Briefing book for HAK’s Oct. 1971 trip POLO II [Part I], FPF, Box 850, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
101 Ibid.
102 Ibid., p.12.
103 Ibid., p.13.
106 Ibid., p.4.
discussed the Japan issue during the July and October 1971 talks was either overlooked or given relatively minor attention. In his memoirs, without revealing any details of his talks with Zhou, Kissinger states only that: “It took me some time to convince him that the US-Japan alliance was not directed against China.”

In reality, however, the NSC staff recognized that Kissinger was neither familiar with nor interested in Japan. Thus, as the former Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Marshall Green recalls, it was State Department officials who took the initiative to develop U.S. policy toward Japan from early 1969 to mid 1971. In essence, as the National Security Decision Memorandum 13 (NSDM 13) stated on May 28, 1969, the vital U.S. interests were to encourage “moderate increases and qualitative improvement” in Japan’s defense efforts, “while avoiding any pressure on her to develop substantially large forces or to play a larger regional security role.” During the U.S.-Japan summit in November 1969, President Nixon and Japanese Prime Minister Sato agreed to “preserve” the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, and affirmed that the two governments “should maintain close contact.” In particular, Sato expressed Japan’s interest in the security of “the

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108 Among recent works which explore the Japan issue, see William Bundy, A Tangled Web: The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency (New York: Hill and Wang A Division of Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1998), p.236; and Mann, About Faces, p.43. Despite no substantial access to primary documents at the time of his writing, Bundy emphasized the importance of the July 1971 talks in which Kissinger sought to ease China’s antagonism towards the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, at least in the short run. Mann concentrates on Nixon’s talks with Zhou in February 1972 rather than the Kissinger-Zhou talks in July and October 1971.

109 Kissinger, White House Years, p.334.


111 Marshall Green (Assistant Secretary for East Asia and the Pacific 1969-1973), Oral History Interview, March 2 and 17, 1995, pp.60-61, FAOHC. Green recalls that there had been a tendency for officials in the Foreign Service, which went back for “at least 100 years,” to be “either pro-Chinese or pro-Japanese.” Ibid.

112 National Security Decision Memorandum 13 “Policy Toward Japan” May 28, 1969, National Security Decision Memoranda, SF, Box 363, NSCF, NPMS, NA.

Republic of Korea” as “essential” and that of “Taiwan” as “a most important factor.”

Regarding U.S. China policy, State Department officials, such as U. Alexis Johnson and Marshal Green, were principally concerned with calming Tokyo’s growing anxiety over Washington’s move towards Beijing. In April 1971, the NSSM 124 paper had already emphasized: “we should concert our moves with Japan through close and frequent consultations.” However, without the State Department’s expertise, Kissinger and the NSC staff used a geopolitical framework to assess the conceptual possibilities of Japan’s future role. As former NSC staff member Peter Rodman recalls, the Kissinger-NSC believed that: “Japan is a very nationalist country and that may some day be asserting itself again.” It would “move in a very nationalist direction if ever it loses confidence in the U.S.”

As ‘POLO’ shows, there was an urgent need to respond to a consistent PRC propaganda theme that a “revival of Japanese militarism” was taking place “at the instigation of the American imperialists.” This long-term theme represented Chinese sensitivity to the rapid growth of Japan’s economic power and political influence, and even without the ingredient of military power, the Chinese regarded Japan as a “serious rival” in Asia. The NSC staff also anticipated that the Chinese

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114 Ibid. On July 5, 1971, during an interview with Ross Terrill, Premier Zhou became very “agitated,” accusing the Americans of joining the Japanese reactionaries to revive “militarism.” Zhou was especially resentful of Japan’s inclusion of its security interests in Korea and Taiwan in the U.S.-Japan joint communiqué of November 1969. See Hersh, The Price of Power, p.382.

115 NSSM124: Next Steps Toward the People’s Republic of China, p.3, NSSMs, SF, Box 365, NSCF, NPMS, NA.


117 Peter Rodman, Oral History Interview, July 22, and August 22, 1994, pp.52-54, FAOHC.

118 Review of U.S. and PRC Views on Other Great Powers, Japan, p.1, Briefing book for HAK’s July 1971 trip, POLO I (hereafter referred to as Japan, POLO I), FPF/Lord, Box 850, NSCF, NPMS, NA.

119 Ibid.
would bring up the Japan issue by specifically referring to the U.S.-Japan Mutual Defense Treaty as being “directed against China.” The principal issue for direct talks therefore was to justify the U.S.’s continuous presence in Asia by persuading the Chinese that the U.S.-security relationship with Japan had the particular effect of “containing” Japan rather than reverse. Being unfamiliar with the historical complexity of Sino-Japanese relations, Kissinger would follow Nixon’s private instructions of July 1 along with the briefing book’s recommendations.

During the July 1971 secret meeting, it was Premier Zhou who raised the Japan issue and accused the U.S. of “rearming” the Japanese “militarists,” for “economic” expansion would lead to “military” expansion. Following Nixon’s instructions, Kissinger explained that: “our defense relationship with Japan keeps Japan from pursuing aggressive policies.” In other words, Kissinger warned Zhou that if Japan felt “forsaken” by the U.S., and if it built its own “nuclear weapons,” the emergence of a “strong” Japan would raise a question of “expansionism.” Thus, Kissinger clarified that: “Neither of us wants to see Japan heavily re-armed.” Finally, adopting an expression from the briefing book, Kissinger sought to assure Zhou that the U.S. was not “using” Japan against China, as that would be “too dangerous.”

Nevertheless, Zhou was still preoccupied with the revival of Japanese militarism, warning of its expansive ambitions not only in “Korea, Taiwan and Vietnam,” but also in “Northeast China, Indochina and the Philippines and areas up to the Straits of

120 Ibid., pp.1-2.
121 Ibid., p.3.
122 Memcon July 9, 1971, p.29.
123 Ibid., p.42.
124 Ibid.
125 Ibid.
126 Ibid.; and Japan, p.3, POLO I.
Malacca.”

Kissinger replied that the U.S. would not “encourage any military expansion by the Japanese” and that if it took place, the U.S. would “oppose” it.

Kissinger reported to Nixon that Zhou understood the “restraining role” which the U.S. played on Japan.

In the briefing book for Kissinger’s October trip, the NSC staff assessed that the Chinese still had attempted to “drive a wedge” between the U.S. and Japan. The People’s Daily editorial of September 18 stated that: “U.S. imperialism has no wish to see an independent, prosperous and strong Japan in Asia. While glibly calling Japan its ’close partner,’ it is actually ready to betray her at any time.” The Chinese paper then called on Japan to “take another road, the road of independence…and neutrality.”

During the October 1971 talks, Premier Zhou emphasized that at the present economic level, it would be difficult to “put brakes” on Japan. Zhou warned further that once Japan took “the road of military expansion,” it would be difficult to measure “to what degree” it would develop.

In response, Kissinger stated that Moscow was seeking influence over Tokyo, and it would be “dangerous for others to use Japan against the United States.” Kissinger reiterated that the present relationship with the U.S. was a “restraint” on Japan.

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128 Ibid., p.27; and Japan, p.4, POLO I.
130 Japan, p.6, Briefing book for HAK’s Oct. 1971 trip POLO II [Part II], FPF/Lord, Box 851, NSCF, NPMS, NA. Section 3.1.2 of this chapter examines the so-called Nixon shock.
131 Ibid., p.7. Inverted commas in original.
132 Ibid.
133 Memcon, October 22, 1971, 4:15-8:28p.m., p.19.
134 Ibid., p.21.
135 Ibid., p.24.
136 Ibid.
However, Zhou was still unconvinced of whether or not the U.S. was capable of “limiting” Japan’s “self-defense strength.” Hence, Kissinger explained that the U.S. would oppose a nuclear re-armed Japan and that, with its nuclear umbrella, the U.S. would do its best to “limit” Japanese armament and expansion. In his report to Nixon, Kissinger estimated that the Washington-Beijing-Tokyo triangular relationship could be “one of our most difficult problems.”

2.4. The India-Pakistan rivalry

Previous major works on the U.S. opening to China have mainly focused on the development of the India-Pakistan war of December 1971. This study examines the India-Pakistan rivalry in South Asia as one of the major issues between Kissinger and Zhou during the July and October 1971 talks. Importantly, moreover, the interpretation of the nature of India-Pakistan rivalry showed the disagreement between the White House and the State Department from March to December 1971.

On March 25, 1971, President Yahya Khan ordered his military to crush the separatist movement in East Pakistan, which was calling for an independent Bangladesh. Nixon and Kissinger perceived the situation in South Asia through the

138 Ibid.
prism of U.S. policy toward the Sino-Soviet rivalry, and were mainly concerned about
the emergence of India’s regional dominance backed by the Soviet Union. Nixon
and Kissinger were also privately concerned with the protection of Pakistan’s role as
an intermediary in U.S.-PRC relations. On the other hand, in an unusual unanimity,
the State Department denounced the brutality of the Pakistani troops’ suppression of
citizens in East Pakistan as a “reign of terror,” and supported India.

During April and May 1971, Nixon and Kissinger urged President Yahya Khan to
take a more moderate and conciliatory line in East Pakistan. On April 28, 1971, Nixon
approved an effort to help Yahya achieve a negotiated settlement and wrote: “Too all
hands, Don’t squeeze Yahya at this time. RN.” Kissinger and the NSC staff
recognized that Nixon personally had a “high regard” for Pakistani President Yahya
Khan. On May 10, 1971, during a talk with Pakistani officials, Nixon himself made
it clear that Yahya was a “good friend” and that the U.S. would “not do anything to
complicate the situation for President Yahya or to embarrass him.”

On May 26, 1971, State Department officials judged that President Yahya was “not
likely” to take steps to bring about a “political accommodation” until he realized

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141 Nixon, RN, p.525; and Kissinger, White House Years, p.767
142 Kissinger, White House Years, p.854. As for a recent controversial work which criticizes Kissinger’s
quiet approval of Yahya’s suppression of civilians in East Pakistan, see Christopher Hitchens, The
143 Telegram, U.S. Consulate, Dacca, “Selective Genocide,” March 28, 1971, Pol and Def, Box 2530,
Subject-Numeric Files (SNF) 1970-73, General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59
(STATE-RG59), NA. See also, Christopher Van Hollen, “The Tilt Policy Revisited: Nixon-Kissinger
Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (1969-1972), criticizes that
Kissinger unnecessarily elevated the local crisis in the subcontinent into one of U.S.-USSR
competition. The White House-centered system was not suitable for a “multifaceted regional crisis”
which required a number of operational decisions over months. Ibid., p.357.
144 Nixon’s handwritten notation, Underline by Nixon in original, in Kissinger to Nixon, “Policy
Options Toward Pakistan,” April 28, 1971, p.6, Country Files (CF)-Middle East, Box 625, NSCF,
NPMS, NA.
145 Memcon, M.M. Ashmad, Agha Hilaly, Henry Kissinger, and Harold H. Saunders, 3:05-3:30p.m.,
May 19, 1971, p.3, CF-Indo-Pak War, Box 578, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
146 Memcon, Nixon, M.M. Ashmad, Agha Hilaly, and Harold H. Saunders, 4:45-5:20p.m., May 19,
1971, p.1, p.3, CF-Indo-Pak War, Box 578, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
himself how essential it was. The State Department had also “confidentially briefed” India on the positions the U.S. was taking privately with Pakistan.

On June 3, 1971, during a talk with U.S. Ambassador to India, Kenneth Keating, and a South Asia expert of the NSC staff, Harold Saunders, Kissinger made clear that President Nixon’s main concern was to discourage India from military action. Kissinger thus explained that: “We want to buy time... We have no illusion that West Pakistan can hold East Pakistan and we have no interest in their doing so.”

In ‘POLO,’ the NSC staff analysed that South Asia was an area where the U.S. was pursuing “no special geopolitical interests of its own,” which was unlike both the Soviets and the Chinese whose positions in South Asia were basically each developed against the other. The NSC staff also estimated that the Chinese would be pleased to see radical elements in East Pakistan come to surface and India “weakened.” Hence, Kissinger was prepared to assure Zhou that the U.S. would not want to “play anyone off against anyone else,” or to “stir up anti-Chinese sentiment in India.”

147 Rogers to Nixon, “Possible India-Pakistan War, May 26, 1971, p.1, CF-Indo-Pak War, Box 578, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
148 Ibid., p.2.
149 Memcon, Kissinger, Keating, and Saunders, June 3, 1971, p.1, CF-Middle East, Box 596, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
150 Ibid., p.3. During his trip to Asia, which would lead to the secret visit to Beijing, Kissinger made a brief visit to India. Kissinger assured Indian officials that under any conceivable circumstances, the U.S. would “back India against any Chinese pressures” and that in any dialogue with China, “we would not encourage her against India.” Memcon, Sarabhai and Kissinger, July 7, 1971, p.3, Presidential/HAK MemCons, Box 1025, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
151 South Asia, p.1, Briefing book for HAK’s July 1971 trip, POLO I, FPF/Lord, Box 850, NSCF, NPMS, NA. In his memoirs, Kissinger notes the India-Pakistan relations as a topic in the briefing book without describing any specific contents. Kissinger, White House Years, p.731. A South Asia expert in the NSC staff, Saunders, stayed in Pakistan. “I joined the party and accompanied him to New Delhi and Pakistan. “I joined the party and accompanied him to New Delhi and Pakistan. On the plane ride from Bangkok to New Delhi, he told me that he was going to Beijing from Pakistan. That was the first time I had ever heard of the plan. The only reason Kissinger told me was because he asked me to write talking points.” Harold H. Saunders (South Asia Specialist for the National Security Council, 1971; Near East Affairs Department of State, 1974-1976), Oral History Interview, p.1, Pakistan, Country Collection, 1996, FAOHC.
152 Ibid.
153 India and Pakistan, pp.1-2, Briefing book for HAK’s July 1971 trip, POLO I, FPF/Lord, Box 850, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
During the July 1971 talks, it was Premier Zhou who raised the question of South Asia, insisting that India was “committing aggression against Pakistan,” and that South Asia was becoming a region in “turmoil.”\(^{154}\) Zhou thus suggested that the U.S. “advise India not to provoke such a disturbance.”\(^{155}\) In his reply, Kissinger sought to give an assurance to Zhou: “we would under no circumstances encourage Indian military adventures against the People’s Republic of China.”\(^{156}\)

Zhou made it clear that: “if India commits aggressions, we will support Pakistan.”\(^{157}\) Kissinger misinterpreted what Zhou meant by “support Pakistan.” Thus, Kissinger agreed to “oppose” Indian aggression, although the U.S. could not take “military measures.”\(^{158}\) Zhou emphasized that the U.S. still had the “strength to persuade India.”\(^{159}\)

By the summer of 1971, as a Soviet expert of the NSC staff, Helmut Sonnenfeldt assessed, the Soviets might see the Indian subcontinent as offering the “most tempting opportunities” for exploiting U.S.-Chinese difficulties and for achieving “unilateral advantages.”\(^{160}\) On August 9, 1971, India signed a twenty-year ‘Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation’ with the Soviet Union. In his memoirs, Kissinger stresses that the Soviets discovered an opportunity to “humiliate” China and also “punish” Pakistan for its role as “intermediary” between Washington and Beijing.\(^{161}\)

On August 11, 1971, during a meeting with the principal members of the Senior

\(^{154}\) Memcon July 10, 1971, p.6.

\(^{155}\) Ibid., p.11.

\(^{156}\) Ibid., p.29.

\(^{157}\) Memcon July 11, 1971, p.17.

\(^{158}\) Ibid.

\(^{159}\) Ibid.

\(^{160}\) Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, “US-Soviet Relations in Light of the President’s Visit to China,” July 20, 1971, p.3, Box 500, China Trip – July-November 1971 [Part 1], PTF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.

\(^{161}\) Kissinger, *White House Years*, p.767. Since Nixon’s presidential visit in August 1969, Pakistan was an “enthusiastic” cooperator for the promotion of Washington-Beijing relations. The Pakistani leaders sought to have the U.S. “weight” as a corner of national security. Bundy, *A Tangled Web*, p.245, and pp.269-284.
Review Group, Nixon expressed his conviction with a "great deal of emphasis" that the U.S. "must not – cannot – allow" India to use the refugees as a "pretext for breaking up Pakistan."\(^{162}\) Moreover, Nixon made it clear that the U.S. still had to "use its influence to keep the war from happening."\(^{163}\)

On August 16, during a secret talk with the Chinese Ambassador in Paris, Huang Chen, Kissinger gave private assurance that the U.S. would "do nothing to embarrass the government of Pakistan by any public statements."\(^{164}\) In his report to Nixon, Kissinger explained that they were "building a solid record of keeping the Chinese informed," especially assuring that the U.S. was "not colluding against their ally."\(^{165}\)

In 'POLO II,' the NSC staff estimated that the Soviet-Indian Treaty was aimed at Beijing as well as Islamabad.\(^{166}\) The NSC staff assessed, however, that the Chinese were "not militarily prepared" on how to sustain major operations against India and that a clear-cut Indian victory would seriously weaken Pakistan and enhance India’s prestige to China’s detriment.\(^{167}\) Hence, China would judge that a "short war," which the international community would stop, would enable it to join in an effort to give Pakistan a "face-saving way to pull back" from East Pakistan.\(^{168}\)

\(^{162}\) Memorandum for the Record, August 11, 1971, p.3, CF-Indo-Pak War, Box 578, NSCF, NPMS, NA.

\(^{163}\) Ibid., p.4.

\(^{164}\) Memcon, Huang Chen and Kissinger, August 16, 1971, p.8, China exchanges – July-Oct 20, 1971, FPF/Lord, Box 849, NSCF, NPMS, NA. In his memoirs, however, Kissinger fails to provide any specific details of his briefing to the Chinese. Kissinger, \textit{White House Years}, p.768.

\(^{165}\) Kissinger to Nixon, "My August 16 Meeting with the Chinese Ambassador in Paris," August 16, 1971, p.4, China exchanges – July-Oct 20, 1971, FPF/Lord, Box 849, NSCF, NPMS, NA.

\(^{166}\) The Soviet Union, pp.11-12, Briefing book for HAK’s Oct. 1971 trip POLO II [Part I], FPF/Lord, Box 850, NSCF, NPMS, NA.

\(^{167}\) South Asia, p.3, Briefing book for HAK’s Oct. 1971 trip POLO II [Part II], FPF/Lord, Box 851, NSCF, NPMS, NA.

\(^{168}\) Ibid.
During the October 1971 talks, as anticipated, Zhou criticized that the Soviet Union was "threatening" Pakistan. Kissinger reiterated that the U.S. would "totally oppose" India's military action against Pakistan. However, Zhou was not convinced, insisting that India was seeking to "get two big powers to contend for it in the Indian Ocean." In his report to Nixon, Kissinger assessed that China would stand clearly "behind Pakistan" but it did "not want hostilities to break out" and was afraid of giving the Soviets a "pretext for attack."

2.5. The Soviet military threat

The Soviet military threat had been a major issue of analysis in previous works on the U.S. rapprochement with China. Nixon and Kissinger were seriously concerned about how to develop a common perception with Beijing to counteract against the Soviet military power. In his memoirs, Kissinger interprets that "China needed us precisely because it did not have the strength to balance the Soviet Union by itself." Hence, Kissinger clarifies that while keeping the Chinese informed of the US-USSR negotiations "in considerable details," Washington would not give Beijing any "veto" over its actions. In essence, Kissinger was seeking to develop an even-handed

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170 Ibid., p.31.
171 Memcon, October 24, 1971, p.17.
173 See, for example, Garthoff, Déteinte and Confrontation, pp.261-262. Garthoff argues that Kissinger provided to Zhou "high-resolution satellite photographs" of Soviet military activities.
174 Kissinger, White House Years, p.749.
175 Ibid., p.837. On the other hand, Bundy argues that Kissinger developed a "double standard" of triangular diplomacy within which U.S. relations with China essentially came to possess a similarly close basis as that with the allies. Bundy, A Tangled Web, p.238.
approach towards both Beijing and Moscow.\textsuperscript{176} Regarding Beijing’s growing sensitivity toward the superpowers’ détente, the NSC staff emphasized in ‘POLO’ that: “Our approaches to the USSR are not directed against China and should not be regarded as U.S.-USSR collusion at China’s expense.”\textsuperscript{177}

In his memoirs, Holdridge states only that during Kissinger’s secret visit to Beijing in July 1971, the U.S.-PRC problem with the Soviets was “mentioned but not stressed.”\textsuperscript{178} In reality, however, Zhou emphasized that: “we would absolutely not become a superpower.”\textsuperscript{179} Moreover, Zhou warned that the Soviet Union was following America’s path “in stretching its hands all over the world.”\textsuperscript{180}

In response, Kissinger explained that the U.S. would not exclude “the possibility of Soviet military adventurism.”\textsuperscript{181} Importantly, Kissinger took steps beyond the NSC briefing book’s recommendations and gave a crucial assurance to Zhou: “I am prepared to give you any information you may wish to know regarding any bilateral negotiation we are having with the Soviet Union on such issues as SALT.”\textsuperscript{182}

In his report to Nixon, Kissinger evaluated that the Chinese did “appreciate” “the balancing role” the U.S. was playing in Asia and that the U.S. must be “exceptionally

\textsuperscript{177} Review of U.S. and PRC Views on Other Great Powers, the Soviet Union, pp.4-5, Briefing book for HAK’s July 1971 trip, POLO I, FFP/Lord, Box 850, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
\textsuperscript{178} Holdridge, Crossing the Divide, p.60.
\textsuperscript{179} Memcon July 9, 1971, p.36.
\textsuperscript{180} Memcon July 10, 1971, Afternoon (12:10 p.m. - 6:00 p.m.), p.9.
\textsuperscript{181} Ibid., p.27.
\textsuperscript{182} Ibid., pp.28-29.
careful not to drive them away." It was crucial to assure the Chinese that the U.S. would "never collude with other powers against China."

In "POLO II," the NSC staff estimated that the U.S. had skilfully managed the delicate U.S.-Soviet-Chinese triangle better than the U.S.-Japanese-Chinese one. With the Soviets, the U.S. had stressed its "priority in dealing with them" in the near future, having moved ahead on negotiations and having agreed on a summit. The Soviets, at least publicly, had to say that they favored the normalization of Washington-Beijing relations with emphasis on this "not being directed against Moscow."

The NSC staff judged that Zhou was thinking in "balance of power terms" and did not want any sudden shift in this balance in Asia, demonstrated by the "absence of a time-limit for U.S. withdrawals." In reality, Zhou could hardly admit that the U.S. was doing the PRC a favor by maintaining a balance vis-à-vis the USSR. The NSC staff thus recommended to Kissinger to stress that U.S. forces in Asia did "not constitute a threat to the PRC" and that a U.S. withdrawal from Asia could create a vacuum that other major powers might be tempted to fill.

