Presupposition, (ideological) knowledge management and gender: a socio-cognitive discourse analytical approach

Alexandra Polyzou

B.A. English Language and Literature
Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Greece

M.A. Language Studies
Lancaster University, U.K.

This thesis is submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
November 2012
Abstract

The thesis proposes cognitive linguistics, and in particular cognitive approaches to presupposition, as a suitable theoretical basis for critical discourse analysis, and explores empirically a sample of texts in order to examine knowledge management in relation to gender, sexuality and sexual health in Greek lifestyle magazines.

I claim that theorising language in terms of cognition can account for the constructive aspect of discourse through the accumulation of cognitive effects, while at the same time discourse is constructed by and reflects social structure in that discourse production draws on shared and commonly accepted knowledge and attitudes in any given context (Ch. 2). I argue that the way knowledge is not only drawn on but also reproduced or contested in discourse is related to the study of presupposition, including the presentation of propositions as ‘given’ (known and commonly accepted) and/or backgrounded and therefore incontestable.

Presupposition has been defined and identified in very different ways within the critical study of discourse, and part of this thesis (Ch. 3) has aimed to disentangle this confusion by exploring the theoretical underpinnings and empirical applications of the concept within the field. I propose studying presupposition more systematically by explicitly taking into account the three parameters which seem to have always influenced the study of presupposition (defined prototypically as a figure-ground distinction where the ground is also triggered and necessary for meaning making): how open to contestation a belief is, how fore- or backgrounded it is, and whether (and to what extent) we can assume it to be known to potential audiences of a text (Ch. 4).
In terms of methodology I suggest a method similar to the study of category norms in order to find out which items are considered prototypical members of a category at a particular point in time among a specific population; in this case the focus has been on discovering prototypical lifestyle magazine titles for the Greek public (see 5.2). I further explore the classification of texts in ‘genre categories’ based on communicative purpose when a discourse community does not have specific names for such categories (see 5.3); in this case, in Greece there are not always specific names for the different types of texts to be found in lifestyle magazines, at least among non-professionals. Finally, within each text I propose distinguishing among different levels of presupposition, from looking at framing activated by single lexical items to examining broad systems of belief or ‘discourses’ pertaining to the data (4.5 and 5.5).

In terms of empirical critical discourse analysis, I chose to examine three texts on the issue of sexual health, one from *Status* (men’s magazine), one from *Cosmopolitan* and one from *Marie Claire* (women’s magazines) in relation to the negotiation between traditional and more recent (hetero)normative beliefs in relation to gender and sexual conduct. The analysis has focused on the frame and sentence levels and has indicated that although there is a higher degree of permissiveness in relation to female sexuality, women in Greece still have to choose or balance between traditional ideals of chastity and modesty and equally pressing imperatives of (penetrative heterosexual) sexual activity circulated (and taken for granted) in popular culture texts.
Declaration

I hereby confirm that this thesis is my own work, and has not been submitted in substantially the same form for the award of a higher degree elsewhere.

Alexandra Polyzou

Lancaster University, November 2012
Στη γιαγιά μου Ελπινίκη,
συνεχή πηγή έμπνευσης και δύναμης

To my grandmother Elpiniki,
constant source of strength and inspiration
Acknowledgements

First and foremost I would like to thank my parents, Eleni Tsourdalaki and Dimitris Polyzos - for their financial support, their help and their patience. Also my little brother Nikos for the inspiration, and my extended family for their support. I must acknowledge my father’s help specifically with the data collection in Greece – he would make an excellent researcher!

I cannot thank enough my supervisor Paul Chilton, but I will try by pointing out that ‘Ο μὲν γὰρ μοι τὸ ἣν ἔχαρισετο, ὅ δὲ τὸ καλὸς ἦν ἐπαιδευσεν’. Despite any remaining weaknesses, the thesis has benefitted a lot by Paul’s critical and insightful comments and unwavering support.

I have had the good fortune to have met some very inspiring teachers throughout my education, and I would like to acknowledge influence of the academic staff of the Department of English Language and Literature, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki during the years 1999-2002, and some of them beyond this period.

The people from the Department of Linguistics and (Modern) English Language to whom I am grateful are too numerous to mention here – members of staff, colleagues and fellow students Lancaster-based, away or visiting.

Many thanks to Marjorie Wood, administrative co-ordinator, for having solutions to all sorts of problems and for her kindness and support for problems that have no solutions. Among the academic staff I am particularly indebted to Ruth Wodak and Elena Semino for help and inspiration in various academic, administrative and professional issues. Working with Greg Myers and Mark Sebba has also been a valuable contribution to my professional development.
I would like to also thank the members of the Lancaster University Research Groups: the Gender and Language Research Group/ RiGLs, especially Surin Kaur whose passion and critical mind have been very inspiring, as well as the Pragmatics and Stylistics Research Group and the Language, Ideology and Power Research Group.

Among my many inspiring, critical and influential fellow students and colleagues, I would like to thank the more specifically Steve Oswald and Paul Sarazin for interesting discussions on ideology, cognition and manipulation, Konstantia Kosetzi on Faircloughian CDA and aspects of gender and language research, Dimitra Vladimirou for her expertise on academic writing. In addition, they have all been sources of inspiring and critical comments on a variety of issues as well as support and encouragement.

I am also grateful, for both academic inspiration and emotional support, to Salomi Boukala, Berhnard and Simone Forchtner, Costas Gabrielatos, Ele Lamb (special thanks for proofreading parts of the thesis), Adele Peticlerc, Katerina Psarikidou, Ayako Tominari and Ana Tominc. In addition to providing the above, Helen Hargreaves, Janina Iwaniec, Kathrin Kaufhold, Amelie Kutter, Sharon McCulloch, Sylva Svejdarova and Ulrike Zschache have offered the warmest hospitality I could have expected. Thanks to Laura Cariola and Anthony Capstick for the positive vibes. From Oxford Brookes University, thanks to Alon Lischinsky, Michelle Paule and Tom Tyler.

Special thanks to Urszula Skrzypik for her kindness and generosity.

Teun van Dijk has offered valuable comments on Ch. 2 – although I have not taken up all of them here, they have nevertheless been stimulating food for thought.
Thanks to Majid KhosraviNik for being there through various stages of this thesis and offering insightful critique as well as emotional and practical support.

Conversations with Chris Hart and John Richardson have been inspiring during the latest stages of my thesis.

Finally, I am grateful to all participants who filled in the questionnaires analysed in Ch. 5, helping thus with the data selection.

The Greek State Scholarship Foundation (IKY) has provided funding for the thesis. The William Ritchie Travel Fund of Lancaster University has made it possible for me to present my work at the conferences IPrA 2011 and CADAAD 2012.
# Table of contents

Abstract ii  
Declaration iv  
Dedication v  
Acknowledgments vi  
Table of Contents ix  
List of figures and tables xiii  

1. Introduction 1  
1.1. Theoretical background 1  
1.2. Gender relations in contemporary Greece 4  
1.3. Research questions 9  
1.4. Outline of the thesis 15  

2. Discourse, cognition and society 18  
2.1. Introduction 18  
2.2. Interrelation of Discourse, Cognition and Society 18  
2.2.1. Discourse 18  
2.2.2. Discourse and cognition – Discursive psychology 23  
2.2.2.a. Studying cognition is essentialist 24  
2.2.2.b. Studying cognition (in relation to language) means assuming cognition (and/or language) to be stable 27  
2.2.2.c. Studying cognition is individualistic 28  
2.2.2.d. Cognition cannot be observed and therefore cannot be studied 30  
2.2.3. Conclusion 31  
2.3. Discourse and Cognition in CDA 32  
2.4. Aspects of social cognition 36  
2.4.1. Ideology vs. Knowledge 41  
2.5. Mental models 44  
2.5.1. Frames– definitions and related terms 44  
2.5.2. Personal and social cognitive representations 47  
2.5.3. Stereotypes 48  
2.6. Gender and discourse 59  
2.6.1. Gender, discourse and social representations 59  
2.6.2. Feminist linguistics and CDA 61  
2.6.3. Gender, cognition and critical discourse analysis 63  
2.7. Conclusion 66  

3. Presupposition - a review 67  
3.1. Introduction 67  
3.2. Presupposition in Truth Conditional Semantics 68  
3.3. Pragmatic and cognitive accounts of presupposition 73  
3.3.1. Truth value vs. appropriacy and background knowledge 73  
3.3.2. Presupposition and cognition – Insights from presupposition negation 77  
3.3.3. Presupposition and cognition – Framing and mental spaces 79  
3.4. Analysing presupposition in discourse 89  
3.4.1. Questioning/ refuting presupposition in discourse 89
3.4.2. Recent critical analyses of presupposition in discourse

3.5. Conclusion


4.1. Introduction

4.2. Meaning: Presupposing vs. Evoking

4.3. Background knowledge and presupposition

4.3.1. Known vs. Unknown
   a) Beliefs not asserted because they are shared/already known
   b) Beliefs represented as known and shared
   c) Beliefs asserted because they are new to the recipient
   d) Beliefs represented as new
   e) Beliefs that are not known and not asserted

4.3.2. Degree of certainty/’definiteness’
   a) Beliefs represented as ‘given/unquestionable’
   b) Knowledge ‘open to contestation’

4.3.3. Degree of emphasis/focus
   a) Knowledge not mentioned, or backgrounded and not processed
   b) Knowledge backgrounded and processed
   c) Foregrounded knowledge

4.3.4. Conclusion

4.4. (Re)defining presupposition

4.5. Levels of presupposition

4.5.1. Frame level

4.5.2. Sentence level

4.5.3. Text level

4.5.4. Discourse level

4.5.5. Pragmatic competence level

4.6. ‘Ideologicity’

4.7. Conclusion

5. Methodology

5.1. Introduction

5.2. Selecting prototypical magazines

5.2.1. Prototype theory and category norms

5.2.2. The questionnaire design and pilot

5.2.3. Questionnaire distribution

5.2.4. Questionnaire analysis and findings

5.3. Selecting genre

5.3.1. Introduction

5.3.2. Approaching genre from a functional perspective

5.3.3. Methodology of categorisation – the two initial stages

5.3.4. Text types as ‘speech act categories’ and ‘genre categories’

5.4. Selecting theme: Sexual health

5.5. Methodology of analysis

5.6. A note on translation

5.7. Conclusion
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9.2.</td>
<td>Hypothetical spaces in <em>Marie Claire</em></td>
<td>305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.3.</td>
<td>Hypothetical spaces in <em>Status</em></td>
<td>315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.4.</td>
<td>Hypothetical spaces in <em>Cosmopolitan</em></td>
<td>323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.4.1.</td>
<td>Solution spaces</td>
<td>325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.4.2.</td>
<td>Problem spaces</td>
<td>327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.4.3.</td>
<td>Danger spaces</td>
<td>331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.5.</td>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.1.</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.2.</td>
<td>Research questions – and answers</td>
<td>336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.3.</td>
<td>Limitations and suggestions for further research</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendices
List of figures and tables

Figure 1: Levels of text classification according to function 177

Table 1: Demographics of participants 166
Table 2: Men’s magazines titles occurring on the first slot 167
Table 3: Women’s magazines titles occurring on the first slot 168
Table 4: Magazines occurring 12 or more times in total 168-9
Table 5: Women’s magazines in order of prototypicality 170
Table 6: Men’s magazines in order of prototypicality 170
Table 7: Men’s magazines found to be prototypical in Polyzou (2004) 171
Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1. Theoretical background

In the broadest sense, this thesis emerged out of an academic and political interest in discourse, society and cognition, and a firm belief that the three are interrelated. Thus, one of its main aims is to further an interdisciplinary synergy of relevant fields.

Cognitive Linguistics, and Cognitive Semantics in particular, have, in my view, provided a more convincing account of natural language meaning than logical and generative approaches, while Sociolinguistics in the broadest sense (including, among other fields, those known as Feminist Linguistics and Critical Linguistics/Critical Discourse Analysis) provides powerful accounts of the role of language in the establishment and contestation of stereotypes, ideologies and, ultimately, social injustice and social change. These, and other related fields, have developed largely independently of each other, making significant contributions to our understanding of the way our mind, knowledge, discourse and society work. However theoretical approaches and findings from these fields have not, overall, been utilised to advance one another's research agendas. Bringing these accounts together follows from believing that the way we think, the way we act and the way we speak influence each other (formulated by Teun van Dijk as the Discourse-Cognition-Society triangle).

The study of cognition, in particular, is relatively new to the critical analysis of discourse, although van Dijk has been advocating a theoretical socio-cognitive account of ideology and discourse since at least the late 1970's (van Dijk, 1977; 1990; 1994; 1997; 1998; 2003; 2005; 2006; 2008). However, van Dijk's theoretical approach, rooted to a large extent in classical Social Psychology, even if heeded,
appears to be particularly difficult to operationalise without recourse to traditional (not necessarily cognitively informed) theories and methodologies of discourse analysis (as in van Dijk, 2000; 2001a – but see more recent work such as van Dijk, 2005 and Bekalu, 2006). Social Psychology has been utilising insights in the workings of cognition, considering, for example, issues of attention, processing of information and prototypicality effects (see, for example, Fiske and Taylor, 1991; 2013). However, it has not always focussed on language, or at least not always engaged with a detailed theorisation of language and cognition.

Cognitive Linguistics with its tenet that linguistic/semantic knowledge interacts with ‘world (encyclopaedic) knowledge’ (Fillmore, 1985; Croft and Cruse, 2004: Ch. 1) seems particularly suited to make links between cognition, language and the social world. Such an understanding of language would explain how our understanding of the world can be influenced by the language we are exposed to, as well how our world experiences and beliefs about the world influence our production of discourse.

However, Cognitive Linguistics is a relatively young field. It has made progress over the past 30 years in advancing a cognitive theorisation of language without extending its theoretical insights into the study of discourse and society. Despite early work notably by Chilton (1985; 1987; 1988; 1996) and, more recently, George Lakoff (1991; 2002; 2003; 2004), it is only very recently that calls have been increasing for a systematic theoretical and methodological cross-fertilisation between cognitively-oriented and socially-oriented approaches to language (e.g. Dirven, Hawkins and Sandikçioğlu; Dirven, Frank and Ilie, 2001; Chilton, 2005; 2011; Oswald, 2010; Hart. 2010; Sarazin, in preparation).

The fact that Cognitive Linguistics has confined itself to linguistic structures usually no longer than a few sentences at most, and its research focus on language and
cognition as opposed to social context, does not make it immediately apparent in what ways studying cognition might be not only an academic but also a political endeavour. Indeed most calls for a synergy between critical discourse analysis and cognitive research, from van Dijk to Chilton and Hart, have focused on the explanatory power of cognitive approaches in relation to the effects of discourse. Critical social research, on the other hand, or at least one understanding of it, can be seen as aiming not only to explain but also to evaluate, if not attempt to alter, the social context(s) under study. This understanding of critical research involves different aims and research agendas, starting with a social issue the researcher sees as requiring further attention and potential action (Wodak and Meyer, 2001; 2009b). However, it needs to be borne in mind that understanding and explanation of social phenomena, including the use of language, is necessary for action – indeed action is determined by understanding and explanation. Thus, we do not only need to determine how discriminatory action, for example, follows from discriminatory beliefs of the perpetrators, but also what beliefs we, as academics and political beings, hold about the way discourse and the mind work in producing such discriminatory action, if we are to advocate ways to end discrimination. On the other hand, a study of society in itself (regardless of whether it focuses on cognition or not) is not necessarily critical if it merely aims to describe and explain social phenomena without offering social critique, and such work can be and is being done in both Social Psychology and Sociolinguistics. In that sense, Cognitive Linguistics can be and is critical insofar as it is applied to the study of discourse in context, and expanded to critique the social context(s) in which the discourse under study occurs and operates.

Applying Cognitive Linguistic theories to the study of discourse in context, and further to the critical analysis of discourse bound to specific social contexts, is clearly
not straightforward. Apart from the need to further develop theory and methodology to suit these newly found aims, ‘discourse’, ‘society’ and ‘cognition’ are complex and fluid, and no one single piece of research can account for this complexity (for further discussion on the discourse-society-cognition interrelation, see Chapter 2). Nevertheless, I maintain that studying cognitive phenomena and discourse in relation to specific social problems remains a worthwhile endeavour, to which I have attempted to make a small contribution in the present thesis.

Thus, although the main focus of the thesis is the theoretical and methodological link between socially and cognitively oriented approaches to discourse, there is also a strong focus on exploring aspects of the social issue of gender relations in Greek society. In the following section I would like to provide a general background in relation to this latter area before I move on to delineating my specific research questions and providing an overview of the contents of the thesis.

### 1.2. Gender relations in contemporary Greece

It is in the past few decades that Greek society has been moving from what we might crudely call a traditional patriarchy to a post-feminist stage (see Kosetzi, 2007, for a detailed account). Especially since the 1980s, Greek women have been afforded a range of newly founded privileges and freedoms more on a par with those of men, and legislative measures have been explicitly geared towards promoting gender equality, while at the same time there has been an increase of covert sexism, with gender equality officially paid lip-service to, but not necessarily applied in practice.
In this context I have been particularly interested in examining the tensions and challenges faced by a generation of women who 'have nothing to complain about', and who grew up believing they are equal with men, or at least as equal as they needed to be. The more I have been learning about the conditions of women's lives historically and across social and geographical contexts (Barker and Adkins, 1996, has offered some particularly memorable accounts), the more aware I have been becoming of the privileged position I was in. I have been observing that women of my generation were educated, and allowed to complete higher education without question (indeed encouraged to do so), were expected to enter paid employment and even actually get some satisfaction from their careers, they generally assumed that they would receive a certain amount of respect from their husbands and co-workers and not live in fear of violence or their reputations being damaged for enjoying their sexuality. Appreciation of these advantages can easily obscure the fact that women in Greece nowadays are still expected to get husbands and procreate, at least eventually, they still need to police their heterosexual desires within acceptable limits (broader than in the past, but still more restrictive in comparison to men's), and that they need to if not suppress, at least be very 'discreet' and careful about whether and how they might have and express any homosexual desires (see Chapter 6 for a more detailed account of aspects of heteronormativity in contemporary Greece). Also in the home and workplace, middle-class Greek women who 'have it all' in fact still shoulder the majority of housework and childcare duties, work less and in less gainful employment than men, and follow an unequal gender differentiation of prescribed behaviours and roles, often uncritically accepted and thus not seen as cause for concern, let alone social unrest.
Tensions between centuries of tradition and the range of opportunities available to Greek women today (at least in theory) have given rise to a range of new social practices and discourses concerning what it means to be a woman and what it means to be a man (or what would be the ‘ideal woman’ and ‘ideal man’) in contemporary Greek society. Such ideological constructs are available to men and women through discourses they are exposed to (and use themselves) daily. Examining mass media discourse provides insights into these ideological beliefs, and the impact of media discourse is more immediate and prevalent than, say, institutional discourse such as legislation and guidelines. ‘It is in part through such representations that we come to know what the world is like, and our ‘lived realities’ are scarcely independent of that media-derived knowledge’ (Meinhof and Richardson, 1994: 4). I am interested in examining lifestyle magazines as a snapshot of the trivial — the discourse which we all may encounter at various points and to different extents and which usually is not seen as anything more important than a cursory leafing through to kill time. In short, lifestyle magazines present one type of discourse that is unmarked in many ways, yet is everywhere, and thus in many ways represents what is normal. This is of course an oversimplification — at least, in the pages of these lifestyle magazines many readers declare their allegiance to the magazine as a valuable friend, a source not only of entertainment but also of comfort and knowledge (cf. Hermes, 1995). At the same time the fact that for many people lifestyle magazines are trivial does not mean that their contents are viewed with approval — indeed a more traditional viewpoint would readily condemn the hedonistic consumerism, vanity and sexual liberation advocated in the pages of the magazines as not very far from a moral catastrophe. Nevertheless, the generations of young Greek men and women born from the 1980s onwards have been continuously exposed to such ‘lifestyle discourses’, not only through magazines
but also through TV, radio and the Internet, in a way that previous generations have not. Moreover, while old-fashioned Greek family-centeredness and morality are often faced with scorn from the younger generations, they still hold strong in influencing their behaviours and lives, sometimes meeting the newer ‘lifestyle discourses’ halfway, sometimes in surprising consonance with them when it comes to perpetuating ideas of gender difference (and inequality).

Both men and women’s lifestyle magazines thus oscillate between rejecting some aspects of old-fashioned overt sexism, repackaging some of them in more fashionable wrapping paper, and advocating new beliefs which are often covertly sexist. In women’s magazines, consumer feminism and the conflation of sexual liberation with new normative demands of the so-called ‘raunch culture’ are two examples of the most common new forms of covert sexism (Walker, 2010; Power, 2009, both cited and reviewed in Dolezal, 2010; Levy, 2005). Men’s magazines similarly aim to avoid appearing old-fashioned, while simultaneously capitalising on material and symbolic privileges traditionally bestowed on men. New forms of sexism in Greek men’s magazines seem to stem from and indeed surpass more traditionally sexist beliefs. In place of the traditional ideal of the male ‘breadwinner’ who is entitled to do no housework, we now have a tongue-in-cheek celebration of dirtiness as an essentially masculine trait (Kosetzi and Polyzou, 2009). The stereotypical dichotomy of men as rational and women as emotional creatures, in conjunction with beliefs about men’s uncontrollable sexuality (Hollway, 1984) evolves in celebration of casual, unemotional sex and in sanctioning the objectification of women as not simply a necessary evil but a desirable state of affairs, to be pursued at all costs. Such exaggerated open sexism is certainly made possible by the utilisation of irony and humour (Benwell, 2002; 2003; 2004), but it is still significant that such jokes would
not have been acceptable fifty years ago, and would potentially be more widely seen as offensive to men, being at odds at least with the ideal of the good provider and *pater familias*.

Middle class women aged approximately between 18-45, the most privileged group of women, are still evaluated and encouraged to evaluate themselves on the basis of their sexual appeal to men and a presentation of 'tasteful' self to other women. Relationships, no longer under the strict perscriptiveness of previous generations, become personal projects to be developed through a set of normative 'guidelines', while men, through a 'Battle of the Sexes' discourse, are normatively expected to do everything in their power to 'sabotage' the project. It is perhaps easy to see that a project/war approach to relationships is self-defeating. At the same time, men and women do not blindly follow the relationship and lifestyle 'manuals' provided in magazines (heterosexual relationships do continue to exist after all, which entails the participation of men, not only women, and not all of them necessarily in the continuous state of doubt and tension described in lifestyle magazines), and there is no coercion, at least at an institutional, overt level, to follow any of the advice given or accept any of the proclamations made in the magazines.

Thus, what men and women *think* actually matters, insofar as they have a range of choices available as to how they will live their lives. Presuming that the main aim of lifestyle magazines as media products is to maintain an appeal with their audiences and continue selling copies, rather than to advocate particular beliefs about how society is or should be, common ground with the audience will be sought on matters taken to be the beliefs of the audiences, while other agendas (such as consumerism) will not necessarily be explicitly stated and promoted — they may be presented tentatively, with a high degree of mitigation and perhaps arguments in their favour, or
they may be presented as taken for granted, incontestable truths which everybody already agrees on.

One of the aims of this thesis, then, is to examine issues such as the 'common knowledge', presumed to be shared among magazine readers and magazine producers alike, and the representation of ideological beliefs as incontestable and taken for granted. As the instruments for pursuing this aim, it seems natural to draw on, and develop the theory of presupposition, a phenomenon often linked to both common ground and incontestability, and thus in principle to the kind of socially shared ideologies I have just outlined. In the following section I formulate these goals as research questions and provide a brief rationale for their choice.

1.3. Research questions

My research questions consist of one broad theoretical/methodological question, one more specific methodological one and an empirical one, which I present here in order of primacy:

RQ1

How can presupposition be theorised and applied in a cognitively and pragmatically informed methodological framework for the critical analysis of texts, and for the exploration of gender and language in particular?

RQ2

More specifically, how can presupposition as an analytical category be operationalised for critical discourse analysis based on theoretical insights from Frame Semantics, Conceptual Metaphor Theory and Mental Space Theory, and what further observations can be made when applying these theories and related methodologies to Greek language data?
RQ3

What are the ideological assumptions regarding gender and sexuality underlying Greek men’s and women’s lifestyle magazines, namely *Marie Claire*, *Cosmopolitan* and *Status*?

Below I discuss the rationale underlying these research questions, and the means employed to explore them.

RQ1 - Theoretical/methodological

How can presupposition be theorised and applied in a cognitively and pragmatically informed methodological framework for the critical analysis of texts, and for the exploration of gender and language in particular?

In order to answer this question I have reviewed a range of theoretical approaches to presupposition and examples of the application of presupposition in the critical analysis of discourse including, among other topics, the analysis of ideology and power in relation to gender in discourse (Chapter 3). These approaches have not necessarily been informed by cognitive approaches to language but follow a largely truth-conditional account. Furthermore, methodologies of presupposition identification and analysis have not always been explicit, and it appears that different scholars have different understandings of presupposition even when they work in the same or closely related field(s) of discourse analysis. Thus, answering this research question has required a re-theorisation and systematisation of the concept of presupposition and the levels of analysis for its application.

Starting from cognitive and pragmatic theories, I have defined presupposition broadly as

a propositionbelief, concept or system of beliefs forming the ground in a figure-ground distinction in discourse. Prototypically, presupposition is the proposition
forming the ground which surfaces in the discourse on sentence level and is attributed to the mutually accepted Reality Space of the participants in the interaction.

Thus, I propose (Chapter 4) that a systematic framework of presupposition analysis should examine whether, in the co-text, information is presented as shared or new, whether it is presented as incontestable or open to contestation, and whether it is foregrounded or backgrounded. For methodological reasons one also needs to acknowledge that ‘figure’ and ‘ground’ are differently manifested at different levels of discourse. Thus I draw distinctions among the following levels:

- frame level
- sentence level
- text level
- discourse level and
- pragmatic competence level.

Any method of categorising parts of discourse is bound to contain a certain degree of artificiality and objectification of what is a complex dynamic process. It is important to acknowledge that in terms of meaning-making all of the above categories are processed simultaneously, and that the above levels interact – for example, an essential part of understanding sentences and texts is understanding the frames activated by specific lexical items (e.g. noun or verb phrases), while at the same time a recipient’s understanding of the overall communicative purposes of a text and the discursive and social contexts in which it occurs will influence how specific lexical items will be interpreted. Nevertheless, when analysing texts this level distinction allows us to point with more precision to the elements of the text which have prompted the analyst’s interpretation and the analyst’s claims about, for example, the activation of ideological beliefs.
In this thesis I specifically focus on the first two levels of the framework, examining the frame level and partially the sentence level of figure-ground distinctions in discourse and exploring the triggering of shared information vs. presentation of new information, degree of contestability and degree of foregrounding. To this end I employ Frame Semantics and Conceptual Metaphor Theory in respect to triggering metaphorical frames, and Mental Space Theory in examining sentence-level presuppositions, aiming to explore the development of methodological tools based on these theoretical perspectives in order to address RQ1. This gives rise to my second Research Question, subsidiary to RQ.

RQ2 - Methodological

How can presupposition as an analytical category be operationalised for critical discourse analysis based on theoretical insights from Frame Semantics, Conceptual Metaphor Theory and Mental Spaces, and what further observations can be made when applying the theories and relevant methodologies to Greek language data?

In order to approach this question I applied the theoretical observations and methodological framework developed in Chapter 4 to the analysis of a selection of texts from Greek lifestyle magazines (Chapters 7, 8 and 9). The framework enabled me to conduct a detailed qualitative analysis of the texts and provide empirical evidence indicating the heteronormative ideologies underlying them. Despite the limited sample of data (three texts), there are some initial indications that the theories of Frame Semantics and Mental Spaces as operationalised through presupposition analysis\(^1\) can indeed work well with a range of languages, in this case Greek data.\(^2\)

---

\(^1\) Cognitive linguistic theorising has been informed by theoretical explorations and typological research on a variety of languages. Given the claim that cognitive linguistics examines the ways in which (presumably universal) aspects of cognition interact with language (despite local/context-bound variations) cognitive linguistic insights should, in theory, apply to all languages. Nevertheless, the current study does not focus on comparing a specific cognitive linguistic parameter across languages, but rather examines stretches of naturally occurring discourse in the Greek language with the additional...
RQ3 - Empirical

What are the ideological assumptions regarding gender, health and sexuality underlying Greek men and women's lifestyle magazines, namely *Marie Claire*, *Cosmopolitan* and *Status*?

As discussed in 1.1 and 1.2, apart from the theoretical and methodological concerns of this thesis, there is also the aim of exploring aspects of gender relations and ideologies in the contemporary Greek context. For the study of covert, mundane ideological beliefs about the everyday lives of men and women I chose to look at lifestyle magazines. For the purposes of narrowing down the dataset I chose to focus on texts providing advice, with the assumption that these texts would be particularly appropriate sites to examine the normative textual construction of gender. I further narrowed down the scope to examining aspects of representations of sexual relationships as discussed in the magazines, and more specifically to aspects of representations of sexual health. Although health does not necessarily need to be a gendered subject (yet it often is), sexuality, on the other hand, is closely related to and regulated by ideologies about appropriate gender conduct. I therefore was interested to examine how the seemingly 'objective' and 'non-judgemental' discourse of science and medicine would interact with discourse about the emotionally and ideologically loaded topics of sex and sexual relationships.

The limited dataset allows for only cautious generalisations, but in comparing a magazine for younger women (*Cosmopolitan*, aimed at below 35 year olds approximately), a magazine for women up to the age of about 45 (*Marie Claire*) and a men's magazine with a marked (upper) middle class orientation targeting men over 30

---

1 Cognitive Metaphor Theory has successfully been applied to Greek data before (e.g. Canakis, 2003; Polyzou, 2004; Gogorosi, 2005; 2009).
(Status), some similarities and differences did in fact emerge. Lifestyle magazines, whether for men or for women, assume a position of authority and wisdom in relation to the reader, while at the same time an impression of closeness is created through the personal nature of the topic, through humour and through expressions of solidarity. There is variation in that a humorous, light-hearted approach seems to be employed more extensively in Status, while the women’s magazines focus more on emotions of fear, unpleasantness and insecurity associated with sexually transmitted diseases (STDs). Status in this case includes also a promotional element, presenting condoms as commercial products (rather than simply measures to prevent the transmission of disease).

All magazines presuppose a heterosexual, sexually active reader and seem to exclude the possibilities that one may be gay or may abstain from sex by choice, for example. Marie Claire and Cosmopolitan also seem to evoke and take for granted the (knowledge of) the existence of a relatively stable partner, employing, among other devices, existential presuppositions such as ‘your partner’ and ‘your boyfriend’. By contrast, Status does not frame the sexual partners of the readers in any particular way - only once is a female sexual partner mentioned, as ‘her’, which is sufficient to trigger the shared knowledge/expectation that the (male) reader has a female sexual partner, but no further indication is given as to the nature of her relationship with him.

It needs to be pointed out here that, as reflected in the order of presentation of the research questions, the main focus of the thesis is theoretical. It is largely concerned with building a theoretical model of presupposition in line with the goals and principles of Critical Discourse Analysis, and secondarily with the operationalisation of the model for analysing discourse (RQ2). It is within the ramification of these aims that I have conducted the analysis, namely, in order to test and further inform the
model. Thus, despite some observations in relation to lifestyle magazines, gender and ideology in the Greek social context (RQ3), it needs to be emphasised that clearly the limited amount of data does not allow for generalisations in that respect. In relation to testing and informing the model, and thus helping answer RQs 1 and 2, the analysis has already informed the methodology by pointing towards refining the analytical categories by including sub-categories. In particular, through the analysis it became apparent that framing in discourse can be examined in a variety of different ways (some of which occurred in the data, namely, metaphorical framings, vague framings and evaluative/emotional language – see Chapters 5 and 7 for further discussion), and that conditionals in advice texts can be further sub-categorised as triggering different types of hypothetical mental spaces (Chapter 9).

1.4. Outline of the thesis

In the following chapter (Chapter 2) I elaborate on the interrelation between cognition, discourse, and society, and advocate a cognitive approach for the study of the latter two. To this end I examine non-cognitive oriented strands of critical research including Critical Discourse Analysis (henceforth CDA), Post-structuralist and Discursive Psychology approaches, addressing criticisms commonly levelled at cognitive approaches. I provide the basics of a social cognition oriented approach, defining ‘ideology’, ‘knowledge’, ‘mental models’ and ‘stereotypes’ as crucial building blocks of social cognition. In section 2.6 of the chapter I review work on gender and discourse, highlighting the links between Feminist Linguistics and CDA, and claiming that a socio-cognitive discourse analytical approach can be a fruitful endeavour in the study of gender identity and gender discourses and ideologies.
In Chapter 3 I provide a selective review of literature on presupposition. I discuss some of the theoretical and empirical weaknesses of the Truth-Conditional account of presupposition, and examine how concepts of presupposition have been applied in socially oriented critical analyses of discourse. The review indicates that there are inconsistencies in the field as regards the theorisation and application of presupposition, which necessitates a re-theorisation and methodological systematisation of the concept. Based on insights from cognitively informed approaches (mainly Marmaridou, 2000), I argue that approaching presupposition from a cognitive linguistic perspective would be helpful for identifying instances in discourse, as well as examining their function.

Following from this, Chapter 4 proposes a theoretical and methodological framework for presupposition, based on principles of pragmatics and cognitive linguistics. Here I discuss more specifically the link between language and underlying mental representations, and propose that different levels of discourse operate by drawing on different types of underlying knowledge. The framework aims to answer Research Question 1 and constitutes the main contribution of the thesis.

Chapter 5 delineates the methodology followed for the application and testing of the framework on the discourse of Greek lifestyle magazines. It presents in detail the stages followed for data selection, starting with the selection of prototypical magazines for analysis. It then discusses the process of identifying and selecting for analysis the advice genre, and the rationale of selecting genres specifically on sexual health. The analysis follows the methodological framework proposed in Chapter 4, and section 5.5 presents some more details on how the selected aspects of the framework are applied to the data. Section 5.6 provides a brief discussion on translating the data from Greek to English.
In Chapter 6 I discuss aspects of the Greek social context pertaining to relationships and sexual health, hoping to present some of the tensions between traditional patriarchal and contemporary permissive beliefs in the Greek context, resulting in what I have termed 'transitional heteronormativity'. By that I mean attitudes and norms regulating young people's sexual activity, which allow a range of freedoms hitherto impossible but are still geared towards achieving the Greek (patriarchal) family ideal.

The analysis in Chapters 7, 8 and 9 aims to operationalise the framework outlined in Chapter 4, while simultaneously attempting to shed some light to the role of lifestyle magazines in establishing and reproducing contemporary transitional heteronormativity. In Chapter 7 I consider frame-level mental representations activated via lexical items and expressions in the data, including metaphorical expressions. In Chapter 8 I examine the role of assertions in providing presumably new information while resting on assumptions about knowledge already shared between text producer(s) and text recipient(s), and the role of relative clauses in providing backgrounded and not readily contestable information. Chapter 9 examines the setting up of hypothetical 'worlds' or Mental Spaces, through which the magazines present possible problems and solutions related to sexual health.
Chapter 2: Discourse, Cognition, Society

2.1 Introduction

In this chapter I present the broader theoretical background underpinning the thesis. Broadly this could be situated in what we might call a critical turn in cognition research, or a cognitive turn in critical discourse research. I will discuss the interrelation among discourse, cognition and society, in order to further build a more detailed theoretical socio-cognitive approach to presupposition phenomena against this background. Van Dijk’s socio-cognitive approach to Critical Discourse Analysis provides a broad theoretical background for such an endeavour. However, this broad theoretical framework needs to be operationalised and informed by more detailed methods of analysis which are at the same time consistent with a cognitively oriented discourse analysis. Thus, I present some basic concepts from a variety of approaches, most of them broadly compatible with van Dijk, and also of use in the discussion of presupposition and analysis later on. Finally, I will briefly discuss how socially oriented discourse analytical approaches have been applied to the study of gender specifically as a social issue, and how they may be complemented by a more socio-cognitive approach, before I conclude the section.

From the outset, the objective of adopting a socio-cognitive approach to ideology and discourse calls for a definition of terms. The terms ‘discourse’ and ‘ideology’ are notoriously controversial, and ‘socio-cognitive’ could do with some explanation. Below I will review a range of definitions from the literature and present the definitions adopted in this thesis for these terms, mainly following van Dijk, but reviewing and taking into account other critical and/or cognitive approaches to discourse.
2.2 Interrelation of Discourse, Cognition and Society

2.2.1 Discourse

Van Dijk defines discourse as ‘conversational interaction, written text, gestures, facework, typographical layout, images’, that is ‘all semiosis’ (van Dijk, 2001a: 98), a view generally adopted in (Critical) Discourse Analysis. Moreover, discourse as ‘language (or semiosis) in use’ (Brown and Yule, 1983) is juxtaposed to ‘language as a system’ which is stored in our memories – putting the system ‘in use’ automatically brings in a specific setting and participants (with specific aims and relations to each other), situated in a social context (see also Cameron, 2001: 10-13). Thus, discourse is at the same time a social practice (which ‘language as a system’ is not) (see also Fairclough, 1992: 4). This means that discourse itself, what is being said, contributes to creating, maintaining or disrupting social relations, for example, including unequal, oppressive and egalitarian social relations. This is by no means new, as Austin (1975) has already highlighted the fact that ‘words are actions’ quite aptly, but CDA focuses specifically on actions influencing social relations on a larger scale.

Traditionally (in philosophy) language has been seen as a medium of representing the world (or ‘states of affairs’ in the world – see Levinson, 1983, on truth conditional semantics, and discussion in Potter and Wetherell, 1987: 14-15). In CDA (indeed in all non-logical approaches to language) discourse is not seen as being in direct correspondence with an objective reality, but mediated by and reflecting (not necessarily representing) social context. This has already been a concern of research.

---

3 This distinction between the ‘system’ and its applications may be somewhat simplistic, for the sake of explanation. ‘It can be argued that ‘the system’ of human language is ‘designed’ for social use (e.g. the existence of construal and perspective alternatives in grammatical structure) but not for the specific social practices that develop in specific societies’ (Paul Chilton, personal communication, 2010).
in variationist sociolinguistics, which found that speakers' social class and other social factors (gender, age, area of residence) correlate with phonetic, morpho-syntactic and lexical features in speech (one of the first influential works in this field is Labov, 1972. See also Milroy, 1980). In discourse analysis the interrelation of language and society is seen in broader terms, in that discourse (including content, lexical and syntactic choices) also reflects widely held ideologies, stereotypes etc. emerging from the way a society or part of society (an organisation, institution or community of practice) is structured. Language in use, rather than 'mirroring' the world for the benefit of individual hearers/readers, '[enables] subjects to experience' it (Howarth, 2000: 10). This phrasing automatically indicates that discourse somehow mediates between subjects and the world. On the 'discourse production' end, no 'representation' is neutral; 'all representations involve particular points of view, values and goals' (Fairclough, 1995b: 47). On the 'discourse consumption' end, 'decoding' or interpretation of discourse also depends on the recipients' points of view, values and goals. From a cognitive linguistic perspective, however, we cannot straightforwardly say that language encodes the thoughts of a speaker about the world, rather than the world itself, either. 'Language evokes ideas, it does not represent them' (Slobin, 1982: 131-132). Thus, we have two mediating levels between a person and the 'real world': discourse and cognition. Below I will elaborate more on the concept

4 Throughout the thesis I use Fairclough's terms 'discourse production' and 'discourse consumption' (1992: 71-72), although I am aware that as metaphors they objectify 'discourse' in a way not corresponding to how it actually works, and they are also not exactly transparent as to what kinds of processes are involved in either 'production' or 'consumption' (cf. O'Halloran's critique of the term 'consumption', 2003: 252 ff.). Practically, although discourse itself is a process impossible to pin down and manipulate, any kind of discourse analysis has to resort to some kind of 'objectification', whether this means analysing transcripts, or analysing written texts out of context, to some degree, since an 'analysis' context is different to the context in which a text may be normally read by the audience. As for the transparency of the terms, Fairclough intends them to mean social processes (who produces the texts, how many people are involved, why, any discussions taking place about the text, but also what other texts and ideas inform the producers of the texts – and, on the other end, who reads the texts, with what intentions, what their social positions are etc., all situated in a particular social context). In addition to these, I would include cognitive processes of producers and consumers/recipient of texts, which otherwise may be termed 'en-' or 'de-coding', 'understanding', 'interpreting', 'processing' - in general, 'communicating'.

20
of discourse, before moving on to arguing for the study of cognition in discourse analysis.

In the social sciences the term ‘discourse’ is also often used as a count noun, with ‘discourses’ defined as ‘practices which systematically form the objects of which they speak’ (Foucault, 1972: 49). So ‘a discourse’ is practice, as we see, but one which systematically forms objects. In that sense, a discourse is related to (it represents and, to some degree, constructs) a particular kind of (groups of) ‘objects’, a particular field, discipline or area of experience (and ‘from a particular perspective’, Fairclough, 1993: 135). This is not to say that Foucault defines discourse only, or clearly, this way. He points out:

instead of gradually reducing the rather fluctuating meaning of the word ‘discourse’,
I believe I have in fact added to its meanings: treating it sometimes as the general domain of all statements, sometimes as an individualizable group of statements, and sometimes as a regulated practice that accounts for a certain number of statements (Foucault, 1972: 80).

Discourses as ‘groups of statements’

correspond roughly to dimensions of texts which have traditionally been discussed in terms of ‘content’, ‘ideational meanings’, ‘topic’, ‘subject matter’ and so forth. There is a good reason for using ‘discourse’ rather than these traditional terms: a discourse is a particular way of constructing ‘subject matter’, and the concept differs from its predecessors in emphasizing that contents or subject-matters –areas of knowledge– only enter texts in the mediated form of particular constructions of them. (Fairclough, 1992: 127-128)

Definitions along the same lines are presented very often within CDA by Norman Fairclough (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999: 63; Fairclough, 1992: 3; Fairclough, 1993; Fairclough, 2000: 170, 179), but this kind of definition seems to equate the term ‘discourse’ with the term ‘representation (in discourse/language in use)’. Although
representation is practice, the term 'discourse' as used by Foucault (or Fairclough, for that matter) is obviously much more complex than that. In practice, however, 'discourse' is very often used to mean 'representation', as in 'the discourse Man as Domestically Incompetent' (Sunderland, 2004; Kosezzi and Polyzou, 2009). In addition to discourses being representations, the systematicity of 'discourses' means at the same time that 'discourse' is broader than 'representation', and also that there is some kind of stability – a 'discourse' is not a one-off representation of an entity or action occurring in a text, but rather, the representation draws on a discourse, a broader underlying system or set of representations (or statements, in Foucault's terms), of which the textual representation is a trace (Fairclough, 1989: 24). Moreover, a discourse also includes 'knowledge and practices generally associated with a particular institution or group of institutions' (Talbot, 1995: 43), as in 'medical discourse', 'political discourse' etc. This is also in line with the concept of systematicity, if we link the discourse of institutions to their practices, ideologies, policies etc., but it can also be used (uncritically or pre-theoretically) as signifying simply the language used by certain institutions.

The various approaches and definitions of 'discourse(s)’ in the social sciences have led to calls for disambiguation and explicitness in the use of the term, both from critics and proponents of CDA (van Dijk, 1998: 193, 197; for a critical approach see Widdowson, 1995: 158). Although discourse is not to be entirely conflated with practice, knowledge, representation or ideology, clearly these are interrelated – it is not possible to have language in use which does not draw on knowledge of a linguistic system. It is not possible to talk about anything without 'representing' it in language, or represent anything in language without drawing on a mental representation of it. And although all discourse is practice/action, indeed a social practice in a variety of
ways, not all practices are (merely) discourse, and not all discourse, action or knowledge is necessarily ideological, or to the same degree (see 4.6). Bearing these distinctions in mind, I would nevertheless argue that using the count noun ‘discourse’ as a configuration of speaking, cognitive representation and action is analytically useful. Using an alternative term such as ‘practice’, ‘knowledge’ or ‘representation’ can place emphasis on different aspects of one’s data, whereas in my view ‘discourse’ brings together ways of thinking and speaking/writing which result from and constitute social practice. Thus, I align myself with the theoretical position of CDA on the dialectical relation between discourse and society (e.g. Fairclough, 1992: 60, 64), and specifically with Teun van Dijk’s argument that this relation is mediated by cognition (1993:110).

2.2.2 Discourse and cognition – Discursive psychology

Foucault and poststructuralist thinking have been of major influence in the ‘discursive turn’ in social psychology, resulting in discursive psychology. One could distinguish between two strands, both influenced by poststructuralism (for a brief review see Sunderland, 2004: 186 f.). For the purposes of this discussion I will not distinguish between these two, since I address principles common to both, as well as to other work drawing on poststructuralism such as Baxter (2003), Butler (1990; 1993) and Laclau and Mouffe (1985). Poststructuralism stems from and shares a number of characteristics of postmodernism, notably ‘its sense of scepticism towards all universal causes, its questioning of what ‘true’ or ‘real’ knowledge is, and its loss of certainty of all absolutes’ (Baxter, 2003: 6; 21-28). Further, poststructuralism prioritises
language/discourse as the site of construction of social reality and identities (ibid., see also discussion below).

Poststructuralist approaches have often involved definitions of the term ‘discourse’ similar to the ones presented in 2.1 in order to speak of ‘broad constitutive systems of meaning’ and ‘ways of seeing the world’ (Sunderland, 2004: 6, emphasis in original. See also Baxter, 2003: 7-11). In discursive psychology, roughly equivalent terms to ‘discourses’ include ‘interpretive repertoires’ (see Edley, 2001: 210 for a discussion of the similarities and differences of these terms; also Potter and Wetherell, 1987; Wetherell and Potter, 1992: 90) or (cultural) systems of meaning (Weatherall, 2002: 76, 123). Sunderland (2004: 62) observes that ‘discourses’ correspond roughly to what Wetherell, Stiven and Potter describe as ‘the systems of making sense available in ... society’ (1987: 59) or ‘collectively shared practical ideologies’, i.e. ‘systems of belief of thought which maintain asymmetrical power relations and inequalities between social groups’ (ibid.: 1987: 60).

Discursive psychologists, despite also using terms such as ‘knowledge’ and ‘ideas’, are opposed to studying cognition (see Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 28). I think this scepticism concerning cognitively oriented critical research stems from a series of misconceptions, some of which I will now discuss.

a. **Studying cognition is essentialist**

This is not so much a criticism directed towards cognitive approaches by anti-cognitivist researchers, as an unfortunate reality of at least some research on cognition, which unsurprisingly does not help the promotion of non-essentialist cognitive research.
Essentialism is said to stem from the Aristotelian belief that everything has an ‘essence’, a core, which is its genuine, true nature, independent of culture or context, and which inevitably leads to an end/goal (telos). In the social sciences biological essentialism is called the belief that different categories of people have different ‘essences’, biologically grounded traits and dispositions that are not only physical but also mental and personality characteristics. Essentialism, best understood as not a single belief but a system of beliefs, serves to justify on ‘biological grounds’ inequalities and unfair treatment of categories of people, forging irrelevant links between biology and (real or imaginary) traits and behaviours supposedly indexed by differences in skin colour, facial characteristics or genitals. The argument goes, if these traits are biologically grounded, we can do nothing to change them and we’d better accept them and arrange our lives accordingly – e.g., by not allowing people do things they are not ‘biologically destined’ to do, and forcing them to do what they supposedly are.

How can studying cognition be essentialist? This depends largely on the questions one asks, the research methodology and the interpretation of the findings. Presuming that there are certain differences among social groups, and that they have a biological cause, and consequently setting out to find and measure these differences is bound to reinforce at least some initial presumptions (see Brehm and Kassim, 1996: 128 on ‘confirmation biases’, esp. Johnston and Macrae, 1994). An example of this type of bias is James Watson’s research on comparing IQ among nationalities\(^5\) (see Milmo, 2007 for media commentary, and Rushton and Jensen, 2008 for a discussion along Watson’s lines of argument). For a critical discussion on essentialism and gender see Talbot (1998: 8-13) and Aries (1996; 1997) cited in Weatherall (2002: 66). Both

---

\(^5\) Thanks to Majid KhosraviNik for bringing this research to my attention.
Talbot and Aries also acknowledge the existence of biology, but still point out the pitfalls of essentialism (see also Bordo, 1999: 253 for an insightful argument related to essentialism in science – namely, that essentialism is unscientific to begin with). Nevertheless, recently a trend has emerged which Deborah Cameron has termed ‘New Biologism’ (2009), based on which male and female behavioural differences result not from socio-cultural factors but from biological differences, both physical and cognitive, between male and female human beings. Problems related to issues of research questions and interpretations are one good reason for scepticism in the social sciences about the study of biology (and, consequently, of cognition, considered part of biology).

However, Newmeyer observes that Chomsky’s postulation of the language faculty as part of universal human nature is in fact not essentialist, as it does not attribute characteristics supposed to indicate biological inferiority or superiority to groups of people. Since the language capacity is common in all humans, no human can be considered inferior based on a presumed biological ‘language deficiency’ (Newmeyer, 1986: 76-77). Elsewhere I have also argued that it is much more productive from a social critical perspective to acknowledge equal biological status for all humans, and further attribute inequalities to environment (Polyzou, 2004). This is not to say that I agree with Chomsky’s theory of the language faculty as a whole. (I do not think that innate characteristics are immune to environment, nor that the capacity for language is independent of other mental faculties.) Rather, the same argument made from a Chomskyan perspective is being made by cognitive linguistics, focussing on physical experience common to all humanity irrespective of biological or other differences.

---

6 Newmeyer makes this point in relation to Chomskyan linguistics and its postulation of ‘human nature’, but the same argument goes for all accounts of ‘human nature’, including cognitive approaches to language and the mind.
among individuals or groups of individuals (see e.g. Johnson's discussion of 'embodiment', 1987: xiv).

Overall it is important to bear in mind that it is one thing to consider work on biology in general, or cognition in particular, with caution, and another thing to dismiss such work altogether because of the possibility that it might be misinterpreted (or indeed the fact that often it is misinterpreted, and exploited to serve ideological agendas).

b. Studying cognition (in relation to language) means assuming cognition (and/or language) to be stable

This might have been an assumption underlying some cognitive research, or it might have been a misinterpretation of this research (Ng, 1990 and Ng, Chan, Weatherall and Moody, 1993). For example, Weatherall suggests that Ng’s (1990) study assumes that ‘masculine generics are sexist because the words ‘he’ and ‘man’ have inherent masculine meaning’ (2002: 26). It is unclear what ‘inherent’ means, but most linguists (including cognitive linguists) would agree that the meaning of words is conventional rather than ‘natural’, that the meaning of words changes over time, and that context plays a role in discourse interpretation. It seems that Weatherall’s criticism stems from the fact that experimental research decontextualises words (ibid.), which is a valid criticism, but does not necessarily mean that one has to interpret findings as indicating some inherent, unchanging quality in mental representations and their relationship with words. Every act of observation and/or analysis (including all forms of discourse analysis) inevitably isolates and de- or re-contextualises the object studied, albeit in different degrees. What research can do is capture a moment in time, say, in Ng’s case, capture one aspect of how (these particular) subjects conceptualised the words and concepts of ‘he’ and ‘man’ with minimal (or no) context. In 2.2.1 I have
deliberately emphasised the relative stability of ‘discourses’ and mental representations – I could just as well have spoken of relative fluidity, but the operative word here is ‘relative’. Therefore, the facts that mental representations have a certain degree of stability and a certain degree of stability do not need to be mutually exclusive, not is it necessary to make a strong claim in favour of one or the other extreme (total stability vs. continuous flux) in order to conduct a critical analysis of discourse and cognition.

c. Studying cognition is individualistic

This criticism is rather confusing, as it is not clear what ‘individualism’ means. Wetherell and Potter (1992) claim that in social cognition analysis ‘the perceiver often remains a lone individual who forms, apparently in isolation, her or his account of [the world]’ (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 29), and thus the ‘socio-cognitive model of analysis pits a self-contained individual against the complexities of the real environment’ (ibid.: 30) (see also Potter, 1996). However, adopting a model whereby individuals draw on interpretive repertoires, with the repertoires opening up possibilities for them or restraining them (Potter and Wetherell, 1987; Wetherell and Potter, 1992) is also open to the same criticism, since also Wetherell and Potter admit that discourse does not ‘[work] smoothly and automatically to produce objects and subjects’ (1992: 90). The question of individual agency versus social and discursive construction is always an issue in critical research (including Potter and Wetherell’s own research), and studying cognition does by no means imply that an individual is ‘self-contained’ and immune to influence from discourse. One could actually argue that ignoring the social and cognitive context in which an interaction takes place, and focusing only on discourse produced in one discursive event is individualistic, as it seems to consider only the discursive practice of the specific individuals participating
in the event. Sunderland (2004: 187-188) discusses Potter’s notion of **uptake** in conversation (1996: 187) and correctly points out that one’s words may or may not have a certain effect, depending on whether the recipients are sceptical, credulous, drunk, experienced or inexperienced, etc. What I consider individualistic is to *only* take these parameters into account (which are mental states to begin with), and not also *why* certain recipients are sceptical and others credulous, what it means to be experienced or inexperienced (having or not certain kinds of knowledge), and *not* considering the links among kinds of audiences and social context.

A good example is Wetherall’s criticism of her own early work, in a study finding, roughly speaking, that drawing on gender stereotypes is influenced, among other factors, by the subjects’ ‘Attitudes Towards Women’, measured by a scale (Ng et al., 1993). The study included learning of nonsense words associated with pictures of men and women – Weatherall suggests that the study’s assumptions about language learning and meaning could be criticised, but ‘the study was interesting because it gave some indication of how individual cognitive processes may mediate between culture and language change’ (Weatherall, 2002: 25). Now one might consider this study ‘individualistic’, in that not everyone associated the learnt nonsense words with gender stereotypes to the same degree, or in the same way, and this places emphasis on ‘self-contained’ individuals as opposed to social constructs like stereotypes. However, I would not consider anyone’s ‘Attitude Towards Women’ to be a strictly ‘individual’ thing – it depends very much on the social background and experiences of the individual, including previous exposure to related discourse (and this makes it very hard to define and measure on a scale, as well). One’s attitude towards women can very well be already a cluster of stereotypes itself. Cameron (1992: 61) points out that gender ‘**should never be used as a bottom line explanation, because it is a social**
construct needing explanation itself' (emphasis in original) – in this case I would add that ‘attitudes’ (however defined) are also social (and cognitive) constructs, needing explanation themselves. Thus, the problem in Ng et al.’s (1993) study is not that it is necessarily individualistic, but that it is interpreted as such, by Weatherall’s description of attitudes as ‘individual cognitive processes’.

d. Cognition cannot be observed and therefore cannot be studied

Problems caused by the use and definition of terms such as ‘attitude’ have played a role in the ‘discursive turn’ in psychology. Studying discourse, especially synchronous spoken interaction, allows one to take situational context into account (and other things, such as negotiation of meaning). This has not only been a methodological turn, but also a theoretical one (as discussed above) – for discursive psychology, ‘emotions, beliefs and opinions are not private things hiding inside the person: they are created by the language used to describe or account for them’ (McIlvenny, 2002: 17).

We can define ‘private’ in various ways (difficult or impossible to know, needing some elicitation, unique and individual), but on the one hand, ‘private’ does not have to mean ‘stable’, and on the other, assuming that something is not private does not tell us much about whether it exists independent of discourse. Also, pointing out that cognition is not directly observable does not mean that it is not indirectly observable. Van Dijk aptly points out that ‘society’ is also an abstraction (1998: 43-46), which we observe indirectly through human behaviour and material effects. He also points out that, if we do not posit a cognitive locus for ‘discourses’ or ‘repertoires’, then they almost become like metaphysical entities floating around ‘in society’ – although ‘discourses’ might ‘float’ in that they are ever-changing, for them to be manifested in discourse or action, we need to assume their prior existence in social cognition.
According to Sunderland (2004: 186), Potter (and presumably discursive psychology in general) 'does not say that there are no 'in-the-head' representations or perceptions, rather that a study of 'fact construction' is better served by 'selectively combining elements from the constructionism in linguistics, conversation analysis and post-structuralism' (1996: 120'). Focus on language and not cognition may thus be seen as 'analytically more productive' (Wetherell et al., 1987: 60-61). However, for Cognitive Linguistics studying language is studying cognition. Cognitive Linguistics believes we can examine/ we have access to cognition through language ('grammar is conceptualisation', Croft and Cruse, 2004: Chapter 1).

2.2.3 Conclusion

One thus wonders if whether by adopting a poststructuralist approach one is adopting a different methodological or a different theoretical approach. Baxter (2003) with Feminist Poststructuralist Discourse Analysis claims to be offering a feminist methodology. To some extent, we are talking about a difference in focus – if we are looking at how interactions participants negotiate identities and other-representations (by drawing on various discourses/repertoires), we still need some idea about the content of these discourses. Although traditional social psychology has not been much concerned with this issue, theoretically at least CDA is able to address fluctuations and negotiation of power and identity (see Kosetzi, 2007). In fact, Fairclough calls for detailed analysis of specific interactions exactly in order to avoid one-sided impressions of power and effects of discourse, something Foucault has been criticised of (Fairclough, 1992: 59).

I would argue that, in theory, any critical cognitive approach could address the issue of negotiation (of meaning and of power), by adopting a pragmatics-oriented
perspective (see Chapter 3). At the same time, in order to be critical, we have to take into account power relations and representations pre-existing the interaction.

2.3 Discourse and cognition in CDA

Although for the most part CDA does not follow poststructuralism, epistemologically or ontologically, it has been, as we saw, influenced by the ideas of Michel Foucault - especially the Duisburg group (for more detailed accounts of the concept of 'discourse' in CDA, see Reisigl, 2007; Wodak, 2008b; and Reisigl and Sarazin, forthcoming). Overall, however, CDA considers the relationship between discourse and society as mutually constitutive (see e.g. Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999), rather than following entirely the poststructuralist position of considering only discourse as constructing society. Social conditions (and social cognition – see next paragraph) also influence the production of discourse.

Despite the frequent use of concepts such as ‘knowledge’, ‘meaning’, ideology’, ‘belief’ and ‘thought’ in order to engage in critical research, CDA does not necessarily or primarily focus on cognition-related research. CDA is multidisciplinary and heterogeneous (see Wodak and Meyer, 2001; Reisigl and Sarazin, forthcoming), with van Dijk’s theoretical work placing heavy emphasis on the interrelation of discourse, cognition and society. Wodak acknowledges the significance of cognition, and occasionally draws on concepts of (social) cognition research (e.g. ‘schemata’ in 1996: 110), but does not engage extensively with this research herself. Fairclough also reviews cognitive approaches to language and finds common points with CDA (1989: 11, 24, 91), but he also does not give cognition a central place in later work. Chilton

---

7 Neither does Cognitive Linguistics, for that matter, with both CDA and CL following an anti-objectivist, experientialist approach (Stockwell, 2000: 513).
8 Nor can we necessarily call Foucault a poststructuralist without some qualification – but this merits discussion which is beyond the scope of this chapter (but see Kaur, 2007: 41-42).
has been incorporating work from Cognitive Linguistics and CDA, as well as Pragmatics, both in theorising and analysing political discourse (1985; 1987; 1988; 1996; 2004; 2005), offering perhaps the most complete approach. However, the proliferation of work applying CDA in the past 20 or so years for the most part does not address issues of cognition, while the most outspoken proponent of adopting a cognitive approaches for CDA, Teun van Dijk, does not propose a methodology for analysing discourse from this perspective. He does however offer valuable insights, which I will address below.

Van Dijk argues that, in addition to the definition of discourse as social practice, and the mutual interdependence of discourse and society, (social) cognition should also be taken into account, as an interface between ‘discourse and society and between individual speech participants and social groups of which they are members’ (van Dijk, 1994: 110); individuals are able to produce and interpret discourse only on the basis of shared knowledge and beliefs, not only because the meanings of the linguistic expressions used are conventional and hence shared, but also because a lot of meaning is not linguistically encoded, but still communicated through coherence, presuppositions, implicatures and indirectness in general, and these meanings can only be understood on the basis of shared knowledge (van Dijk, 1994; 1998; 2001b; 2003 – the argument has been put forward already in Schank and Abelson, 1977).

The very claim that society and discourse mutually influence and construct each other can only be explained with the postulation of a social cognitive interface mediating between the social context individuals find themselves in and the discourse they produce. Thus, on the one hand, ‘social structures can only ‘affect’ discourse structures through social cognition’ (van Dijk, 1994: 110). That is, ideologies and shared mental representations in general are determined (to a certain extent) by social
structure and they are expressed by individuals through discourse – social structures themselves are not expressed through discourse directly (van Dijk, 1994; 2001b). On the other hand, ‘discourse can only ‘affect’ social structures through the social minds of discourse participants’ (van Dijk, 1994: 110) rather than having a direct impact on society. It is difficult to find out how discourse can affect the minds of discourse participants, but arguably certain discourse structures, strategies and moves will influence the construction of online models by the participants - according to van Dijk (2001b), discursive strategies like topicalisation or specification (giving a lot of details) creates a stronger memory of the entity represented, and thus can influence not only short-term but also long-term memory.9 In discourse one might elaborate on the positive characteristics of one’s group and downplay the negative ones, and conversely, when talking about another group, with which there may be conflict, one will elaborate on the negative aspects of the Other and downplay the positive ones. There is other research exploring the elusive relation between discourse and cognition based on empirical/experimental data, which I will not review here in its entirety.10 Of interest are also Frank Boers’ work on metaphor affecting decision making (1997) and Steve Oswald’s work on discourse and manipulation (2010), while Sarazin (2009) observes that Relevance Theory (a cognitive pragmatic approach) seems to be supported by psychological work such as Gigerenzer and Todd (1999) and Wilson and Matsui (2000).11 Overall, research on the relation between discourse and cognition is under way, although the relation is by no means straightforward or easy to study, it should be taken into account.

9 ‘Memory’ as discussed here is ‘nothing but a theoretical construct of the ‘cognitive’ part or dimension of the mind, that is, the theoretical location where information is stored and processed’ (van Dijk, 1998: 21).
10 I discuss some experiments of social psychological research in this chapter (2.5.3 and 2.6).
11 Numerous references to experimental work supporting Relevance Theory can be found in Wilson and Sperber (2004/2006).
In particular, in CDA, adopting a cognitive linguistic perspective addresses the problem of selecting a theory of language. According to Fairclough ‘textual analysis presupposes a theory of language and a grammatical theory, and one problem for critical discourse analysis is to select from amongst those available’ (1995a: 10). O'Halloran (2003) points out that another problem can be actually not having an explicit theory of language, as it can lead to problematic analysis. Chilton emphasises that, by ignoring cognition and its workings, CDA may appear to be making claims ‘in a theoretical vacuum’ (2005: 34; see also van Dijk, 1998: 43-46). Therefore, a critical discourse analyst must self-consciously and explicitly adopt a theory of language. I would further add that the selected theory must be compatible with the epistemological positions of CDA, and that CL is the one of the most compatible available theories.