During the October 1971 talks, Premier Zhou insisted that despite the existence of profound differences regarding world outlook, the two sides came to share a common interest in easing tensions in East Asia. Hence, Zhou emphasized that: "no country

184 Ibid., p.22.
185 Ibid., p.12. It was originally the Soviet Union that had, since 1949, insisted on the recognition of the People's Republic. Therefore, by the late 1960s, Moscow could hardly justify its private opposition to Washington's move toward Beijing.
186 The U.S. Role in Asia, p.4, Briefing book for HAK's Oct. 1971 trip POLO II [Part II], FPF/Lord, Box 851, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
187 Ibid., p.5.
188 Ibid., pp.5-6.
189 Memcon, October 24, 1971, pp.7-8. On October 23, 1971, after having read the draft communiqué, Chairman Mao showed dissatisfaction, for it had "no voice." Zhou carefully followed Mao's
should make efforts to establish hegemony and no major power should collude with any country.”¹⁹⁰ Moreover, Zhou suggested that the two sides, through their respective actions and influences, “affect” allies “not to go to certain extremes.”¹⁹¹ Finally, Zhou claimed that both sides should “not allow another greater power far away feel easy in coming into the Far East for hegemony.”¹⁹²

Kissinger and Zhou thus agreed to include in the communiqué the so-called “anti-hegemony clause,” a joint opposition to the emergence of any major threat seeking hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region. In his memoirs, Kissinger recalls that although the term hegemony later became “a hallowed Chinese word, it actually was introduced first by us.”¹⁹³ Holdridge interprets that China “removed” the “American hegemonists” from the lists of “offenders” of this principle and it was the Soviet Union that remained.¹⁹⁴

After the October trip, Kissinger reported to Nixon, emphasizing that “a deep and abiding Chinese hatred of the Russians” repeatedly came through during his

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¹⁹⁰ Ibid., p.15.
¹⁹¹ Ibid., p.16.
¹⁹² Ibid.
conversations with Zhou.\textsuperscript{195} Kissinger assessed that for the U.S., a rapprochement was a "matter of tactics," but for the Chinese, it involved a "profound moral adjustment."\textsuperscript{196} However, the July 15 presidential announcement had "not changed the direction of Soviet policy but had improved Russian manners."\textsuperscript{197} Finally, therefore, Kissinger emphasized that the Chinese should be "under no illusions that we fully intend to pursue our interests with Moscow while we try to improve our dialogue with Peking."\textsuperscript{198}

2.6. Kissinger's report to Nixon after the July and October 1971 trips

In his report to Nixon, Kissinger described the secret trip as the "most searching, sweeping and significant discussions."\textsuperscript{199} Premier Zhou spoke "with an almost matter of fact clarity and eloquence. He was equally at home in philosophic sweeps, historical analysis, tactical probing, light repartees. His command of facts, and in particular his knowledge of American events, was remarkable."\textsuperscript{200} Lord also assesses that: "Zhou Enlai was a survivor. You don't survive the Cultural Revolution without being brutal, although he was more pragmatic than Mao. He certainly was the most impressive foreign leader I have ever met."\textsuperscript{201}

\textsuperscript{195} Kissinger to Nixon, "My October China Visit: The Atmosphere," October 29, 1971, p.7, Book III, China Trip, Record of Previous Visits, FPF/Lord, Box 847, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
\textsuperscript{196} Ibid., p.8.
\textsuperscript{197} Ibid., p.22.
\textsuperscript{199} Kissinger to Nixon, "My Talks with Chou En-lai," July 14, 1971, p.1, Miscellaneous Memoranda Relating to HAK Trip to PRC, July 1971, FPF, Box 1033, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
\textsuperscript{201} Lord, Interview with Komine, October 15, 2003.
More specifically, Kissinger emphasized the remaining profound perception gap with the Chinese:

The Chinese clearly like to picture themselves as free from the vice of great power ambitions.... Their attitude toward great powers now is a mix of hostility, suspicions, and fear... they may be making a virtue out of a necessity. And their very interest in a U.S.-Chinese summit has them playing a great power game.202

Finally, Kissinger defined the U.S. role in world politics:

For Asia and for the world we need to demonstrate that we are enlarging the scope of our diplomacy in a way that, far from harming the interest of other countries, should instead prove helpful to them. Our dealings, both with the Chinese and others, will require reliability, precision, finesse.203

As his handwritten comments on ‘POLO II’ show, President Nixon strongly believed that the Chinese continuing demand for U.S. total withdrawal from Asia was “out of question.”204 Therefore, during the “very intensive substantive discussions for some twenty-five hours” in October 1971, while Zhou continued to pressure “the prospect of a lower American military profile in Asia,” Kissinger sought a “built-in restraint on Chinese activities in Asia.”205 Together, Kissinger and Zhou attempted to ensure “less danger of miscalculation” and develop a “counterweight to the Soviet

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202 Kissinger to Nixon, “My Talks with Chou En-lai,” July 14, 1971, pp.22-23, Miscellaneous Memoranda Relating to HAK Trip to PRC, July 1971, FPF, Box 1033, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
203 Ibid., p.27.
204 Nixon’s handwritten note on the cover page of Briefing book for HAK’s Oct. 1971 trip POLO II [Part I], FPF/Lord, Box 850, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
Union." In consequence, the two sides established the "basic technical and substantive framework" for the upcoming summit. Kissinger particularly explained to Nixon that: "they are clearly gambling on your re-election." Finally, Kissinger estimated that "if we can navigate the Taiwan issue successfully, we should have a communiqué that is realistic, clear, dignified, reassuring to our friends and positive for the further development of US-Chinese relations."

3. Reactions to the China Breakthrough

3.1. The Nixon presidential announcement of July 15, 1971

On July 13, the day of Kissinger’s return from his secret trip to Beijing, Nixon and Haldeman discussed how to "set something up" for Secretary Rogers and agreed that Rogers should not state "anything about China." Nixon urged Haldeman to ask Kissinger to inform the press that it was President who "did the whole thing." Nixon and his advisers determined to remind the press that the recent China initiative did not happen "accidentally" and that it was a "culmination of a long process."

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206 Ibid., p.2.
207 Ibid., p.3.
208 Kissinger to Nixon, "My October China Visit: Drafting the Communiqué (No date), p.1, China – HAK October 1971 visit, FPF, Box 1035, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
209 Ibid., p.8. However, as the following chapter demonstrates, Kissinger still underestimated the Chinese persistence on Taiwan as their domestic issue.
211 Ibid. Nixon sent instructions to Kissinger for press briefings, to describe how the President and Zhou had similar characteristics: "(1) Strong convictions; (2) Came up through adversity; (3) At his best in a crisis; (4) Tough, bold, willing to take chances; (5) A man who takes the long view; (6) A philosophical turn of mind; (7) A man who works without notes; (8) A man who knows Asia; (9) Steely but who is subtle and appears almost gently." Nixon to Kissinger, July 19, 1971, POF, Box 85, WHCF, NPMS, NA. Nixon worried that Kissinger might overshadow him. See Isaacson, Kissinger, pp.340-341.
212 Ibid., p.8.
Accordingly, it became Haldeman's task to enhance Nixon's "world leader image." Secretary Rogers agreed later that there was no need to "say anything beyond announcement." 

On the morning of July 15, 1971, Haldeman, Rogers, and Kissinger discussed the upcoming presidential announcement. The United States would need to "reassure Pacific allies" that "no secret deal" was made during Kissinger's trip to Beijing. The main issues of U.S. messages to allies were: 1) "we are not changing our policy"; and 2) "we don't deal with our friends behind their back."

On July 15, 1971, at 8 p.m. local time in California, President Nixon appeared on a major TV network broadcast and read the joint announcement, prepared by Kissinger and Zhou and issued simultaneously in the United States and in China. Nixon accepted Zhou's invitation to visit China before May 1972 "to seek the normalization between the two countries and also to exchange views on questions of concerns to the two sides." Anticipating a wide sensation which would be likely to follow the announcement, Nixon read an additional explanation that the U.S. opening to China "will not be at the expense of our old friends. It is not directed against any other nation." Finally, Nixon expressed his profound conviction that "all nations will

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213 Ibid.  
214 Ibid.  
216 Ibid.  
217 Announcement of Trip to China, July 15, 1971, Speech Files, Box 67, PPF, WHCF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.  
218 Ibid. Regarding the U.S. relations with its allies, Nixon revised a draft statement by the NSC staff from "Our action in seeking a new relationship with the People's Republic of China does not mean that the United States will abandon its old friends." to "will not be at the expense of our old friends." Underline by Nixon in original. Ibid.
gain from a reduction of tensions and a better relationship” between the United States and China.219

The seven-minute presidential announcement brought about wide-ranging reactions not only within the American public but also abroad. The New York Times reported in its headline that: “Nixon Is Expected To Visit China Around End of Year; To See Both Mao and Chou.”220 The U.S. Information Agency reported that the overwhelming majority of media commentators in non-Communist countries enthusiastically greeted the news as a “momentous event.” The announcement was also described as a “diplomatic triumph” for President Nixon that dramatically conformed his pledge to seek to transform an era of “confrontation” into one of “negotiation.”221

However, several observers held that the development enhanced Beijing’s prestige and posed some serious risks for the United States. A few right-of-center commentators also presented a note of caution, warning against “expecting too much too soon.”222 Finally, the “unusual secrecy” for the conduct of American foreign policy was “very disturbing and very unhealthy.”223

219 Ibid.
220 The New York Times, July 17, 1971. Foot explains that the U.S. opening to China stimulated the American ambition that the nation was still capable of taking a bold action to embrace a long-term enemy. Foot, The Practice of Power, pp.263-264.
221 Barbara M. White (Acting Director, U.S. Information Agency) to Haig, July 23, 1971, “President’s Acceptance of Invitation to Peking: An Assessment of Foreign Media Reaction, July 22, 1971,” p.1, Box 500, China Trip – July-November 1971 [Part 1], President’s Trip Files (PTF), NSCF, NPMS, NA.
222 Ibid., p.2.
3.1.1 The Republic of China’s reactions

Less than two hours after the President’s statement, the U.S. Ambassador to Taipei, Walter P. McConaughy was given an official government of the Republic of China statement which protested “in the strongest terms possible” the President’s statement and termed it “a most unfriendly act” which “will have gravest consequences.” The U.S. Information Agency reported that Taipei media replayed the Taiwan government’s “serious protest.” It also reported that President Chiang kai-shek received a personal letter from President Nixon which contained “reassurance” that the U.S. would “continue to honor its defense treaty commitment” to the Republic of China and maintain the continuing friendship with her.

On August 9, 1971, Secretary Rogers sent a memorandum to Nixon, re-assessing the ROC’s “feelings of shock and betrayal” over the announced intention to visit the mainland, which might generate further “emotionalism.” On the other hand, the ROC government had a “realistic appreciation of its vital interests,” the primary one being its “continued existence as a viable entity on Taiwan.” State Department officials thus concluded that the ROC would go through the motions of “bitter protest for the

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sake of face,” but might privately feel “some sense of reassurance” concerning its existence over the mid-term future.226

3.1.2 The Japanese reactions

In public, the Japanese Acting Foreign Minister Kimura termed the President’s announcement a “very good thing,” commenting that although such a development was “anticipated,” events had taken a “sudden turn.”227 The State Department reported that the Sato government was “taken by surprise and embarrassed by the announcement.”228 The U.S. Information Agency also noted the Japanese media’s coverage of “an air of uneasiness” in Tokyo.229

Soon after the secret trip, Kissinger reported to Nixon: “With Japan our task will be to make clear that we are not shifting our allegiance in Asia from her to China.”230 However, Nixon and Kissinger were seriously concerned about the danger of leaks from Tokyo as they personally did not trust the Japanese government.231 In reality, the day before the July 15 announcement, following the recommendations from the

226 Ibid., p.2.
227 Elliot to Kissinger, “Reactions to the President’s Announcement on July 15, 1971,” July 16, 1971, p.3, POL Chicom-U.S., 1970-73, Box 2191, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA.
228 Elliot to Kissinger, “Reactions to the President’s Announcement on July 15, 1971,” July 22, 1971, p.2, Box 499, Reaction to China Initiative (July 1971) Memos, Letters, etc., PTF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
231 Solomon, Interview with Komine, September 24, 2003. Solomon further recalls that a former NSC staff member and a Japan specialist, Richard Sneider was “furious” after hearing about the Kissinger secret trip on the radio, considering that it would “screw up” the U.S. relationship with Japan “very badly.” Ibid. Nixon later stated to British Prime Minister Edward Heath that the Japanese had “the leakiest government in the world, so we couldn’t afford to give them advance word.” Memocon, Nixon and Heath, December 20, 1971, p.5, Memoranda for the President (MemforP), Records of Meetings (ROM), Box 87, POF, WHCF, NPMS, NA. See also Isaacson, Kissinger, pp.342-343, and pp.347-348; Bundy, A Tangled Web, p.233, and pp.244-245; and Kissinger, White House Years, p.762.
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Secretary Rogers had planned to send Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson to Tokyo to inform Japanese officials privately in advance. However, Kissinger vetoed the idea, telling Johnson that the President was too worried about the possible danger of a leak, and thus the trip was never materialized.\(^2\)\(^3\)\(^2\) Lord recalls that alternatively, Kissinger could have sent Holdridge or himself to fly to Tokyo just after leaving China; although the Japanese would still have been upset, at least they “would not have been humiliated publicly.”\(^2\)\(^3\)\(^3\) Moreover, Secretary of State Rogers also attempted to reach Japanese Ambassador to the U.S. Uchiba, however was restricted by Nixon’s insistence on only an hour’s prior-notice.\(^2\)\(^3\)\(^4\) Consequently, the Japanese officials were “astonished” and “outraged” that there had “not been any advance consultation, much less warning. ...Privately, the Japanese felt that Kissinger had betrayed them.”\(^2\)\(^3\)\(^5\) Johnson assesses that: “The damage had been done. After this ‘Nixon shokku’ as the Japanese called it, there has never again been the same trust and confidence between our two

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\(^2\)\(^3\)\(^2\) Johnson found out about the cancellation from Lord on the airplane on the way to California. Lord, “The Nixon Administration National Security Council,” p.45, NSCP-OHR.

\(^2\)\(^3\)\(^3\) Lord, Interview with Komine, October 15, 2003. In reality, Secretary of Defense Laird, who was in Tokyo, knew exactly what was happening, through his own sources, such as naval communication channels, Yeoman Radford’s secret reports, National Security Agency communications intercepts, and the special mission plane that Kissinger used. Laird privately told his Japanese counterpart about the Kissinger trip and the forthcoming summit six hours before it was announced. See Isaacson, \textit{Kissinger}, p.348.

\(^2\)\(^3\)\(^4\) State Department officials Richard Erickson and Marshall Green drafted a message of explanation from President Nixon to Prime Minister Sato. Green recalls that there had been a tendency in the Foreign Service for officials to be either pro-Chinese or pro-Japanese. This went back for at least 100 years and the U.S. Government had fallen into “that syndrome, with the President favoring China over Japan.” Green, Oral History Interview, March 2 and 17, 1995, p.58, pp.60-61, FAOHC.

\(^2\)\(^3\)\(^5\) William Sherman (Consul General, Osaka-Kobe, 1968-1970, Political Counselor, 1970-1972), Oral History Interview, p.14, Japan, Volume II, Country Collection, FAOHC. Kissinger had been quoted on more than one occasion: “Who cares if some civil servant is embarrassed? He could care less.” Thereafter, there had been very significant attitudinal changes within the Foreign Service: “Can one be sure that the policy being given to you by the leadership is really the one that they will follow? ...He has to find a mentor, a protector, a rabbi in the White House or in the NSC or somewhere who is going to advance his cause.” Robert, Duemling (Head of Political-External Section, United States Embassy, Tokyo, 1970-1974), Oral History Interview, p.2, Japan, Volume II, Country Collection, 1996, FAOHC.
governments.236 Thereafter, Tokyo would begin to initiate its own diplomatic move toward Beijing.237

3.1.3. The Soviet reactions

The Soviet media reported President’s Nixon’s acceptance of Premier Zhou’s invitation. However, it did not mention the President’s statement that his trip to the PRC was “not directed against any other nation.”238 The unofficial Soviet reaction to the President’s Beijing visit remained a “low key approval.”239 The State Department reported that there had been no comment from official Soviet sources in Moscow.

On July 20, 1971, a Soviet expert in the NSC staff, Sonnenfeldt sent a memorandum to Kissinger, analysing the implications of the presidential announcement on U.S.-Soviet relations.240 In the Soviets’ view, immediate U.S. goals had been to “bring the USSR under pressure” in various negotiations and to limit the Soviet role in the Asia-Pacific. These suspicions, reinforced by deep-seated “antagonism toward the Chinese,” would have been raised further by the presidential announcement. Finally, regarding a possible U.S.-USSR summit, Sonnenfeldt estimated that the materialization of the Beijing trip would make Soviet interest in a summit greater than


238 Elliot to Kissinger, “Reactions to the President’s Announcement on July 15, 1971,” July 16, 1971, p.4, POL Chicom-U.S., 1970-73, Box 2191, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA.

239 Elliot to Kissinger, “Reactions to the President’s Announcement on July 15, 1971, July 22, 1971, p.6, Box 499, Reaction to China Initiative (July 1971) Memos, Letters, etc., PTF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.

it was before, but the Soviets, and Brezhnev personally, would still psychologically be reluctant to disclose this interest.241

On July 22, Kissinger sent an analysis of the China initiative to Nixon. The following point drew Nixon’s attention: “Moscow simply cannot help gaining the conviction that our new China policy is but a symptom of our overwhelming desire to see reconciliation and disengagement anyway and everywhere.”242 At the end of the memo, Nixon wrote: “K[issinger] – Our task is to play a hard game with the Soviet[s] and to see that wherever possible – including non Communist Asia – our friends are reassured.”243

In reality, Nixon’s announcement of his presidential trip to China brought about a more cooperative attitude from the Soviets. On July 19 and August 17, 1971, Kissinger gave a briefing on his trip to the Soviet ambassador to the U.S., Anatoly Dobrynin. Kissinger mainly sought to re-assure Dobrynin that the U.S opening to China was not against the Soviet interests. However, Moscow worried that Washington’s quick opening might push Tokyo to move close to Beijing, leading to the real danger of a “combination of China and Japan.”244 The Soviets were thus worried that a Sino-Japanese rapprochement would lead to the worst strategic situation, namely encirclement by the United States, China, and Japan. Despite Kissinger’s denial, Dobrynin was still concerned about a U.S. attempt to engage in “an anti-Soviet manoeuvre.”245 On September 29, 1971, Soviet Foreign Minister

241 Ibid., pp.7-8.
243 Nixon’s handwritten notations, in Ibid.
245 Ibid., p.2.
Andre Gromyko formally invited President Nixon to meet Secretary Leonid Brezhnev in Moscow in May 1972.\textsuperscript{246}

The U.S. and Chinese officials carefully monitored the Soviet reactions to the Nixon announcement. After the July trip, Kissinger established the Paris channel with the Chinese, namely General V.A. Walters’s contact with the Chinese Ambassador in Paris, Huang Chen. On August 16, Kissinger affirmed to Huang that he would carefully be “keeping the PRC informed” on any developments with Moscow.\textsuperscript{247} On September 13, Kissinger informed Huang in advance that Gromyko would be likely to convey a formal invitation for the President to visit Moscow.\textsuperscript{248} Accordingly, on October 9, General Walters gave Huang a text of the October 12 announcement of the US-USSR summit set for May 1972, stressing the importance that China being the “first country to be informed.”\textsuperscript{249}

\textsuperscript{246} On October 12, 1971, Nixon officially announced his decision to visit Moscow in late May of 1972.
\textsuperscript{248} Ibid., p.10.
\textsuperscript{249} Ibid., p.11. The major political incident in China between Kissinger’s secret trip in July and his official trip in October was the so-called ‘Lin Biao Incident’ of September 1971. On September 24, 1971, the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research assessed that just before September 12, “some event of the highest importance” took place, including Mao’s “incapacity and uncertain recovery, or his death,” giving rise to “political uncertainty and concern for internal security.” Intelligence Note, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (BINR), Department of State, “People’s Republic of China: Succession Crisis?” September 24, 1971, pp.1-2, POL Chicom, 1970-73, Box 2177, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA. On the other hand, despite rumors of the “mysterious recent happenings,” namely the disappearance of Defense Minister Lin Biao and the clash of a Chinese Trident jetliner deep inside Mongolia on September 13, the NSC staff had “no hard facts.” The Soviet Union, pp.11-12, Briefing book for HAK’s Oct. 1971 trip POLO II [Part I], FPF/Lord, Box 850, NSCF, NPMS, NA. On February 21, 1972, Mao explained to Nixon that: “In our country also there is a reactionary group which is opposed to our contact with you. The result was that they got on an airplane and fled abroad.” Memcon, February 21, 1972, p.5. For the recent works, based on Chinese archival materials, see, for example, Qiu Jin and Elizabeth Perry, \textit{The Lin Biao Incident and the Cultural Revolution} (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1999); and Chen, \textit{Mao’s China and the Cold War}, pp.269-271.
3.1.4. Briefings of the new China initiative

After the July 15 presidential announcement, Nixon and Kissinger conducted domestic briefings on the background of the China initiative. On July 19, 1971, Nixon explained to the White House Staff the need to bring “one-fourth of the world’s population” into the community of nations:

They’re [the Chinese] not a military power now but 25 years from now they will be decisive. For us not to do now what we can do to end this isolation would leave things very dangerous…. it means a dialogue, that’s all. Looking to the future, the world will not be worth living in if we can’t get the great potential explosive forces under control.250

Regarding the secrecy of the new initiative, Nixon emphasized strongly that:

"Without secrecy, there would have been no invitation or acceptance to visit China. Without secrecy, there is no chance of success in it."251 Nixon explained further that in the “critical early stages” of the initiative, “No one else on his staff knew,” except Kissinger.252 Finally, Nixon demanded the continuation of strict secrecy for his staff:

“What can we say? Stick to the President’s announcement and say you know no more.”253 Kissinger warned the staff further: “The most impressive thing we can do as far as the Chinese are concerned is to shut up. Don’t even quote what the President said here.”254 Kissinger, who was particularly sensitive to leak from his staff,
explained the importance of reliability in that: "Our problem is to keep discipline....
The Chinese wanted to keep it secret, as we did, but they wondered about us."\(^{255}\)

On July 20, 1971, Nixon and Kissinger briefed the Republican Congressional leaders. Kissinger stressed that there were no secret agreements or understandings during his trip and it was improbable that the Chinese would cancel the presidential visit.\(^{256}\) Nixon also made it clear that "each of us agreed to this visit for our own reasons," and therefore there would still be a "basic disagreement in policy" between the two sides.\(^{257}\)

On July 22, 1971, during the Bipartisan Senate Briefing, President Nixon reiterated the world outlook from his Kansas City speech that "the world was evolving into one of five economic giants" and that "as we move into the post-Vietnam world, military confrontation will be replaced by economic competition."\(^{258}\) Finally, Nixon emphasized the fact that China was "a reality" and it was best to attempt to "bring her into the family of nations."\(^{259}\)

\(^{255}\) Ibid., p.4.
\(^{256}\) "Notes on Republican Leadership Meeting on Tuesday, July 20, 1971, at 8:00a.m.,” p.1, MemforP, ROM, Box 85, POF, WHCF, NPMS, NA.
\(^{257}\) Ibid. Nixon took notes extensively, reviewing his thoughts behind the July 15 announcement. While anticipating wide speculation in the headlines of major newspapers regarding secrecy, Nixon wrote: "Without secrecy - we could not agree on meeting. Without secrecy - meeting will not succeed.... speculation would jeopardize the results we want." Nixon’s handwritten notations, Leadership Meetings – China, Monday, July 19, 1971, Speech Files, Box 67, PPF, WHCF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
\(^{258}\) "Bipartisan Senate Briefing – July 22, 1971 in the Cabinet Room," p.1, MemforP, ROM, Box 85, POF, WHCF, NPMS, NA.
\(^{259}\) Ibid.
3.2. The India-Pakistan War in December 1971

The most severe event related to the U.S. breakthrough with China in 1971 took place in South Asia. On November 4, Nixon met with Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and discussed the latest developments in South Asia. Gandhi made it clear that: "India has never wished to the destruction of Pakistan or its permanent crippling. Above all, India seeks the restoration of stability. We want to eliminate chaos at all costs."\(^{260}\) Privately, however, Nixon was not convinced, suspecting that India was motivated by anti-Pakistan attitude.\(^{261}\)

On November 22, 1971, India conducted a cross-border operation to support the rebellion within East Pakistan against West Pakistan. Kissinger interpreted this incident as the "beginning" of an India-Pakistan war that India had started.\(^{262}\) On December 3, 1971, the day of the outbreak of a full-scale India-Pakistan war, Kissinger told representatives from State, Defense, CIA, and the NSC staff in the Washington Special Action Group meeting that President Nixon was criticizing that "we are not being tough enough on India.... He wants to tilt in favor of Pakistan."\(^{263}\) The President believed that India was "the attacker."\(^{264}\) As Harold Saunders assesses, Kissinger thought that the Chinese would "measure our steadfastness by our

\(^{260}\) Memcon, Nixon and Indira Gandhi, November 5, 1971, POF, Box 86, MemforP, WHCF, NPMS, NA.
\(^{261}\) In his memoirs, Nixon criticizes that Gandhi had "purposely deceived" him, because during the November meeting, she already knew in private that her generals and advisers were planning to intervene in East Pakistan and were also considering contingency plans to attack West Pakistan. Nixon, \textit{RN}, pp.525-526.
\(^{263}\) Kennedy and Saunders to Commander Howe, The Anderson Papers, January 6, 1972, p.2, CF-Middle East, Box 643, NSCF, NPMS, NA. The main reasons for Pakistan's move were not entirely clear. President Yahya Khan told U.S. Ambassador Joseph Farland that India conducted an air and land invasion into West Pakistan in Kashmir and east of Lahore, and Pakistan responded defensively. Reeves, \textit{President Nixon}, p.396. Pakistani Foreign Secretary Sultan Khan recalls that Yahya was "counting on the United States to save Pakistan." Sultan M. Khan, \textit{Memories and Reflections of a Pakistani Diplomat} (London: London Centre for Pakistani Studies, 1997), pp.268-269.
\(^{264}\) Ibid., p.3.
willingness to support our Pakistani allies” in the context of Soviet expansionism.265

“If the Chinese were permitted to doubt America’s reliance, then they might have questioned the utility of closer relationships. ...When the war broke out, our main objective was to make sure that the Pakistanis would not seriously [be] damaged.”266

State Department officials considered that India was limiting its aims in East Pakistan and had no designs for West Pakistan, and therefore the danger of Soviet or Chinese intervention was small. Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Joseph J. Sisco, strongly disagreed with an intelligence report that stated “the Indians intended to go beyond separating Bangladesh from Pakistan, but also to pursue military operations in order to destroy effectively the overall military capacity of Pakistan for an indefinite period.”267 Donald Anderson explains that the Indians were “very furious” when the U.S., particularly Kissinger, was tilting very heavily toward Pakistan. In the eyes of State Department officials, “there’s no question Pakistan started the war.”268

On December 10, 1971, Kissinger held a secret talk with the Chinese Ambassador to the United Nations, Huang Hua, at a CIA “safe house” in New York.269 Kissinger

265 Harold Saunders (South Asia Specialist for the National Security Council, 1971; Near East Affairs Department of State, 1974-1976), Oral History Interview, p.1, Pakistan, Country Collection, 1996, FAOHC.
266 Ibid., p.2.
267 Joseph J. Sisco (Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, 1969-1974), Oral History Interview, p.1, Pakistan, Country Collection, 1996, FAOHC. Tyler interprets that Kissinger tried to induce China to consider attack on India’s frontier, while the crisis still remained only a regional scale. See Tyler, A Great Wall, pp.119-120.
268 Donald Anderson (Political Officer, New Delhi, 1970-1972), Oral History Interview, pp.4-5, India, Country Collection, 1996, FAOHC. Anderson argues further that the Indians viewed China with a “mixture of awe, envy, and contempt.” Thus, there was a sense of competition that “China gets treated better than India. That the West, and in particular the United States, doesn’t recognize the importance of India and accept India’s logical hegemonic position in South Asia.” Ibid.
handed Huang Hua a top-secret folder of U.S. intelligence as well as photos of how the U.S. was "moving a number of naval ships in the West Pacific toward the Indian Ocean." Kissinger sought to induce China's move against India by indicating that: "if the People's Republic were to consider the situation on the Indian subcontinent a threat to its security, and if it took a measure to protect its security, the U.S. would oppose efforts of other to interfere with the People's Republic." In response, Huang emphasized that: "The Soviet Union and India now are progressing along on an extremely dangerous track in the subcontinent. And as we have already pointed out this is a step to encircle China." Realizing China's sensitivity, Kissinger emphasized that "both of us must continue to bring pressure on India and the Soviet Union." In reality, however, China remained very cautious thought the war. Although Chinese troops were positioned on the Indian border, they did not take the risk of aiding Pakistan by attacking India. As Huang Hua informed Haig on December 12, China would be willing to support the UN General Assembly's call on India and Pakistan to "institute an immediate cease fire and to withdraw troops from each other's territory." On December 14, Nixon and Kissinger received a formal note from Moscow which informed them of "firm assurances by the Indian leadership that

270 Ibid., p.5. On December 10, Nixon authorized the creation of a task force of eight ships centered around the nuclear aircraft carrier Enterprise, which would head from waters off Vietnam to the Bay of Bengal.
271 Ibid., p.6.
272 Ibid., p.11.
274 Memcon, Haig and Huang Hua, December 12, 1971, pp.1-2, China exchanges – Oct 20, 1971 – Dec.31, 1971, FPF/Lord, Box 849, NSCF, NPMS, NA. Nixon assessed that the Chinese played a "very cautious role" because they understandably "feared" that the Soviets might use Chinese aid of Pakistan as an "excuse for attacking China." Nixon, RN, p.530. Moreover, after the Lin Biao incident of September 1971, the Chinese leadership was still seeking to resolve internal division, and it was too risky to use its army abroad. See Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, p.316.
India has no plans of seizing West Pakistani territory.\textsuperscript{275} On December 16, 1971, India offered a cease-fire, and Pakistan surrendered unconditionally.

Nixon and Kissinger believed that if India and the Soviet Union succeeded in “destroying Pakistan as a military and political entity,” it could have a “devastating effect in encouraging the USSR to use the same tactics elsewhere.”\textsuperscript{276} “A victory of India over Pakistan was the same as a victory of the Soviet Union over China.”\textsuperscript{277} The best solution would therefore be an arrangement in which “neither the USSR nor China are in a position of having won or lost.”\textsuperscript{278} However, because of the highly secretive decision-making style and the lack of effective communication with the State Department from the summer to the winter of 1971, Nixon and Kissinger became isolated within the administration. Finally, as the U.S. rapprochement with China came to be materialized from July 1971 to February 1972, Pakistan’s role as the intermediary between Washington and Beijing ended.

In summary, the U.S. breakthrough with China in 1971 took place as U.S. officials came to realize the reduction of the direct threat from China. In the short term, it was China’s weakness in the Sino-Soviet border clashes and the conflicts in Indochina that provided a crucial opportunity for U.S. officials to reassess U.S. China policy. As for the Chinese strategic perception, Nixon estimated that “the Chinese view the U.S. as no longer its major enemy. The Soviets are their greatest fear; Japan is second [because of the likelihood of its rearmament] and very probably India in the light of

\textsuperscript{275} Kissinger, \textit{White House Years}, p.911. On December 12, in a public statement, Indian Prime Minister Gandhi already denied any territorial ambitions in West Pakistan. Van Hollen, “Tilt Policy in South Asia,” p.352. Dobrynin recalls that Kissinger privately acknowledged the importance of Soviet “assurance about India’s intentions” as the “breakthrough” in ending the war. Dobrynin, \textit{In Confidence}, p.238.
\textsuperscript{276} Memcon, Nixon and Pompidou, December 13, 1971, 4:00p.m., p.4, MemforP, ROM, Box 87, POF, WHCF, NPMS, NA.
\textsuperscript{277} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{278} Ibid.
recent events [the India-Pakistan conflicts].\textsuperscript{279} For his upcoming trip, Nixon was thus determined to exploit China's growing sense of fear of being surrounded by its major neighbouring states.

In the long term, it was China's potential strength that persuaded U.S. officials to pursue a new dialogue with her. Nixon assessed that "China is a reality."\textsuperscript{280} Nixon illustrated the China initiative as "the culmination of a long period of careful preparation," which originated in his \textit{Foreign Affairs} article of October 1967. Despite the difficulties posed by the U.S. treaty commitment to Taiwan, China's continued isolation "could no longer be tolerated. In ten years, China will be a great nuclear power and an incalculable danger to peace should it continue to be isolated from the world community."\textsuperscript{281} Finally, Nixon believed that his visit to Beijing would be "the opening of a channel of communication" with the PRC Government which had been "isolated" from the U.S. for a quarter of a century.\textsuperscript{282} It was on the basis of the above conviction that Nixon would take his trip to China in February 1972, as the following chapter examines.

\textsuperscript{279} Memcon, Nixon and Brandt, December 29, 1971, p.2, MemforP, ROM, Box 87, POF, WHCF, NPMS, NA.
\textsuperscript{280} Memcon, Nixon and Brandt, December 28, 1971, p.7, MemforP, ROM, Box 87, POF, WHCF, NPMS, NA.
\textsuperscript{281} Ibid., p.1.
\textsuperscript{282} Memcon, Nixon and Brandt, December 29, 1971, p.2, MemforP, ROM, Box 87, POF, WHCF, NPMS, NA.
Chapter 8. Nixon’s Trip to China in February 1972

This chapter investigates the major issues in Nixon’s trip to China in February 1972. First, it examines the final preparations for the summit, such as Haig’s advance trip to China in January 1972 and the NSC staff’s briefing books for the President. The main body of the chapter is devoted to the analysis of the Nixon-Mao talks and the Nixon-Zhou talks. Finally, this chapter assesses foreign reactions to the China trip and the briefings by Nixon and Kissinger on the trip to the Cabinet members and Congressional leaders.

1. Haig’s advance trip to China in January 1972

From January 3 to 10 1972, General Alexander Haig Jr., the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs of the United States, headed a delegation to China to make final technical arrangements for President Nixon’s visit to China. His main role was to play the role of Nixon’s “stand-in.” Although Haig’s two memoirs do not reveal substantial details, nor does he refer to any particular documents, Haig held intensive and substantive talks with Premier Zhou Enlai on such major issues as the Indochina conflicts, the India-Pakistan conflict, and the Taiwan question.

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1 The trip was arranged through the New York channel between NSC staff member Jonathan Howe and Chinese Ambassador to the UN Huang Hua. The White House wanted to “ensure” that this major foreign policy initiative would be “given full world-wide coverage.” Janka to Haig, “Official Media on China Trip,” December 23, 1971, China - HAK October 1971 visit, Box 1035, For the President's Files (FPF)-China/Vietnam Negotiations, National Security Council Files (NSCF), Nixon Presidential Materials Staff (NPMS), National Archives (NA).

2 For Haig’s accounts of the trip, see Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Caveat; Realism, Regan, and Foreign Policy (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1982), pp.201-202; Alexander M. Haig, Jr. with Charles McCarr, Inner Circles: How America Changed The World (New York: Warner Books, 1992), pp.258-266; Alexander Haig Jr., Interview Transcript, Nixon’s China Game, American Experience, PBS Online; and PBS, Correspondence with Komine, September 1, 2004. See also Kissinger, White House Years, pp.1049-1051.
On January 3, during his first talk with Zhou, Haig explained the U.S. assessment of the Soviet military threat. Referring to the India-Pakistan war of December 1971, Haig warned that the Soviet policy toward South Asia was “to keep the subcontinent divided.”\(^3\) Drawing from the record of Kissinger’s previous talks with Zhou, Haig also exaggerated that the Soviets were seeking to “encircle the PRC with unfriendly states.”\(^4\) Haig thus sought to make it clear that “the future viability of the PRC” was of the greatest interest to the U.S.\(^5\) In his cable to Kissinger, Haig suggested that the Chinese were still “sensitive” to Soviet criticism of U.S.-PRC “collusion.”\(^6\)

Haig also warned that the continuation of war in Indochina would “only give Moscow an opportunity to increase its influence in Hanoi.”\(^7\) As for Nixon’s visit, Haig claimed that it had to be successful “in fact and in appearance.”\(^8\) Finally, regarding the future of Taiwan, Haig re-affirmed Kissinger’s assurance for the “One China” principle, the prevention of Japanese entry, and the reduction of U.S. armed forces.\(^9\) Haig interpreted Zhou’s silence as approval.

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\(^4\) Ibid., p.3.

\(^5\) Ibid.


\(^7\) Ibid., p.4; and Cable from Haig to Kissinger, January 6, 1972, p.1. Haig originally anticipated that the Chinese would not push hard on Vietnam. For example, Haig reviewed the New China News Agency’s non-authoritative article of December 30, 1971, which denounced the U.S. Government for its “insolence and adventurism” in the twelve day bombing campaign against North Vietnam. The article, however, did not directly criticize the U.S. action, nor attack the President by name. By Wire, Richard T. Kennedy to Haig, December 31, 1971, “Peking Media on the U.S. Bombing of North Vietnam,” by Richard Solomon, December 31, 1971, China-HAK October 1971 visit, Box 1035, FPF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.

\(^8\) Ibid., p.7.

\(^9\) Ibid., p.8.
After the talk, Haig sent a cable to Kissinger, reporting his impression in rather optimistic terms. It was likely that the U.S. could achieve “some PRC movement on more positive expressions,” especially “some better language” on the Taiwan issue in the joint communique.10 Haig decided to refrain from discussing these issues further during his visit. He would only seek to assure the Chinese that the U.S. was prepared to make “positive suggestions” in February.11

On January 7, Zhou presented the Chinese reply, formally approved by Chairman Mao, to Haig’s previous statements.12 Zhou reiterated that the Chinese perceived the Soviet conclusion of a treaty of peace with India as, “friendship and cooperation in name,” but “a military alliance in substance.”13 Hence, by supporting the Indian armed aggression against Pakistan, the Soviets were continuously “contending for hegemony.”14 As for the U.S. policy in Indochina, Zhou criticized that the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam in December 1971 consequently increased the Soviet influence in Southeast Asia. Zhou insisted that it was Washington that was “insulting Hanoi” rather than the other way around.15

[12] On January 6, Zhou reported the issues in his first talk to Mao. In Chinese eyes, Haig appeared to be “excited and nervous.” Mao was unconvinced by Haig’s assessment of the Soviet threat. Mao viewed that not only the Soviets, but also South Asia, Indochina, Taiwan, the Philippines, and South Korea were all “surrounding” China. Regarding Nixon’s political standpoint, Mao claimed that the worst case would be that the visit itself was to be “cancelled.” “Haig’s Preparatory Mission for Nixon’s Visit to China in January 1972,” p.3, Diplomatic History Institute of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Xin zhaoguo wenjiao fengyun [New China’s Diplomatic Experience] (Beijing: Shijie shishi, 1991), Volume 3, pp.71-82, in William Burr (ed.), Negotiating U.S.-Chinese Rapprochement: New American and Chinese Documentation Leading Up to Nixon’s 1972 Trip, Electronic Briefing Book No. 70, NSA.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Ibid., p.3.\]
estimated that Chinese leaders would help the U.S. end the war in Vietnam on terms favorable to the United States and South Vietnam.\footnote{Haig, \textit{Inner Circles}, p.266.}

Zhou argued further that China was "a big country" but not yet "a very strong one."\footnote{Memcon, Haig and Zhou, January 7, 1972, 11:45p.m., p. 3, Haig-File, Haig China Trip File [Haig Advance Party, Dec.29, 1971 – Jan. 10, 1972], Box 1015, NSCF, NPMS, NA.} However, disagreeing with Haig’s description of China’s “future viability,” Zhou insisted that: “no country should ever rely on external forces to maintain its independence and viability.”\footnote{Ibid., p.4.} As for Haig’s reference to the importance of the “appearance” of Nixon’s visit, Zhou claimed that one’s image depended on his own “deeds” and expressed serious doubt about “self styled” attitude in public.\footnote{Ibid.}

Haig explained defensively that “the simple language of a soldier” might have been “misinterpreted.”\footnote{Ibid., p.6.} In particular, Haig argued that the U.S. would not unilaterally assume the role of “protector” or the “guarantor” of China’s viability, but China’s “viability and future health” were in the U.S.’s national interest.\footnote{Ibid., p.7.} Finally, Haig sought to defend that “popularity” was not the “criteria” for President Nixon’s decisions.\footnote{Ibid., p.8.}

In his report to Kissinger, Haig characterized the Chinese reply as “tough and polemic in tone” on Indochina and South Asia. Haig also noted that Zhou criticized that the U.S. assessment of Soviet “expansion” was in “error.”\footnote{Haig to Kissinger, January 8, 1972, p.2, Haig China Trip December 29, 1971 – January 10, 1971, Haig-File, Box 1015, NSCF, NPMS, NA.} Most importantly, Haig reported Zhou’s assurance that the Chinese would “do nothing to embarrass the
President during his trip.” Overall, Haig’s talks with Zhou played a crucial role in clarifying the respective sides’ view on the latest development of global and regional security issues. Finally, the two sides determined to leave the remaining differences to the February summit.

2. Final Preparations for the China Summit

2.1. The ‘Books’

From early January to mid February 1972, the NSC staff and the State Department prepared their respective briefing papers for Nixon’s presidential trip to China. Kissinger and his NSC Staff prepared the ‘Books’ - six black-ring notebooks including main briefing papers on major security issues between the U.S. and Chinese sides, such as Taiwan, Indochina, Japan, South Asia, and the Soviet Union. Since it was anticipated that the President’s conversations with the Chinese leaders would be very “lengthy and intensive,” these papers were “more detailed than usual,” arranged as follows:

- Chinese broad perceptions of the problem (including relevant background and what they would want);
- Issues and Talking Points (including the Chinese Position in specific terms, along the lines Zhou used with Kissinger; and Your Position, consistent with the line Kissinger used with Zhou); and
- The draft language of the joint communiqué.25

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24 Ibid., p.3. Solomon explains that Haig “warned the Chinese they should make Nixon look good” – if the Chinese “embarrassed or humiliated” the President, it would “hurt them and their problems with the Soviet Union.” Richard Solomon, Interview with Komine, September 24, 2003.
25 Kissinger to Nixon, “Briefing Papers for the China Trip,” February 8, 1972, Underline in original, Book V, The President, Briefing Papers for the China Trip, For the President’s Files (Winston Lord)-China Trip/Vietnam (FPF/Lord), Box 847, NSCF, NPMS, NA. The NSC staff considered that Nixon
The State Department’s ‘Books’ contained issues papers, which were considerably briefer but substantively consistent with the NSC briefing papers on subsidiary questions and background information. Kissinger also requested for the CIA to prepare background studies on the following subjects: 1) the philosophies and the present political roles of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai; 2) the internal political situation in the PRC; 3) the PRC’s approach to international affairs; and 4) the present state of Sino-Soviet relations. The CIA papers became the basis of the NSC staff’s briefing papers to the President.

2.2. Kissinger’s briefings to Nixon

In his detailed memos to Nixon, Kissinger stressed that the conversations with the Chinese leaders would be at a “far greater intensity and length” than any previous talks the President had previously conducted. In essence, the Chinese leaders would take a “very principled approach,” but within that framework they would be

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27 Kissinger to Helms, “Studies to be Prepared for the President’s Visit to the People’s Republic of China,” January 20, 1972, p.1, Box 501, China Trip-January 1972 [Part I], PTF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
"realistic." Thus, it was important for the President to demonstrate his grasp of the strategic outlines:

"Their main attention will be on the perspectives you paint. They will be primarily interested in your judgement of the future and the principles and reliability of your policy. Accordingly, one basic task is to get across to them that we can make certain moves they want in the future because it is in our own self-interest, and that we will make such moves in the future because we are reliable." 30

Kissinger also presented a detailed briefing on the Chinese leaders. Premier Zhou was "the tactician, the administrator, the negotiator, the master of details and the thrust and party." 31 Zhou would talk in "philosophic and historical" terms, but his main concern would be on "the concrete substantive issues." He could also be "extremely – and suddenly – tough," certainly directed by Mao. 32 Overall, one could "have a dialogue" with Zhou who was clearly "running China." 33

Relying on the NSC staff’s briefing information and the CIA background studies, Kissinger wrote that Chairman Mao was "the philosopher, the poet, the grand strategist, the inspirer, the romantic." Mao would set the "direction and the framework" and leave the negotiations to Zhou. He would want to talk about the

29 Ibid.
30 Ibid., p.3. Underline in original.
32 Ibid., p.6.
33 Kissinger to Nixon, “Mao, Chou and the Chinese Litmus Test,” February 19, 1972, p.4, Box, 13, China, HAK-ASF, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
"long view, the basic tides running in the world, where China and the US are heading, with each other and with others."34

Mao and Zhou had believed that "the U.S. has learned the hard way that it cannot manipulate political affairs in Asia to its own advantage."35 They would thus try to persuade that China constitutes no threat to the U.S.;36 Mao felt that "the other barbarians, the Russians and Japanese," were now "far more dangerous." Thus, he would "let the American barbarians come in briefly, just enough to offset the other dangers."37 Mao would "study our President's mind" and test the "degree of determination and shrewdness."38 Overall, as Solomon assesses, Nixon had "brought a lot of personal experiences" for the trip and was "making some assumptions about how Chairman Mao thought about politics."39

2.3. Nixon's handwritten notations

President Nixon reviewed the briefing material, memorizing his basic positions and taking extensive notes. The notes essentially show the development of Nixon's thoughts on the vital interests in U.S.-PRC relations.40 Former NSC staff member Winston Lord recalls that: "Nixon read every page, almost all of the briefing books

35 Kissinger to Nixon, "Your Meetings with Mao," February 15, 1972, p.3, Underline by Nixon in original, Book IV, The President, China Visit, Readings on Mao Tse-Tung and Chou En-lai, FPF/Lord, Box 847, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
36 Ibid., p.4. Underline by Nixon in original.
38 Ibid., p.9. Underline by Nixon in original.
40 Nixon preferred to talk without notes whenever possible in order to impress people. As for the published excerpts of the Nixon notes, see James H. Mann, About Face: A History of America's Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to Clinton (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1999), pp.13-15, and pp.40-49.
for his China trip. You can see him marking up almost every page. Even during the trip over in the plane [to China in February 1972], he sent them pages back, asking for additional information. Nixon’s handwritten notes on the cover page of the main ‘Books’ show his broad aim of the China trip:

We will play a role in Pacific.
We do not threaten anyone’s freedom – or peace.