Although CL (as well as Relevance Theory) often does not deal with socio-cultural aspects of discourse, as Stockwell observes (2000), it most certainly does not deny their importance for language and cognition. From the origins of Frame Semantics Fillmore (1985) chooses to call his approach ‘semantics of understanding’, juxtaposing it to ‘semantics of truth’ (Truth Conditional Semantics), and acknowledges the cultural input to the world knowledge constituting frames (for a detailed account of frames and frame semantics see 2.5.1.

Regardless of degree of allegiance to the field currently known as CDA, there has been some critical cognitive linguistic research. Apart from the work of Paul Chilton mentioned in 2.3, George Lakoff has been applying his Cognitive Metaphor Theory in his critique of US politics (1991; 2002; 2003; 2004). Cognitive Metaphor Theory has also been applied to critical studies of language and gender (e.g. Polyzou, 2004; Koller, 2004), and overall rather enthusiastically embraced for various critical studies
on representation and ideology, broadly speaking (see Hart, 2010, for extensive references). Further critical work employing cognitive linguistics not limited to the study of conceptual metaphor includes Dirven, Hawkins and Sandikçioğlu (2001), Dirven, Frank and Ilie (2001), Chilton (2004), Hart and Lukeš (2007), Hart (2010; 2011) and Sarazin (in preparation). It seems then that it is in the past decade or so that research employing cognitive linguistic theories and methods has started being employed for the critical study of discourse, which I have labelled at the beginning of this chapter's 'cognitive turn in critical discourse analysis'.

2.4 Aspects of social cognition

The term 'social' can be understood in at least two ways. Broadly, it refers to anything that has to do with human contact and relations, including communication. No individual lives in a vacuum, and language is an essentially social institution, as communication presupposes at least two communicating individuals (in my view soliloquy is not communication). Interpersonal relations, shared knowledge of a specific variety of a language and conventions such as politeness and the performance of speech acts apply to this aspect of 'social' use of language. Critical discourse and social studies, however, seem to focus on the sense of 'social' as referring to anything that has to do with 'society' as a total of structures and processes on a larger scale, affecting larger groups of people and therefore concerned not simply with interpersonal contact and relations, but also with group relations, where power is exercised, negotiated and potentially (or actually) abused. This can also happen with power relations among individuals, but social groups relations are also permeated by structures, institutions, laws, policies and conventions beyond the individual. CDA
overall considers relations of power among groups situated within the broader social context (see e.g. van Dijk, 1993).

Clearly these two aspects of the word ‘social’ are by no means separate. It is rather a matter of scope, where we participate in any interaction both as unique individuals and also as social (and political) animals. Any interaction is at least partly informed by socio-cultural, socio-economic and socio-political factors, although to what extent and with what implications will vary. The same goes for individual and social cognition – the two are not separate entities, occupying different ‘locations’ in someone’s brain. Rather, the distinction between the two is a theoretical and methodological one. Speaking of ‘social cognition’ allows us to focus on human mental capacities and properties when they are put in use in relation to matters of ‘society’ as defined above, and on shared mental representations (see below).

Van Dijk defines social cognition as follows:

the system of mental structures and operations that are acquired, used or changed in social context by social actors and shared by the members of social groups, organizations and cultures. This system consists of several subsystems, such as knowledge, attitudes and ideologies, norms and values, and the ways these are affected and brought to bear in discourse and other social practices (2003: 89).

The shared mental structures referred to in the above are what is termed ‘social representations’, and, as we can see, van Dijk discusses the fact that they are organised in social cognition as ‘knowledge, attitudes and ideologies’.

The terms ‘knowledge’ and ‘attitude’ as significant parts of social cognition refer to clusters of ‘factual’ and ‘evaluative beliefs’ respectively. Van Dijk defines beliefs roughly as ‘building blocks of the mind’ (1998: 19); that is, beliefs are ‘units or representations’ which can be ‘constructed, stored, reactivated, organized in larger
units' (1998: 21), and will further constitute the total of one’s knowledge or attitude about something.

Knowledge is the total of factual beliefs that are deemed to be true by the truth criteria of a group, community or culture (van Dijk, 1998: 25; 2003). Factual beliefs refer to facts, whether something is or is not the case. These factual beliefs may be considered wrong or untrue by other truth criteria, shared by other groups or cultures – hence, what is defined knowledge is not ‘objective’ or ‘universal’, but always context-bound, true for a specific group (it can only be universal if it satisfies truth criteria which happen to be shared by everyone in the world). Of course, apart from shared, social factual beliefs, which constitute social knowledge one may have personal beliefs and personal knowledge. Moreover, one may have personal or shared evaluative beliefs, that is, beliefs not about whether something is or is not the case, but about whether something is right or wrong, good or bad etc. A cluster of socially shared evaluative beliefs is an attitude. The distinction between factual and evaluative beliefs, knowledge and attitudes, is a useful theoretical distinction, but it is hard to see how this would correspond to mental representations. Clearly it is not the case that purely factual and purely evaluative beliefs exist and are clustered together in memory, separately with each other. Both in linguistic and mental representation of people or groups, evaluation is inextricably linked with expressions and beliefs about what the ‘facts’ are. Thus, in a group schema one may have of immigrants, there will be both factual and evaluative beliefs, but we may want to separate them in our analysis to show how attitudes about a group are prejudiced, and how they contribute to, e.g., racist or sexist ideologies.\(^{12}\)

\(^{12}\) One methodological problem with attitudes is that, unlike knowledge, it’s harder to describe them as analysts through language – we cannot go much beyond ‘positive/negative evaluation’.
Van Dijk points out that ‘ideologies are [also] clusters of beliefs in our minds’ (van Dijk, 1998: 26); they are shared, ‘social belief systems’ (van Dijk, 1998: 29) and include both knowledge and attitudes. What belief or belief system is ideological is ultimately dependent on social factors (e.g. social group membership) and not on different cognitive structure. The question then is who shares these belief systems, with what goals and with what results. Ideologies are linked to social groups and their interests. Social groups are distinguished both from random groups of people who are together by chance (like passengers on the same flight) and from social categories defined by socio-biological or socio-economical (more or less inevitable) properties like skin colour or socio-economic class. Membership to a social group presupposes a sense of collective identity as well as common goals and interests, that is, one belongs to a group once one feels part of the group; a homeless person does not belong to the social group of homeless unless they are aware that it is not only personal but also social circumstances involved in his or her position. Thus, not all women will share a feminist ideology, but the women who are aware of the systematic inequality and dominance by other groups (i.e. groups of heterosexual men) over women, and who share the common goal of achieving gender equality, will. The definition of social groups in relation to ideology and vice versa is partially or fully circular – being a member of the social group of feminist women takes both satisfying the biological criterion of being born female (however this is medically defined in any given culture), but also sharing a sense of collective identity and feminist ideology. There are certain social groups, like churches or political parties, where membership is

14 Identity is defined as self-representation, personal when it refers to each individual’s total of self-representations as a unique human being, or social when referring to the total of group self-schemata that constitute the social identity of an individual belonging to various social groups (van Dijk, 1998: 140 ff).
solely defined by sharing the ideology of the group. Once one stops having the respective religious or political ideology, one stops belonging to the group.\textsuperscript{15}

Van Dijk’s definition of ideology is compatible with other approaches, which I briefly discuss here. The connection of ideologies and social group interests bears obvious similarities to the Marxist definition of ideology as ‘a view of society from the standpoint of a particular social class acting in accordance with its own interests’ (Jones, 2001: 235). There are, however, two significant differences: in the Marxist approach it is the dominant class (or, in the broader terms of van Dijk, social group) that uses ideology as a system of ideas in order to legitimate the unequal social relations and make them appear commonsensical (Jones, 2001). Thus, (and this is the second difference) ideology is a result of certain power relations and social structures, rather than a pre-existing system of ideas that shapes people’s actions and society. Van Dijk though (1998) argues that systems of beliefs that defend the rights and interests of dominated groups are also ideologies (e.g. feminism or anti-racism), and suggests a relationship of mutual constituency between ideology and society. Indeed, ideology can be seen as pre-existing and shaping social reality when even members of privileged social groups become aware of social inequalities and are willing to participate in social change, such as men contributing to the acknowledgement of women’s rights or white activists against racism. Social reality may be conducive to certain groups developing certain ideologies, in order to perpetuate a privileged position or resist domination, but there is no straightforward, fixed group-to-ideology correspondence. Thus, in my analysis I am expecting to find both dominant and resisting ideologies in relation to gender (even in the discourse of the same magazine).

\textsuperscript{15} This is different to ‘social category’, which I will define as how one is categorised by others. I.e., ‘women’ is a social category, because all women will be at least potentially discriminated against, regardless of their own ideologies and social group memberships, just because they are women.
Fairclough (1992: 87 ff.) also discusses the difficulties with defining ‘ideology’ only as a tool for maintaining the status quo – he points out that struggle to transform social (including discursive) practices is ideological and may have an impact on society. Therefore, ‘discursive practices are ideologically invested in so far as they incorporate significations which contribute to sustaining or restructuring power relations’ (1992: 91). This is perhaps the most clear criterion of distinguishing ideological from non-ideological beliefs, while at the same time avoiding the issue of truth and falsity.\(^\text{16}\)

That is to say, it is not the case that ‘ideological’ beliefs are false and oppressive, while ‘non-ideological’ beliefs are true and liberating.\(^\text{17}\) Rather, all (systems of) beliefs which are related to unequal social relations in a way that they either affirm or contest them (or create them, I might add), are ideological (because contestation in discourse at least contributes to a change of power relations, although it is not the only factor). Thus, ultimately, determining whether a belief is ideological or not is not a matter of a different cognitive representation (to non-ideological beliefs), but a matter of the social context in which it emerges, and the social entities it refers to. However, van Dijk does observe that ideologies have a very prominent evaluative component in mental representation (1998), which I would attribute to their relation to group membership and identity, and to (real or created) conflict of interests and goals among groups (see also 2.5.3).\(^\text{18}\)

### 2.4.1 Ideology vs. knowledge

Van Dijk (2005) also distinguishes between (presupposed) beliefs that are considered shared knowledge in a particular epistemic community, and ‘presumptions’, which are

\(^{16}\) However, Fairclough prefers to talk of ‘structures’ or ‘orders of discourse’ rather than systems of beliefs (1992: 97 ff.).

\(^{17}\) An approach which seems to be the reason for Foucault’s ‘[resistance] to the concept of ideology’, due to his relativism (Fairclough, 1992: 60).

\(^{18}\) From a Relevance Theoretical perspective, Žegarac observes in ideological statements the ‘superseding of linguistic meaning by social function’ (2003: 161).
defined differently to Chilton’s notion of *presumptions* (2004: 64-65 – see 3.4.3),
namely, as ‘presupposed beliefs that are in fact ideological assumptions and not
knowledge’ (van Dijk, 2005: 88). This is potentially contradicting van Dijk’s earlier
stance (e.g. 2003), which moves away from the (philosophical) definition of
knowledge as ‘justified true beliefs’ and points out that ‘knowledge’ is defined as such
by the epistemic criteria of each community, and that one group’s ‘knowledge’ is
another group’s ‘ideology/opinion’ (van Dijk, 1998; 2003). However, with his
definition of ‘presumption’ van Dijk implicitly claims that ideological assumptions
cannot be knowledge. And he claims that they are not knowledge because they are not
‘certified knowledge of the community’ (2005: 88). He ignores the fact that ‘certified
knowledge of the community’ can be both false and ideological, as well as that
ideological beliefs can also be true — such as ‘women have equal intellectual
capacities as men’. Of course, I can only say that this belief is true based on
satisfaction of certain epistemic criteria of some communities I belong to (e.g.
scientific evidence). It is still an ideological belief though, because it is contested,
contestable, and related to social group interests, inequality and potential conflict.
Also, according to van Dijk, racist beliefs are not ‘true’, but ‘presented as true’, and
they are not true because they do not satisfy the epistemic criteria and consensus of
our community/society. Van Dijk here also ignores that no community or society is
homogeneous, and some of the communities/social groups he belongs to would not
consider racist beliefs valid, but some others would.

Unfortunately the only criterion needed for something to count as true in a group is
consensus, which may well be false/socially damaging. All ideological beliefs, true or

---

19 This is too broad a generalisation and would have to be qualified in various ways before it is accepted
as a ‘certified’ scientific statement, but for our purposes here we can consider it the general conclusion
emerging from a number of scientific statements.
false, are shared by some sub-groups and contested by others within the same society or larger grouping. And most importantly, the epistemic criteria of any society/group are defined more often than not by its elites (which could be scientific/intellectual communities, the media, powerful political figures, groups controlling sources of wealth etc.). If certain elite members happen to be racist, it is more likely that other elite non-elite members will accept such beliefs, than if racist beliefs are held and expressed by marginal groups. Hegemonically established racist beliefs can be 'certified knowledge' within a community, and accepted as such by all members of the community, and it only takes an outside/distanced perspective to point out alternative options/systems of belief. If the elites of a community happen to believe that racism is unfounded, (and anti-racism is 'certified knowledge' in their communities), racism is wrong but not just because these elites/epistemic criteria say so. (cf. Sayer (e.g. 2009) on critique judging 'right' and 'wrong' based on human suffering and wellbeing; also Fairclough (1995a: 18) on claims of truth or falsity and analysis of ideology.

For a critical analysis, then, we may want to examine the kind of systems of beliefs underlying texts, whether these systems have the status of knowledge within an epistemic community, and what it is that contributes to consensus constructing such knowledge. The latter may be extra-textual factors, from coercion to institutional and social norms, as well as beliefs manifested in texts other than the texts under analysis. These are all factors to be taken into account, to the extent that we can identify them. We further need to consider how they are articulated in a certain text, and the potential cognitive effects the text may have on the recipients. Cognitive linguistics can provide methodological tools for such an analysis, or at least can be useful in helping us

---

20 Ironically, even an oppressed group may have (and usually has) internal hierarchy. Such a group may not have the power to define 'knowledge', but its ideology will be defined based on its own elites.
develop such tools. The concept of mental models (frames/schemata) has been shown to be useful in analysing referential strategies, i.e. systematic ways of representing groups from particular ideological perspectives (Hart, 2010). Frames will be a central category in my analysis as well (Chapter 7). Below I provide a review of the literature on mental models and explain how these terms will be used in the rest of the thesis.

**2.5 Mental models**

**2.5.1 Frames – definitions and related terms**

In the field of Cognitive Linguistics the term ‘frame’ initially was employed to in order to account for the meaning of words, providing an alternative to ‘checklist’ linguistic theories of meaning (compositional semantics). That is, instead of having a list of properties or semantic features which constitute the meaning of a word, a word can only be understood in terms of its ‘frame’, where frame is defined as ‘any system of linguistic choices ... that can get associated with prototypical instances of scenes’ (Fillmore 1975: 124, cited in Ungerer and Schmid, 1996: 209, see also Tannen, 1993b: 20). A much-cited example of such a frame would be that of the word ‘buy’, which, according to Fillmore, would prototypically involve a buyer, a seller, certain goods and money – this frame would also apply to verbs like ‘sell’, ‘cost’ or ‘charge’, which would refer to the same frame but from a different perspective (Ungerer and Schmid, 1996: 206-207). In any actual sentence, when the word ‘buy’ is used, the action of buying and the agent (buyer) is foregrounded or ‘profiled’, while the rest of

---

21 'Scene' here roughly corresponds to what Ungerer and Schmid call 'situation' (1996: 46, 209), namely an event taking place in the 'real world' (as opposed to the term 'context' or 'context model', which, according to Ungerer and Schmid, and van Dijk (2001b:18), is a mental representation of a situation).
the elements (‘money’, ‘seller’ or ‘price’, for instance) are in the background and constitute the ‘base’ (Croft and Cruse, 2004: 15).

Fillmore’s characterisation of ‘frame’ later shifts towards a more broadly cognitive, less language-oriented one, where frames are viewed as ‘specific unified frameworks of knowledge, or coherent schematizations of experience’ (1985: 223). There is also an explicit link with the phenomenon of presupposition, as frames are ‘cognitive structures ... knowledge of which is presupposed for the concepts encoded by words’ (Fillmore and Atkins, 1992: 75). This bears great similarities to Ungerer and Schmid’s (1996: 209) discussion of the term ‘cognitive model’ as the total of ‘stored cognitive representations that belong to a certain field’. This is a broad definition, subsuming different kinds of cognitive models, such as ‘frame’ and ‘script’ (1992: 211). In Tannen’s discussion of ‘frames’ and related terms (1993b; 1993a) it becomes quite apparent that the term is used differently across disciplines, and also that there is overlap between what some call a ‘frame’ and what others may call a ‘schema’ or ‘script’.

At around the same time as Fillmore, the sociologist Goffman (1974, 1981, cited in Wodak, 1996: 22) defines frames as follows: a frame is ‘the definition which participants give to their current social activity – to what is going on, what the situation is like, and to the roles that the interactants adopt within it’ (Wodak, 1996: 22). Tannen (1993a: 4) observes that ‘Gumperz’s notion of speech activity is ... a type of frame’ (referring to Gumperz, 1982). Goffman and Gumperz were not necessarily concerned with cognition, but participants’ ‘definitions’ of speech situations would correspond to ‘context models’ as ‘participants’ constructs of communicative situations’ (van Dijk, 2006: 159; 2008).
Minsky’s definition of ‘frame’ is broader (Minsky, 1975, cited in Tannen, 1993b: 19), including event sequences as well as expectations about objects and settings (Tannen, 1993b: 19). Schank and Abelson have proposed the term ‘script’ as one kind of frame, specifically referring to mental representations involving sequences of events (Schank and Abelson, 1975, cited in Tannen, 1993b: 17), whereas knowledge related to a specific entity is often named ‘schema’ (see discussion in Tannen, 1993b: 16-17). Tannen herself prefers to use the term ‘frame’ to define for a mental definition (by the participants) of a communicative situation (following Goffman, 1974), and ‘schema’ to refer to knowledge about entities like, e.g. illness (Tannen and Wallat, 1993: 59-61).

Thus, the term ‘frame’ for some may mean a specific kind of cognitive model, along with other kinds, whereas for others it is synonymous with ‘cognitive model’ as an umbrella term including ‘scripts’, ‘frames as models of communicative situations/context models’ and ‘schemata’. I think it is useful to distinguish between ‘schemata’, for more or less static ‘ideal, abstract or prototypical’ representations of the structures of objects, events, people, groups, stories or social structures (that is, we can have a schema for the structure of anything, abstract or concrete), and ‘scripts’, which dynamically represent the ‘setting, time, location and a sequence of events and actions and the typical or optional [participants]’ which will constitute the representation of the stereotypical events or rituals of a culture (van Dijk, 1998: 57-58; 2003: 92). Yet for my purposes in the thesis I will consider ‘mental model’ as a general term for all internal (cognitive and affective) representations, while I will most often be using the term ‘frame’ in alliance with Fillmore’s Frame Semantics. I will further use the term ‘framing’ for the online activation of a specific frame in relation
to a specific linguistic expression/concept, indicating simultaneously the adoption of a particular point of view.

### 2.5.2 Personal and social cognitive representations

As Ungerer and Schmid observe, the knowledge, or mental representations an individual may have about 'a field', will often be formed based on cultural experiences and are shared by the groups of a culture (or group), in which case they would be called 'cultural models' – they point out that both the terms 'cognitive models' and 'cultural models' refer to the same kind of entities, only placing the emphasis on different aspects of these entities (1996: 50 – for 'cultural models' see also Quinn, 1996). Others appropriately have employed the term 'cultural cognitive models' in order to account for both the cognitive/ psychological and the shared/ cultural aspect of these representations (e.g. Morgan, 2001: 78).

Van Dijk makes a distinction between individual and shared mental representations or knowledge - the term 'mental models' refers to the mental representations each person has, and 'social representations' to the mental models that are shared among members of a social group or culture (van Dijk, 1994; 1998; 2003). Mental models can be more or less permanent structures in the long-term memory, or on-line models created on the spot; for instance, one can create an on-line 'event model' while witnessing or experiencing an event, but this model can later be stored in long-term memory as one remembers the event (van Dijk, 1998; 2001b).\(^2\) For the term 'social representations'

---

\(^2\) As discussed above, if the event is frequently occurring in a given culture and involves similar participants, settings, sequences of events etc., the collective representation of such a stereotyped event will be a script, as opposed to a personal 'event model' (van Dijk, 1993: 114; 2003: 92).
van Dijk draws mainly on the work of the social psychologist Moscovici (1984 – see also other contributions in Farr and Moscovici, 1984).

Something to be borne in mind in the discussion of all (kinds of) cognitive representations is that their descriptions ‘necessarily involve a considerable degree of idealisation’, since psychological states are private and individual experiences (Ungerer and Schmid, 1996: 49-50). Not only can one’s description of a cognitive model never be complete (as we never have full access to any subject’s cognition), but cognitive models are actually open-ended, as there is no fixed limit to the amount of representations that belong to a ‘certain field’. Hence any description of a cognitive model is ‘never exhaustive, but always highly selective’ (ibid: 48).

In order to discuss social representations one has to move to yet another level of abstraction – namely ‘filter out’, so to speak, elements of the mental models of individuals deriving from purely personal experience. Thus, every individual may have a ‘personalised version’ of a social representation, but the social representation itself will refer to the elements that do not vary across individuals who are members of the same culture, or the same social group within a culture (van Dijk, 1998: 30).

2.5.3 Stereotypes

The concept of ‘stereotype’ emerges often in critical research – it refers at the same time to the cognitive (‘pictures in our heads’, Lippmann, 1922/1950), and the social (but also affect – Quasthoff, 1973: 28; 1989). In the light of more recent work on cognition, the question arises whether a ‘stereotype’ is a different kind of mental entity to all other shared mental representations (schemata, Idealised Cognitive
Models, prototypes, etc.) – and, by extension, what consequences this may have on social life. Socially-oriented (including social- psychological) accounts focus mainly on the function of stereotypes (as the basis or rationalisation of discrimination) and the reasons for their perpetuation (Quasthoff, 1978; van Dijk, 1990; Brehm and Kassin, 1996: 122). However, I believe that for a sufficient understanding of stereotypes and, ultimately, for dealing with stereotypical discriminatory thinking in society, we need to focus also on the question of what kind of mental entity a stereotype is.

The (social psychology) textbook definition of ‘stereotype’ is ‘a belief that associates a whole group of people with certain traits’ (Brehm and Kassin, 1996: 122). Chilton (2004: 38) puts it as follows: ‘a cognitive construct concerning the properties of a social category’. The above definitions seem at first glance unsatisfactory, because they appear neutral. Surely, as we have mental models of categories of objects, events etc., we also have models of categories of people. However, in that case, why do we use the negatively loaded term ‘stereotype’ instead of the neutral ‘group model’? Van Dijk also considers stereotypes as social (i.e. shared mental) representations of groups of people (‘group models’); although in most of his work he does not use, or define explicitly, the term, he seems to define a ‘stereotype’ as a biased (or prejudiced) shared group model representing a suppressed and/or minority group, held by a dominant majority group (1990, esp. 169 f.).

There are two problems with van Dijk’s view. First, it seems to distinguish stereotypes from other mental models based on whom they are held by (majority dominant groups); that is, oppressed minorities have mental models and dominant majorities

---

23 The terms ‘stereotype’ and ‘stereotypical’ are often used in discussing prototype research such as this of Labov (1973), although Labov himself does not use the terms (see e.g. McCarthy, 1990: 46).
24 Chilton does not define ‘social category’ here, but in any case with ‘stereotypes’ he refers to conceptual constructs about groups of people, not objective sociological variables of these groups (pers. comm. 2010).
have stereotypes. This is at odds with van Dijk's own theory of ideology, according to which ideologies can be held both by dominant and subordinate groups (1998). Based on this, there is no reason why minority groups should not have stereotypical representations of majorities.\(^{25}\) Moreover, this seems to define stereotypes based on external factors (who has the beliefs), rather than what kind of beliefs they are, which points again towards the function rather than the 'nature' or ontological status of stereotypes.\(^{26}\) The second problem has to do with the terms 'biased' and 'prejudiced'. These terms seem on the one hand to suggest that these models are of a different kind to other mental models (i.e. biased vs. non-biased), and on the other to indicate why stereotypes are bad and harmful (because they are wrong). However, as I will discuss below, the human conceptual system is inherently biased anyway, and all categorisation is based on generalisations drawn from perception (which is not objective to begin with).

A brief look at the main characteristics of stereotypes would include the following points, most of which are common among all sorts of mental models:\(^{27}\)

- Stereotypes are mental representations (of groups of people).
- They are elliptical generalisations - elliptical in that they do not contain much or very detailed information about the groups represented, and generalisations in that the information they contain is taken to apply to all (or most) members of a group.
- They are related to categorisation, classifying people into categories.
- They structure our view of reality and our expectations and they are used as a basis for reasoning.

\(^{25}\) Social psychological research indicates that, although it is more likely that a minority group will be stereotyped, the reverse is also possible, and indeed happens (see Brehm and Kassin, 1996: Ch. 4).

\(^{26}\) The same seems to apply to Chilton's definition in relation to the term 'social category', since it appears that a 'social' category is defined by external factors (e.g. income, ethnic origin, social status), but this, in itself, merits further discussion.

\(^{27}\) Here I will favour the term 'mental' over 'cognitive' in that 'mental' more clearly includes aspects not only of cognition, but also affect (Chilton, personal communication, 2006).
- They contain evaluative and affective elements, as well as factual.

Most of the characteristics of stereotypical mental models (stereotypes) are exactly the same as the characteristics of any other mental model. All mental models are elliptical (cf. Ungerer and Schmidt, 1996; Lakoff, 1987), in that it is not possible to be aware of, let alone store in memory, all the properties of any category. In fact, for reasons of cognitive economy, we store only the most salient aspects of a category, i.e. the ones more prominent in our interaction with members of the category, or the ones more often encountered through direct experience or discourse about the category. Some social psychological research seeking to explain stereotyping has been in fact dealing with priming, salience or other cognitive effects when people encounter minority categories in objects, or (pairings of) words (see Brehm and Kassin, 1996: 125 f. on ‘illusory correlations’, esp. Chapman, 1967; McConnell, Sherman and Hamilton, 1994; and Hamilton and Rose, 1980).

As our human system of perception is limited, and therefore by definition biased (see Das-Smaal, 1990), categorisation itself does not rely on natural or clear cut distinctions in the world, but distinctions made based on our perception of and interaction with the world. By structuring our expectations based on our knowledge/mental representation of the world, we are saving ourselves the effort of treating any object, person or situation as a ‘one-off’ instance, and having to process everything about the situation from scratch before we are able to deal with it. Clearly, this would be too time consuming and probably practically impossible.

Finally, it does appear that stereotyping is more likely to occur in relation to groups one does not have much contact with or knowledge of (van Dijk, 1998). This is quite well established in social psychological research, and explained again in terms of ‘illusions’, heuristics or exaggerations of our perceptual system making judgements
about categories when there is very little information available, while closer acquaintance between groups reduces stereotyping (see Quattrone and Jones, 1980; Quattrone, 1986; Linville, Fischer and Salovey, 1989). However, there can be cases where stereotyping involves groups with which one has much contact, or about which one has quite detailed knowledge. Gender is perhaps the most obvious category where members of each group co-exist and interact daily most of the time (Cameron, 1992: 58), while orientalism, for example, is based on acquiring quite detailed knowledge of an ‘other’ group, with which one does not directly interact, while still adding this knowledge on to a stereotyped model.

In the literature it is often emphasised that the problem of stereotypes is that they are inaccurate, or that they constitute overgeneralisations (see Quasthoff, 1989: 182). In terms of accuracy, a stereotype may have a factual basis, whereby real differences among groups ‘contribute to the birth of perceived [i.e. not real] differences’ (Brehm and Kassin, 1996: 122), an observation very often made in relation to gender (Brehm and Kassin, 1996: 138 ff.; see also Eckert and McConnell-Ginet, 2003: 10). To an extent, the content of stereotypes relies on misinterpretation of the reason of differences – e.g. white people perceiving black people as inferior due to the history of black slavery in the U.S. (Brehm and Kassin, 1996: 122), during which black people were indeed inferior in society, but not due to any biological reasons, but due to being forced in this position. Moreover, accuracy is straight away compromised through overgeneralisation. Every generalisation is potentially inaccurate, since it gives rise to general statements based on induction, and then it is used for deductive reasoning. Any claim ‘all X are Y’ cannot be definitely true unless indeed all members of

28 Although it seems far-fetched to claim that slavery is responsible for contemporary racist stereotypes, there may be some remnant beliefs transmitted through discourse, which is indicative of the importance of the role of discourse in perpetuating stereotypes (see van Dijk, 1994).
category X have been examined and found to be Y. Moreover, finding an exception does not necessarily modify the mental model/stereotype, as people retain the generalisation, but treat the ‘exceptional’ individual as just that – an exception (Quasthoff, 1973, 1987, 1989: 188; Brehm and Kassin, 1996: 128 f.). This is, however, the case with all mental representations, as they are based on generalisation of limited experience, and also they define our expectations and influence the way we store mentally new experiences (Das-Smaal, 1990) – cases which do not match our expectations will be classified as ‘atypical’ (Lakoff, 1987). For example, we can all say with some confidence that all dogs have four legs, and that any three-legged dog is an exception due to an accident or some medical reason, without having experience of all dogs on the planet. Quasthoff suggests that it is a matter of degree, i.e., that stereotypes are less flexible than non-stereotypical mental representations (1989: 189).

Quasthoff (1989) makes a distinction between harmful and harmless stereotypes based on the content of the models. Namely, she considers generalisations such as ‘all Italians are good singers’ as positive, and not harmful stereotypes, whereas identifying groups of people as criminals etc. is negative. This is not necessarily a valid distinction, in that positive generalisations are also problematic – consider ‘all blacks are good athletes’; ‘all women are naturally good carers’. The problem here is not just that stereotypical mental models are abstract and elliptical, but that they are metonymic (Lakoff, 1987: 91; Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 56-58), roughly speaking taking ‘part for the whole’. That is, emphasising one (real or imaginary, widespread or rare) aspect of a group downplays all other human aspects of the group and the individuals belonging to it. So one difference between stereotypical and non-stereotypical knowledge about a group is that stereotypical knowledge is not only
incomplete, but also one-sided/ biased in that it only concerns one aspect of the group and its members.

Another crucial difference is that stereotypical knowledge is always, directly or indirectly, evaluative. Directly evaluative knowledge includes clearly positive or negative properties, expressed in language either through evaluative adjectives (‘good/bad’), or expressions indicating a clearly negatively evaluated property (criminals, benefit-scroungers, etc.). Indirectly evaluative knowledge can be expressed in neutral expressions (and as factual knowledge), which however indicate negatively evaluated properties in a certain context (e.g. people in group X eat with their hands, sitting on the floor). Even apparently positive evaluations, such as ‘good carers’, is indirectly negative in contexts where caring is not valued as an activity (see Cameron, 1992: 5).

The points made in the last paragraph relate closely to the affective aspect of stereotypes, further linked to the Us/Them distinction which serves as their basis (originally traced back to Sumner, 1906, cited in Quasthoff, 1989: 187). That is to say, one may have very strong positive or negative feelings towards people of a certain ethnic or socioeconomic background, in a way that we don’t have strong feelings towards chairs, tables, trains or other entities in the world.29 Thus, although ‘grouping humans is much like grouping objects, there is a key difference. When it comes to social categorization, perceivers themselves are members or non-members of the categories they employ.’ (Brehm and Kassin, 1996: 123). This key difference is not elaborated on very much by Brehm and Kassin (ibid.), but ultimately it accounts for

---

29 Animals are an interesting in-between case, but I would think that strong positive feelings arise from personification/anthropomorphism of animals, and strong negative feelings from objectification.
all the differences (whether qualitative or a matter of degree) between stereotypes and other kinds of mental models.

Consequently, I would define social stereotypes primarily as being about (groups or categories) of people, with a strong evaluative element, which follows from the sense of 'self', self-evaluation or personal and social identity of the individual holding these beliefs. Thus, the determining feature for something being a stereotype is not just being about people (in theory at least we have mental models of groups that are not necessarily stereotypical), but is related also to the identity of the 'stereotyper' (aspects of which could possibly be explored from a psychoanalytic perspective, which is beyond the scope of the thesis, but see Quasthoff, 1989). The stereotyper's identity in turn is determined by social and material conditions. As a psychological phenomenon, stereotype is very closely linked to affect (also beyond the scope of the thesis, but definitely worth more consideration). The fact that stereotypes are often created when there is limited knowledge of the stereotyped group, and that perceptual illusions lead us to overgeneralise or exaggerate when we encounter a very small number of members of a category, contributes to the creation and perpetuation of stereotypes. But these factors mainly build on and accentuate aspects of personal and social/group identity which constitute fertile ground for such mis-perceptions.

To sum up, stereotype emergence is based on the same perception and categorisation principles the human cognitive system uses for all sorts of categorisation. What is context-specific is the content of stereotypes (van Dijk, 1990: 178). To a certain extent, it is irrelevant whether the (factual) content of stereotypes is 'positive' or 'negative', or whether it is based on (over)generalised true facts or fiction, because of the function of stereotypes. What is most relevant, however, is that the content of stereotypes also involves very strong evaluative and affective aspects. Along the same
lines, van Dijk (1998) points out that ideologies, as belief systems, rely largely on attitudes/evaluation. Thus, accepting that mentally constructing and using categories is biased anyway, we can define bias as preferring one way of categorisation and category representation over other possible ways, and ‘[d]irecting attention towards certain features and away from others’ (Das-Smaal, 1990: 351). A (biased) stereotypical mental model is constituted as such (stereotypical) not necessarily in relation to which characteristics are preferred (and paid attention to), since, as we saw, stereotypical characteristics are not necessarily negative, but because of the high proportion of evaluation attached to the factual elements of the model. Evaluation itself is, of course, related to socio-cultural context and group membership, ultimately related to group interests. Ultimately, however, the term ‘social’ does not include only material parameters, but also the aspect of relationships and emotions among (groups of) people, and this is why it cannot be treated as any other case of categorisation. Namely, the fact that the object of stereotypes is not objects but people is not, as I have assumed, an external difference, but the determining difference between stereotypes and other types of mental models, because it involves a difference in the kind of mental representation (factual vs. evaluative), which is, of course, a matter of degree. In that sense there are degrees to how stereotypical the mental representation of a group is. The more evaluation and less factual information, the more stereotypical; less evaluation and more factual information mean the representation is less stereotypical. Inaccurate factual information with no evaluation is just wrong, but I would not call such a model a ‘stereotype’ unless there was evaluation attached to it. Finally, in this thesis by ‘stereotypes’ I refer to mental models (not their linguistic manifestation, cf. Quasthoff, 1989).
In terms of function, in the case of dominant groups (majorities or minorities), stereotypes serve to affirm in-group superiority and perpetuate inequalities. In the case of dominated groups, dominant stereotypes can function hegemonically as negative self-representation, again perpetuating inequalities (thus, dominant stereotypes can also involve the element of positive other-evaluation, when the ‘other’ is the dominant group). In practice, dominated groups can also share non-dominant stereotypes about the dominant group(s), and this can temporarily contribute positively towards the liberation of a dominated group. However, in the long term, there can be no peaceful co-existence among groups unless other-group representations come to include at least a reduced element of evaluation (since complete neutrality is impossible) – i.e., some de-stereotyping. The case of gender stereotyping is a good example to demonstrate this: (most) men may share a negative representation of women (although women are not a minority), but women may also share this negative representation of themselves, and accept men as superior in some (most, or most important) aspects. This includes negative self-representation for women. On the other hand, women stereotyping men negatively (in a ‘war of the sexes’) might have been useful in some cases, but overall it does not necessarily contribute to gender equality.

Quasthoff (1989), asks whether we should view stereotypes as something good, because they are natural, or as something bad, because of their role in discriminatory attitudes and practices. In my view, something being natural does not necessarily mean it is good. Death is natural, but it is very rarely seen as something good and desirable. I would say that having mental representations of groups or categories of people in itself is (natural and) useful, helping us most of the times interact efficiently with groups we are not very familiar with. However, stereotyping, i.e. absolute
evaluative judgements about groups of people, albeit also natural, and potentially helpful, but obviously gives rise to more harmful effects on a larger scale.

It would be more significant to ask, does the fact that stereotypes arise from universal human cognitive properties make them inevitable? Does this constitute critical analysis and efforts to combat social inequalities pointless? On the issue of avoiding (or deconstructing) stereotypes, one needs again to look at research in social psychology – it is not sufficient to increase contact or information among groups. 30 Rather, this contact should be gearing people towards co-operatively achieved goals (for details, see Brehm and Kassin, 1996: 130). Incidentally, this at the same time points again towards the importance of the role of affect, and indicates the plausibility of Marxist analyses of sexism and racism, as a competitive economic (and social) system (i.e. capitalism) does seem, also from a psychological perspective, to privilege stereotyping and discrimination.

As for the second question, i.e. the role of critical analysis in relation to natural mental processes, the answer is already pointed at by Chilton (2005). Social psychology is descriptive, showing us what people do with stereotypes. Basic cognitive psychological principles are explanatory in providing the principles in the human mind which cause stereotyping, also mentioned by social psychology: attention, cognitive effort, learning, memory, goals. A sociological account needs to account for the context in which these socio-cognitive mechanisms are put in use and/or are exploited. That is to say, if we all have these abilities and dis-abilities, why is it that some people have certain stereotypes, and others have different stereotypes? Why, and how (under what social conditions), do people fight against stereotypes, and why and how do they fail or succeed? A (critical) discourse analytical account needs to account.

30 Although it certainly helps (Linville et al., 1989).
for the role of discourse in these socio-political and economic conditions which create inequalities, as well as the role of discourse in emancipatory/egalitarian action. Also, the role of discourse in relation to the management/manipulation of audiences’ (group members’) cognitive resources, and, finally, the elements of discourse which betray certain beliefs/ideologies not directly visible.

2.6 Gender and discourse

2.6.1 Gender, discourse and social representations

The distinction between sex as a biological category and gender as ‘the psychological, social and cultural differences between males and females’ (Giddens, 1989: 158, emphasis in original) has been useful to feminist thinking since the 60’s in answering arguments of biological essentialism prescriptively telling men and women how to behave and justifying unequal treatment of women as ‘natural’ (Weatherall, 2002: 81; Sunderland, 2004: 14). However, one can see from Giddens’ definition that gender remains linked to sex in certain ways - Eckert and McConnell-Ginet (2003: 10) observe that ‘gender builds on biological sex, it exaggerates biological difference and, indeed, it carries biological difference into domains in which it is completely irrelevant’ (for further discussion on the conceptualisation of the relation between ‘sex’ and ‘gender’ see Mathieu, 1989; Wodak, 1997a and Cameron, 1997).

Postmodern feminist thinking has also argued that even ‘sex’ as a biological category is socially constructed – this is in line with Moscovici’s argument that we only have access to the ‘real world’ through our social representations (1984: 5-6, 36-37). There is further discussion on how conceptions of what ‘sex’ is change over time, and on
how these have material effects on the bodies of individuals in Weatherall (2002: 81 ff.), Wodak (1997a) and Cameron (1997), and also, importantly, in the work on biology by Anne Fausto-Sterling (e.g. 1992; 2000). Therefore, Weatherall argues that 'gender' should be seen as primary, as it constructs our conceptualisations of sex and biology too (2002: 81).

With the 'discursive turn' in the social sciences, starting in the 80's with works like Billig, Condor, Edwards, Gane, Middleton and Radley (1988) and Potter and Wetherell (1987), emphasis is placed on discourse constructing identities and social relations, and not simply reflecting them (see Weatherall, 2002: Ch. 4 for a review). This is valuable in avoiding making essentialist assumptions of people and groups simply having certain fixed and inevitable characteristics which are reflected in the way they use language (or the way language is used about them). However, other feminist linguists observe also that discourse is 'language in a social context, shaped by discursive and socio-cultural practices' (Litosseliti, 2006: 1; also Ch. 3). Talbot (1998: Ch. 8) aligns herself with CDA in considering discourse both constituted by and constitutive of social relations and identities, in a dialectic relationship (cf. Fairclough, 1992: 60; Fairclough and Wodak, 1997: 258; Titscher et al., 2000: 146).

As discussed above, van Dijk also puts emphasis on social cognition as the interface between discourse and society and their effects on each other, a dimension downplayed by the discursive psychological approach – Wetherell, Stiven and Potter point out that although they are interested in 'systems of belief or thought' which 'have obvious affinities with Moscovici's (1984) concept of 'social representations'', they consider the view of those systems being constituted linguistically (and not cognitively) as 'an analytically more productive option' (1987: 60-61). For me, there is no contradiction in assuming that social representations are discursively constructed
but are cognitive entities. Indeed, the way people draw on their social representations in discourse is influenced by the immediate situation, but these representations have to have a more stable presence in people’s minds for people to draw on them and ‘share’ them (van Dijk, 1998: 44-45).

2.6.2 Feminist linguistics and CDA

Discursive psychology has researched discourse and gender quite extensively; CDA less so, although Wodak (1997a) points out the similarities between CDA and feminist linguistics. The labelling suggests that ‘Critical Discourse Analysis’ should be broader, encompassing feminist linguistics, but in practice researchers aligning themselves primarily with the CDA paradigm rarely conduct feminist research, with Wodak the most notable exception (1997b; 2003; 2005; Kothoff and Wodak, 1997). Other researchers in gender and language aligning themselves more or less with CDA are Talbot (1995; 1998), Lazar (2005), Kosetzi (2007; 2010; Kosetzi and Polyzou, 2009) and perhaps Koller (2004), while Kaur (2007) argues for synergy of the poststructuralist philosophical approach of Judith Butler and strands of CDA.

Overall feminist linguists may not explicitly align themselves with a particular paradigm (such as CDA), but rather eclectically point at the commonalities of all critical approaches to analysing discourse, focussing perhaps more on feminist approaches. Thus, Litosseliti emphasises the value of CDA for feminist discourse analysis (2002; 2006: 3; 54f.) at the same time incorporating insights from more poststructuralist perspectives. Also Sunderland (2004) and contributions to Litosseliti and Sunderland (2002) do draw on CDA, but not exclusively. Along the same lines,
Baxter proposes Feminist Poststructuralist Discourse Analysis as complementary to, and not competing with CDA (2003: Ch. 2).

Overall, 'feminist' and 'CDA' ways of discourse analysis and principles do overlap significantly in their critique of inequality, their political agendas and their scrutiny of discourse in order to reveal power management, manipulation, maintenance and contestation of dominance. Differences are to be seen among scholars from either of these fields, as both 'CDA' and 'feminist' scholars may align themselves to different degrees with poststructuralist or humanist principles, for example. The emphasis on gender also varies from scholar to scholar rather than according to different theoretical or methodological principles (and conversely, feminist scholars, especially more recently, take into account race, ethnicity, class and other social parameters traditionally studied within CDA, see Mills, 2008). These differences aside, it is hard to conceive of any social critique of inequality that allows for gender inequality, or to conceive of feminism without social critique. Therefore, in theory at least, there should be no contradiction between CDA and feminist linguistics.

A few words of critical reflection of my own position as a researcher are in order at this point perhaps. In this chapter I have distanced myself from certain poststructuralist epistemological positions in relation to cognition, while in the following chapters I critique specific theoretical and methodological aspects of CDA in relation to presupposition. In that sense, as a feminist scholar, I acknowledge the benefits of various approaches, while as a cognitive linguist I orient myself to the one(s) that I find more viable epistemologically. In the thesis I often use the term 'critical discourse analysis' without capitalising the initials, in order to include all critical theoretical and methodological approaches to language rather than the particular group of scholars and approaches known as 'CDA'. I must also recognise,
however, that, a certain scepticism notwithstanding, it is within CDA that interest in
cognition has emerged, and interest in cognition constitutes a central part of this
thesis. To my knowledge there is no scholar as of yet self-identifying as ‘feminist
cognitive linguist’ (bar myself), while for example Hart, Koller and Sarazin would
probably identify themselves as ‘cognitive critical linguists’.

Having examined the overlap of feminist and CDA approaches, I will now move on to
the more contentious relation between gender and cognition, or, rather, between a
feminist and a cognitive approach to language and discourse.

2.6.3 Gender, cognition and critical discourse analysis

Mentioning ‘gender’ and ‘cognition’ in the same sentence is very likely to bring to
mind essentialist biological assumptions about innate differences in cognition, affect
and brain structure between men and women, especially as this view is recently
gaining ground also in academic circles (see Cameron, 2009). Clearly this thesis does
not set out to address this debate, especially as Cameron (2009) has already done so
more than sufficiently. There is perhaps one more specific point that I need to clarify
further before proceeding with my theoretical position on gender and cognition. One
major point of criticism of the biological account of ‘gender differences’ is that it ‘by
implication treats all kinds of linguistic behaviour as the natural expression of
cognitive traits embodied (or ‘embrained’) in individuals; the socio-cultural one treats
behaviour as the outcome of calculations and choices which, though ultimately made
by individual language-users, arise within and are affected by a larger social context’
(Cameron, 2009: 185). Now I have already claimed that studying language is studying
cognition in 2.2, but there are two points of clarification here. The first is the point I
have already made about cognition being a universal human trait, a claim less contentious than and much different to claiming that different groups of people have different cognitive abilities. Second, by focusing on conceptualisation we examine representations in cognition rather than cognitive abilities or traits.

In light of my discussion in this chapter on society, discourse and cognition, I would define ‘gender’ as a ‘mental representation’, or, more specifically, an element of the mental representations of gendered categories (such as ‘man’, ‘woman’, ‘boy’, ‘girl’) and sub-categories (such as ‘housewife’, ‘mother’, ‘bachelor’ etc.). Gender ideologies are systems of beliefs in which gendered mental models emerge and of which these models become part – thus, gender ideologies and models are mutually constitutive, but with ideologies forming the broader basis.

Biological configurations of elements of ‘sex’ do exist (chromosomal, hormonal and anatomical), but ‘sex’ as a label refers to the mental representation of categories whose boundaries are culturally defined (and biologically not always clear-cut). Gender, and knowledge thereof, is ideological (although on different levels and in different ways and degrees), due to social context placing prominence on sex, and justifying and creating further inequalities based on sex. Thus, in most contexts, knowledge about ‘sex’ is also ideological, but not always, as in ‘knowledge about ovarian cancer’. Indeed, if ‘sex’ was not made relevant in all sorts of irrelevant contexts, its mental representation would not be ideological. What is or is not relevant to biological sex is of course debatable and varies across contexts, and much that is considered relevant in folk theories of sex has often been shown not to be the case under examination of scientific evidence, such as the beliefs Cameron (2009) has shown to be unsubstantiated.
Gender identity as an 'illusion', as Butler puts it (1990: xxii), is also a mental representation, namely, self-representation (since identity constitutes the mental representation we have of ourselves, and gender identity includes the aspects of ourselves that are defined by/related to gender conceptualisations). Gendered self- and other-representations in cognition and discourse are to a certain extent both stable and fluid, in that they are changeable and indeed changing, but this change may take time and cannot necessarily be triggered at will. These two aspects (stability and fluidity) can be captured by the distinction between mental models stored in long-term memory and on-line models occurring in context – in the case of discourse, in the course of an interaction. On-line model (and identity) construction can be understood under the term 'construal', while 'construction' may be the result of complex processes of re-iteration, memory and affective factors, which are overall beyond the scope of this thesis.

Thus, instead of 'gendered discourses' I will be talking about beliefs about gender, and for me negotiation of 'discourses' in discourse involves drawing selectively on pre-existing, socially shared beliefs. Thus every text involves 'monitoring' and guessing, on behalf of the producer, about what the audience already knows, as well as what will make the text appealing to the target audience. In text production choice is of course important – i.e. what beliefs will be expressed, and which not, which determines the content of the text. The combination of various beliefs and the evaluation/attitude expressed is also important. In cognitive linguistic terms, we might be interested in what knowledge is activated/introduced, whether it is contested, how

---

31 In the course of a dialogue an interlocutor can of course change her or his mind, in which case they may express a belief that did not 'pre-exist' the interaction, or, more precisely, that was not shared by that particular individual. In planned written discourse, such as I analyse here, all beliefs expressed pre-exist at least the final version of the written text.
it is framed/evaluated through lexical choice, and what salience is afforded to each
belief through fore- or back-grounding.

2.7 Conclusion

In this chapter I have broadly presented the theory of language I adopt, and argued for
taking cognition into account for critical discourse research. I have elaborated on the
concept of frames as a crucial unit for critical cognitive analysis on which I draw for
my own analysis (Chapter 7). I have further discussed stereotypes as a kind of frames
which are particularly influenced by ideology and may circumvent reason via affect.
Based on the above, I see gender as a socio-cognitive and affective construct, brought
about by discursive (i.e. semiotic) practices and perpetuated due to maintaining
gendered mental representations, which are often stereotypical.

In the following chapter (Chapter 3) I will move to discussing presupposition, and
demonstrate that most definitions of presupposition in critical discourse analysis draw
on a different theory of language, namely Truth Conditional Semantics (henceforth
TC Semantics). Other theories are more inclined towards a cognitive approach, but so
far have not been detailed or systematic enough for their analyses to be transparent
and replicable. I will therefore argue in Chapter 4 that it is necessary to operationalise
a fine-grained linguistic analysis in general, and for presupposition analyses in
particular. In Chapter 4 I will further elaborate on a cognitive theory of language
specifically as it relates to presupposition and I will suggest a model that will
hopefully be more helpful in identifying what ideologies the authors of my data draw
on, and making explicit what linguistic devices allow them to present certain gendered
beliefs as incontestable.
Chapter 3: Presupposition - A review

3.1. Introduction

In studying background knowledge (including ideological knowledge) and the ways it may surface in discourse, the notion of 'presupposition' often appears as a relevant parameter to look at, for a number of reasons. First, as van Dijk (2003) points out, what is shared knowledge (and, consequently, accepted as common ground) is normally not asserted but presupposed. Therefore, this gives us a lead for ideological representations which have become naturalised and commonly accepted. Second, it has been claimed that the usage of 'presupposition' by a speaker makes it more difficult for their interlocutor to contradict the presupposed proposition (Borutti, 1984; Harris, 1995), thus reinforcing the status of the proposition as 'common sense', again significant in the case of ideological propositions. From the above two claims it follows that finding 'presuppositions' in a text helps us identify what ideological representations underlie a text, but also how the language of the text contributes to these representations being maintained and reinforced rather than contested or at least reflected upon.

I have been using the word 'presupposition' in quotation marks because the term has been used for a range of phenomena or entities far from homogeneous – despite the appeal of using 'presupposition' as a methodological tool towards uncovering ideology, a careful delineation of the term is necessary to avoid ending up with more methodological problems than solutions.

In this chapter I claim that one of the problems faced by early pragmaticians aiming to provide accounts of the phenomenon of presupposition was that they were still using logical and/or truth conditional approaches to language as a starting point, which were
in conflict with the agenda of pragmatics as examining meaning in relation to speakers and/or context. I further claim that within Critical Discourse Analysis some scholars adopt the same Truth Conditional Definition in contrast to the allegiance of CDA to entirely different schools of epistemology (from Austin and Wittgenstein to Habermas and Marx, to mention some of the most prominent influences). The Truth Conditional approach to meaning is in direct conflict with critical theories of language as an entity shaped by and shaping society and social action. On the other hand some CDA scholars do not adopt a truth conditional approach, while in some cases presupposition analyses are not clear as to epistemology, theory and methodology.

I will begin with a discussion of approaches towards 'presupposition' in the literature, giving a background of the definition of the term in Truth Conditional Semantics, and problems arising from it within Truth Conditional Semantics that may have theoretical and methodological relevance for (critical) discourse analysis. I further discuss pragmatic and cognitive linguistic approaches, which provide some answers but need to be carried further in order to be applied to the particular task of analysing discourse. Finally, I look at recent examples of critical analyses of discourse, and the approaches to presupposition they have taken.

3.2. Presupposition in Truth Conditional Semantics

In Truth Conditional Semantics, a presupposition is a proposition that does not get negated when the sentence in which it occurs gets negated. That is, a presupposition is a proposition which is constant under negation, as in the following examples:

32 I also need to point out that critically examining deception, manipulation and otherwise untruthful linguistic behaviour, which are central concerns of critical discourse analysis among other fields, should be separated from accounts of actual linguistic meaning depending on the philosophical concept of 'truth conditions'.
Referring expressions: Kepler died in misery (Frege, 1892/1952: 71)

Kepler did not die in misery

Presupposition: Kepler exists

Temporal clauses:

After the separation of Schleswig-Holstein from Denmark, Prussia and Austria quarrelled (Frege, 1892/1952: 71).

After the separation of Schleswig-Holstein from Denmark, Prussia and Austria did not quarrel.

Presupposition: Schleswig-Holstein was separated from Denmark.

Change-of-state verbs:


Bertrand has not stopped beating his wife.

Presupposition: Bertrand had been beating his wife.

Referring expressions (triggering existential presuppositions, namely the presupposition that the referent exists), temporal clauses, factive verbs, change-of-state verbs, and other expressions (see Levinson, 1983: 181-184, for an extensive list) are termed presupposition triggers, which we could define as expressions introducing information that is not negated/refuted when the sentence in which it occurs is negated (I will revisit this definition later on).

The initial discussion, which later developed in the discussion of the phenomenon ‘presupposition’, began with Frege separating sense/meaning (Sinn) and reference/denotation (Bedeutung), and observing that a referring expression may have meaning but no referent (such as possibly ‘Odysseus’) or that two expressions may have the same referent but a different meaning, such as ‘the morning star’ and ‘the evening star’, or ‘Aristotle’ and ‘the teacher of Alexander the Great’ (Frege, 1892/1948: 210-211, 215). He then proceeds to comment that, apart from what we might call referring expressions, sentences and clauses can also ‘refer’, and in that case the reference is the state of affairs in the world that corresponds to the
proposition (or ‘thought’, *Gedanke*) expressed by the sentence. The proposition then is the meaning/sense of the sentence, and the corresponding state of affairs is the referent.

From Frege’s discussion, and from Russell’s response (1905), which I will discuss below, it becomes apparent that problems with the phenomenon not yet termed presupposition are related to how we define ‘meaning’, and what constitutes ‘meaningful language’ (an issue I will discuss in Chapter 4). For Frege, expressions and clauses with no referent have meaning but constitute ‘problematic language’. Reference here is important because and insofar as we are concerned with truth value. Frege points out that we are not always concerned with truth value, as in the case of poetry/fiction. ‘It is the striving for truth that drives us always to advance from the sense to the referent’ (1948: 216), and we strive for truth because recognising the meaning alone ‘yields no knowledge’ (ibid.: 217).

Frege suggests that ‘[a] logically complete language... should satisfy the conditions, that every expression grammatically well constructed as a proper name out of signs already introduced shall in fact designate an object and that no new sign shall be introduced as a proper name without having a referent assured’ (ibid.: 222). That is, in a ‘logically complete’ language presuppositions must always be satisfied.

When it comes to subordinate clauses such as ‘after Schleswig-Holstein was separated from Denmark’, Frege remarks that a Hearer who does not know or believe this to be the case will either take the truth value of the whole sentence to be indeterminate, or will take the whole sentence as false (224). Interestingly [unlike Russell] Frege does not explicitly comment on what happens when a temporal clause is actually false, but from his commentary on the uncertain existence of Odysseus we might conclude that he considers this as one of the cases where a sentence has meaning but no reference.

Presupposition triggers pose problems for logic and Truth Conditional Semantics because they create issues for representing the propositional content of a sentence in a logical formula, and for determining a sentence’s ‘truth value’. There are two related reasons for this: First, for TC Semantics, a sentence is true if and only if the state of affairs it represents corresponds to a state of affairs in the world – if what the sentence represents is not the case, then the sentence is false and the negation of
this sentence is true. The fact that a part of the sentence holds for both a sentence and its negation is thus problematic (to use Frege's words, not occurring in an ideal, 'logically constructed language').

Second, if we are to not separate 'sense' from 'reference', and consider the truth values of a sentence the meaning of a sentence, then the meaning of the sentence is directly related to the state of affairs in the world it represents. In that sense, 'in order for an assertion... or a sentence to be either true or false [i.e. to have truth value and therefore meaning], its presuppositions must be true or satisfied' (Levinson, 1983: 170). If this is not the case, one is faced with the philosophical problem of explaining why linguistic expressions which contain presuppositions are not meaningless (Russell, 1905: 484).

Russell (1905) proposes that referring expressions have no 'meaning', and sometimes have a referent. According to Russell, referring expressions are to be turned into clauses as in 'there is a X', and all clauses with reference to the real world are true, while if they have no referent/corresponding state of affairs in the world, they are false. Thus the only linguistic unit that can have truth value and hence meaning is the clause (in the indicative), and any presupposing expressions are to be developed into clauses before they are assessed for truth value.

Therefore, a sentence such as 'the King of France is bald' is true if there is a King of France, and false if there is not (i.e. it is not nonsensical). The negation of the sentence, namely, 'the King of France is not bald', would then be true if there is a King of France who is not bald, false if there is a King of France who is bald, and also false if there is no King of France.

Russell's approach has been criticised on the grounds that it is counter-intuitive and that it suggests an 'unnatural' way of processing an utterance and assigning truth value to it (Saeed, 2003: 105; see also Strawson, 1950: 330). Presumably, we would not treat and process every presupposing statement as a series of assertions (in this case, 'there is a King of France' and 'the King of France is bald'), nor would we claim, when the first (i.e. the presupposed) 'assertion' does not hold, that the statement is simply false. In natural language, we would either assign the presupposing statement to an alternative world (e.g., to the past, or to a fictional
world — or to a ‘possible world’ – Stalnaker, 1976), or would resolve the presupposition ‘pragmatically’ (Strawson, 1950; 1952 – see also 3.1 below).

From a pragmatic perspective we would still need to define a presupposition as a non-defeasible proposition (‘constant under negation’), and we would need to identify the presupposition triggers resulting in non-defeasibility.

‘Constancy under negation’ has been shown early on to be a problematic concept – even the most typical cases of what we might call ‘presupposition triggers’ turn out to be possible to be negated, after all. Such an example, including a temporal clause, would be (Levinson, 1983: 204):

- Sue cried before she finished her thesis.
- Sue died before she finished her thesis.

Levinson (1983: 194-195) discusses cases where a presupposition can be denied e.g. ‘Sue didn’t cry after finishing her thesis, because in fact she never finished it’ or ‘suspended’ (Horn, 1972), as in ‘Sue didn’t cry after finishing her thesis, if, in fact, she ever did [finish her thesis]’.

Such (and other) problems reasonably lead one to assume that presupposition cannot be treated as a semantic phenomenon, but as a pragmatic one. To quote Levinson,

semantic theories of presupposition are not viable for the simple reason that semantics is concerned with the specification of invariant stable meanings that can be associated with expressions. Presuppositions are not invariant and they are not stable, and they do not belong in any orderly semantics (1983: 204).

Levinson defines ‘presuppositions’ as ‘certain pragmatic inferences or assumptions that seem at least to be built into linguistic expressions and which can be isolated using specific linguistic tests’ (Levinson, 1983: 167, my emphasis). Thus, even in Levinson’s pragmatic approach, ‘presupposition’ does not mean any ‘previous assumption/supposition’ or ‘presumption’, and is only used for specific linguistic expressions (presupposition triggers).
Saeed also makes the distinction between a semantic and pragmatic approach, whereby semantics deals with phenomena unaffected by context or co-text (such as entailment), whereas a pragmatic approach takes into account co-text and situational context, including the participants' intentions and background knowledge (2003: 102, 109).

By locating 'presupposition' in pragmatics, however, we are still left with the task of defining what presupposition is, how we define it, and how we study it (and why). Pragmatic approaches account for the phenomenon of 'constancy under negation' by discussing in more detail the concept of negation. In the following section I discuss some pragmatic as well as cognitive approaches to presupposition, demonstrating how they resolve or render irrelevant problems raised by a formal, logical approach to language. I argue that approaching presupposition phenomena from a cognitive and pragmatic is much more productive. Nevertheless, in some cases pragmatic approaches seem to implicitly adopt a Truth Conditional approach, for example by apparently making assigning truth value an indispensable step of 'meaning making'. This becomes even more problematic in applications in discourse analysis, where it may lead to unjustifiably strong claims about the inability to refute pieces of discourse containing presuppositions. It is perhaps worth noting that Frege's point is exactly that it is possible to 'make sense' when truth or falsity are not determined.

3.3. Pragmatic and cognitive accounts of presupposition

3.3.1 Truth value vs. appropriacy and background knowledge

Strawson has already pointed out that we cannot talk about the Truth Values of sentences in abstract, but only the truth or falsity of statements uttered in context (Strawson, 1950). So context is a crucial element which determines whether a
presupposition holds (is true or not), and, if not, whether it will be questioned, negated or end up in lack of comprehension. Saeed (2003: 105) points out that when a presupposed statement does not hold, we can speak of presupposition failure, which would normally be resolved in context by the Hearer signalling the failure: if I say ‘X is coming to join us’, and the Hearer does not know of the existence of X, the Hearer will ask ‘who is X?’. Alternatively, the Hearer will not question the Speaker's presupposition, but will accommodate ('tacitly acquiesce', Lewis, 1979: 172), i.e. assume the truth of the statement ‘there is an individual X’, which then becomes part of shared knowledge between Speaker and Hearer without being explicitly asserted.

Thus, a presupposition can have the same function as an assertion, in that it can be used to introduce new knowledge, which is encoded in the presupposed proposition (Gazdar, 1979: 105-106; Karttunen, 1974/1991; Abbott, 2000). When a presupposed proposition is indeed shared knowledge, it refers to entities or states of affairs already known to all participants and therefore there is no need to explicitly assert it, or to question it. When the information is not shared knowledge, but it is uncontroversial and to a certain degree expected, again it will not be questioned due to consistency with the context/our expectations (Gazdar, 1979: 105-106; also Stalnaker, 1973; 1974/1991): ‘I’m sorry I’m late, my car broke down’ is acceptable even if the Hearers do not know whether I own a car, because it is reasonable to assume this in a given context (Levinson, 1983: 205, points out that saying ‘my fire-engine broke down’ would not be equally acceptable - we wouldn’t expect that someone would own a fire-engine or use it for transport). Whether something is controversial or not depends also on the purpose of the interaction and the individual participants - the Hearer may not ask about an unknown referent because s/he is not interested, or does not care if it

---

33 Interestingly this is intuitively in line with Russell's approach, specifically, with the claim that a presupposition is an assertion included in the meaning of the sentence.
exists or not (Al-Raheb, 2005). Thus, we may say that a presupposition will not get contested or questioned, unless there is a reason to do so (cf. Sadock, quoted in Stalnaker, 1974/1991: 480).

In the paragraphs above I have already linked presupposition to context, and context to shared knowledge. Indeed, cognitively speaking, our physical context, perceived through our senses, as well as non-physical properties of the situational context (knowledge and evaluation of the participants and the situation, communicative purpose/genre, etc.) are represented in our minds in context models (Ungerer and Schmid, 1996: 45-47; van Dijk, 2006: 159). Thus, participants operating in the same situational context may form their individual context models, depending on how they differently perceive, interpret and evaluate the situation, as well as what is more salient/notable/of interest to them, but large parts of their context models will overlap, or come to overlap in the course of their interaction, constituting thus shared knowledge.