China and America have unique opportunity to change the world –
Let us not miss it.

We were to write a new page in history
The world is watching.

We like you believe in honesty
We have had differences
We will continue to have –
Let’s talk about what brings us together

Nixon perceived his trip as a “major turning point” in U.S.-PRC relations hoping that “our discussions this week will lay the foundation for a new and enduring relationship.” He also recognized the depth of the remaining perception gap between the two sides regarding their respective world outlooks. Thus, while reviewing the briefing books on February 15, Nixon wrote:

Understanding of difference is worth achieving –

We must be honourable – (to our friends) or our friendship is worthless to new friends –
We don’t ask them to give up their ideology or their friends

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42 Nixon’s handwritten notations on the cover page, Book V, The President, Briefing Papers for the China Trip, FPF/Lord, Box 847, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
43 Plenary Opening Statement, p.1, Underline by Nixon in original, Book V, The President, Briefing Papers for the China Trip, FPF/Lord, Box 847, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
They must not ask us to do so.44

During a stopover in Hawaii on February 18, Nixon wrote his positions for negotiating with Chairman Mao:

Trust him (as emperor)

1. Don't quarrell [sic]
2. Don't praise him (too much)
3. Praise the people – art, ancient
4. Praise poems.
5. Love of country –45

We will make moves in our self interest can because we are reliable –
We’ll tell you nothing if I can’t Prudence, Will do more than say46

Be strong so that they respect you –47

Nixon also wrote his thoughts on the vital issues in U.S.-PRC rapprochement as follows:

What they want:

1. Build up their world credentials –
2. Taiwan
3. Get U.S. out of Asia –
What we want:

1. Indo China (?)
2. Communication – To restrain Chinese expansion in Asia –
3. In Future - Reduce threat of confrontation by Chinese Super Power

What we both want

1. Reduce danger of confrontation + conflict
2. A more stable Asia –
3. A restraint on U.S.S.R.  

On February 21, prior to his arrival on the Chinese mainland, Nixon again wrote on Chinese interests:

What do you want?

You must think of your security
1. Soviet – present threat
2. Japan – future
3. India – an irritation (except of built by Soviet)
4. Peace – but a need to retain your principle –

How can we work together?

Your opponents are ours –
Taiwan – V.nam [Vietnam] are irritants –

With these respective vital national interests in mind, Nixon prepared his negotiating positions with the Chinese leaders.

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48 Ibid.
49 Nixon's handwritten notations, February 21, 1972, p.15, China Notes, Alpha/Subject File, Box 7, PPF, WHSF, NPMS, NA.
3. Nixon’s presidential trip to China in February 1972

3.1. The Nixon-Mao talks

On February 21, 1972, President Nixon arrived at the Beijing airport where the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai welcomed the historic arrival. The handshake between the two leaders sparked the public spectacle of the summit to “mark the end of a generation of hostility” and to “begin a new but still undefined” relationship between the most powerful and most populous nations in the world.50

After the arrival ceremony, Zhou visited official U.S. guest-house and informed Kissinger that Mao was “inviting” Nixon to hold a meeting “fairly soon.”51 Until that time, Nixon and Kissinger were not entirely sure whether the Chairman would meet with the President.52

Lord recalls that Mao and Zhou were “extremely charismatic figures” who had a “broad worldview which concerned strategic and long-term interests.”53 The Chinese understanding of the nature of the international situation from the late 1960s to the

50 “Nixon Arrives in Peking to Begin an 8-Day Visit; Met By Chou at Airport,” The New York Times, February 21, 1972. The trip was heavily televised, creating tremendous impact in America, leading to instant euphoria.
51 Memcon, Kissinger and Zhou, February 21, 1972, 2:30-2:40p.m., p.1, Dr. Kissinger’s Meetings in the People’s Republic During the Presidential Visit February 1972, Box 92, Country Files (CF)-Far East, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA. From the U.S. side, only the President, Kissinger, and a NSC staff member Winston Lord attended the meeting with Mao. Kissinger told Zhou: “We won’t tell him [Secretary of State William Rogers]. We can announce it a little later.” Ibid. On February 29, 1972, President stated to the Congressional leaders that there was some “nonsense” that Kissinger’s attendance “downgraded the Secretary of State.” Nixon explained that in the Chinese system, the Foreign Minister was fifth ranking in protocol, and if the President had brought in the Secretary of State, they would have had to bring in five additional Chinese. “Meeting with Bipartisan Leadership, February 29, 1972, 10:00a.m. The Cabinet Room,” p.2, Memoranda for the President (MemforP), Records of Meetings (ROM), Box 88, POF, WHCF, NPMS, NA.
52 Soon after the Nixon-Mao talk, Kissinger admitted to Zhou that: “I did not know we were going to see the Chairman today. I was going to raise this problem with you. It is not right for the President to wait until he is summoned to see the Chairman.” Memcon, Kissinger and Zhou, February 21, 1972, 4:15-5:30p.m., p.9, Dr. Kissinger’s Meetings in the People’s Republic During the Presidential Visit February 1972, CF-Far East, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA. On the other hand, State Department officials worked out a plan to minimize damage if Mao decided not to grant an audience. See Walter Isaacson, Kissinger: A Biography (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1992), pp.400-401.
early 1970s "was remarkably sophisticated." Lord also assesses that Mao and Zhou had a "very good grasp of geopolitics and they understood what they needed." On the other hand, as Solomon recalls, the elderly Chinese were shocked by the Nixon party in "how young they all were, may have made them feel uneasy, made them feel like old guys, dealing with these young Americans."\(^{54}\)

The Mao-Nixon meeting, originally planned for fifteen minutes, turned out to be more than an hour-long talk which set the fundamental direction of the following negotiations that took place between the two sides at a various official levels.\(^{55}\) Nixon emphasized the importance of strict secrecy in the confidential talk at the highest official level, assuring that "nothing goes beyond this room."\(^{56}\) Nixon then sought to illustrate the great forces in Asia:

We, for example, must ask ourselves... why the Soviets have more forces on the border facing you than on the border facing Western Europe. We must ask ourselves, what is the future of Japan? ...[I]s it better for Japan to be neutral, totally defenseless, or is it better for a time for Japan to have some relations with the United States? The point being – I am talking now in the realm of philosophy – in international relations there are no good choices. One thing is sure – we can leave no vacuums, because they can be filled. ...The question is which danger the People’s Republic faces, whether it is danger of American aggression or Soviet aggression.\(^{57}\)

\(^{54}\) Solomon, Interview with Komine, September 24, 2003.


\(^{56}\) Memcon 21 Feb. 1972, p.5. The Nixon-Mao talk was interpreted by Chinese interpreter T’ang Wen-sheng (also known as Nancy Tang, born in Brooklyn, New York, and emigrated to China in 1955), and NSC staff member Winston Lord attended as a note-taker.

\(^{57}\) Ibid, p.6. In his description of the Nixon-Mao talk, Kissinger misleadingly quotes Mao’s statements which supported in postponing the resolution of the Taiwan issue. Kissinger, \textit{White House Years}, p.1062. Mao’s statements were made in February and November 1973 and October 1975, not in February 1972.
In essence, Nixon was justifying the U.S. presence in Asia by urging the Chinese leaders to re-assess the degree of threat from each superpower. In response, Mao outlined the fundamental change between the two sides that materialized in the rapprochement:

At the present time, the question of aggression from the United States or aggression from China is relatively small; that is, it could be said that this is not a major issue, because the present situation is one in which a state of war does not exist between our two countries. You want to withdraw some of your troops back on your soil; ours do not go abroad.58

It was the mutual realization of the reduction of direct threat that motivated both sides to initiate direct talks in this particular period.

President Nixon: ...I think you know the United States had no territorial designs on China. We know China doesn’t want to dominate the United States. We believe you too realize the United States doesn’t want to dominate the world. ...Therefore, we can find common ground, despite our differences, to build a world structure in which both can be safe to develop in our own ways on our own roads. That cannot be said about some other nations in the world.

Chairman Mao: Neither do we threaten Japan or South Korea.

President Nixon: Nor any country. Nor do we.59

58 Ibid., pp.6-7.
59 Ibid., p.8.
In essence, the above exchanges established the broad framework for the Nixon-Zhou talks that followed. The United States and China would not impose direct threats or territorial ambition against each other. Therefore, this mutual understanding would promote the partial reduction of the U.S. armed forces originally directed at containing China, and in turn encouraged China’s tacit admission of the U.S. military presence in Western Pacific region. Finally, the media described Nixon’s meeting with Mao as “frank and serious” and as “the highlight of the week.”

3.2. The Nixon-Zhou talks

Following the Nixon-Mao meeting, the two sides held discussions at various official levels. The plenary session indicated the general direction of the summit and arranged for 1) a restricted principal talk between Nixon and Zhou on a wide range of major issues and 2) an assisting talk between Secretary of State William Rogers and Chinese Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei on a series of steps to promote bilateral relations, such as trade, scientific and other exchanges. The drafting of the joint communique was conducted between Zhou and Kissinger and between Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Ch’iao Kuan-hua (Qiao Guanhua) and Kissinger. Finally,

61 CHINA – President’s Talks with Mao & Chou En-lai February 1972, CF-Far East, NSCF, NPMS, NA. See also Nixon, RN, pp.564-579; and Kissinger, White House Years, pp.1070-1087. Among U.S. officials, also present were Kissinger, Lord, and Holdridge.
62 MemCons Between Secretary Rogers and PRC Officials, POL Chicom, 1970-73, Box 2699, Subject-Numeric Files (SNF), General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59 (STATE-RG59), NA. Among U.S. officials, also present were Marshall Green, John Scali, Ron Ziegler, Alfred le S. Jenkins, Charles W. Freeman Jr., and Commander John Howe (NSC staff).
63 Dr. Kissinger’s Meetings in the People’s Republic During the Presidential Visit February 1972, CF-Far East, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
Nixon reiterated to Zhou the importance of the preservation of secrecy. Hereafter, this study examines the five major security issues, such as Taiwan, Indochina, Japan, India-Pakistan relations, and the Soviet Union.

3.2.1. The Taiwan issue

As President Nixon wrote before the departure for China, the Taiwan issue remained the “most crucial” issue between the two sides. While reviewing the briefing books, Nixon was fully aware that Taiwan would be “the first item” on the Chinese agenda which would require him to “show flexibility in addressing it.” It was crucial for him to find a way to put the issue aside: “Neither of us should allow the Taiwan issue to color unduly our developing relationship (Taiwan will be settled).” At the beginning of the first restricted talk, Nixon proposed the so-called ‘five principles’:

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64 Nixon assured Zhou that only five individuals (namely the President himself, Kissinger, Winston Lord, John Holdridge, and General Haig) would see the transcripts of their talks. Memorandum of conversation, February 22, 1972, 2:10-6:00p.m. (hereafter referred to as Memcon 22 Feb. 1972), p.3-4, CHINA – President’s Talks with Mao & Chou En-lai February 1972, CF-Far East, NSCF, NPMS, NA. Two Chinese interpreters, T’ang Wen-sheng and Chi Chao-chu interpreted the Nixon-Zhou talks. Kissinger arranged interpretation with Zhou in advance: “We will not use our interpreters but will rely on your interpreters. We will tell the press that we have Mr. Holdridge there to check on your interpreter.” Memcon, Kissinger and Zhou, February 21, 1972, 4:15-5:30p.m., p.2, Dr. Kissinger’s Meetings in the People’s Republic During the Presidential Visit February 1972, CF-Far East, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA. Nixon later explained to Congressional leaders that Premier Zhou must have understood English because he “corrected the translator many times.” Holdridge told the President that it was a disadvantage for the U.S. side because every time the President spoke, while the translator translated it into Chinese, Zhou “had a great deal of time to think about his response.” “Meeting with Bipartisan Leadership February 29, 1972, 10:00a.m. The Cabinet Room, pp.3-4, MemforP, ROM, Box 88, POF, WHCF, NPMS, NA.

65 Nixon’s handwritten notations, February 15, 1972, p.2, China Notes, Alpha/Subject File, Box 7, PPF, WHSF, NPMS, NA.

66 Taiwan, p.3, Underline by Nixon in original, Book V, The President, Briefing Papers for the China Trip, PPF/Lord, Box 847, NSCF, NPMS, NA.

Principle one. There is one China, and Taiwan is a part of China. There will be no more statements made – if I can control our bureaucracy – to the effect that the status of Taiwan is undermined.

Second, we have not and will not support the Taiwan independence movement.

Third, we will, to the extent we are able, use our influence to discourage Japan from moving into Taiwan as our presence becomes less, and also discourage Japan from supporting a Taiwan independence movement.

The fourth point is that we will support any peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue that can be worked out. And related to that point, we will not support any military attempts by the Government on Taiwan to resort to a military return to the Mainland.

Finally, we seek the normalization of relations with the People’s Republic. 68

These five principles, especially the ‘One China’ premise was the central assurance for the Chinese in proceeding in the Sino-U.S. normalization process. In addition, viewing Taiwan as “an irritant” and as having “a high emotional content,” Nixon referred to the technical aspect of “language” for public presentation. 69 It was a question of the U.S. domestic political situation, because there was a possibility that the critics might “gang up” and create “a danger to the whole initiative.” 70 Thus,

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68 Memcon 22 Feb. 1972, p.5; and Taiwan, pp.4-5, Book V. Nixon’s opening statement on the Taiwan issue was a crucial pre-condition for the Chinese to improve Sino-U.S. diplomatic relations. While reviewing briefing books, Nixon wrote:

I restate what our policy is:
1. Status
   One China, Taiwan is part of China –
2. Won’t support Taiwan independence move
3. Try to restrain Japan –
4. Support peaceful resolution
5. Discuss –
   Will seek normalization

Nixon’s handwritten notations, February 21, 1972, p.16, Underline by Nixon in original, China Notes, Alpha/Subject File, Box 7, PPF, WHSF, NPMS, NA.


70 Ibid., p.7.
Nixon and Zhou decided to have some flexible “running room” which would reflect the remaining differences between the two sides in the joint communiqué.\(^{71}\)

Regarding the methods of resolving the Taiwan issue, Nixon sought to clarify the U.S. long-term position that Taiwan should be settled peacefully.\(^ {72}\) Nixon wrote the negotiating position:

> You must not listen to what I say. You must watch what I do. Coming to Peking has itself created a new reality. ...We want a peaceful resolution.\(^ {73}\)

As for the timetable, Nixon wrote: “Age: My life is 10 months or 5 years – then done – I have little time and will do it.”\(^ {74}\) “Want RN reelected – ...Direction – must be pointed out –[.]”\(^ {75}\)

Hence, Nixon suggested to Zhou that the two sides should refrain from making Taiwan “a big issue” in the next two or three years which implied his second term in office.\(^ {76}\) Moreover, it was essential for the Nixon administration to “sell” the promotion of the U.S. withdrawal from Taiwan “as step by step” to Congress, while persuading the public of the importance of normalization with the People’s Republic.\(^ {77}\)

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\(^{71}\) Memorandum of conversation, February 24, 1972, 5:15 - 8:05 p.m. (hereafter referred to as Memcon 24 Feb. 1972), p.10. Underline in original.

\(^{72}\) Taiwan, p.7, Book V. Underline by Nixon in original.

\(^{73}\) Nixon’s handwritten notations, in Ibid., p.8. Underline by Nixon in original.

\(^{74}\) Nixon’s handwritten notations, February 21, 1972, p.16, China Notes, Alpha/Subject File, Box 7, PPF, WHSF, NPMS, NA. Nixon referred to his presidential terms.

\(^{75}\) Nixon’s handwritten notations, February 24, 1972, China, Speech Files, Box 73, China Trip, PPF, WHSF, NPMS, NA.

\(^{76}\) Memcon 24 Feb. 1972, p.10.

\(^{77}\) Ibid., p.12.
In response, Zhou made it clear that "[w]hile your armed forces are there our armed forces will not engage in military confrontation with your armed forces." However, Zhou emphasized that China would still treat Taiwan as an "internal issue" and "liberate" it in its own way. Thus, Zhou did not make any further commitment: "we would rather let the question of Taiwan wait for a little while."

Regarding the U.S.'s withdrawal from Asia, Nixon sought to link the reduction of U.S. armed forces in Taiwan and the promotion of the Vietnam settlement. He wrote his calculation:

Taiwan – V. Nam [Vietnam] = trade off
1. Your expect action on Taiwan
2. Our people expect action on V. Nam
3. Neither can act immediately
   But both are inevitable – Let us not embarrass each other

In direct talks, Nixon gave assurance to Zhou that:

[T]wo-thirds of our present forces on Taiwan are related to the support of our forces in Southeast Asia. These forces, regardless of what we may do will be removed as the situation in Southeast Asia is resolved.

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80 Ibid.
81 Nixon’s handwritten notations, February 23, 1972, 6a.m., p.17, China Notes, Alpha/Subject File, Box 7, PPF, WHSF, NPMS, NA. Garver interprets that the Chinese leaders were hoping to drive a wedge between Washington and Taipei by opening to the United States. John W. Garver, The Sino-American Alliance: Nationalist China and American Cold War Strategy (New York: An East Gate Book: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1997), p.274.
82 Memcon 22 Feb. 1972, pp.5-6.
Finally, Nixon assured that once the military operation in Vietnam was completed, the U.S. could reduce its "other forces"—"the remaining one-third."

On February 26, Secretary of State Rogers and Assistant Secretary Green were given the opportunity to read the communique approved by Nixon and Kissinger, and also the by Chinese Politburo. Importantly, Green immediately detected "a major flaw" in the draft. First, while the communique stated that "all people" on either side of the Straits regarded Taiwan as part of China, Green objected to the word "people." He maintained that the inhabitants of Taiwan, who looked at the island as their home regardless of their ancestors' origin in China, and who regarded themselves as "Taiwanese," would not necessarily agree that Taiwan was a part of China. Accordingly, Kissinger proposed to re-negotiate with Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua (Qiao Guanhua) to change the term "people" to "Chinese."

Second, the draft communique reaffirmed the continuation of the U.S. security commitment to its Asian allies such as Japan, South Korea, South Vietnam, the Philippines, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), and the Australia-New Zealand-US treaty (ANZUS). Yet, it did not mention America's treaty obligation to

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85 Ibid.
86 Memcon, Kissinger and Ch'iao Kuan-hua, February 26-27, 1972, 10:20-1:40a.m., pp.2-3, Dr. Kissinger's Meetings in the People's Republic During the Presidential Visit February 1972, CF-Far East, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA. However, Kissinger dropped Green's suggestion to change 'all Chinese' to 'the Chinese.'
the Republic of China on Taiwan. Green estimated that this omission would almost certainly be seized by the opposition to the U.S.-PRC summit, especially the U.S. domestic critics charging the Nixon trip as unilaterally terminating the treaty obligation and “selling out” the Chinese Nationalists. It also posed a serious question for U.S. reliability in terms of its willingness and capability to fulfil treaty obligations to its allies. As Kissinger told Ch’iao, ‘every other ally in the Pacific will say “what about us?”’ After intense exchanges, they finally agreed to remove that particular section on defense treaty from the communique. On February 27, in a news conference in Shanghai, Kissinger orally re-confirmed the U.S. commitment toward the Republic of China.

Regarding strict secrecy, Lord recalls that: “We could have had more expertise. ...I think it would have been worth running that risk.” Lord also admits that: “I still feel it would have been useful to have State there in dealing with the Chinese, and also it would have been much less messy at the end, where the State Department had to climb in on the communique at the last minute, for bureaucratic support.”

In the final version of the joint communique, China reiterated its long-term vital interest in the sovereignty over Taiwan:

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87 Green, *Evolution of U.S.-China Policy*, Oral History Interview, pp.37-38, FAOHC. Green recalls further that this omission of any reference to a treaty obligation toward Taiwan reminded him of former Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s failure in the early 1950. Acheson, defining the “defensive perimeter” for the United States ranging from the Ryukyu islands in Western Pacific to the Philippines in Southeast Asia, did not include South Korea, and thus might have induced the North Korean launching of the Korean War. Ibid.

88 Memcon, Kissinger and Ch’iao, February 26 to 27, 1972, p.3. Ch’iao reacted furiously to Kissinger’s proposals: “the sentiments of all Chinese are very strong on the Taiwan question. I am restraining myself to the utmost. ...If you have to persist in this, let us not continue tonight.” Ibid., p.10.

89 Kissinger prepared a statement as follows: "we are here on the soil of a country with which we have no diplomatic relations and for which this is the most sensitive issue. Therefore do not keep asking this question. I will answer it once. We stated in the World Report our position on this, and the statement in the World Report remains intact. Then when the President goes back to Congress he will have to answer it again.” Ibid., p.11.


91 Ibid., p.45.
[T]he Government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government of China; Taiwan is a province of China which has long been returned to the motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China’s internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere; and all U.S. forces and military installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan. The Chinese Government firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creation of “one China, one Taiwan,” “one China, two governments,” “two Chinas,” and “independent Taiwan,” or advocate that “the status of Taiwan remain to be determined.”

In response, the U.S. declared:

The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objectives of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces as the tension in the area diminishes.

After the summit, a China expert in the NSC staff, Richard Solomon, conducted a detailed comparative analysis of the English and Chinese versions of the joint communique. First, while the English version “acknowledges” “the legitimacy of Chinese declaration that Taiwan is part of China,” the Chinese version conveyed that the U.S. “understands [is aware]” that both Chinese states maintained this position.

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93 Ibid.
94 Solomon to Kissinger, “Comparison of the Chinese and English Versions of the Sino-American Joint Communiqué,” March 17, 1972, p.1, Underline in original, Box 501, China Trip – February-March
Moreover, the Chinese version’s use of a verb “understands” [jen-shih-tao] would imply diplomatic recognition [ch’eng-jen] or acceptance of the other side’s point of view.  

Second, the English statement that the U.S. “does not challenge” the Chinese position acquired an “even more hands-off implication” in the Chinese version. It implied a degree of involvement in the issue – “does not raise a divergent opinion [an objection].” The Chinese version thus could mean that the U.S. “does not wish to get involved in a dispute over the matter.”

Third, where the English version “reaffirms” the U.S. “interest” in a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question, the Chinese phrase was better translated as “reiterate its concern” with a peaceful solution on the U.S. part. The likelihood of peaceful solution was thus stronger in the Chinese language version. Overall, each side interpreted the implications of the communique for its own advantage.

Regarding the U.S. partial withdrawal, the U.S. statement, ‘as the tension in the area diminishes’ implied the final reassurance of the linkage between the U.S. withdrawal from Taiwan and the progress of Vietnamization. In other words, the U.S. would withdraw from Taiwan as the tension in the region eased with its military disengagement from the Vietnam War. One of the major purposes of the communique for the U.S., and especially for Kissinger, was “to put off the issue of Taiwan for the future.” Thus, the U.S. statement was an indication of ‘One China, but not now.’

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1972 [Part 2], PTF, NSCF, NPMS, NA. On March 20, Kissinger transmitted a brief summary of Solomon’s detailed memo to the President.

95 Ibid.

96 Ibid. Underline in original.

97 Ibid., p.2. Underline in original.

98 Kissinger, White House Years, p.1074.
3.2.2. Conflicts in Indochina

As President Nixon’s comments on a yellow pad indicate, the conflicts in Indochina were the “most urgent” issue between the two sides.\(^9^9\) While preparing for his trip to China, Nixon outlined his negotiating positions.

V. Nam:

1. We are ending our involvement.
2. We had hoped you would help – but now it doesn’t matter  
   (Our lost offer – It doesn’t matter to us –)\(^1^0^0\)
   1. We must end it honorably – it will –
   2. S.V. Nam is stronger than you think –

You can’t be expected to do anything – Soviet would accuse you of colluding.
But it is in your interests for U.S. to get out (2/3 of Taiwan)
It is in Soviet interests for U.S. to stay\(^1^0^1\)

Regarding the promotion of Vietnamization, Nixon was seriously concerned about the question of U.S. reliability for its allies in the world. While preparing for the talks with Zhou, Nixon wrote:

\(^9^9\) Nixon’s handwritten notations, February 15, 1972, p.2, China Notes, Alpha/Subject File, Box 7, PPF, WHSF, NPMS, NA.
\(^1^0^0\) Ibid., p.4. On January 30, the Chinese replied to Kissinger’s message (dated on January 26) via Paris showing its continuing support for North Vietnamese and refusing to “exert pressure” on Hanoi on the behalf of Washington. On February 6, 1972, through the Paris backchannel, Nixon and Kissinger asked China to arrange a meeting with the North Vietnamese on Chinese soil during the Nixon visit. China refused to arrange a meeting with Le Duc Tho. Memo from Walters to Haig, February 16, 1972, Box 330, Policy Planning Staff, (Director’s File – Winston Lord), General Record of the Department of State, Record Group 59, NA. Tyler interprets that while asking the Chinese to help convince Hanoi to come to acceptable terms, Nixon was determined to get a breakthrough at almost any cost and as early as possible in the presidential campaign season. Patrick E. Tyler, \textit{A Great Wall: Six Presidents and China, An Investigative History} (New York: Public Affairs, 1999), pp.125-126.
\(^1^0^1\) Ibid.
Should take bold action in V. Nam –
Or others will benefit – 102

Accordingly, Nixon explained to Zhou that: “if the U.S. does not behave honorably, the U.S. would cease to be a nation as a friend and which the people of the world could depend upon as an ally.” 103 Nixon believed that the U.S. should “react strongly if tested.” 104 Finally, Nixon clarified that the U.S. would never intend to “engage in unilateral withdrawal without accomplishing the objectives of our policy there.” 105

On the other hand, believing that the Vietnam problem should no longer be the division line between Washington and Beijing, Nixon wrote his comments on the NSC briefing book: “Reduces irritant to our relations” 106 Thus, Nixon gave assurance to Zhou:

I am removing this irritant as fast as anyone in my position could. My predecessor sent in 500,000 men into Vietnam, and I’ve taken 500,000 out. I will end American involvement – it’s a matter of time. I can speak with certainty on this point. 107

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102 Nixon’s handwritten notations, February 22, 1972, China, Speech Files, Box 72, China Trip, PPF, WHSF, NPMS, NA.
106 Indochina-Vietnam, p.11, Book V.
107 Memcon 22 Feb. 1972, p.27.
Accordingly, Nixon stated further that: "you have no reason to believe that we have territorial designs in Southeast Asia."\(^{108}\)

As for China's influence in Indochina, Nixon underlined the following specific points in the NSC briefing book:

\textbf{The U.S. has recently been suggesting that the PRC exert pressure on its allies.} (We don’t ask –)\(^{109}\)

\textbf{We would thus welcome Peking's constructive attitude.} (But do not expect)\(^{110}\)

Nixon also wrote his comments on the yellow pad:

\begin{quote}
We would appreciate influence on Hanoi.  
We think it is in your interest  
But if you can't, we understand  
We shall chart our own course.\(^{111}\)
\end{quote}

Hence, Nixon was fully aware that there would be no agreed upon statement on the conflicts in Indochina. During the talk on February 22, while still maintaining "hopes," Nixon made it clear that he had "no illusions" about the promotion of a

\(^{108}\) Ibid., p.28.  
\(^{110}\) Ibid., p.11. Underline by Nixon in original. Nixon's handwritten notations in parentheses.  
\(^{111}\) Nixon's handwritten notations, Indochina-Vietnam, Point to Emphasize, p.2, Book V-a, The President, Briefing Papers for the China Trip, FPF/Lord, Box 847, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
Vietnam settlement during his stay in Beijing: "I don’t ask the Prime Minister to do anything about it, and certainly not do anything about it publicly."¹¹²

Regarding the danger of North Vietnamese expansion, while reviewing the NSC briefing books, Nixon underlined that the Chinese would “not want to see Hanoi control all of Indochina.”¹¹³ The NSC staff estimated that Beijing had no desire to see an “overwhelming North Vietnamese victory” in Laos and Cambodia.¹¹⁴ Nixon wrote his comments on the NSC briefing book:

N.V.nam presence in Cambodia + Laos would mean expanded Soviet influence.

All alien influence should be removed –

Neutrality + non alignment our policy –¹¹⁵

In direct talks, Zhou repeatedly urged an earlier completion of the U.S. military withdrawal from Indochina: “you went there by accident. Why not give this up?.... It would be beneficial for the relaxation of tensions in the Far East to bring about a nonaligned Southeast Asia.”¹¹⁶ Thus, Zhou expressed China’s continuing support for all Indochina states, “but we will not get involved unless, of course, you attack us.”¹¹⁷ Moreover, Zhou clarified that China only had an obligation to assist them but not the right to engage in negotiation on their behalf, for it respected “their sovereignty and

¹¹³ Indochina-Vietnam, p.1, Book V, The President, Briefing Papers for the China Trip, FPF/Lord, Box 847, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
¹¹⁴ Indochina: Laos and Cambodia, p.3, Book V, The President, Briefing Papers for the China Trip, FPF/Lord, Box 847, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
¹¹⁵ Nixon’s handwritten notations, Ibid.
¹¹⁷ Ibid., p.29.
independence." Finally, Zhou stressed that China had "exerted great restraints" in Indochina since July 1971.

Regarding the Soviet expansionism in Indochina, Nixon wrote his comments on the NSC briefing book: "Reduces Soviet hand there." Nixon was thus seeking to enhance China's understanding of the U.S. search for a negotiated settlement in Indochina by stressing the Soviet threat. During the direct talks, Nixon estimated that the Soviets expected the U.S. to be "tied down" in Indochina, and consequently increased their influence on North Vietnam to be "the only gainer" from the prolonged U.S. military operation. On the other hand, Zhou urged that the United States should "take more bold action" because the delay of the U.S. military withdrawal was likely to "facilitate the Soviets in furthering their influences." In other words, the longer the U.S. stayed, the more difficulty it would bring for the satisfactory completion of its military withdrawal from Indochina.

Finally, Nixon anticipated how his domestic political opponents would criticize the outcomes of his trip:

Obviously what will be said, even with a skilful communique, is what the People's Republic of China wanted from us was movement on Taiwan and it got it; and what we wanted was help on Vietnam, and we got nothing.
Nixon expressed appreciation to Zhou that China would “not try to discourage the North Vietnamese from negotiating.”\textsuperscript{124} In the joint communiqué, the U.S. side stated: “the peoples in Indochina should be allowed to determine their destiny without outside intervention; its constant objective has been a negotiated solution.”\textsuperscript{125} In the “absence of a negotiated settlement,” the United States “envisages the ultimate withdrawal of all U.S. forces from the region consistent with the aim of self-determination for each country of Indochina.”\textsuperscript{126} On the other hand, with a strong opposition to “foreign aggression, interference and subversion,” the Chinese side expressed “its firm support to the peoples of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia” in their continual efforts to achieve “freedom and liberation.”\textsuperscript{127} Lord assesses that the U.S. rapprochement with China “generally helped to provide stability in Asia and the Pacific region. It was of some help on Vietnam.”\textsuperscript{128} In reality, however, it took another eleven months for the United States to achieve the Paris Peace Accords with the North Vietnamese, which took place on January 13, 1973.

### 3.2.3. Japan’s future role

The NSC staff’s briefing book explained that the Chinese traditionally had both “hated and feared the Japanese.”\textsuperscript{129} Thus, the Chinese would not want to “push Japan in the direction of a heavily-armed neutralism (including nuclear weapons) outside China’s ability to control.” The NSC staff recommended that the President should

\textsuperscript{124} Ibid., p.24.  
\textsuperscript{126} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{127} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{128} Lord, Interview with Komine, October 15, 2003.  
\textsuperscript{129} Japan, p.1, Underline by Nixon in original, Book V, The President, Briefing Papers for the China Trip, FPF/Lord, Box 847, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
“focus the Chinese attention on this possibility and on the countervailing.” Nixon thus sought to exploit China’s long-term fear of Japan’s possible move in the future. Nixon wrote specific instructions to Kissinger:

K – Japan –
Don’t say “we oppose rearmament of Japan.”
We oppose nuclear Japan

Nixon further outlined his negotiating positions:

Japan ready for take off commercially
Best to provide nuclear shield –
1. To keep Japan from building its own.
2. To have influence from US.
   (1) We oppose Japan “stretching its hands” to Korea, Taiwan, Indochina –
   (2) But if we don’t keep a truly our recommendation would be like “empty
cannon.”
Wild horse would not be controlled.

Regarding the anticipated Chinese position, Nixon wrote: “You prefer neutral – (you
should say it)[.]” Nixon was aware that discussions on the Japan issue would be
“very difficult.”

Ibid., p.4. Underline by Nixon in original.
131 Nixon’s handwritten notations, February 18, 1972, p.8, Quotation marks in original, China Notes, Alpha/Subject File, Box 7, PPF, WHSF, NPMS, NA. The NSC staff originally recommended the following point that: “We oppose a rearmed Japan particularly with nuclear weapon. Nixon erased “particularly with nuclear weapon” and added “nuclear” in front of “rearmed.” Japan, p.6, Book V. Underline by Nixon in original.
132 Ibid., p.10, Quotation marks in original.
133 Nixon’s handwritten notations, February 21, 1972, p.16, China Notes, Alpha/Subject File, Box 7, PPF, WHSF, NPMS, NA.
134 Ibid.
During the direct talks with Zhou, Nixon sought to justify the US-Japan Security Treaty by re-emphasizing the danger of U.S. withdrawal from East Asia:

The U.S. can get out of Japanese waters, but others will fish there. And both China and the U.S. have had very difficult experiences with Japanese militarism... The Japanese, with their enormously productive economy, their great natural drive and their memories of the war they lost, could well turn toward building their own defenses in the event that the U.S. guarantee were removed. That's why I say that where Taiwan is concerned, and I would add where Korea is concerned, the U.S. policy is opposed to Japan moving in as the U.S. moves out, but we cannot guarantee that. And if we had no defense arrangement with Japan, we would have no influence where that is concerned.\[^135\]

In essence, as Nixon wrote, "It is a U.S. Japan policy with a U.S. veto."\[^136\] On the other hand, as the NSC suggested, "[i]f Japan feels abandoned, it could follow a much more dangerous course."\[^137\] There were basically two possible directions for Japan, either toward China or toward the Soviet Union "for nuclear protection."\[^138\] During the direct talks, Nixon thus explained the essential implications of the U.S. role in East Asia as: "the U.S. will use its influence with Japan and those other countries where we have a defense relationship or provide economic assistance, to discourage policies which would be detrimental to China."\[^139\] Thus, Nixon sought to persuade

\[^{136}\]: Nixon's handwritten notations, February 15, 1972, p.5, China Notes, Alpha/Subject File, Box 7, PPF, WHSF, NPMS, NA.
\[^{137}\]: Japan, Points to Emphasize, p.1, Underline by Nixon in original, Book V-a, The President, Briefing Papers for the China Trip, FPF/Lord, Box 847, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
\[^{138}\]: Nixon's handwritten notations, February 15, 1972, p.5, China Notes, Alpha/Subject File, Box 7, PPF, WHSF, NPMS, NA.
Zhou for the continuation of the U.S. military presence, as he wrote: "Our friendship with Japan is in your interests – not against."\(^{140}\)

Premier Zhou estimated that Japan, as an emerging economic great power, was "at the crossroads." Zhou thus warned: "Since their development has been at such a great rate the result is bound to be expansion abroad. Expanding in such a great way as they are toward foreign lands, the inevitable result will be military expansion."\(^{141}\) Moreover, Zhou insisted that once reaching "a certain point," Japan would "cease listening to" the U.S. and begin to pursue its own path.\(^{142}\) In response, Nixon gave assurance that the U.S. policy was, to the extent possible, to "restrain the Japanese from going from economic expansion to military expansion."\(^{143}\)

Regarding Beijing's diplomatic relations with Tokyo, Zhou emphasized the remaining historical antagonism and "a state of war" between China and Japan.\(^{144}\) However, Zhou also hinted that: "if China and Japan are able to restore diplomatic relations, Chinese-Japanese friendship [sic] should not hurt the relations between Japan and the United States."\(^{145}\)

\(^{140}\) Nixon's handwritten notations, February 21, 1972, p.16, China Notes, Alpha/Subject File, Box 7, PPF, WHSF, NPMS, NA.

\(^{141}\) Memorandum of conversation February 23, 1972, 2:00-6:00p.m. (hereafter referred to as Memcon 23 Feb. 1972), p.18.

\(^{142}\) Ibid., p.19.

\(^{143}\) Ibid., pp.19-20.

\(^{144}\) Ibid.

\(^{145}\) Ibid. However, Zhou remained suspicious of the Sato Cabinet's pro-Taiwan attitude. Hence, the Chinese did not make any substantial diplomatic move until Kakuei Tanaka's new cabinet came to power in June 1972. See Epilogue, pp.339-341.
In the joint communique, the U.S. side declared that:

The United States places the highest value on its friendly relations with Japan; it will continue to develop the existing bonds.\textsuperscript{146}

The phrase ‘the existing bonds’ implied a broad relationship, including the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. It was a crucial reassurance for the maintenance of the U.S. presence in the Asia-Pacific region. On the other hand, the Chinese side maintained that:

It firmly opposes the revival of and outward expansion of Japanese militarism and firmly supports the Japanese people’s desire to build an independent, democratic, peaceful and neutral Japan.\textsuperscript{147}

The Chinese statement reflected its long-term opposition to the revival of Japanese military expansionism.

Overall, the U.S. gave an assurance that it would attempt to discourage the designs of the Japanese if they pursued an expansionist policy. In response, China gave its acknowledgement of the U.S. continuous presence in the Asia-Pacific region. For both sides, a Japan closely allied with the United States and diplomatically related to China was more preferable to its pursuit of an independent defense policy.


\textsuperscript{147} Ibid.
3.2.4. The India-Pakistan rivalry

The NSC staff’s briefing book explained that Beijing had “wanted to strengthen Pakistan as a power rival to China’s great opponent in the subcontinent, India.”\textsuperscript{148} Therefore, the U.S. and the PRC had “parallel interests in coping with expanded Soviet influence in the subcontinent.”\textsuperscript{149} In his comments, Nixon wrote:

Moscow seeks a dominant role in India –
U.S. help to India would blunt this role –\textsuperscript{150}

On February 15, while reviewing the briefing books, Nixon wrote his concerns:

Need for U.S. to be strong as counter to Soviet –
India shows – if a vacuum
They will fill it.\textsuperscript{151}

During the direct talks, Nixon sought to stress the expansion of the Soviet military threat in the subcontinent: “India is no threat to China, but India supported by the Soviet Union is a very present threat to China.”\textsuperscript{152} Thus, Nixon explained that during the India-Pakistan war of December 1971, “we were speaking not just to India or

\textsuperscript{148} South Asia, p.1, Underline by Nixon in original, Book V, The President, Briefing Papers for the China Trip, FPF/Lord, Box 847, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
\textsuperscript{149} Ibid., p.3. Underline by Nixon in original.
\textsuperscript{150} Ibid. Nixon’s handwritten note on a paper between page 3 and page 4.
\textsuperscript{151} Nixon’s handwritten notations, Underline by Nixon in original, February 15, 1972, p.2, China Notes, Alpha/Subject File, Box 7, PPF, WHSF, NPMS, NA.
\textsuperscript{152} Memcon Feb. 22, pp.10-11.
Pakistan but also – and we made them well aware of it – to the Soviet Union.”

Accordingly, Nixon sought to develop further cooperation with China in the subcontinent: “our policies in the subcontinent go together.... we don’t want to make movement with respect to India and Pakistan unless you are fully informed, because we believe your interest here is greater than ours.”

Finally, Nixon revealed to Zhou that during the December 1971 war, he was “prepared to warn the Soviet Union against undertaking an attack on China.”

In essence, while Nixon sought to re-affirm a get-tough policy against any further Soviet advancement in the subcontinent in order to protect U.S. credibility in the world, Zhou still viewed the growth of the India-Soviet relationship as a major step toward the encirclement of China. Together, the two sides were principally concerned about the expansion of India’s hegemonic aspiration to establish “a great Indian empire” backed by the Soviet Union. Hence, the two sides would coordinate their policies and “go in tandem,” in Nixon’s words, to counterbalance the India-Soviet expansive aspiration in South Asia. Thereafter, the India-Pakistan rivalry became less of an urgent issue between the two sides.

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153 Ibid., p.11.
154 Ibid.
156 Ibid, p.10. Kissinger provided intelligence reports on New Delhi’s arms purchase from Moscow.
157 Ibid., p.9.
158 Nixon’s handwritten notations, February 21, 1972, p.16, China Notes, Alpha/Subject File, Box 7, PPF, WHSF, NPMS, NA.
159 During the rest of his term in office, President Nixon visited neither India nor Pakistan again. He also never visited Bangladesh.
### 3.2.5. The Soviet military threat

The handling of the Soviet threat in the direct talks with the Chinese required diplomatic subtlety. While reviewing the NSC briefing book, Nixon underlined the following specific point of reality: "Although the Soviet Union is the PRC's major reason for seeking better relations with us (and although they know we know that), they will, of course, never acknowledge the fact."[^159] Thus, Nixon anticipated that the Chinese leaders would still try to show their self-reliance against the Soviets. Regarding the deepening Sino-Soviet mutual hostility, Nixon wrote: "We will treat with even handedness[.]"[^160] Before his arrival in Beijing, Nixon outlined his policy:

**Russia:**

1. Maintain balance of power –
2. Restrain their expansion (if our interests are involved)
3. Try to reduce tension between us
4. Not make them irritated at you –
5. Make no deal with them we don’t offer to you
    Will inform you in all details[^161]

While preparing talks with Zhou, Nixon wrote: "Can be no vacuum in the world[.]"[^162]

In the direct talks, Nixon thus stressed the importance of the two superpowers' continuing presence in the world: "in terms of the safety of these nations which are

[^159]: The Soviet Union, p.2, Underline by Nixon in original, Book V, The President, Briefing Papers for the China Trip, FPF/Lord, Box 847, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
[^160]: Nixon’s handwritten notations, in Ibid., p.6.
[^161]: Nixon’s handwritten notations, February 21, 1972, p.16, China Notes, Alpha/Subject File, Box 7, PPF, WHSF, NPMS, NA.
[^162]: Nixon’s handwritten notations, February 22, 1972, China, Speech Files, Box 72, China Trip, PPF, WHSF, NPMS, NA.
not superpowers in the world, they will be much safer if there are two superpowers, rather than just one.”

Nixon warned that if the U.S. fell into a position of weakness, it would raise a credibility problem in terms of its “shield of protection” for its allies. Thus, the United States must maintain its military strength at least to be in a “position of equality” with the Soviets.

In response, Zhou explained the danger of the full encirclement of China: “The worst possibility is... that you all would attack China – the Soviet Union comes from the north, Japanese and the U.S. from the east, and India into China’s Tibet.”

Accordingly, Nixon sought to assure Zhou that the U.S. “would oppose any attempt by the Soviet Union to engage in an aggressive action against China.” Moreover, Nixon made it clear that while the U.S. would continue arms control talks with the Soviets, it would put both China and the Soviets on “an absolutely equal footing.” More particularly, Nixon reiterated the U.S. intention to respect China’s interests vis-à-vis the Soviets: “under no circumstances will I negotiate about or discuss our relations with the People’s Republic of China without his [Zhou’s] approval or knowledge.”

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164 Ibid., p.10. Nixon offered Zhou a briefing by Kissinger on “very sensitive material” on the position of the Soviet forces against China. Ibid. Accordingly, “on a very restricted basis,” Kissinger briefed Zhou with “a list of all the negotiations” which the U.S. was conducting with the Soviet Union and also “some information on dangers” the U.S. and China might confront in “the military field.” Memcon, Kissinger and Zhou, February 21, 1972, 4:15-5:30p.m., p.2, Dr. Kissinger’s Meetings in the People’s Republic During the Presidential Visit February 1972, CF-Far East, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA. In reality, the Soviets knew “as a fact” that when Kissinger visited Beijing first time, he handed over to the Chinese “American satellite pictures of Soviet installations along the Sino-Soviet border.” Memo from John Scali to Kissinger, March 8, 1972, p.1, Box 501, China Trip – February-March 1972 [Part 1], PTF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
165 Ibid, p.11.
166 Ibid., p.18.
168 Ibid, p.22.
169 Ibid., p.36; and The Soviet Union, Points to Emphasize, p.1, Book V-a, The President, Briefing Papers for the China Trip, FPF/Lord, Box 847, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
Regarding the restoration of stability in the Asia-Pacific region, Nixon wrote on his yellow pad: "Neither seeks Hegemony." In the direct talks, Nixon and Zhou discussed a new principle.

Premier Zhou: ...[N]either of us should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region. And that would not only imply our two countries should not seek hegemony in this region, but that Japan should not either.

President Nixon: And the Soviet Union.

Premier Zhou: That's right. Nor the Soviet Union.

President Nixon: Nor India.

Premier Zhou: That's right. Here implies that both will try to do good things, not do bad things.

President Nixon: Let me clarify. It implies that neither of our two sides should seek hegemony. It also implies, to the extent that each of us can, that we will resist efforts of others to seek hegemony. In that what it means?

Premier Zhou: Yes, that is we, oppose any efforts by another country.