Stalnaker has early on pointed out the interconnection among context, knowledge and presupposition (1973; 1974/1991). According to Stalnaker, 'the presupposition relation... must be explained partly in terms of facts about the users of sentences: their beliefs, intentions and expectations' (1973: 447). Thus, presuppositions are the background assumptions (beliefs, intentions and expectations) shared by the speakers ('presumed common knowledge'), not explicitly mentioned (or not at all), which 'define' the context (ibid.; also 1974/1991: 474). New information introduced during the interaction by one of the participants may be presupposed after its introduction, as it becomes part of the 'common knowledge' (at least until it is 'denied, challenged,

34 Stalnaker brings as an example the case of 'suppressed premisses in an enthymematic argument' (1973: 447, cf. topoi, Reisigl and Wodak, 2001).
retracted or forgotten’ Stalnaker, 1973: 455) and the context (with every new piece of information, the context ‘shifts’; Stalnaker, 1974/1991: 476).

Apart from the immediate online conceptualisation of the situational context (and the co-text, as part of the context), participants in an interaction may presuppose knowledge related to the broader cultural and social context in which their exchange takes place. In Stalnaker’s example (1973: 449), in discussing the 1972 U.S. presidential election, when saying ‘I think McGovern is going to win’, a speaker presupposes that Nixon is also running for president (although this background assumption does not surface in the discourse at all).

By acknowledging the interdependence of presupposition and background knowledge, as Stalnaker advocates, we are moving away from viewing presupposition in terms of truth value and direct relations of propositions to an external, objective reality, and place the focus on the context and beliefs that are shared, or presumed to be shared, by the participants in an interaction. That is, to be pragmatically appropriate, a presupposed belief has to be shared and/or in accordance with the participants’ other beliefs about the (socio-linguistic) conventions of interaction of the genre and situational context they find themselves in, as well as about the topic under discussion (including associations with other, related topics, forming the cluster of beliefs we may call ‘knowledge’ or ‘ideology’). Thus, the issue of ‘truth’ does not arise, except as commonly accepted by most possible interlocutors in any given context – and, when it comes to ideology, ideological beliefs by definition will be shared by certain (groups of) people and contested by others.

I align myself with Stalnaker’s view of presupposition as background/unstated knowledge, an approach also adopted with van Dijk more recently. I argue that this
approach can be further refined to acknowledge different types of presupposition, and make a contribution to this direction when proposing a categorisation in Chapter 4. In the below I discuss how cognitive linguistics can contribute to the endeavour of identifying, explaining and categorising presuppositions.

3.3.2. Presupposition and cognition – Insights from presupposition negation

In this section I discuss how we can explain cognitively the phenomena that have traditionally been analysed as ‘presupposition’, as well as the ‘negation of presupposition’, based on Cognitive Linguistics literature. Marmaridou has provided a comprehensive account of the phenomena (2000) – here I focus on the most relevant points to my cognitive approach to presupposition.

Looking at how we can explain presupposition negation gives us some valuable insights into the phenomenon termed ‘presupposition’. As mentioned above, Russell’s analysis of presupposition (1905) has been criticised as counter-intuitive. One of the problems has been that, if we interpret ‘the King of France is bald’ as false, because there is no King of France, ‘the King of France is not bald’ is false both in situations where there is no King of France, and when there is a King of France who is not bald. It follows that ‘not’ (or equivalent negation markers) is ambiguous, negating either the existence of the (existentially presupposed) King of France, or his baldness (cf. Marmaridou, 2000: 139). Apart from being counter-intuitive (the word ‘not’ having ‘two meanings’), this is problematic for seeing the word ‘not’ as the equivalent of the logical operator for negation, as logical operators should have one and only one ‘meaning’ and cannot be ambiguous. Alternatively, one would have to come up with
two different logical operators of negation, one just for the negation of presuppositions, which is ‘theoretically undesirable’ (ibid.).

One way out of this is to consider only one negation operator, which however can have different pragmatic functions. Horn has suggested that negation can be seen as *pragmatically* ambiguous, that is, the original single meaning of the negation operator can be extended for cases like ‘metalinguistic negation’, as in


Metalinguistic negation, then, is a matter of scope. Rather than rejecting the total of a speaker’s utterance, the interlocutor (in correcting), or the speaker herself (in self-correcting) is rejecting one part of the utterance (in the example above, the grammatical realisation of a concept). The same holds for negating presupposition – one can negate that the King of France is bald, or one can negate the existence of the King of France. This has been observed by Horn and Burton-Roberts (see Carston, 1996), however it needs to be noted that Burton-Roberts sees presupposition as a semantic phenomenon, and thus presupposition negation (as well as metalinguistic negation) as a logical contradiction which pragmatically results in re-processing an utterance in order to make sense.

Carston (1996) makes a convincing case about why metalinguistic negation and presupposition negation do *not* necessarily involve logical contradiction, and links both to the metarepresentational, ‘echoic’ property of language. That is, through a presupposition negation such as ‘I don’t regret telling her my secrets; I haven’t told her anything’ the second clause ‘echoes’ and refutes only one part of the first clause, namely ‘telling her my secrets’. However, Carston views language as a representation of the world, and not as a representation of beliefs. As a result, she still maintains a
distinction between two types of negation, 'descriptive' and 'metarepresentational' -
the 'descriptive' use serves for determining the Truth Conditions of an utterance, and
the metarepresentational echoes and refutes parts of previous utterances (ibid.).

Whereas in communication we often try to determine the truth or falsity of what is
being communicated, this judgement is by no means essential or necessary in
determining meaning and reaching understanding. We can perfectly well understand
the sentence ‘the King of France is bald’, whether we know there is no King of
France, or we think that there is one, or even if we do not know whether France has a
King or not. Efforts to move away from the semantic understanding of presupposition,
already from Levinson and Fillmore, and even Stalnaker, have been hindered by the
effort to preserve ‘Truth Value determination’ as a part of semantics, pragmatics or
both. Below, I discuss the Cognitive Linguistics take on presupposition, taking into
account that the relationship between language and reality is not direct, but mediated
by cognition. It then becomes apparent that all cases of negation involve negating one
part of a mental representation (which may be expressed linguistically) – whether this
part is a phonological characteristic, a part of (a belief expressed by) an utterance or a
belief/proposition expressed by a sentence, is a matter of scope, but also a matter of
framing.

3.3.3 Presupposition and cognition – Framing and mental spaces

As we saw, both what has been called presupposition negation and what has been
called metalinguistic negation involve negating a part of a previous utterance, which
we can elaborate into negating a part of the mental representation evoked by the
previous utterance. Based on Fillmore’s Frame Semantics (see 2.5.1), Marmaridou
points out that ‘a single situation can be framed in different ways... For example, a
A person may be described as 'stingy' or 'thrifty' (2000: 143). The very same way of handling money, by the same person, can be understood within a mental representation (frame) including the value ‘Spending as little money as possible is not good’ (‘stingy’), or another, including the value ‘Spending as little money as possible is good’ (‘thrifty’). In an expression like ‘Mary is stingy’, a speaker says ‘in one breath something that could be challenged in two different ways’ (Stalnaker, 1974/1991: 476) – one could say ‘Mary is not stingy – she is really generous’, or ‘Mary is not stingy – she is just thrifty’. In the former negative sentence, the framing of ‘trying to spend as little as possible’ as a negative attribute is accepted, but it is refuted that Mary does indeed follow this practice. In the latter, it is not accepted that all cases of ‘spending as little as possible’ are negative – some cases (presumably the most extreme) can be negative, but in other cases it can be positive (thrift), and it is in this category Mary is classified into – this is ‘cross-frame negation’, in the sense that it rejects one framing of a situation in favour of another. Fillmore argues that

the intuitions about presuppositions and the so-called ‘negation test’ hold under the ‘normal’ or ‘within frame’ sense of negation and that apparent counterexamples are instances of... non-truthconditional negation, which [he equates] with instances of cross-frame negation (1985: 244).

Thus, looking at both metalinguistic and presupposition negation, ‘scope’ refers to whether it is the total or part of the content of an utterance that is being negated (presuppositions surviving or not depending on scope), but, unlike in Russell’s account, we do not consider all parts as ‘equal’ – the presupposed elements may belong to a broader ‘frame’ encompassing the asserted elements, in which case refuting the presupposed elements requires a frame shift, or asserted elements may be parts of different mental spaces, again on a higher level hierarchically.
Cross-frame and meta-linguistic negation have definitely been shown to be possible in both discourse and cognition. In order to explain why cross-frame negation is conceptually troublesome we might want to attribute it to disruption of the ‘conceptual unity of domain’ (Croft, 2003). According to Croft (based on Langacker, 1987) the meaning of words ‘appears to be determined by the interpretation of the whole construction in which they are found. Much of this is determined by the domain in which the words are to be interpreted’ (2003: 161), and the ‘meaning of the whole’, i.e. the domain in which the ‘whole’ is to be interpreted, determines the meaning of the ‘parts’ (2003: 162). The scope of what the ‘whole’ might be can vary of course – for example we can imagine how our interpretation of a text may be influenced by our knowledge of its genre, producers, and/or context of production, as well as our interpretation of specific parts of the text following from our holistic assessment of the text. However, also with a narrower scope (and perhaps a narrower definition of the concept of ‘domain’), Croft argues that ‘all of the elements in a syntactic unit must be interpreted in a single domain’ (ibid.) – if not, we might interpret some of the elements as metaphoric or metonymic, or, I would argue, we may proceed cognitively to frame or domain shifting.

The issue of presupposition negation in cases such as ‘The King of France is not bald, because in fact there isn’t such an individual’ or ‘Mary will not regret doing a PhD in linguistics, because she didn’t do the PhD after all’ is only one of the cases that fall under the category of the ‘projection problem’ in presupposition. The projection problem refers to the fact that although the presupposition ‘there is a King of France’ is preserved in the simple sentence ‘The King of France is not bald’, it is not

[^35]: For our purposes we could define ‘domain’ as a field, akin to ‘semantic field’, but emphasising that semantic domains are related to experiential domains, and bearing in mind that they have a hierarchical structure, i.e., embedded within a domain can be sub-domains, or mental models.
preserved in the complex sentence 'The King of France is not bald, because in fact there isn’t such an individual’. To bring another example, consider:

- Mary will regret doing a PhD in linguistics.
- If Mary does a PhD in linguistics, she will regret doing it.

In the first sentence it is presupposed that Mary is doing, will do or has done a PhD in linguistics, and asserted that at some point in the future she will regret it. In the second sentence, the presupposition (triggered by ‘regret’), does not remain (Mary may not do a PhD in linguistics). In general, the projection problem refers to the issue of presuppositions of sentences, which remain constant if the sentence is simply negated, not remaining constant when a simple sentence becomes a part of a complex or compound sentence (for a more detailed account of the projection problem see Marmaridou, 2000: 127-132). In this section I will discuss how we can account for it from a cognitive perspective, bringing in the notion of ‘mental spaces’ as imaginary worlds we construct online as we process discourse (Fauconnier, 1985; 1994; 1997; Marmaridou, 2000).

I will argue that ‘cross-mental space negation’ is similar to cross-frame negation, but with a broader scope. We could define a mental space as a mental representation constructed online. Admittedly there is much work to be done in this area, as mental representations constructed online can be minimal units evoked by a referring expression to the whole of what van Dijk calls ‘discourse schema’ (1998). This is a matter of scope and taxonomy which are beyond the scope of my thesis. For my purposes here I will consider the mental spaces corresponding to epistemic worlds built in discourse on the sentence level. Mental Space builders for this could be conjunctions/connectives, aspect (in Greek), and the expressions traditionally
classified as ‘presupposition triggers’. When there is no space builder, it is assumed that the discourse evokes representation within the last mental space constructed.

Mental spaces can account for the fact that presuppositions are triggered by expressions introducing subordinate clauses (such as ‘He forgot that the class starts at 9’ – presupposes the class starts at 9), infinitive clauses (such as ‘I managed to do x’ - presupposes I tried), or gerund clauses (‘I have stopped beating my husband’ presupposes I have been beating my husband) 36, whereas other expressions with exactly the same syntactic structure do not (such as ‘He said that the class starts at 9’ – it may or may not be true that the class starts at 9). This has been extensively discussed in the work of Lauri Karttunen (e.g. 1973), among others. Marmaridou observes that, although Karttunen and others have been describing, but not explaining the projection problem, cognitive accounts of ‘mental spaces’ or ‘imaginary worlds’ also explain why it is that in some complex or compound sentences the truth value of presuppositions is maintained, whereas in others it is undetermined (2000: 153).

In a nutshell, mental spaces as imaginary worlds are created by ‘space building’ expressions, and worlds can be embedded in other, hierarchically higher worlds. Thus, ‘It is raining’ pertains to the real world (as perceived by individuals in their temporal and spatial context), whereas ‘believes’ in ‘Ann believes that it is raining’ builds the mental space or ‘world’ or Ann’s beliefs. ‘It is raining’ is the case in the world of Ann’s beliefs, but may or may not be the case in the real world. The same holds for reference to situations in a world including presuppositions. For example, in the sentence ‘Ann believes that it will not stop raining until tomorrow’, ‘stop’ seems to trigger the presupposition that ‘it is raining now’, but if interlocutors know that it is

---

In Greek, all the above verbs can introduce subordinate clauses in the subjunctive form, or take a noun as an object complement.
not raining then this presupposition holds only in the world of Ann’s beliefs, but not in the real world (or, at least, not in the world of the interlocutors’ beliefs). This account includes also the cases of framing discussed in the previous section, i.e. ‘Mary is stingy’ holds in a ‘world’ (system of beliefs) where Mary’s behaviour is not conforming with the norms and expectations of managing money, but not in a ‘world’ where the same behaviour corresponds to what would be positively perceived and described as ‘thrifty’, and is socially desirable. But both these worlds are part of a reality world where Mary is trying not to spend a lot of money. However, in ‘Mary is not stingy, she is really generous’, we are not talking about a reality where Mary is tight with money, which is differently evaluated in different sub-worlds/systems of belief within this reality. The negation is applied to the superordinate, ‘real world’ mental space, where ‘Mary is stingy/thrifty/tight with money [and other synonyms for the same behaviour]’ is not the case.

Marmaridou discusses the Mental Space Theory as an explanation for the problems encountered by TC Semantics in assigning truth value to sentences, linking presupposition to specific linguistic triggers, and making generalisations on the phenomenon of presupposition (cf. Fauconnier, 1985). However, if truth conditions are more of a philosophical issue than an issue of meaning-making, why would we be so concerned about the determination of truth value even in cognitive semantics or pragmatics? The reason is related to the communicative function of the texts and interactions we may be interested in studying. In the narration of a traditional fairy tale, hearers understand what is being said and also are perfectly aware that the narration applies to a fictional world (but are still able to assign representations to the superordinate fairy tale world and the subordinate worlds of the beliefs of characters etc.). In non-fictional genres, however, there is the implicit or explicit claim on behalf
of the speakers/narrators/text producers that their utterances represent aspects of the real world. There is then an issue of whether speakers, by representing certain states of affairs as true through devices that make negation more difficult, can impose their own ideologies/group knowledge on other groups, or at least influence their audience making it more willing to accept certain beliefs as true at their expense, or at the expense of third parties/groups that are being discriminated against. In the following section, I discuss the issue of negating/questioning presupposition in interaction, and how it may or may not be useful to adopt a notion of presupposition for analysing the manifestation of ideological beliefs in texts.

3.4. Analysing presupposition in discourse

3.4.1 Questioning/refuting presupposition in discourse – cognitive and social constraints

Marmaridou points out that cross-frame negation involves ‘[bringing] out some kind of disagreement between interlocutors which is based on presupposed rather than asserted material’ (2000: 146), which is more difficult than disagreeing on asserted material. Fauconnier suggests that presuppositions ‘make the hearer feel they are already somehow given and therefore difficult to question or refute’ (Fauconnier, 1985: 108). This may be resulting from the fact that ‘[to] presuppose a proposition consists of being committed to that proposition while not countenancing the possibility that it may be false’ (Burton-Roberts, 1989a: 26, cited in Marmaridou, 2000: 134), whereas to assert a proposition allows considering the possibility that it may be false. Thus, Burton-Roberts proposes that ‘the distinction between assertion and presupposition can be pre-theoretically characterized in terms of a distinction in
degree and/or kind of commitment’ on behalf of the speaker (Burton-Roberts, 1989b: 452-453, cited in Marmaridou, 2000: 135) – in Stalnaker’s terms, presupposition expresses a ‘propositional attitude’ on behalf of the speaker towards what is being expressed but not asserted (1973: 448).

Sbisá proposes seeing presuppositions ‘not as shared assumptions, but as assumptions which ought to be shared’, attributing thus to presuppositions a ‘normative feature’ (1999: 501). Questioning a presupposition is ‘laborious, because it involves a change of topic from what was explicitly at issue to what was merely presupposed, as well as being risky, because it amounts to openly challenging the entitlement of the utterances he or she has issued’ (ibid.: 502). This is in line with Strawson’s point that the question doesn’t even arise (1950: 12, in Sbisá, 1999: 502).

So we have two factors here: the amount of work needed to question a presupposition, which can be seen in terms of ‘processing effort’ or ‘cognitive effort’ in Relevance Theory (Sperber and Wilson, 1986; 1995). It is worth the effort if the expected results overcome the costs – this can be seen in terms of benefits in understanding (it may cost more cognitive effort not to ask about something which is presupposed, as many students may have felt when attending a lecture presupposing knowledge they do not have), but also in terms of extra-linguistic costs and benefits in relation to what one is trying to achieve through an interaction. So challenging an interlocutor, as Sbisá notes, can be costly.

This is particularly clear when taking into account the power relations among interlocutors. Harris (1995), examining data from a magistrate/defendant and police/suspect interactions, claims that presuppositions are difficult to challenge based on the fact that the defendants/subjects in her data do not challenge the
presuppositions in the questions of the magistrate or police. Although they do in fact have a vested interest in challenging their interlocutors' presuppositions, in terms of power they are subordinate. It seems that at least in such cases there is nothing in the linguistic structure of the expressions used ('presupposition triggers') that cognitively prevents addressees from questioning presuppositions (see discussion in 3.1). One could argue that, pragmatically, the discursive and social conventions related to presupposing expressions make it socially unacceptable to challenge presuppositions, especially for people in powerless/less powerful positions. Generic conventions should also be noted, as the structure of court interaction involves certain discursive roles for the participants. As Borutti observes

Presupposition... is analysable as a strategy which transforms the addressee's possibility of speaking – although this change is not of a causal nature (such as: influencing the hearer's opinions, volitions, interests etc.). Rather, the change concerns the hearer's right of speaking. The strategic value of presupposition in a discourse is that the utterer implicitly imposes a particular thematic – pragmatic organization of discourse. Such an organization is, precisely for this reason, more difficult to challenge (1984: 442, my emphasis).

One cannot help but wonder, however, if it is not also (maybe equally?) difficult for a powerless participant in an interaction (highly structured or otherwise) to challenge the powerful interlocutors' assertions. Therefore, in any analysis it may be worth considering whether it is primarily cognitive, social-interactional or social-structural factors influencing 'defeasibility' (or a combination of these).

When it comes to cross-mental space negation, Fauconnier's account (1985) explains why statements in relation to any world subordinate to one person's 'belief world' are of indeterminate truth value in the real world, and we can only be certain they are true

87
for this person. Consider Marmaridou’s brief discussion on the following example, and the contextual factors involved (2000: 158-159):

The Prime Minister said that he didn’t know about telephones being tapped.

We can identify three mental spaces:

\[ S(1): \text{the space of the Prime Minister's knowledge (built by 'know')} \]
\[ S(2): \text{the space of the Prime Minister's sayings (built by 'say')} \]
\[ R: \text{the real world space} \]

Presupposition (P): Telephones were being tapped.

The presupposition (P) is not satisfied in S(1) – that is, it is not True in the mental space of the Prime Minister’s knowledge (it is either false or undetermined). Therefore, it cannot be inherited by S(2). However, S(2) is built by the word ‘say’.

Someone saying that the Prime Minister said he didn’t know about telephones being tapped means that the truth of the claim ‘the Prime Minister didn’t know about telephones being tapped’ is also undetermined (the Prime Minister may be lying).

There are two states of affairs to be judged in terms of truth value here – whether telephones were being tapped and, if yes, whether the Prime Minister knows about it. Members of the audience who, ‘for independent reasons’ know, or believe they know, that the Prime Minister has no knowledge of phones being tapped, will also believe it even if it is introduced by the reporting verb-space-builder ‘say’ (Marmaridou, 2000: 159). However, a journalist reporting the Prime Minister’s words cannot be held responsible if the Prime Minister was lying and it turns out he knew about the tapping of phones, since s/he was only reporting on the world of the Prime Minister’s sayings S(2), and not necessarily on the real world. Marmaridou observes that this allows speakers to create beliefs in speakers’ minds, without being held responsible if these beliefs turn out to be unsustainable (2000: 159). I would be more interested, however,
in the ‘independent reasons’ that might entice a speaker to deem something as ‘true’ in the real world or not. To begin with, let us not forget that the ‘real world’ is yet another ‘mental space’. In many cases, we are not able to verify through our senses states of affairs represented as belonging to the ‘real world’ (say, assertions in simple sentences, as when we have the sentence ‘Telephones were being tapped.’), either because they refer to a different temporal or spatial point from the one we are in, or because they represent abstract states and actions we have no access to (as in, ‘the Prime Minister does not know x’ – we don’t know if this is true in the superordinate, real world, because we have no access to the Prime Minister’s mind. We may know this is true in the world S(2), ‘he said he doesn’t know x’, because we have heard him say it, for example). The question of whether a hearer will deem what the Prime Minister said to be true has to do with whether the hearer considers that the Prime Minister is an honest person, and that s/he has no evidence countering the Prime Minister’s statement, or proving that he is not telling the truth in this case, or this evidence is not sufficient. Clearly, then, the hearers bring in other beliefs/information about the context of the utterance, the speaker(s) and the real world in general in order to assign truth value (or not). Thus, the use of reporting verbs may indicate an unwillingness of the reporting speaker to commit to the truth of the reported representations; it may indeed indicate distancing from and doubt about a person’s words (‘Did James lock the door when he left?’ ‘He says he did’), or, on the contrary, it may provide a reason why we should accept the reported representations as true, as in all arguments *ad verecundiam* (appeals to authority). Thus, although from a formalist/semantic perspective the verb ‘say’ does not guarantee the truth or falsity of the representations within the mental space it builds, the hearers’ beliefs and reasoning
about various aspects of the context will determine whether to accept the represented state of affairs as true or not.

There are a number of issues arising from this and the previous sections. One of them is the issue of to what extent the classical examples of presuppositions are more difficult to negate due to different cognitive processing or due to social norms about what parts of our interlocutors’ utterances we are allowed to question – where power as well as specific generic conventions play a role. The other important issues are, given the insights from cognitive linguistic approaches to presupposition, whether we should re-define the notion of presupposition, how we can identify and analyse presuppositions based on our new definition, whether this new definition also predicts the difficulty of defeasibility observed in the classical examples and what implications this has for the manifestation of ideology in discourse and its effects.

It has often been observed (Stalnaker, 1974/1991: 475; Sbisa 1999) that ‘understanding’ the presupposition is necessary for making meaning of the discourse. Based on this, I regard presupposition as ‘prerequisite for meaning’. This is not to suggest that if a presupposition/presupposed assumption is not true, then the sentence has no meaning. Rather, that in order to achieve ordinary ‘understanding’ of the meaning of a stretch of discourse, it is necessary to access the presupposed material from our stored background knowledge. In a theory of language where each single lexical item constitutes part of a frame, and profiles one aspect of the frame, at least some other elements of the frame need to be triggered for comprehension on the frame level. It is in that sense that it is impossible for an outsider to understand what Jörg Heider means by ‘East Coast’ (and not only because of the inability to assign reference to the name) – although in this case activated knowledge on the discourse level would include accessing ideological stereotypical assumptions about Jews and
the US. As we go up the levels, the scope of presupposition and consequently the type of 'meaning' co-constructed between text and recipient differs. One might then argue that on a narrow level we can still understand the lexical items 'East' and 'Coast' in this example, and therefore we don't consider them nonsensical. The higher the level, therefore, and the broader the scope, the more pragmatic and context oriented the type of meaning constructed becomes.

In addition, 'presupposed' is knowledge that is required in order to access and construct meaning, and knowledge that is taken to be or made relevant by the text producer. That is, the text producer not only has the knowledge underlying the surface of the discourse they produce, but also has awareness and expectations in relation to whether and to what extend various audiences have access to the relevant knowledge too. For meaning-making this means that the audience may not necessarily agree with the presupposed assumptions, but that they are able to decode them and understand them. Thus, my definition of presupposition does not require necessarily that presuppositions be mutually accepted (this is related to the social aspects of presupposition and presupposition questioning), but that they should be mutually accessible.

The question of making meaning and persuasion/acceptance has always been important for the critical study of language. If, in any given interaction, we construct a discourse model, which includes a representation of the contents of the discourse produced by our interlocutor(s) (van Dijk, 1998; 2001b), this is first and foremost a meta-representation. That is, we form a mental model of 'what has been said'. Drawing on other knowledge about the speaker and the context, we normally tend to assume that our interlocutor is truthful, i.e. believes that what s/he says is true (or we may detect dishonesty – cf. Chilton, 2005). Nevertheless, we may still have issues
with the representation of reality constructed by the speaker, or blatantly disagree with every single word. The issue is to what extent discourse persuades (and possibly deceives) by using our meaning-making mechanism as a tool for persuasion, i.e. by exploiting the default processes of attention and inferencing in order to lead to a specific understanding, desirable to the speaker/discourse producer.\(^{37}\)

Stalnaker (1974/1991) points out that we often *behave as if* certain information is shared even if we mention/hear it for the first time, and Sbisá (1999) suggests that ‘presupposition’ is not information which is shared, but information which *ought to be shared*. Stalnaker however does not claim that presupposition defined this way has a persuasive function – we may *behave as if* we know, or even agree with something, but not come to the point of agreeing with it. Sbisá is right to point out the normative function of discourse, but does not elaborate so much on the issue of cognitive vs. social/pragmatic difficulty in refuting ‘presupposition’.

A potential explanation for the normative/persuasive power of presupposition is that the issue of how the world *is* and how the world *ought to be* are very often conflated in discourse (and consequently potentially in cognition). A good example is the constant, ostensibly purely descriptive representation of gender – e.g. in an issue of the Greek men’s lifestyle magazine *Nitro*, pages of text are devoted to how ‘real men’ are. Implicitly, this is also prescriptive – if by definition ‘real men’ are this way, anybody who is different is not a ‘real man’ (Kosetzi and Polyzou, 2005). Incidentally, this is one important reason to examine textual representation of reality, even if it appears to be a merely descriptive endeavour. According to how factive descriptions in texts are framed or used, they can provide a representation of reality to be prescribed or criticised. It is always, however, a matter of framing. Likewise the

\[^{37}\text{Thanks to Steve Oswald for interesting discussions on this.}\]

92
distinction between ‘given’ and contestable information. As pointed out above, both new and old information can be represented as ‘given’ and not open to contestation. As for old information, and whether this can be either ‘given’ or ‘contestable’, we need to take into account the status of ‘information’ and ‘knowledge’ as mental representations. That is, a proposition representing a state of affairs in the world (a belief) may be widely present in the discourse of a community, thus shared and ‘known’, but may be evaluated as true by some people, as false by others, and as undetermined for others (cf. van Dijk’s (2003) point that some beliefs may be considered ‘knowledge’ or ‘mere opinions’ based on who evaluates them). This involves a meta-representational element accompanying the mental representations, i.e. ‘I know that group x believes y, but I think y is not true’. In discourse we can distinguish among representations which are presupposed to be true (presupposed to be the case, ‘given’, whether new or old/shared information), presupposed to be known/shared (old information but not necessarily accepted as true by everyone), and of course both, i.e. presupposed to be the case and shared by everyone, or at least everyone participating in an interaction and the social groups/communities of the participants.38

3.4.2 Recent critical analyses of presupposition in discourse

Despite van Dijk’s seemingly very broad definition of presupposition as ‘everything which is not asserted’ (‘presupposed material’, in Marmaridou’s terms, cf. also Grundy, 1995: Ch. 6), and Sbisá’s (1999) comment in passing that we can analyse

38 Bekalu also makes the distinction between what has to be presupposed/ assumed to be known for the discourse to make sense, and what is taken for granted, which he calls ‘discourse presuppositions’ (2006: 152).
‘linguistically marked’ presuppositions (which she does), and ‘linguistically unmarked’ presuppositions (which she does not do), analysing presupposition in discourse remains for the most part restricted to the truth conditional definition of presupposition even when the analysts purportedly do not subscribe to the objectivist, formalist understanding of language which gave birth to the discussion of ‘presupposition’ as a phenomenon in the first place. Moreover, none of these approaches seem to subscribe to a cognitive explanation of presupposition taking into account mental representation, such as the frame- and mental space-based approaches presented above. Below I review some recent literature specifically from critical discourse analytical approaches taking different perspectives on presupposition and knowledge.

Chilton reserves the term ‘presupposition’ for the cases traditionally identified as such in the literature, also making the observations that presupposition triggers serve for a more convenient or succinct ‘packaging’ of information, which may either be known or accommodated, and therefore cognitively and socially difficult and ‘inconvenient’ to question/refute (2004: 63-64). Wodak also follows the truth-conditional definition of presupposition (2007: 213), focussing on existential presuppositions in her analysis. For the analysis of gender ideologies in discourse, Christie (2000, 24-25; 88ff.) Talbot (2010: Ch. 7) and Magalhães (1995) explicitly subscribe to the truth-conditional approach.

For background knowledge (what Sbisá calls ‘linguistically unmarked’ presuppositions) Chilton seems to employ the term *presumptions* (2004: 64-65; see also analysis in 2004: 78-79, for example). Wodak uses the term *allusions* for all (other) expressions in the discourse that evoke (rather than explicitly assert) background, shared and commonly accepted knowledge (2007: 212), and mentions
topoi as a kind of shared knowledge often evoked through allusions in her data for argumentation purposes (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001).

It appears that, for both Chilton and Wodak, presuppositions may rely on shared and commonly accepted knowledge, but are more interesting for critical analysis when they present new knowledge as old/given. ‘Presumptions’ can also have this function, when it comes to principles of discourse, for instance, as in the case of a speaker who performs a speech act, whereby ‘presuming’ that s/he is authorised to perform the speech act felicitously (which may be ‘new information’ for the addressee). On the contrary, allusions only ‘work’ when the knowledge is already shared, and allusions have more to do with content rather than principles. In this case, then, as it also becomes apparent from Wodak’s critical analysis, knowledge of the presupposed representations (including presupposed topoi, 2007: 217) is necessary for understanding aspects of the discourse, but it is not necessary that the recipient will agree with the presupposed representations. In this case, Wodak disagrees with the anti-Semitic representations alluded to, but points out that knowledge of these representations is necessary for the audience to understand (and only subsequently be persuaded by) Jörg Heider’s discourse.

The analyses and/or examples by Talbot (2010), Magalhães (1995) and Christie (2000) indicate that the concern here is not so much whether the addressee already shares the presupposed beliefs – in fact the beliefs in question are likely to be already shared by (at least the intended) text consumers, such as the belief that teenage girls are romantically interested in teenage boys (Talbot, 2010: 123) or the stereotype that women gossip (Christie, 2000: 90-91). The issue is rather that these ‘common sense’ ideological beliefs are reinforced, presented as ‘normal’ and incontestable (and thus
also normative), and become even harder to challenge and change, both short-term in
interaction and long-term in social cognition.

One possible reason for the resilience of the use of traditionally defined
'presupposition' may be the power of tradition. Early scholars presenting slightly
different takes to the traditional, truth-conditional one, such as Austin, Stalnaker, and
Fillmore, have been trying to find a common ground between their approaches and the
prevalent formalist paradigm as the then new fields of pragmatics and cognitive
linguistics were being established. Relevance Theory also seems to feel obliged to
account for Truth Conditions as part of meaning, rather than as part of an underlying
pragmatic principle. That is, the relevance theoretical approach includes making
judgements on truth or falsity in the account of how interlocutors process and
understand language, rather than viewing it as a default underlying assumption that
every speaker is truthful unless there is evidence to the contrary - an assumption that
may or may not hold, or which may be suspended in some contexts such as in the
courtroom (for more discussion see Chilton, 1987).

On the other hand, it remains the case that there is something about certain
expressions that makes them noticeable as some kind of special phenomenon - to
quote Kripke, ‘to some degree Justice Stewart’s comment about pornography holds
here: we all recognize it when we see it, even if we can’t say exactly what it is’ (2009:
367). However, when attempting to define presupposition triggers it is still
problematic to separate them from other, ‘ordinary’ linguistic expressions, for
example as ‘expressions introducing propositions that can only be negated by cross-
frame negation’, given that cross-frame negation (including metalinguistic negation)
can occur practically for any lexical item, since, as discussed in Chapter 4, every
lexical item or longer linguistic expression carries with it unexpressed meanings
(which can only be negated if these – presupposed- meanings are brought to the foreground).

In this chapter I have argued that what have traditionally been called ‘presupposition triggers’ are ‘mental space builders’ (Fauconnier, 1985/1994), and that the propositions they introduce constitute the most prototypical sub-category of a broader ‘presupposition’ category. This places emphasis on the semantic aspect of these expressions particularly in assigning epistemic status, while acknowledging that recognising a ‘mental space’ (or epistemic world/level) involves taking into account syntax/co-text, context and the interlocutors’ ‘world knowledge’, none of which poses a problem for a pragmatic cognitive approach (while all of which do potentially pose problems for logical formal approaches).

Classifying ‘sentence-level’ presuppositions introduced by presupposition triggers as ‘prototypical’ acknowledges that there is no clear dividing line between ‘presupposition triggers’ and other linguistic expressions triggering background knowledge, but still assigns them some special status, which, I argue, is the case due to the status of clauses as expressing ‘complete thoughts/propositions’ (see 4.4 for further details on this).

Whether we consider sentence-level presupposition as only one type of presupposition (albeit the most prototypical one), or we reserve the term ‘presupposition’ for this type only, we would still need to account for other types of (presumed, not directly defeasible) ‘background knowledge’– a category ‘indicators of background knowledge’ would be too nebulous for systematic linguistic analysis, as are the categories ‘presumption’ or ‘allusion’, which could, in principle, include every expression indicating, alluding to or triggering any amount or type of background
knowledge. Moreover, according to Wodak's definition of 'allusion', every presupposition which is not informative can be an allusion, at least in theory (in that it will be based on shared knowledge, which some people may not have and thus not comprehend the text). Chilton’s ‘presumptions’ could also include what Wodak calls allusions plus pragmatic competence and any other ‘presumed’ knowledge (Chilton, personal communication, 2008), which would therefore also include ‘presuppositions’ when the ‘presupposed propositions’ are already known to all participants.39 Given that what is known to the participants cannot always be determined with certainty, and also it will change according to the participants (e.g. in media texts it will vary according to recipient), we have no way of telling a ‘presupposition’ from a ‘presumption’ or ‘allusion’ apart from the presence or not of ‘presupposition triggers’.

On the other hand, van Dijk (2003; 2005) and Bekalu (2006) define ‘presupposition’ solely as ‘background, presumably shared, knowledge’ which is not asserted, irrespective of ‘presupposition triggers’. Van Dijk (2005) elaborates on what kind of knowledge would be presupposed in what kind of communicative situations. He discusses how in any interaction participants monitor each other's already existing knowledge, and determine what they should assert, and in what manner, taking into account the perceived shared knowledge as well as other contextual considerations (politeness, appropriacy, genre/purpose of interaction, interests of self, interests of interlocutors etc.). In this approach, some beliefs not stated, directly or indirectly, in the discourse, are presupposed (e.g. that Egypt is a country), whereas indirectly surfacing propositions can be ‘reminded’ to the recipients who may have forgotten them from previous discourse, or ‘obliquely asserted’ for recipients who never knew them in the first place (2005: 91, 94). It seems that these are the cases where it is not

39 Later on Chilton limits the concept of presumptions to shared moral ‘values that are taken for granted’ (2011: 777).
assumed that this knowledge is shared, but the 'reminded' facts are taken for granted/true. Van Dijk also touches upon the problem that in some cases shared knowledge may nevertheless be asserted, or that certain information may not be part of the discourse not because it is shared knowledge but because it is backgrounded ('underemphasized') or hidden (2005: 95). I would link his discussion of the latter to the issue of framing, namely, the question of what information is presupposed and communicated as part of the frame of a word used, as opposed to information which is not communicated because it is not explicitly stated but also not part of the frames/mental representations evoked.

Since van Dijk, as well as Bekalu, is concerned primarily with knowledge (or lack thereof) on behalf of the audience, they can speak of presupposition, as indicated through linguistic expressions, as presupposed knowledge because it has been explicitly stated at some other part of the text, or as mental models that are never fully described in the text but are supposed to be part of the audience’s pre-existing knowledge, evoked by (explicit descriptions of) facts in the text. However, this can appear methodologically problematic and/or unsystematic. Consider one example (a headline) from Bekalu’s analysis:

**Ministry calls for active public participation in exposing anti-peace group in Gambella.**

According to Bekalu (2006: 158),

>[i]f we begin with the headline, it presupposes that in Gambella (a name of a place likely to be construed as such by the reader by the linguistic clue of capitalization) there had been an ‘anti-peace group’ that should be exposed, and this in turn presupposes that there was a clash of some kind in the place mentioned, Gambella.
Most, if not all, analyses of presupposition would agree that the existence of an anti-peace group in Gambella is presupposed/presented as given (existential presupposition through the definite referring expression). I would argue that it is also presupposed that there is, or is planned to be, and ‘exposing’ of this group (not necessarily that there ‘should be’).40 ‘Exposing’ also presupposed that the group is somehow ‘hidden’, although this is not part of Bekalu’s analysis. Moving on to the assumption that there was a clash in Gambella – this is where ‘presupposed’ comes to mean ‘requires the reader to draw on other mental models/resources than the text alone’. The expression ‘anti-peace group’ alone does not automatically mean there was a ‘clash’, since there are other things an anti-peace group can be involved in that may need ‘exposing’, such as threats, symbolic violence acts, etc. Bekalu knows that in this case there was a clash involved because of his knowledge of the context, and his point is exactly that it is ‘unfair’ to expect the audience to understand certain elements that are ‘presupposed’ (absent) because they do not have enough evidence to infer them, and thus they cannot fully comprehend the text (this is the same as Wodak’s point about ‘allusions’, reversed. Indeed, in both cases, a hearer who does not have the necessary background knowledge alluded to will not fully understand the text, or will have a different understanding).

Other cases of slippage between the ‘traditional’, truth-conditional and a broad ‘background knowledge’ approach to presupposition include Mills (2008) and Magalhães (1995) in the study of language and sexism. Mills’ (2008: 146) re-analysis of Christie’s example ‘So, have you women finished gossiping?’ (2000: 90-91) suggests it presupposes not only that the addressees had been gossiping (truth-

40 This could be one of the cases one could analyse as ‘backgrounding’ or ‘mystification’ – probably readers can infer that the Ministry will do the ‘exposing’, and is asking for co-operation from the public, but the abstract, non-basic level noun or verb ‘exposing/expose’ does not make it clear what actions this involves (see O’Halloran, 2003).
conditional), but also that ‘women’s talk is trivial, that women engage in gossipping more than men, that two women talking together can be assumed to be gossipping’ (2008: 146) assumptions which are definitely widely held stereotypes about women but not derived merely by performing a ‘negation test’ on the sentence. Magalhães (1995) presents a formal, Truth Conditional theoretical approach, but in her analysis she also comments about a male character: ‘Rubinho’s speech presupposes his former and current power over Tina [his girlfriend]’ (1995: 189). ‘Presupposition of power’ is not, strictly speaking, truth-conditional, and does not emerge from ‘presupposition triggers’.

It seems that, as Sbisa has pointed out, the terminological confusion and appearance of methodological lack of systematicity emerges from the different uses of the term ‘presuppose’. Is presupposed material automatically inferred, and therefore difficult to reflect on consciously and refute, or ‘not stated, but required’, in which case it may not be inferred, leading to impaired or insufficient understanding for some recipients? There is an element of contradiction when van Dijk says that certain ‘knowledge can be presupposed because it is irrelevant or can be inferred by the recipients themselves’ (2005: 76) – surely, if this knowledge is not mentioned because it is irrelevant, it is not meant to be inferred, whereas if it is relevant and can be inferred it will not be asserted for reasons of economy. Bekalu speaks of ‘fair’ and ‘unfair’ presuppositions – fair ones are the ones that will be readily inferred by the audience, which should include all the ‘linguistically marked’ ones (the issue of strategic imposition of these automatic inferences as incontestable facts is not the concern of Bekalu’s analysis), unfair ones are the ones which require background knowledge the audience may not have. In the following Chapter (Chapter 4) I provide an account of the factors related
to issues of both processing and accepting (or not) underlying presupposed meanings, and present a cognitively informed broad definition of presupposition.

3.5. Conclusion

From the above review of classical and more recent account of presupposition, there are a few concluding remarks pertinent to the thesis. First and foremost, truth conditional logical approaches to meaning are ontologically and epistemologically incompatible with critical analyses of discourse, and of functionalist/performative approaches to language in general (see Robinson, 2006, esp. Ch. 2, for a brilliant discussion on the two main strands of approaches to language). The explanation of presupposition as 'socially costly to challenge' fits the critical approach and often emancipatory agenda of feminist and other critical approaches to linguistics, with Harris (1995) providing perhaps the most relevant account in this respect. However focussing on this seems more apt for analysing dialogic exchanges, where participants are by virtue of the genre and mode of communication allowed and/or at times obliged to respond to an interlocutor's utterances. It is harder to account for social cost when analysing unidirectional texts, such as newspaper or magazine texts, lectures or speeches.

I argue that cognitive aspects of discourse processing must be taken into account for a more satisfactory and comprehensive account of presupposition, presupposition processing and ideology. This should include also the psychological/affective factor of acknowledging authority and power – personal, professional, institutional or other, as well as issues of perception and salience, pre-existing shared knowledge etc. The latter can actually account for presupposition acceptance in the case where there is no
significant power imbalance among interlocutors, whereas there is naturalisation and reinforcement of ideologically dubious beliefs.
4.1 Introduction

In this chapter I would like to outline my proposed definition for ‘presupposition’ as a category with radial structure, encompassing more or less prototypical cases related to each other with ‘family resemblances’. I will further discuss both prototypical and less prototypical cases, considering how the various characteristics and functions attributed to ‘presupposition’ in the literature can occur in these categories.

Finally I will propose a theoretical and methodological distinction of five levels of analysis, relating these to the definition. I argue that taking into account functions and levels of discourse, and stating explicitly in our analysis which of these we are addressing, contributes to more clarity and reliability in the analysis, and, from a critical perspective, it allows us to reflect more on how and why certain beliefs are, or are more likely to, be taken for granted in certain contexts.

My working definition of presupposition, on which I will elaborate in this chapter, is the following:

Presupposition is a proposition/belief, concept or system of beliefs forming the ground in a figure-ground distinction in discourse. Prototypically, presupposition is the proposition forming the ground which surfaces in the discourse on sentence level and is attributed to the mutually accepted Reality Space of the participants in the interaction.

Before I provide the elaboration and explanation of the definition itself, I will first present the theoretical considerations that led me to this definition, namely, the
4.2 Meaning: Presupposing vs. Evoking

It seems to me that one of the reasons for the theoretical and methodological discrepancies across different approaches, even within functionalist paradigms of discourse analysis, is the different understandings of the concept of ‘meaning’. Traditional TC accounts speak of denoting, entailing, presupposing, and implicating, whereby ‘denoting’ belongs to the study of the field of semantics and stands for a direct relationship between the language and the world, in Morris’ classical definition (1938). The concept of ‘denoting’ and in some cases also that of ‘entailing’ could be replaced in Cognitive Linguistics by that of ‘evoking’ frames or knowledge structures in general.

I have already discussed in Chapter 2 that the relationship between language and the world is mediated by cognition, which has various implications not only for the study of social cognition, ideology and knowledge, but also for the study of ‘meaning’. Not only do linguistic expressions correspond to mental representations, as opposed to entities in the world, but also this correspondence is not a simple word-to-concept correspondence. Lehrer and Kittay (1992) observe that knowledge of the meaning of a word is not just a self-contained lexical entry in the mind, to be defined by a closed list of semantic features. It is notable that even though frames can be defined as clusters of concepts, they cannot be defined as ‘closed’. O’Halloran (2003: 62), based on Quine (1953), argues that we see sentences not as discrete representations of reality but as cues of background knowledge. O’Halloran (2003: 63) also quotes a
particularly telling extract from Slobin (1982: 131-132), which I would like to reproduce here:

A sentence is not a verbal snapshot or movie of an event. In framing an utterance, you have to abstract away from everything you know, or can picture, about a situation, and present a schematic version which conveys the essentials. In terms of grammatical marking, there is not enough time in the speech situation for any language to allow for the marking of everything which could possibly be significant to the message. Probably there is not enough interest, either. Language evokes ideas, it does not represent them. Linguistic expression is thus not a natural map of consciousness or thought. It is a highly selective and conventionally schematic map. At the heart of language use is the tacit assumption that most of the message can be left unsaid, because of mutual understanding (and probably also mutual impatience). The subset of semantic notions which is formally marked in a particular language serves more to guide the listener to the appropriate segments and categories of analysis than to fully represent the underlying notions.

What I would like to emphasise in particular here is that not only language does not represent the world, but that it also does not represent concepts and ideas – it evokes them.

First I would like to discuss the implications this has for the definition of ‘meaning’, then move on to the implications for ‘presupposition as shared knowledge’, and finally ‘presupposition as incontestable knowledge’.

In semantic and pragmatic research, we generally tend to think of two ‘kinds’ or levels of meaning. Meaning (1), semantic meaning, which is necessary for language comprehension. This is perceived as relatively stable and relatively conventionalised
as a default, i.e., more or less independent of context. Meaning (1) is fossilised enough to be encoded in dictionaries, and would be what I mentioned above as 'denotation'. In everyday meta-linguistic commentary people may explain to children or non-native speakers of a language what a word ‘means’ in that sense, and this is normally perceived as, if not easy, at least perfectly plausible. Meaning (2) is much broader – it can include what we may call ‘connotations’ or associative meanings, but also personal associations ('what this means to me'), and it has a broader scope. In that sense we can link the use even of isolated lexical items (such as 'slut' or 'nigger', for example) to whole systems of beliefs and socio-historical circumstances.  

This kind of meaning is more elusive and much more controversial.

However, as we have seen, from a Cognitive Linguistic perspective we cannot speak of meaning (1) as ‘closed’ and self-contained. Linguistic (and particularly, but not exclusively, semantic) knowledge is associated with ‘world knowledge’, and clusters of this knowledge (frames or mental models) are linked to each other, forming the complex network of all knowledge an individual has (Croft and Cruse, 2004: 30). Thus, the ‘meaning of a word’ acts as an access node into the knowledge network:

The entity designated by a symbolic unit can therefore be thought of as a **point of access** to a network. The semantic value of a symbolic unit is given by the open-ended set or relations... in which the **access node** participates. Each of these relations is a cognitive routine, and because they share at least one component the activation of the routine facilitates (but does not always necessitate) the activation of another. (Langacker, 1987: 163, emphasis in original)

---

41 See also Hart’s (2010) analysis of ‘referential strategies’ realised through evoking certain frames in immigration discourse. Fairclough also observes that even one word can serve as a textual ‘cue’ to a discourse/ideology (1989: 24).
Therefore, it is impossible at any given time to give a precise and definite 'meaning' of a word (or a text, for that matter). Further, 'meaning' would then have to be equated with everything symbolised by the physical aspect of language, i.e. everything but the actual strings of sounds or marks on a page (or computer screen). One of the crucial questions for determining 'meaning' then is, if all knowledge is interconnected, how much of this knowledge is activated with every linguistic unit uttered for communication to be possible. Given time and memory constraints, a hearer has to process every unit uttered at a very high speed as the speaker continues speaking. Possibly with reading one would have the time to stop and retrieve more knowledge, but this also depends on the kind of reading (skimming, scanning for information, reading for pleasure, close reading, studying or reading with the purpose of conducting textual analysis). Moreover, we may still not want to do away with the 'meaning (1)' and 'meaning (2)' distinction altogether, but rather recognise that there is no clear and fixed dividing line between the two.

A way to look at meaning levels from a cognitive linguistic perspective is to take into account the issue of scope. A narrow scope, termed scope of predication (Langacker, 1987: 119) or immediate scope (Langacker, 1999: 49), seems to include the minimal amount of background knowledge (part of a frame) necessary to make meaning, which we then we could argue would be 'meaning (1)'. Langacker illustrates this through the example of body parts; '[t]he body as a whole functions as the immediate scope of predication for such terms as head, arm, leg, and torso, since their position within the overall configuration of the body constitutes an essential part of their meaning' (1987: 119), while for hand the immediate scope of predication is arm, and
for *finger* it is *hand*. Croft and Cruse schematise the scope of predication for each item as follows: 42

Knuckle > finger > hand > arm > body (2004: 23)

From the above we can also see that for *knuckle* the concept of *body* lies outside the immediate scope of predication, but is part of a broader scope, which we can term *maximal scope* (Langacker, 1999: 49) or *domain structure* (see also Croft, 2003).

Based on this, we can at least identify a minimal narrow scope for each concept, but we still cannot determine with certainty and how much of the broader scope of a concept will be activated through discourse comprehension. We can, however, say quite safely that due to processing constraints the narrower the scope, the more readily available the material evoked (see Croft and Cruse, 2004: 50; also O'Halloran, 2003).

Our theorisation of meaning and background knowledge is important for our understanding of presupposition, a link I will elaborate on in the following section.

### 4.3 Background knowledge and presupposition

The relevance of the previous section to presupposition in particular lies in that, if we define presupposition as shared knowledge, or even as shared knowledge necessary for understanding discourse, we end up almost equating 'presupposition' with 'meaning', excluding perhaps inferences made by a recipient of discourse which are very closely related to unique personal experiences. However, all accounts of presupposition, despite their contradictions, agree that 'presupposition' is not just any kind of meaning, but one that has certain special properties. If, however, all meaning

42 See also Croft and Cruse's example of the concept of the letter 'T' and its domain matrix (2004: 26).
is evoked, we would have to consider different categories of meaning than just ‘meaning (1)’ and ‘meaning (2)’. Van Dijk (2005), for example, distinguishes between ‘asserting’, ‘reminding’ and ‘presupposing’ to label communicating different types of meaning – in this case it is crucial to define both ‘presupposing’ and ‘asserting’.

Let us consider (part of) my working definition of presupposition, reiterated here for convenience:

Presupposition is a proposition/belief, concept or system of beliefs forming the ground in a figure-ground distinction in discourse.

‘Forming the ground’ involves the following:
- first, whatever it is we call ‘presupposition’ is not foregrounded
- second, ‘presupposition’ is, however, accessed/activated
- it is accessed by virtue of being a part of knowledge activated/evoked in discourse processing through linguistic cues, and necessary for achieving at least meaning(1)

It is in that sense that Fillmore and Atkins suggest that the contents of frames are presupposed by the lexical items which evoke the frames (1992: 75), and Croft and Cruse observe that ‘in the scope of predication, the domains immediately presupposed by a profiled concept are accessible in a way that more indirectly presupposed domains are not’ (2004: 50).

As we have seen, however, there is an element of presupposition which is said to make the presupposed material (concept, belief or system of beliefs) ‘incontestable’ - and it is in this sense that Dancygier and Sweetser (2005), for example, distinguish between ‘evoking’ and ‘presupposing’. In my framework this distinction would signify the difference between information ‘presupposed because known’ and
information 'presupposed as given/incontestable'. Yet it should be noted that an item of information can be at the same time (assumed to be) known and (presented as) incontestable – in that sense, if we were to use Dancygier and Sweetse’s terms, we could say that it is possible to evoke and presuppose at the same time.

For the study of knowledge management (cf. van Dijk, 2005) I would argue that it is perhaps necessary to consider these aspects (degree of ‘sharedness’, degree of ‘backgrounding’ and degree of ‘incontestability’), in order to avoid, for example, equating ‘what is not asserted because it is irrelevant’ and ‘what is not asserted because it is known’. Let us consider these distinctions one by one:

4.3.1 Known vs. Unknown

a. Beliefs not asserted because they are shared/already known

Much knowledge in discourse is presupposed in that sense – the most obvious example would be the aforementioned ‘meaning of words’. Normally speakers do not explain the meaning of every single word they use, as every competent speaker of the language they use will already know it. That is, every interlocutor will have knowledge of at least some part of the frame associated with the item in question, which draws on ‘world knowledge’ (see Fillmore, 1985; Fillmore and Atkins, 1992; also discussion above). Allusions to stereotypes would be included in this category – these do not need to be spelt out, but everyone who is aware of the stereotype (whether ‘sharing’ it in agreement or not) would be able to access the speaker’s intended meaning. Anyone unfamiliar with the stereotype will not be able to fully ‘understand’ the allusion in that sense (see Wodak, 2007, for an example).

O’Halloran (2003) looks at the issue of mystification as it has been discussed in the CDA and critical linguistics literature. He focuses on the problem of whether by using
a noun phrase instead of a full clause (a process sometimes called ‘nominalisation’ in the literature) the text producers withhold information from the receivers and thus lead them not to attribute responsibility to actors, for instance. On the other hand, he brings in examples where not mentioning some information is taken as a sign that this information is actually accepted by the ‘ideal reader’ as given (Fairclough, 2001: 44-45, commentary in O’Halloran, 2003: 27 ff.). O’Halloran concludes that in some cases of noun usage, some information is not withheld, because it is part of the frame automatically triggered by the word. By the above definition of presupposition, this would be presupposed. However, it would not ‘be mystified’ or ‘escape our attention’. Moreover, in a sentence such as ‘Demonstrators have been shot’, which has been analysed as mystifying the agent through the use of the passive, the agent is not presupposed if s/he is not known. However, the immediately previous sentence states that the police interfered with the demonstration, and because it is right before the passivised sentence, the readers (even ones reading quickly and uncritically) are very likely to infer that it was the police who did the shooting (O’Halloran, 2003: 123-124). In this case, knowledge that the police did the shooting is presupposed in that the author has stated it in the preceding co-text and proceeds knowing that the audience has this knowledge.

b. Beliefs represented as known and shared

Often beliefs may be asserted, but not because they are new. Such beliefs may be prefaced with ‘As we all know,...’, or ‘Of course,...’ (as concessions). Or they may be presented as unqualified statements at the beginning of a written or spoken text, with the aim of ‘setting the scene’, indicating what the text is about, before moving on to contribute new information. These beliefs are backgrounded in the sense that they are
not the focus of the text, they are not the issue under debate, and, in that sense, they function as introductions rather than the ‘topic’ of the text per se (see van Dijk, 2000: 60). Beliefs introduced through presupposition, narrowly understood, fall under this category: ‘When I finish my degree, I will take a year off’ presupposes I will finish my degree, and that my interlocutor knows or expects this (setting), and introduces the new information that I will take a year off.43

There is also the possibility that a belief (or set of beliefs) may be known and shared, but still asserted and emphasised (not backgrounded) for other reasons. Van Dijk’s (2003; 2000: 61) point that we have to look at what is ‘not said’ in order to find the ‘commonsensical’ (presupposed, naturalised and accepted in the community or communities involved in an interaction) is contradicted by the fact that for some strategic purposes we may elaborate and say a lot about known things. For example, in representing in- and out-groups (members of one’s social group vs. other social groups) positive self-representation and negative other-representation are more detailed, and negative self-representation and positive other-representation less detailed, if provided at all (van Dijk, 2000: 63). Positive information about one’s own group (and negative information about other groups) is not necessarily unknown, but it will be repeatedly and elaborately provided for persuasive purposes. For example, in the parliamentary discourse examined by van Dijk (ibid.) the in-group (politicians and citizens of a country accepting immigration) is represented as civilised, hospitable, tolerant etc., while the out-group (immigrants) is presented as unrefined, untrustworthy, threatening etc. These beliefs are not new in that they circulate very widely in media, political and everyday discourse of the countries researched. This is

43 This is commonly accepted as presupposition even when we have no means of checking whether the knowledge is shared or not, thus the classification of this example as ‘presupposition’ is based solely on the basis that it is presented as incontestable.
just one case where shared knowledge does not surface in the discourse as 'presupposition' but as assertions as well, and detailed ones no less. And negative self-representations/ positive other-representations will be absent, vague and short not because they are known and do not need to be asserted/ elaborated on, but because the speakers' intentions are for them to remain unknown/ neglected.

c. Beliefs asserted because they are new to the recipient

Assertions rarely have the aim to just provide new information. There are, however, some cases in which they do, most notably news discourse and 'initiation' or educational discourse (van Dijk, 1998). In this case it is interesting to think of the selection process: What news story is chosen over others? What knowledge is deemed necessary to be explicitly taught to children and new members of communities? In this case the ideological function does not lie in the backgrounding, but in the foregrounding of this unquestionably new for the recipients information, at the expense of other knowledge, which is not simply backgrounded but not mentioned at all. These new assertions still occur within a setting provided, implicitly or explicitly by the co-text, as we can see from the example in the paragraph above. Moreover, these need to be distinguished from beliefs that are asserted in order to provide the setting (again, see above), as reminders (see next paragraph), or from beliefs that are asserted because, although known, they are under question or under attack.44

44 'Asserted' could be understood as the 'profile'/ 'figure' of frames on lexical level, or an indicative clause on sentence level, for example.
d. Beliefs represented as new

Often, and most probably in most cases where the audience is more than one person and unknown to the speaker (including overhearers), it is impossible for a speaker to know whether the beliefs she or he is drawing on are already familiar to the audience (let alone whether they agree with them). Breaking news can be assumed to be new to all of the audience, and it is quite safe to guess that most schoolchildren do not already know the Pythagorean theorem. Turning to a genre like advice texts of lifestyle magazines, however, it is impossible to know how many of these beliefs are already held by or known to the readers. A new reader might encounter much unknown information about grooming, beliefs about gendered behaviour, and the like. A reader who has already read some of these texts (even if not a regular reader) might have encountered these beliefs before. Also, with the exception of the youngest members of the community, most adults will have encountered these beliefs about gender and appearance in other genres, even if they have never read a lifestyle magazine in their lives. Magazines will still present this knowledge as new, sometimes allowing for the possibility of some readers’ already having this knowledge (with rhetorical questions such as ‘Did you know...?’). They thus present the ‘new knowledge’ to ‘novices’ while at the same time reinforcing or reminding the ‘old’ knowledge to the more experienced readers (see also van Dijk, 2005). Presenting knowledge as new always runs the risk of sounding patronising (assuming ignorance), and devices like the aforementioned rhetorical question allow the readers to perceive themselves as knowledgeable (knowing more than other readers) rather than patronised.
e. Beliefs that are not known and not asserted

Such beliefs may be simply irrelevant to a topic – even if I assume that you do not know the Pythagorean theorem, I do not consider it relevant to (re)iterate it here. In the cases when certain new beliefs may be considered to be relevant, however, there are issues related to ‘information selection’ – some facts may not be mentioned because the hearers knowing them is against the interests of the speaker, or some topics or beliefs may be taboo. Or, as in the case of allusions, allowing some relevant aspects of meaning to remain unasserted (implicit) may be a method of ‘audience selection’, where the target audience ‘gets it’ and the rest remain in the dark (Wodak, 2007; also Bekalu, 2006, on ‘unfair presuppositions’).

4.3.2 Degree of certainty/’definiteness’

a. Beliefs represented as ‘given/unquestionable’

Introducing knowledge through certain ‘presupposition triggers’ contributes to them not being ‘open to questioning’. Categorical modality (i.e., a categorical assertion without modification, which usually indicates factuality or certainty – see Fairclough, 1992: 158-159), epistemic modality of high certainty, deontic modality indicating strong obligation and certain kinds of evidentiality (e.g. citing a very authoritative and trustworthy source) also contribute to a belief being presented as ‘unquestionable’. The difference here is that presupposition triggers function as backgrounding devices, while modality and evidentiality can have a foregrounding function. However, the presence of presupposition triggers may be combined with drawing on the authority of a speaker, or the authority of a quoted source, in presenting knowledge as even more definitive and unquestionable (as this is a continuum of various degrees of definitive-
ness). ‘Informative presupposition’ is a case where new but incontestable information is introduced through ‘presupposition triggers’ (Abbott, 2000). Karttunen (1974/1991: 411) observes that through the sentence ‘We regret that children cannot accompany their parents to commencement exercises,’ the audience is actually informed that children cannot accompany their parents (as well as that the source of this information claims to be sorry about this. In Sbisa’s example ‘The anti-cancer treatment invented by Luigi Di Bella, the professor from Modena, scores another amazing goal in its own favour.’ (1999: 496), the reader might not previously know that Luigi Di Bella has invented an anti-cancer treatment. Lewis (1979) comments on referring to ‘the cat’ when there is a cat in the room, even though the existence of the cat has not been previously asserted.

In Lewis’ example it is most reasonable to assume that the existence of the cat has been perceived by all interlocutors in the room, and thus ‘the cat’ is part of the common physical context and also part of the common context model (shared knowledge). In Karttunen’s example, the purpose of the announcement is exactly to inform those who do not know that children are not allowed. However, some of the addressees may already know that from other sources. The same holds for Sbisa’s example – readers may or may not know/believe that Luigi Di Bella has invented an anti-cancer treatment, or that this treatment has already had some success (‘scored a goal’, and now scores ‘another’). For some cases, it does not matter. In Karttunen’s example, the purpose is to make sure people do not bring their children along, whether they knew this information in advance or not. What matters is the directive speech act and whether it will be followed. In this case, ‘we regret that’ as a ‘presupposition trigger’ seems to function rather as a politeness/formality device. Vice versa, in Lewis’
example, if by any chance participants have not perceived the presence of a cat in the
room, they will look around them for a cat before they challenge the presupposition.
What matters is that the act of 'referring to the cat in the room' is achieved
successfully so that the hearers know what the speaker is talking about. In Lewis’ case,
using a referring expression without asserting the existence of the referent functions as
a 'shortcut' (Karttunen, 1974: 191) or more economical 'packaging' (Saeed, 2003:
104).
Choosing to foreground or background 'incontestability' does depend on principles of
economy, but foregrounding has the function of making explicit the certainty,
obligation or authority underlying this incontestability, something to be determined by
the dynamics of the interaction - does the speaker wish to assert authority? Reassure
or save face for the hearer? Patronise or mock the hearer? What is more at stake,
economy (packaging 'given' beliefs briefly and implicitly through presupposition) or
explicit assertion of incontestability?

b. Knowledge 'open to contestation'

There are two reasons a speaker might want to introduce beliefs as open to
contestation. One is that one may be genuinely unable to assert certain beliefs with
certainty, or one may acknowledge that disagreement is a valid option. Such an
acknowledgment of limitations may, of course, be strategic, as in the case of news
discourse trying to avoid charges of inaccuracy, or academic discourse avoiding
overgeneralisations. Epistemic modality of not-so-high certainty is one of the devices
used for these purposes, but it seems to me that here the focus of attention is meant to
be the proposition itself, and the mitigation serves as a marginal disclaimer. Some
kinds of evidentiality can have similar functions (e.g. '...or so I've heard'). The second reason of presenting beliefs as open to contestation is to simply go on and contest them. In this case more emphasis would be placed on the modality or weakness of the evidence or quoted source, and we may have a contrast following in the co-text ('It is possible that he is telling the truth, but I find it very unlikely', 'The opposition want us to believe that..., when in fact...').