In other words, Nixon and Zhou sought to apply the so-called "anti-hegemony clause" not only to the United States and China, but also to the Soviet Union, Japan, and India in order to prevent any potential threat from expanding its influence in the Asia-Pacific region. Equally important, Zhou was fully aware of the Soviet sensitivity to the Sino-U.S. collusion: "They claim that our two sides are discussing how to oppose the Soviet Union, to conclude an anti-Soviet alliance." Hence, Zhou clarified that: "neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of third countries or enter into agreements

170 Nixon's handwritten notations, February 24, 1972, China, Speech Files, Box 73, China Trip, PPF, WHSF, NPMS, NA.
172 Ibid., p.3.
or understanding directed at other states." Together, the U.S. and China sought to impose restraints on great powers in the Asia-Pacific region.

4. Reactions to the February 1972 summit

4.1. The Shanghai Communiqué

At the end of the February 1972 summit, the two sides released the so-called Shanghai Communiqué. Following the formula developed in the October 1971 talks, the joint communiqué took a unique approach in clarifying both the new common grounds and the remaining historical differences. The two sides jointly declared the five principles of peaceful coexistence as the fundamental basis of state relations, namely "the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, non-aggression against other states, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence." Finally, both sides clarified the common interest in the materialization of diplomatic normalization.

While preparing his statement for the final banquet in Shanghai on February 27, Nixon wrote: "We have changed the world – But it is only a beginning[.]") Upon his return to Washington, Nixon made a public statement:

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173 Ibid., p.4.

174 The New York Times, February 28, 1972. The communiqué was issued on February 27 at Chinese local time. For the full text of the Shanghai Communiqué, see Appendix.

175 Ibid.

176 Nixon’s handwritten notations, February 27, 1972, Shanghai, Speech Files, Box 73, China Trip, PPF, WHSF, NPMS, NA. Nixon declared in his toast: "This was the week that changed the world," with a conviction that the two governments were committed to "build a bridge" across the Pacific after 22 years of mutual hostility. Max Frankel, “China Visit Ends: President Presents a Pledge to Build Pacific ‘Bridge,’” The New York Times, February 28, 1972.
As a result of this trip, we have started the long process of building a bridge across that gulf of almost 12,000 miles and 22 years of non-communication and hostility... We have demonstrated that nations with very deep and fundamental differences can learn to discuss those differences calmly, rationally, and frankly, without compromising their principles.\textsuperscript{177}

In essence, Nixon emphasized the new characteristics of the U.S. relations with China, namely the beginning of the long process to establish substantial communication after two decades of mutual hostility.

4.2. Foreign Reactions

While staying in China, Nixon and Kissinger already developed concerns about possible reactions to the summit. On February 27, Haig, who stayed in Washington, sent a memo on initial reactions. In short, the travelling press corps and reports from foreign capitals had been "positive and objective."\textsuperscript{178} Anticipating wide speculation especially in Asia, President Nixon decided to send Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Marshall Green and NSC staff member John Holdridge to brief U.S. allies in the Asia-Pacific region.\textsuperscript{179} The main purpose of their mission


\textsuperscript{178} Haig to Kissinger, "Initial Reactions to Communiqué and briefing," February 27, 1972, p.1, Box 88, China – President's Trip 15-29 Feb. 1972, CF-Far East, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.

\textsuperscript{179} Green, Evolution of U.S.-China Policy, Oral History Interview, pp.41-45, FAOHC. The Green-Holdridge mission included visits to Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, South Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Australia, and New Zealand. See also Holdridge, Crossing the Divide, pp.97-102.
was to assure allied leaders that "we will remain true to our commitments and have struck no secret deals."\(^{180}\)

The Republic of China expressed its "surprise and shock" by the U.S. statement in the communiqué on its future withdrawal from Taiwan.\(^{181}\) Taipei also demonstrated "strong disapproval" of the Chinese positions in the joint communiqué. Importantly, however, the statement "avoided any invective" toward the United States or the Americans.\(^{182}\) After the initial shock over the communiqué, Taipei was "still highly apprehensive" of U.S. "long-term intentions."\(^{183}\) The Green-Holdridge mission appeared to have "reassured" the ROC that the U.S. defense commitment was "intact for the present." Nevertheless, the Chinese Nationalist officials still wondered whether the long-run U.S. strategy might "not be to preserve the appearance of adherence to its commitment."\(^{184}\)

In Japan, Foreign Minister Takeo Fukuda described the President's trip as "fruitful" and stated that it would serve as a "lubricant" for Japan to normalize its relations with China.\(^{185}\) The Japanese Government, "fearful of being undermined" by the Nixon trip, reached with "almost visible relief" to the limited concrete achievement in the joint communiqué.\(^{186}\) On the other hand, some Japanese critics called the trip a "betrayal"

\(^{180}\) Haig to Nixon, "Summary of Foreign Reactions to Your Trip to China," March 24, 1972, p.1, Box 501, China Trip – February-March 1972 [Part 2], PTF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
\(^{181}\) Haig to Kissinger, “Initial Reactions to Communiqué and briefing,” February 27, 1972, p.1, Box 501, China Trip – February-March 1972 [Part 2], PTF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
\(^{184}\) Ibid.
\(^{185}\) Haig to Kissinger, “Initial Reactions to Communiqué and briefing,” February 27, 1972, p.1, Box 88, China – President's Trip 15-29 Feb. 1972, CF-Far East, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.

Green gave assurance to the Japanese Government that President Nixon had made "no secret deals" with the Chinese leaders. Green conveyed Nixon's personal letter to Sato reassuring that Japan "remained a key ally" of the U.S. Green also assured Fukuda that U.S. delegation refused to accept
by the United States and blamed Prime Minister Eisaku Sato for having been “outstripped” by Washington in forming ties with Beijing.

The Western media reported that the Soviets were “fearfully of some new power grouping directed against Moscow.” The Soviet press agency Tass reported that there remained “essential differences” between China and the United States on foreign policy issues and in their social systems. Tass also noted that the joint communique stated some of their views with “insufficient clarity.” For nearly three weeks, the Soviet government itself withheld official comment, confining itself to a “cautious” and equivocal reaction expressing “suspicion of possible U.S.-PRC secret arrangements.”

The general reaction in Saigon appeared to be “cautious and favorable.” “We felt at ease,” reportedly stated a senior official of South Vietnamese Foreign Ministry. On the contrary, despite Premier Zhou’s trip to Hanoi immediately after Nixon’s departure from China, the North Vietnamese were “bitter and disenchanted.”

The most negative reaction came from India, where there was a “tendency to read the worst possible into the trip,” namely a “new balance of forces” that would “circumscribe Indian freedom of action.” In contrast, Pakistani reaction to the trip was “strongly positive,” and the communique was “welcomed.”

In sum, most Asian states were “publicly approving” of the trip and privately became “less apprehensive” as a result of assurance given by the Green-Holdridge

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191 Ibid., p.4.

192 Ibid.
mission.\textsuperscript{193} Many Asian capitals came to believe that they “must begin adapting their policies to a changing international context.”\textsuperscript{194} However, there was a widespread belief in Asia that there were “secret agreements or understanding” in Beijing that were “left out of the communique.”\textsuperscript{195} In particular, there still remained “uncertainty” among Asian states over whether the U.S. had “loosened its commitment to defend” its allies.\textsuperscript{196}

4.3. Briefing on the domestic front

After his return to Washington, President Nixon conducted numerous briefings on the trip. On February 29, 1972, Nixon met the bipartisan Congressional leaders in the Cabinet Room of the White House to discuss his trip to China. Nixon pointed out two lessons for the future. First, the Chinese had reiterated that they were “not a super power.”\textsuperscript{197} However, the President stressed that: “750 million Chinese Communists are something to be reckoned with. Consequently, they are destined to become a major force.”\textsuperscript{198} Second, the U.S. relationship with China was “a very delicate one,” which required building upon “trust,” assuring that: “We are reliable, we are strong and we will continue to build for the future.”\textsuperscript{199}

\textsuperscript{192} Ibid., p.1.  
\textsuperscript{193} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{194} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{196} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{197} Tom C. Korologos (via, William E. Timmons), “Meeting with Bipartisan Leadership February 29, 1972, 10:00a.m. The Cabinet Room,” p.3, MemforP, ROM, Box 88, POF, WHCF, NPMS, NA.  
\textsuperscript{198} Ibid., p.5.  
\textsuperscript{199} Ibid.
During a Cabinet meeting on the same day, Nixon emphasized that: “we both agreed we will not resort to the threat of force or the use of force in international relations and with each other. We agreed that no nation should dominate Asia. This is the heart of the communique.” Kissinger also explained that what the President had done was to “set a major new direction.” Finally, when asked a question about the most important thing to the Chinese, Nixon replied “[c]old blooded interest, [n]ot friendship”:

They see the Soviet Union, India, Japan – with all of them, each in its way, encircling them – so they need somebody who is not antagonistic. They know the Soviets have more men on the Chinese frontier than against Western Europe. As for Japan, history has to give them some pause. With India, they’ve had a little squabble. As for the United States, first, we’re long way off; and second, while they would never state publicly that India, Russia and Japan have designs on them, they know very well, I think, that we don’t.

It was Nixon’s realization of Chinese perception of threat regarding full encirclement that drove the entire initiative of rapprochement.

Shambaugh confirms that the Chinese were approaching the United States “not out of the question of balance of power but out of the self-survival.” The Chinese leaders believed that the Soviet Union would really attack them. Therefore, they thought that the United States could be a “counterweight and perhaps even help to defend China if it were attacked.” Shambaugh thus assesses that the balance of power

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201 Ibid., p.18.
202 Ibid., pp.21-22. Underline in original.
between the U.S., the Soviets and China was "the consequence rather than the motivation" of the opening.\(^{204}\) Beijing's motivation was "very much fear of the military attack," and thus the Chinese wanted to "put pressure on the Soviet Union from another flank."\(^{205}\)

As for the balance of power in Asia, Solomon assesses that the United States, allied to various Asian countries, such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, was "the balancer checking the expansion of China."\(^{206}\) However, the Chinese at that point were principally worried about the Soviet Union. Thus, Nixon and Kissinger did "not let that view of history and traditional pattern of international relations in East Asia affect their policy."

Finally, Nixon and Kissinger viewed that "if we can not resolve our strategic difference with China, then a nuclear China is going to be a big threat. We already got one threat from the Soviet Union. So it was an effort to establish the basis or common strategic interest with China."\(^{207}\) In his meeting with Mao, Nixon clarified that there was no fundamental strategic conflict between China and the U.S., which became his way of saying "We do not want to have a confrontation with another nuclear power."\(^{208}\)

\(^{204}\) Ibid. Shambaugh argues further that balance of power relates to "shifting correlates and weights of power either in the region or in the globe." Ibid.

\(^{205}\) Ibid.

\(^{206}\) Solomon, Interview with Komine, September 24, 2003.

\(^{207}\) Ibid.

\(^{208}\) Ibid.
Personalized Diplomacy

The February 1972 summit promoted dynamism and optimism in the U.S. relations with China for the rest of the year and the first half of 1973.\(^1\) One of the principal consequences of the pursuit of strict secrecy by Nixon and Kissinger was the development of a highly personalized diplomatic practice. A China specialist in the NSC staff, Richard Solomon, emphasized the importance of “personalized diplomacy” during the “transitional period” before the U.S. relations with China were “institutionalised.”\(^2\) A highly “valuable factor” was that Kissinger developed a “notable degree of personal rapport” with Premier Zhou.\(^3\) Thus, “timing” became very important, as “changes in key personnel” were likely to require “further visitations,” and thus possibly “delaying progress” toward normalization.\(^4\) In other words, to the U.S. advantage, “the degree of mutual personal respect” was a key quantity in “breaking down the distrust of the past,” and in “generating a degree of confidence.”\(^5\) Finally, therefore, Solomon suggested that it was in the U.S.’s vital interest to “consolidate the political gains” “before Mao and Chou pass from the scene.”\(^6\)

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3. Ibid.

4. Ibid., p.2.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.
Kissinger was “really impressed” by Mao and Zhou for their “intelligence and charisma.” During his trips to China from 1972 to 1975, Kissinger “did share a general strategic view” with the Chinese leaders and found it was “exciting and interesting to have these encounters.” Thus, as a former State Department official, Donald Anderson recalls, Kissinger “retained a very direct interest in China” and “set a tone that really shaped the way we dealt with China for a very long time.” There was an atmosphere within the U.S. government that “as long as Kissinger was running the show that basically in dealing with China you looked at the big picture and the strategic relationship, don’t bother with details…but a lot of people [were] feeling that we were giving away things that we didn’t need to give to China.”

Following Nixon’s landslide re-election victory in November 1972, Kissinger and the NSC staff estimated that “we now had four years to deal with each other, building up a certain mutual trust. …The Chinese knew that they would have four more years to deal with a strong leader.” Thus, Kissinger and the NSC staff anticipated that the Chinese leaders would be willing to “accelerate the normalization and institutionalisation” of the U.S.-PRC bilateral relations. Importantly, however, as Kissinger reported to Nixon, “we have no assurance that the PRC will continue its policy toward us when Mao and Chou depart.”

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8 Ibid.
10 Ibid.

By late 1973, Zhou’s health was declining. However, U.S. officials were not yet sufficiently aware of
By late 1973, the Watergate scandal was damaging Nixon's presidential authority, and it had "tremendous impact on foreign policy in general."\textsuperscript{14} The NSC staff came to perceive "greater aloofness and lack of cooperation" from the Chinese at the operational level.\textsuperscript{15} Owing to "the policy and philosophical differences," Beijing opposed Washington's attempt to improve the mere "appearance" of bilateral relations.\textsuperscript{16} A former NSC staff member, Peter Rodman, recalls that Kissinger "did not see how he could function in any way at all without the presidential authority. He did not think he could survive, or the policies he believed in could survive, unless he had institutional base of the State Department."\textsuperscript{17} Thus, after his sworn-in as the Secretary of State in September 1973, Kissinger sought to pursue more personalized and secretive relations with the aging Chinese leaders.\textsuperscript{18} It appeared, however, that the Watergate scandal "puzzled" the Chinese.\textsuperscript{19} The NSC staff estimated that the Chinese leaders increased their doubt as to whether Nixon could still be in a position to "act in a strong manner in foreign policy" and to make "further major initiatives" in the normalization process.\textsuperscript{20}

On August 8, 1974, President Nixon resigned from the Oval Office, elevating Gerald R. Ford to a new presidential power.\textsuperscript{21} It was the pursuit of strict secrecy that materialized the U.S. rapprochement with China; ironically, however, it was also the

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\textsuperscript{14} Lord, Interview with Komine, October 15, 2003.

\textsuperscript{15} Solomon to Kissinger, "The PRC's Domestic Political Situation and Foreign Policy as a Context for Your Meeting with Deng Tsiao-p'ing and Ch'iao Kuan-hua," April 12, 1974, Box 376, China-Sensitive-Feb.-April 1974, PPS-Lord, STATE-RG 59, NA.

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{17} Peter Rodman, Oral History Interview, July 22, and August 22, 1994, p.55, FAOHC.

\textsuperscript{18} Kissinger held his position as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs until October 1975, when he was replaced by his deputy Brent Scowcroft.

\textsuperscript{19} Richard Solomon, Interview with Komine, September 24, 2003.

\textsuperscript{20} Solomon to Kissinger, "Peking Sends the U.S. Some Warning Signals," February 16, 1974, China Exchanges 1 Nov 1973-31 March, Box 330, PPS-Lord, STATE-RG59, NA.

excessive secrecy that destroyed the Nixon presidency as a whole. During the Ford presidency, it was principally Secretary Kissinger who sought to negotiate with the aging Chinese leaders in order to explore "their continued presence on the scene as leaders, and to discuss in concrete terms which we have in mind."22

Conflicts in Indochina

After the February 1972 summit, the Vietnam War remained the "predominant" issue that hindered U.S. relations with China.23 During Kissinger's visit to Beijing in June 1972, Zhou took a "hand-off attitude" on military and negotiating questions in Indochina.24 Kissinger judged that while Beijing was not letting Vietnam block U.S.-China bilateral relations, the Chinese would be "less willing" than the Russians to "exert actual pressure" on Hanoi to be reasonable at the negotiating table.25 Kissinger estimated further that while the Chinese would approve the U.S. course of action toward a ceasefire, withdrawal, and "leaving the political solution to the Vietnamese alone," it was North Vietnam that was still "reluctant to rely upon it."26 Therefore, in his report to Nixon, Kissinger concluded that the U.S. could "not expect to solve the Vietnam issue" in Beijing.27

24 Ibid., p.3.
25 Ibid., pp.3-4.
26 Ibid., p.5. Underline in original.
27 Ibid., p.6.
On January 17, 1973, the United States and North Vietnam finally agreed upon what became the Paris Peace Accords – U.S.-Vietnamese Armistice Agreement. Henceforth, the principal interest between the U.S. and China in Indochina coincided, for neither side wished for North Vietnam to fulfil its regional hegemonic aspiration. Rodman recalls that China supported the Paris agreement because they were “happy to have Vietnam divided.”

In reality, however, the radicals’ criticisms of Zhou in China increased after the failure of a Sino-U.S. joint approach in Cambodia to establish a neutral coalition government under Prince Sihanouk bringing together the Lon Nol regime and the Khmer Rouge. After the collapse of the Nixon presidency, the United States failed to prevent the fall of the Cambodian regime; Khmer Rouge captured Phnom Penh on April 17, 1975 and replaced the Lon Nol regime. On April 30, North Vietnamese troops captured Saigon, defeating the remaining South Vietnamese and expanding its aspiration in Indochina. In consequence, as Kissinger reported to Ford, the collapse of the Indochina policy had “created a context where any major change in our relationship with Taiwan which implied the abandonment of yet another ally would be unacceptable.”

29 Peter Rodman, Interview with Komine, October 21, 2003.
The Soviet military threat

Winston Lord recalls that the opening to China “had a particularly strong short-term impact on the Soviet behavior.”32 Nixon’s presidential trip to Moscow from May 22 to 29, 1972 symbolized détente – an era of negotiation, resulting in the SALT I Treaty and the Agreement and Declaration on Basic Principles of U.S.-USSR relations.33 During his trip to Beijing in June 1972, Kissinger gave long briefings to Zhou on Nixon’s recent talks with the Soviet leaders in Moscow. Kissinger particularly stressed that the U.S. was “not joining in any agreements” that might be directed against China and was “keeping them fully informed.”34 In his report to Nixon, Kissinger argued that the “existence of Soviet global ambitions” remained China’s “main preoccupation and principal motive” for moving ahead with the United States.35 Thus, Kissinger sought to “play the ominous Soviet themes” with the Chinese.36

Kissinger assessed that it was striking “how far” the Chinese had moved from an “adversary posture” to one that could be described as a “tacit ally.”37 Kissinger also interpreted that the Chinese were “trying to build walls around the Soviet Union” by opening to the U.S., encouraging a “united Europe as a counterweight” in the west, moving toward Japan in the east, and trying to “contain India” - a “tool of Soviet

34 Memcon, Kissinger and Zhou, p.20, p.27, June 20, 1972, 2:05-6:05p.m., CF-Far East, Box 97, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
35 Kissinger to Nixon, “My Trip to Peking, June 19-23, 1972,” June 27, 1972, p.2, p.8, CF-Far East, Box 97, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA. Following the Moscow summit of May 1972, Kissinger visited Beijing from June 19 to 23, 1972. Interestingly, however, Kissinger fails to refer to this trip in his memoirs. Previous major works also overlooked the importance of the June 1972 trip.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid., p.2.
encirclement” - by supporting an “independent Pakistan” in the south.\(^3\)8 Thus, Kissinger reminded Nixon that “only a strong United States” was of use to them, and that they would seek “the balance” which the U.S. would provide.\(^3\)9

In his report to Nixon after his trip to Beijing in February 1973, Kissinger evaluated the current nature of U.S.-PRC relations: “The Chinese leaders are among the very few in the world with a global and longer term perspective – and it now parallels ours in many important respects.”\(^4\)0 In November 1973, Kissinger and Zhou completed a new communique, which extended the joint opposition to hegemony to anywhere in the world, beyond the Asia-Pacific region.\(^4\)1 As Kissinger reported to Nixon, the Chinese crucial calculation was “the steadiness and strength of America as a counterweight.”\(^4\)2 Nixon commented: “K – the key.”\(^4\)3 From the mid-1970s, the promotion of the so-called ‘tacit alliance’ would become one of the central issues in U.S. relations with China.\(^4\)4

The Chinese leaders, however, still remained suspicious of the possible collusion between the two superpowers against the PRC. In February 1973, Mao warned Kissinger that the whole of the West intended “to push Russia eastward.”\(^4\)5 Mao and Zhou also criticized that the U.S. wanted “to reach out to the Soviets by standing on

\(^{38}\) Ibid., p.9, and p.12; and Memcon, Kissinger and Zhou, p.27, June 20, 1972, 2:05-6:05p.m., Country Files – Far East, Box 97, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.

\(^{39}\) Ibid.

\(^{40}\) Kissinger to Nixon, “My Trip to China,” March 2, 1973, p.3, HAK China Trip – February 1973 Memcons & Reports (originals), Box 98, HAK Trip Files, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA. Kissinger thus concluded: “For in plain terms, we have now become tacit allies.” Ibid., p.2, Underline in original.


\(^{42}\) Ibid., p.2, Underline by Nixon in original.

\(^{43}\) Nixon’s handwritten notations in Ibid.


\(^{45}\) Kissinger to Nixon, “My Trip to China,” March 2, 1973, HAK China Trip – February 1973 Memcons & Reports (originals), Box 98, HAK Trip Files, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
Chinese shoulders." By late 1973, the NSC staff saw an increasing sign that the Chinese leaders did not fully trust Kissinger, especially in terms of the issue of "who is using whom" against the Soviet Union, which was the "nature of the triangular dynamic." In November 1973, Mao and Zhou "even intimidated Kissinger a bit."

During the November 1974 Vladivostok summit, Ford and Brezhnev reached an interim agreement on the overall numbers of strategic nuclear weapons, leading to grain sales, technology transfers, and the signing of the Final Act at the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in August 1975. However, the Soviet adventurism continued in Third World conflicts, such as in the Middle East and Africa. The development of Eurocommunism in Italy, France, Portugal, and elsewhere - Communist parties in Western Europe's search for a more independent path - threatened to undermine the unity of the West. It appeared that détente did not create the expected effect of self-restraint of the Soviets' external behavior.

Equally important, the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger détente became the principal target of U.S. domestic criticisms. While the liberals criticized it for its inadequate attention to human rights, the conservatives attacked the Nixon-Ford administrations for being soft on the Soviet global threat, and the neo-conservatives stressed the importance of American traditional moral values underlining foreign policy. During Kissinger's visit to Beijing in November 1974, Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping criticized détente:

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46 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 See Bundy, A Tangled Web, pp. 428-472; and Isaacson, Kissinger, pp. 673-692.
50 The Soviet desk officers in the State Department often disagreed with Kissinger: "the errors he made were in areas which he was not familiar. He was making assumptions about the Soviets, that they would let economic incentives influence their political actions." William Dyess (Assistant Administrative Officer, Embassy Moscow, 1966-1968; Political Officer, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, 1970-1979), Oral History Interview, p. 3, Russia, Country Collection, 1996, FAOHC.
51 On the U.S. domestic controversy on détente, see Kissinger, Years of Renewal, pp. 92-112; and Isaacson, Kissinger, pp. 607-611.
"we don’t think there is any agreement that can bind the hands of Russia." As Solomon reassesses, Deng felt that Kissinger was rather "manipulating intelligence information to make them more nervous about the Soviet Union than they felt." Kissinger himself believed that only the continuing sense of a common adversary could preserve "a strictly unsentimental relationship."

On October 21, 1975, Mao criticized Kissinger: "We see that what you are doing is leaping to Moscow by way of our shoulders, and these shoulders are now useless." The Chinese thus would not "let itself be used" because détente was "in trouble." The NSC staff described this situation as "a cooling of our relationship linked to the Chinese perception of the US as a fading power in the face of Soviet advance." Kissinger and his advisers became very doubtful of whether Washington was still "capable of playing the kind of major world role" which would provide "an effective counterweight" to Moscow's attempt to encircle Beijing. U.S. officials estimated further that the Chinese would keep their relations with the U.S. at the "present level – alive enough to suit their geopolitical purposes" but not more than that. In the short term, therefore, as Kissinger reported to Ford before his presidential trip to China in December 1975, "appearances were everything" in the U.S. relations with China. In the long term, however, the U.S. remained China's "only real option as a

56 Ibid.
57 Ibid., p.1. Underline in original.
60 Ibid.
counterweight" to the growing "Soviet menace." Thus, despite the collapse of the Nixon presidency and the decline of détente, the strategic triangle between the U.S. the Soviets, and China continued to remain as a fundamental element in the international situation during the 1970s and the 1980s.

Japan's future role

The U.S. rapprochement with China paved the way for the restoration of Sino-Japanese relations. It appeared that Japan was prepared to abandon Taiwan for normalization with China. From the U.S. point of view, however, it raised the problem of Zhou's three principles for Sino-Japanese normalization: "recognition of the PRC as the sole legal government of China"; "recognition of Taiwan as an integral part of China"; and "abrogation of the Japan-ROC peace treaty of 1952." The NSC staff was concerned that Japan's "unqualified" acceptance of these three principles would be that: 1) the international status of the ROC would be "seriously undercut"; 2) the U.S.-ROC mutual defense treaty would become "more difficult to justify"; and 3) from the Japanese standpoint, the U.S. bases within Japan could no longer be used to defend Taiwan against a PRC effort to "liberate" it.

The U.S. vital interest was that Tokyo's moves toward Beijing would "not inhibit" the U.S. use of its bases within Japan in fulfilment of its "defense commitments to

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61 Kissinger to Ford, "Possible Approaches to Your China Trip," November 24, 1975, Sec. Kissinger's Trip to China Oct 1975, Box 374, PPS, STATE-RG 59, NA.
62 Holdridge to Kissinger, "Your Meeting with Tanaka and Ohira," August 10, 1972, China Policy, p.1, Tanaka Visit (Hawaii) 31 Aug – 1 September (1972), Box 926, VIP Visits, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
63 Ibid. Underline in original.
Taiwan and South Korea.” Kissinger and his NSC staff were concerned that the Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka’s new cabinet might “haste” to normalize Tokyo’s relations with Beijing, which would give its recognition of the settlement of the Taiwan issue as China’s internal problem. Thus, Kissinger recommended to Nixon to “encourage Japan to preserve its economic and cultural ties with Taiwan.”

On August 31, 1972, during a two-day summit at Hawaii, Nixon emphasized to Tanaka the “overriding importance” that the U.S. and Japan “not get into a conflict over China policy.” Nixon cautioned that while the two sides “need not have identical positions,” “neither should we allow antagonism to develop between us.” Finally, Nixon cautioned again that Tokyo’s normalization with Beijing “should not be done at the expense of Japan’s friends,” particularly implying the Republic of China.

On September 29, Premier Zhou and Prime Minister Tanaka finally achieved Sino-Japanese rapprochement ending the state of war situation and resuming diplomatic relations between the two old Asian rivals. Japan closed down its embassy in

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64 Kissinger, to Nixon “Your Meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka in Honolulu on August 31 and September 1,” August 29, 1972, p.1 and p.4. Underline by Nixon in original, Tanaka Visit (Hawaii) 31 Aug - 1 September (1972), Box 926, VIP Visits, NSCF, NPMS, NA. The NSC staff referred to the Nixon-Sato communique of November 1969 which stated that the defense of Taiwan as a “most important factor” for Japan’s security. Ibid. See Chapter 6, Section 2.3 of this study. State Department officials also recommended that the effective area of U.S.-Japan Security Treaty to “maintain peace and stability” in East Asia “must continue to encompass Taiwan.” Rogers to Nixon, “Your Meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka and Foreign Minister Ohira,” August 18, 1972, Issues and Talking Points, p.5, Briefing Paper, Department of State, Box 926, VIP Visit, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
65 Ibid., p.2. Underline by Nixon in original.
67 Memcon, Nixon and Tanaka, August 31, 1972, 1:00p.m., p.9, Box 926, VIP Visit, NSCF, NPMS, NA. The State Department’s memorandum for the President recommended that the President stress that the U.S. did not regard itself “in a race or competition” with Japan to improve its relations with China. Rogers to Nixon, “Your Meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka and Foreign Minister Ohira,” August 18, 1972, Issues and Talking Points, p.3, Briefing Paper, Department of State, Box 926, VIP Visit, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid., p.12.
Taiwan while maintaining a non-governmental office for trade and cultural relations.\textsuperscript{71} In the joint communique, Beijing and Tokyo declared their opposition to hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region. The combination of Sino-Japanese rapprochement and Sino-American rapprochement thus brought Japan into broader triangular relations with the United States and China in order to contain Soviet expansionism.\textsuperscript{72} Consequently, in Kissinger’s interpretation, the Chinese came to regard the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty as a “brake on Japanese expansionism and militarism.”\textsuperscript{73} Equally, the Chinese leaders viewed Japan as an “incipient ally” “to counter Soviet and Indian designs.”\textsuperscript{74} The Washington-Beijing-Tokyo strategic triangle against Moscow became one of the major features of the Cold War in Asia during the 1970s and the 1980s.

The Taiwan issue

The February 1972 summit enhanced a more regular and direct communication between Washington and Beijing. As Solomon explains, the rapprochement with China meant “initiating and broadening a political dialogue” that would ultimately lead to the U.S. diplomatic recognition of the People’s Republic of China.\textsuperscript{75}

\textsuperscript{71} The so-called ‘Japan formula’ thus set a restrictive framework for the U.S. in normalizing with China.


\textsuperscript{73} Kissinger to Nixon, “My Trip to China,” March 2, 1973, p.1, HAK China Trip – February 1973 Memcons & Reports (originals), Box 98, HAK Trip Files, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.

\textsuperscript{74} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{75} Solomon, Oral History Interview, September 13, 1996, pp.55-56, FAOHC.
In February 1973, Kissinger and Zhou agreed to establish liaison offices in Washington and Beijing, which Kissinger saw as “embassies in everything but name.” Importantly, Kissinger offered an explicit timetable for normalization: in the first two years of Nixon’s second term, the U.S. would remove all the remaining armed forces from Taiwan; and in the second two years, it would complete full diplomatic normalization with China. Normalization would be achieved along the same line as Sino-Japanese normalization, namely the so-called ‘Japan formula’ - terminating formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan and preserving only an unofficial tie with the Taipei government. Finally, the U.S. would “abolish its defense treaty” with the Republic of China.

In reality, however, the Chinese opening of the Liaison Office in Washington in May and the American opening of the Liaison Office in Beijing in July 1973 marked the last major official developments in the U.S. relations with China during the middle of the 1970s. Thereafter, Nixon and Kissinger came to further realize the seriousness and complexity of China’s persistence on the Taiwan issue, which was greater than they had estimated before the February 1972 summit. The Chinese leaders were in no rush to resolve the Taiwan issue. In November 1973, Mao indicated to Kissinger that: “we can do without Taiwan for the time being, and let it come after one hundred years.” Kissinger estimated that the U.S. normalization of relations with China could be achieved “only on the basis of confirming the principle of one China,” to which Nixon commented: “K very significant.”

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76 Kissinger to Nixon, “My Trip to China,” March 2, 1973, HAK China Trip – February 1973 Memcons & Reports (originals), Box 98, HAK Trip Files, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
78 Memcon, Mao and Kissinger, November 12, 1973, Secretary Kissinger’s Conversations in Peking, Box 100, HAK Trip Files, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
however, the NSC staff estimated that “[o]ur China policy is drifting without a clear sense of how we will move toward normalization, or indeed what the shape of a future normalized relationship with the PRC will look like,” particularly regarding Taiwan.80 “We are in danger of losing a sense of momentum in our dealing with Peking.”81

After Nixon’s resignation in August 1974, the Chinese leaders “did bully and put a lot of pressure on Kissinger” because they wanted him to “get President Ford to fulfil Nixon’s commitment to normalize relations” with them and to “make them to break relations with Taiwan” before the end of the Ford presidency.82 However, the Chinese did not run risk of seriously damaging the newly established direct communication with the United States. The Chinese were “patient” on Taiwan and “confident of its ultimate resolution.”83 In October 1975, Mao downplayed the Taiwan issue: “The small issue is Taiwan, the big issue is the world.” Taiwan was “unwantable.” “It is better for the U.S. to maintain control over Taiwan for the time being” because it was “filled with counter-revolutionaries,” and also in order to prevent an independence movement or the influence from the Soviet Union.84 Lord recalls that the October 1975 trip was very “unpromising. ...When we got back, we were so annoyed.”85 “A lot of momentum” from the Nixon trip in February 1972 was “declining” by the Ford trip in December 1975.86 Therefore, as State Department officials estimated, it appeared that the Chinese “want to put us under psychological pressure by

81 Ibid.
83 Ibid.
84 Kissinger to Ford, “Your Meeting with Chairman Mao,” November 28, 1975, p.6, Pres. Ford's Visit to Peking-International Issues Dec 1-5 1975 (1 of 2), Box 372, PPS-Lord, STATE-RG 59, NA; “Analysis/Highlights of Secretary Kissinger’s Meeting with Chairman Mao, October 21, 1975,” October 25, 1975, p.6, Sec. Kissinger’s Trip to China Oct 1975, Box 374, PPS-Lord, STATE-RG 59, NA.
86 Ibid.
manoeuvring us into a position where we want the relationship with them more than they with us." Overall, Kissinger believed that although the pro-Nationalist Taiwan lobby became a "vocal minority" rather than a majority, the U.S. still needed a transitional period to persuade its public. In reality, however, without a strong presidential authority, it was "impossible" for Kissinger, even with his great diplomatic skills, to proceed in full diplomatic normalization with China before the 1976 presidential election.

After the death of Chinese key leaders, Premier Zhou and Chairman Mao, and the arrest of the radical leaders, namely the so-called "Gang of Four" in 1976, the moderate leaders named Hua Guofeng as Party Chairman, and sought to determine the timing of Deng Xiaoping's return to power. In the November 1976 presidential election, Ford was defeated by Democrat candidate Jimmy Carter. Hence, the completion of full normalization had to wait until January 1979 when it was undertaken by President Carter and Vice Premier Deng.

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88 Memcon, Kissinger and Zhou, June 22, 1972, 11:03p.m.-12:55a.m., p.20, CF-Far East, Box 97, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
89 Lord, Interview with Komine, October 15, 2003; and Memcon, Kissinger and the NSC staff, July 6, 1975, p.1, Box 331, Box 330, PPS, STATE-RG59, NA.
90 The Gang of Four consisted of Jiang Qing, Wang Hongwen, Yao Wenyuan, and Zhang Chunqiao. On the final stage of political situation in Mao's China, see, for example, Philipe Short, Mao: A Life (New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1999), chapter 16 and epilogue; Ross Terrill, Mao: A Biography (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1999), chapter 22 and epilogue.
91 On U.S. full normalization with the PRC, see Tyler, A Great Wall, pp.229-285; Mann, About Face, chapter 4; and Ross, Negotiating Cooperation, chapters 5.
Conclusion

This thesis has focused on the advantages and disadvantages of the pursuit of strict secrecy by Nixon and Kissinger as a key feature in the foreign policy decision-making leading to the U.S. rapprochement with China in the early 1970s. Within that fundamental framework, it has examined three major elements of the U.S. rapprochement with China:

- Conception – The presidential leadership, and the revitalization of the NSC system as the principal foreign policy decision-making machinery;
- Implementation – The evolution of policy option studies, and the public and private signal exchange from January 1969 to June 1971; and
- Direct Talks – Major issues in Kissinger’s trips to Beijing in July and October 1971 and Nixon’s trip to China in February 1972.

Conception

This study has analyzed the similarities and differences between Nixon and Kissinger regarding the development of their respective views on China. The origins of Nixon’s personal interest in China could be traced back to the late 1940s and the early 1950s. While maintaining the political stance of an anti-Communist cold warrior in public, Nixon privately took great interest in the development of domestic and international atmospheres surrounding Communist China. By the late 1950s, he came to believe that the PRC was there to stay, rather than being a passing phenomenon, and realized the advantage of trade as a possible means of promoting an initial dialogue with China and widening the split between Moscow and Beijing. However,
he remained cautious, principally because of the danger of conservative backlash from the pro-Chinese Nationalists in Congress.

During the 1960s, crucial changes gradually took place in the American view of China. First, academic experts took a lead in the debate on the China policy in American domestic politics. There was a long-term development of an "underlining willingness" to have better relations with China, which was "less strategic than idealistic." The academic contribution to the development of what became solid public support for a new China initiative in the long term was much more important than was previously thought.

At the same time, the State Department's middle ranking officials were examining a number of possible policy options, such as the easing of trade and travel restrictions, as a means of developing a new dialogue with China. The Warsaw Ambassadorial Talks played a crucial role as a channel of communication between Washington and Beijing which helped to prevent any miscalculation of the respective intentions during the Vietnam War. Therefore, there was already some "fundamental consideration" on the China policy by the bureaucracy and also by academic experts in America.

As a private citizen, Nixon became more aware of changes in China threat in terms of the decreasing danger of its entry into the Vietnam War. During foreign trips to Europe and Asia, Nixon reassessed China's geopolitical importance. He concluded that China as a central reality with its influence prevailing in Asia could no longer be excluded in the international scene. Thus, Nixon as a political pragmatist came to realize the utility of China for the restoration of the U.S. strategic centrality in the post-Vietnam world. In his Foreign Affairs article of October 1967, Nixon advocated that China should be pulled back into the community of nations, implying that its

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1 Nancy Tucker, Interview with Komine, October 14, 2003.
2 David Shambaugh, Interview with Komine, October 8, 2003.
external behavior should be modified in the long term. Nixon believed that a new China initiative should be taken to make China’s re-emergence safe for the restoration of stability in Asia. Simultaneously, however, he was still concerned about the remaining danger of conservative backlash, and thus carefully avoided providing open-ended support for the idea of a new China initiative.

As this study emphasized, Kissinger was much more sceptical and even slow to comprehend the necessity and possibility of the rapprochement with China than was previously estimated. The development of Sino-Soviet border clashes from March to September 1969 certainly provided a crucial opportunity for Kissinger to assess the necessity of a new China policy. Even in its weakened state, China was “imposing some form of constraint” on the Soviet Union, tying down a large number of Soviet forces along the Sino-Soviet borders.3 Thus, Kissinger came to view the China policy as a part of the broader U.S. Soviet policy. However, Kissinger remained uncertain about the possibility of a new initiative toward Beijing until late 1969. He was pessimistic about the danger of a Soviet military attack on China. Despite his underestimation of the bureaucratic contribution to the U.S. China policy, it was the resumption of Warsaw Ambassadorial Talks in January and February 1970 that finally convinced him that the Chinese were seriously interested in a new dialogue with the United States. Details of unilateral public steps toward Beijing did not really interest Kissinger, and what was much more important for him was to “go there [Beijing] and to lay out the big picture of what the U.S.-China relations could be.”4 Kissinger enhanced his negotiation skills and emerged as a great diplomat only as a result of his substantial talks with Premier Zhou in July and October 1971.

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4 Ibid.
In essence, Nixon’s presidential authority for the political credibility of a new China initiative was even more important than was previously assessed. With his strong willingness for bold action, Nixon articulated the U.S. rapprochement policy, viewing an isolated China as a great threat to peace and stability in Asia and the world. He sought to seize the political opportunity to demonstrate a dramatic opening aimed at the easing of great tensions in the world, especially the ending of the Vietnam War and the promotion of arms control talks with the Soviet Union. In contrast, Kissinger’s role in the early period of the opening to China in 1969 and 1970 was less important than was previously pointed out. As the chief theorist within the Nixon administration, Kissinger examined the structural aspects of the international system in terms of the restoration of its stability. He developed a strategic perspective to formulate a triangular balance of power relationship between the United States, China, and the Soviet Union; the U.S. exploited the escalation of Sino-Soviet mutual hostility and played the central role of pivot between the two communist giants. Komine’s interviews with former U.S. officials and senior academic experts have reconfirmed that it was Nixon’s presidential leadership that drove the new China initiative, and Kissinger was more of a skilful operator and negotiator.

Regarding the materialization of their conception for a new China initiative, Nixon and Kissinger still relied on the foreign policy decision-making machinery in order to obtain expert advice from the bureaucracy. The revitalization of the NSC system by Nixon and Kissinger was a ‘diplomatic coup.’ The exclusion of the State Department from the direct decision-making process was much more systematic than has previously been thought. The revitalized NSC system was planned to conduct a systematic policy study by obtaining a wide range of policy alternatives from
departments and agencies without necessarily informing them of the real objectives of the White House. As former NSC staff member Peter Rodman recalls, Nixon and Kissinger used the interagency process for policy studies "to get what they thought was the best of the wisdom of the bureaucracy."\(^5\) Owing to this excessive secrecy, however, they did not make sufficient use of the expert advice that was available in the State Department. Instead, they relied on policy analysis papers filtered through the perceptions of Kissinger and of his selected NSC staff members.\(^6\) Ironically, however, even State Department officials considered that some secrecy was needed to protect the evolution of a new China initiative from the conservative backlash. Thus, Nixon and Kissinger still could have consulted a limited number of senior officials in the State Department in a highly confidential way in order to make use of their expertise more effectively.\(^7\)

President Nixon took the lead in the new China initiative by sending very confidential memoranda to Kissinger, such as the broad review of U.S. China policy on February 5, 1969, and the promotion of lifting of trade and travel restrictions and the reassessment of the Chinese UN representation issue on November 22, 1970. Nixon had only a handful of senior officials in his inner circle, such as Kissinger, Haig, and Haldeman. In Nixon's confidential meetings with foreign leaders, such as De Gaulle, Yahya, and Ceausescu during 1969, even Kissinger was not present.

\(^5\) Peter Rodman, Oral History Interview, July 22, and August 22, 1994, p.13, Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection (FAOHC), Lauinger Library, Georgetown University.

\(^6\) According to Komine's interviews and oral history collections in this study, there are three types of recollection from former U.S. officials: 1) a highly critical view of Kissinger's (and of Nixon's to a lesser extent) excessive secrecy and exclusion of State Department, such as those from the former Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Marshall Green, and a former NSC staff member, Morton Halperin; 2) a relatively neutral, but still critical view of the Nixon-Kissinger leadership of a China initiative, such as those from former NSC staff members John Holdridge and Richard Solomon, and former State Department official Paul Kreisberg; and 3) a supportive and even defensive view of Kissinger, such as former NSC staff members Winston Lord and Peter Rodman.

\(^7\) Winston Lord, Interview with Komine, October 15, 2003.
Nixon used these meetings to test his views on U.S. China policy. Kissinger thus became much more eager to ensure that he would be included in every important meeting between the President and foreign leaders; and his attempt to exclude Secretary of State William Rogers increased. Paradoxically, however, Nixon was personally reluctant to have a face-to-face meeting with the heads of departments and agencies. Thus, the communication between the Oval Office and the rest of the administration was conducted principally through memoranda, which escalated further secrecy by the White House.

As the National Security Adviser, Kissinger recruited his NSC staff from a variety of background, such as the State Department, the Defense Department, the CIA, and the academia in order to develop diversity and flexibility in policy studies. Regarding the China policy, Kissinger pursued highly personalized secrecy by using strictly restricted NSC staff members, such as Alexander Haig Jr., John Holdridge, Winston Lord, Peter Rodman, and Richard Solomon. The NSC staff provided expertise and developed policy options for a new China initiative, taking short, medium, and long term perspectives. Simultaneously, however, as Solomon recalls, Kissinger was “very jealous of who got credit, and of the visibility that resulted from all facets of the China issue.”

While the NSC staff functioned as the “mini” and “operational State Department,” the State Department itself continued to “manage most of the routine things.” Importantly, despite the pursuit of strict secrecy by Nixon and Kissinger, State Department officials and NSC staff members had informal and private exchanges with each other on the background information of policy studies. In particular, on the basis of past efforts in the earlier administrations, the State Department’s Bureau of

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8 Richard Solomon, Oral History Interview, September 13, 1996, p.28, FAOHC.
9 Solomon, Interview with Komine, September 24, 2003.
East Asian and Pacific Affairs and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research prepared a number of basic materials for policy studies on possible steps towards China. The State Department’s principal interest was the Taiwan issue, such as the language of the ‘One China’ principle, the renouncement of the use of force between Beijing and Taipei, and the Chinese representation issue in the UN. Former Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Marshall Green confirms that: “The focus was so much on Taiwan. China almost meant Taiwan in those days.”

The NSC sub-committees provided very important occasions on which to examine a wide range of policy options to promote a new China initiative. At Review Group meetings (1969-1970) and Senior Review Group meetings (1971) on NSSM studies (such as NSSM 14: Initial review of U.S. China Policy, NSSM 63: Sino-Soviet differences, and NSSMs 106 and 107: the Chinese representation issue in UN), Kissinger encouraged broader discussions for a new China initiative without necessarily revealing his true views. China experts in the State Department urged a friendly dialogue with China in order to encourage its participation in the world community and promote a stable environment in Asia. These experts still thought that Taiwan was a crucial issue that would prevent the U.S. from having a contact with Beijing without giving up its formal diplomatic relations Taipei. On the contrary, Soviet experts opposed any quick move toward China which might provoke Moscow because of its sensitivity to the danger of the Washington-Beijing collusion. In reality, however, as a result of the opening to China, the U.S. became a balancer in Sino-Soviet mutual hostility. Thus, the regional experts who were “too close to a subject” misjudged possible policy alternatives in a broader strategic context.

11 Peter Rodman, Interview with Komine, October 21, 2003.
Implementation

From January 1969 to June 1971, selectively adopting the recommendations from the interdepartmental policy studies, Nixon and Kissinger sent a series of unilateral public signals toward Beijing, such as lifting trade and travel restrictions. Nixon used press conferences, media interviews, and speeches to clarify his personal interest in promoting a new dialogue with the Chinese leaders. Kissinger and his NSC staff drafted the President’s annual Foreign Policy Reports to Congress in order to promote a positive political atmosphere and to encourage China’s participation in the community of nations. Importantly, sending these unilateral public signals did “not require Chinese reaction.”