4.3.3 Degree of emphasis/focus

a. Knowledge not mentioned, or backgrounded and not processed

Practically all discourse analytical (and most pragmatic) approaches associate presupposition phenomena with backgrounding. Taking something for granted, and not questioning it, then, stems from the fact that the presupposed elements are backgrounded; salient propositions are noticed, and therefore open to question. In order for beliefs to be (readily) accepted, however, they have to be at least communicated, i.e., the hearer must have some mental representation of them by the end of the interaction.

However, there are beliefs (and corresponding facts, when it comes to factual beliefs) which the speaker intends the hearer to miss. Indeed, this is perhaps the most crucial defining feature of manipulation – deflecting attention from beliefs (or contextual assumptions, in Relevance Theoretical terms) which are relevant for the hearer, but contrary to the effect the speaker wants to achieve (see Maillat and Oswald, 2009; Oswald, 2010; see also O’Halloran, 2003, on ‘mystification’). This is information withheld from discourse receivers and not presupposed – it is expected that audiences have no knowledge of the information withheld. In this case, hearers still arrive at
some meaning of what is being said. If this co-occurs with representations of the speakers as reliable sources, and no other representation of the world as different from what the speakers represent it to be, hearers will accept them as not only truthful but also true. In order to be able to identify such non-communicated but (potentially) relevant beliefs, the analyst would have to have this information from another source (other texts and/or belief systems, not present in the text).

Concepts and propositions may also be present in the text, but backgrounded deliberately so as to be missed, with the most obvious example the obligatory ‘small print’, which has to be present in the text for some reason (e.g. advertising regulations or other legal requirements), but can only be processed with some effort which may or may not be made by the audience.

Both of the above kinds of propositions (completely missing or backgrounded) cannot be said to constitute ‘presuppositions’ just because they are not salient. Likewise, information not mentioned because they are simply irrelevant are not presuppositions, whether they are shared knowledge between speaker and addressee or not.

A special case would be what Bekalu calls ‘unfair presuppositions’ (2006). In the above sense, ‘unfair presuppositions’ are not presuppositions at all, but merely backgrounded contextual assumptions. This, however, would mean that

- For the speakers already having these beliefs/knowledge, or accessing them through close reading, such as the analyst, these are presuppositions and for the rest of the audience these are not, or

- We have to have different terms for presupposed (assumed) knowledge which might or might not be activated and for presupposed knowledge that will definitely be activated, or
We have to assume that it is the speaker who presupposes, in which case presupposition is not merely the speaker’s knowledge, but it is the knowledge the speaker assumes the audience to have, and which is necessary for meaning-making.

This is perhaps the main problem with defining presupposition, which relies upon our definition of ‘meaning’ and theorisation of audience. For Truth Conditional approaches, meaning resides in the language itself, and it is sentences who ‘presuppose’, which makes it impossible to speak of presupposition above the sentence level. Assuming that ‘meaning’ is co-constructed jointly by speakers and hearers, and relies as much on linguistic as on encyclopaedic knowledge means that each text has a ‘meaning potential’ encompassing at least a range of ‘meanings’. This is where scope and focus are significant – there is a certain amount of ‘meaning potential’ which will be realised even with an audience who has relatively limited ‘world knowledge’ (i.e. no specialist or professional knowledge), and who makes the minimum effort to process a text (e.g. is distracted, reads fast etc.). This will be more visibly accessible to the discourse analyst as well (O’Halloran, 2003), and would be categorised under ‘backgrounded and processed knowledge’, see below. Thus, according to van Dijk (2005), sentence level presuppositions are not ‘presupposed’, but ‘obliquely asserted’.

As discussed in 3.4.1 the critical cognitive approach I follow view presuppositions as ‘prerequisites for meaning’; accessing presuppositions is necessary for meaning making. I would also like to emphasise the necessity to take into account ‘what means what to whom’, and under what conditions. Thus, ‘the King of France is bald’ has meaning in the lexico-grammatical sense for all English speakers, but on the discourse
level, in the current socio-political context and presuming the genre of the text is not fictional, it does not ‘make sense’.

b. Knowledge backgrounded and processed

Generally all pragmatic approaches to presupposition, from Levinson to van Dijk, assign ‘backgrounded-ness’ as a core feature of presupposition, which is essential for distinguishing it from propositions which are not defeasible due to social-contextual rather than cognitive factors (see above). I argue that sentence-level presupposition is one form of windowing of attention (Talmy, 2010; 2007), a figure-ground distinction (Marmaridou, 2000: 124. 147; see also Sperber and Wilson, 1986; Wilson and Sperber, 1979).

This is also the aspect of presupposition of most interest to critical discourse analysis. Both for discourse comprehension purposes, and for persuasion purposes, the belief introduced through presupposition has to be triggered, in order for the utterance to make sense, while at the same time it must not be the focus of attention and debate, the topic, ‘what is really the problem here’ (van Dijk, 2000: 60). Van Dijk (2000: 61) suggests that these implicit representations would not form part of the audience’s discourse model (memory of the discourse they have been exposed to) – I would argue that, in the case of presuppositions, they would, as they surface in the discourse as ‘setting’ or background (ground), against which concepts in the discourse are profiled (as figures) (Levinson, 1983: 180). Cognitively, then, ‘presupposition triggers’ on sentence level set up mental spaces within which the rest of the proposition (in the main clause) is interpreted. Saeed (2003: 103-104) thus suggests that propositions expressed through noun phrases (e.g. nominalisations) are backgrounded in relation to the main verb. The same could be said with the rest of the presupposition triggers.
namely, that subordinate clauses receive less attention than main clauses (see Talmy, 2007). Backgrounding is thus always a relative notion – something is foregrounded at the expense of and in relation to something else (backgrounded), which however belongs to the default mental representation/knowledge associated with a concept or topic.

c. Foregrounded knowledge

Foregrounding in discourse can take different forms, overall related to perceptual salience. An early theorisation of perceptual salience and its cognitive effects in discourse was Mukařovský (1970, cited in Semino and Culpeper, 2002: ix), empirically investigated by van Peer (1986). From a Cognitive Linguistics perspective, due to iconicity of language, devoting more space/time on an expressed concept or belief (elaboration) increases its salience (see Ungerer and Schmid, 1996: 252). Perceptual salience is also increased by larger, bold or italicised print in writing, and higher pitch and/or volume in speaking (emphasis). An element can be foregrounded also by being placed in initial or final position (or before and after a long pause), or by repetition (cf. 'parallelism', Leech and Short, 2007). Interestingly, foregrounding can also be achieved by deviation (ibid.), linguistic, graphological or other, that is, by departing from expectations. In that sense, an expression introduced through a presupposition trigger, which would normally be taken as backgrounded, may be foregrounded if an assertion (and/or more elaboration) is expected.  

To provide an example, if I apologise for my delay to new acquaintances due to problems with my car, the presupposition that I have a car will be accepted because it does not violate expectations in any way (which often accounts for the processing of

---

\[46\] This could be taken as flouting the Gricean maxim of quantity, by providing less information than required/expected.
informative presupposition, see Gazdar, 1979: 105 on expectations), and hearers have neither reason nor vested interest in questioning it. However, if my friends know perfectly well that I do not have a car, and I say ‘Sorry I’m late, I had some problems with my car’, instead of focussing on my delay they will probably focus on the new information of my owning a car. I may even choose to introduce the news of buying a car this (deviant) way in order to create a stronger impression.

On the other hand, when backgrounded propositions and concepts do not blatantly violate expectations, less effort will be invested in processing them – Culpeper (2002: 270) observes that ‘more attention and effort is focused on foregrounded elements, in an attempt to rationalize their abnormality’ and that ‘foregrounded elements are not only psychologically more striking but are also regarded as more important’, based on the work of Leech and Short (e.g. 1981: 29; 2007) and van Peer (1986). Thus, the claim that ‘presuppositions’ are more backgrounded and therefore difficult to contest on cognitive grounds does indeed hold, other things being equal. An analysis aiming to analyse the ideological underpinnings, aims or effects of a text should take into account also co-textual and contextual factors, including the degree to which a presupposition may still be processed carefully and contested (when foregrounded through other means, such as violation of expectations).

4.3.4. Conclusion

Beliefs represented in discourse can combine two or more of the above properties. New knowledge can be presented as given, shared knowledge can be presented as given, shared knowledge can be presented as contestable, and so on. In order to determine whether certain knowledge can be reasonably assumed to be shared the analyst can draw on her own knowledge of the context (socio-political and discursive).
4.4 (Re)defining presupposition

In this section I would like to continue looking at my proposed working definition of presupposition in some detail, repeated here for convenience:

Presupposition is a proposition/belief, concept or system of beliefs forming the ground in a figure-ground distinction in discourse. Prototypically, presupposition is the/a proposition forming the ground which surfaces in the discourse on sentence level and is attributed to the mutually accepted Reality Space of the participants in the interaction.

'a proposition/belief, concept or system of beliefs': This relates to the issue of scope – I do not necessarily consider 'a presupposition' to be a single proposition. This is in line with many critical scholars on ideological presuppositions, and it is also related to methodological issues of identifying presupposition triggers, as this in fact broadens the definition as to what a presupposition might be (as opposed to the TC definition).

'forming the ground in a figure-ground distinction in discourse': This is also not new by any means, as it has been observed very early on that presupposition forms the ground rather than the figure (see e.g. Levinson, 1983: 180; Sperber and Wilson, 1995: 215). What is more interesting and ultimately important methodologically is to identify 'a figure-ground distinction in discourse': Based on my discussion on meaning above, every single instance of language use involves a figure-ground distinction, with the ground being everything evoked, and the figure an aspect that is
made most salient; by uttering 'finger' I evoke 'hand' (ground), but 'finger' is made salient (figure).

'is attributed to the mutually accepted Reality Space of the participants in the interaction': This is a cognitive explanation from the perspective of the theory of Mental Spaces for what has been repeatedly observed to be the other crucial defining characteristic of presupposition – presenting something as taken for granted and incontestable.

'Taking something for granted' indicates not only epistemic but also potentially deontic stance. Presupposition is therefore not necessarily shared knowledge, but definitely somebody's 'knowledge', and by being presented and understood by participants as 'knowledge'/reality, it is further presented and often also perceived as incontestable. ‘Knowledge’ is here in quotation marks because in this thesis I do not define knowledge as necessarily corresponding to an external independent reality, whereas in lay definitions (and some philosophical definitions) ‘knowledge’ entails ‘truth’. Likewise ‘reality’, or the Reality Space, is what is understood by the discourse participants to be the real world. This has also been termed the Base Space (Fauconnier, 1985; 1994), which overall I think is descriptively more accurate in that it can be used more transparently to describe a mutually manifest fictional reality (e.g. what two characters in a novel perceive as reality in the text world). In the thesis I will be using the two terms interchangeably.

'Prototypically, presupposition is the/a proposition forming the ground which surfaces in the discourse on sentence level':

There are three aspects to consider here:

- I define presupposition prototypically as a proposition.
• I define presupposition prototypically as a proposition which surfaces in the discourse.
• I define presupposition prototypically as being located on sentence level.

So far in my definition I have advocated the not particularly new ideas that presupposition is ground rather than figure, and that it is incontestable knowledge (taken for granted), but that it does not have to be shared knowledge (and this is why we can have informative presupposition). I would like to explore more the issue of prototypicality, and consider why it is at the sentence level that this phenomenon seems to manifest itself prototypically, and also discuss a bit more why I would nevertheless call some other more controversial instances 'non-prototypical presuppositions' rather than not presuppositions at all.

To begin with, prototype effects occur in categories with radial structure, which include 'good' and 'not-so-good' exemplars of category members (rather than consisting of equally 'good' members). (I discuss prototypicality also in Chapter 5). This means that there is no set of necessary and sufficient conditions for category membership. Rather, a set of features characterise the category, but not all members will display all features. Prototypical members will display more features than non-prototypical members, but even prototypes may not display absolutely all features of the category. In the category 'presupposition' these features are:

- Forming the ground in a figure/ground distinction
- Being presented as incontestable
- Being activated/ evoked (as opposed to irrelevant knowledge not asserted and not activated)
- Being shared
I have already argued that the latter (being shared) is not a necessary condition for an expression triggering a presupposition. The fact, however, that it is a common feature of presuppositions may be precisely why presupposed knowledge is seen as knowledge which 'ought to be shared'. I will further discuss below also the question of why I consider a presupposition to be prototypically, but not necessarily, a proposition.

Based on the features above, we still need to consider how it is that sentence level cases of presupposition are more prototypical? To me it seems that this is related to the importance of the clause as a unit of analysis, with a ‘sentence’ comprising of one or more clauses. ‘Clause’ is taken as a particularly important unit of analysis in functional approaches to language (Dik, 1997a, 1997b), possibly because it is seen as the smallest possible unit conveying a speech act (see Dik, 1997a: 55; Dik, 1997b: 92). In turn, the speech act has been characterised as the minimal linguistic unit which performs some action (van Leeuwen, 1993: 195). Traditionally the importance of the clause as a unit of analysis comes perhaps from the Aristotelian ‘equation of the verb with the core of a proposition’ (Pawley, 2011: 22), and further the importance of the verb in defining the clause. Further, it has been argued that speakers ‘typically introduce one new idea per clause’ (Pawley, 2011: 39, citing further Chafe, 1987, 1994; Givón, 1984 and Du Bois, 1987), and it seems that it is generally accepted that a clause is the minimal unit representing an ‘event’ (e.g. in Bohnemeyer and Pederson, 2011). Now a sentence can be either a clause, or a combination of clauses connected more closely than clauses simply co-occurring in a text. ‘The sentence’ as a unit of

---

47 Cf. ‘the characteristic grammatical form of the illocutionary act [speech act] is the complete sentence’ (Searle, 1969: 16).
analysis may be more contentious than 'the clause', but I choose to employ it here because although we cannot have a sentence which is smaller than a clause (so in some cases the terms actually refer to the same thing), 'sentence' also includes a set of clauses combined in such a way that they create a figure-ground distinction. It is still the clause that would be classified as 'ground' or 'figure', but it is only from examining the clauses around it that we can tell.

Another factor contributing to the sentence level as a prototypical level is the issue of scope. As I have discussed above, narrow scope knowledge is 'immediately presupposed' and wider scope elements are more indirectly presupposed. O'Halloran (2003) argues extensively that certain inferences are automatically made, and hence accessible even when a reader reads quickly and inattentively. Based on his discussion I would conclude that these inferences concern elements that constitute the narrow scope knowledge activated by any given expression.

Therefore, a more prototypical presupposition would belong to the narrow scope knowledge activated in the discourse. The best candidates for such a classification would be representations evoked by clauses, and certain elements of frames. By containing pretty much all the necessary elements of argument structure, knowledge activated immediately is sufficient for making sense of the clause. The way it is linked to other clauses (as well as other factors such as its position in the text structure or modality) will tell us whether the clause forms the ground or figure, and whether it is represented as contestable or incontestable. Thus, clauses are most likely to display the characteristic of 'activated backgrounded knowledge' which distinguishes presuppositions from 'mystified (non-activated) knowledge.
4.5 Levels of presupposition

Having looked at what I have defined as ‘prototypical presupposition’, I would like now to move on to discuss each level, including less prototypical cases and provide a methodological model for their identification. My claim is that the various propositions and phenomena that have been identified in the literature as ‘presupposition’ can fit into the below categories. The purpose of this categorisation is, on the one hand, to provide a systematic methodological framework for analysing presupposition in discourse, and on the other to acknowledge that, despite their similarities, the various presupposition phenomena are indeed different to each other and need to be theoretically accounted for accordingly. At the same time it is necessary to acknowledge that these levels are not isolated from each other, but they interact. Every categorisation runs the risk of appearing more clear-cut than the reality it attempts to represent.

The levels I propose are as follows:

- frame level
- sentence level
- text level
- discourse level and
- pragmatic competence level

On all levels except the sentence level the presupposition is not necessarily a (single) proposition, but it nevertheless forms a ground which is necessary for making meaning on the respective level. This ground can be manifested or not in the text, and it can be already known by the hearer or established on the spot. Above the sentence it is much more complex than at sentence level, while below the clause it never surfaces in the text but is part of frames.
Therefore, while advocating a broad view of presupposition the differences among the levels are also acknowledged. The aim of maintaining a multi-level categorisation is exactly to avoid the drawbacks of more general 'background knowledge' approaches to presupposition. Closer elaboration of phenomena that might be addressed in relation to each level would suggest that these are meant to be included in and examined through the prism of, rather than conflated with a broad concept of presupposition. Therefore, rather than simply labelling 'presuppositions' categories such as relevant world knowledge/ contextual assumptions, stereotypes, Felicity Conditions, politeness norms (as sometimes occurs in discourse analytical accounts – see 3.4.2) my categorisation acknowledges overlaps in categories while maintaining the difference among them. Thus, in analysing a command such as in Magalhães (1995), where the boyfriend makes his girlfriend change clothes, I would still suggest that his command presupposes power over the woman, but it would be necessary to clarify that this is because on the pragmatic level 'authority' is one of the presupposed Felicity Conditions of the speech act of 'commanding'.

4.5.1 Frame level

On the noun or verb phrase level 'frames' as discussed by Fillmore can be employed to represent activities, states of affairs and social actors (individuals or groups) in ideologically laden ways.

Consider the example 'So, have you women finished gossiping?' (Graddol and Swann, 1989: 166; Christie, 2000: 90 – 91). On the sentence level it is just presupposed that the addressees had been gossiping. However, as Christie also observes (ibid.), it is also significant that the activity is framed as 'gossiping', with all
the evaluative, stereotypical elements that this entails – I would classify this as presupposition on the frame level. One would have to re-label/re-frame the activity in order to challenge these background assumptions, and that would be a case of frame-shifting as discussed in Chapter 3: ‘We are not gossiping, we are talking!’.

A similar example is the advice from a Greek women’s lifestyle magazine ‘stop nagging about his performance’ (Polyzou, 2008). Here the female reader is not only advised to stop talking about her male partner’s sexual performance (which, it is assumed, she does, based on the sentence level presupposition), but any such talk is framed as ‘nagging’, carrying evaluative connotations hard to contest.

Of course both these examples are also instances of discourses/systems of belief in relation to men, women, and the relationships between men and women. So the ‘discourse level’ does surface in the frames triggered in the discourse. However, it goes beyond just the cluster of concepts constituting a frame. Therefore I would like to distinguish between frame and discourse level presuppositions based on scope – frame level presuppositions are narrow scope while discourse level presuppositions are broader scope. Due to both the concept of ‘scope’ (which is graded) as a criterion of categorisation, and the embeddedness of frames in discourses and of discourses in the broader knowledge network, frame presuppositions are embedded in discourse presuppositions, but are more likely to be automatically inferred than discourse presuppositions.

Much research in Critical Discourse Analysis, then, in examining representations at a micro-linguistic level and linking those to broader systems of signification and belief (discourses) actually examines the frame level as a first stage of analysis. Hart (2010) points out that Frame Semantics explains the operation of referential and predicational strategies in discourse as defined by Reisigl and Wodak (2001). Similarly, the
framework of representation of social actors by Theo van Leeuwen (1996) presents the analyst with a categorisation of different types of framing of social actors in discourse.

In examining lexical items in discourse and their relation to knowledge presupposed as part of frames (Fillmore and Atkins, 1990: 75) I have also chosen to include metaphorical items, items I have termed as 'vague' because they limit understanding in some (ideologically biased) way, and items which can be seen as triggering affective rather than only factual mental representations.

Metaphor is one of the ways in which framing occurs in discourse. According to the Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT), '[t]he essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another' (Lakoff and Johnson 1980:5, italics in original). That is, we may for example conceptualise an abstract concept such as 'time' (the 'target' category) in terms of a more concrete concept (the 'source' category), such as money or any other valuable material resource, which may be manifested in linguistic expressions such as 'spending', 'investing' or 'wasting time'. This transfers cultural understandings and attitudes towards money to the way we reason and behave about time (see also Lakoff, 1993). In terms of underlying knowledge then it is the source category-related vocabulary which is always present in the text. The target category may be present (as in 'wasting time'), or inferred from the co-text and context, or inferred because the metaphor is conventional, or through a combination of context and conventionality. Yet the metaphor activates our knowledge of the source category, which is more salient and at times may even override knowledge related to the target category. For example a war metaphor as in the 'battle of the sexes' makes salient factual and evaluative beliefs about war, activating notions of aggression, desire to win at all costs and seeing the 'opponent'
with distrust and enmity, and obscures the fact that men and women do not necessarily always have conflicting interests, or, more generally, that problems can be solved through co-operation rather than aggression. Additionally, such a metaphor is ideologically informed, since the gender-related frames it activates include ideological (and normative) beliefs about men and women and are situated in the broader discourse of 'Battle of the Sexes' (Sunderland, 2004. On metaphor and ideology see also Semino, 2008: 32-34). In short, metaphorical framings, like non-metaphorical ones, trigger unstated presupposed knowledge, the accessing of which contributes to meaning making and the negation or challenging of which would require cross-frame negation.

Vagueness often results in 'mystification' or obscuring understanding (on mystification see Wodak and Meyer, 2009a: 7; Wodak, 2008a: 298; also Fowler, Hodge, Kress and Trew, 1979; Fowler and Kress, 1979; Kress and Hodge, 1979; O’Halloran, 2003; 2004). For the purposes of my analysis I will define vagueness as language which does not allow a recipient, or at least a non-ideal recipient, to either construct a schema of an event or situation, or to fill in the slots in the schema through inference, due to providing insufficient information. For instance, using superordinate instead of basic level terms can lead to mystification (O’Halloran, 2003), because superordinate terms are too general. I would call this use of superordinate terms 'vagueness'. My definition of vagueness bears similarities to that of Cruse (2004: 49-50). Cruse discusses 'ill-definedness' as a characteristic of

---

48 Boers (1997) provides interesting experimental evidence on reasoning and problem-solving influenced by the metaphorical language in which the problem is framed.
49 Here I am using the term 'schema' differently to 'frame' in that 'frame' signifies default background knowledge, while schema is a mental representation constructed online during discourse processing (cf. van Dijk, 1998).
vagueness, as in the phrase ‘middle age’. The phrases ‘job’ and ‘critical moment’, which I discuss later in this section, are also not very well defined in that sense.

Contrary to the above definition, Channell, in her seminal work on vagueness (1994) explicitly excludes ‘mystification’ as defined by Fowler and Kress (1979) from her definition, as well as ‘ill-definedness’. She includes ‘vague additives’ (such as ‘around’ and ‘approximately’), words that are ‘always, and unabashedly vague’ (such as ‘whatsit’) and rounded-up numbers (Channel, 1994: 18-19). It seems, indeed, as Channel observes, that some degree of imprecision and ‘ill-definedness’ is present in every lexical item, partly due to the internal radial structure of lexical categories (Rosch, 1973; Labov, 1973 – see also 5.2), and partly due to the context-boundedness of meaning of any language-in-use. In that sense, then, we would have to concede that all language is vague, which would then result in the term ‘vagueness’ not being very useful. However, Channel also observes that ‘[w]hat matters is that vague language is used appropriately’ (1994: 3), and that vagueness is so prevalent that it is not noticed until it is, or appears to be, used inappropriately (even deliberately so). She briefly reviews work suggesting that all language is inherently vague, but users seem to be able to choose the appropriate type and degree of vagueness for their purposes (Fodor, 1977; Bolinger, 1965: 567; Lehrer, 1975).

This view then is not all that unhelpful for the purposes of Critical Discourse Analysis, since this type of critique of language aims to examine exactly how ‘normal’ features of language may be used differently and exploited for ideological purposes. Thus, if we concede that all language (use) is vague to some extent, from a CDA perspective we might ask: is vagueness used appropriately here? For whose purposes
is vagueness used (in)appropriately? Why is such an instance of vagueness considered (in)appropriate, and by whom (interlocutors? some or all of them? other people influenced by the interaction? the analyst?) – who defines appropriacy, of vagueness among other things – institutions? social and cultural norms? Are there any strategic and/or hidden purposes for the use of vagueness in this instance?

Especially in relation to my presupposition model, vagueness and resulting mystification are relevant in that they involve knowledge which is not present in the discourse but also not inferred, and therefore not presupposed. Here we might again ask the question – not inferred by whom? In my analysis I argue that some inferences in Status may not be made by the ‘uninitiated’ who then does not access the same ‘amount of meaning’ as an ‘initiated’ reader. I further argue that these unexpressed meanings are ideological, they would not be contested by an ‘initiated’ ideal reader, and they cannot be accessed and contested by a non-ideal reader unless the latter invests certain time and effort in accessing them.

Emotion also can short-circuit and override rational processing, so when both neutral factual and evaluative (or affect-inducing factual) beliefs are presented, it is more likely that the affective ones will attract more attention that the neutral ones, obscuring the latter. It is not impossible to infer or to speculate what the obscured beliefs may be, but they may be accessible only to certain readers who have sufficient knowledge/beliefs independent of the text, they would not be accessible through quick reading even to these readers (because they would require more cognitive effort), and,

---

50 Mystification can also occur through complete absence – for example, female condoms are not mentioned in any of the three articles.
even when inferred, it is more questionable whether these were indeed the communicative intentions of the text producers.

Thus my present analysis also includes what I have called here ‘emotional language’ or ‘emotional expressions’. It needs to be noted that by ‘emotional expressions’ I do not mean language expressing or influenced by emotions (for that, see contributions in Caffi and Janney, 1994), or the way emotion is conceptualised and labelled in different linguistic systems and cultures (as in, for example, in Wierzbicka’s work, 1992; 1994; 1995). While this is not precluded, even in heavily edited texts such as media texts (after all, even professional authors and editors are human, and emotion may have played a role in what they have selected to write/change and how), this is not my focus here. Rather, as with other lexical choices, I attempt to consider the interpretation of language from a critical-cognitive perspective. Expressions that activate evaluative frames/mental models can trigger emotional reactions – notably, in this case, emotions of fear, worry etc. – and short-circuit reasoning. This is view is only recently being taken up in critical cognitive studies of discourse (Hart, 2010, based on Chilton, 2005), so the present analysis is only an exploratory and very rudimentary step in this direction.

4.5.2 Sentence level

Examining the figure-ground distinction on the sentence level is complicated, and perhaps related to the numerous problems with presupposition negation. On the one hand, the proposition surfacing in the sentence as presupposition is more salient than the numerous entirely unexpressed underlying knowledge/beliefs of Speaker and Addressee in relation to the topic under discussion, the immediate context, world knowledge, each other’s beliefs and so on. On the other hand, the main clause is often
thought to be more salient than any subordinate ones. For the purposes of this thesis I focussed mainly on conjunctions, prepositional phrases and modality markers as Mental Space Builders. Due to space limitations I have not been able to include the whole analysis in the thesis. I chose to present the analysis of the main clauses, relative clauses (and some cases of marked syntax in relation to main and relative clauses) and conditionals because these were the most prevalent categories in my data, and also because they represent a broad range of the characteristics discussed earlier in this chapter. I would nevertheless like to present an overview of my observations of the whole sentence level analysis in this section, and focus on my chosen sub-categories in more detail in the analysis chapters 8 and 9.

When considering the pairing of form and function, all sentence types/speech act types involve background knowledge and expectations in some way. Declarative sentences performing assertions rest on the assumption that the information they present is new to the reader. Declarative sentences may, of course, perform a range of other functions, which in some way anticipate and respond to readers' expectations and reactions – insofar as they present evidence for previous assertions, they (or rather their author) pre-suppose that evidence is needed; when they serve to legitimise a certain piece of advice, it is because it is not immediately evident that the advice will be beneficial to the recipient, or doable, and so on, i.e. it needs to be explicitly stated how the Felicity Conditions of 'advice' are being met. I would categorise such functions as belonging to the Pragmatic Level of presupposition, and I will therefore not deal with it in this thesis in great detail. I will, however, consider some illustrative examples of assertions, primarily in order to consider what kind of information is not taken for granted in the texts I analyse here.
Negations in declarative sentences pragmatically presuppose assertions – that is, they negate something that either has been stated before in the text, or is assumed to be the readers’ pre-existing thoughts, which are unexpectedly to be negated.

Relative clauses are formulated very similarly to declarative main clauses, yet in principle their function should depend on whether they are restrictive/defining or non-restrictive/non-defining. Defining relative clauses bring in information presumed to be known (or immediately perceivable) to the recipient in order to help them distinguish the referent among a number of other potential referents. Non-defining clauses may contain new information which is presumably less emphasised and not important enough to be granted its own main clause, yet important enough to be mentioned. It may be the case that these clauses contain reminders of known information, or present ‘less surprising’, and therefore less controversial and less contestable information. I have included relative clauses in my analysis (Ch. 7) in order to look at what information is presented as new and what information is presented as shared in the data. Furthermore this allows me to consider a lower degree of emphasis (in comparison to main clauses) in the presentation of new information, while I have also found that it is not always possible to distinguish between defining and non-defining relative clauses, and therefore between presumably shared and presumably new but incontestable knowledge.

Relative clauses are also involved in clefts and cleft-like constructions, such as ‘it was John who ate the cake’ (see Levinson, 1983). Such constructions are manipulations of sentence structure to create varying effects of fore-and back-grounding, and indicate what information is new and noteworthy (in the above example, who the culprit is) and what information is shared and taken for granted (the cake was eaten). I have
analysed such constructions together with other cases of marked syntax in order to examine devices that manipulate emphasis/focus and therefore attention within the sentence.

Temporal expressions are not very frequent in the data. Although they have been one of the central concerns of presupposition research, I will not discuss them here, mainly because of lack of sufficient data for any kind of meaningful generalisation. Another central concern for presupposition research which I will not discuss in this thesis in detail is the heterogeneous category of ‘that-clauses’. The ‘taken-for-granted-ness’ of these clauses relies largely on the expression introducing them, a phenomenon that has been observed in the literature with a range of explanations presented. My analysis confirms Fauconnier’s theoretical model (1985), indicating that the introducing verb/expression sets up a mental space within which the ‘that-clause’ holds – to what extent the clause holds in the ‘real world’ then will be determined by the epistemic status of the mental space within which it occurs. With the exception of Cosmopolitan, very few ‘that-clauses’ are present in my data. Moreover, many of the Cosmopolitan cases involve instances of speech and thought presentation. These are certainly of interest for the study of epistemic status of propositions, as one of the functions of attributions is evidentiality, they lie, however, beyond the scope of this thesis.

Expressions of causality and explanations are taken for granted simply by virtue of their function – in order for them to function as causal attributions and explanations, the reader needs to accept their reality, otherwise they explain nothing. Contrast relations (adversative and concessive) also operate in subverting expectations – here, instead of a marker of negation, we have a marker of contrast (e.g. a conjunction) which simultaneously sets up a Reality mental space (what is claimed to actually be
the case) and a presupposed Reader’s Beliefs mental space, which is claimed not to be the case against expectations.

Conditionals have been of interest to the analysis of presupposition mainly in relation to the ‘projection problem’ – the ‘constant under denial’ presuppositions of a simple assertion cease to be necessarily ‘undeniable’ when the assertion constitutes the second part (apodosis) of a conditional construction (see 3.3.1). Fauconnier (1985) explains this as the assertion being contained within the hypothetical mental space set up by the conditional – thus, the apodosis will only be satisfied insofar as the hypothesis is satisfied. Analysis of conditionals has allowed me to explore this further, applying the theory to data in the Greek language (the model has been extensively elaborated on and applied to English by Dancygier and Sweetser, 2005). It is interesting to consider potential ideological functions of conditionals: even though by definition information contained in conditionals is not necessarily true or taken for granted, depending on the type of conditional, information can be presented as at least possible and likely, or so unlikely as to be practically impossible. Conditionals thus indicate what would be conceivable and in line with currently shared knowledge and expectations, and what would be utterly unexpected and most definitely not true (counterfactual). Conditionals, as well as generic clauses introduced with ‘when’ set up hypothetical mental spaces.

In Chapter 8 I present my analysis of declarative main clauses, relative clauses and marked syntax, and in Chapter 9 I look at conditionals. If not otherwise specified, it is assumed that the mental space R (‘reality’ or ‘base space’) and the mental space of the author’s perception of reality/beliefs, overlap, i.e. the author believes that what he/she they says is the reality, and (s)he believes that (s)he has knowledge of the reality.
4.5.3 Text level

We can discuss presuppositions on the text level in terms of knowledge and expectations which are presumed to be both shared and incontestable and arise from our perception of the structure and type of the text we are dealing with. Like with sentence level presuppositions, content and form/structure are to be looked at in conjunction for such an analysis.

As an example I would like to discuss the presupposed knowledge of the generic structure of advice texts. Advice texts as a genre type typically consist of a ‘problem’ and a ‘solution’ part, and optionally may include elaboration parts, which provide further details but also justify/legitimise seeing something as a problem or accepting a suggestion as its solution (for further details, see Chapter 5 and Polyzou, 2008b; 2008a).

In the text ‘Make his libido skyrocket!’ (Marie Claire, Feb 2006, pp. 157-158) the problem is set up in the first line of the lead-in paragraph: ‘Did you know that 23% of men prefer watching television to having sex?’ (Problem: 23% of men prefer watching television to having sex). In the first paragraph on the main body we have the elaboration of the problem: ‘45% of women ... say that they would like more sex ... it gives us a sense of affection and security ..., consequently if he is not in the mood, we get frustrated and feel that he is rejecting us.’ I presume that elaboration and legitimation are present in the text when they are deemed to be more necessary or appropriate by the text producer in advising the target audience. I would think that it is not self-evident that it is a problem for anyone to prefer watching TV to having sex.
but more importantly it seems that it may not be self-evident for the target readers of *Marie Claire* that it is a problem that some men have this preference. Therefore the text proceeds by presenting two reasons why this is a problem: First because some women would like to have more sex, and second because, regardless of how much sex women would like to have, it is claimed to be frustrating for women when their partners do not want to have sex with them. Notably on discourse level the whole text presupposes heterosexuality and sexual activity on behalf of all men and women.

On the contrary, on the piece on hair entitled 'her hair' (*Marie Claire*, Feb. 2006, p. 77), why hair is a problem is not elaborated on. The text consists just of a lead in paragraph and just a bulleted list on what each hairstyle 'means' (please see Appendix 1 for a scanned image of the text). In terms of background knowledge and femininity discourses in particular, it is already taken for granted that women consider their hair a problem. However, in terms of generic structure the readers will expect that the text will consist of a 'problem' part and a 'solution' part. Every bullet point constitutes a solution. In terms of setting up the problem, though, I would argue that the assumption that 'The way you do your hair reveals your personality', as is stated in the lead-in paragraph, is also not necessarily a problem. For interpreting this as a problem we have an interplay of femininity ideologies, knowledge of generic structure of advice texts which states that prototypically the problem comes first, the solutions follow', and a broader knowledge of the pragmatics of Speech Acts (see 4.5.5 below). On the latter I will briefly observe here that pragmatically one simply does not provide advice on something unless it is a problem in need of solution, or an area of ignorance for the addressee in need of illumination. Thus providing advice on something in itself implies that the 'something' is a problem.
4.5.4. Discourse level

In Chapter 2 I have discussed the understanding of 'a discourse' as 'a way of seeing and understanding the world' including ideologies, stereotypes and so on. I have also touched upon 'discourse level' presuppositions in the section addressing frame presuppositions above (section a - examples from Christie, 2000: 90 – 91 and Polyzou, 2008b). Discourse level presuppositions would include what Wodak has called 'allusions', as well as background knowledge drawn on, for example, for interpreting implicatures.

One might notice that what I call 'discourse level presuppositions' is what others might just call 'discourses', and that identifying either one or the other is fraught with methodological problems (but see Reisigl, 2007). First I would like to address the issue of discourse identification, and then move on to the issue of choice of terminology.

It is notoriously difficult to 'systematically' identify 'a discourse', and even more so to provide an account of how that was done once the analysis is over. Sunderland likens 'discourse spotting' to bird watching (2004), whereby identifying a discourse has similarities to catching a glimpse of a (part of) a bird. In making their methodology explicit analysts may present lists of parameters they checked in identifying (and indeed co-constructing) discourses (e.g. Koller, 2004; Kosetzi and Polyzou, 2009), but it is not the case that we can tell 'a discourse is what you get when you analyse the metaphors', or the adverbs, or whatever. I would argue that this is because a discourse is a broad system of meaning, part of the 'knowledge network' (mentioned in 4.2) which therefore can be activated with any content word, but at the same time it is 'broad scope' and therefore 'indirectly presupposed'.
In short, a ‘broad scope’ presupposition may or may not be accessed by all participants in the discourse, it may require more cognitive processing in order to be accessed, and exactly for this reason it is defeasible, as it is not present in the ‘surface’ of the text. However, it may well be instantly accessed by an audience displaying characteristics of the ‘ideal audience’ (possessing all necessary background knowledge to a satisfactory degree of salience), and/or by an audience that has been primed by previous linguistic or visual discourse or other perceptual stimuli, for example. I would say that the meaning accessed through accessing ‘discourse level presuppositions’ is what I have labelled ‘meaning(2)’ in 4.2 above. Moreover, if challenged, one would probably have to negate underlying ideological assumptions by a laborious process similar to ‘frame shifting’ or metalinguistic negation. Consider Graddol and Swann’s example ‘So, have you women finished gossiping?’ (1989: 166). If the addressees, or an overhearer of this question, were to challenge the utterer of this by saying ‘Do you mean that women always gossip?’, its negation would have to be something like ‘No, I don’t mean that women always gossip, [I mean] just that these two particular women gossip all the time’, for example. Or one could say ‘So, have you women finished gossiping? Not that women gossip all the time, of course...’ which, like with presupposition negation, would require bringing an element of the ground to the fore in order to negate it.

It is in that sense that I employ here the term ‘discourse (level) presuppositions’, similarly to the way Bekalu (2006) defines the term. He suggests that discourse presuppositions are ‘the pieces of information that are taken for granted in a given discourse’ (2006: 152). Clearly then with this quote Bekalu does not equate ‘discourse’ with underlying knowledge, but with actual language produced by a specific institution in a specific socio-historical context, while, for example, for Fairclough
(1989: 24) a discourse (as a count noun) is not actually present ‘in’ the text but only leaves linguistic ‘traces’ on the text (or feathers, to pursue Sunderland’s metaphor). These two views are not mutually exclusive (Greek media discourse evokes femininity and masculinity discourses, for example). Moreover, if we consider that every single linguistic expression in order to be meaningful necessarily evokes at least a cluster of concepts (narrow scope - frame), the question is not so much whether the discourse is ‘in’ the text or not, but rather to acknowledge that in interpreting texts readers draw on discourses/systems of beliefs/interpretive repertoires or however we might call them, and that the broader the scope of these parts of the knowledge networks the less we can rely on the text alone to identify them as analysts. By ‘discourse presupposition’ I suppose one could avoid the proliferation of the term ‘discourse’ for a range of categories (Widdowson, 1995), at the same time emphasising that knowledge of this type still ‘forms the ground’ and is necessary for making meaning in interaction.

4.5.5 Pragmatic competence level

Pragmatic competence is presupposed knowledge on how discourse works, including, e.g. felicity conditions, politeness conventions and so on, i.e. presupposed pragmatic knowledge. By ‘presupposed pragmatic knowledge’ I mean that it is required and expected to be there. It is knowledge of pragmatic principles needed to access the full (pragmatic) meaning of an utterance and/or interaction and principles assumed by the Speaker to be accessible to the Hearer (if the Speaker assumes these principles to not be accessible to the Hearer then they are deliberately producing something they aim the Hearer to not understand).
We could see pragmatic competence as procedural rather than representational knowledge (see van Dijk, 2003) — knowledge on how things are done. We can nevertheless use our knowledge of how things are done, or are to be done, in order to make assumptions about the world, which would then be representational knowledge.

I would like to demonstrate this with an example from our knowledge of the Felicity Conditions of Directive Speech Acts (see Austin, 1975: 14-15; 50-51 and Searle, 1969). Regardless of sub-type (command, advice, request), all directives have as a preparatory condition the assumption that the addressee would not go on and perform the requested act anyway (Searle 1969: 60 ff.) - otherwise the directive would be superfluous and perhaps received as patronising, impolite, or simply annoying).

Now when Greek *Playboy* advises its (presumably male) readers on how to please their (presumably female) partners (Feb. 2006, pp. 136-137), it includes a number of directives along the lines of the ones cited here:

- ‘...show self-restraint’
- ‘Don’t grope her loutishly’
- ‘Don’t hurry’

From our knowledge about directives we can see that the text producers believe that the readers will *not* show self-restraint and so on (or, at least that they present themselves as believing that) and therefore positioning their readers accordingly (see Polyzou, 2010: 121f. for further discussion; also Polyzou, 2008a: 118). Knowledge about how mass media work will make it clear for the reader that he is not addressed personally, the pronouns will make it clear for the female heterosexual reader that she is not addressed at all, and discourse level presuppositions, specifically ideologies about male and female (hetero)sexuality will make it clear both that it is not a lesbian reader who is addressed, and that the group of readers addressed is addressed in their
capacity as ‘straight men’ (and not, say, in their capacity as marathon runners, business people or Greek citizens, all of which may be true for some of the readers but irrelevant).

Notably Austin calls Felicity Conditions ‘the presuppositions of speech acts’ (1975: 50-51), probably in order to suggest that if Felicity Conditions are not met the speech act ‘doesn’t make sense’. I think this insight is worth incorporating in a presupposition classification model, but being aware that it is a different kind of shared knowledge put in use here. It seems that Magalhães has a similar understanding in mind when she says that ‘Rubinho’s [directive speech act] presupposes his former and current power over Tina [his girlfriend]’ (1995: 189), as having authority over the addressee is one of the preparatory conditions of orders and commands (Searle, 1969: 64-66).

The use of terms such as ‘presupposition’ and ‘presupposing’ to talk about such pragmatic principles is not generally the prototypical use of the terms, but in fact it is not as deviant as it may appear. Frege’s (1892/1948) initial observations in relation to presupposition seem to point to pragmatic competence and principles of discourse (at least in an ideal speech situation) rather than Truth Conditions as determinants of meaning. Frege says that ‘when we say ‘the moon’... we presuppose a referent’ (ibid.: 214), and generally that ‘[if] anything is asserted there is always an obvious presupposition that [referring expressions] have referents’ (Frege, ibid.: 221). That is, Frege claims that ‘we’, as users of language, engage in communication following the pragmatic assumption that referring expressions have (real world) referents. We might argue that this is not the case, or we might point to cases where this principle does not apply (e.g. when referring takes place within a Fictional World Mental Space). 51 Yet,

51 Even though I have not pursued this further in this thesis, I would like to observe that based on the present discussion existential presuppositions should also belong to this level of analysis, as they are a
this is not exactly the point here. What I argue is that pragmatic competence includes generalisation regarding the use of language such as:

- A referring expression carries the assumption that it refers (to an entity)
- A speech act carries the assumptions stated as its Felicity Conditions
- Indirectness (at least not very conventional indirectness) carries the assumption that there is a reason for it, rather than the assumption that the speaker does not intend to be understood (what, for example, Grice accounts for with the Co-operative Principle, 1975/2006)

What the above three have in common (the presupposition of reference, Felicity Conditions and the Co-operative Principle) is that they are 'taken for granted' principles, which are necessary in that, when not observed or recognised, we have some sort of breakdown in communication. However, it should be noted that, as with the terms 'pragmatic principles' or 'pragmatic competence', 'presupposed pragmatic knowledge' (presupposition on the level of pragmatic competence) is not meant to replace the more specific terms and concepts (such as Felicity Conditions), but rather to acknowledge that

a. these refer to mentally represented 'rules' of how discourse works, how we should speak and how we are to interpret what we hear/read

b. examining this type of knowledge is useful for analysis of underlying ideologies (even though in the literature sometimes it is called 'presupposition' and sometimes it is not), and

---

product of (and, in terms of discourse processing, an inference stemming from) the application of this pragmatic principle.
c. presupposed pragmatic knowledge is in some ways distinct from general 'world knowledge', and it is applicable in processing the representational meaning of utterances in any level

The latter point suggests that the 'pragmatic competence' level has a special status in relation to the other levels of this framework. We might perhaps want to argue that, as it is not on a par with the other levels, this should not be included in the list at all but be considered separately as a meta-level.

4.6 'Ideologicity'

In Chapter 2 I mentioned a few times that not all linguistic expressions are necessarily ideological, or not to the same degree. In order to explain this I would like to link this the issue of extra-textual context and to two points from this chapter: the levels of presupposition and the issue of scope.

The Earth is flat' is a belief which used to be considered true universally – in that context, it was part of universal knowledge. It was only made ideological knowledge during the phase when believing or not believing this becomes a source of conflict (of interests, among other things) and/or persecution. Nowadays the belief that the Earth is flat is not epistemologically ratified by dominant scientific criteria (i.e. it is not knowledge), but as a rule an individual holding this belief would just be considered to be wrong. Therefore, as a whole this belief would not be defined as ideological nowadays. Overall, rather than speaking of ‘something’ as being ‘an ideology’ or not, I find it more precise to speak of knowledge/beliefs, which, depending on socio-
historical context, may be ideological or not. 'Ideology' would then constitute a shorthand for a configuration of related ideological beliefs.

An implication of choosing the adjective 'ideological' over the noun 'ideology' the possibility of a belief, or a statement of belief, being 'more' or 'less ideological' than another, displaying a degree of 'ideologicity', as it were. This is related to the well-founded criticism that CDA sees ideology as underlying all discourse, which is counter-intuitive if we consider utterances such as 'What time is it?', or 'How big is a 15 inch monitor?' (Oswald, 2010: 179-180 f.).

I would say that socio-cultural norms, perceptions and knowledge underlie all discourse, which would determine e.g. politeness strategies, or the kind and amount of knowledge taken as shared – in short, social cognition underlies all discourse. Socio-cognitive representations have the potential of being, or becoming, ideological insofar as they constitute points of difference among social groups. Yet this potential is only realised when these differences are utilised to establish, maintain or challenge interests of social groups, as in the example 'the Earth is flat'.

Finally, although it is hard to come up with a method of measuring linguistic expressions as 'more' or 'less' ideological, we can nevertheless consider that different expressions may be more or less observably ideological, or not. A similar concern is addressed by Swann (2002), who discusses what warrants we may have when analysing discourse as drawing on gender ideologies. In line with the model developed in this chapter I would define ideological presuppositions as all presuppositions corresponding to beliefs that can be said to be ideological based on group interests in the context in which they were uttered. Thus, there will be presuppositions in the data which are not ideological, or at least not related to gender.
ideologies. From a methodological point of view, whereas ideology operates in discourse on more than one level, we can link these levels to the levels of presupposition proposed in this chapter (see also Polyzou, 2008b). Thus, a derogatory, sexist term for women, or a group of women, would be sexist on the frame level, as the sexist meaning would be automatically activated by default upon the utterance of the word (with contextual factors adding potentially subversive meta-representations of this meaning such as irony, citation or reclaiming of a term for solidarity). On the other hand, ‘what time is it?’ would not be ideological by default. Yet of course in context it could be used to generate all sorts of ideological implicatures. To make up an example, this could be said angrily to a young woman returning home at a time deemed unsuitable for women to be out in a specific socio-cultural context. That would not be ideological on a frame, but on a discourse level, since for accessing the implicature it would be necessary to draw on ideological beliefs/discourses about ‘women’s behaviour’. As with presupposition, it is easier for an analyst to identify textual elements which are ideological on the frame level, and it is easier to make a more convincing case about it. Nevertheless, by considering what is presupposed (taken for granted) for the production of the discourse we analyse, we can find evidence for the more elusive discourse level ideological presuppositions.

4.7 Conclusion

The motivation for this categorisation of various phenomena, which have been at one point or another been labelled ‘presupposition’, has been their similarities in many aspects. All items in the above five levels concern presupposition as knowledge which is taken for granted in interaction, it is not foregrounded, but it nevertheless needs to be accessed or acquired on the spot for the interaction to proceed. Although they are
taken for granted and therefore presented as if they are shared, there is always a possibility that the recipient will either not have the presupposed knowledge, or it will not be salient in their mind at that moment of the interaction. In both cases through accommodation the recipient should infer or be reminded of the presupposition.

There will be, however, different degrees to which it can be expected that presupposed knowledge will be shared or not. What I have termed frame presuppositions are narrow scope and can be presumed to be accessed by any competent speaker of the language of the interaction under analysis, since knowledge of frames is necessary semantic knowledge (together with the world knowledge involved in the frames). On the other hand, sentence level presuppositions are expressed in clauses and are definitely presented as incontestable insofar as they are attributed to a commonly accepted Real World Mental Space. Shared-ness is here not so important as incontestability, since the propositions in question can be accommodated very easily (with small cognitive effort).

It is hard to draw a line between frame and discourse presuppositions, because it is hard to draw a line between frames and discourses/systems of belief, so for methodological purposes I will define discourse presuppositions as the broad scope backdrop of knowledge against which the interpretation of text takes place. Discourse and also text presuppositions are knowledge that does not surface in the text, but needs to be shared for understanding of meaning (2) to take place. These presuppositions generally taken as incontestable, and questioning, challenging or refuting them involves the cognitive and social costs of bringing backgrounded material to the foreground.
Admittedly many of the examples mentioned in 4.4 and 4.5 could be and have been 
analysed perfectly well without the use of the term ‘presupposition’ at all. We could 
simply talk of frames, felicity conditions, generic conventions, discourses and so on. 
The list is very diverse; however, as we have seen from this and the review in Chapter 
3, knowledge falling under any of these categories has at some point been called 
‘presupposition’, or ‘presupposed’. In context any of these analyses intuitively makes 
sense, and my aim is not to claim that any of these are inaccurate. In fact I find it 
rather unsurprising, since there is no clear dividing line between the truth conditional 
category ‘presupposition’ and any other type of knowledge taken for granted in 
discourse – already Fillmore has been suggesting categories that were controversial 
for logical approaches to meaning such as ‘verbs of judging’ (‘accuse’, ‘blame’ etc., 
Fillmore, 1971), which Levinson characterises as ‘not really presuppositional at all’ 
(1983: 182). It does still seem that sentence level presuppositions occupy some kind of 
special status occurring from the combination of the semantics of ‘presupposition 
triggers’ as space-builders, something which we have to take into account also when 
looking at ‘non-presupposition-triggering’ space builders, and the actual mental space 
built.

Thus, what I am arguing for here is that when using the terms 

presuppose/presupposed/presupposition we need to be explicit as to the level to which 
we attribute the presupposed knowledge. Further, we need to have an argument about 
why, as analysts, we consider the presupposed material to be forming the ground, 
what is the profiled material, and what it is in the text that makes the presupposition 
incontestable/necessary, including whether it is necessary for accessing meaning (1) 
or meaning (2). Looking at Mental Spaces helps us determine what it is that forms the
'ground', as well as what the epistemic status of the ground is (fictional, hypothetical, 'real' etc.).

Moreover, I would like to point out that there are further cases, not identified as 'presuppositions' in the literature and not exemplified above, that would constitute at least non-prototypical presuppositions. For example, 'forming the ground' and 'being attributed to the Mental Space of reality' also includes indicative clauses which do not perform the speech act of 'asserting new information'; such cases would include 'setting the ground' on text level, or concessions/first parts of adversative relations on sentence level.

I would like to close with some final words on the issue of evoking vs. presupposing. Two questions still need to be clarified: a. Is everything evoked presupposed? and b. is everything presupposed evoked? I can only provide tentative answers to these questions in light of the discussion in this chapter. In relation to a. I would answer both yes and no – it depends on which level of meaning we are talking about. Everything automatically evoked/activated for narrow scope 'meaning making' (meaning (1)) is also presupposed, that is, taken for granted and forming the ground/frame of the profiled concept activated by a lexical item. In the case of ideologies and broader meaning systems/ discourses matters are not so clear cut, mainly because it is harder to identify what is evoked to begin with. Overall from sentence level and above syntactic and textual structure, phrasing, modality and other parameters need to be examined in order to make an informed interpretation as to whether a belief is taken for granted or not. In relation to b., what is presupposed may not be evoked in the case of 'unfair presuppositions'. When there is a clash between presupposed and actually shared knowledge 'evoking' occurs through accommodation,
or there is a misunderstanding, or insufficient understanding, with (a) recipient(s) not accessing meaning (2) or even meaning (1).
Chapter 5: Methodology

5.1. Introduction

In this chapter I discuss the methodological choices made in the thesis in relation to selecting a set of magazine titles to analyse, selecting a specific genre from the magazines, selecting a topic and finally beginning to apply the theoretical and methodological insights presented in Chapters 2-4. I begin by explaining how and why I conducted a questionnaire survey in order to identify prototypical men’s and women’s Greek magazines. Firstly, I outline the concept of prototypicality as the ‘best example’ of a category according to the evaluations of community, and argue that replicating experiments in identifying ‘category norms’ can actually be used for identifying both what a community considers to be members of a category, but also which category members are more prototypical than others.

I move on to explore the concept of ‘genre’ and the difficulties in applying this to categorise different text types within the magazines. I review various approaches to genre across disciplines and conclude that, for text types not named as specific genres by the community of their users, the criterion of ‘community purpose’ or function performed by the texts can serve as a guiding principle in categorisation. I consequently chose to look at texts performing the function of ‘advice’, broadly speaking.

In order to make detailed analysis practicable, the data have been narrowed down to three texts of the ‘advice’ type, all dealing with the issue of sexual health. Moreover, rather than applying the whole model outlined in Chapter 4, I focus on the first two levels, those of frames and mental spaces (but for a full application see Polyzou, 2008b; 2010; 2011 and 2012). Thus I provide the rationale for choosing the particular
topic, and finally explain how I identified the frames and mental spaces in the texts and looked for patterns demonstrated underlying presupposed ideological beliefs.

5.2. Selecting prototypical magazines

In generating my dataset, my aim was to collect a range of titles for detailed qualitative analysis of selected texts. There are a number of issues emerging in any such task, related to selecting the appropriate titles to analyse.

One of them is the issue of ‘influence’ or ‘representativeness’ - clearly any social constructivist approach would choose to look at media and pop culture under the assumption that these have an influence on social cognition, ideologies and social practices of the communities in which they circulate (more so on regular users). However, selecting the most influential one, or selecting a number of titles representative of the sort of influence exerted by lifestyle magazines in general, would have to be based either on detailed studies of the media in question, and surrounding practices, or on the analyst’s own research and/or speculation.

Until recently there has been no research whatsoever on Greek lifestyle magazines (see also Chapter 6) with the exception of Hatzidaki (2011) and part of Goutsos and Fragaki (2009) – and none by the time of data selection and collection in 2006. Moreover, the work of Hatzidaki, Goutsos and Fragaki is quantitative corpus-based analysis, and does not deal with reception, cultural implications and social context. It has been beyond the scope of this thesis to engage in detailed analysis of the emergence and consumption of lifestyle magazines as a genre in Greece (but see some
discussion of the broader contemporary social context in Chapter 6), and I can only make informed speculations as to the role or representativeness of each title.

There is some information available online, which one could use to provide a rough idea about each magazine currently circulating in Greece, such as circulation numbers, readership, target audience etc. Although useful, this information is not necessarily helpful in selecting specific titles in a reliable and systematic way. First of all, the availability of information is inconsistent across publications – some include readership information, some do not. Also, often the information overlaps to the extent that it is no longer useful for making distinctions: virtually all magazines target an audience of middle- or upper-middle class (with the exception of Penthouse, targeting men ‘from the whole social spectrum’).\(^{52}\) Circulation indicates to some extent the popularity of a publication, but not necessarily, as indicated by practices such as sharing magazines among friends (Hermes, 1995). Also, media texts may be consumed without necessarily being ‘popular’ or liked, as in the case of reading magazines at a waiting room (but even in these cases ideological assumptions remain ‘in circulation’). Finally, circulation does not tell us whether a magazine is (considered to be) a lifestyle magazine, or a men’s magazine, and so on – some method of classification is still required.

At first glance at least the distinction between men’s and women’s magazines appears quite clear-cut. Regardless of circulation and class affiliation of target audience, magazines can be distinguished as targeting ‘men’ or ‘women’. Although looking at actual readership complicates matters (20% of men’s magazines readers in UK are

\(^{52}\) http://www.daphne.gr/index_en.asp, last accessed January 2006. It should be noted that Penthouse is no longer present in the website, presumably because now it is being published by a different publisher (no further information available online).
women – Benwell, 2003), magazines on their websites self-identify as men’s and women’s, either directly (information for advertisers) or indirectly (through the discourse of their advertising, their cover pages etc.). However, there are cases such as the Greek magazine Nitro, which is listed as ‘general interest’ on the websites ClipNews Press Monitoring53 and Communication and Publicity Guide54, and claims to target ‘25-44 year olds’ independent of their sex55 (in contrast to, e.g., Esquire56); however, I would consider Nitro a men’s magazine, a hypothesis confirmed by two independently conducted prototypicality tests (see below). Therefore, despite the label under which it is marketed, for most members of the community in which it circulates, Nitro is not only a men’s magazine, but a prototypical one.

It seems, then, that there are a number of ways to interpret ‘men’s’ and ‘women’s’ as terms to categorise magazines by: who they targeted, as what they are marketed, who actually reads them, and how the public perceives them whether they read them or not. The latter may be linked to the social cognition of at least a percentage of ‘the public’, which, in this case, consists of the whole literate Greek speaking population of Greece, as lifestyle magazines are circulated on a national level. That is, people have expectations of what kind of topics, style, ideologies and attitudes and so on are to be found in a ‘men’s’ versus a ‘women’s’ magazine, related to what is considered appropriate for, or relevant to, men or women.

Therefore, rather than relying on my own initial perceptions of the content and attitudes of Greek lifestyle magazines prior to the analysis, I considered it more reliable to conduct a survey with the aim of finding out which magazines a sample of

Greek men and women consider prototypical of the categories ‘Greek men’s lifestyle magazine’ and ‘Greek women’s lifestyle magazine’. Below I briefly outline prototype theory, and how it relates to the questionnaire design, moving on to the discussion of the pilot and the main survey, and finally presenting my findings, which determined the data selection.

5.2.1 Prototype theory and category norms

Prototype theory in the cognitive sciences (cognitive psychology and cognitive linguistics) is based on the research of Eleanor Rosch (some of it published under her former name, Heider. See Heider, 1971; Heider, 1972; Rosch, 1973. See also Labov, 1973). Contrary to the traditional (Aristotelian) approach to categorisation (followed, e.g., by formal semantics), Rosch showed that categories are not homogeneous groups of concepts or entities assigned to the category by necessary and sufficient conditions. Rather, categories have an internal radial structure, with central members considered more prototypical, or best exemplars (Rosch, 1973: 114), and more marginal members less prototypical. ‘Borderline’ members could also be seen as members of another category. Thus, there is no fixed set of properties all members of a category should share, but rather they are connected through ‘family resemblances’ (Wittgenstein, 1953), i.e. various combinations of sharing some features with some members of the category, and other features with other members. Importantly, categories and prototypes themselves are not stable, possessing a timeless and context-independent ‘essence’; they are determined by the users of the category and the context (material, social and psychological) – some even created on the spot (Barsalou, 1991). Therefore, what is a prototypical Greek men’s or women’s lifestyle magazine at any
given time is only what is considered as such by Greek people who are familiar with the category at that time.

Rosch's experiments showed that people are capable of judging prototypicality among a list of items regardless of their personal preferences, likes or dislikes (1973: 134). This is an important point for my research, since on the one hand lifestyle magazines are primarily related to pleasure and entertainment, and thus are subject to personal taste (but also critical or favourable judgements about their ideological orientation), and on the other hand, they carry a certain degree of social stigma as 'inferior' forms of entertainment, along with other products of popular culture (see, e.g., Stevenson, Jackson and Brooks, 2003 on men's reluctance to admit they are regular readers of men's lifestyle magazines).

One straightforward way of measuring prototypicality for members of a category is to replicate one of Rosch's tests (1973: 130ff.), namely, to provide participants with a list with the members of each category, and ask them to rate them according to how good examples of the category they are (giving 1 to the best example, 7 to the most marginal example, and anything in between according to prototypicality). This method has been used for a small scale research I conducted for selecting a prototypical men's lifestyle magazine for a previous project (Polyzou, 2004 – see below for findings). For my purposes I would need two categories: 'Greek men's lifestyle magazines' and 'Greek women's lifestyle magazines'. However, in my 2004 research I pre-determined the list of 'Greek men's lifestyle magazines' based on a mixed list provided by a Sunday newspaper (Kyriakatiki Eleftherotypia, 04/04/2004) and my own intuitions, which restricted participants to a closed list of options, and also ignored more recent publications that were not listed on the paper yet. Also, importantly, my own judgements of including, e.g. Nitro as a 'men's lifestyle magazine', were given
precedence over the publisher's own representation of their publication as 'general interest'.

Thus, I decided to design a free response questionnaire, asking participants to list titles of magazines which belonged to the categories 'Greek men's lifestyle magazines' and 'Greek women's lifestyle magazines'. Rosch herself (1973: 131) based her lists of category members on findings from Battig and Montague's research on category norms, which are part of 'research in organizational processes in free recall learning and memory' (Battig and Montague, 1969: 1). Research on category norms provides participants with names of categories, asking them to list items they think belong to this category. The aim is to 'find out what items or objects people commonly give as belonging to various categories or classes' (1969: 2). Other conditions of such experiments vary: sometimes participants are given a limited time period in which to compile their list for each category, sometimes not; sometimes participants are asked to write as many members of the category as they can, sometimes they are limited; sometimes the category name is written down for the participants, sometimes it is read/spoken aloud for them, and so on.

Rosch's list for prototypicality experiments (1973) did not include all the responses Battig and Montague got for every given category. Instead, she selected some items that occurred more frequently (i.e. most people thought they were members of the category), some items that occurred very rarely (fewer people thought of them as members of the category), and some in-between. Since she wanted members that 'might reasonably be expected to range from very good to peripheral members of their categories' (1973: 131), she chose members which appeared with considerably different frequencies in the Battig and Montague norms, which also represented what she 'subjectively judged to be a wide spread on how focal the instances were to the
category (ibid.). Rosch predicted that more focal (i.e. prototypical) members will appear more frequently in the category norms, and fewer focal members will appear more rarely. Indeed, 'the mean rank of goodness of example in the present task [prototypicality] and the item’s Battig and Montague frequency were highly correlated' (Rosch, 1973: 132). Therefore, by asking participants to provide names of members of the categories I was interested in, the ones given more frequently as responses would be more likely to be prototypical.