Simultaneously, owing to their distrust of the State Department, Nixon and Kissinger developed a very closely guarded communication with the Chinese through the backchannels, such as Pakistan, Romania, and France. These channels were based on Nixon’s long-term personal connections with foreign leaders. Nixon and Kissinger privately conveyed to the Chinese leaders that: “We’re the ones you should talk to, and don’t pay much attention to these others.” In every confidential message until June 1971, they stressed that the U.S. was “serious about moving toward them.” In reality, however, owing to excessive secrecy, Nixon and Kissinger occasionally missed subtle signals from the Chinese and also developed difficulty in comprehending complex regional problems, especially the Taiwan issue and the India-Pakistan rivalry.

In military-security terms, while the Chinese insisted on the U.S. total withdrawal from Asia, the Nixon administration sought to justify the continuing U.S. presence in

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12 Rodman, Interview with Komine, October 21, 2003.
13 Rodman, Oral History Interview, July 22, and August 22, 1994, p.15, FAOHC.
14 Rodman, Interview with Komine, October 21, 2003.
the world. In the short term, realizing China’s physical weakness, Nixon and Kissinger sought to exploit the deepening Sino-Soviet mutual hostility. While seeking a new dialogue with China, the Nixon administration also sought to promote détente – the global relaxation of tensions through arms control talks with the Soviet Union. Equally important, it was the reduction of China’s direct threat in Southeast Asia that enabled the U.S. retrenchment of military deployment in the Asia-Pacific region. The Nixon Doctrine of July 1969 thus demanded much more burden sharing among allies in order to promote military withdrawal from the Vietnam War. In the long term, it was China’s potential strength, especially its geopolitical importance in East Asia with nuclear capability, that persuaded Nixon and Kissinger to seek new diplomatic relations with her. In other words, it was too dangerous to leave a nuclear-armed China outside of state interactions.

During the early period of the opening in 1969 and 1970, because of the pursuit of strict secrecy by Nixon and Kissinger, a highly complex bureaucratic rivalry emerged between the White House and the State Department. While the White House focused on promoting U.S. relations with its adversaries, namely China and the Soviet Union, State Department officials were more concerned with maintaining regular U.S. diplomatic relations with its allies, such as the Republic of China and Japan. In contrast to Kissinger’s underestimation in his memoirs, the resumption of the Warsaw Ambassadorial Talks in January and February 1970 was very crucial – it was the first major breakthrough during the U.S. opening to China. As this study demonstrated, from December 1969 to May 1970, the White House and the State Department were respectively testing how far the Chinese were prepared to move forward in a new dialogue with the United States. The bureaucratic preparations for the Warsaw talks
revealed the growing difference between the White House and the State Department regarding the timing, agenda, and channel of direct communication with the Chinese. The State Department took an initial lead by preparing detailed instructions to Ambassador Stoessel in Warsaw. Importantly, it was State Department officials, such as the Director of the Office of Asian Communist Affairs, Paul Kreisberg and a China expert Alfred Jenkins, who originally prepared the draft language on Taiwan. In the February 1970 Warsaw talks, Ambassador Stoessel made clear the U.S. intention to withdraw its armed forces from Taiwan in accordance with the development of the Vietnam settlement. Nixon and Kissinger adopted the same expression in their direct talks with the Chinese leaders in July and October 1971, and in February 1972.

After the January and February 1970 talks, however, the White House became increasingly irritated by the time-consuming nature of the bureaucratic preparations for the Warsaw meetings. As for the materialization of sending a special envoy to Beijing, the State Department’s Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs remained cautious, still seeking to hold one additional Warsaw talk in order to obtain more practical and substantial concessions on the Taiwan issue, especially the agreement on the renunciation of the use of force in the Taiwan Strait. Equally important, owing to the State Department’s briefing to U.S. allies on the Warsaw talks, Nixon and Kissinger became much more sensitive to the danger of leaks. Thus, Nixon and Kissinger wanted to move faster by sending a special envoy to Beijing to hold a direct and secret meeting with the Chinese leaders. From late 1970, seeking to materialize the opening to China before the presidential election of 1972, Nixon and Kissinger thus decided to exclude the bureaucratic involvement and relied on the Pakistan and Romanian backchannels to communicate with the Chinese.
Direct Talks

The bureaucratic preparations for the presidential meetings with the Chinese leaders were much more systematic and substantial than previously estimated. The State Department prepared and sent over the ‘Books’ to the NSC in advance. The NSC staff also wrote their own ‘Books,’ which had more confidential information on the backchannel communications as well as Kissinger’s trips to Beijing in July and October 1971. Thus, as Solomon recalls, “we had a double track system.” These briefing books included the President’s talking points, the anticipated Chinese positions as well as background information about the Chinese leaders’ biographical sketches, Chinese history, philosophy, and culture. Nixon reviewed the briefing books as well as Kissinger’s confidential memoranda carefully and took extensive notes (including comments, questions, and new directives), which reflected the development of his own thoughts on major security issues. Nixon and Kissinger also came to realize the importance of briefings. In his meetings with Cabinet members and Congressional leaders in July 1971 and February 1972, Nixon illustrated the essence of his China initiative, namely the importance of pulling China back into the international community before it became too powerful for the U.S. to manage.

Regarding the great powers encircling China, Nixon and Kissinger assessed that the Chinese feared the Soviets as the most urgent threat, disdained an India backed by the Soviets, and suspected Japan as being a long-term potential threat. Nixon and Kissinger concluded that Beijing would view new relations with Washington as the beginning of a long process for its re-emergence in the international scene. Thus, Nixon and Kissinger sought to convince the Chinese leaders of the advantage of the

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U.S.'s continuous presence in the Asia-Pacific region in order to prevent the emergence of any expansive states. In February 1972, Mao and Nixon agreed that there was no direct threat between the U.S. and China. In particular, there were five major issues between the two sides during the July and October 1971 talks and the February 1972 talks, such as Taiwan, Indochina, Japan, South Asia, and the Soviet Union.

The Taiwan issue was the most sensitive and difficult obstacle between the U.S. and China. There was long-term disagreement between China's insistence on the use of force to resolve the Taiwan question as its internal affairs and the U.S. persistence on a peaceful resolution between Beijing and Taipei. As a historic remainder of the Chinese civil war, the Chinese leaders kept insisting that the Sino-U.S. diplomatic communication could progress only after the Taiwan question was substantially discussed. On the other hand, Nixon and Kissinger tended to perceive Taiwan through the lens of U.S. domestic politics, namely the remaining danger of the conservative backlash from pro-Taiwan conservatives in Congress rather than through the lens of the Nationalist-Communist Chinese civil war. The handling of the Taiwan issue for the Nixon administration was also related to the question of U.S. reliability to its allies in the world. Owing to the excessive secrecy by the White House, however, Washington's rapid move towards Beijing significantly shocked Taipei. In October 1971, Washington failed to preserve Taipei's membership in the United Nations.

In the February 1972 summit, Nixon gave a crucial assurance to Zhou, admitting to the 'One China' principle and pledging a future commitment to withdraw the U.S. armed forces from the islands and to achieve normalization with the People's Republic. Moreover, Nixon gave an assurance that the remaining U.S. armed forces in
Taiwan would discourage the Chinese Nationalists from taking any independent movement, especially launching a military action against the mainland. Importantly, by adopting the State Department’s draft, Nixon and Kissinger sought to link the Taiwan issue with the Vietnam settlement. The joint communiqué thus stated that the U.S. withdrawal of its armed forces from Taiwan would be conducted as the tensions in the area diminished, which principally implied the ending of the U.S. military operation in Indochina. Nixon and Kissinger attempted to defer the Taiwan issue in order to concentrate on the U.S.-Soviet-China triangular relations.

In reality, however, Nixon and Kissinger still underestimated the complexity of the Taiwan issue, especially the importance of the Chinese long-term persistence on its sovereignty on Taiwan. In February 1972, because of Kissinger’s willingness to obtain credit for an historic document, the drafting of the joint communiqué caused a serious flaw, namely the failure to refer to the U.S. defense commitment to the Republic of China. Nixon and Kissinger also failed to obtain Chinese agreement on the renunciation of the use of force in the Taiwan Strait. Overall, by excluding the State Department’s expertise and by rushing to the rapprochement to meet the 1972 presidential election, Nixon and Kissinger made the handling of the Taiwan issue more difficult. The opening of the Liaison Offices in the respective capitals in 1973 was the only official development in the normalization process during the mid 1970s. The Chinese demanded three vital conditions for a full diplomatic normalization, namely: 1) the U.S.’s formal recognition of Beijing as the sole government of China and the end of official Washington-Taipei diplomatic relations; 2) the U.S. military withdrawal from Taiwan; and 3) the termination of the U.S.-Republic of China Security Treaty. After the fall of the Nixon presidency as a result of the Watergate scandal and the damaging of the U.S. reliability to its allies as a result of the collapse
of Indochina policy, the fulfilment of the official normalization became impossible
during the mid 1970s.

The conflicts in Indochina were the most urgent problem for the U.S. in its new
dialogue with China. Nixon and Kissinger sought to reduce tensions in Indochina by
promoting the U.S.'s withdrawal and by inducing China's cooperative attitude
towards a negotiated settlement between Washington and Hanoi. Nixon and Kissinger
also sought to develop a common ground with the Chinese leaders in order to prevent
the emergence of North Vietnam's regional hegemonic aspirations in Indochina
backed by the Soviet Union. For the State Department, the Vietnam factor existed
principally in terms of the danger of China's entry into the Vietnam War. Thus, State
Department officials continued to use the Warsaw Ambassadorial Talks to reassure
the Chinese that the U.S. had no intention to expand the Vietnam War. Importantly,
both the White House and the State Department shared the view that China was not as
dangerous as it was previously estimated.

The Chinese leaders, however, were not necessarily willing to cooperate with the
U.S. in a search for a negotiated settlement in the Vietnam War. Moreover, China's
influence over North Vietnam was more limited than it was previously estimated
among U.S. officials. Both the White House and the State Department underestimated
the degree of Hanoi's independence from Beijing and Moscow. Moreover, the linkage
between the U.S. withdrawal from Taiwan and the U.S. negotiated settlement with
North Vietnam allowed the Chinese to pressure the U.S. for the delay of its
withdrawal from Indochina as well as from Taiwan. Overall, Nixon and Kissinger
were unsuccessful in obtaining Chinese active assistance in Indochina.
Regarding the future of Japan, State Department officials were principally concerned about Japan’s anxiety over the U.S. move toward China. The State Department thus sought to reassure Tokyo by briefing Japanese leaders on the Warsaw Ambassadorial Talks. On the other hand, Nixon and Kissinger focused on the possibility of a more independent Japanese defense policy. In direct talks, Nixon and Kissinger over-exaggerated the danger of the revival of Japan’s military expansionism in order to exploit China’s long-term anxiety. Nixon and Kissinger sought to convince the Chinese leaders that Japan’s independent defense policy should be contained by the preservation of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. In essence, Nixon and Kissinger gave assurance to the Chinese leaders that the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty would play multiple roles to prevent Japan from expanding its influence over Taiwan, Korea, and Indochina. In return, Nixon and Kissinger acquired the Chinese leaders’ tacit acknowledgement of U.S. military bases in Asia. Thus, the U.S. rapprochement with China led to Sino-Japanese rapprochement and the formulation of the U.S.-China-Japan strategic triangle against the Soviet Union.

In the long term, however, the combination of the Nixon Doctrine’s pressure on Japan for further burden sharing in military and economic terms and the rapid development of the U.S. opening to China brought about a functional fragmentation in U.S. relations with Japan. The U.S. single-handed initiative toward China led to Japan’s more independent economic policy and its diplomatic initiative to normalize with China. Nixon and Kissinger calculated that the emergence of diversity between Washington and Tokyo could be contained under its restored credibility in world politics. However, a fragmentation within U.S.-Japan relations continued to remain as a potential source of uncertainty for the regional security in East Asia, creating an imbalance in the U.S. relations with China and Japan respectively in the long term.
It was the India-Pakistan rivalry over which the perception gap between the White House and the State Department became most widened in 1971. Without substantially knowing of Pakistan’s role as a crucial intermediary between the White House and Beijing from late 1970, the State Department’s Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs considered that Pakistan had principally increased tensions and caused the war with India. In contrast, Nixon and Kissinger believed that they had to prove their reliability in the eyes of the Chinese leaders by supporting China’s friend, Pakistan. Nixon and Kissinger also sought to exploit Chinese anxiety by exaggerating the danger of the emergence of India’s Soviet-backed regional hegemony. In reality, however, the Chinese leaders showed little interest in any active involvement in the India-Pakistan conflicts of December 1971. Overall, it was the pursuit of excessive secrecy by Nixon and Kissinger that over-simplified and even distorted the complexity of India-Pakistan regional rivalry. After the February 1972 summit, the India-Pakistan rivalry decreased in its urgent importance as a major security issue between the U.S. and China.

Regarding the deepening Sino-Soviet hostilities, Nixon and Kissinger attempted to induce China’s tacit cooperation against the growing Soviet military threat. In essence, Nixon and Kissinger were fully aware that the U.S.’s position toward the Soviet Union and to China was closer than they were with each other. Nixon and Kissinger thus sought to improve U.S. diplomatic flexibility by pursuing an even-handed approach toward the two states. For the State Department, however, the Soviet factor was not enough to promote a new dialogue with the Chinese; the Soviet factor existed as one of the major issues rather than the principal dominant issue. The State
Department thus underestimated the geopolitical dynamism in the short term, especially the U.S. leverage in the Sino-Soviet rivalry and the impact of the U.S. opening to China on the Soviets as a patron of North Vietnam.

Nixon and Kissinger tended to view the China policy in global terms rather than regional terms. They concentrated on the promotion of a strategic triangle between the U.S., the USSR, and China, and then handled regional problems in terms of how they enhanced or interfered with the overall stability in the international system. Their primary concern with local conflicts was “when a big power attempts to exploit them for its own ends.”\(^{16}\) Thus, Nixon and Kissinger over-exaggerated the Soviet threat and essentially imposed the simplified measures that developed from global security on the complex regional security. Equally important, owing to the pursuit of the strategic triangle, Washington tended to be highly sensitive to the possible reactions from Beijing in both global and regional security. After the fall of the Nixon presidency, Kissinger calculated that the continuation of a China policy would sustain the imagery of the U.S.’s commitment in international affairs. The fundamental framework of the strategic triangle continued to remain crucial in the U.S. relations with China.

In conclusion, the pursuit of strict secrecy brought about surprise as well as imagery in the U.S. rapprochement with China, restoring the U.S. credibility in world politics in the short term. It appeared that Nixon and Kissinger anticipated that the overwhelming impacts of the historic opening justified its highly secretive means and processes. However, the rapid and dramatic U.S. opening to China made the international and domestic audiences over-expectant for further developments. In other words, Nixon and Kissinger over-sold the ending of mutual hostility and the

\(^{16}\) Memcon, Kissinger and Zhou, June 20, 1972, 2:05-6:05p.m., p.27, Country Files – Far East, Box 97, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
easing of tensions with China. Moreover, there was a wishful thinking among U.S. officials that China could be brought to accept restraints in regional security to facilitate the overall easing of tensions in global security. Certainly, Nixon and Kissinger never expected that a single summit would eliminate many conflicting issues in the U.S. relations with China. However, Nixon and Kissinger still underestimated the depth of the perception gap between the two sides over the respective worldviews. The Chinese leaders would not allow the U.S. to continue to use its new relations with China for the improvement of U.S. centrality in the world. Moreover, by pursuing the highly secret diplomacy with Mao and Zhou, Kissinger placed himself in the front position of direct U.S. negotiation with China. The Chinese leaders sought to exploit this personalized relationship to pressure and even intimidate Kissinger, criticizing the delay of the U.S. diplomatic normalization with China.

Overall, the U.S. rapprochement with China in the early 1970s played the crucial role of a substantial learning process and subsequently characterized Washington’s diplomatic communication with Beijing in the long term, namely in the pursuit of highly personalized diplomacy with the Chinese leaders. After the February 1972 summit, neither side allowed the remaining conflicting interests to jeopardize the newly established communication. U.S. officials realized that they could disagree with the Chinese leaders and that, despite intervals, negotiation could be resumed at a later date as long as the diplomatic communication line itself was preserved. Thus, the U.S. rapprochement marked the beginning of the long process to pursue pragmatic co-existence with China - neither as a friend nor an enemy.
APPENDIX:

The Joint Communiqué between the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China
Shanghai,
February 27, 1972

President Richard Nixon of the United States of America visited the People’s Republic of China at the invitation of Premier Chou En-lai of the People’s Republic of China from February 21 to February 28, 1972. Accompanying the President were Mrs. Nixon, U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers, Assistant to the President Dr. Henry Kissinger, and other American officials. President Nixon met with Chairman Mao Tse-tung of the Communist Party of China on February 21. The two leaders had a serious and frank exchange of views on Sino-U.S. relations and world affairs.

During the visit, extensive, earnest and frank discussions were held between President Nixon and Premier Chou En-lai on the normalization of relations between the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China, as well as on other matters of interest to both sides. In addition, Secretary of State William Rogers and Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei held talks in the same spirit.

President Nixon and his party visited Peking and viewed cultural, industrial and agricultural sites, and they also toured Hangchow and Shanghai where, continuing discussions with Chinese leaders, they viewed similar places of interest.

The leaders of the People’s Republic of China and the United States of America found it beneficial to have this opportunity, after so many years without contact, to present candidly to one another their views on a variety of issues. They reviewed the international situation in which important changes and great upheavals are taking place and expounded their respective positions and attitudes.

The U.S. side stated: Peace in Asia and peace in the world requires efforts both to reduce immediate tensions and to eliminate the basic causes of conflict. The United States will work for a just and secure peace: just, because it fulfills the aspirations of peoples and nations for freedom and progress; secure, because it removes the danger of foreign aggression. The United States supports individual freedom and social progress for all the peoples of the world, free of outside pressure or intervention. The United States believes that the effort to reduce tensions is served by improving communication between countries that through accident, miscalculation or misunderstanding. Countries should treat each other with mutual respect and be willing to compete peacefully, letting performance be the ultimate judge. No country should claim infallibility and each country should be prepared to re-examine its own attitudes for the common good. The United States stressed that the peoples of Indochina should be allowed to determine their destiny without outside intervention; its constant primary objective has been a negotiated solution; the eight-point proposal put forward by the Republic of Vietnam and the United States on January 27, 1972 represents a basis for the attainment of that objective; in the absence of a negotiated settlement the United States envisages the ultimate withdrawal of all U.S. forces from
the region consistent with the aim of self-determination for each country of Indochina. The United States will maintain its close ties with and support for the Republic of Korea; the United States will support efforts of the Republic of Korea to seek a relaxation of tension and increased communication in the Korean peninsula. The United States places the highest value on its friendly relations with Japan; it will continue to develop the existing close bonds. Consistent with the United Nations Security Council Resolution of December 21, 1971, the United States favors the continuation of the ceasefire between India and Pakistan and the withdrawal of all military forces to within their own territories and to their own sides of the ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir; the United States supports the right of the peoples of South Asia to shape their own future in peace, free of military threat, and without having the area become the subject of great power rivalry.

The Chinese side stated: Wherever there is oppression, there is resistance. Countries want independence, nations want liberation and the people want revolution - this has become the irresistible trend of history. All nations, big or small, should be equal; big nations should not bully the small and strong nations should not bully the weak. China will never be a superpower and it opposes hegemony and power politics of any kind. The Chinese side stated that it firmly supports the struggles of all the oppressed people and nations for freedom and liberation and that the people of all countries have the right to choose their social systems according to their own wishes and the right to safeguard the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of their own countries and oppose foreign aggression, interference, control and subversion. All foreign troops should be withdrawn to their own countries. The Chinese side expressed its firm support to the peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in their efforts for the attainment of their goal and its firm support to the seven-point proposal of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam and the elaboration of February this year on the two key problems in the proposal, and to the Joint Declaration of the Summit Conference of the Indochinese Peoples. It firmly supports the eight-point program for the peaceful unification of Korea put forward by the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on April 12, 1971, and the stand for the abolition of the "U.N. Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea." It firmly opposes the revival and outward expansion of Japanese militarism and firmly supports the Japanese people's desire to build an independent, democratic, peaceful and neutral Japan. It firmly maintains that India and Pakistan should, in accordance with the United Nations resolutions on the India-Pakistan question, immediately withdraw all their forces to their respective territories and to their own sides of the ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir and firmly supports the Pakistan Government and people in their struggle to preserve their independence and sovereignty and the people of Jammu and Kashmir in their struggle for the right of self-determination.

There are essential differences between China and the United States in their social systems and foreign policies. However, the two sides agreed that countries, regardless of their social systems, should conduct their relations on the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, non-aggression against other states, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, equality and mutual
benefit, and peaceful coexistence. International disputes should be settled on this basis, without resorting to the use or threat of force. The United States and the People's Republic of China are prepared to apply these principles to their mutual relations.

With these principles of international relations in mind the two sides stated that:

- progress toward the normalization of relations between China and the United States is in the interests of all countries;
- both wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict;
- neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony; and
- neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter into agreements or understandings with the other directed at other states.

Both sides are of the view that it would be against the interests of the peoples of the world for any major country to collude with another against other countries, or for major countries to divide up the world into spheres of interest.

The two sides reviewed the long-standing serious disputes between China and the United States. The Chinese reaffirmed its position: The Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the United States; the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government of China; Taiwan is a province of China which has long been returned to the motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China's internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere; and all U.S. forces and military installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan. The Chinese Government firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creation of "one China, one Taiwan," "one China, two governments," "two Chinas," and "independent Taiwan" or advocate that "the status of Taiwan remains to be determined."

The U.S. side declared: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes.

The two sides agreed that it is desirable to broaden the understanding between the two peoples. To this end, they discussed specific areas in such fields as science, technology, culture, sports and journalism, in which people-to-people contacts and exchanges would be mutually beneficial. Each side undertakes to facilitate the further development of such contacts and exchanges.

Both sides view bilateral trade as another area from which mutual benefit can be derived, and agreed that economic relations based on equality and mutual benefit are in the interest of the peoples of the two countries. They agree to facilitate the progressive development of trade between their two countries.
The two sides agreed that they will stay in contact through various channels, including the sending of a senior U.S. representative to Peking from time to time for concrete consultations to further the normalization of relations between the two countries and continue to exchange views on issues of common interest.

The two sides expressed the hope that the gains achieved during this visit would open up new prospects for the relations between the two countries. They believe that the normalization of relations between the two countries is not only in the interest of the Chinese and American peoples but also contributes to the relaxation of tension in Asia and the world.

President Nixon, Mrs. Nixon and the American party expressed their appreciation for the gracious hospitality shown them by the Government and people of the People’s Republic of China.
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