Moreover, another factor which appears to be of significance in relation to prototypicality is the order in which the items given as response are listed. Generally, in category norms research, participants are asked to write down the items ‘in whatever order they happen to occur to [them]’ (Battig and Montague, 1969: 2). Evidence from Freedman and Loftus’s experiments (1971) suggests that, when faced with such a task, participants scan their mental representations of the category starting with the prototypical members and moving outwards (towards more marginal members), with which Rosch concurs (1973: 140). Generally it seems, then, that prototypical items come to mind faster than (i.e. before) less prototypical items, and would occur with higher frequency when one compiles a list.

Therefore, I distributed a questionnaire requesting participants to list items belonging to the categories ‘Greek men’s lifestyle magazines’ and ‘Greek women’s lifestyle magazines’. The ones occurring more frequently and higher up on the lists they provided would be the most prototypical ones, which I would choose to analyse.
5.2.3 The questionnaire design and pilot

The questionnaire was written in Greek. It was preceded by a paragraph (also in Greek) thanking participants for their time, informing them that the questionnaire was part of research for my PhD Thesis and reassuring them that their answers and any personal information they provided would remain anonymous and confidential. It was originally piloted on 6 Greek participants, 3 male and 3 female, aged 23-27.

An English translation of the task the participants had to complete would be:

'Please list up to 5 women’s lifestyle magazines circulating in Greece' and 'Please list up to 5 men’s lifestyle magazines circulating in Greece'.

Since I was only interested in the most prototypical titles, no more than 5 titles would be necessary, as presumably the 5 titles that would occur first would be the ones most prototypical for each individual. Moreover, ‘women’s lifestyle magazines’ and ‘men’s lifestyle magazines’ are subordinate terms, sub-categories of the category ‘lifestyle magazines’. ‘Lifestyle magazines’ in turn is subordinate to the basic level category ‘magazines’, part of the superordinate category ‘Kind of Reading Materials’, used as a category for Battig and Montague’s category norms (1973). Apart from general ‘knowledge of the world’, some kind of expert knowledge is required for participants to name members for my categories, since knowledge of subordinate categories involves more specialised knowledge than that of basic level terms. Moreover, my categories are closed and smaller, i.e. there is a certain number of magazines circulating in Greece, which cannot be extended ad infinitum (whereas, for instance, the category ‘Kind of Reading Material’ can be extended almost infinitely). Therefore, I asked for ‘up to 5’ titles, taking into account the fact that some participants may not

57 For superordinate, basic level and subordinate terms, see Ungerer and Schmid (1996).
know as many as 5 titles. The phrasing ‘circulating in Greece’ was chosen instead of ‘Greek magazines’, because many lifestyle magazines circulating in Greece are international titles (usually published in Greek, by Greek publishers, but sometimes including Greek translations of texts from the original, usually English-language, title).

One of the implications of this is that at least some participants might find the task more difficult and require more time to respond. In the pilot study this turned out to be indeed the case, thus I rephrased the instruction ‘Please take no more than 2 minutes to answer the below’ to ‘Try to answer within 2 minutes’. This encouraged participants to try to answer as fast as possible, without dwelling too long on their answers, but also meant that they could take longer than 2 minutes if necessary.

The pilot version ‘In filling out the following, please bear in mind that there are no right or wrong answers. I want to know what you think, in fact, what comes readily to your mind’ was complemented with ‘Please write down the titles in the order in which they come to your mind’, as some participants in the pilot asked for clarifications in relation to the order in which they had to write down their answers.

Finally, in order to avoid priming effects, the two questions were not always presented in the same order; half of the questionnaires (60) were asking participants to list women’s magazines first (type A), and half were asking first about men’s magazines (type B).
5.2.3 Questionnaire distribution

The questionnaires (hard and electronic copies) were distributed during my 2 weeks’ long stay in Greece in the summer of 2006, through snowballing. That is, I first approached friends and acquaintances asking them to fill in the questionnaires for me, and then I asked them to pass on some hard copies, or the electronic copy to their own friends and acquaintances. These questionnaires were either returned directly to me, or via the common acquaintance.

All participants were unpaid volunteers, and they were Greek having spent all or most of their lives in Greece, to ensure that they would be familiar with the press circulating in Greece. They were aged 18-44, approximately the target age groups of most lifestyle magazines, which means that, even if they were not lifestyle magazines’ readers, they were likely to have encountered advertising of the magazines, or heard about the magazines in conversations with their peers.

115 questionnaires were returned, 60 from female participants and 55 from male participants. 60 of the questionnaires were type A (33 by female and 27 by male participants), and 55 were type B (27 by female and 28 by male participants).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1: Demographics of participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.2.4 Questionnaire analysis and findings

The questionnaires were analysed with SPSS by Damon Berridge and Elizabeth Ackerley, (Centre for Applied Statistics, Lancaster University) to whom I am very
grateful. Two factors were relevant for the analysis: the frequency with which each title was mentioned as a member of the related category, and the rank order, i.e. the order each title is mentioned in each list of 5 titles by each participant.

As I first step, for each category I constructed 5 lists of titles, one for each rank (position in the list, from 1st to 5th), and the frequency each title for each rank.

This is, for example, the table with the men’s magazines’ titles occurring first on the list:

Table 2: Men’s magazines titles occurring on the first slot

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Wheels</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Esquire</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FHM</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magnum</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Man</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Max</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>20.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maxim</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>23.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>41.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men's Health</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>54.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men's World</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>55.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Money and Life</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>56.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nitro</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>74.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penthouse</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>75.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Playboy</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>85.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>99.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unintelligible</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I am also grateful to Aaron Hunsberger for his help.
This is the list of women's magazines titles occurring in the first position:

Table 3: Women's magazines titles occurring on the first slot

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Magazine</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Celebrity</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cosmopolitan</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>39.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diva</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>41.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dolce Vita</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>42.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egw</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>43.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elle</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>46.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glamour</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>49.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gynaika</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>54.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hello</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>55.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katerina</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>56.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life and Style</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>60.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lipstick</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>60.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lucky</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>61.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madame Figaro</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>75.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marie Claire</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>87.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nitro</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>88.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pink Woman</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>90.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Super Katerina</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>91.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vogue</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>98.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Votre Beaute</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>99.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From the tables it is clear that certain magazines were mentioned very frequently, while others only occasionally. Therefore, I grouped all titles mentioned less than 12 times in total in one category, 'others' (12 times was a random 'cut-off point'). I then ended up with the following lists (presented alphabetically):

Table 4: Magazines occurring 12 or more times in total

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Women's magazines</th>
<th>Men's magazines</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cosmopolitan</td>
<td>Esquire</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
An interesting observation when looking at all the titles listed by participants is that, even though women had no difficulty listing magazines addressed to men, and men magazines addressed to women, none of the participants listed magazines addressed to gay men or women. This indicates the marginalisation of homosexuality in Greece – participants had no trouble listing magazines addressed ‘not for them’, so even if we assume that all participants self-identified as straight, this is no reason for them to ignore gay publications. The reason a publication was listed was because (a) the participants were aware of its existence and (b) it was considered ‘prototypical’. Which means that either participants were not even aware of gay publications, or they had classified them mentally as something other than ‘men’s/ women’s lifestyle magazines’. In my opinion this may also linked to the definition and prototypical instances of the categories ‘man’ or ‘woman’. Ironically, a straight woman is more likely to be aware of magazines addressing men, than of magazines addressing gay women.

For the magazines listed, I calculated prototypicality by attributing a certain weight to each rank, 5 for the first position, 4 for the second, 3 for the third, 3 for the fourth, and 1 for the fifth, and multiplying this by the frequency of occurrences of each title for each rank. Therefore, the prototypicality score for the magazine Nitro (nitroscore) would be

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Diva</th>
<th>Klik</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elle</td>
<td>Max</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glamour</td>
<td>Men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gynaika</td>
<td>Men's Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madame Figaro</td>
<td>Nitro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marie Claire</td>
<td>Playboy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mirror</td>
<td>Status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life and Style</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
nitroscore = 5×21 + 4×9 + 3×15 + 2×4 + 1×2 = 196

because *Nitro* was mentioned 21 times in the first position, 9 times in the second, 15 times in the third, and so on. Below are the scores of each title in order of prototypicality (see column ‘Sum’):

Table 5: Women's magazines in order of prototypicality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Magazine</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Sum</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>cosmoscore</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>317.00</td>
<td>2.7565</td>
<td>2.15452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>figaroscore</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>226.00</td>
<td>1.9662</td>
<td>2.03017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mariecscore</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>151.00</td>
<td>1.3130</td>
<td>1.91194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>voguescore</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>111.00</td>
<td>0.9652</td>
<td>1.71643</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ellescore</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>101.00</td>
<td>0.8783</td>
<td>1.54550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>glamscore</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>55.00</td>
<td>0.4783</td>
<td>1.30012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>diviscore</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>47.00</td>
<td>0.4087</td>
<td>1.16901</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gynaikascore</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>46.00</td>
<td>0.4000</td>
<td>1.25516</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>istylescore</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>35.00</td>
<td>0.3043</td>
<td>1.10956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mirrorscore</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>28.00</td>
<td>0.2435</td>
<td>0.79020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valid N (listwise)</td>
<td>115</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6: Men's magazines in order of prototypicality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Magazine</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Sum</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>nitroscore</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>1.70</td>
<td>2.069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>menscore</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>1.59</td>
<td>2.123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>statusscore</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>2.040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>playboyscore</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td>1.863</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mhscore</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>1.697</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>maxscore</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>1.557</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>esqscore</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>1.424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>klikscore</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>1.019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valid N (listwise)</td>
<td>115</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Therefore, the 3 most prototypical women's lifestyle magazines were *Cosmopolitan*, *Madame Figaro* and *Marie Claire*, and the 3 most prototypical men's lifestyle magazines were *Nitro*, *Men* and *Status*. However, *Men* stopped being published in
November 2005, as is apparent from the magazine website, something participants might not have been aware of yet. Thus, I collected Nitro, Status and Playboy, which was fourth in prototypicality. Incidentally, Nitro and Status were found to be prototypical in Polyzou (2004) as well.

Table 7: Men’s magazines found to be prototypical in Polyzou (2004)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mag. Title</th>
<th>Average score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Status</td>
<td>2,290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nitro</td>
<td>3,129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>3,387</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Max</td>
<td>3,774</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klik</td>
<td>3,968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Playboy</td>
<td>3,968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Esquire</td>
<td>4,323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men’s Health</td>
<td>4,710</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penthouse</td>
<td>4,742</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Wheels</td>
<td>5,613</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the above table, the closer the score is to 1, the higher the prototypicality.

I collected a random trimester for each title (February, March and April 2006), purchasing the hard copies, since most of these magazines either do not have online versions at all (e.g. Madame Figaro), or have very little content available on their websites (e.g. Cosmopolitan at the time of collecting the data had the editorial, some quizzes and the horoscopes).

---

5.3. Selecting genre

5.3.1 Introduction

The notion of ‘communicative purpose’ as a primary criterion for genre identification and classification (Swales, 1990) has been criticised and shown to present the analyst with a number of challenges (Askehave, 1999). Similarly, scholars from Critical Linguistics and Critical Discourse Analysis speak of the ‘social activity’ linked to each genre (Fairclough, 1992; Kress, 1985/1989); they thus view communicative purpose from a more socially-oriented perspective and make the identification of the social activity taking place central to genre identification. At the same time, researchers aiming to provide guidelines for genre analysis place their focus on how to conduct the analysis of a corpus of texts of the same genre, rather than on the criteria used to compile the corpus – genre identification has been broadly assumed to be accomplished solely on the basis of background knowledge of or about the ‘speech community’ using the genre (Bhatia, 1993; Fairclough, 1992; Swales, 1990). I claim that, despite the problems they present, the notions of ‘communicative purpose’ and social activity are indeed primary for critical research, as they point us towards the ideological functions of genres. Taking into account other parameters for genre identification provided by Swales (1990: 58), such as the participants, the content, the structure and the style of the texts in my data, I propose that texts of quite different structure and/or content can be classified as sub-genres of the same genre type (e.g. ‘advice’), as these texts share a set of common generic characteristics (see Polyzou, 2008a).

Initially I discuss the notion of ‘genre’ as a criterion for categorising texts for critical analysis. Despite its advantages, certain difficulties are presented with less
conventionalised mediated texts - various kinds of texts in magazines do not always belong to clearly identified/identifiable genres. Then I move on to propose a way of facing these difficulties, by adopting categories broader than, but related to genre. I am making the theoretical suggestion of viewing texts as overarching speech acts, and suggest classifying texts in ‘speech act’ categories, further to be divided in ‘genre categories’ as a method of categorisation.

5.3.2 Approaching genre from a functional perspective

Currently, genre as a kind of text is considered to be part of every human social activity, and the functions and extra-textual conventional characteristics of genres are taken into consideration. Swales’ (1990: 58) definition of genre as

a class of communicative events, the members of which share some set of communicative purposes... In addition to purpose, exemplars of a genre exhibit various patterns of similarity in terms of structure, style, content and intended audience

provides a useful starting point. One would assume that in order to identify the various genres within the magazines, one would have to identify the shared (sets of) communicative purposes, as well as the structure, style, content and intended audience shared by the texts belonging to the same genre. Communicative purpose is privileged as a criterion (Bhatia, 1993: 13; Swales, 1990: 58), at least for a functional approach to discourse, although other elements may be assigned more importance depending on the genre.

The approaches adopted by Critical Linguistics and Critical Discourse Analysis in relation to genre are compatible with that of Swales and Bhatia, putting more
emphasis on the additional dimension of social situation or social activity. Kress’s references to participants and to ‘functions, purposes and meanings’ (Kress, 1985/1989: 19) are related to the notion of ‘communicative purpose’. Critical Linguistics and Critical Discourse Analysis scholars also refer to form, again in line with the common perception that genres are ‘types’ or ‘kinds’ of texts, with specific texts being the tokens of these types (Kress, 1985/1989; Wodak, 2001: 66).

The emphasis for CDA lies in the connection of genres to social situations or activities (Fairclough, 2001: 123; Fairclough, 1992: 51-52; 125; Kress, 1985/1989: 19; Wodak, 2001: 66), a connection earlier identified and discussed by Bakhtin (1986: 60). That is, genre is bound to what we may call the ‘situational context’, which in itself is embedded in the broader historical and socio-political context (see Wodak, 2001: 67; Martin, 1992: Ch. 7). Kress suggests that ‘the characteristic features and structures of ... situations, the purposes of the participants ... all have their effects on the form of the texts which are constructed in those situations’ (1985/1989: 19). Moreover, he points out that most social situations are conventionalised, to a certain extent, and that ‘[t]he conventionalised forms of occasions lead to conventionalised forms of texts’, genres, which are ‘deriving from and encoding the functions, purposes and meanings of the social occasions’ (ibid.). Fairclough also suggests that genre is ‘a relatively stable set of conventions that is associated with, and partly enacts, a socially ratified type of activity’ (1992: 126). Thus, whereas we may not have access to the minds, intentions and purposes of the participants in a communicative event, and we may not be able to read off effects from texts, genres as event schemata are abstractions of how people use language conventionally, in order to achieve conventionally ratified (or even institutionalised) social purposes.
In terms of the methodology of genre identification, the link to specific conventional situations and what people are actually doing with discourse in these situations is in many cases valuable. However, there are still problems. Admittedly not all situations, or the language associated with them, are equally conventional (Fairclough, 1992: 70; Kress, 1985/1989: 19). Most importantly, practically all mediated texts (i.e. written or broadcast) are less bound by a ‘context of situation’ including a specific setting (time, space) and specific participants. At the same time, by definition communication involves at least two parties (as pointed out in encoding-decoding models of communication since Shannon and Weaver, 1949; cf. also Hall, 1980) and thus a discursive event (or its communicative purpose) is not realised until the consumption of the text. With written, recorded or mass media texts it is not always possible even to know who is consuming the texts, let alone where, when and how. Of course, some mediated texts, particularly written ones, are more closely linked to specific production, distribution and consumption practices, specific audiences and specific functions (or communicative purposes and effects). Such texts are academic genres like student essays, exam papers, academic journal articles etc., texts used in the areas of law and politics (in the narrow sense) like laws and bills, and generally genres used in specific institutions and organizations such as job applications, or even the Bible.

When it comes to mass media texts, however, even ethnographic observation may not give us the full range of what people do with these texts, and audiences are much more fluid and flexible in their composition and practices. To link with the specific case of magazine genres, the setting, audience and even the effect of the texts are not determining factors for the assignment of the texts to genres, in the way that they are with other, context-bound discursive events. If I decide to discuss my medical problems with my friend, who is a doctor, over a cup of coffee, the interaction will be
a hybrid genre between medical consultation and friendly conversation, and the participants will simultaneously occupy the subject positions of doctor/patient and friends — a 'proper' medical consultation would most probably have to take place in a doctor's consulting room. However, whether I decide to read a magazine at my home, or someone else's home, or in the tube, or in a waiting room does not change the genre of the texts I am reading. And there is nothing to stop a young man, or elderly woman from reading a lifestyle magazine targeting young women, whereas not everybody can have access to exam papers, for example. In addition, the fact that a number of texts are put together in one volume of a magazine, and can therefore be read in exactly the same settings by the same reader, does not mean they all belong to the same genre.

At the same time, texts are clearly restricted by their co-presence in the same medium. There are certain forms, contents and communicative purposes texts can have in order to appear in an academic journal, for instance, or in a lifestyle magazine. In that sense, one can speak of lifestyle magazines as 'super-genres', that is, comprising a number of genres and occupying a position superordinate to genres (see Figure 1 below). Such super-genres do play a role in and are associated with social activity. This is however best discussed in terms of social activity and social context in the broad sense (Wodak, 2001: 67), rather than specific situations. We can still be concerned with what 'communicative purpose' the genres or super-genres in question have, and at least their potential effects, but also consider ideology which, as a social and cognitive structure, occupies a superordinate level to genres (see, e.g. Martin, 1992: 496). It is on that level that Martin discusses a rather different notion of purpose emphasising that 'genres are social processes, and their purpose is being interpreted here in social, not psychological terms' (1992: 503). By using the Aristotelian term 'telos' instead of
purpose, he alludes to the overall contribution of genres as processes to the organisation and function of any given culture, irrespective of the private purposes of any individual involved in a communicative event. It is in that sense that although we may not have access to the purposes of the author of a text in the lifestyle magazines, or the various purposes people seek to fulfil by reading a magazine, or the effects of the magazines on specific people, we can still examine how the texts in the magazines link to specific ideologies, and thus of what social activity they are part.60

![Figure 1- Levels of text classification according to functions](image)

The question then is how to go about distinguishing the number of genres present within a multi-genre medium (or ‘super-genre’) such as a lifestyle magazine; none of them is strictly bound to a specific situational context while all of them occur simultaneously within the same social context, and address roughly the same

---

60 It should, however, be borne in mind that it is simplistic to assume that ‘the cultures as a whole are goal-directed, with some over-riding purpose governing the interaction of social processes’ (Martin, 1992: 502), but rather, ‘[s]ocial processes negotiate with each other and evolve’ (ibid.); thus telos should not be taken as an essentialist, deterministic ‘inherent purpose’ in any social activity, but rather as the role of every activity in this (ideological) negotiation of social relations and structures.
audience. Moreover, we cannot have a list of the generic characteristics of the texts in advance to use as criteria for our categorisation.

Andrew Tudor observes this fundamental problem in categorising texts in preconceived genre categories and then discussing their generic characteristics:

To take a genre such as the 'western', analyse it, and list its principal characteristics, is to beg the question that we must first isolate the body of films which are 'westerns'. But they can only be isolated on the basis of the 'principal characteristics' which can only be discovered from the films themselves after they have been isolated (1974: 135, cited in Gledhill, 1999: 138).

In selecting, then, texts belonging to the same genre in order to analyse them, the analyst is faced with the paradox that s/he has to analyse them before s/he can categorise them.

5.3.3 Methodology of categorisation – the two initial stages

Swales (1990: 39) and Bhatia (1993: 23) suggest using one’s already existing background knowledge of a genre and the speech community as an additional, extra-textual criterion for genre identification. Thus, I initially relied on my own insights as a member of Greek society who has come in contact with both men’s and women’s Greek lifestyle magazines, had informal conversations with other Greeks, as well as non-Greek colleagues who have had experience of lifestyle magazines in their own discursive communities (since often characteristics of lifestyle magazines transcend geographical and cultural boundaries and are as related to the magazine’s international ‘brand’ as to the local social context of its circulation - see Machin and Thomborrow,
2003 and Machin and van Leeuwen, 2005). Despite the value of these insights, the members of the relevant discourse communities do not necessarily have category names for all kinds of texts present in magazines, with the exception of the highly conventionalised ones.

This inevitably leads to looking at the texts themselves for elements for their categorisation, and to the paradox identified by Tudor, which applies not only to genre categorisation but to every hermeneutic process. This is also known as the hermeneutic circle (Gadamer, 1965), which ‘implies that the meaning of one part can only be understood in the context of the whole, but that this in turn is only accessible from its component parts’ (Meyer, 2001: 16). It is thus impossible to approach any category of texts without a preconceived notion of what its members are, and it is impossible to analyse the parts of any text without a previous idea of the function and meaning of the whole text. In order to avoid misled or biased conclusions or categorisations, one cannot rely on first impressions alone and follow a linear ‘theory – data selection – analysis’ process. Initial insights are valuable but too intuitive and unsystematic, and therefore have to be informed by the data and reformulated accordingly, with the data selection revisited after some preliminary analysis, the resulting dataset followed by more in-depth analysis, and the theory informed by the data and the analysis consequently (Meyer, 2001; Wodak, 2001).

Thus, I moved on to the second step, which involved a closer reading of a sample of the data, beginning from the theoretical premise of the primacy of function as a criterion for categorisation. I concentrated on a randomly selected sample, namely the

---

61 I am particularly indebted to Costas Gabrielatos and the members of the Gender and Language Research Group of the Linguistics Department of Lancaster University, whose observations have helped significantly with my categorisation. The discussions with them highlighted even more the dimension of function and its importance.
February 2006 issues of all six selected magazines (one-third of the total data). The categories found would presumably also be found in the March and April issues of the same magazines of the same year. The initial reading of the data (in conjunction with the background knowledge I already had of the texts and the discourse communities involved) provided the first impressions and an initial categorisation of the texts according to function. This was an interpretative first step, relying on the 'overt' (rather than 'hidden') communicative purpose of the texts (cf. Askehave, 1999). Hidden communicative purposes would be the object of the later stage of in-depth analysis.

Hence I came up with a classification of texts on a level superordinate to genre, as it is based on function but does not initially address the issue of the rest of the generic characteristics of the text; these I discuss later on in relation to the function of the text. I suggest that a useful way of looking at texts in relation to the function is seeing them as broad types of speech acts. Thus, the categories used are not genres but 'speech act categories' and/or 'genre categories', based on the overall speech acts performed by the texts. I suggest that two broad kinds of speech acts are performed by the texts in lifestyle magazines, directive speech acts and commentary/expression of beliefs, further broken down in categories of the genres performing the functions advice or promotion (directives), and social and personal commentary (commentaries) – this classification is represented schematically in Figure 1. The categorisation has involved cyclical procedures of moving from theory to data and then back to theory again (cf. Wodak, 2001: 70), as well as from the data categorisation to analysis which feeds back into the data categorisation again, before moving on to further more detailed analysis (cf. Meyer, 2001: 16, 18). Below I am elaborating on what I have termed
‘speech act categories’ and ‘genre categories’ and how these different levels of categorisation emerged from examining the data.

The four main functions identified through my initial categorisation were: promoting commercial products and services, providing advice to readers, providing commentary on social situations and social groups, and providing information, gossip and evaluation of individuals. At this stage two theoretical observations emerged: first, that these function categories can include texts which can be readily identified as established genres in the discourse community as well as unclassifiable texts with characteristics of form and content too unique or too common to determine genre membership. For instance, expert interviews (e.g. interviews with doctors, cosmetologists or nutritionists) are an established genre performing the function of advice – but so do other texts which are clearly not interviews; for instance, a text in Marie Claire (February 2006 issue, pp. 70-73) entitled ‘One more drink after work… Yes, but are you overdoing it?’ (Ένα ακόμα ποτό μετά το γραφείο… Ναι, αλλά μήπως το παρακάνει;) discusses the issues of alcoholism and alcohol abuse and provides relevant advice – it is a long text broken down in sections, which is a very common format of many magazine texts. At the same time, expert interviews perform a very different function to celebrity interviews, although they have exactly the same format (question-answer) and layout (e.g. questions may be in different fonts from the answers, the initials of interviewer and interviewee may precede the questions and answers etc.) – celebrity interviews practically never provide advice (maybe only occasionally), and rather provide to the readers as ‘overhearers’ of the interview information about the interviewee’s work, gossip about their personal lives and in some cases promote the interviewee’s recent work (e.g. a new album or film). It would therefore be misleading to consider all interviews as belonging to the same genre or
performing the same functions merely because they have the same form and are referred to by the discourse community with the same name ('interview'), whereas texts with functions similar to celebrity interviews could be grouped with them (see section on 'commentary' below). Thus, a categorisation on a level superordinate to genre can lead to a more fruitful data classification and selection, since it does not lead to the exclusion of texts with the same function merely on grounds of form or content.

The categories at this level are too broad to be considered genres, although the category members do display shared generic characteristics. Indeed Askehave (1999: 22) criticises Bhatia for speaking of 'promotional genres' (1993: 59), because this broad term can include many different kinds of texts belonging to different genres. I would therefore propose to use the term 'genre categories' for categories or groups of genres (and texts of unidentifiable genre) which perform the same function.

My second theoretical observation is the striking similarity between the functions performed by discourse on the one hand and Austin's notion of speech acts on the other. The proposed genre categories can be seen as directive speech acts (the promotion and advice categories), or as expressions of beliefs (social and personal commentary categories). I suggest that speech act theory can be extended from the study of sentences or clauses, which was its initial focus, and the study of parts of texts (as suggested by van Leeuwen, 1993, 2008) to the study of whole texts. We then end up with a hierarchy of scope when it comes to focussing on function, from the overall kind of speech act performed by a text (which I will call the 'speech act category'), to its genre category, moving down to genre (see Figure 1). I am focussing on these levels in this discussion, although this hierarchy can continue upwards to include lifestyle magazines, then the total of Greek media and their ideological functions, ending up to the total of discourse activity taking place in Greek society as
a whole, and downwards to include parts of texts constituting structural elements of
genres (or ‘moves’, see van Leeuwen, 1993: 195), to smaller units like phrases down
to single words.

In the following section I provide a theoretical discussion of the parallels between
speech acts and text as belonging to genres and genre categories, and then move on to
discuss the third step of my data selection process involving textual analysis as a guide
for identifying the genre category membership for the texts in the data, focussing on
the ‘advice’ genre category.

5.3.4 Text types as ‘speech act categories’ and ‘genre categories’

As Martin very aptly puts it, ‘[g]enres are how things get done, when language is used
to accomplish them’ (Martin, 1985: 250). The parallels between genres as a means of
achieving communicative purposes, my broad ‘genre categories’ based on function
and speech acts as defined by Austin and Searle, are many. The emphasis in Austin’s
lectures (see Austin, 1962; 1975 for edited published versions of the lectures) is
indeed on the fact that language is not merely used in order to describe states of affairs
in the world, but rather in order to perform actions. Due to the multifunctionality of
language, though, even a short phrase can perform more than one action (Austin,
1975: 73) and Searle explicitly states that ‘the characteristic grammatical form of the
illocutionary act [speech act] is the complete sentence’ (1969: 16) because words only
have meaning as parts of sentences.

---

62 For a similar approach, see Tsiplakou and Floros (2013).
The question then arises whether we can speak of whole texts, consisting of a number of sentences, as speech acts, or rather as the accumulation of a number of speech acts, each act performed by each sentence. According to van Leeuwen ‘the basic unit of generic structure is the speech act’ (1993: 195) and the speech act is not necessarily restricted to one sentence but constitutes a part of the structure of a genre which surfaces as a text part of indeterminate length, which can be clauses or sentences. Van Leeuwen points out that the speech act is the minimal linguistic unit which performs some action (ibid.). I would argue that we can concentrate on a higher than the minimal level and focus on the action performed by whole texts as a ‘speech act’. That is, whereas every utterance or part of a text performs a certain act (or acts), such as insulting or requesting, a genre as a whole is a resource we use to achieve broader purposes, such as acquiring a job or making a commercial transaction.

Thus, despite the fact that we can isolate sentences or phrases performing speech acts as the basic or minimal units of generic structure, we can also see whole texts as overarching speech acts. Importantly, although Searle speaks of sentences, Austin speaks of utterances, since the term ‘sentence’ refers to a specific grammatical formulation, whereas utterance refers to language in use (Levinson, 1983: 16 ff.). Levinson in his discussion focuses on comparing sentences with sentence-long utterances, in order to emphasise the context-bound nature of utterances. He does note, however, that an utterance can be a ‘sentence part, sentence, string of sentences or sentence parts’ (Levinson, 1983: 16). Thus, an utterance may consist of more than one sentence and at least in theory it can be of any length - cf. Harris’s definition of utterance as ‘any stretch of talk, by one person, before and after which there is silence on behalf of that person’ (Harris, 1951: 14, cited in Lyons, 1977: 26). Arguably a written text of any length can be perceived as the equivalent of a spoken utterance (see
e.g. Loos et al. 2004 63) – interestingly Bakhtin begins to define genres as ‘types of utterances’ (1986: 60). In that sense any (spoken) utterance or (written) text as a whole can be seen as performing one (or more) speech acts; 64 Brown and Yule indeed observe that ‘[f]rom a speaker’s point of view several sentences (or syntactic chunks) strung together may constitute a single [speech] act. Thus, a fairly extended utterance may be interpreted as a warning or as an apology’ (1983: 233).

A more interesting consideration is that, to echo Searle’s extension from the word to the sentence for the study of meaning, as words have meaning only within sentences, sentences only have meaning in the discourse in which they occur. For instance, we wouldn’t be able to identify the expression ‘don’t tell your beloved one ‘I love you’ (Μην πεις στον αγαπημένο σου ‘σ’αγαπώ’, Madame Figaro, Feb. 2006, pg. 84) as advice rather than command or request without the co-text. Thomas provides a useful example of how ‘speakers... ‘build up to’ the performance of a particular speech act’ (1995: 200). She demonstrates how a speaker ‘prepares the ground’ for a request – in my ‘advice’ texts the initial stage, where the problem or question is set up and elaborated, is ‘preparing the ground’ for the advice to be given in relation to the specific problem. Although most of the sentences in the ‘problem setting’ part can be characterised as statements or rhetorical questions (rather than advice), the actual sentences performing the advising (including often imperatives or expressions such as ‘I advise you’ and ‘I suggest’) would make no sense without the ‘problem setting’

64 Lyons also extends this definition of utterance to written texts (1977: 26); however, this definition encounters problems when we consider texts as the ‘representation of discourse’ (Brown and Yule, 1983: 6), where discourse involves dialogue, whether spoken, transcribed or (as is the case in magazines) written questions and answers. In texts like interviews we cannot speak of the utterance of one person but rather of two people taking turns. However, it is presumably one person who writes the text (the journalist – although there may be editing by other persons too), and the interviewees are not involved in the representation of their own speech. As far as the readers are concerned, they never take a turn, and thus we can perhaps still treat an interview as one single text/utterance, with the turns within it constituting different moves/units of structure.
part. Moreover, 'the pragmatic force of successive utterances can have a cumulative effect' (Thomas, 1995: 201), so that a succession of the speech acts of advice within the same 'advice' text will contribute towards the overall advising function of the text – one more reason to consider the text as a whole rather than isolating parts of the texts that can strictly be considered 'speech acts' according to Austin and Searle's discussions. Indeed Wunderlich (1980: 293) points out that there is a continuum in the complexity of speech acts according to the length of the unit one is examining: 'turn, move, speech act pattern, complex speech unit and discourse type'. He discusses the interconnection of speech acts as they appear in larger units of interaction - as turns within a dialogue or as moves in dialogue or monologic text, contributing to moving on towards the final communicative purpose to be achieved. He also argues (1980: 296) that a discourse type 'is the most complex unit of speech activity ... that can be realised by a whole conversation' (or any text as a whole) and the examples of discourse types he provides roughly correspond to genres ('getting-and-giving direction, instruction, interview, counseling', ibid.). Van Leeuwen demonstrates how generic structure consists of a number of stages, where each stage 'consists of one or more of the same speech acts' and 'has a specific function in moving the text or communicative event forward towards the realization of its ultimate communicative aim' (2008: 348).

By classifying types of texts according to the overall speech act they perform in 'speech act categories' I recognise the cumulative and joint contribution of the stages and respective speech acts within texts – it should be noted that by speaking of the overall function of a text as an overarching speech act I mean a complex, higher level speech act and do not attempt to reduce the complexity and multifunctionality of texts into one single dimension, but rather to emphasise the role of text as action.
So far I have been speaking of text categories (the ‘speech act’ categories) as *types* of speech acts. That is, directive speech acts are all kinds of speech acts that dictate a course of action on behalf of the hearer/reader, but can be divided further in ‘advice’, ‘request’, ‘demand’, ‘command’, and so on. Likewise expressions of beliefs can take place through statements/assertions, explanations, etc. (see Searle, 1971/1976 for a suggested typology of speech acts). Likewise, texts performing the functions of promotion and advice belong to the broader *directive* ‘speech act type’, whereas personal and social commentary are both *expressions of beliefs* (Searle, 1971/1976: 3).

These more specific functions/ speech acts (according to which I assign texts to ‘genre categories’, as discussed above) are nevertheless still *types* or kinds of texts, just as a number of different utterances can be categorised as ‘requests’ irrespective of what is requested or the specific phrasing of the request. One can further distinguish between kinds of requests, depending on the way the requests are expressed linguistically - e.g. polite and impolite, formal or friendly, expressed in the declarative, interrogative or imperative mood and so on. Thus, ‘genre categories’ can be further broken down into genres, but members of every category will all share the same primary communicative purpose of advice, promotion etc.

From the above identified genre categories, I decided to select the ‘advice’ category for the compilation of the final corpus. As directive texts, the members of this category are more reader-oriented and incite action more directly, and from a social perspective they are linked to ideology in that they suggest on a personal(ised) level what (should) constitute problems for modern men and women in Greece and how these problems should be faced.

I then conducted a preliminary analysis of the texts I had originally assigned to the ‘advice’ category, which either confirmed or disconfirmed my initial, more intuitive
categorisation. The preliminary analysis also allowed me to see to what extent each text was (proto)typical of the category, and identify hybrids and marginal members. The purpose of the process described in this section has been to provide a motivated categorisation of lifestyle magazine texts – as I have already pointed out in 1.3, however, from the present thesis we cannot make any meaningful generalisations about advice texts based on the analysis in this thesis alone, and this is not the aim of the thesis (but for work on advice texts please see, for example, Mikkonen et al. 2013; Aubrey, 2010 specifically on health advice in women's magazines; Koeing et al., 2010; Tyler, 2008).

5.4. Selecting theme: Sexual health

The primarily theoretical focus of this thesis has not allowed for the analysis of an extensive database, even narrowed down to only the advice texts of 18 issues of magazines. In narrowing this down further, I aimed for selecting texts along the same or similar thematic lines. This was not a very easy task, because men's magazines include much fewer advice texts than women's, and the advice is not generally on the same topics. Eventually I selected three texts, in order to demonstrate the application of part of the framework outlined in Chapter 4. The three texts come from two of the women's magazines, Cosmopolitan and Marie Claire, which differ in terms of the age of their target audience (Madame Figaro is very similar to Marie Claire in that respect), and one of the men's magazines, Status, which is the closest one to the ideal of upper-class consumerist hegemonic masculinity, with traces of 'New Man' aspirations (see also Polyzou, 2010), and they all deal broadly with the issue of sexual health (Playboy and Nitro did not include any texts on this in the issues collected).
In reflecting on why I selected this seemingly arbitrarily chosen topic, a comment of Sara Mills came to mind. Mills observes that some people, inspired by Michel Foucault’s work, rather than applying theoretical insights from his work, choose to simply look at themes similar to the ones he examined, such as surveillance/methods of preserving ‘social order’, sexuality and (in)sanity (2003: 110-111). She criticises this practice ‘[s]ince Foucault was very concerned to question ways of thinking rather than simply locating themes to apply’ (ibid.: 111). By contrast, for Critical Discourse Analysis, apart from the necessary openness and reflexivity on theories, methods and critique, the selection of ‘theme’ or ‘topic’ holds also a very central role – indeed the starting point is a social issue which needs to be shown to influence power relations, inequalities and/or the struggle for equality in context. It appears to me that the two issues my data are dealing with – health and sexuality – are issues where always high stakes have been involved when it comes to power, the authority to define what constitutes ‘knowledge’, and normativity, while also being somehow very ‘intimate’, ‘personal’ and closely bound to the body. Viewing certain topics as ‘universal human concerns’ goes against Foucault’s approach, and probably against approaches of at least some strands of CDA. Yet for both political and theoretical reasons, ‘humanism’ is not entirely without merit. Politically, Cameron (1992: 4) defines feminism as the struggle for the full humanity of women, which is a humanist account, while also demonstrating that ‘equal oppression’ for groups of women and men is simply not good enough. Furthermore, I claim that it may be politically more productive to focus on both the biological, cognitive and other similarities between men and women, treating both as ‘human’ and examining whether/how any differences result from unequal and/or different social circumstances and pressures (Polyzou, 2004: 9). In terms of linguistic theory and the explanation of the effects of discourse, cognitive
approaches generally see human cognition and the mechanisms of its operation in 'humanist' terms (while actual mental representations are of course context-dependent – see also Chapter 2).

The question of universality is not to be answered in this thesis, yet we can safely observe I think, that health and sexuality have been, if not always, then very often, sites of personal/political struggle, and I thought it would be interesting to examine how the lifestyle magazines as cultural products approach these heavily loaded issues. In addition, when it comes to the particular texts I examine here, I think it is significant that the topic in van Dijk's sense ('what is actually at stake here') is not sexuality per se, but health. In Status the text is part of a regular column entitled HEALTH: BODY + SOUL, while for both Cosmopolitan and Marie Claire the texts are special features explicitly marked as 'health' features. This implies that, although lifestyle magazines are rife with deontic modality (Hatzidaki, 2011), and advice texts within the magazines more so (Polyzou, 2008a), the particular texts have the additional authority of 'medical expertise', displaying features similar to other genres of medical discourse. Moreover, as the focus seems to be (physical) health, the issue is not ostensibly moral, social or cultural beliefs related to sexuality, yet these are still present in the background. Thus, ideological beliefs related to gender and sexuality adopted in these texts are likely to be both 'incontestable' and 'backgrounded', constituting thus suitable candidates for the exploration of presupposition. This exploration, in turn, would contribute to shedding more light on the construction of heteronormativity in the contemporary Greek media landscape.

It needs to be emphasised, however, that any observations made here in relation to gender and sexual health are to be used rather as opening up directions for further study, rather than fully substantiated conclusions, due to the very limited amount of
texts examined. The primary interest for the thesis is to demonstrate such observations can be usefully made by employing the presupposition framework outlined in Chapter 4, and to suggest that the systematic application of the framework to a larger body of texts could help us make some generalisations in relation to the social problem(s) we wish to examine.

5.5. Methodology of Analysis

In this section I will briefly discuss the methodology applied in this thesis to identify frame-level and mental-space level presuppositions, rather than the application of the whole model outlined in Chapter 4. Chapter 4 is concerned, among other issues, with the methodological issue of identifying and categorising different types of presupposition, assigning them to different ‘levels’. I have analysed my data in terms of the first level (the frames), and partially the second level (sentence level), looking in particular at main indicative clauses (or ‘assertions’), relative clauses and instances of marked syntax involving main and relative clauses, and conditional constructions.

One of the reasons for selecting these levels for analysis was practical – since the largest part of the thesis is devoted to theory building, the application and illustration of the theory had to be more limited. Although I have applied the entire framework elsewhere (Polyzou, 2008b; 2010; 2011; 2012), these analyses were inevitably less detailed. Here I chose to demonstrate a more limited part of the framework in more detail. The first two levels were chosen not only in order to start ‘from the beginning’, but for two other reasons:

---

65 I would indeed suggest starting from these levels when applying the model, since the lower level findings feed into the higher level ones.
First, these are the two levels who have concerned pragmaticians for longer, and have been examined in more detail in relation to presupposed knowledge. So far cognitive accounts for these levels have been proposed (see Marmaridou, 2000), but never applied to a level beyond the sentence. Thus, I consider it necessary to complete and present here these first steps before proceeding further.

Second, I have already acknowledged that the lower the level, the narrower the scope of background knowledge activated, and the higher the degree of certainty about its activation. As opposed to the discourse and pragmatic competence level, we can more easily point to specific items in the text, and argue that specific lexical items or sentences convey particular meanings. By contrast, in identifying discourses we need contextual knowledge and social theory, and in analysing presupposed pragmatic knowledge we need a pragmatic theory. In response to criticisms for 'reading things into the data' (see e.g. Schegloff, 1997; Widdowson, 1995), clarifying the methodology for identifying discourses is a central concern for CDA. As can be seen from the analysis chapters (6-9), analysis of these first two levels already points to certain discourses/ideological assumptions in relation to gender. Sceptics might consider applying at least these two first levels of the framework given that they follow the principle of analysing only what the text itself orients to (as Schegloff, 1997, suggests), although I would suggest that, from a critical perspective, the analysis is not complete until the broader social context has been taken into account.

On the sentence level I have identified relative clauses as introduced with the pronouns 'who' and 'which', and conditionals as introduced with 'if', although I also look at some examples introduced with 'when', which I argue carries a generic

---

66 Arguably a reception study could also contribute to testing my analysis in juxtaposition with interpretations of the participants. However, this was beyond the scope of the thesis as it would require an entirely different research design.
conditional function as well in these cases. I have focussed on these prototypical and relatively uncontroversial cases, as engaging with the finer details of each category could result in a separate thesis for each category. For example, conditionals can be expressed through a wide range of means, such as imperatives and prepositional phrases, while we could also argue that conditionals should be analysed as epistemic modality (see Gabrielatos, 2010). The present analysis is therefore far from exhaustive but rather a first foray in considering expressions of varying degrees of emphasis, incontestability and 'sharedness' beyond the traditionally examined presupposition categories.

In relation to the frame level, as discussed in Chapters 2, 3 and 4, I broadly consider a 'frame' or 'mental model' to be a cluster of concepts stored in long-term memory, and activated every time a word signifying one of these concepts is used in discourse. I have also addressed the point (Chapter 4) that a 'frame' does not have clear-cut boundaries, and noted that therefore we cannot assume that with every lexical trigger a whole frame and only that frame is activated. It is a matter of scope in that concepts more closely associated in the mind are more likely to be activated with associations that may be looser or for some people not exist at all (when certain factual and/or evaluative knowledge is not there at all). We could generally, though, agree, that narrow-scope (see Chapters 2 and 3 on scope) closely connected concepts are necessary for communication to occur at all, as in understanding the word 'Tuesday' requires for all English speakers knowledge of the system of the 'week' and the other days of the week.67 A broader scope item of knowledge that will not be shared among

---

67 In this thesis I focus on mental models activated by content words, which roughly correspond to mental representations of (abstract or concrete) entities. Grammatical/function words also correspond to underspecified clusters of concepts (as opposed to single concepts), with radial structure. However here I am concerned with these words only insofar as they set up mental spaces, and with articles when it comes to triggering existential presuppositions.
all English speakers and may not even be activated among people who share it would be, for example, that Tuesday is the day waste is collected from a specific area of a specific city – this would only be activated when shared and when relevant. Thus for narrow-scope frame-level presupposition native speaker intuition can be taken as quite reliable, as it would be default knowledge activated in most contexts. This could be triangulated with large-scale psychological experiments, following perhaps methodologies of free association similar to those of the ‘category norms’ experiments. However it was not possible to conduct such research for this thesis.

Broader scope knowledge activation is where the ‘frame’ fades into a ‘discourse’ – the distinction between the two is largely a matter of scope and perhaps complexity. I have not always tried therefore to draw a rigid distinction between the two, but I need to point out that identifying a discourse as an analyst, as well as processing one as a text recipient, requires more and less certainly activated knowledge – thus nuances of meaning such as evaluations presupposed to be shared may be lost on a reader who is an ‘outsider’. By the same token analysts are always open to the accusation of ‘reading discourses into’ the text. Although the ‘discourse level’ is not included in the Analysis part of this thesis, I can only reiterate that for that we can only rely on the knowledge of the analyst as an ‘insider’ of the community under study, further supported by ethnographic/sociological and/or other research in the social context, and making explicit the assumptions and knowledge that led to identifying the ‘discourse presuppositions’ in question (see also Sunderland, 2004).

In Chapter 7, in the frame level analysis, it may appear that the three different texts are analysed for different things – vagueness, metaphor, representation of actors, emotion/evaluation. However, these are all phenomena that occur on the frame level.

It would be especially interesting to try and find out narrow scope activated concepts for seemingly neutral terms (such as ‘man’ or ‘woman’).
of analysis, and their identification contributes towards answering the questions: what frames are triggered in the text? What parts of frames are highlighted? What parts of frames are accessed/accessible, and what parts are not? These sub-categories of the frame level emerged during the analysis. The emergence of these categories serves to emphasise once more that the broad categories of this presupposition framework are not to replace more specific categories so far used in the exploration of discourse. Rather, my approach would place emphasis on the cognitive component of the various phenomena, simultaneously seeking to link this to the ideological functions of the texts under analysis. Finally, specifically in relation to frames, I took the presence of these sub-categories as indicative of the fact that, as well as the other categories in this framework, the narrow scope level of frames/framing should also be considered in terms of sub-categories. Just as on the sentence level we are concerned with a number of different sentence types, and on the text level different genres, and underlying pragmatic knowledge encompasses a range of pragmatic principles which become relevant at appropriate points in each interaction, we could also perhaps start to distinguish among different types of frame activation — those that involve also activating another experiential domain (metaphor), those that emphasise evaluative/affective rather than factual content, or those that leave gaps that we think matter specifically from a critical perspective (such as strategic vagueness). Further research is required in order to consider more specifically what categories should be included in the frame level analysis. The current categorisation is simply a result of this exploratory, largely data-driven analysis. The analysis of social actors has as a starting point the topic rather than the means of representation, and I have chosen to include it (and discuss it separately) also in line with the critical assumption that
representation of people and social groups always matters as a significant part in how ideologies about the relevant groups are transmitted, consolidated or contested.

Following the data-driven hermeneutic approach to discourse analysis (see van Dijk, 2001a: 98-99; Meyer, 2001), in CDA we simultaneously seek to identify what gender ideologies surface in or underlie the text, and what linguistic features in our data indicate this. As language is multifunctional and context bound, we cannot know in advance that ideology in any given text will be communicated through the means of metaphor, or conditionals, for example. Even if we start with a provisional checklist or guiding framework (such as the presupposition framework I apply here), we might discover categories which were not on our list, or not find anything significant based on the categories that are on our list. It may also be the case that a category occurs very often in one of our texts and not at all in another – if that is the case, this is yet another finding. For example, it is notable that in my data the texts in the women’s magazines include many expressions that would trigger fear, and the text from the men’s magazines doesn’t; the choice of language seems to echo the prevalent stereotypes of ‘emotional women’ and ‘rational men’ (a point that we could make when linking the findings of the frame level analysis to the discourse level assumptions underlying the data).

In particular in relation to metaphor analysis, I would like to point out that, for the purposes of developing a theoretical presupposition framework, my analysis here is ‘level 1’ analysis; level 1, the ‘theory level’, is “the level at which theoretical analysis and categorisation of metaphor takes place” (Cameron, 1999: 6). Level 2 is concerned with the on-line processing of metaphor by individuals, and level 3 with the neural activity which brings about metaphor processing at levels 1 and 2 (ibid.).
Semino et al. (2004: 1272) state explicitly and discuss some problems of level 1 analysis:

- The boundary between the literal and the metaphorical in the identification of linguistic metaphors;
- The precise identification of tenor [target category] and vehicle [source category] in relation to each linguistic metaphor;
- The extrapolation of conceptual metaphors from linguistic metaphors;
- The extrapolation of conventional metaphors from patterns in the data.

The boundary between the literal and the metaphorical is fuzzy rather than clear-cut (e.g. Goatly, 1997: 14ff; Grady et al., 1999; Sperber and Wilson, 1986: 236-237. See also Heywood et al., 2002) and it lies upon the analyst to decide what is metaphorical and what is not. Lakoff and Johnson (1980) emphasise that metaphor involves mapping between two different domains, but still the decision remains about what belongs to which domain.

Given that our cognition is embodied (Johnson, 1987; Lakoff, 1987) and that metaphors help us understand abstract notions in terms of more direct, often physical experiences (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Lakoff, 1987; Lakoff, 1993), in metaphor identification I initially try to trace a more primary meaning of the ‘metaphor focus’ based on one’s physical experience. For example, I consider the primary meaning of ‘take’ literally stretching out one’s arm and taking an object in one’s hand - I took meanings of ‘take’ like ‘have sex’ or ‘take as a spouse’ as metaphorical.
At the same time in the data we often have the reverse situation: we have aspects of related to the body (sexual activity, disease) represented metaphorically, while the source domain used may be in fact a cultural experience (for example, war), which many readers may not have experienced directly. This contributes to the explanatory function of the texts, in that they may, for example, help readers create mental representations of and reason about micro-organisms they are not able to see (see also Cameron, 2003 on metaphor in education). At the same time, the choice of metaphorical framing imparts cultural understandings, ideologies and attitudes in relation to health and disease, healthcare, relationships and sex.

In Chapter 7 I focus on war metaphors, which occur most often in the data. In determining frequency I considered the presence of linguistic expressions we could consider metaphorical, thus focussing, for the purposes of this framework, on the frame/lexical rather than the clause level. Taking into account the Invariance Principle, according to which source and target categories maintain their internal structure (Lakoff, 1993), I look at the structure of source and target category, and how the one is mapped onto the other (for example, in metaphors from the source domain of ‘war’ I discuss what parts of the target domain are represented as the opponents).

Finally, I would like to acknowledge that in identifying meaning (and presuppositions) at any level, at least some semantic default knowledge on behalf of the analyst needs to be accepted as shared, intuitive, native or native-like speaker intuition. This applies also to the identification of ‘mental spaces’ through expressions which

---

69 However the extrapolation of conceptual metaphors from the data, for the purposes of which we might want to identify and count metaphorical mappings on the clause level (Boers, 1999; Semino, 2002; Polyzou, 2004; Gogorosi, 2005) would inform the discourse level analysis of the present presupposition framework. Here it is sufficient that certain frames (those of the source domains) are activated simply by relevant expressions being there in the text.

70 At the same time attention needs to be drawn to ambiguities and contestation of meanings (as in ideologically loaded terms), even when this contestation does not occur explicitly in the specific text under analysis.
function as ‘mental space builders’ — to a large extent it is the semantics of these expressions that allow us to identify them as space builders.

With the above observations in mind I conducted a manual qualitative analysis of the three texts, identifying every expression I would consider as activating a frame or building a mental space. I then searched for patterns according to a number of questions. I asked:

- What concepts and frames occur regularly in these texts?
- What concepts are presupposed, and triggered as the bases of activated frames?
- What are the implications of these frames, if any, for gender ideologies?
- Is the information presented through indicative main clauses always ‘new’ information? And, if yes, what kind of ‘new’ information is included and what information is not asserted?
- Is information not asserted in main clauses left out because it is shared and self-evident, or because readers are not meant to infer it, and how do we know?
- What are the implications of presenting certain propositions as incontestable and some as open to contestation, if any, for gender ideologies?
- To what extent do relative clauses present information as shared and given, and what kind of information is included in relative rather than main clauses?
- What kinds of propositions are presented as possibilities via conditionals? Is the epistemic status of if-clauses always undetermined, or are there any contextual factors that contribute to presenting these hypothetical worlds as more or less likely, and more or less contestable?

In line with the critical aims of the analysis, to which the framework can be put to use, it is not all background knowledge we are interested in, but rather, the aspects that are
related to gender ideologies. This is to serve as a guiding principle in selecting the aspects of the text we focus on and the specific kinds/aspects of background knowledge we are interested in. In considering the dialectic interrelation of media discourse and society, when looking at sexual health-related media texts one might be generally interested to find out whether such discourse has any positive or negative impact on public health. Or we might be generally interested (say, from a Foucauldian perspective) in the normative functions of such discourse, its cultural underpinnings and the disciplinary practices it produces. From a feminist perspective, however, we are interested in some more specific aspects. Firstly, we might want to look at how such authoritative discourse, in addition to normative beliefs about health, also serves covertly as a vehicle of (re)producing stereotypes and beliefs about gender and sexuality in particular. Secondly, we might want to examine how and to what extent ideological beliefs interfere with the seemingly objective advice and information imparted to men and women – for example, to what extent might risky behaviour be encouraged/tolerated, or certain safe alternatives suppressed, due to dominant beliefs about how a ‘proper’ man or woman should behave? Based on these questions, the examples I have chosen to discuss here are based not only on the concepts and propositions that occur regularly, are presented as given etc., but also on the concepts and propositions that have implications for gendered ideologies, practices etc.

5.6 A note on translation

In the thesis I analyse Greek language data and consider ideological issues pertaining to the Greek context, and provide an English translation for each example. Analysing the original data, and not the translations, is crucial for CDA (Fairclough, 1995a: 191)
what is of interest here is not just what is said, but how the way it is said might influence readers and promote or counter ideological assumptions. When it comes to analysing presupposition, this involves examining how language use results in fore- or backgrounding and assigning epistemic status, ways that may well vary across languages, while presenting something as new or shared information may also be achieved through some similar and some different devices across languages. Especially the first two levels of the analytical framework applied here (frame and sentence level) require close attention to linguistic detail, and on occasion ‘readers who have no access to the original language must put up with a severe loss of information’ (Stubbs, 1997: 108).

In providing translations for my data I have aimed for staying as close to the original as possible, even if that meant some awkward translations, as long as it seemed that the translation would still be intelligible for a non-Greek speaking reader. This has meant that the translation I intended as close often was not close at all, especially when it came to idioms or metaphors, and the analysis has often involved extensive metalinguistic commentary, for example in relation of aspects of a frame conventionally triggered for interactants by a word, or in relation to the form of clauses as the subjunctive was lost in the English translation. In some cases I have foregone commentary when I thought that the effect of the original and my translation would be equivalent. For example, a metaphor describing a theory as being ‘dead and buried’ would be translated word-for-word as ‘it has left us years’ (‘μας έχει αφήσει χρόνους’), and idiomatic expression meaning ‘it has died’. As the focus here is not metaphorical idiomatic representations of death in Greek and English, I simply chose a roughly equally idiomatic and often metaphorically used expression in English.
Nevertheless it needs to be noted that many phrases identified as ‘presupposition triggers’ in English (thus expressions on the lexical and clause level) were overwhelmingly similar in Greek, due to semantic and function similarities in the terms concerned.\textsuperscript{71} Thus, a definite expression in both languages triggers existential presuppositions, to accuse someone of something in both Greek and English presupposes that this ‘something’ is something bad, and so on. Therefore occasionally throughout the analysis I also point to similarities in meaning and function between the default uses of Greek and English items, hoping that this would also be of some help.

\textbf{5.7 Conclusion}

In this chapter I have explained the rationale and methodology for my choice of magazine titles, genre categories and text topics for my data. Through questionnaire research I selected the most prototypical women’s and men’s titles. I further categorised the contents into genre types according to their broad communicative purposes, and chose to focus on advice regarding sexual health. I chose the topic of sexual health as a potentially fruitful epistemic site for the indirect manifestation of ideological beliefs on gender and sexuality, looking at three texts with different target audiences – \textit{Cosmopolitan} aiming at teenagers and younger women, \textit{Marie Claire} aiming at women up to 45 years of age, and potentially older, and \textit{Status} aiming at men of similar age to the \textit{Marie Claire} target readers. Through this selection I have been aiming to examine a wider range of beliefs towards sex, sexuality and health,

\textsuperscript{71} This applies only to the data analysed, and in relation to the aspects of the framework applied. There are other parameters, such as telic clauses, which would generally be translated as infinitives, prepositional phrases or gerunds in English, on which further research is required.
while at the same time considering the differences in what magazine producers consider as appropriate and appealing reading for their respective target audiences.

In the following chapter (Chapter 6) I delineate the contemporary Greek social context in terms of research on sexual health, sexuality and gender, and review the few relevant works in relation to the contemporary Greek media landscape and the ideological positions of various popular media products in relation to gender.
6.1 Introduction

In this chapter I will try to cover mainly two aspects of the Greek social context – firstly, that of (hetero)sexual relations as they have been observed by anthropologists and medical experts, as well as myself, and secondly aspects of the media landscape relating to gender relations and their representations. Here I will discuss findings from research roughly up to the first decade of the 2000s, as my data are from 2006.72

A very extensive review of many aspects of the Greek social context in relation to gender (in)equality, at least up to the late 2000’s, is to be found in Kosetzi (2007), and shorter versions in Kosetzi and Polyzou (2009) and Kosetzi (2010). In summary, I would make the following observations: Greek society has been, and still is, lagging behind in progress towards gender equality in relation to the rest of Europe, North-Western European countries in particular.73 Nevertheless, progress has been and is being made, which makes the situation somewhat fluid. Social changes in the direction of gender equality have been instigated by feminist struggles within, as well as top-down, through legislation and regulation (e.g. through the socialist government in the 80’s and later on through the European Union), and out of what we might call ‘sociological coincidence’. For example, women getting paid employment outside the home might often have been a financial imperative rather than a political choice, but this may have contributed to attitudes changing. ‘Sociological coincidence’ does mean

72 In the meanwhile changes in Greek society have taken place, notably since the global financial crisis of 2008. These have led to the challenging of many certainties, ideological shifts and material impact on the lives of people living in Greece, much of which has undoubtedly influenced gender relations and the position and lives of women in Greece. Much research is underway and still needs to be done on these issues.

73 This is not to say that gender equality has been achieved in these countries, or that progress has been in any way homogeneous.
that analysing the gender situation (anywhere) becomes more complicated, but is not meant to discount the aspects of gender (in)equality involved, nor to obscure other kinds of inequalities involved (working class women who are forced to work are not necessarily more ‘liberated’ than upper middle class women who do not have paid employment). This is relevant to the general role of ‘lifestyle’, although not directly related to the focus of this thesis – an ideological and socio-economic organisation allowing and encouraging women to earn (and spend) their own income does not necessarily lead to gender equality, although it might, so this is an aspect worth studying in its own right. The important point here is that in Greece there is an ongoing negotiation of gender relations, often sidetracked or set back, at times progressing.

As a critical discourse analyst the social problem I am concerned with in this thesis is the (inter)personal, and still political, issue of (hetero)sexual relationships - in particular, safe sex and sexual health. As Paxson observes, ‘[s]exual relations are profoundly shaped by cultural pressures and, in Greece, sexual responsibility for men and women include upholding asymmetrical gender relations. This gender asymmetry is inseparable from the meanings and practices of sex and love’ (2002: 316).

Media discourses on these issues will be looked at in 6.4 – for the time being I will concentrate on research on life ‘outside the media’, as it were, although of course findings have been motivated by the researchers’ methods and research questions. I will try to synthesise these findings, which will themselves be informed by the lens of my own experiences, observations and ideological positions, hoping to offer a reasonably comprehensive picture of the context in which the texts in my data emerged and operated.
6.2 Sex, health and ideology

When it comes to research on sexual and reproductive health in Greece, medical journals provide statistics and some classical social psychological attitude research through questionnaires, which of course cannot be interpreted through the medical research alone. Ethnographic research focuses on contraception, notably Paxson (2002), or on gender relations, attitudes and ideologies in general (e.g. Hirschon, 1978; Herzfeld, 1985; Loizos and Papataxiarchis, 1991b), some with a narrower focus on sexuality (e.g. Canakis, Kantsa and Yannakopoulos, 2010). After the 90's there is some research on STDs, although it has not been possible to locate earlier research. This may be due to my own lack of expertise in the area of medical research, but also it seems to me that STDs have been, and still are, to some extent taboo and/or 'invisible'.

Medical literature shows some concern for the issue of Chlamydia and the repercussions of the disease for the overall health of women, notably reproductive health (Polyzos et al., 2006; Spiliopoulou et al., 2005; Kalogeropoulos et al., 1993). Some literature is concerned with safe sex practices per se (Galazios et al., 2004; Kordoutis, Loumakou and Sarafidou, 2000).

Current medical research in Greece seems to me to be geared, to some extent, to attributing STDs to an 'Other', notably immigrants, coinciding with the commencement of immigration to Greece from the 90's onwards. HBV (Hepatitis B) is said to be an issue mainly for non-Greek ethnic populations of Greece, reportedly Asian and Albanian (Elefsiniotis et al., 2007: 200). Gonorrhea in men is also said to be associated with sexual contact with non-Greeks, as instances of infection 'were
strongly associated with contacts outside the country or with foreigners and their incidence presented erratic time fluctuations indicating that they have not been established as endemic in the Greek population’ (Kyriakis et al., 1999: 48). Although so far research has found that Trichomoniasis is very rare in Greece (4.6% of a sample of 502 women), the researchers report that ‘*T. vaginalis* was more frequently detected in immigrants (7.9%) than in Greek women (3.3%)’ (Piperaki et al., 2010). Other work is conducted along similar lines, studying patients attending STD clinics and concluding that immigrants are found to suffer more often also from herpes genitalis and HPV/genital warts (Kyriakis et al., 2003; Kyriakis et al., 2005).

As socioeconomic factors are not necessarily examined in such medical surveys, and despite the fact that differences of infection are not always very large between Greek and non-Greek participants, as in the case of trichomoniasis mentioned above, these surveys have reinforced stereotypical associations of ‘outsiders’ with disease. Indicative of this is an anecdote from a conversation at which I was present: 

‘Othering’ of the disease also occurs even within the medical community - safe sex practices are defined as including not only condom use, but also ‘previous knowledge of partner’ (e.g. Kordoutis et al., 2000: 6) – it needs to be noted that by that they do not mean knowledge of the *medical history* of the partner. Such beliefs on behalf of medical practitioners and researchers add a medical justification to previously

---

74 All persons involved in and referred to in the conversation are Greek. In order to protect their anonymity no further information is included.
morally/socially condemned sexual behaviours (promiscuity), while they are very
dangerous in maintaining the illusion that a familiar person is ‘safe’ and ‘healthy’, and
therefore no safe sex measures are needed.\footnote{5}

These attitudes towards disease (as belonging to ‘outgroups’) have influenced the
discourse of lifestyle magazines on sexual health to a certain extent. In the data I
analyse in the thesis these attitudes seem to permeate especially the \textit{Cosmopolitan} text,
either as underlying presupposed and uncontested/-able beliefs (in particular when
discussing the possibility of a male partner suffering from an STD), or as presupposed
shared beliefs that need to be questioned (as in when comforting a projected female
reader suffering from an STD).

\section*{6.3 Gender and Sexuality– Tensions between Permissiveness and
Normativity}

The ideological background underlying heterosexual practices in Greece, and the
discourse of lifestyle magazines, is that of \textit{heteronormativity}, defined by Cameron and
Kulick as ‘an overarching system for organizing and regulating sexuality, whereby
certain ways of acting, thinking and feeling about sex are privileged over others’
(2006: 9). As such, heteronormativity is always context-bound. Describing Western,
predominantly Anglo contexts, Cameron and Kulick observe that ‘[t]he ‘ideal’
heteronormative sexuality is the kind stereotypically associated with the middle-class
nuclear family, involving a stable, monogamous (preferably marital) and reproducible

\footnote{5} In criticising this and other assumptions by the sociologists Ioannidou and Agrafiotis (2005), the now
deceased blogger Maria Papagiannidou, diagnosed with HIV during her lifetime, writes:

\begin{quote}
Why should we care to learn that the frequency with which people alternate their
sexual partners has either increased or decreased? It only takes one HIV-infected
sexual partner to pass the virus to his sexual partner and spread it. Why should we
care to know how many Greeks knew their sexual partners beforehand? How far into
the past has [sic] an acquaintance have to go for it to be sexually safe? (n.d.)
\end{quote}
(within 'sensible' limits) sexual relationship between two adults (not too young or too old) whose social and sexual roles are differentiated along conventional lines' (2006: 9-10, my emphasis).

Looking at the Greek context, the notions of 'honour' and 'shame' have been well documented as potential effects of the sexual behaviour of women on their families and possibly even their communities (Campbell, 1964; Hirschon, 1978; Herzfeld, 1985). As Dubisch (1993: 274) observes, in a large part of anthropological research, women in Greece are claimed to be

viewed as inherently weak, associated with the devil and with Eve, and saddled with a sinful nature that must be controlled by themselves and others and redeemed through motherhood. In order to guard their own reputations and their families' honor, women must restrict their public activities, maintain their chastity, and in general cultivate their sense of shame.

Even though women's behaviour has been more restricted and more closely monitored, marriage for both men and women has been seen as 'completing' someone as a person, followed by 'starting one's own family' - having children (with male fertility seen as a sign of virility, see Loizos and Papataxiarchis, 1991a; and, on procreation, Paxson, 2002; 2003).

These ideological normative beliefs are very firmly rooted in tradition and unquestionably are still current and influential on men and women's everyday lives. However it should be noted that the anthropological research cited above was published at least 20 years ago (and conducted even earlier). One would be justified in asking whether in the 2000's we have seen in Greek society any 'permissive' beliefs, expressed in what Hollway (1984) has termed 'permissive discourse' while conducting her research in an Anglo context. As summarised by Sunderland (2004: 210)
58), permissiveness or ‘permissive discourse’ is the ‘validity of sexual activity outside of monogamous marriage’ (for both men and women).

Social changes in Greece in recent years mean that things are no longer so simple as to say that marital sexual activity is the only acceptable heterosexual activity in Greece (although heterosexual is still pretty much the only acceptable sexual activity – see e.g. Canakis, Kantsa and Yannakopoulos, 2010). On the discourse level we have some signs of ‘permissiveness’, as in the discourse of lifestyle magazines, or the TV series Σχδόν Ποτέ, the Greek equivalent of Sex and the City (Kosetzi, 2007; 2010; 2011 – in Greek), where sex is depicted in ways that would have been inconceivable 50-60 years ago, if not less. So, talking about sex, and talking about sex publicly in specific ways (e.g. related to pleasure rather than reproduction) is no longer a complete taboo in Greece.

I also find it notable that in my last year of high school (1998-99) an optional module on Sexual Education was offered. The module was optional in two ways: students did not have to take it, and it was not assessed, and not all schools had to offer it. Another group of the same year, for example, in that high school was offered Environmental Education. Sexual Education has not become part of the national curriculum in Greece to this day, and if such optional modules continue to be offered, it is still upon an unsystematic and voluntary basis (see also Agrafiotis and Mandi, n.d.; Dinas, Hatzipantelis, Mavromatidis, Zeipiridis and Tzafettes, 2008: 81; Patseadou, Galli-Tsinopoulou, Goulis and Arvanitidou, 2010: 358). Although in some ways the high school I went to could be considered ‘progressive’ (it was a ‘Classical’ as opposed to ‘General’ Lyceum, with an emphasis on humanities), it is still significant that at least some high school students in Greece in 1998 were able to be offered institutionally
ratified and, as far as I could tell, generally impartial information about contraception, abortion and negotiating sexual relations without this causing any sort of objection.

When it comes to actual sexual practices among individuals, we can only rely on indirect evidence. As the average marriage age for Greek women was 28.47 y.o. in 2007, and 27 or older in 2000-2007 (Kotzamanis and Sofianopoulou, 2009 – in Greek), statistical evidence on teenage sexual activity, pregnancies and/or abortions, and/or STDs inevitably would include a number of women (and men) engaging in sexual activity without being married. For example Creatsas (1997: 87- 88) cites the adolescent pregnancy rates in Greece as 7.5 in 1990 and 5.6 in 1995 (with average marriage ages 24.65 and 25.74 respectively these years; Kotzamanis and Sofianopoulou, 2009 – in Greek). Creatsas (1997: 88) also lists a range of contraceptive methods used by adolescents in Greece, although he does not specify the sex of participants or the percentage of participants surveyed who reported that they are not sexually active. In Patseadou et al. 48% of High School students surveyed reported onset of sexual activity (ages 15-18 years), ‘half of whom stated this has occurred by the age of 15 (2010: 357). In Tountas, Dimitrakaki et al.’s sample of Greek women (2004: 191) the ‘reported average age at first sexual intercourse was 18’. We could assume that much of the teenage sexual activity reported occurs out of marriage because women in Greece tend to get married in their mid- to late twenties (and men at a similar age or later).

On abortion, Ioannidi-Kapolou (2004: 174) reports that in 2001 one in ten women in the 16-24 age group ‘had had at least one unwanted pregnancy ending in abortion’, while the average age of marriage for women was 26.91 in 2000, according to
Kotzamanis and Sofianopoulou (2009 – in Greek). This again indicates that at least some (if not all) of these pregnancies (and abortions) occurred out of marriage.

In their research on contraception among female students of an average of 25 years of age, Dinas et al. report that ‘ninety-seven of the 102 respondents were single (95.1%) and five were married’ (2008: 78), while from the way the article is written it appears that all of them were sexually active; for example ‘[m]ost students (86.3%) stated that they discussed contraception with their sexual partner’ (ibid.).

Kordoutis et al. (2000) have actually looked at different types of relationship among adults of both sexes in relation to condom use, including casual and non-monogamous ones (relationship type was found to have no effect on consistency of condom use). Kordoutis et al. also found that ‘[m]edian lifetime number of sexual partners was Median=4 for men and Median=2 for women’ (ibid.: 772) and that of the 458 participants ‘155 individuals [had] had more than one relationship’ in the 12 months prior to the survey (ibid.: 772-773).

The above, together with the high frequency of ‘pregnant marriages’ (i.e. when the bride is already pregnant – see Paxson, 2002: 327) suggest that sexual activity outside of marriage is not uncommon in contemporary Greece. Agrafiotis and Mandi (n.d.) go as far as to suggest that ‘Greeks regard love and sex as a main part of their existence, as evidenced by the incidence of extramarital relations and abortion, both of which are condemned by the Church. Greece’s abortion rate is among the highest in Europe’, (my emphasis), and that

---

76 Also Tountas, Dimitrakaki et al. (2004).
78 They appear to have been writing this in the mid-90’s.
Premarital sexual activities, especially in large cities, are not any longer socially condemned, and sexual intercourse begins between the ages of 14 to 17. Research showed that the most frequent types of contact are through hugging, deep (open mouth) kissing, petting above and below the waist, sleeping together (without sexual intercourse), and oral and vaginal sex (ibid., my emphasis).

While it is important to take into account these social changes, it should also be borne in mind that they entail a different type of (hetero)normativity, and this relatively newly found permissiveness is not as widespread or as enthusiastically embraced as Agrafiotis and Mandi (ibid.) seem to suggest in the passages quoted above. For example at another point they acknowledge that ‘it is very difficult for an unmarried couple to find an apartment and live together because of the strong opposition of the majority of Greek society’ (ibid.).

When it comes to schooling, where sexual education is unsystematic or non-existent, Religious Education is obligatory from the age of 10 (3rd year of Primary School) until the last year of High School (end of secondary education). Religious Education in Greece mainly imparts the teachings of the Greek Orthodox Christian religion, and one can be exempt by providing evidence of belonging to a different religion. It is in High School Religious Education Classes that premarital abstinence is promoted and abortion is condemned, while there is no emphasis on the issue of contraception, at least not in the textbooks used on national level.

Furthermore, a range of factors to be considered are generation, class, ethnic/cultural and other differences within the Greek population. Describing a situation on the other extreme, Agrafiotis and Mandi (n.d.) state that

[i]n more ‘closed’ rural communities and small villages, premarital relations and courtship are not yet the norm before marriage. Although freer than in the
past, young adults and especially women do not have the opportunity of
dating their future spouse. The idea of arranged marriages and matchmaking
(proksenio) is still present; the difference is that now women have the right to
choose which matchmaking will end in marriage. In some areas a dowry (prika)
is still required.

In fact, even in ‘closed’ rural communities, ‘unmarried girls’ enjoy more freedom than
‘married women’ in some ways, as observed for example by Cowan on the social life
of a small community in rural Greece (1991). What I think needs to be explored
further is the exact delineations of this relative freedom. For example, in examining
heteronormativity Archakis and Lampropoulou describe a teenage boyfriend-
girlfriend relationship as a ‘proper’ relationship (2010: 73), juxtaposing it to other,
less acceptable forms of heterosexual relationship (e.g. when there is a large age gap
between the partners, and/or there is less emotional commitment). Young women
from urban areas of Greece participating in focus groups have criticised the sexual
practices depicted in the TV series Σχεδόν Πολύ as ‘slutty’, not because of extra-
marital sex taking place per se, but because of the number of the sexual partners of the
female protagonists, and the speed with which they were being replaced (Kosetzi,
2007; 2010; and esp. 2011 – in Greek).

Furthermore, despite the generally tolerated pre-marital sexual activity, it is notable
that most pre-marital pregnancies end up either in abortion or marriage. ‘[T]he
numbers of children born to unmarried women is the lowest in Europe; between 1926
and 1980, the rate changed from 1.1 percent to 1.5 percent of all births’ (Agrafiotis
and Mandi, n.d.). According to Kane and Wellings (1999: 18) in 1996 only 3% of live
births occurred outside of marriage, while the most recent data (from circa 2001) still
suggest that ‘Greece has the lowest rate of children born outside of marriage (4.1
percent) among the OECD\textsuperscript{79} countries, yet by Greek standards the increase is unprecedented... Only three percent of parents are lone-parents in Greece’ (The Clearinghouse on International Developments in Child, Youth and Family Policies, last updated April 2004). Apart from parenthood, cohabitation outside marriage also seems to remain problematic – ‘it is very difficult for an unmarried couple to find an apartment and live together because of the strong opposition of the majority of Greek society’ (Agrafiotis and Mandi, n.d.).

6.3.1 Double standards

The negotiation and conflict of the two trends of permissiveness vs. traditionalism and restriction of female sexuality is thus always present in the background, and faced by every young woman in Greece to different degrees and in different ways. Bajos and Marquet (2000: 1538) point out that ‘a gender-based double standard of sexual initiation’ is confirmed by their research, whereby ‘Mediterranean men start their sex lives well before marriage, while women in these countries have only recently gained limited access to both premarital sex and the formal labour market’ (ibid. – they specifically refer to data from Athens and Portugal). Survey responses from Athens in 1990 indicate that 10.9% of men reported two or more heterosexual partners over the last 12 months vs. 1.5% of women (ibid.: 1539). Greek men report having twice as many (hetero)sexual partners as women in their lives (Kordoutis et al., 2000: 772).

Although the vast majority of women in Kordoutis et al.’s study (had) had (hetero)sexual partners of the same age as or older than themselves, with only 2 out of 279 reporting having a partner of more than 2 years younger (2000: 773), men

\textsuperscript{79} OECD stands for ‘Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’.
generally report starting their sexual activity earlier in their lives. Patseadou et al. (2010: 360-362) found that Greek men are significantly more likely to start their sexual activity in High School than women (based on self-reporting) — ‘[c]ontrolling for the possible effect of all other variables, it was found that the probability of the onset of sexual activity was... 3.6 times higher in boys than girls’ (ibid.: 361). These findings are similar to those of other European studies and in the USA, and more so in Balkan/Southern Europe countries (ibid.: 363-364).

Furthermore, according to Kordoutis et al. (2000: 777) ‘[m]ore women than men reported long-lasting, matrimonial\footnote{By the term ‘matrimonial’ Kordoutis et al. do not mean necessarily ‘marital’, but characterised ‘by feelings of security and concern for the partner (2000: 768).} and romantic relationships... In contrast, more men than women reported short-term, hedonistic and utilitarian relationships...', and more women reported being monogamous than men. ‘These findings indirectly support the assumption that genders differ in the way they construe or cognitively represent relationships’ (ibid.), which, I argue, would be influenced by normative social beliefs and expectations.

With all self-reporting questionnaires

[I]here is always concern about how accurate information may be that is provided by interviewees regarding themselves. Critics are cautious about the self-reported questionnaires for adolescents. There is evidence that sexual experience may be under-reported by females and over-reported by males (Patseadou et al., 2010: 361).

Siegel, Aten and Roghman (1998) found that some teenagers, and especially young middle school males, reported themselves as being insincere when filling in a sexual behaviour questionnaire (which of course further creates the conundrum of whether they were insincere when they reported being insincere, which Siegel et al. also
acknowledge, 1998: 27). However, they also observe that the results of their sexual behaviour questionnaires were too systematic to have been influenced by the small number of respondents who were actually insincere when filling them in.

However, this is not necessarily the point. Siegel et al. (1998: 27) observe that

[o]ne might posit that sexually inexperienced boys in our [North American] culture feel some pressure to inflate their reports of actual behavior in an attempt to measure up to some perceived standard of sexual prowess. ...young female adolescents in middle school, if dishonest, are at risk for understating not only whether they have ever had sexual intercourse, but also their frequency of intercourse in the recent past. The characterization in American culture of young women who are sexually active as being irresponsible, promiscuous, or lacking in self esteem may very well be evidenced in this bias, whereas young males are seen as successful, powerful, and mature when they admit to sexual experience during their school years.

Patseadou et al. make similar observations in relation to the Greek context, and add that in the Greek context ‘data from self-reports can underestimate the real behaviour [of both boys and girls] due to the conservative Greek attitudes towards sexual issues’ (2010:363). Thus, if questionnaire responses are sincere, they indicate that there is a male-female divide in sexual behaviour in Greece, possibly because of men feeling allowed to, entitled to or even obliged to be more sexually active, with more partners and from an earlier age, and women feeling that they have to delay the onset of their sexual activity and limit their number of partners to as few as possible. If (some) questionnaire responses are not sincere, they still display a systematic pattern of tendencies towards gender-specific norm, with young men presenting themselves closer to the stereotypical ideal masculinity of sexual prowess and young women closer to the ideal femininity of ‘decency’ and restraint.
6.3.2 Transitional heteronormativity

I would argue that the issues surrounding permissiveness vs. restriction (especially for women) in relation to sexual life in Greece is framed by two overarching ideological principles: the still prevalent importance of marriage and the issue of visibility/social control.\(^8^1\) Thus, extramarital sexual activity is generally perceived as pre-marital – marriage remains the unstated telos of a person’s life. Before marriage young people generally enjoy a period of ‘relative freedom’, which I would term ‘transitional heteronormativity phase’, a transition to ‘proper’ heteronormative conduct (as mentioned, still marriage in Greece), sanctioned or ‘tolerated’ but still regulated. Not all societies may allow a ‘transitional heteronormativity’ phase, and when they do, conventions and regulation will vary culturally.\(^8^2\) An example that springs to mind is the perhaps stereotypical ritualistic scenario of the middle class white American young man collecting a young woman of a similar background from the parental home for a date, when he has to make small talk with her parents first, and promise to have her home at a specific time. Watching this in movies and TV shows I have always found this scenario very unfamiliar and strange – yet, where this applies, that would be a way of allowing young people to have a pre-marital romantic life while at the same time regulating it and subjecting it to quite detailed control (and re-producing gender ideologies along the way).

In Greece social control on sexuality is in some ways more implicit – often there may be a ‘don’t ask, don’t tell policy’ in place between parents and their teenage or adult

---

\(^8^1\) I will not discuss this extensively here – I will only comment that it is when pre-marital sex becomes ‘visible’, through pregnancy or cohabitation, that it becomes more acutely problematic.

\(^8^2\) See also Polyzou (2012).
children (Polyzou, 2011 – in Greek), although due to double standards it is generally seen as easier for boys/young men to openly have/speak of girlfriends, while girls/young women may only confide to their mothers or their closest friends. It is therefore worth inquiring how moral values and ideological beliefs on sexuality are transmitted if not explicitly through the traditional channels of family and community. Both Kosetzi’s focus group members (2007; 2010; 2011 – in Greek) and my own observations of, and conversations with friends and acquaintances indicate a strong sense of boundaries on behalf of Greek women, and of what is appropriate or not appropriate, even in relationships that were not ‘public’ and therefore not ‘policable’, but in the realm of ‘illicitness’.

Of course exploring how gender-related values and ideologies are implicitly transmitted is a very broad issue. Mass media is one of the ‘central sites at which discursive negotiation over gender takes place’ (van Zoonen, 1994: 41), while at the same time media discourses do not translate directly into unanimously shared ideologies or practices. However, even media texts that depart from the commonly accepted ideologies of the social contexts in which they occur have to take these ideologies into account, and it is interesting to see how ideologies are incorporated as presupposed backgrounds and then meta-discursively commented upon.

6.4 Gender and Media in the Greek context

Paxson presents two quite compelling reasons why media are a site worth studying in relation to gender and sexuality in the Greek context in particular: first, because, together with word of mouth, they constitute the most accessible source of

83 For example on the issue of contraception Tountas et al. (2004: 3-4) point out that ‘[m]aternal consultation for young women under the age of 24 years was … reported by a significant percentage’ (more than 40%, ibid.: 5).
information in relation to issues of sexuality and sexual health (2002: 311, see also Tountas, Creatsas et al., 2004), and second because Greek media in particular ‘often mimic Western formats, [and therefore] they offer an incisive view of the ambivalence that characterizes a young urban Greek gaze toward the West, emblematically represented by the United States’ (ibid.: 308), something that seems to hold true in particular in relation to lifestyle magazines (see also Polyzou, 2010). This is relevant in that it helps explain the complex ways of reception of these texts – in a way they are ‘necessary’ for whatever information they offer, while on the other hand they may be rejected as unrealistic and foreign to Greek society (as in Kosetzi, 2010).

It has been noted that there is not much academic research on the representation of gender in the Greek media (Kafiri, 2002 – in Greek; Kosetzi, 2007). Some commentators suggest that women are represented stereotypically as young and beautiful (objects of desire) or housewives/mothers (Sarris, 1980/1992 – in Greek; Drakopoulou, 1988 – in Greek, both cited in Kosetzi, 2007: 82; see also Diamantakou, 2000 – in Greek; Doulkeri, 1990 – in Greek). Specifically in Greek comedies, Drakopoulou (1988: 87 – in Greek) identifies ‘the types of the grumpy (mother-in-law), the dependent or submissive (wife), the incompetent (driver), the stupid (the young blonde), the emotional (the young woman)’ (translated by and cited in Kosetzi, 2007: 82). Somewhat earlier on, in the 80’s, Pantazi-Tzifa also identifies the representation of women as sexually vulnerable and therefore in need of protection (1984 – in Greek, cited in Kosetzi, 2010: 95).

Doulkeri (1990 – in Greek) also looks at women’s magazines, observing that while women are represented as sexual objects, men are usually represented as successful businessmen. I have found this to be the case also in men’s lifestyle magazines, where
upper-middle class masculinity is exalted at the expense of women, gay men and working class men (Polyzou, 2004; Kosetzi and Polyzou, 2009; Polyzou, 2010). In Greek men’s lifestyle magazines, representations of hegemonic masculinity ‘the dominant form [of masculinity], the one that counts as normal’ (Talbot 1998: 191) include a preoccupation with sports and career, ineptitude or indifference to housework, a ‘naturally high’ (and heterosexual) sexual drive, and fear of marriage and emotional commitment (Kosetzi and Polyzou, 2009; Polyzou, 2010). Upper-class allegiance legitimises the consumerist imperative of the magazines and resolves tensions stemming from any associations of consumerism and/or grooming with femininity (Polyzou, 2004; 2010). Women are generally represented as passive and sexual objects (Polyzou, 2004; 2010), and there is emphasis on what Sunderland (2004) has termed ‘Gender Differences’ and ‘Battle of the Sexes’ discourses. In the magazine *Nitro* women and men ‘are being referred to as different ‘species’, which implies they are naturally and inescapably different’ (Polyzou, 2004: 31), while war metaphors ‘emphasise not only that men and women are different, but also that they are enemies and their interests are different’ (ibid.: 32). A brief look at the representation of women’s sexual desire in Greek women’s lifestyle magazines shows that in some ways women’s sexuality is still to be seen as ‘other-centred’ and passive, focussed on being desired/desirable rather than desiring (Polyzou, 2008; 2012), although, unlike in other, more traditional types of discourse, in both men’s and women’s lifestyle magazines sexual activity for both men and women is taken for granted without the prerequisite of marriage.

Nevertheless, despite the ethnographic research, medically-oriented surveys and aforementioned research on media text, there is a more heterogeneous range of gender and sexuality representations, at least in popular culture - for example women are
often represented as sexual ‘hunters’ or ‘predators’ rather than ‘prey’ (Kosetzi, 2007; 2011 – in Greek). Kosetzi (2007: 34-35) presents a list of media texts (specific TV show episodes and newspaper texts) which draw on the belief that the roles of men and women in interpersonal (heterosexual) relationships have been reversed in this way, with men playing the role of ‘prey’. However, it is important to be noted that these representations are often ironic or otherwise subverted or criticised in the very texts in which they occur, and, even when they are not, they are not necessarily reflecting the reality, or accepted unequivocally, or even positively evaluated, as Kosetzi’s focus group findings indicate. And, equally importantly, I’m not sure whether representing any group of people as ‘predators’ or ‘prey’ contributes much towards gender equality.

Furthermore, Kafiri (2002: 57-58 – in Greek) commends that both within academic and other research, and in media texts themselves, media representations of gender in Greece are said to be ‘patriarchal’ and not following positive developments towards equality in Greek society. This points towards a post-feminist ‘Gender Equality Now Achieved’ discourse (Sunderland, 2004: 44, 46), namely assuming that gender equality has been achieved in Greece and media portrayals of unequal gender relations are anachronistic; this argument obscures the remaining inequalities between men and women in Greece. Of course, the very fact that such representations are acceptable, or at all possible, indicates that there is still much to be done towards gender equality in Greece. On the other hand, Doulkeri (1990 – in Greek) and Paidousi (2000 – in Greek) concede that since the 80’s there has been some acceptance of women’s liberation (sexual and otherwise) and images of financially and emotionally independent women have been increasing.
6.5 Conclusion

Overall the research reviewed in this chapter in relation to the Greek social context reveal ambivalent attitudes, representations and practices. These vary between sexual permissiveness and restriction, traditionalist past and utopic (or dystopic) futures of gender relations, tendencies towards 'sameness' or 'gender differences'. Overall, on the issue of sexuality, Greek society remains relatively conservative/traditional and restrictive, making the concession of 'transitional heterosexuality'. Homosexuality is still either invisible – as in the women’s magazines - or presented at best with ironic distance – interestingly, in the men’s magazines (Polyzou, 2004; 2010).\textsuperscript{84} For women ‘transitional heteronormativity' dictates for pre-marital sexual activity to be 'discreet', to involve a limited list of suitably chosen partners in terms of age, socio-economic class, and ethnicity, and to lead to marriage and motherhood. The mere concept of STDs is a disturbance to this order, as illness is taken to represent an 'other', 'unknown' and thus unsuitable partner, while at the same time they constitute a prevalent material reality. With my analysis I hope to shed some light in the negotiation of these beliefs and concepts within texts of lifestyle magazines aiming to construct themselves as authorities on issues both of health and sexuality while at the same time remaining appealing to their audiences.

\textsuperscript{84} For some ethnographic work on attitudes towards homosexuality see contributions in Canakis, Kantsa and Yannakopoulos (2010) and Canakis (2011 – in Greek).
Chapter 7: Analysis – Frame level

7.1 Introduction

In Chapter 4 I presented a cognitive pragmatic definition of presupposition as a prerequisite for meaning, constituting the ground in a figure-ground mental representation in discourse. I argued that this can take place on various levels of discourse: the lexical/phrase level (frame level), the sentence level, the text level and the discourse level. Pragmatic knowledge is always (or at least by default) presupposed, and is a prerequisite for communication; that is, by default speakers act upon certain assumptions about their interlocutors’ pragmatic competence, and if these assumptions are mistaken, a breakdown or anomaly occurs in the interaction (see also 3.4.1 and 4.5.5). It is of interest (for this model at least) in two ways: when it surfaces in discourse (as meta-discourse), and in its interaction with the other levels in analysing specific texts, which influences interpretation.

All levels interact with each other and influence the processing of the whole text anyway, although not in a strictly or solely compositional sense. That is, lexical items do not only constitute components of the meaning of a sentence (thus forming part of ‘sentence level’ as well), but they also influence the interpretation of a whole text as coherence anchors, they can foreground associated concepts if repeated, and, depending on their position in the text and their connotations (associated evaluative meaning components), they may ‘frame’ the whole meaning of the text by triggering certain ‘knowledge networks’, including ideologies. Thus, analysing texts separately according to these levels is not meant to suggest that each level is distinct or independent from the others – the term ‘level’ is mean to imply that they are all steps
of the same ladder, as it were. There are, however, reasons to make this apparently formal distinction, apart from methodological convenience.

In relation to methodology, the level distinction helps us identify what exactly it is in a text that triggers a particular bit of ‘presupposed knowledge’, contributing thus to systematicity. One point of discrepancy among discourse analyses of presupposition is that analysts have been conducting their analyses on different levels (usually the sentence level or the discourse level), or that they have not been explicit about which level they are talking about. This makes it difficult to replicate presupposition analyses, and can potentially leave certain analytical decisions appearing unjustified and impressionistic.

In terms of theory, there are two connected reasons for this distinction. First, for every linguistic unit we have a pairing of form and mental representation/conceptualisation. Figure-ground conceptual relationships are thus realised formally in different ways depending on the unit we are looking at. In a way, the basic unit of analysis for discourse analysis should then probably be the text, because a text production/consumption/distribution can be seen as a discourse event in the context of which all smaller units (words, clauses, sentences) will be understood. Although no speech event is uninformed by a broader socio-cognitive context including conventions, ideologies and overall world knowledge, it is the speech event itself (namely, the participants and the conventions they follow) which make aspects of these relevant. Nevertheless (despite the significance of the ‘text’ as a basic unit of analysis), discourse analysis can and does focus on smaller units in order to examine certain aspects of the text. In the model applied here, the level differentiation spells out which elements of a speech event are presupposed because they belong to frames triggered by certain words (lexical/frame level), which elements form the ground for
certain clauses to be foregrounded (sentence level), which elements are presupposed as generic conventions or backgrounded due to their position in the text (text level), and which beliefs are (potentially) brought into the interpretation of the text due to the expected world knowledge of participants in relation to the topics discussed (discourse level). This then refers to different conceptual structures/mental representations (for example the difference between a frame and an ideology), and also indicates different ways of drawing or deflecting attention from these different kinds of representations.

The second reason, most related to the theoretical focus of this thesis, is to explore what exactly presupposition is, and why it is (still) predominantly examined on sentence level. I would hypothesise that presuppositions on word level fulfil at least the criteria of non-defeasibility of sentence level presuppositions (see discussion in Chapter 3). However, as discussed in Chapter 3, there is one main difference between frame level and sentence level presuppositions. On the frame level, it is usually only one element of a frame that surfaces in the discourse as a lexical item or phrase (e.g. a noun or verb phrase), while the rest of the concepts included in the frame are presupposed and inferred. On the sentence level, presuppositions always surface as referential expressions or subordinate clauses (at least if we follow a formal, truth conditional approach). The text level is the most complicated one, as issues of memory, attention and style and genre come into play, and, depending on the approach one might talk of (visible) parts of the text added to the 'list of presuppositions' of the receiver, that is, knowledge that after its assertion is taken as shared for all interlocutors (e.g. Stalnaker, 1973; van der Sandt, 1992), or of presuppositions not surfacing in the text at all because they are self-evident (Stalnaker, 1974/1991; van Dijk, 2005). My level differentiation allows me to look at what
constitutes 'ground' on each of these levels, as well as whether it is manifest in the
text or not.

In order to further explore the applicability of the model, I engage below in an
exploratory analysis of three texts. Although all texts are related to the same overall
theme (sexual health), Status topicalises condoms (as a means of protection),
Cosmopolitan discusses sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) themselves, presenting a
detailed repertoire and Marie Claire focuses on one disease (the HPV virus) and the
vaccine newly available in Greece for HPV prevention.

7.2 Visuals

Although this is not a visual analysis, description of visuals is relevant when the
visuals are salient (e.g. as large pictures) and reinforce or oppose the verbal text. This
is a descriptive account of the visuals in these three texts, as visuals also trigger
mental representations of concepts relevant to the analysis such as health, sex and
gender. Please consult Appendices 2, 3 and 4 for scanned copies of the originals from
Marie Claire, Cosmopolitan and Status respectively.

The texts in Cosmopolitan and Status both have a white cross in a red circle on the top
right hand corner of the page. Status has a large photo of a condom in the middle of
the page, which is quite salient, and 4 smaller pictures of different brands of condoms
at the lower part of the page in a hybrid of advice and promotion. As usual in Status,
there is also a passport size photo of a man in a white medical blouse next to an
'agony column' (presumably by a doctor, as is indicated by a short bio-note at the
bottom of the column, although this is in fact a footnote on the author of the text ‘The
Bodyguard’).
Cosmopolitan and Marie Claire both include sex- or relationship-related visuals, such as half naked couples (a man and a woman) embracing (in both Cosmopolitan and Marie Claire), looking at each other or sitting next to each other (Cosmopolitan), or the half naked torso and hips of a woman (Marie Claire). This is not simply related to the fact that STDs are transmitted through sexual contact – this is repeatedly stated in the verbal texts as well. The number and size of these images makes them quite salient visually, and bound to be noticed before the verbal text is read. Sex is thus emphasised also in this context, echoing the overall presupposed assumption that readers are (hetero)sexually active and interested in reading about sex (discourse level presupposition). Images triggering a ‘relationship’ frame occur all over Cosmopolitan (at least), even around texts unrelated to relationships. Images and presuppositions about sex are probably assumed to make these health-related texts more appealing. Moreover, the positive evaluation of sex as an activity is carefully preserved in all three texts discussed here, which focus on and topicalise the dangers of sex – it appears that the reader must be warned and informed, but not put off. All people depicted look young and conventionally attractive.

Cosmopolitan also includes two images of how skin affected by certain STDs might look (herpes and trichomoniasis), a drawing of female internal genitals and other images meant to make it easier to conceptualise aspects of the article (e.g. the numbers of people in the world infected by each STD every year are shown by one colourful pawn per million people). These images echo the didactic discourse often found in Cosmopolitan – although all magazines assume a more knowledgeable position of advice-provider, Cosmopolitan in particular also addresses younger women and often constructs a didactic persona for itself. However, Playboy, for example, which also claims to address men of all age groups above 18, never does this.
7.3 Framing in language

In *Marie Claire* the issue is right away framed as a health issue through the single-word label 'HEALTH' (as part of the regular section 'Only4YOU'), and other lexical items such as 'vaccine', 'medical' etc. Cosmopolitan labels its feature article as 'BONUS My doctor' (vocative), and a white cross on red background. The Status section labelled 'HEALTH' and 'BODY AND SOUL' is also a regular section. The section also regularly includes a column entitled 'My doctor' (vocative) ('agony column' in form) accompanied by the white cross on red background.

7.3.1 Metaphorical framing

In the following analysis of metaphor I will focus on war metaphors as the most prevalent type of metaphor found in the data, and throughout the chapter I will mention other metaphorical representations where relevant.

7.3.2 War metaphors

As in most Western health related discourse, there are a number of war metaphors (see e.g. Stibbe, 1996; Semino, Heywood and Short 2004). Generally it is to be expected that illness is metaphorically conceptualised as war between the illness (possibly personified) and the patient, with medication further mapped as weapons against the enemy (disease), and restoring health as winning the war.

---

85 Quotes from the data are in quotation marks. Italicised Roman characters indicate that the original text is in Roman characters (usually in English). Non-italicised English text in quotation marks is my translation of the Greek original. Capitalisation as in original.
a. **Cosmopolitan**

*Cosmopolitan* does not include many metaphors of this kind – a ‘protection’ frame comes up (‘be protected/protect yourself’, 86 ‘Can condoms protect me?’), and there is some presentation of STDs as agents or forces acting upon the reader (patient), e.g. ‘How much will it harm me?’. Once, the Chlamydia-causing bacterium is said to ‘attack’. There are other violence-related metaphorical frames (source categories), such as ‘the news that you have an STD can hit you like a thunder’ – these do not construct the disease specifically as the perpetrator of the violence. All of the above, however, contribute to a representation of the patient as a victim in need of help – a reader not suffering from an STD is further constructed as a potential victim. However, the construction of the reader as a victim is mainly constructed through the presupposed (as given), explicitly mentioned or implied, feelings projected onto her (see below).

b. **Marie Claire**

*Marie Claire* presents the virus HPV more as a human-like agent, which is facilitated by the fact that the word ‘virus’ in Greek (τοῦ) is grammatically masculine, as well as the lexico-syntactic properties of the clauses in which it is referred to. For example, the virus ‘is responsible for cervical cancer’ and ‘causes infection’. ‘His big advantage is that he acts... sneakily’. If not diagnosed, the virus ‘escapes arrest and acts unimpeded’. In these examples the virus is personified, not merely as a force but specifically as an agent who acts and causes damage almost consciously. The

---

86 Passive and self-reflexive constructions have the same form in Greek, and it is not always possible to tell from the context which one it is. This means that the common denominator which is bound to be inferred is that something happens to the ‘self’/subject (regardless of who does it), as opposed to the active voice where the ‘self’ acts, often upon a patient.
metaphor of 'arresting' depicts the virus more specifically as a criminal agent. Female readers are also metaphorically represented as the victims of this agent, more obviously in the phrase: 'one out of three of us gets in the gun sight of... HPV' (i.e. is targeted), and also through the phrases 'get protected/protect yourself'.

The virus is also conceptualised as an inanimate weapon or instrument of torture: 'scourge' (μάστιγα), which is a dead metaphor but more transparent than the English term, as the Greek cognates μαστίγο (lash, whip N) and μαστιγώνω (to lash, to whip V) are still in use. The vaccine is a weapon of defence, as it 'accoutres the organisms of boys and girls'. 'Accoutre' or 'shield' would be the translation for the military/security term 'θωρακίζω', which could also be translated as 'furnish' or 'equip', but literally means 'providing an armour'.

Early in the article the area of medicine is referred to as 'the medical front'. This is an intertextual reference to the novel and film title All Quiet on the Western Front/ Im Westen nichts Neues, translated in Greek as 'Nothing Newer from the Western Front'. The link here is the word 'new', as the article is about a new development. Describing new developments in a field/area/aspect of life as news from the respective 'front' occurs very often as a witty allusion in Greek. Nevertheless the word 'front' (μέτωπο) is very clearly military-related in Greek. The etymological metaphor καταπολέμηση ('fighting off') refers to the treatment and prevention of the virus. It is never used literally, but the root 'war' is still visible (-πολέμ-).

---

87 The military term is itself a metaphor, 'μέτωπο' literally meaning 'forehead', however, in the co-text the literal interpretation is excluded.
c. Status

There are no war metaphors, except the danger/threat presupposed in the metaphorical frames of ‘protect’ and ‘guard’, and the conceptualisation of condoms as ‘the bodyguard/musketeer’ (ο σωματοφύλακας) in the title and subtitle.

The metaphorical title ‘the bodyguard’ focuses on the ‘protective’ function of condoms, which makes the value of condoms more salient, as a bodyguard is specifically hired to protect someone (it’s his/her job – main function) and has connotations of loyalty, bravery etc. In Greek the same word has been used to translate ‘musketeer’, which makes these positive connotations even stronger (as opposed to ‘security guard’, ‘security staff’ etc., which have negative connotations). There is an element of wordplay here, since health literally has to do with ‘the body’, and condoms metaphorically guard the body not from human agents, but from disease.

The word ‘safety’ is also mentioned in the description of types of condoms, which semantically presupposes danger.

7.3.3 Observations on war metaphors

In this section I have primarily looked at lexical items used metaphorically. Metaphors are best examined on clause level (cf. Boers, 1999) or above, and can also be visual – the focus here is single noun or verb phrases as triggering specific frames, but taking into account the whole clause also evoking the frame, argument structure etc., which is beyond the scope of this chapter. In particular, as with all frames (also non-metaphorical ones), the concept evoked by the word is profiled, and the elements/concepts constituting the frame are also evoked as frame presuppositions (ground). Metaphorical frames include the additional element of concepts from one frame (source category) mapped onto to another (target category), which can be
inferred (because presupposed as part of pre-existing knowledge). Concepts not mapped are backgrounded to the point of not being inferred, unless one of the interlocutors decides to bring them to the foreground through creative elaborations of the metaphor (see Semino, 2002).

There are two interesting findings in relation to war metaphors in these texts. First, physical violence and war are closely associated with hegemonic masculinity (Connell, 1995, see also Chapter 6), and war metaphors are very often used in discourse addressed to or about men (Polyzou, 2004; 2010; Koller, 2004). In Status, however, there are much fewer war/violence metaphors than in Cosmopolitan or Marie Claire in this case. One explanation could be that the Status text is only one page long, whereas the Marie Claire text is 2 pages long, and the Cosmopolitan text is 8 pages long. However, Marie Claire has many more violence metaphors than Cosmopolitan, despite the difference in length. Moreover, ‘the bodyguard’ as a word is very foregrounded as a header in larger fonts, and again in the lead-in paragraph, at the beginning on the article.

It is likely that the lack of war and violence metaphors has to do with the subject matters of the texts, and the tone adopted in relation to them. The combination of the frame of ‘protection’ with the conceptualisation of disease as a sneaky attacker further construct the reader as a (potential) powerless victim, in many cases justifiably so since there are no early symptoms and no cure, e.g., for viruses such as HIV and HPV, and no 100% secure means of preventing infection. Marie Claire, through repetition, exaggeration and creative elaborations of the metaphor emphasises even more the powerlessness of people exposed to HPV, and projects all (female) readers as potential victims. Cosmopolitan does this less, but the enacted ‘readers’ questions’ (see Thompson and Thetela, 2005 on audience enactment and projection) also project
a powerless, scared reader, at the receiving end of physical harm ('How much will it harm me?').

Within the 'protection' frame, Status does not focus on 'from what/whom' the reader should be protected, but on 'how'. Thus, no details are given on the 'enemy' (STDs), but rather on the 'bodyguard'. The 'bodyguard' or 'musketeer' (grammatically masculine and usually a male person), apart from the aforementioned positive connotations, is also employed to protect a powerful figure, and can be seen as a sign of prestige. Thus, Status evokes the 'protection' frame without constructing the (male) readers as powerless, and focuses on the means of protection as a commercial product (different kinds of condoms), bringing in promotional discourse.

The second finding is related to the following section on vagueness. The use of metaphor as a tool for conceptualisation can help us conceive of abstract notions, such as time, as concrete entities, and can be helpful in structuring our experience in a cognitively 'manageable' way. However, it can also obscure understanding by emphasising or constructing certain aspects of the target category, or by being vague. In the following section I discuss vagueness in more detail, both in cases related to metaphor and in other cases.

7.4 Vagueness and emotion

7.4.1 Cosmopolitan and Marie Claire

In this case, vagueness is related to the foregrounding or backgrounding of danger in relation to STDs through evaluative vocabulary. Marie Claire in particular, but also Cosmopolitan, foreground the emotional element of danger. Marie Claire almost never refers to the virus HPV without accompanying the noun with the adjective
'dangerous' (and, once, 'hated'); the vaccine against HPV is characterised 'miraculous' (used similarly to 'works wonders' in English), and the news about the new vaccine are presented 'with joy'. These expressions (as well as the metaphors discussed in 7.3.2) foreground evaluative and emotional aspects of the referents, constructing a negative attitude towards the virus and a positive attitude towards the vaccine, without providing themselves any information on why and how the virus is harmful and the vaccine beneficial. The effects of the virus are similarly presented in the example: ‘...the hated virus, who can turn a night of passion into a real nightmare’. The metaphor ‘nightmare’ here again emphasises negativity, but does not specify in what way.

*Cosmopolitan’s* use of the words ‘safe’ (in the headline) and ‘protect’ presupposes a danger to be safe/protected from, and they twice refer to facts presented as new as ‘the most shocking [thing]’ and ‘the scariest [thing]’. In the lead-in paragraph young women are said to be statistically more likely to contract an STD through the phrase ‘more vulnerable’. Overall, the *Cosmopolitan* article does not contain a lot of vagueness – almost everything is spelt out in detail. Therefore, even if one lexical item is vague, it is immediately specified/clarified in the following clause(s) or sentences. *Cosmopolitan* does contain as much evaluative and emotional vocabulary, but for the most part the emotions of fear, guilt, embarrassment etc. are presupposed as known and given. Occasionally it is mentioned as given that the reader will feel ‘rage’ if her partner has an STD, and that she will be ‘embarrassed’ to inform her doctor fully about her sex life. The latter is presupposed to occur only when she displays unsafe or non-heteronormative sexual behaviour (the example provided is having sex with two men at the same time) – a ‘normal’ sex life is not presented as embarrassing to discuss, with a doctor at least.
The use of evaluative words alone is not sufficient to cause mystification/lack of understanding — specific information about STDs can and is provided in the co-text in both the *Cosmopolitan* and the *Marie Claire* texts. However, they do foreground (even more) negative evaluations and emotions\(^8\) of worry and fear, which may be already understandably present in relation to health issues, while not being helpful in any way in understanding or resolving the problem addressed.\(^8\)

There are cases however where the co-text does not provide more specific information. In *Marie Claire*’s metaphor ‘one out of three of us gets in the gunsight of the dangerous virus HPV, who is often responsible for cervical cancer and is transmitted through sexual contact’, it is not clear whether that means that one out of three women actually contracts the disease, or that one out of three women simply is in a high-risk category (and why the other two out of three are not). This sentence is in the lead-in paragraph and by containing the words ‘gunsight’, ‘danger’ and ‘cancer’ (which is only a possible cause of only one type of HPV), it immediately frames the issue as a scary one.

The link of HPV with cervical cancer is emphasised on the text level through statistics and numbers of women dying from cervical cancer (these numbers are, of course, not vague but specific, but they are still mystifying because they do not specify how many of these cancer cases were actually caused by HPV), followed by representing the available therapies as having ‘many disadvantages’ and being ‘rather ineffective’. Surgical operation, chemotherapy and radiotherapy ‘hide\(^9\) huge dangers, from disorders of the immune system and sexuality to infertility and miscarriages’. The

---

\(^8\) I see evaluation and emotion as related, but exploring this relationship in detail is beyond the scope of this thesis.

\(^8\) On text/genre level these function to justify (and in some other cases construct) the problem, rather than solve it (see Polyzou, 2008a).

\(^9\) ‘hiding dangers’ is a conventional metaphor meaning the dangers are not always visible — it does not necessarily mean that the subject is represented as an agent intentionally hiding something.
topic of the article is not cervical cancer per se, but HPV, so only enough information
about cervical cancer treatments is provided to show how ineffective they are – it is
not clear what exactly happens to a patient with ‘disorders of the immune system and
sexuality’, but it is clear that they are negative (‘huge dangers’). Infertility as a ‘huge
danger’, and the mention of ‘miscarriages’ presuppose that some of the readers are or
want to be pregnant in the future, so they run the additional risk of having a
miscarriage. In the co-text it is easy to read these treatments (surgery, chemotherapy
and radiotherapy) as ‘therapies for HPV’ rather than ‘therapies of cancer’, thus
blurring of ‘HPV’ and ‘cancer’, which also could reinforce the element of fear in the
text.

Overall, the Cosmopolitan article is written (and visually laid out) in a textbook-style,
as an instance of initiation discourse similar to schoolbooks (but not, generally,
academic textbooks, except for the pictures of skin displaying the symptoms, which
are also to be found in medical academic or professional texts). Although the
‘description’ of the problem (diseases, symptoms, ways of transmission) is very
detailed and not vague (despite some emotional language), interestingly some
vagueness occurs in the ‘solution’ part of the text.

When/if the reader discovers that she has an STD, she is advised to ‘confront the boy
who gave it to [her]’ (‘αντιμετώπισε το αγόρι που σε κόλλησε’). This is probably
back-translation – the name of the author of the article is not Greek (Hallie Levine, in
Roman characters) - much of this article would then be translated or adapted from an
English-speaking original (although it contains some ‘Greek statistics’). Some of the
meanings (including evaluative aspects) of ‘confront’ (αντιμετωπίζω) seem to overlap
between Greek and English, as ‘facing’ (a problem) or facing a person ‘in defiance or
etymologically on the metaphorical military term ‘front’ (μετωπ-). However, in this
cointext it seems that, unlike the English term conventionally used for talking to
someone (albeit ‘in defiance’), the Greek word seems to window attention not on the
process but on the outcome of this act, namely, successfully solving (a problem) or
fighting off (a person or group). This might be signalled by the imperative or the fact
that the patient is a human agent (as opposed to ‘we are facing a problem/difficulties’,
which can also be expressed through αντιμετωπίζοντας/χωρίς/confront in Greek). In short, this
unconventional use of the imperative of ‘confront’ in Greek seems more aggressive
than the English equivalent — however, a reader reading fast for gist might not notice
that, or draw on her own knowledge of English overlooking the awkward translation.

What is more significant here is that the reader is not given any concrete advice on
what exactly ‘confronting’ entails — the verb communicates the tone of the
conversation, but not the content. The reader is further advised to ‘give him a chance
to reply’ before she assumes ‘that he did it on purpose’. So the reader is advised to
speak to her partner and give him ‘a chance to reply’ — this is still vague and does not
shed any light on what she is supposed to say, with the additional contradiction that
she should be aggressive (‘confront’) and conciliatory at the same time (giving him a
chance to reply).

Upon discovery of an STD, the reader is further advised to follow ‘her usual routine’
(whatever that is), and is assured that this is not the end of her sex life. If her partner
informs her he has an STD, she is told, among other things, that people with STDs
will not give them to their partners if they are ‘honest and careful’, and that she could
(temporarily or permanently) leave her partner if she needs time to take ‘the right
decision for both’ of them. There is a contradiction in the overall content of these two
(separate) sections, one on what to do if she has an STD and one on the case that her
partner (but not her) has an STD. In the former case she is given the optimistic messages that she is still attractive and could/should continue her sex life (while ‘confronting’ the person she thinks gave it to her), and in the latter she is partly reassured but partly given the option to ‘depart’/’retreat’ (‘αποχώρησε’, another unconventional use in Greek which seems to also result from awkward translation from an English original to Greek – see discussion in 8.3.3). In general, in these two sections the female partner is framed as a victim, whereas the male one, albeit not a wilful perpetrator, is definitely a cause for concern. Most importantly, apart from this rather subtle construction of an ‘us’ and ‘them’ distinction, all advice on what to do in order to conduct a sex life upon discovery of an STD is extremely vague, with the most concrete suggestion being to see a doctor. There is no mention of what to do, exactly, in order to conduct a safe sex life, what ‘honest and careful’ entails (with all the positive connotations of the words), and what ‘the right decision’, or the right decisions would be. The text revolves around reassurance, diplomacy and mitigating the (presupposed) panic when one or both partners discover an STD, but all protective measures mentioned occur in different sections, namely, in the sections advising how to avoid catching an STD when she knows nothing about her partner’s health (here the structure of the text plays a role too). Some other rather obvious measures, such as testing and treating both partners before they engage in a sexual relationship, or temporary abstinence/medical treatment/use of condoms when a partner is known to have an STD, are not mentioned at all at any part of the text. Thus vagueness occurs also through metaphor or/and hyperbole, but also through insufficient information in relation to numbers, causal relationships and description of symptoms and therapies.
In contrast, *Status* does not discuss the characteristics of STDs at all (therefore such knowledge is not inferable from the text), choosing instead to focus on condoms as products. The author only says that the ‘correct use [of condoms] can... save you [courtesy plural]... many pages of reading on venereal [diseases]’. Thus, the aspect of (the frame of) contracting an STD which is emphasised here is ‘reading’ on them, presumably in order to find a way to treat the disease. This backgrounds the aspects of danger, fear, suffering etc. related to having a disease, and foregrounds an inconvenient but less harmful result of the disease.

This is a case where the ‘reading’ frame is associated in the text with suffering from an STD, or worrying about it (the cause of the ‘reading on STDs’). I would say that, rather than presupposed because known, the frame is at least partially constructed on-line in the text, as suffering from or worrying about an illness is not necessarily or typically linked with reading for all readers. However, we do have a case of metonymical windowing of attention (Talmy, 2000; 2007). If we construct a scenario of ‘unprotected sex – worry/illness – reading about STDs/suffering/getting treatment’, although obviously the ‘problem’ is the worry and the illness, it surfaces in the text as one of its less painful consequences (the reading). Clearly the less threatening ‘focus’ evokes the ‘ground’ of the illness, but at the same time preserves a less grave and rather optimistic tone (as does the focus on the ‘bodyguard’ as opposed to the ‘attacker’). The vagueness lies in that, as it is not a conventional, well established scenario evoked, it is not clear whether the reading on STDs will be because of mere worry, or because of actually suffering from an STD – this also contributes to the concept of ‘threat’ not being foregrounded here.
One case that could be seen as vagueness due to emotional hyperbole (as opposed to providing information) is the phrase ‘basic virtues’ in the sentence

(1) Ειδικά στην Ελλάδα, το 77% των ανδρών ηλικίας 20-45 ετών αγνοεί αρκετές από τις βασικές αρετές τους.

Especially in Greece, the 77% of men aged between 20-45 years old are not aware of quite a few of their [condoms’] basic virtues.

‘The 77% of [Greek] men aged between 20-45’ foregrounds this demographic, either because this is the group of men surveyed,91 or because it overlaps with the target readership of the magazine (or possibly for both reasons). It is possible that the focus on this demographic either by a researcher or by the author of the text results also from the (generally shared and given) presupposed assumption that it is this age group that is more sexually active, including the (projected) reader.

It is categorically stated then that the majority of the readers ignore/are not aware of (αγνοούν) many of the ‘basic virtues’ (βασικές αρετές) of condoms. ‘Basic’ entails some form of prioritisation or importance - ‘basic’ can mean ‘main’, ‘elementary’ and also ‘necessary’. This, as well as the formal positively evaluative word ‘virtue’ present/frame the following information as very important.92 As far as I know, the basic virtues of condoms are preventing STDs and pregnancy, and most people in Greece are aware of them. The framing of the information by the author as ‘basic virtues’ then merely aims to highlight the information as ‘important’.

91 Information on the survey is not mentioned and not inferable.
92 ‘Virtue’ (αρετή) also has a moralistic undertone, but I think that here it is either irrelevant or may at most have a humorous effect (due to the incongruity between subjects of ‘sex’ and ‘morality’). In any case, in Greek ‘virtue’ may be used for non-morality related advantages, but it sounds formal and dated (shifts in register also produce a humorous effect).
Since the *Status* text is a hybrid between advice and promotion, there is a lot of vocabulary evaluating positively not just condoms in general ('the bodyguard'), but particular brands of condoms as well. At the bottom of the page 4 types/brands of condoms are presented, their descriptions including the characterisations 'comfortable', 'fitting well', offering 'a pleasant sense of sturdiness/strength and safety', 'great feeling, 'very popular'. These 4 kinds of condoms are chosen as the 'best' in their categories (e.g. the best polyurethane condom), and there are some disadvantages mentioned, e.g. 'more expensive' or 'not reliable for all uses' (see below).

In 4.5.1 I mentioned that there is information not presented in a text that may only be inferred by readers with the necessary background knowledge; I found some instances of this in the *Status* texts, where some phrases could be seen as instances of vagueness, as they do not seem to evoke a specific schema/frame. However, it may be the case that some readers (the 'ideal' readers?) would have conventional associations, or draw on-line inferences, based on their background knowledge and social group membership. Interpreting the phrases below took more than average cognitive processing effort in my part, including a close reading of the whole text more than once, and thinking. Some readers might not be willing to put the same processing effort, or may not read the whole text, or may not have the required mental representations readily available while reading. I would then suggest that the phrases below may be mystifying for some readers, but not for others.

a. 'Jobs'

The sentence in example (1), repeated here for convenience
Especially in Greece, the 77% of men aged between 20-45 years old are not aware of quite a few of their [condoms’] basic virtues.

This is then followed by a brief ‘history of condoms’ (their invention by Goodyear) and presumably new information about different materials and sizes of currently available condoms in the market (the important ‘basic virtues’ mentioned in the previous sentence). The ‘basic virtues’ then are explained (‘the fact that...’), the ‘many materials’ are listed, but the ‘many jobs’ are not. Lifestyle magazines constantly oscillate between the issue of sex as taboo in Greek society in general, and the imperative to ‘sell sex’, prescribe it and describe it, both as an aim in itself (providing advice and thus delineating sexual identities on sale), and also as a means to sell products (the magazine itself, advertised products, products helping the reader approximate the ideal sexual identities). Euphemism, vagueness and humour are often recruited to that end. ‘Job’ (δουλειά, also translatable as ‘work’) can be used in Greek, as in English, to refer to sex euphemistically, but it can also be used for all sorts of activities. (Notably the equivalent of ‘I’m busy’ in Greek is ‘έχω δουλειά’ – I have work/[a] job [to do]). Due to the context it seems that ‘many jobs’ here does not refer to activities other than sex, but rather to sexual acts that are not heteronormatively sanctioned, such as anal or oral sex (similarly the phrase ‘for all uses’, see previous sub-section). One would have to have some prior mental representation of (the
desirability of) these in order to infer this, or read the whole page down to the 4th text of the section, a numbered list of ‘tips’ in a box, where anal or oral sex as mentioned (but not foregrounded) as examples of ‘different contacts’ requiring a change of condom each time (tip no 5). ‘For many jobs’ might also include ‘preventing pregnancy’, which is also alluded to in the readers’ question in a separate section and is commonly shared (presupposed) knowledge about the function of condoms.

Thus, the ‘ideal reader’ possessing all the ‘previously shared’ knowledge would immediately infer the above, but the initiate would either not get it, or would only infer it after more processing and/or reading every detail on this section. This is one example of the magazine catering to different audiences, with different levels and amounts of presupposed knowledge. At the same time, the reader ‘in the know’ is privileged, and the missing knowledge is the one worth having for one to achieve the masculine identity projected (in this case, sexually ‘adventurous’).

b. ‘Critical moment’

In the box of numbered bullet points (‘tips’), one tip points out that no air should be left in the condom, or else it could break ‘at the critical moment’ (‘την κρίσιμη στιγμή’). ‘Critical’ as a ‘turning point’ (point of ‘judgement’- ‘κρίση’ - etymologically speaking) cannot refer to the point one would catch an STD, since such a ‘point’ is hard to isolate, at least outside a science lab - some STDs can be contracted even with skin contact (in which case, all moments are ‘critical’). ‘Critical moment’ most likely refers to ejaculation as the point most likely for the condom to break (and also as the point where pregnancy is more likely). The existential presupposition (the ‘critical moment’ exists), and the choice of words, presuppose (as shared but also given knowledge) penetrative sex resulting in male orgasm as the
typical sexual act. Unlike with ‘many jobs’, the phrasing is not chosen (only) for its vagueness but exactly because it is (or should be) easily inferable by (target) readers. ‘Critical’ indeed emphasises importance in general, even if one does not infer what is ‘at stake’ just from that noun phrase (but from the co-text).

Thus, this phrase on the one hand perpetuates a heteronormative, phallocentric view of sex with no need for justification or explanation (it is the given ground of all discussions on sex by default anyway), and on the other, as with the women’s magazines, creates a sense of drama (‘crisis’) in order to reinforce the persuasive function of the text, prioritising the emotive effect over informative content. In the main feature (‘the bodyguard’), it is mentioned that a very tight condom might break, while a very large might ‘leave its place on the most critical moment’. Again it is not clarified what ‘the most critical moment’ is. It does seem that the moment becomes ‘critical’ by virtue of the fact that there is an accident with the condom. The cases of the condom breaking or leaving its place are framed in the next sentence as ‘unpleasant surprises’, which does communicate negative emotion, but somehow downplays health risks as merely ‘unpleasant’ (in comparison to the extremely loaded vocabulary in the women’s magazines).

Thus, as I have already pointed out, Status does not generally employ vague expressions causing emotions of fear, with few exceptions. Apart from the word ‘critical’, another such rare case occurring in the ‘tips’ section is the use of the term ‘dangerous’, which is relatively vague – the phrase ‘an expired condom is more dangerous than an expired glass of milk’ highlights the danger, but does not explain in what sense the condom is dangerous. The reader is again left to infer what kind of danger this is based on co-text (prior mention of STDs and breakage of condoms), and on the readers’ background presupposed knowledge. It is also suggested that ‘long
nails can cause small disasters'. It is quite easily inferable here that ‘disasters’ means
the condom might be torn, but the qualification ‘small’ again downplays the drama
here.

7.5 Framing of actors

In the previous sections I have looked at various frames triggered relatively frequently
in the texts with different effects. All three texts are framed early on as ‘health-
related’ texts through both visuals and language. I have further looked at how they
frame the problems and solutions they present, namely, the diseases and the means of
prevention or treating the diseases. These representations have had implications on
how the male or female addressees/readers are framed; the two women’s magazines
frame the projected female reader as being in danger, or a victim. Status projects the
reader more positively, as more active, and generally frames him as a consumer
choosing a product. In this section I look more closely at how gendered actors are
referred to and framed in the texts (most notably readers and their presumed sexual
partners).

7.5.1 Marie Claire

Marie Claire states that HPV is one of the viruses which ‘trouble millions of men and
women throughout the world’, and that the vaccine protects (‘shields’) ‘the organisms
of boys and girls from childhood’. In that sense, there is a symmetry in the terms used
for male and female adults and children, and it is mentioned that both men and women
are at risk. This symmetry may be a result of the hybridisation with medical,
'scientific' discourse. However, the text addresses the reader through 2nd person singular ‘you’, it refers more often to women (through statistics and mention of diseases such as cervical and ovarian cancer), and the overall vocabulary of war, threat, risk and suffering is aimed mainly at the female reader. The partner is either not mentioned (suppressed – cf. van Leeuwen (1996) – cognitively draws attention away from the participants and windows attention on the outcome of a process), when catching the disease is presented as the virus turns ‘a night of passion... into a real nightmare’ (cf. Cosmopolitan), and once it is mentioned that if the reader needs medical treatment for HPV, so should her ‘love/romantic/sexual partner’. The word ‘partner’ is grammatically masculine here, presenting the relationship as by default hererosexual. All 6 magazines use the ‘generic masculine’ form when the sex of a person is unknown – however, men’s magazines do use the feminine endings, articles and pronouns for partners. Moreover, the pronouns ‘he’ and ‘she’ are often used in all lifestyle magazines to refer to ‘a partner’, with no further or previous definite noun phrase indicating a partner, which conventionally triggers the frame of ‘heterosexual partner’ (Polyzou, 2008b).

This occurs in the Cosmopolitan text: ‘[he] lives [in the same student residence], and you eat at the same restaurant... You trust him’. ‘[What to do] when he has an STD’. Also in the Status text: ‘Don’t let her apply [the condom] on you’. In these cases there is no anaphoric (and often, no cataphoric) reference to a noun phrase, but the reader automatically infers ‘your partner’ due to the presupposed shared knowledge.
7.5.2 Cosmopolitan

Cosmopolitan also uses the terms 'women' and 'men' when referring to medical facts (like Marie Claire); e.g. 'women have more mucous membranes in their genitals than men'. Other cases include citing research (female participants), or discussing the HPV vaccine (which protects women from the indirect risk of cervical cancer), or the differences in symptoms of a particular STD in women and men. Terms like 'people' and 'adults' are also used when discussing medical facts related to both sexes. Twice it refers to 'your partner [masc.]' (σύντροφος). These may be traces of medical discourse, but there are a lot of more 'informal' terms referring to partners and men in general used to evoke a frame/genre of 'informal conversation among friends'. When it comes to partners, in Greek rather than 'your boyfriend' one can say 'your friend [masc.]' or 'your boy' – the definite reference and possessive pronoun disambiguate, distinguishing the references from those to 'a male friend' or 'a young male' person. Such references are frequent throughout the text.

What I find interesting is the two cases when young men are referred to as 'boys'. Although 'girls' is used widely also in Greek (as in English) to refer to adult females, 'boys' is not symmetrically used; it is used in some contexts, but not as often. Here the usage might result from an awkward translation from the English term 'guys' (no equivalent in Greek), or an unsuccessful imitation of the style of young women referring to young men as 'boys' (and themselves as 'girls'). The incongruity might arise exactly because of the medical content of the text, and the attempt to make it sound more 'friendly'.

Once, 'boy' occurs in the title of the section 'What boys say'. This presents what appears to be statistics from questionnaire results (with participants being asked what
they would do if their girlfriend had an STD, for example). This foregrounds the ‘social’ aspect of these male participants – they are not mentioned as patients or potential victims, but as a category of people to whom the reader wants to relate, so their attitudes and feelings are focussed on. This is in contrast with the referring terms for females, which (when not addressing a projected female reader as ‘you’) is almost exclusively ‘women’ (regardless of age). E.g. we have ‘women under 25’, ‘young women are more vulnerable’, ‘the fact that you are a woman increases the possibility of infection’.

The second time ‘boy’ occurs is more incongruous. It occurs in the context of suggesting that condoms should be worn from the beginning of penetration: ‘most boys have pre-ejaculatory fluid before they reach orgasm’. The usage of a term primarily meaning ‘non-adult’ male is incongruous with a discussion on sex. One could argue that this usage might well occur in the discourse of young women (I have encountered this usage, as with ‘girls’), because it refers to young men not as male patients or objects of medical observation, but as partners discussed among friends. However, again, the term ‘girl’ is never used in the text; ‘women’ is used very often. This on the one hand frames the female reader as a potential patient, echoing medical discourse; on the other, both medically and socially, the frame triggered by ‘women’ entails ‘sexually mature’ biologically, in the case of medicine - socially it is more complicated, depending on the normative assumptions of each society, but consider the usage of ‘girls’ to refer to unmarried women regardless of age, as not fully mature, or the usage of ‘women’ to refer to prostitutes. In this case, the reader is framed as a responsible and sexually active adult, something which is not done with the framing of male partners. The reader is a ‘woman’, but her partner (conventionally of the same age or older) is a ‘boy’.

250
7.5.3 Status

In Status women (as patients or partners) are never mentioned, except in the phrase: ‘Don’t let her apply [the condom] on you; long nails can cause small disasters’. Metonymically ‘long nails’ are to be understood as part of the frame of ‘her’ – the reader is able to make sense of this because of the shared, presupposed, non-asserted stereotypical knowledge that ‘women have long nails’. Apart from this, though, women and partners are completely suppressed (in the terms of van Leeuwen, 1996). The focus is the reader, and the choice of condom is framed as that of the reader alone. E.g. ‘extra large’ sized condoms are ‘very popular even with those [masc.] with more usual [average] qualifications’ (with the ‘qualifications’ metaphor conventionally but humorously referring to male genitals). The masculine ending of ‘those’ and the attribution of male genitals presents the choice as made by men alone. There are quite a few nominalisations and process-indicating nouns: ‘the [sexual] contact’ (intercourse), ‘pleasant feeling’, ‘excellent feeling’, ‘worse feeling’ – the actual people who have intercourse or feel one way or another are not mentioned. It is more likely that the implied actor/senser is the addressee/reader, who is addressed in the text often as ‘you’.

What could create ambiguity in that respect is the 2nd person plural used throughout the text (mainly through verb endings, as pronouns in subject position are often omitted in Greek). This is generally courtesy plural. The medical expert persona responds to a question from a reader:

---

93 The association is made in the search of coherence through underlying semantic relations, in this case between ‘her’ and ‘long nails’ (see Brown and Yule, 1983: 194-195).
(3) Δεν είναι δυνατόν να είστε αλλεργικός στα προφυλακτικά γενικά, αλλά μάλλον στο λάτεξ, ....

It is not possible for you to be allergic to condoms in general, but rather to latex, ....

(4) ... επισκεφθείτε έναν δερματολόγο.

... visit a dermatologist.

(5) Εκείνος [ο γιατρός], αφού σας εξετάσει, ...

He [the doctor – masc.], after he examines you [courtesy 2nd pers. pl.], ...

here plural is clearly used to address one person.

The following can be read as both (courtesy) generic ‘you’, or addressing the reader as an individual, or addressing all male readers as a group (genuine plural):

(6) ... η σωστή χρήση [των προφυλακτικών] ... μπορεί... να σας γλιτώσει από πολλές σελίδες διάβασμα με θέμα τα αφροδίσια.

correct use [of condoms] can... save you many pages of reading on venereal [diseases]

(7) ... πρέπει να δοκιμάσετε διάφορα μεγέθη μέχρι να βρείτε αυτό που σας ταιριάζει.

...you must try various sizes until you find the one that suits you.

(8) ... επενδύστε με μια γερή δόση αυτογνωσίας.

...invest with a good dosage of self-knowledge [regarding choosing the size of the condom].

(9) ... δεν μπορείτε να ακουμπήσετε πάνω του για όλες τις χρήσεις.

... you cannot rely on it for all uses.

(10) Μην αφήνετε να σας το φορέσει εκείνη: ....

Do not let her apply [the condom]:...
From the above one can see that, even though genuine plural ‘you’ could in theory include female partners (as it is not marked grammatically for gender), as in ‘you [as a couple] cannot rely it for all uses’, in most of the cases it is clear from the co-text that the addressee(s) is/are male (e.g. trying on the condom), as well as from the broader context of *Status* belonging to the genre of ‘men’s magazine’. Thus, the projected male reader is the one choosing, buying and applying the condom, decides where to store it (‘do not store it in your back pocket’) etc., while women are presupposed as heterosexual partners but not mentioned.

### 7.6 Framing in readers’ comments

The *Status* and *Cosmopolitan* texts include text which seems to have not been produced by employees of the magazine, but by readers (*Marie Claire* does not). This content could be coming from actual readers’ letters or e-mails, which would normally be edited, or constructed. It could also be answers literally provided by ‘people on the street’, answering questions by the magazine authors in a kind of impromptu ‘mini-interviews’. These interviewees however are always selected to fit either the ideal reader of the magazine (young women in the case of *Cosmopolitan*), or people of the opposite sex whose opinion the reader is presumably interested in (or should be).

Either way contributions by ‘real people’ serve to present the content as ‘authentic’/reliable, and project/construct the ideal reader, since the actual reader is positioned in the same ‘group’ as the writing persona. Stylistically it may make reading less monotonous and more interesting. For these reasons I analyse these sections here separately from the rest of the content. However, when accompanying other relevant material (like here), the content of ‘everyday people’s contributions’
usually reiterates and reinforces the rest of the content, provides additional information and occasionally qualifies, but does not refute, the overall content. In terms of presupposition these sections still contain underlying knowledge that is (or ought to be) shared with the projected ideal readers of the magazine, perhaps even more so since the speaking personas are not constructed as 'experts' but as members of the same group as the readers.

7.6.1 Cosmopolitan

The last page of the *Cosmopolitan* feature on STDs includes 5 testimonials by 'Women with STDs'. Unlike the name of the author, the names (or pseudonyms) of these 5 women are Greek first names, written in Greek characters. It is not mentioned whether these women wrote to *Cosmopolitan*, or if they were interviewed, or how they were found. Their ages are stated next to the names, ranging from 21 to 36. So the sex, age and nationality of these speakers match those of the target readers.

The title and subtitle of this section is: “I caught an STD” – Women with STDs have something to tell you. Like the title, the testimonials address the reader through 2nd person singular ('you'). For the most part the frames emerging in these testimonials are the same as in the rest of the feature, e.g. male partners are labelled ‘friend’ or ‘boy’. It is interesting that, when ‘friend’ or ‘boy’ is used, the women either talk about their current partners (who are understanding despite their health conditions), or speak generically, as in ‘a proper boy[friend] will appreciate your honesty’. When speaking of past partners who transmitted their STDs to the speakers, one woman (Ioanna) uses ‘my ex’ (omitting the noun, also very conventional in Greek informal discourse,
including in lifestyle magazines), and another (Vicky) just says ‘Two years ago I had a relationship with a stockbroker’.

Ioanna’s testimonial is the only part of the whole feature bringing up ‘cheating’, and the suspicion that ‘her ex’ was not faithful (and giving the advice that with the slightest suspicion the reader should see a doctor, like she did). I find it interesting that the frame of ‘cheating’ is carefully avoided in the rest of the feature; it may be the case that it is presupposed anyway that the reader will be upset to hear that her partner has, or has given her, an STD, but it seems that exploring the reasons is moving beyond the informational and comforting purposes of the feature. The issue is, however, added, as an afterthought, through a ‘real story’, so that this possibility is covered as well (leaving emotional and trust issues aside).

Vicky also speaks of ‘fooling’ in saying ‘Don’t let [his] appearance fool you – even successful, well-dressed men may have been infected. Two years ago I had a relationship with a stockbroker. He seemed clean so I didn’t insist on [us] using a condom.’ The conventional metaphor ‘clean’ for healthy is also used a couple of times in the rest of the feature, but one can see its metonymic basis (lack of sanitation causing disease). The prototype of the ‘clean’ man is a ‘stockbroker’ who is ‘successful’ and ‘well dressed’, evoking an ideal of hegemonic masculinity. This is the (mental) model of the man who is presupposed to be desirable for Cosmopolitan readers. The readers’ frame of ‘desirable man’ needs to be modified to include the information that this type of man, contrary to the previous (stereotypical) frame, is also likely to suffer from an STD.

It is also interesting that using a condom is something that ‘we’ do, not that ‘he’ does (although it is the female partner who has to ‘insist’). Other frames in the readers’
testimonials also evoke negative emotions (‘horror’, ‘shame’, ‘scary’, ‘guilt’) to be dispelled by comforting, and mention of ‘honesty’ in discussing it with their partners.

7.6.2 Status

Here we have a readers’ question in a section entitled ‘My doctor [vocative] – consult the expert’ [see section on visuals above]. This is visually framed with a picture of a doctor and a white cross on red background at the top, and a footnote in small print at the bottom with the biographical details of a doctor (the author of the text on the left, ‘the bodyguard’), who is presumably also the one answering the question, and a disclaimer ‘our advice does not substitute your visit to the doctor’.

The reader signs with initials (no name), and the area of Athens where he lives. He asks:

(11) Τι να κάνει κάποιος αν είναι αλλεργικός στα προφυλακτικά; Να γεμίσει τον πλανήτη με τους απογόνους του;

What should one do if one is allergic to condoms? Fill the planet with his offspring?

‘One’ (κάποιος) here is grammatically masculine, as well as the possessive pronoun (‘his’, ‘του’). The second part of the question relates to the part of the frame of ‘condoms’ that is associated with contraception, and is a rhetorical and somehow humorous question (the answer is obviously ‘no’, and the expert should provide an alternative solution). The rationale of the reader is that (a man) being allergic to condoms will not use them, this will result in lack of contraception, which will result in offspring. It is also presupposed as given that ‘one’ (i.e. the reader, but also the
other ‘ideal’ readers) is very active sexually, as indicated by the hyperbole that without contraception he will ‘fill the planet with his offspring’.

The expert begins his reply by reframing the problem, bringing in what he labels ‘the good news’, namely, that ‘it is not possible that you are [courtesy pl.] allergic [sing.] to condoms in general, but rather to latex’. He suggests visiting a dermatologist ‘before blaming your poor condom’, which somehow personifies the condom as a potential agent of causing harm (in the eyes of the reader), and patient of the act of blaming.

The expert discusses allergy to latex as a minor problem (‘17% of men’ is a ‘small percentage’, ‘rarely is the allergy so acute as to prevent its use’), and the solution is factual, information-oriented and brief – using condoms made of different materials, which can be bought at pharmacies. This is related to the discourse level (unlike, e.g., Cosmopolitan, the content in general does not deal with emotional, evaluative or interpersonal issues such as honesty in discussing with a partner, or experiencing strong negative emotions, and linguistically we do not have evaluative frames evoked or vague terms with unclear informative content).

It is interesting that, in the whole feature, STDs are mentioned only once as a superordinate term (no specific STDs) and ‘offspring’ (rather than, e.g., ‘accidental pregnancy’) also once. These are both mentioned at the beginning of their respective sections, but not referred to again. In the whole text, thus, the problem (disaster, danger etc.) is generally represented as the condom breaking, slipping etc., and the solutions presented have this as the focus (i.e. how to avoid, rather than solve, these problems in the first place). This is in stark contrast with Marie Claire, which does not focus only on the possibility of catching HPV, but also on the possibility of HPV
causing cancer, and then it elaborates on the problems related to cancer therapies. The mention of ‘offspring’ in the reader’s question introduces the other reason for using condoms (contraception), which is not asserted but easily inferable through co-text and readers’ background knowledge (coherence). The framing and the humour bring in another argument in favour of condoms, without bringing in issues such as pregnancy, abortion, the partner involved, or any other emotional or social issues. It does, however, presuppose as given a female partner (or more than one). So, the use of condoms for contraception, the presence of (a) female sexual partner(s), and the fact that being allergic to something means avoiding it, form the inferred ground against which the problem of condom allergy and contraception is profiled. Other methods of contraception, STDs, abortion, any attributes of the concept of partner other than ‘female’ and ‘fertile’, possibility of homosexual partner are, however, backgrounded and not meant to be inferred (attention is drawn away from them).

7.7 Conclusion

In this chapter I focussed mainly on the frames triggered by noun or verb phrases, seeing what is being profiled by the phrase as ‘figure’ and on the rest of the frame evoked as presupposed ‘ground’, which is inferred and necessary for the frame to make sense. In some cases I have contrasted evoked presupposed ‘ground’ with concepts that are probably not inferred (if already part of readers’ frames), and occasionally non-inferable, through attention being directed to other aspects of the frame. Analysing a text for ‘absences’ occurs often in critical analysis of discourse (Sunderland, 2004; van Leeuwen, 1996) – it is interesting to reflect on what (based on the analysts’ knowledge at least) can reasonably assumed to be part of the related
knowledge of the text producer, but not focussed on; what different aspects of the same topic (related to the same 'knowledge network') different texts focus on, and also what is genuinely 'mystifying', and thus with different interpretations for different audiences (based on their level of attention and socio-cognitive representations).

I focussed on metaphorical frames, with knowledge of the source category and the mapping between source and target category serving as the 'ground', and generally on the framing of 'disease', 'sex', 'relationships' and the readers and their (pre)supposed partners.

Frames, however, interact with other levels of discourse – it is not words alone that construct the representation of any abstract or concrete entity. In fact, it proves very difficult (and artificial) to isolate words from their co-text, especially if we are interested in attention issues. On the other hand, as with content analysis and electronic corpus analysis, recurring frames or semantic fields at least indicate concepts which are in some way reiterated and thus allocated a certain amount of attention (and potentially influence the reception of the whole text). Even then, though, we are not talking simply about 'words', but about 'semantic fields', so if this analysis was to be done with quantitative methods, manual annotation would still be necessary prior to quantification.

In the next two chapters I move on to 'sentence and clause level presupposition', examining how clause structure (in interaction with other levels) may contribute to knowledge being presented as contestable or incontestable.
Chapter 8: Sentence level – Main and relative clauses

8.1 Introduction

Moving on from the noun or verb phrase level to the sentence level involves an increase in complexity. Rather than the mere activation of frames (in itself not insignificant, but methodologically easier to examine) here we start being concerned with the way the activated information is combined and how sentence structure influences the salience of elements within the sentence and present propositions and elements of propositions as ‘shared’ or ‘new’ information. In theory, then, every type of sentence would indicate something about the negotiation of knowledge, and consequently in my analysis I have looked at every single sentence in the three texts. However, due to space limitations I have had to exclude part of the analysis from the thesis. I have chosen to exclude the categories occurring less frequently in the data, considering that the most prevalent categories would account for more solid theoretical points. Nevertheless, even when considering only the frame level and part of the sentence level analysis, patterns can be seen to emerge relating to the construction of (the producers of) the magazines as health and sexuality authorities, assumptions of gender and sexuality taken for granted and the legitimation of new information and advice within the matrix of ‘old’ heteronormative assumptions.

8.2 Assertions in main clauses

It is generally assumed that main clauses in the indicative mood constitute ‘assertions’, and that their content is ‘new information’ and more open to contestation
than subordinate clauses constituting ‘presuppositions’. In the current section I would like to suggest that ‘assertions’ are not necessarily open to contestation. ‘Incontestability’ is achieved, on the sentence level, by categorical modality, as well as the fact that often these assertions provide genuinely new information for the reader, which s/he has no resources of contesting without significant processing effort or research ‘outside’ the text, but also, importantly, has no obvious reason to contest. The content of these assertions, and also their function on the text level, contribute to their incontestability. Sometimes these assertions are qualified by ‘boosters’ (Holmes, 1983; 1984; 1990), or mitigated by hedging which may or may not present them as more open to contestation.

8.2.1 Assertions in Marie Claire

Headlines typically introduce new information, presenting the topic of the text. Here it has the form of a full sentence:

(12) Επιτέλους, βρέθηκε το εμβόλιο για τα κονδυλώματα.

‘Finally, the vaccine for genital warts was found.’

The clause is new information in categorical modality, qualified by ‘finally!’ which indicates the desirability of the news.

New and incontestable information in main clauses includes information about the effects of the virus HPV and cervical cancer:

(13) Μία στις τρεις από εμάς μπαίνει στο στόχαστρο του επικίνδυνου ιού HPV

‘One in three of us gets in the sight of the dangerous virus HPV’
Because of him [it] 40 women per day die in Europe

The assertions are presented as incontestable through categorical modality and the evidentiality expressed through the numbers/rough statistics.

Other assertions present the ineffectiveness of cancer treatments:

Surgical operation, chemotherapy and radiotherapy [carry] huge dangers, from disorders of the immune system and sexuality to infertility and miscarriages.

and more details on the properties and effects of HPV:

The dangerous virus causes inflammation, ...

His [its] big advantage/strength is that he [it] acts ... sneakily, ...

Certain types [of HPV] are responsible for the creation of cervical cancer...

Other clauses present new medical and practical information on vaccination and diagnosis, for example:

Other types [of HPV] are responsible for the creation of cervical cancer...
The new vaccine, then [discourse marker], aims at protection from the virus \textit{HPV}, and in particular from the types 6, 11, 16, 18...

(20) \ldotsονομάζεται \textit{Gardasil}...

\ldots[it] is called \textit{Gardasil}...

(21) \textit{στην Ελλάδα θα είναι διαθέσιμο το πρώτο εξάμηνο του 2007}.

In Greece it will be available in the first semester of 2007.

(22) \textit{Ο εμβολιασμός γίνεται στο διάστημα από 9-14 χρονών}

Vaccination takes place in the period 9-14 years old.

(23) \textit{Στη γυναική, η διάγνωση γίνεται με το τεστ ΠΑΠ, αλλά και με κάποιες συμπληρωματικές εξετάσεις...}

In women, diagnosis takes place with the PAP test [cervical screening], but also with some additional tests...

Mitigation and/or modality in relation to frequency and likelihood also seem to present incontestable knowledge, with likelihood as an ‘objective’, statistical likelihood rather than the speakers’ assessment or doubt about the information presented:

(24) \textit{Μερικές φορές τα κονδυλώματα μπορεί να υποχωρήσουν από μόνα τους.}

Sometimes the genital warts may subside by themselves.

(25) \textit{Οι ιοί «νηφηλού κινδύνου» ... δεν προκαλούν πάντα κονδυλώματα και δεν έχουν ορατά συμπτώματα.}

The “high risk” [HPV] viruses... do not always cause genital warts and do not have visible symptoms.
In all of the above examples, information is presented as new (although some of it might be already known to some of the readers).

An interesting example of incontestability is the below:

(26) Ο εμβολιασμός γίνεται στο διάστημα από 9-14 χρονών

Vaccination takes place in the period 9-14 years old

One would expect deontic modality here, indicating that it is somehow desirable for vaccination to take place at this age. It would further imply some degree of obligation of the parents (or the state, if there is a national policy) to make sure that children get vaccinated. The categorical modality presents the factual information as incontestable; deontic modality might make readers feel patronised, and would perhaps create the need for justification of why vaccination at this age is desirable or obligatory. The choice of deontic expression would also make it necessary to indicate the degree of desirability or obligation (at least via the choice of modal expression), and this is not easy in this case, since vaccination could equally well take place at the age of 15, for example.

Using categorical modality avoids the above, and backgrounds these concerns (a reader might not think to question these without prior knowledge). Unqualified, though, it includes a degree of vagueness – does it ‘always’ or ‘usually’ take place at this age? Since the article announces that the vaccine will soon be made available in Greece (not yet available at the time of publication of the article), in which countries does the vaccination ‘take place’?
8.2.2 Assertions in Status

As with the other two texts, main clauses in the indicative tend to present the reader with information which is supposed to be new for him:

(27) Η μαζική παραγωγή των ανδρικών προφυλακτικών ξεκίνησε πριν από 150 χρόνια...

Mass production of male condoms started 150 years ago...

This is ‘historical information’, which is likely to be unknown but which is also not particularly important for the function of ‘giving advice’. It is providing some ‘general knowledge/trivia’ which functions as ‘introduction’ to the paragraph and might make the text more interesting.

(28) Σήμερα, θα βρείτε προφυλακτικά από λάτεξ, από δέρμα ή από πολυουρεθάνη (τα πρώτα, αποδεδειγμένα, προστατεύουν καλύτερα από τα αφροδισία) και επίσης με λιπαντικό ή χωρίς λιπαντικό, καθός και με σπερμοκτόνο ή χωρίς.

Nowadays you will find condoms made of latex, leather or polyurethane (the former are proven to offer better protection against STDs), and also with or without lubricant, as well as with spermicide or without.

The information may or may not be new, or may be partially new as readers may know of some of these types of condoms but not others. Thus, partially this has an ‘informative’ function. In the context of advice, this means that readers can choose from this range the type of condom they find most suitable. Moreover, listing the materials (latex, leather, polyurethane) highlights the variety available, aiming to encourage readers to actually use condoms and implying that ‘not finding a suitable one’ is not an excuse for not doing so.
The verb group ‘you will find’, in terms of modality, involves an epistemic element, but also a deontic element of both obligation and volition, and a dynamic element (one can find these types of condoms). Rather than categorical modality simply stating what kinds of condoms exist, the future tense projects something that is almost certain to happen, and possibly implies a conditional (‘if you are looking for a condom, you will find many different kinds’). It also implies that looking for, finding and using a condom is desirable, and that it is a possible and positive thing that one can find all these types of condoms.

(29) Πολύ σημαντικό κομμάτι είναι η εφαρμογή.

A very important part is the fit.

This is another case of categorical modality which indirectly provides advice (and thus contains an element of deontic modality). The fact that the fit is important means that one must ensure that the condom fits properly. Foregrounding the importance of this fact (via categorical modality, beginning the sentence with ‘very important’, boosting ‘important’ with ‘very’, and also the mere fact that the importance of this parameter is mentioned at all) strengthens the force of the indirect command to ensure proper fit above everything else. The reader is either expected to not be aware of this, in which case the information is new and highlighted as very important, or to be aware of this, in which case the reminder and accompanying ‘boosters’ aim to raise the salience of this fact in his cognition.

This indirect advice is further reinforced by the elaboration in the following sentence:

(30) Το ένα-μέγεθος-για-όλα μας εξει αφήσει χρόνους, ως θεωρία.

‘One-size-fits-all’ as a theory is dead and buried.
This presupposes that it used to be common/shared perception that the size of the condom does not matter. Some people might still share this perception, while others not. ‘Theory’ is a loose (and technically inaccurate) use of the word instead of ‘belief’ or ‘assumption’. The ‘death’ metaphor indicates how definitive this fact is (that people do not believe that anymore). Moreover, this is a conflation of ‘what should be’ represented as ‘what is’ – ‘the theory is dead’ can either mean that people do not believe it any more, or that it has been proven wrong (therefore people should not believe it anymore). Either way the authoritative speaking persona is in a position to know which theory is correct and which is not, and to state that in categorical terms.

The statements below provide information to the question of a reader who complains of allergy to latex:

(31) Το 17% των ανδρών εμφανίζει κάποια αλλεργία σε αυτό το υλικό.

17% of men display some allergy to this material.

This (new, categorically stated information) in itself can be read in two ways – on the one hand, this is presumably a small percentage, so it is possible that the reader is not in fact allergic to latex. On the other hand, allergy to latex is presented as an existing problem, sufficiently well known for research to have been done on it (as statistics routinely ‘presuppose’ research).

(32) Οι περισσότεροι απλώς αποδίδουν κάποιο υπόκειμενο πρόβλημα (που επιτείνεται με το λάτεξ) στην επαφή με το λάτεξ.

Most [of them] just attribute some underlying problem (which gets exacerbated with latex) to contact with latex.

‘Οι περισσότεροι’ (‘most of them’) here refers to men who experience irritation when using latex condoms. In conjunction with the previously mentioned (now taken as
information that only 17% of men are actually allergic to latex it suggests that the reader may have some other dermatological problem which he attributes to latex. On text level this legitimates the advice that follows, which is that the reader should see a doctor in order to find out what the problem is.

A section of the text is entitled (capitals in original):

(33) ΚΑΝΑΜΕ ΤΗ «ΒΡΩΜΙΚΗ ΔΟΥΛΕΙΑ» ΚΑΙ ΣΑΣ ΠΑΡΟΥΣΙΑΖΟΥΜΕ ΤΟΥΣ ΝΙΚΗΤΕΣ ΣΕ ΚΑΘΕ ΚΑΤΗΓΟΡΙΑ.

WE DID THE "DIRTY JOB" AND WE PRESENT YOU THE WINNERS IN EACH CATEGORY.

These are two co-ordinated statements, presenting events in temporal order. ‘We did the “dirty job”’ is vague, as it is not clear what the ‘dirty job’ is. However, both in Greek and in English, it means a job nobody wants to do. The negative, and here metaphorical, term ‘dirty’ thus carries the connotations of ‘unpleasant’ and ‘undesirable’, but it can also be more ambiguously connoted as related to sex, which can be positive or negative depending on one’s attitudes to sex, or particular sexual acts. In the context of Status, and other lifestyle magazines, it is positive as sexual activity is presented as given and desirable.

What follows (the next clause but also the whole section) indicates that the ‘dirty job’ is a kind of research into the various types of condoms, although the collective ‘we’ standing for Status obscures exactly who did the research. It is also not stated how the research was conducted, but the ‘insider’ commentary and the term ‘dirty job’ could imply this was done by actually having sex using the condoms. This implicature is however quite clearly defeasible, as ‘dirty job’ is still quite vague and it is up to the reader to make (or not make) the cognitive effort of figuring out what this might
mean. The statement nevertheless functions as legitimation of the (new) information in this section, as it is doing this job that enables the author(s) to have an authoritative evaluation of the condoms and decide on their advantages and disadvantages.

‘we present you the winners in each category’ is a metalinguistic comment on what is to follow, and through existential presuppositions lets the readers know that condoms belong to different categories (which can be taken to be known, as different types of condoms have already been listed) and that certain brands are better than others in each category.

This is followed by ‘new information’ on specific brands of condoms (the text is accompanied by the brand names and pictures of the types of condom in question):

(34) [Είναι] Το αντίστοιχο ενός παντελονιού τζιν: βολικό, άνετο και φτιαγμένο για όλα τα γούστα, όλες τις ώρες και όλες τις περιστάσεις.

[It is] The equivalent of a pair of jeans: convenient, comfortable and made for all tastes, all times and all occasions.

(35) [Έχει] Καλή εφαρμογή, ευχάριστη αίσθηση στιβαρότητας και ασφάλειας.

[It has] A good fit, pleasant feeling of sturdiness and security.

(36) Σημαντικά λεπτότερο από τα στάνταρ του εμπορίου, ... αφήνει εξαιρετική αίσθηση και διευκολύνει την επαφή.

Significantly thinner than the commercial standard [ones], ... it leaves an exceptional feeling and facilitates contact.

The content of these sentences, apart from the ostensive function of informing, also has a promotional function, presenting the advantages of the condoms deemed to be ‘the best in their category’. The vocabulary/register is also similar to advertising.
The best polyurethane condom is at the same time one of the thinnest in the market.

This is factual information which can be interpreted as an advantage insofar as there is the underlying presupposed evaluative belief that, for a condom, ‘thin is good’, which, in this text, has been primed by first presenting ‘the best thin condom’ which ‘leaves an exceptional feeling and facilitates contact’ (via positive vocabulary such as ‘exceptional feeling’ and ‘facilitates’).

Mentioning a disadvantage of the polyurethane condom appears to balance things out and give the text a more ‘informative’ and less ‘promotional’ character:

Its largest disadvantage [is] the worse feeling (like a plastic bag) and fragility.

However, it should be noted that these disadvantages are characteristics of all polyurethane condoms and not just the particular brand in question.

As is often the case, direct statements are used in order to not only present ‘new information’ but also to ‘justify advice’. In that sense they are presented as unquestionable beliefs, which are most likely to be new. Even in the case where they are not new, they still emphasise the importance of the advice, explicitly fulfilling the felicity condition that advice is to the benefit of the advisee, but also that the advisor is more knowledgeable and thus in a position to offer guidance and advice.
Early in the text (1st paragraph) we have a disclaimer (example (39), which is the very first 1st sentence of the first paragraph), and a ‘statement of ignorance’ (example (40), the second sentence of the first paragraph), very common in advice texts, justifying the overall need for advice.

The disclaimer reads as follows:

(39) Τα προφυλακτικά σίγουρα δεν είναι ένα πρωτότυπο θέμα, η σωστή χρήση τους όμως μπορεί, το λιγότερο, να σας γλιτώσει από πολλές σελίδες διάβασμα με θέμα τα αφροδίσια.

Condoms are certainly not an original subject/topic, their correct use, however, can, to say the least, save you [courtesy plural] many pages of reading on STDs.

The first statement, ‘condoms are certainly not an original subject/topic’, concedes that most readers have, or should have, some knowledge on the subject of ‘condoms’. This is a ‘metadiscursive’ comment, namely, a comment on the author and readers’ shared socio-cognitive representations. There is, however, the presupposed and implied assumption (on behalf of the author), that there is still knowledge lacking on the part of the audience. This is confirmed by the following sentence:

(40) Ειδικά στην Ελλάδα, το 77% των ανδρών ηλικίας 20-45 ετών αγνοεί αρκετές από τις βασικές αρετές τους.

Especially in Greece, the 77% of men aged between 20-45 years old are not aware of quite a few of their [condoms’] basic virtues.

Presented as new information, this assertion justifies the previously presupposed (‘backgrounded’ but ‘given’) assumption that readers most probably do not have adequate knowledge on condoms. Therefore it fulfils the felicity condition of the
speech act of ‘informing’ that S informs H of something H does not already know. It also prepares the ground for (a) directive speech act(s) to follow, as H will need to be given advice for H’s own benefit by the more knowledgeable S on how to use condoms properly.

Although this new information is presented as factual and incontestable (categorical modality, statistics), the source of this information is not given in any shape or form. The text relies on the commonly shared belief that such statistics derive from some kind of survey or research.

Apart from the overall ignorance of the audience as justification for the need of advice and information, assertions are often provided as justification or explanation of specific pieces of advice.

(41) Ἐνα λημένο προφυλακτικό είναι πιο επικίνδυνο από ἕνα ποτήρι γάλα.

An expired condom is more dangerous than an expired glass of milk.

(42) ...τα μακριά νύχια μπορεί να προκαλέσουν μικρές καταστροφές.

...long nails can cause small disasters.

(43) Ἡ στοματική, ἡ πρωκτική καὶ ἡ ἐντονη κολπική [επαφή] μπορεί να οδηγήσουν σε θραύση του.

Oral, anal and vigorous vaginal [contact] can lead to its breakage.

(44) ...η θερμοκρασία καὶ οἱ ἐντονὲς τριβὲς [στὴν πίσω τσέπη σας] θα μειώσουν τὶς αντοχὲς του.

...the temperature and strong frictions [in your back pocket] will reduce its endurance.
On the frame level all of the above contain negative (and in particular danger related) vocabulary, and these are the only examples that such vocabulary is used in this text (as opposed to the prevalence of the frame of danger in the women's magazines).

The statements appear to contain new information, presented as authoritative although sometimes modified in terms of certainty or frequency. An increased (vaguely termed) 'danger', reduced endurance and the possibility of 'small disasters' and 'breakage' all point to the probability of something negative happening. The authority lies in that the reader might have not been aware of these possibilities, while the author is aware of all dangers and warns the readers against them.

8.2.3 Assertions in Cosmopolitan

Due to its genre and content, the feature article contains a lot of information that is presumed to be new to the readers. There are very few main clauses, however, which have as their main function just presenting new information. Some of them present information that might be shared, or expected, serving to link to a further more surprising piece of new information (as is the case with adversative connections), or to move on to the 'advice' section of the text, which should contain advice new to the reader.

There is new medical information about the diseases discussed (STDs) in categorical modality and authoritative tone, but they may be modified for frequency, as in Marie
Claire — i.e. it may be indicated that something is not always the case, as in the example below.\(^{94}\)

(45) Συνήθως δεν δημιουργούνται κονδυλώματα, δεν νιώθεις άρρωστη και μετά από μερικούς μήνες μέχρι πολλά χρόνια το ανοσοποιητικό σύστημα αποβάλλει τον ιό από τον οργανισμό.

Usually no genital warts are created, you don’t feel ill and after some months to many years the immune system expels the virus from the organism.

(46) ...ο έρπης εισέρχεται στο νευρικό σύστημα, κρύβεται στη σπονδυλική στήλη και πολλαπλασιάζεται στα νευρικά κύτταρα γύρω από την περιοχή που μολύνθηκε.

...herpes enters the nervous system, hides in the spine and multiplies in the nerve cells around the infected area.

(47) Τα έλκη σχηματίζουν φουσκάλες, σκάνε και γιατρεύονται μετά από περίπου δύο βδομάδες.

Ulcers form blisters, burst and heal about two weeks.

(48) Τα ΣΜΝ μεταδίδονται μέσω των σωματικών υγρών και από την απευθείας επαφή του δέρματος. Οι ιοί δεν επιβιώνουν περισσότερο από μερικά δευτερόλεπτα στον αέρα.

STDs are transmitted through bodily fluids and from direct skin contact. Viruses don’t survive for longer than a few seconds in the air.

(49) [Η γονόρροια είναι] λοίμωξη που προκαλείται από έναν τύπο βακτηριδίου που ζει στο σπέρμα, στα προσπερματικά υγρά και στα υγρά του κόλπου. Μέσα σε λίγες εβδομάδες ο ιός εισέρχεται στον κόλπο και από εκεί προοδεύεται στα αναπαραγωγικά όργανα.

---

\(^{94}\) Although in the *Cosmopolitan* text it is always clear from the co-text, in the analysis I do not always specify which STD is being talked about. This is because in this thesis I am more interested in how the information is presented to the reader, than STDs themselves. Occasionally the choice of information (content) is also significant, or simply helps make sense of the sentence, and in these cases I elaborate as necessary.
Gonorrhoea is an infection caused by a bacterium type living in the sperm, pre-sperm fluids and vaginal fluids. Within a few weeks the virus enters the vagina and from there is promoted to the reproductive organs.

(50) Η λοίμωξη θεραπεύεται με αντιβίωση.

The infection is cured with antibiotics.

(51) Ο ιός [HIV] ζει στο σπέρμα, στο προσπερματικό υγρό, στα υγρά του κόλπου και στο αίμα.

The [HIV] virus lives in the sperm, pre-sperm fluid, vaginal fluids and blood.

The affinities with medical and educational discourse mean that most of the above information is provided so that the readers will be able to identify the diseases and their symptoms, be aware of the ways of transmission and perhaps understand more the physiological makeup of these diseases (e.g. viruses vs. bacteria).

However the characteristics of the diseases, as well as statistics of people suffering from them, also serve to accentuate the danger posed by carelessness/ignorance, and thus justify the advice and convince the reader to read on and follow the advice:

(52) Τα ποσοστά αυτών των ασθενειών είναι υψηλά.

The percentages of these diseases are high.

(53) Οι γυναίκες έχουν περισσότερες βλεννογόνες μεμβράνες στα γεννητικά τους όργανα από τους άντρες και οι λοιμώξεις ευμερεία υπέρ του υγρού και ζεστού περιβάλλον.

Women have more mucous membranes in their genitals than men and infections prosper in this wet and warm environment.

(54) Επιπλέον, μέχρι την ηλικία των 25 οι ίδιοι διαπερνούν πιο εύκολα την κολπική κούλτητα.
Moreover, until the age of 25 viruses penetrate more easily the vaginal cavity.

(55) Το HPV έχει λάβει τη μορφή επιδημίας στις ηλικίες 20-25.

HPV has taken the form of an epidemic among ages 20-25.

(56) ... τα κονδυλώματα είναι πολύ μεταδοτικά...

...genital warts are very contagious....

At the end of every section (one for every disease), there is a sub-section entitled ‘conclusions’. Depending on the way of reading the article (from the beginning to the end, or just bits and pieces), this information may not be new, in the sense that it has been mentioned before in the text. It is ‘new’ in the sense that the reader is presumed to not know this before reading the article. Moreover, it is important, and its repetition and visual salience (text-final, heading ‘CONCLUSION’ in capitals, background colour of this section different to the rest of the text) emphasise this. Whether read for the first time, or as a ‘reminder’, it is presented as the new information the reader must retain from this section about the respective STD:

(57) ΣΥΜΠΕΡΑΣΜΑ: Δύο τύποι HPV μπορεί να προκαλέσουν γεννητικά κονδυλώματα. Άλλοι 15 τύποι μπορεί να δημιουργήσουν αλλοιώσεις στον τράχηλο προκαλώντας καρκίνο.

CONCLUSION: Two types of HPV can cause genital warts. Another 15 types can create cervical malformations causing cancer.

The epistemic can/may has two functions: it indicates that lack of these symptoms does not necessarily mean that a person does not have the virus, and it also indicates that having the virus does not necessarily result in further health problems for everyone. The epistemic modality does not necessarily mitigate the threat, though, as
its presence enables the author to discuss (and mentally activate) the worst case scenarios without being inaccurate.

(58) ΣΥΜΠΕΡΑΣΜΑ: Ο έρπης είναι ένας ιός που δεν θεραπεύεται, αλλά αντιμετωπίζεται. Προκαλεί εξάρσεις με επώδυνες φουσκάλες και μεταδίδεται μέσω της επαφής του δέρματος.

CONCLUSION: Herpes is a virus which is not curable, but is treatable. It causes outbreaks with painful blisters and is transmitted via skin contact.

(59) ΣΥΜΠΕΡΑΣΜΑ: Οι τριχομονάδες προκαλούνται από ένα μικροοργανισμό και μεταδίδονται σχεδόν πάντα με το σεξ.

CONCLUSION: Trichomoniasis is caused by a microorganism and transmitted almost always through sex.

Categorical modality in most of these examples is quite notable, especially as, in some cases, it is used instead of other, equally grammatical and stylistically more elegant constructions. For example, in the case I have translated as ‘Herpes is a virus which is not curable, but is treatable’, the word-for-word translation would be ‘Herpes is a virus which is not cured, but is treated’, although even in Greek dynamic/epistemic modality would be perfectly in order. The same applies to other examples, such as: ‘Moreover, until the age of 25 viruses penetrate more easily the vaginal cavity’, ‘With the use of a condom the danger gets reduced by 90%’, ‘The intestine skin gets injured much more easily than the vagina...’. All of these examples could have been expressed with dynamic or epistemic modality, while in the example ‘Women have 1 out of 1 000 chances to catch HIV through vaginal sex,...’ ‘chances’ clearly indicates a degree of likelihood. However the choice of numbers/statistics with ‘have’ formally indicating categorical modality again creates the impression of scientific objectivity and authority.
8.3 Relative clauses

According to Fauconnier, restrictive/defining relative clauses are processed as part of the noun phrase they qualify (1994: 9, 33; 1984; 1971/1975). Grammatically, often they could equally well be rephrased as adjectives, participles or prepositional phrases. Consider the following examples from *Marie Claire*:

Originals (and translations, with relative clauses):

(60) οι θεραπείες που εφαρμόζονται σήμερα έχουν πολλά μειονεκτήματα...

the therapies which are being applied nowadays have many disadvantages

(61) τα τελευταία στατιστικά στοιχεία που αφορούν το πρόβλημα του καρκίνου του τραχήλου

the most recent statistics which concern/concerning on the problem of cervical cancer

Alternatives (and alternative translations, without relative clauses):

(60') οι σήμερα εφαρμοζόμενες θεραπείες έχουν πολλά μειονεκτήματα...

(60'') οι σύγχρονες θεραπείες έχουν πολλά μειονεκτήματα

the currently applied therapies have many disadvantages

(61') τα τελευταία στατιστικά στοιχεία σχετικά με το πρόβλημα του καρκίνου του τραχήλου

the most recent statistics concerning/on the problem of cervical cancer
Restrictive/defining relative clauses are thus taken to hold when the main clause of the sentence in which they occur is negated, since they still serve to determine the referent of the noun phrase they modify. They are presented as an incontestable part of the frame evoked by the noun phrase they qualify, and actually contesting them would require cross frame negation.

Non-restrictive/non-defining relative clauses syntactically resemble main clauses in that they are always in the indicative in Greek, but they have a relative pronoun in place of a pronoun or noun phrase. A rather significant difference between non-defining relative and main clauses is that their syntactical position assigns them a parenthetical status, which renders them less prominent and therefore presumably less open to contestation than main clauses. They can function as reminders of (presented as) shared information, or explanations/elaborations which are not open to contestation.

8.3.1 Relative clauses in Marie Claire

Defining/restrictive relative clauses are best analysed in conjunction with the existential presuppositions underlying the noun phrases. In the above examples from *Marie Claire*, ‘the currently applied therapies’ and ‘statistics on cervical cancer’ are also informative, as the referents have not been introduced earlier in the text. The readers are being informed that there are therapies at the moment for cervical cancer (yet insufficient, in contrast to the new preventive vaccine), and that there are statistics on cervical cancer (rather than guesses and estimations).
The below examples suggest that non-defining/non-restrictive relative clauses introduce non-defeasible, presented- as- shared, information.

(62) Το νέο εμβόλιο... στοχεύει στην προστασία από... τους τύπους 6, 11, 16, 18, που ενθάδεναι για τον καρκίνο του τραχήλου, ...

The new vaccine... aims at protection from... the types 6, 11, 16, 18, which are responsible for cervical cancer, ...

The knowledge that the types 6, 11 etc. of HPV are responsible for cervical cancer is presumably not already shared between author and readers, but among the medical community. The fact that it has to be mentioned indicates that readers are not expected to know that, but, at the same time, it is incontestable information, and necessary for understanding the aims and effects of the vaccine.

On the other hand, we may have information which is not really new, both because the readers will already have this knowledge, but also because it may have already been triggered or introduced earlier in the text.

(63) ...αντισώματα ενάντια στο μισητό ιό, που μπορεί να μετατρέψει ένα βράδυ έντονο πάθος σε πραγματικό εφιάλτη.

...antibodies against the hatred virus, which can transform an evening of strong passion into a real nightmare.

Here the information is shared and expected. The modality indicates a degree of likelihood (epistemic), or ‘propensity’/ability of the personified virus (dynamic modality) without presenting the nightmare scenario as inevitable. The dynamic aspect however (i.e. the ability of the personified virus) indicates that this is not just a matter of chance (the text is indeed about how this personified agent can be stopped from fulfilling this potential).
(64) Οι ιοί «ψηλού κινδύνου», που ευθύνονται για τον καρκίνο του τραχήλου, δεν προκαλούν πάντα κονδυλώματα και δεν έχουν ορατά συμπτώματα.

The ‘high risk’ viruses, which are responsible for cervical cancer, don’t always cause genital warts and don’t have visible symptoms.

Here the non-restrictive relative clause does not just provide additional information, but is presented as explanation of the term ‘high risk’ viruses – technically this means that ‘high risk’ should entail ‘cervical cancer’, but since this is not automatically inferable, explanation is needed. Explanations are, due to their function, necessarily presented as incontestable information, in that they are meant to provide readily acceptable support for what they explain. However, they are ‘new information’ or ‘reminders’ in that they are taken to not be currently among the beliefs accessed or accessible by the recipient for the processing of the discourse.

At the same time this relative clause could well be seen as restrictive/defining, in that it sets apart the viruses in question from other viruses, and thus are included in the mental model of the referent of the noun phrase. There is the issue here of taking punctuation as the deciding criterion of whether to classify a relative clause as restrictive or non-restrictive, as punctuation might involve mistakes on behalf of the author, creating an effect different to the one intended by the author, or might be ignored or processed differently by the reader.

Compare with

(65) η νέα ιατρική μέθοδος αφορά στην καταπολέμηση ενός από τους πιο επικίνδυνους ιοδός που ταλαιπωρούν εκατομμύρια άνδρες και γυναίκες ανά τον κόσμο.
the new medical method concerns the fighting off of one of the most
dangerous viruses which hassle millions of men and women around the
world.

‘One of the most dangerous viruses’ and ‘viruses of “high risk”’ are both qualified by
relative clauses, but, based on punctuation, in the former case the relative clause is
restrictive, and in the latter it is not. It does not seem to me that whether the sentence
is restrictive or not makes a significant difference in meaning in these two cases.

The noun phrase ‘one of the most dangerous viruses which hassle millions of men and
women’ presumably sets the virus as a referent apart from some dangerous viruses
which affect fewer people, while if it was a restrictive relative clause the information
about the number of people affected would be presented parenthetically as additional
information. In both cases the framing of the virus as dangerous is presented as
incontestable, and the number of people it affects is presented as also incontestable
new information. I would suggest that this kind of non-restrictive relative clause is a
less prototypical example in comparison to the most prototypical function of non-
restrictive relative clauses for reference, as in ‘The woman who is wearing the red
coat’, setting the referent apart from other women not wearing red coats. In this text
both restrictive and non-restrictive relative clauses can be used to introduce potentially
new information (which is not required for reference but for adding elements to the
‘virus’ frame), and present it as incontestable.

Consider also the following:

(66) Ο επικίνδυνος ίός προκαλεί λοιμώξη, που έχει δυσάρεστες
συνέπειες για τον οργανισμό.

The dangerous virus causes inflammation, which has unpleasant
consequences for the organism.
The non-restrictive relative clause here is also not contestable. It could be qualifying
the whole main clause or simply the noun ‘inflammation’. Either way, it is most
probably not only incontestable but also shared and/or expected knowledge (part of
cognitive frame of inflammation), because it is sufficiently vague. A reader may well
not have the specific details of what each inflammation causes, but no inflammation is
expected to be anything but negative/unpleasant. So its inclusion here is not so much
in order to provide (questionable) information in an unquestionable way, but rather to
reinforce the already existing and mutually manifest negativity, as a ‘reminder’. This
could equally well be expressed through a restrictive clause, which would set the
‘inflammation’ apart from other, less dangerous inflammations. This would then be
similar to the construction ‘one of the most dangerous viruses which hassle millions of
men and women around the world’.

Although in theory then restrictive relative clauses present information which is
already shared and incontestable as a way of determining a referent, while non-
restrictive relative clauses introduce new information, or reminders as additional and
incontestable information, this is not a clear cut distinction. Both kinds of clauses
package the information as incontestable and given. Whether the information is
backgrounded or foregrounded seems to depend more on the length of the clause, and
whether it re-iterates previously mentioned information, than the presence or not of a
relative pronoun (while other syntactic patterns may contribute to directing attention
and emphasis – see examples in 8.4). At least in the current data, choosing whether to
present information in a relative clause or not seems to contribute more than anything
to stylistic variation – i.e., in order to avoid a monotonous ‘list’ of main clauses; the
content and function of both relative and main clauses (presenting incontestable
information in an authoritative tone) generally overlap in this text.
8.3.2 Relative clauses in Status

In the Status text there are three relative clauses which seem to be non-restrictive/non-defining, and a restrictive/defining one. The non-defining clauses function similarly to the ones from *Marie Claire*, analysed above; they present incontestable information which may be new or a reminder of shared information, providing some explanation or elaboration:

(32) Οι περισσότεροι απλώς αποδίδουν κάποιο υποκείμενο πρόβλημα (που επιτείνεται με το λάτεξ) στην επαφή με το λάτεξ.
Most [of them] just attribute some underlying problem (which gets exacerbated with latex) to contact with latex.

(67) Αν τύχει και ανήκετε σε αυτό το μικρό ποσοστό, που όντως έχει πρόβλημα με τα λάτεξ προφυλακτικά, τότε μπορείτε να χρησιμοποιήσετε τα προφυλακτικά από δέρμα προβάτου (που υπάρχουν στα φαρμακεία) ή, απλούστερα, τα προφυλακτικά από πολυουρεθάνη.
If you happen to belong to this small percentage, which indeed has a problem with latex condoms, then you can use the condoms of sheep skin (which exist in pharmacies), or, more simply, the condoms from polyurethane.

All three clauses provide explanation or elaboration on the noun they modify. In one case they contain shared knowledge which is repeated to facilitate processing: ‘this small percentage, which indeed has a problem with latex condoms’. ‘This small percentage’ anaphorically refers to the 17% of men who are allergic to latex. ‘Indeed’ indicates some doubt as to whether everyone who thinks they are allergic to latex are actually allergic.
The relative clauses ‘which gets exacerbated with latex’ and ‘which exist in pharmacies’ both occur in brackets and provide probably new information. The presentation of this content in parenthetical relative clauses is partly in order to achieve a more economical and elegant stylistic effect, but also probably indicates that this information does not merit emphasis by being placed in a main clause. ‘which gets exacerbated with latex’ explains why someone who has a different problem would assume that it is a latex allergy, and ‘which exist in pharmacies’ provides information as to where condoms made of sheep skin are to be found (this information is not necessary for the more widespread polyurethane condoms, or for the latex condoms – it is presupposed that the reader knows where to get those).

The example below is a defining/restrictive relative clause, and it functions like other constructions I have analysed as ‘marked syntax’ in the 8.4:

(68) Πράγμα που πρακτικά σημαίνει ότι πρέπει να δοκιμάσετε διάφορα μεγέθη μέχρι να βρείτε αυτό που σας ταιριάζει.

[A thing] which practically means that you have to try various sizes until you find the one that suits you.

In Greek it would be possible to just say ‘which practically means that you have to try various sizes until you find the one that suits you’ (without the subject ‘a thing’), not only as a continuation of the previous sentence but also at the beginning of the sentence (although probably, like in English, this would not be acceptable in academic written genres). This would then indicate a close connection between this and the previous sentence.

The whole construction ‘A thing which practically means that’ provides a lengthy preface to the oblique assertion/command ‘you have to try various sizes until you find
the one that suits you'. This does not seem to have the effect of weakening or backgrounding the speech act(s) performed, but rather the contrary.

8.3.3 Relative clauses in Cosmopolitan

The *Cosmopolitan* article is mostly translated from an English original, in some cases adapted. The author is named as Hallie Levine, a health and lifestyle journalist (now Hallie Levine Sklar). I assume the original is not British due to references to a health system quite different from that of the UK, which are too many and extensive to have been simply adapted to become closer to the Greek context. From other online writings of Hallie Levine on the subject, with references to health insurance, I assume that she is American/writes for an American audience.\(^{95}\)

It appears that the article is a very close translation because the syntax, and occasionally the vocabulary, of the article often sound quite awkward in Greek. In some cases it has been possible for me to guess the English phrase which has been translated almost word-for-word. In some other cases, however, this is not so obvious, and translating back to English has resulted in even more awkward constructions. I have tried to avoid this, but sometimes I deliberately draw attention to the awkwardness or prolixity of the Greek text, as it is this text that the Greek readers are confronted with and have to process. It should be noted that although this excessive use of relative clauses often results from lack of effort on behalf of the *Cosmopolitan* translator, equally often certain adjectives or participles of English cannot be directly translated into Greek equivalents, and (restrictive) relative clauses have to be used,

\(^{95}\) See last section here [http://www.cosmopolitan.com/advice/health/young-women-health-6](http://www.cosmopolitan.com/advice/health/young-women-health-6), last accessed 11 Aug 2011. Unfortunately I have not been able to locate the English original of this particular article online.
unless the text is revised quite drastically (which apparently is not the case here). Below I present a selection of examples from the data.

Restrictive/defining relative clauses mainly serve to clarify reference, and, as I mentioned above (in 8.3), could have been incorporated into more concise Noun Phrases. ‘The areas which got infected’ could be ‘the infected areas’; ‘an STD which doesn’t have symptoms’ could be ‘an STD without symptoms’.

Some nouns need this clarification in a relative clause e.g. ‘the areas... which came in contact with those of your partner’s’, ‘the way [in which] he reacted’, ‘a subject [which] I don’t discuss easily’, as ‘area’, ‘way’ and ‘subject’ are quite vague nouns in themselves:

(69) ...κονδυλώματα, λευκά ή στο χρώμα του δέρματος εξογκώματα στο αιδοίο, στον κόλπο, στον τράχηλο ή στον πρωκτό – τα σημεία δηλαδή που ήρθαν σε επαφή με αυτά του συντρόφου σου.

...genital warts, white or skin-coloured bumps on the vulva, vagina, cervix or anus – the areas, that is, which came in contact with those of your partner’s.

(70) ...εκτίμησα τον τρόπο που αντέδρασε και κατάλαβα ότι είναι κάποιος που πρέπει να κρατήσω.

...I appreciated the way in which he reacted and I realised that he is somebody that I must keep.

(71) «Μου αρέσει πολύ να είμαι μαζί σου, γι’αυτό θέλω να είμαι ευλογημένη για ένα θέμα που δεν το συζητάω εύκολα. ...»

‘I like being with you a lot, that’s why I want to be honest with you about a subject which I don’t discuss easily. ...’
‘Women who have caught it’ in the below could also be ‘infected women’ or ‘female patients’ etc.:

(72) Το 75% των γυναικών που έχουν κολλήσει δεν νιώθουν τίποτα όσο το βακτήριο κάνει τη ζημιά του.

75% of women who have caught [it] don’t feel anything while the bacterium is doing its damage.

However, the relative clause creates more distance between the referent and the property described – ‘women who have caught it’ are still primarily women, who, among other things, have an STD, while ‘infected women’ or ‘female patients’ would be primarily described in terms of their disease. The same applies to the ‘areas which got infected’ and having sex with ‘someone who has been infected’ – this generally seems to result in representing the infection as something separate from the bodies of the patients or the patients themselves. The use of tenses referring to the past (including present perfect, which implies a past action), which would have been impossible without the use of full clauses, contributes to this, as present tense in this context would imply a ‘timeless’ condition. Compare this to ‘10% of women who have Chlamydia cannot have children’ – in this case the women referred to seem to still ‘have chlamydia’, and be unable to have children for ever (while someone who ‘has caught’ an STD can still get rid of it).

There are some cases, nevertheless, which are quite obviously awkward in Greek, and could potentially make processing more difficult for readers. For example:

(72) [Η γονόρροια είναι] λοίμωξη που προκαλείται από έναν τύπο βακτηριδίου που ζει στο σπέρμα …

[Gonorrhoea is an] infection which is caused by a bacterium type which lives in the sperm
In the English original this could have been something like: ‘[Gonorrhea is an] infection caused by a bacterium type living in the sperm’. A more concise translation in Greek would be

(72') Η γονόρροια προκαλείται από έναν τύπο βακτηριδίων που ζει...

Gonorrhoea is caused by a bacterium type which lives...

As it is, currently the use of relative clauses, although awkward, does not impair understanding (although it might make processing more demanding), and it is reminiscent of scientific or academic writing, which also include many relative clauses in Greek.

An example I found particularly awkward/unusual in Greek was ‘I realised that he is somebody that I must keep’ (example 70). I suspect that the English original must have been ‘he is a keeper’, which, in itself, entails an element of irony in humorously presenting a partner as an object or pet one can keep or discard, but by now it has been conventionalised. Since there is no one-word equivalent in Greek, one could use a similar noun (e.g. ‘κελεπούρι’, slang for ‘bargain’, which would be perhaps too informal for the tone of the feature), or use a different relative clause, e.g. ‘somebody worth staying with’. The stylistic difference, however, is so small, and the semantic difference negligible, so that such translations would still be processed accurately in the co-text, and probably contribute to the influence of English as a lingua franca on Greek, not only on a lexical but also on a syntactical/stylistic level.

All of the relative clauses identified are slightly more salient than adjectives and other elements of noun phrases, because they are longer, but since they are still modifying a noun (or pronoun), they would still require ‘cross-frame negation’ in order to be
question or negated. In that sense they are closer to presuppositions on a frame level, since they modify the framing of the referents in the text.

The below non-restrictive relative clauses present new information to the reader:

\[(73)\] ... προχωροῦν στη μήτρα και τις σάλπιγγες σου προκαλώντας σοβαρή λοίμωξη, που σε κάποιες περιπτώσεις οδηγεί σε στειρότητα.

...it progresses in your uterus and fallopian tubes causing serious infection, which in some cases leads to infertility/sterility.

\[(74)\] Εκείνη όμως με έφερε σε επαφή με την αδελφή της, που είχε επίσης τον ιό,...

She however brought me in touch with her sister, who also had the virus,...

Although the clauses ‘which in some cases leads to infertility/sterility’ and ‘who also had the virus’ modify a particular noun in the preceding main clause, they seem to function as meta-representative explanations of why the previous information was mentioned. Thus, it is important that the speaker got in touch with her friend’s sister, because the latter also had the virus. In the example ‘serious infection, which in some cases leads to infertility/sterility’, the relative clause justifies why the infection is characterised as ‘serious’.

8.4 Marked syntax

In this section I discuss cases of marked syntax which involve a combination of main clauses and relative clauses. I have identified such examples only in the texts from *Marie Claire* and *Cosmopolitan*, possibly because the *Status* text is much shorter.
8.4.1 Cleft-like constructions and marked syntax in *Marie Claire*

Clefts, pseudo-clefts and cleft-like constructions constitute the ‘grey area’ in between syntax and non-syntactically marked emphasis, indicating figure-ground distinctions in discourse (see Levinson, 1983; Sperber and Wilson, 1986). Sperber and Wilson (1986: 202) discuss cleft sentences together with other kinds of emphasis (including sound volume and intonation) as minimising processing effort by emphasising the new or important element in the sentence. The line between cleft sentences and other forms of emphasis becomes even more blurred when we compare English to other languages. In Greek, which is a pro-drop language, including a pronoun can produce the same effects as a cleft construction in English, for example. Thus, it is difficult to identify and analyse a category ‘cleft constructions’ in Greek data. The examples I discuss in this section do not constitute marked syntax in that they are somehow deviant or unusual for Greek speakers; they are, however, choices of phrasing that are somehow convoluted ways of putting something which could have been expressed much more briefly and concisely. They include either the 3rd person verb ‘πρόκειται’ (‘It/this is about...’), or NP + relative clause where a main or relative clause alone could be used, or a combination of both.

(75) ...τα τελευταία στατιστικά στοιχεία που αφορούν το πρόβλημα του καρκίνου του τραχήλου, ασθένεια που αποτελεί τα δεύτερη συχνότερη αιτία θανάτου μετά τον καρκίνο του μαστού μεταξύ των γυναικών 15-44 χρονών.

...the latest statistics which concern/concerning the problem of cervical cancer, [an] illness which constitutes the second most frequent cause of death after breast cancer among women 15-44 years old.
'an illness' here is redundant – one could have said 'cervical cancer, which constitutes...'. As it stands, the construction can be seen as appositional, functioning like a non-restrictive relative clause, in apposition to its antecedent 'cervical cancer'. Alternatively, it could have been phrased as 'cervical cancer, which is an illness which...', or it could have been put as a separate main clause: 'Cervical cancer is an illness which...'. It is easy to see that the latter two options could have been avoided for economy. Moreover, pragmatically, stating through assertion that cervical cancer is an illness could easily come across as patronising, since most readers of Marie Claire would be expected to know that. The NP + relative clause construction allows for the inclusion of the word 'illness', adding to the cumulative effect of the overall fear-laden vocabulary of the text, as discussed in the previous chapter (Chapter 7). The content of the non-restrictive relative clause is new information, presented as given but probably foregrounded due to its length, the choice of syntax and also its content.

A similar construction occurs in

(76) Στην «καλύτερη» περίπτωση δημιουργεί κονδυλώματα, ...που προκαλούν ήπιο πόνο, ...ή ακόμα και κολπική αιμορραγία, συμπτώματα που κρύουν τον κώδωνα του κινδύνου και οδηγούν τους ασθενείς στο γιατρό.

In the “best” case, it [HPV] creates genital warts, ...which cause mild pain, ...or even vaginal bleeding, symptoms which ring the alarm bell and lead patients to the doctor.

Through the main clause we have incontestable new information – ‘in the “best” case’ intensifies the proposition expressed, because it means that if there are no genital warts, it can only be something worse.
The fact that the preceding clause presents a list of symptoms makes the construction ‘symptoms which ring the alarm bell’ more necessary than in the previous example, as ‘symptoms’ summarises the list. Omitting it and simply including a non-restrictive relative clause ‘...pain... bleeding, which ring...’ would be syntactically awkward in Greek, because of the number disagreement between the last noun in the list (singular) and the verb (plural). Also semantically the personification (because of ‘ring the alarm bell’) of ‘symptoms’ would not work if the noun was omitted. However in this case it would be perfectly acceptable (not only grammatically but also stylistically) to start a new sentence with two main clauses: ‘These symptoms ring the alarm bell and lead patients to the doctor’. This information apparently is not deemed important enough to be allocated its own main clause(s), and indeed is not particularly relevant to the questions of what the symptoms and what the treatments are for HPV. The inclusion of yet another two relative clauses again adds to the syntactically elaborate style of the whole text and to the overall ‘alarming’ tone.

However, the non-restrictive relative clause qualifying ‘the genital warts’ may well be processed as an assertion, because it also contains categorically phrased and important information presented as new. The whole sentence constitutes a paragraph on its own (39 words in total, taking up 12 lines of a column), and the list of disturbing symptoms of genital warts is likely to attract more attention than the preceding main clause or the following relative clauses.

(77) Οι δυσάρεστοι και ανεπιθύμητοι επισκέπτες που ακούν στο όνομα κονδυλώματα μεταδίδονται με τη σεξουαλική επαφή...

The unpleasant and unwanted visitors that listen to the name [that are called] ‘genital warts’ are transmitted with sexual contact...
The word-for-word translation ‘listen to the name’ means something like ‘are called’/‘have the name’. The whole Noun Phrase (with the embedded restrictive relative clause) is longer than normal, which creates a stylistic effect of deviation adding emphasis. It does not add much information except evaluative content (unpleasant, unwanted, and, ironically, ‘visitors’). The expression ‘that are called X’/’that have the name X’ creates some distance from the referent X, implying that it is something new or unusual (in other cases it might imply that the Speaker either does not agree with the labelling, or criticises X). To illustrate the function of the expression, I conducted a quick Google search in Greek (14 March 2011), which brought up 4 cases of ‘that are/is called...’ followed by the proper name of a criticised individual or group, e.g. ‘the disappointment which is called England’, 3 cases of technological innovations (i.e., new information) e.g. Gmail introduces a new e-mail characteristic ‘which is called Smart Labels’, and one case of new and unexpected information delayed, perhaps for the purpose of suspense: ‘The hot transfer for Juventus which is called Federica!’ (Federica is the partner of a newly acquired football player). In the case of genital warts the distancing effect of the expression does not rely on suspense, since readers already know what this is about, but it does present the ‘genital warts’ as both something the reader is unfamiliar with, and something negative.96

(78) Πρόκειται για ένα εμβόλιο που χρησιμοποιείται σε τέσσερις... δόσεις...

It/this is about a vaccine which is administered in four... dosages...

As a declarative sentence this should be an assertion, presenting new information. However, the new information is not that ‘this is about a vaccine’, since the existence

---

96 In Gricean terms, the additional meaning emerges via implicature due to flouting the Maxim of Manner – consider for example a phrase such as ‘the man who calls himself Prime Minister’ in English.
of the vaccine has already been introduced from the title. The actually new information is the content of the following relative clause (i.e. that the vaccine is administered in four dosages), as well as other following subordinate clauses (not discussed here). The placing of the new and important information in the relative clause is what makes this sentence similar (although not identical) to an English cleft construction, equivalent to ‘the vaccine is administered...’ in terms of truth-conditions.

The use of ‘πρόκειται για’ (‘this is about’) allows for the re-introduction of ‘the vaccine’ as new information (with an indefinite rather than definite article), which emphasises the authority of the magazine and the ignorance of the reader, and for the (oblique) assertion of the virtues of the vaccine through the restrictive relative clause (to be included in the framing of the referent) rather than assertion. However, we have seen that assertions in main clauses occur very often in the text without necessarily being more contestable. Apart from stylistic elegance, the construction ‘πρόκειται για’ + N + relative clause creates emphasis in topicalising the vaccine, as in emphasising that ‘this is the important thing in this text’, with all subsequent information (at least in the same section) being related to that.

(79) Για να ξεκαθαρίσουμε τα πράγματα, όμως, δεν πρόκειται για θεραπευτικό εμβόλιο, αλλά για μια μέθοδο πρόληψης που θωρακίζει τον οργανισμό...

To clarify things, though, this is not about [a] therapeutic vaccine, but about a preventive method which shields the organism...

The telic clause could be seen as qualifying an omitted main clause (‘we are saying this in order to clarify’). The ellipsis takes emphasis away from the omitted (but easily inferable, and semantically unimportant) main clause. We could then take the telic clause as adverbially qualifying the main clause ‘it is not about a therapeutic vaccine’,
with the focus on that main clause (as well as on the coordinated clause ‘but [this is about] a preventive method...’).

However, by being placed at the beginning, the telic clause frames everything that comes next, as does the negative main clause ‘this is not about...’. Pragmatically this anticipates and responds to thoughts projected on the reader, i.e. it is expected that Point out that the negation will be dealt with in the ‘pragmatics’ section the reader will assume that the vaccine can cure HPV. In terms of emphasis on the sentence level, attention is drawn to the need for clarification (by opening the sentence with ‘to clarify...’) and negating an assumption (the assumption that this is a therapeutic vaccine) before presenting (presumably) new information in the affirmative; this places more stress on the new information because of the build-up indicating that this is going to be unexpected, and that it will clarify existing confusions. The use of ‘πρόκειται για’ adds to this effect (stress on the vaccine and its properties) – as above, the proposition could still have been phrased as ‘the vaccine is not therapeutic, but preventive’. The ‘πρόκειται για’ continues to present the vaccine as unfamiliar through indefinite articles (or lack of article):⁹⁷ ‘this is not about [a] therapeutic vaccine’, ‘[this is about] a preventive method’, and again it allows for the inclusion of additional ‘new’ information through relative clauses qualifying the vaccine. Because this information is in fact not particularly new or useful (in the metaphorical perception of medicine as warfare all vaccines can be said to ‘shield the organism’, I would say that its main function is to provide positive evaluation for the new vaccine, which would be difficult to elaborate on so much without a whole clause. Thus this

⁹⁷ Grammatical in Greek, but I will not discuss the usage of definite or indefinite articles here. In the translation I have used the indefinite article where it would have been used in English with the same function.
evaluative information is not placed in a main clause, but is also afforded a relative clause rather than just an adjective, for example.

In this particular example we also have the reframing of the vaccine as ‘method’, which is a superordinate medical term, not as specific as ‘vaccine’, but bringing in medical discourse terms as an indication of authority. This is also made syntactically possible by ‘πρόκειται για’.

8.4.2 Marked syntax in Cosmopolitan

Assertions in the Cosmopolitan text present their content as new, incontestable and important knowledge, which should become known and remembered by the reader. As we saw, in some cases this is emphasised even more by the layout of the text and verbal co-text creating salience, as is the case with ‘Conclusions’. A similar case is the separation of certain information from the main body of the text in colourful boxes. One of these boxes bears the title ‘DID YOU KNOW THAT?’ (capitals in original), which, as a pragmatic level analysis would suggest, implies that the reader might not know what follows, followed by new (presumably newsworthy) information in categorical assertions.

Similarly, in the example

(80) Κάτι εντυπωσιακό: Τα χλαμύδια συνήθως συνοδεύονται από κάποιο άλλο βακτηριδιακό ΣΜΝ, όπως η γονόρροια.

Something impressive: Chlamydia is usually accompanied by some other bacterial STD, like gonorrhoea.
the new information about Chlamydia is not only presented authoritatively, but is explicitly introduced meta-linguistically as ‘impressive’, which increases the salience of the following information.

As in *Marie Claire*, there are also certain cases of marked syntax strictly within the sentence boundaries. This is what I have termed ‘cleft-like constructions’ in 8.4.1, and they could be seen as introducing ‘presuppositions’, although the information they introduce is not actually backgrounded and overall amounts to an assertion of new information, much like simple main clauses:

(81) **Το πιο σοκαριστικό είναι ότι το γεγονός πως είσαι γυναίκα αυξάνει την πιθανότητα να μολυνθείς κατά πολύ.**

The most shocking [thing] is that being a woman [word for word: the fact that you are a woman] increases the likelihood of you getting infected by far.

(82) **Το πιο τρομακτικό, πάντως, είναι ότι πολλά ΣΜΝ δεν εκδηλώνουν συμπτώματα στις γυναίκες και κάποιοι γυναικολόγοι δεν κάνουν τις σχετικές εξετάσεις.**

The scariest [thing], in any case, is that many STDs don’t show symptoms in women and some gynaecologists don’t do the relevant tests.

And from the testimonial of an STD sufferer:

(83) **...Το χειρότερο είναι ότι μολύνθηκε η μία σάλπιγγα μου και ίσως δεν μπορέσω ποτέ να κάνω παιδία.**

...The worst [thing] is that one of my fallopian tubes got infected and I may never be able to have children.

In all of the above cases the main information of the sentence is not presented in the main clause (‘the worst (thing) is...’ etc.), but in the ‘that’ clause. The main clause
functions as a meta-comment on the facts to be presented next, and, in theory, they could equally well be expressed through adverbs, when equivalents are available (in practice in English we could say ‘shockingly’, and in Greek there are no close equivalents to any of the adjectives used, but still other adverbs such as ‘unfortunately’ could be used). They could also be expressed as clefts or pseudo-clefts, as in: ‘It is $X$ that is the worst thing’ or ‘What is the worst thing is $X$’. Using a main clause just adds more emphasis to the characterisation of the facts under discussion which, apart from new and incontestable information, is also shocking and scary. (More precisely, the last two examples above are information not mentioned in the text before, while the first clause includes information already mentioned in the lead-in paragraph ‘young women are more vulnerable’, which is repeated/ reminded for emphasis). Thus the information in the subordinate clauses is actually quite salient, so it is not prototypical presupposition in the sense of ‘forming the ground’.

One can see how these clauses function similarly to ‘did you know that?’ or ‘Something impressive’, followed by main rather than subordinate clauses. A similar example is in the parenthetical ‘are you ready for this?’, and the adverbial ‘even worse’, in the following, from the lead-in paragraph:

(84) Και — είσαι προετοιμασμένη γι'αυτό; - οι νέες γυναίκες είναι πιο ευπαθείς. Ακόμη χειρότερα, ο γιατρός μπορεί να μη σε έχει ενημερώσει.

And – are you ready for this? – young women are more vulnerable. Even worse, the doctor may not have informed you.

Cleft-like constructions can also involve the use of relative clauses (as with actual clefts and pseudo-clefts). As with the previous examples, I consider these cases marked because they could have been expressed much more concisely in order to
convey pretty much the same content, and the longer construction attracts longer processing time and more attention.

8.5 Conclusion

Analysis of the three sample texts has shown that indeed main clauses in the indicative provide new information for the readers, mainly on sexually transmitted diseases, cures and preventive measures. These assertions may further serve to remind of, and bring attention to already known/shared information, justify the need for advice on the subject matter of the texts (problem construction), and justify particular pieces of advice. Finally, categorical assertions legitimate the positioning of the magazine/Speaker as an authority, more knowledgeable than the readers. These assertions are not easy to contest, not because they are backgrounded, but because it is very likely that a casual reader will not have the cognitive resources and/or motivation to do so.

By examining assertions providing new information we can also tentatively draw conclusions about what knowledge is presumed to be shared between text producers and readers, as this would be knowledge *not* asserted in the texts. Thus, all three texts presuppose that the readers are sexually active and have some knowledge of STDs and condoms – thus the information on these will be more detailed rather than very general and basic. *Marie Claire*, in a hybrid between advice text and news report, presents detailed information on how dangerous HPV is and how ineffective cervical cancer treatments are presupposing that readers either do not know all the details about these topics, and/or need reminding. In both cases this information legitimates
the purpose of the text and enhances its news value as it introduces new information about the HPV vaccine.

*Status* implicitly acknowledges that readers have some knowledge about condoms, presupposes that readers use them, and undertakes to fill in small gaps in the readers’ knowledge. These details (e.g. historical background on the invention of condoms, information of the variety of condoms available on the market) further serve to promote condoms as consumer goods. It is presupposed that readers are not knowledgeable enough about the issue of latex allergies, on which a ‘medical expert’ is recruited, while statements about the dangers of improper use of condoms legitimise giving advice on how to use and store them while avoiding a patronising tone. Information on sexually transmitted diseases or other forms of contraception is not provided – this could imply that readers already know all they need to know about these topics, but also gives indications as to what it is that men ‘need’ to know about these issues. The merely cursory mention of STDs and procreation indicate that the readers are aware of the two main functions of male condoms, but the focus lies on the male readers’ comfort and celebration of the variety of types of condoms available nowadays, rather than the negative consequences of *not* using condoms.

The *Cosmopolitan* feature contains elements of medical and educational discourse. The information that STDs are transmitted via sexual contact is taken for granted, because it is shared or at least very readily inferable. Thus we have more detailed information on how exactly each STD is transmitted via sexual contact, e.g. via kissing, skin contact, exchange of fluids etc., as well as medical/biological information on the type of microorganisms causing the diseases and their development, symptoms and results.
In the analysis of relative clauses and marked syntax we can see how relative clauses can function as 'oblique assertions', in van Dijk’s terms (2005). In longer sentences with heavy content of ‘new information’ these could attract just as much attention as main clauses, when they present equally important new information (e.g. in Status parenthetical relative clauses help fill in the ‘small gap’ in the readers’ knowledge about where to find sheepskin condoms). Occasionally they are added on as an afterthought, with the function of reiterating relative well-known information, which, however, emphasises the negative evaluation of the virus and positive evaluation of the vaccine (for example that HPV can result in a ‘nightmare’, or that ‘high risk’ strands of the virus cause cancer). The use of restrictive relative clauses in particular shows most clearly that ‘framing’ can supersede the Noun Phrase level, unless we classify them as embedded in the Noun Phrase to begin with. Through iconicity this draws attention to the referent of the Noun Phrase and its properties, although, as we saw in Cosmopolitan, this can also contribute to distancing the ‘person’ from the ‘disease’, resulting thus in a comforting effect. Marked syntax is used in Marie Claire and Cosmopolitan for emphasis, mostly enhancing the alarming tone of the texts, while in Marie Claire they also emphasise new/unexpected information, namely, the news of the discovery and availability of the HPV vaccine.
Chapter 9: Conditionals and hypothetical spaces

9.1 Introduction

In terms of Mental Space theory, 'if' as a marker of conditionality sets up a mental space of a scenario (Dancygier and Sweetser, 2005: 11), in a way very similar to that of Possible Worlds Theory (Kripke, 1972/1980). There are two significant differences between Mental Spaces and Possible Worlds. Firstly, Dancygier and Sweetser (2005: 11) observe that mental spaces represent a more general mechanism than possible worlds, referring not only to very partial cognitive 'world' or 'situation' constructions as well as to more complete ones, but also to a variety of non-world-like structures, which can be connected and mapped onto other cognitive structures.

They bring in metonymy as an example (metaphor could be another one), where the mental spaces in question constitute whole domains and/or elements within the domains, rather than worlds (for 'domain' see Langacker, 1987; Croft and Cruse, 2004). For the time being I will leave aside the criticism that this is exactly one of the major weaknesses of Mental Space theory (a mental space could practically be any sort of mental representation), and focus on Mental Spaces on the sentence level, which prototypically evoke mental representations of (past, present, future or possible) 'states of affairs' / 'worlds' or 'situations'.

Secondly, although 'setting up a Possible World' can be criticised as a rather metaphysical notion (Ken Turner, Personal Communication, 2008), which presumably is not sufficiently 'realistic' or 'scientific', a Mental Space is a mental representation exploiting the human capacity of imagination and does not tell us anything about

---

98 By 'imagination' here I do not mean a particularly creative ability, but rather the human ability to represent the world – and 'possible worlds' – mentally.
whether the mental space/scenario set up is indeed possible, real or realistic, and to what degree, and its locus is the mind rather than some parallel Universe.\textsuperscript{99}

Mental spaces are different from possible worlds ..., most importantly in that they are not objective in nature, nor necessarily describable in terms of Boolean truth conditions; and also in being local rather than global (Dancygier and Sweetser, 2005: 30).\textsuperscript{100}

In this section I will be mostly following Dancygier and Sweetser (2005: esp. Ch. 1 and 2) for the analysis of conditionals, further linking the textual examples to the ideological functions of conditionals in the data.

A category which occurs quite often in the data is that of generic conditionals (as in ‘if you heat water to 100°C, it boils’). Generic conditionals (and generic statements overall) are not surprising for the genre. Provision and legitimation of advice involves establishing authority and imparting ‘knowledge/wisdom’, among other things. This would definitely involve general knowledge about facts/the world, statements that are not true within a particular interactional context but ‘always’, as it were (van Dijk, 2003). Generic conditionals make sense here also because the addressee is not known to the author/speaker. The reader is addressed, but necessarily through ‘generic you’, as mass communication does not and cannot aim to provide tailor-made advice to each individual reader/addressee. Therefore the author needs to construct a variety of scenarios and provide advice for each of these scenarios. Some of the generic conditionals in the data could also be seen as predictive; and there is some overlap between them anyway (generic prediction – for further details, see Dancygier and Sweetser, 2005).

\textsuperscript{99} Admittedly the mind is also a theoretical construct (van Dijk, 2003), and also I’m not entirely unconvinced that a theory of parallel Universes is such a misguided notion, but I will leave this for a thesis on Philosophy and Quantum Physics as it is beyond the scope of this one.

\textsuperscript{100} This definition of mental spaces is very close to the theory of Text Worlds and Sub-worlds as discussed by Werth (1999).
There is also overlap between *if-* and *when-* clauses when it comes to generic predictions in the cases where ‘when’ refers to the future (consider: ‘When you heat water to 100°C, it boils’). Therefore in the analysis below I will also analyse ‘when’ as a space builder and consider its temporal and conditional functions.

Throughout the analysis I will be providing some comments on form and aspect, but overall I have not investigated thoroughly the role of form, aspect and tense as mental space builders (Fauconnier, 1985) and therefore I will not be focussing on these here.

9.2 Hypothetical spaces in *Marie Claire*

(85) Η σπουδαιότητα του εμβολίου γίνεται αντιληπτή αν παρατηρήσεις προσεκτικά τα τελευταία στατιστικά στοιχεία που αφορούν το πρόβλημα του καρκίνου του τραχήλου, ασθένεια που αποτελεί τα δεύτερη συχνότερη αιτία θανάτου μετά τον καρκίνο του μαστού μεταξύ των γυναικών 15-44 χρονών.

The importance of the vaccine becomes perceivable/ apparent if you observe carefully the latest statistical evidence regarding the problem of cervical cancer, a disease which constitutes the second most frequent cause of death after breast cancer among women 15-44 years old.

This conditional is unusual in that the protasis is in the form of ‘if + subjunctive’ (perfective -‘αν παρατηρήσεις’), which should normally be accompanied in the apodosis by future tense, whether perfective or imperfective (‘γίνεται αντιληπτή’/ ‘will become apparent’ or ‘will be becoming apparent’). That would then be a predictive conditional. However the apodosis here is in (habitual) present tense (‘becomes perceivable/ apparent’/ ‘γίνεται αντιληπτή’). I would argue that this, as well as the fact that the apodosis precedes the protasis here, primes a generic reading of the sentence, corroborated by the generic ‘you’ and the content of the sentence. The
syntax is awkward, but it would be even more awkward to use subjunctive progressive in the protasis here (‘αν παρατηρεῖς’, indicating some sort of continuous observation).

However, at the same time, ‘if + perfective subjunctive’ is very common in uses of conditionals as indirect directive speech acts (as it is in English, for example ‘it would be great if you could...’ or ‘this will become easier if you...’). The conditional in such cases would function as a perfective imperative (as opposed to a progressive imperative, which is also possible in Greek), and this might have influenced the choice of an imperfective verb form in the protasis here.

The protasis of the conditional in this case sets up not only a ‘possible’ but also a ‘desirable’ world (thus functioning as deontic modality). The whole sentence is a preamble to the new information and statistics, some of it in the same sentence, some in the next. It frames what is to follow as important, but presupposing the importance of the vaccine (through existential presupposition) and urging the reader to observe the following statistics carefully. This highlights the news value of the text, as it justifies why the release of this vaccine is important, newsworthy, and relevant to the readers.

The two examples below (86 and 87) are generic predictions, the first one conditional, although I would argue that the second is also conditional:

(86) Σε ειδικές συνθήκες ο ιός μπορεί να μεταδοθεί και με τη δερματική επαφή – ειδικά αν στο δέρμα υπάρχουν εκδορές που επιτρέπουν την ανταλλαγή υγρών ανάμεσα στα άτομα.

In/under special circumstances the virus can be transmitted also by skin contact – especially if on the skin there are scratches which allow exchange of fluids between persons.
The condition here is ‘in special circumstances’ – it already sets up a mental space ‘Special Circumstances’, within which the virus can be transmitted with skin contact.

The clause ‘especially if on the skin there are scratches which allow exchange of fluids between persons’ could be one of the ‘special circumstances’. This would thus be a sub-space (one of the cases where if ‘delimits generic subclasses of generic categories’ (Dancygier and Sweetser, 2005: 99).

The assertion is epistemically modified (although ‘can’ is also dynamic here), but by the default interpretation of if as iff (‘if and only if’, according to Dancygier and Sweetser, 2005) the virus can be transmitted via skin contact only if there are special circumstances, the most notable of which is the presence of scratches on the skin.

(87) Ὅταν, λοιπόν, τα κονδυλώματα εἶναι ἄμεσα ὀρατά, ἡ προσοχή θα πρέπει να εἶναι τεράστια. Οἱ σεξουαλικὲς επαφὲς θα πρέπει να αποφεύγονται μέχρι να εξαφανιστοῦν τα κονδυλώματα.
Thus, when the [genital] warts are directly visible, attention [care] will have to be huge. Sexual contacts should [will have to] be avoided until the [genital] warts disappear.

The extract occurs immediately after the example 86, and continues communicating generic meaning: in every case where genital warts are visible, care should be taken.

Dancygier and Sweetser (2005: 98) observe that when indicates inevitability, or certainty on behalf of the speaker that the when-clause represents a state of affairs that definitely is, or will be, the case. Yet we cannot interpret the extract as suggesting that all readers have or will acquire genital warts, which will in addition be ‘directly visible’. The when-clause clearly refers to a hypothetical situation where anyone having visible genital warts should take care. Notably the definite expression ‘τα κονδυλώματα’ (‘the genital warts’) does not constitute an existential presupposition that the addressee (or anyone in particular) has genital warts, but rather evokes the
genital warts within the mental space where there are genital warts (‘when the [genital] warts are directly visible’) – for economy, instead of ‘when there are genital warts, and the genital warts are visible’. It does not, however, have the misleading effect of convincing the reader that the existence of genital warts (in the reader’s local context) is unquestionable, but rather of being an indefinite reference in fact, to genital warts existing in the hypothetical/conditional mental space of ‘special circumstances’.

Due to local coherence, ‘when the [genital] warts are directly visible’ can be read as an elaboration/explanation of ‘scratches’, or rather as one sub-set of ‘scratches which allow exchange of fluids between persons’, or, more likely (since genital warts are not scratches), as another sub-set of ‘special circumstances’ (in addition to scratches). Therefore, both ‘if on the skin there are scratches which allow exchange of fluids between persons’ and ‘when the [genital] warts are directly visible’ build and populate mental spaces embedded in the space ‘in special circumstances’, which are separate but on a par. Both states of affairs are possibilities of special circumstances.

It may be the case that in fact all of the text (and all magazine advice texts as a genre) builds a hypothetical world within hypothetical world (much like text worlds in Werth, 1999), and it is due to the genre that even assertions can be read in a hypothetical light. If that is the case, temporal-conditional when-clauses have the conditional dimension not because of the meaning of when, but because the when-situation occurs within a mental space which is already hypothetical. However, in this

---

On the other hand, we might argue that it is indeed certain and inevitable that someone, somewhere in the world will have visible genital warts. However, mental spaces are local, and the interpretation of conditionals (and when-clauses for that matter) is also local (see Dancygier and Sweetser, 2005: 29-30; 40).
context there does not seem to be an epistemic stance indicating certainty any more than with *if* (contra Dancygier and Sweetser, 2005: 98).

The same observations can be made about the following example:

(87) Στον άνδρα, όταν οι βλάβες είναι εμφανείς, η διάγνωση στηρίζεται στην κλινική εξέταση, ενώ σε αντίθετη περίπτωση, δυστυχώς, ο ίδις παραμένει... απολληπτός και δρα ανενόχλητος.

In men, when the damage is visible, diagnosis relies on clinical examination, while otherwise, unfortunately, the virus remains... on the loose and acts unimpeded.

*When* sets up a mental space where the damage is visible, and an alternative mental space where the damage is not visible. 'Men' is generic (lit. 'the man' in the Greek original – definite singular nouns are often used generically in Greek), as well as the 'habitual' present tense/ imperfective subjunctive. Again we have almost complete overlap between *when* and *if*, not only in the generic meaning but also in the epistemic stance. Again, this does not comply with Dancygier and Sweetser’s (2005) distinction between the two – *when* here does not suggest that it is expected that the protasis is more certain to take place than it would be if *if* was used. In fact, the alternative space (of invisible damage) is not only evoked, but is explicitly mentioned in the text: 'otherwise' actually is phrased word for word as ‘in [the] opposite case’. Both 'otherwise' and ‘in the opposite case’ set up alternative mental spaces, and indicate conditions for the fulfilment of the apodosis.

Both spaces ('Visible Damage' space vs. 'Invisible Damage' space) are alternative sub-spaces of a broader space where a (generic) man has the HPV virus. In that sense the presence of the virus is presupposed for the extract to make sense at all. The existential ‘οι βλάβες’ ('the damage') presupposes that there is damage, caused by the
virus, and it is the concept of ‘damage’ in conjunction with the topic of the text (and immediate co-text) that the presence of the virus is inferred (‘damage’ triggers the frame of ‘HPV virus’).

In comparison to the presentation of diagnostic methods for women, fewer details are provided about the kinds of examination for HPV diagnose in men. It may be assumed that this is not of interest to the female reader, it may be not known to the author or the author might take it as irrelevant (or might want to present it as irrelevant). The explicit mention of the alternative possibility (that of non-diagnosis) makes it more salient – note that this alternative space would have been inferred anyway. Perhaps stressing the fact that HPV can remain undiagnosed in men is meant to emphasise the importance of safe sex for women, functioning as a warning. This is somewhat misleading though, since for women HPV can also remain undiagnosed – the suggested tests for women also only detect visible damage, in a way. This might be a trace of what occurs in the Cosmopolitan text on a much larger scale – ‘double standards’ in alignment between the narrating/authorial persona and the assumed-to-be-female reader, with a focus therefore on the interests, fears and experiences only of (the projected, ‘ideal’) women.

(88) Αν εκείνος κρίνει ότι πρέπει να υποβληθείς σε θεραπεία, εξε υπόψη σου ότι σε ανάλογη αγωγή θα πρέπει να υποβληθεί και ο ερωτικός σύντροφός σου.

If he [the doctor] deems that you must undergo treatment, bear in mind that your romantic partner should undergo relevant treatment too.

Here if builds the mental space of a possible scenario where the doctor deems that the reader needs treatment (let us call it ‘the mental space of the Treatment scenario’). ‘he deems that’ builds an embedded mental space within this scenario: the doctor’s belief world. ‘you must undergo treatment’ is the content of the doctor’s belief. Due to
interaction with real-world-knowledge, the doctor's belief can be expected to be taken as true in the real world as well. That is, the proposition is inherited in the mental space of 'the Treatment scenario' because the doctor is accepted as an authority (if the doctor thinks you should get treatment, then you should get treatment). The deontic modal through which the doctor's belief/judgement is presented ('must') indicates a high degree of obligation.

'Bear in mind that' is also a space builder. As an imperative it directs the reader to include the belief following in the 'that-clause' in her Belief World (i.e. 'that your romantic partner should undergo relevant treatment too'). The that-clause could in fact be taken as the apodosis of the conditional (rather than the imperative), in that it represents an obligation which is only there if the protasis is also true (i.e. if the doctor indeed judges that the reader must undergo treatment).

The whole conditional could be rephrased as 'Bear in mind that if he deems that you must undergo treatment, your romantic partner should undergo relevant treatment too'. The sentence opens with the protasis probably for emphasis. In addition, even if the different position of 'bear in mind' motivates slightly different readings (the second being 'bear in mind that your partner will need treatment if and only if the doctor deems that you must undergo treatment'), this is not significant because the proposition following 'bear in mind' floats into the mental space of the 'Treatment scenario' anyway. In both readings, 'your romantic partner should undergo relevant treatment' takes place in the mental space of the Treatment scenario.

The fact that the reader is told (via an unmitigated imperative) to include the proposition in her belief world makes the statement that 'your romantic partner should undergo relevant treatment' incontrovertible within the Treatment scenario. Due to the
pragmatics of ‘advice’, the author is presented as believing that it is good for the reader to have the belief/knowledge that ‘if he deems that you must undergo treatment, your romantic partner should undergo relevant treatment too’. The deontic modal (‘should’) is also quite strong, and unmitigated (as opposed to, e.g. ‘should probably’, or ‘it would be desirable to...’). The tone is, overall, authoritative. Notably, in Greek the imperative ‘έχε υπόψη σου’ very often introduces new information (although the first person indicative ‘έχω υπόψη μου’ not necessarily). It seems to metalinguistically suggest that ‘I’m telling you this because I predict that this will be useful to you although you might not have thought of it so far’.

(89) έτσι δεν πρέπει να παραλείπετε να κάνετε μία φορά το χρόνο το τεστ ΠΑΠ – εκτός και αν ο γιατρός σου κρίνει διαφορετικά -, την εξέταση που θα σου δείξει αν έχεις την ατυχία να φέρεις τον επικίνδυνο ιό.

Thus, you must not omit doing once a year a PAP test [cervical screening] – unless [lit. except if] your doctor deems differently -, the exam which will show you if/whether you have the misfortune of carrying the dangerous virus.

There is no one-word Greek equivalent to unless, but ‘εκτός και αν’, ‘εκτός κι αν’ and ‘εκτός αν’ word for word mean ‘except (and) if’. ‘Except if’ (and the Greek equivalent εκτός (και) αν’) is semantically more transparent than ‘unless’, but other than that they seem to be near synonyms, and in Greek both the functions of unless and except if need to be fulfilled by εκτός (και) αν (see Dancygier and Sweetser, 2005: 193 ff. on except if in English).

As with English, unless-clauses also appear in Greek usually after the main clause and often separated by a comma (cf. Dancygier and Sweetser, 2005: 183). In example 89 the separation of unless- and main clause is even more marked, as the unless-clause is presented as a parenthetical clause.
Glossing the *unless* constructions as \( Q: \neg Q \text{ if } P \) (where \( Q \) is the main clause), Dancygier and Sweetser (2005: 184) observe that

Q-clauses [can] stand on their own as assertions, speech acts or generic statements – which are then somewhat restricted by the following unless-clause. The Q clauses are added to the current mental space of the story or the conversation; and assuming this to be some highly accessible space (possibly the base space ['Reality Space'] or some space construed as a real future or past counterpart of the base), there is no need to identify it explicitly. Indeed, the space in need of identification is the space wherein \( Q \) does not occur, namely in the ‘unless’ space \([P]\), which is set up in the following clause.

In this case, the unmarked mental space \( Q \) ‘you must not omit doing once a year a PAP test’ is attributed to the ‘reality’ space (the ‘base space’) – in fact a generic reality space as ‘you’ addresses a generic woman.

The marked *unless* space \([P]\) sets up an exception mental space, one of a hypothetical scenario which is not very likely to happen (but with a small likelihood to happen nevertheless). The clause ‘unless your doctor deems differently’ would cover possibilities not occurring to the ‘generic woman’ addressed which is presumed to be overall healthy, sexually active, within a certain age range, etc. The adverb ‘differently’ would include medical recommendations for having a cervical screening both more and less often than once a year.

Moreover the *unless*-clause functions as a disclaimer, with the authority of the magazine deferring to the authority of the doctor. Indirectly it implies that the instructions of the magazine not only do not supersede, but if fact do not replace the instructions of the doctor, a disclaimer which *Status* states explicitly. The indirectness here functions as a reminder in that the only way for the reader to know whether the doctor deems differently or not is to visit the doctor and ask.
Your attack/affectation from/by the virus becomes more likely if your immune system is maltreated/‘in bad shape’.

There are two unusual features in this sentence – the choice of verb and the nominalisation.

It seems that the verb ‘to be’ has an imperfective aspect, in that it can refer to an ongoing and/or generic ‘state of being’, while ‘to become’ is perfective, implying there is a change-of-state-process with a beginning and an end (this has to do with the semantic frame of ‘become’ both in English and in Greek). In Greek (as well as in English, for that matter) ‘is more likely’ would be a more normal way to put it, which would then form a generic conditional in historical/habitual present tense (in the apodosis) and imperfective subjunctive (in the protasis).

The awkward choice of verb might be because the definite article ‘Η’ (‘the’) in the noun phrase ‘Η προσβολή σου από τον ιό’ (‘your attack by the virus’) seems to take for granted that the addressee ‘you’ is already ‘under attack’, i.e. has already caught the virus, which is obviously not the case. It is also not desirable that such a reading would be triggered at all (even to be rejected), as disease is an unpleasant thing. Furthermore, politeness norms dictate that we do not attribute unpleasant things to our interlocutors, or assume something bad will happen to them – a norm Leech termed the ‘Pollyanna principle’ (‘be optimistic’) (Leech, 1983: 147 – 148).

One then wonders why one would choose the awkward nominalisation ‘your attack by the virus’ in the first place, rather than an (appropriately mitigated) verb such as ‘you might be attacked’ or ‘you are more likely to get attacked’ and so on. It seems to me that this is a stylistic matter, with the author trying to emulate medical discourse.
Processes are often referred to through nominalisations (with a definite article in Greek) in instructional medical discourse. These often occur in such discourse in generic statements; this does not imply that the disease under discussion ‘exists’ in any specific local context.

9.3 Hypothetical spaces in Status

Early in the text in Status we have a mental space set up by when. The subtitle reads:

(91) Ὄταν επιλέγεις κάποιον να σε φυλάει, πρέπει να ξέρεις από πού κρατάει η σκούφια του.

When you select someone [masc.] to guard you, you have to know [where he is coming from].

*When* indicates positive epistemic stance (high certainty that something will happen – Fillmore, 1986; 1990; Dancygier and Sweetser, 2005: 31-32), which seems to presuppose that the reader will select a ‘bodyguard’ (i.e. a condom). Yet the sentence is generic, not predictive, which means it is not bound to local context and it applies only to the cases when the addressee will indeed select a bodyguard. In that sense when here is interchangeable with if – it seems to admit the possibility that the reader will not select a bodyguard – or will not do so in some cases. The obligation to obtain knowledge about the ‘bodyguard’ is therefore not applicable for these cases.

Here Dancygier and Sweetser’s point seems to hold (2005: 95 ff.): although not predictive, *when* seems to indicate an expectation that the *when*-clause proposition

---

102 The *when*-clause is in imperfective subjunctive and the main clause in habitual present tense.
holds or will definitely hold in the future, or that it is a default, generic truth with universal validity. It does not only indicate that there are some cases when the addressee will choose (and use) a condom, but that it is expected that he will do so (cf. Gabrielatos, 2008 on if-conditionals).

Both on the level of this sentence and on the speech act level of the whole text, the fact that the focus is on getting more detailed information about condoms, as opposed to justifying why the readers must use condoms, for example, indicates that it is both shared and incontestable knowledge that readers use condoms, and know the reasons why they should. Here, as well as underlying the whole text, is also the presupposed assumption that readers are sexually active. The assumption is initially evoked by the activation of the frame ‘sex’ through the mention of ‘using condoms’, which itself is accessed through the metaphor ‘the bodyguard/you select someone to guard you’. These associations are made possible at first glance by the presence of the salient photo of a condom in the middle of the page.

On the speech act level it is also presupposed that the readers (a) may not have enough information about the kinds of condoms among which they can choose and (b) will not take the trouble to check the ‘credentials’ of the condoms they use. Hence ‘you have to know’ at the same time presupposes that they do not know and indirectly (through the deontic modality) urges readers to acquire this information (by reading the article) and take it into account in their future choices.

By contrast the use of ‘if you happen’ below indicates negative epistemic stance:

(92) Αν τύχει και ανίκητε σε αυτό το μικρό ποσοστό, που όντως έχει πρόβλημα με τα λάτεξ προφυλακτικά, τότε μπορείτε να χρησιμοποιήσετε τα προφυλακτικά από δέρμα προβάτου (που
If you happen to belong to this small percentage, which indeed has a problem with latex condoms, then you can use the condoms of sheep skin (which exist in pharmacies), or, more simply, the condoms from polyurethane.

Word for word ‘Αν τύχει και ανήκετε’ corresponds to ‘if it happens and you belong’, but the same relation can be expressed by the more grammaticalised (more fixed and less transparent) ‘Αν τυχόν [ανήκετε]’, ‘τυχόν’ functioning as an adverbial. The fact that the percentage of men allergic to condoms is small (‘μικρό ποσοστό’) already means that chances for every given man to be allergic are low, but this is further emphasised by ‘Αν τύχει και’. This generally shows the disbelief on behalf of the expert towards the implication of the reader’s letter that the reader is ‘allergic to condoms’, while at the same time providing the solution for the mental space in which the problem actually exists. 103

Example 92 is part of the answer to the below question(s) (example 93):

(93) Τι να κάνει κάποιος αν είναι αλλεργικός στα προφυλακτικά; Να γεμίσει τον πλανήτη με τους απογόνους του;
What should one do if he is allergic to condoms? Fill up the planet with his offspring?

The first question ‘What should one do if he is allergic to condoms?’ presupposes that there is something one should do if one is allergic to condoms. It should be noted that ‘Τι να κάνει’ in Greek does not contain a modal verb – the verb ‘to do’ is put in the subjunctive. Such uses of the subjunctive can be used as an alternative of the imperative in the second person, and it is the closest to the function of the imperative in the 3rd person (there is no 3rd person imperative in modern Greek). The common

103 Here if does not mean iff.
characteristic of the imperative, this use of subjunctive and my translation is the
deonitic function.

Therefore, the deontic function is not presupposed (it is actually encoded in the
sentence), but what is presupposed is that it is possible to do something, because such
a ‘something’ exists. There is some enrichment due to context, in that this ‘something’
is clearly something to do with sex and condoms, most possibly contraception and/or
protection from STDs (which is confirmed by a follow-up question, to be analysed
below). The expert also interprets and addresses this question as being about ‘doing
something’ in relation to condoms.

The protasis ‘αν είναι αλλεργικός στα προφυλακτικά’ (‘if he is allergic to condoms’) through the background knowledge of the frame of ‘allergic’ implies that one cannot
use condoms, at least not ‘normally’, as a non-allergic person would do. This is an
assumption corrected in the expert’s answer (who points out that it is not possible to
be allergic to condoms in general, but to latex). The reader sending the letter though is
presented as equating ‘allergy to condoms’ to not being able to use condoms. Thus the
protasis sets up a mental space where a person (most likely a man) is allergic to
condoms, and cannot use condoms. On the genre level this is the problem, and there is
no solution present in the current hypothetical mental space.

Notably this is a speech act level conditional (see Dancygier and Sweetser, 2005: 16)
in that ‘doing something (about condoms/contraception etc.)’ does not rely
conditionally on ‘being allergic to condoms’. The speech act is to be taken as effective
within the set-up space (ibid.) – the problem expressed by the question (and the request
for a solution) is to be perceived as taking place in the mental space set up by the
conditional (i.e. in the mental space where one is allergic to condoms). However, as
with ‘If I don’t see you before Thursday, have a good Thanksgiving!’ (ibid.), the speech act is *not* to be retracted if the conditional is not realised. Here, in fact, the conditional does not hold (technically nobody can be allergic to condoms, only to latex condoms), but the request for information is still legitimate, and its presupposition still holds (indeed there *is* something that *should* be done).

‘Fill up the planet with his offspring?’ can be analysed as an elliptical yes/no question: ‘If one is allergic to condoms, should one fill up the planet with his offspring?’ This is a hyperbole which makes salient the use of condoms for contraception and the implicature that if one is allergic to condoms, one will not use condoms, and therefore no contraception (and therefore one will have offspring). There is clearly a causal relation between protasis and apodosis.

The leaps in reasoning and the hyperbole make it clear that this is a rhetorical question – the answer is obviously no, one should not fill up the planet with his offspring, at least not just because one is allergic to condoms. Such rhetorical question constructions (‘what should I do? X?’) occur often in Greek, where X is an undesirable action, clearly not to be done. This emphasises the dead-end in which the speaker finds her- or himself, running out of options. Coupled with the hyperbole here it also has a humorous effect.

I think that this question is interesting here. The question ‘What should one do if he is allergic to condoms?’ could stand on its own. The elaboration however is important as it projects a number of thoughts on the ‘ideal reader’ – ‘average sexually active man who is allergic to condoms’. By foregrounding the option of no-contraception first of all it assumes that allergy will result to avoiding condoms; one could just as easily say ‘What should one do if he is allergic to condoms? Spend his days scratching?’ – the
latter option would assume that it would be possible for someone who is allergic to
condoms to use them and put up with the itchiness or irritation caused by latex. One
could also ask ‘What should one do if he is allergic to condoms? Stop having sex
altogether?’ - which would make salient the option of not having sex, and therefore
not having to use condoms. The option actually considered in the hypothetical mental
space is only the one of having sex without using condoms (and therefore procreating
endlessly). Considering this option then places emphasis on having sexual activity no
matter what (evoking stereotypes of male sexuality as hyper-active and uncontrollable
– cf. Hollway, 1984), and on not sacrificing comfort regardless of the consequences
(perhaps evoking and legitimising a level of ‘masculine’ self-centeredness).

Second, choosing to foreground one consequence of not using condoms (offspring)
backgrounds the other possible consequence – STDs. ‘What should one do if he is
allergic to condoms? Catch Chlamydia and end up infertile?’ of ‘Catch HIV and die?’
would hardly allow for any humorous hyperbole. The question seems to project (and, I
would argue, reproduce) the most widespread concern of the male ideal reader as
being that of unwanted offspring. One could argue that this mentality (carelessness
about using condoms, not considering STDs) is only reproduced here in order to be
criticised, however, in the expert’s answer these assumptions are not being addressed
at all. They are though implicitly dismissed in that the expert suggests a number of
alternative materials to latex, thus constantly presupposing that a condom will be used.
The option of not using condoms is neither denied nor confirmed as a valid option
(and, incidentally, other methods of contraception are also not mentioned).

The following conditional, due to context, has a rather positive epistemic stance:
This speech act conditional is in answer to the reader who enquires about allergy to condoms (example 93). The expert answering the question thus assumes that it is likely for the reader to think that he is allergic because he has noticed some irritation, but he has no way of knowing that. So he sets up a hypothetical mental space where the irritation has occurred, and the apodosis ('visit a dermatologist') applies within the context of this mental space. I would say that the epistemic stance is positive because there is no alternative hypothetical scenario presented, which means that the expert considers this as the most possible reason why the reader would consider himself to be allergic.

On the contrary, I would argue that the below indicates negative epistemic stance:

(95) Αν είστε χωρίς περιτομή, πριν φορέσετε το προφυλακτικό, βεβαιωθείτε ότι η βάλανος έχει αποκαλυφθεί πλήρως.

If you are uncircumcised, before you put on the condom, make sure that the glans is fully uncovered.

The previous example (‘If you have noticed some irritation...’) (example 94) is apparently given as an answer to a specific reader, and involves ‘guessing’ a dimension of his problem in order to suggest a solution. It responds to a very specific concern, allergy.

Unless otherwise indicated, though, the whole article provides generic advice, which is presented as applying to all men in general, although in fact it addresses an ‘ideal reader’ with specific characteristics which are normatively projected to ‘all men’.
Therefore categorical assertions and deontic expressions are by default attributed to the ‘Reality’ (base) mental space.

In that sense, building alternative, hypothetical mental spaces is meant to address a variety of situations and/or ‘types of men’, when differences are acknowledged in the relatively homogeneous group encapsulated in the ideal reader. (For example alternative situations are presented when at some point it is asserted that a condom which is too tight may break, while a too loose condom may slip.).

On the surface ‘If you are uncircumcised’ indicates neutral epistemic stance – the addressee may or may not be circumcised, and the speaker has no way of knowing this. However, it does presuppose that some of the addressed men/target readers are circumcised and some are uncircumcised (as all conditionals set up a conditional space and evoke an alternative space ~P - Dancygier and Sweetser, 2005). Moreover, if it was assumed that the majority of target readers are uncircumcised, there would be no need to set up an ‘uncircumcised’ mental space, as this would be by default the base space (‘Reality’). For example nowhere in the text is a mental space set up ‘if you are sexually active’ – it is taken for granted that the Ideal Reader is sexually active. Thus, uncircumcised men are addressed here as an exceptional case, for the sake of completeness.

I find this odd because circumcision is not common in Greece among non-Muslim and non-Jewish populations. In fact, the default is that boys and men are not circumcised. 104 Apparently in Greece less than 20% of the male population is circumcised (World Health Organisation, 2007 http://www.who.int/hiv/mediacentre/infopack_en_2.pdf). Of course in Greece there

---

104 This has been uncommon in Greece since ancient times, while it was widespread e.g. in ancient Egypt (see Herodotus, History, Book II, http://classics.mit.edu/Herodotus/history.html, translated by George Rawlinson. Last accessed November 2012).
are Muslim and Jewish men, some of them belonging to indigenous minorities and some of them immigrants. I find it very unlikely, though, that the default target/ideal readers of Status come from these categories – the target readership of Status is ‘indigenous’ and ‘white’ Greek men, overall of Christian background historically (although not practising, judging both by common practice in contemporary Greece and the contents of the magazine). Why is this not then taken as the default? One explanation could be that the authors may be influenced by North American discourses on sex and condoms (most likely via American lifestyle magazines), as USA is the only non-Asian country in the Northern hemisphere where non-religious routine infant circumcision is practised. Another explanation is again related to globalisation, but broader – the author considers that male circumcision is a possibility even in Greece nowadays, for whatever reason, and has no (briefer and more convenient) way of separating the circumcised from the non-circumcised readers, in order to give a piece of advice only to the latter, without making them sound somehow exceptional.

9.4 Hypothetical spaces in Cosmopolitan

The Cosmopolitan article is not only the longest of the three, but also the most complete, in the sense that it aims to present an ‘encyclopaedic’ comprehensive set of information about STDs, while Marie Claire deals only with one STD and the new vaccine developed to prevent it (HPV), and Status only deals with condoms.

As a longer and comprehensive account Cosmopolitan presents a pattern in the use of conditionals. The majority of conditionals in the text deal with either hypothetical problems or hypothetical solutions regarding STDs. I have categorised the mental
spaces set up by the conditionals as 'Solution spaces', 'Problem spaces' (which include the sub-category 'Problem signs spaces') and 'Danger spaces'.\textsuperscript{105} Solution spaces are mental spaces where the generic addressee is represented as doing something which will result in solving or preventing the problem. The protasis contains the 'solving action', and the apodosis is the positive result of this action. Problem spaces are mental spaces where the generic addressee actually has the problem (has an STD), and the apodosis is used to either provide a solution to the problem (as a directive speech act), or to inform the addressee of the consequences of the problem. Danger spaces are spaces where the generic addressee does something that increases the risk of the problem (i.e. catching an STD), and the apodosis presents the result of this risky behaviour. Because the result will not necessarily follow from risky behaviour, these apodoses are most often modified epistemically (possible results).

It needs to be noted that these spaces are not exclusive in 	extit{Cosmopolitan}, nor are conditional constructions the only way to set up 'Problem' and 'Solution' spaces, for instance. This analysis merely indicates how conditionals in particular contribute to the setting up of such spaces, in conjunction with their 'population' with relevant lexical items (problem- or solution-related). In the analysis of 	extit{Marie Claire} I have named various hypothetical mental spaces 'Visible Damage space', 'Special Circumstances space', 'Treatment scenario space' and so on. Clearly the precision and affinity to content varies in the naming of these spaces (compare with the space I have simply identified as an 'unless-space'), while such naming could also occur in the 	extit{Status} text (e.g. we could identify the 'Latex allergy' space). The reason of following a categorisation of spaces as an organising principle in this section is primarily for

\textsuperscript{105} I focus only on these categories in the data although these are not the only ones – they are, however, the most prevalent ones.
convenience and systematicity in dealing with a somewhat longer text. Such an approach would perhaps be useful overall if the framework was to be applied to larger bodies of texts, although it would present issues of arbitrariness vs. systematicity much like the issue of naming 'discourses' or 'topoi' in other critical discourse analytical research (see e.g. Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999; Sunderland, 2004; Reisigl, 2007; 2011). Addressing these issues is beyond the scope of this thesis, yet a difference needs to be borne in mind in relation to Mental Spaces vs. discourses or topoi; discourses and topoi are generally defined as relatively stable socially shared ideological structures, pre-existing any given communicative event. A reader or hearer brings such pre-existing knowledge to the text and co-constructs the meaning of the text based on this knowledge in conjunction with the specific linguistic triggers to be found in the text. Mental Spaces, on the other hand, are constructed on line and ad hoc. Therefore, by naming mental spaces in this analysis I do not make any claims as to the existence or content of pre-existing mental/social representations. It may be the case that advice texts routinely set up 'problem' and 'solution' mental spaces, and any systematicity as to the types of problems and solutions set up in specific genres would be motivated by relatively stable ideological structures. Naming such structures (as discourses or topoi for example) would perhaps entail claims about their content and evaluative stance in a way that naming mental spaces here does not.

9.4.1 Solution spaces

The hypothetical spaces illustrated below constitute spaces in which the problem is being solved, or does not occur in the first place:
(96) Μπορούν τα προφυλακτικά να με προστατεύσουν; Αν τα χρησιμοποιείς πάντα και σωστά, μπορούν.
Can condoms protect me? If you use them always and correctly, they can.

(97) Πρόσφατη έρευνα έδειξε ότι αν βάζεις πάντα προφυλακτικό, ο κίνδυνος της λοίμωξης μειώνεται κατά 60% στις γυναίκες.
Recent research has shown that if you [sing.] always use a condom, the danger of infection gets reduced by 60% in women.

(98) Εκατομμύρια άνθρωποι έχουν ΣΜΝ' αλλά αν είναι ειλικρινείς και προσεκτικοί, δεν θα κολλήσουν τους συντρόφους τους.
Millions of people have STDs; but if they are honest and careful, they will not [give them to] their partners.

The first two examples (96 and 97) are about Chlamydia and occur one after the other in the text. They set up a space where a condom is used (correctly) in every sexual contact. Within that space, a woman is safe from Chlamydia, at least 60% safer than she would be if no condom was used. These are generic spaces in that it is a general rule that condoms offer protection from Chlamydia, and ‘you’ is generic. The [second example] apodosis is a categorical statement in habitual present tense.

In the example 96 ‘they can’ seems to be dynamic modality – condoms have the property of preventing Chlamydia and, insofar as they are used properly and consistently, they will. I would say that the ‘ability’ aspect of the dynamic modality is further made salient by the overall metaphorical representation of disease and preventive measures, according to which we can interpret the question and answer sequence as personifying condoms (as agents who protect from the enemy/disease).

However, by reading on one encounters the information that the danger is reduced by 60%, but nevertheless is still there, and this highlights more the epistemic aspect of ‘they can’, in that it is likely that condoms can prevent Chlamydia, but not 100% certain. In example 98 it is in the reality/base space that millions of people have STDs.
In the hypothetical space where they are honest and careful, their partners are safe from catching the STDs.

In all three examples the fact that every hypothetical space \( P \) evokes a hypothetical space \( \sim P \) is exploited, as well as the meaning of \( \text{if} \) as \( \text{iff} \), giving the conditionals a directive force. Whereas in the hypothetical spaces where \( P \) is fulfilled there is (some degree of) safety from STDs at least for a person who does not already have one, where \( \sim P \) there is no such safety and the danger to catch an STD is much higher.

Thus, although the epistemic stance of the protases is neutral, there is a deontic element in these conditionals, due to the content – it is to be inferred that it is desirable for the protases to be fulfilled, because it is desirable for the apodoses to be fulfilled. Thus the reader should take care to always use condoms, correctly, and if she or her partner suffer from an STD, they should be ‘honest and careful’ (these vague terms become more specific in the co-text, where extensive advice is given both on what to do if the reader has an STD, and what to do if her partner has an STD).

### 9.4.2 Problem spaces

Conditionals related to the ‘problem’ aspect of the advice texts are of two kinds: those who provide advice/solutions on what to do if you are faced with the problem in question, and how to solve it, and those which deal with the problem of identifying the problem, which also occurs as a move in advice texts (Polyzou, 2008a).

The grammatical construction of the former type is that of a prototypically predictive conditional, but in fact they are generic. The protasis is in subjunctive perfective, and the apodosis in perfective future tense (Greek distinguishes between perfective and
imperfective/continuous future tense), both giving the impression of a one-off instance. However this occurs because of the enactment of face-to-face conversation with the reader (synthetic personalisation), which is supposedly giving advice to one specific individual asking a question ‘What should I do if I catch [it]?’ The subsequent ‘you’ in the answer then can be reasonably interpreted as direct address to the projected individual reader, while also generically addressing all readers.

Problem spaces are the mental spaces where the problem occurs:

(99) Τι να κάνω αν κολλήσω; Ο γυναικολόγος θα σου γράψει μια αλληφή, με την οποία μέσα σε 8 εβδομάδες πρέπει να εξαλειφθούν τα κονδυλώματα. Αν αυτό δεν αποδώσει, θα σου κάνει καυτηριασμό ή κρυοπηξία. Υπάρχει, βέβαια, πάντα η πιθανότητα νέα κονδυλώματα να εκδηλωθούν όσο προσπαθείς να απαλλαγείς από τα προηγούμενα.

What should I do if I catch [it]? The gynaecologist will prescribe for you an ointment, with which within 8 weeks the genital warts must be eliminated. If this doesn’t work, he will do to you cauterisation or cryoablation. There is, of course, always the possibility for new genital warts to appear while you try to get rid of the previous ones.

In the mental space where the projected reader has contracted an STD (HPV/genital warts in this case), initially any actions to be taken are ‘blank slots’ – it is unknown to her what she should do. The response within the same mental space (the omitted ‘If you catch HPV/genital warts’) is that the patient will be prescribed an ointment. The attention is windowed to the final stage of all the things that need to be done before that – booking an appointment, seeing a doctor, being examined by the doctor. These are presupposed as elements of a ‘disease’ frame/scenario (note the existential presupposition), while they are emphasised in Status in the ‘allergy to latex’ mental space. This might be because Cosmopolitan devotes quite a lot of space elsewhere explaining why, under what circumstances and how often a target reader (young
sexually active woman) should see a doctor and/or get tested. Moreover, in this particular case it is the final stage of the process that actually offers the solution and may be more comforting, while certainly being more helpful (as ‘you will go to the doctor’ is not particularly informative – it is nevertheless inferred by the existential presupposition, so it is not entirely left out).

Within that mental space, where the patient has the disease and has used the ointment, there is a sub-space built, that of the possibility that the ointment will not work. The epistemic stance is neutral, since the ointment may or may not work in any given case, but it is in the case that it does not work that further action is needed. Thus the processes of cauterisation or cryoablation occur within the mental space where there are genital warts, ointment has been administered, and the ointment has not worked.

(100) Στο τεστ Παπ ο γυναικολόγος σου θα δει αν έχεις δυσπλασία και θα σου δώσει τα απαραίτητα φάρμακα για να μην αναπτυχθεί.

At the smear test your gynaecologist will see if you have a malformation and will give you the necessary medication so that it doesn’t develop.

Although ‘if you have a malformation’ is an indirect question and not a conditional, it also fills in the omitted protasis in the following main clause: ‘[If you have a malformation], he will give you the necessary medication so that it doesn’t develop’ – ‘it’ refers anaphorically to the malformation, and therefore to the hypothetical mental space where the malformation actually exists.

In all of the above examples, the protasis sets up a problem, and the apodosis presents the solution, focussing on the final stage of the solution process – it is presupposed that the patient will go to the doctor, will actually use the ointment and will actually have a smear test.
‘Problem sign spaces’ are spaces where the existence of the STD/problem becomes apparent. These are speech act conditionals, in that the apodosis is a directive speech act in all examples, sometimes direct and sometimes indirect. These are also generic though, as they are meant to apply to all cases where the protasis is fulfilled, even though one individual reader seems to be addressed directly here as well.

(101) Αν προσέξεις εξογκώματα, εξωνόματα ή σημάδια, διάκοψε τις σεξουαλικές δραστηριότητες αμέσως.
If you notice bumps, rashes or marks [in your boyfriend’s genital area], interrupt sexual activities immediately.

Here the urgent-sounding and authoritative advice ‘interrupt sexual activities immediately’ only applies within the mental space where the girlfriend discovers marks etc. on her boyfriend’s body. These are signs that he may have an STD, but at this point it is not yet certain that he does (the irritation may be because of some other reason).

(102) Πρέπει να εξεταστώ; Οπωσδήποτε αν έχεις περίεργα εξογκώματα.
Do I need to get tested? Definitely if you have weird bumps.

The ‘bumps’ are a sign that the projected reader has HPV (they may be genital warts), and within the mental space where she has weird bumps, the advice is given that she should get tested.

However, ‘definitely’ (as well as ‘especially’ – see example 105) does not mean that only ‘weird bumps’ warrant medical examination (if ≠ iff). It is in fact also presupposed (taken for granted and not even mentioned at all) that every young woman will have a smear test once a year (unless there is reason to do otherwise, consider example 107).
9.4.3 Danger spaces

In the three examples below, the protases set up mental spaces/situations which cause danger and potentially harm. However, as it is not a certain causal relation (such as water boiling when heated at 100° C) the protases are all epistemically modified:

(102) Αν ένα αγόρι με έρπη σε φιλήσει εκεί κάτω, πιθανότατα θα κολλήσεις έρπη.
If a boy with herpes kisses you down there, you will most probably catch herpes.

(103) Αν κάνεις σεξ μαζί του, μπορεί να κολλήσεις κι εσύ.
If you have sex with him, you may catch [it] too.

(104) Αν δεν την εντοπίσεις έγκαιρα, η γονόρροια μπορεί να προχωρήσει στις σάλπιγγες και να επηρεάσει τη γονιμότητά σου.
If you don’t spot it in time, gonorrhoea can move on to your fallopian tubes and affect your fertility.

It is clear that the apodoses represent undesirable results – in context, advice is given on how to avoid the realisation of the protasis (e.g. how to spot gonorrhoea in time), or about how to realise the protasis without it causing the apodosis (e.g. how to have sex without catching an STD). The 2nd example is a hypothetical sub-space of an already hypothetical space, where the possibility exists that the sexual partner has an STD to begin with.

The examples below are speech act conditionals (Dancygier and Sweetser, 2005: 69f.) – the advice in the apodoses is to be understood within the mental spaces where the protases hold, but it is to be understood as good advice, to be followed even if the protasis does not hold (so if here does not mean iff).
(105) HEPATITIS B: Τα προφυλακτικά θα σε προστατεύσουν, αλλά καλύτερα να κάνεις το εμβόλιο, ειδικά αν έχεις περισσότερους από έναν ερωτικούς συντρόφους το εξάμηνο.

HEPATITIS B: Condoms will protect you, but it’s better to have the vaccine, especially if you have more than one sexual partner per semester.

(106) Αν έχεις την παραμικρή υποψία ότι το αγόρι σου σε απάτησε, πήγαινε για εξέτάσεις.

If you have the slightest suspicion that your boyfriend cheated on you, go for testing.

In example 105, it is always recommended to get vaccinated against Hepatitis B, but having more than one sexual partner per six months simply provides an additional reason to do so. In example 106, getting tested for STD is not suggested only for the cases when one suspects being cheated on, but when such a suspicion exists, immediate testing is imperative (note again, as in example 101, the unmitigated imperative conveying a sense of urgency and authority. This is still understood as advice and not as command because in terms of Felicity Conditions it is meant to benefit the addressee, not the speaker).

(107) Αν έχεις παρουσιάσει τον ιό κάποια στιγμή στη ζωή σου, πρέπει να κάνεις το τεστ Παπ κάθε έξι μήνες.

If you have [manifested] the virus at some point in your life, you have to have the smear test every six months.

The apodosis here is also a directive speech act, albeit indirect, expressed through deontic modality. The smear test is desirable to be taken yearly anyway, and the new information here is ‘every six months’, which applies only (or at least mainly) to the scenario that one has ‘manifested the virus at some point in [her] life’. The expression ‘having manifested the virus’ is vague though, mainly because HPV very often has no symptoms, and presumably the manifestation of carcinogenic HPV would be through
cervical malformations, in which case a smear test should be done every six months. It is not clear, however, whether genital warts also mean that one should have a smear test every six months. I think that for the fast reader, or the reader with not much background knowledge, it is not made immediately clear what counts as 'manifesting the virus at some point in your life', and therefore the extract is more scary than informative for such a reader.

9.5 Conclusion

Conditionals by definition do not present incontestable truths, but mere possibilities. However, other elements in the data, like statistics about how frequent STDs are, present certain possibilities as more likely than others. When it comes to the conditionals themselves, it is significant that certain possibilities are considered at all — contracting an STD or being allergic to latex, for example, are not necessarily problems every reader has, but problems every reader is invited to consider as very likely, and invited to be prepared as to what to do in these situations. Thus, Cosmopolitan and Marie Claire readers might find themselves mentally checking whether they have observed any marks or warts, or whether their sexual practices meet the safety conditions presented in the texts. In Status such possibilities are not primarily presented through conditional constructions, but through other devices not explored in this chapter — for example stating that the correct use of condoms can save readers from (needing to read about) STDs, or that a tight condom would be uncomfortable, set up hypothetical spaces where condoms are used correctly or incorrectly, and where condoms are too tight or too loose or fitting properly. The
hypothetical mental spaces where one is allergic to latex, and where a man is uncircumcised, are considered but not necessarily presented as very likely.

Although the limited amount of data does not allow for much generalisation, the present analysis does indicate that in analysing conditionals context is crucial in determining epistemic status and degree of contestability; it is not merely the case that a conditional creates the possibility of either P or ~P being the case. Moreover, once the hypothetical mental spaces have been set up, the protases of each conditional may set up ‘incontestable truths’ much like assertions, depending on factors like modality and degree of mitigation. They also legitimate the authority of the magazine vs. the reader in a fashion similar to assertions, further highlighting that the magazine producers are knowledgeable about and are able to provide advice for a number of situations in which the readers may find themselves.
Chapter 10: Conclusion

10.1 Introduction

The main argument of this thesis has been that critical, socially oriented analyses of discourse present inconsistencies in their approaches to presupposition, and that this creates theoretical and methodological issues that need to be addressed. Often a truth-conditional approach to presupposition is employed, which is theoretically inconsistent with a socially informed approach acknowledging that social structures and understandings influence and are influenced by language as a system and discourse as language in use. Other analysts acknowledge that there are links between presupposition and (social) cognition in that presupposition, as 'ground' in figure-ground distinctions in discourse, is often shared or assumed to be shared among interactants, and normatively creates the impression that the presupposed ground should be shared and not questioned. Methodologically, however, the identification process of such presupposed beliefs in discourse has not always been transparent, which suggests the need for a re-examination of the theoretical and methodological underpinnings of presupposition analysis, and the application of a theoretically consistent and methodologically systematic framework.

It is such a framework that I have tried to put together here, further putting it to the test by analysing a sample of texts I believe to be ideologically charged, albeit not obviously so, namely, texts about sexual health in lifestyle magazines.

I have focussed on Greek lifestyle magazines in order to examine common normative beliefs pertaining to the personal sphere of the lives of men and women living in a society in the process of social change (Kosetzi, 2007), facing tensions in an
intersection of traditional heteronormative beliefs, egalitarian/feminist discourses and new, often covert forms of sexism.

I have aimed to operationalise these aims through three research questions. In the following section (10.2) I will reiterate each question and summarise the tentative answers to these questions as they have emerged from the thesis. As with every research project, this has also had its limitations, and it seems to me that in answering these three questions many more were raised – these limitations and questions will be addressed in 10.3, as well as possible venues for further research on the topics dealt with in the thesis.

10.2 Research questions – and answers

RQ1

How can presupposition be theorised and applied in a cognitively and pragmatically informed methodological framework for the critical analysis of texts, and to the exploration of gender and language in particular?

The thesis has begun to develop a systematic framework of presupposition analysis. I have suggested that three parameters should be examined, namely whether information is presented as shared or new, whether it is presented as incontestable or open to contestation, and whether it is foregrounded or backgrounded. I have argued that to this end presupposition phenomena need to be studied as figure-ground distinctions on five levels of discourse, and analysis should be examining all three aforementioned parameters on each level (foregrounding vs. backgrounding; presentation of information as shared or new; and degree of contestability). Thus I distinguished
among the following levels, acknowledging that in discourse processing all of the levels interact and are processed simultaneously:

- frame level
- sentence level
- text level
- discourse level and
- pragmatic competence level

For the purposes of this thesis I have focused specifically on the first two levels of the framework, examining the frame level and partially the sentence level of figure-ground distinctions in discourse. At each level, the analysis was done by applying Frame Semantics and Cognitive Metaphor Theory in respect to triggering (metaphorical) frames, and by applying Mental Space Theory in examining sentence-level presuppositions.

In applying the framework to the analysis of gender, sexuality and discourse I have advocated a socio-cognitive approach. I have argued that ideologies are socially shared systems of mental representation surfacing or evoked in discourse, informed by discourse and other social experience and influencing the ways people talk about and experience aspects of social life, in this case sexual relations and medical aspects of sexual activity, and subsequently the ways they evaluate and act towards their peers and sexual partners and medical experts. I hope to have shown that adopting a socio-cognitive account of presupposition can contribute to a fruitful analysis of ideological assumptions underlying gendered discourse.

RQ2

How can presupposition as an analytical category be operationalised for critical discourse analysis based on theoretical insights from Frame Semantics, Conceptual
Metaphor Theory and Mental Spaces, and what further observations can be made when applying the theories and relevant methodologies to Greek language data?

Examining texts word-by-word and sentence-by-sentence indicates that there is a wide range of knowledge underlying even a short stretch of discourse. I have focussed on selected examples here, but I think it is important to acknowledge that not all knowledge/beliefs underlying discourse will necessarily be ideological. Moreover, one needs to consider how much of the ideological knowledge will be triggered in discourse processing (the issue of scope), and what are the factors that lead to ideological beliefs not only being recognised or activated but actually reinforced and perpetuated in discourse, or being contested. The analysis has shown that factors presenting propositions as incontestable include triggering them indirectly, by activating frames with presupposed evaluative elements, and presenting them as categorical truths via categorical modality, attributing them to the Reality Space jointly acknowledged by text producer(s) and text recipient(s).

In relation to discussing presupposed ideological knowledge in discourse, one also needs to recognise the issue of the scope of any given research project and the aims of the research question. For example, all three texts I have analysed have presupposed (as indicated mainly through existential presuppositions and frame activation but also other devices) a particular type of healthcare system, and assumed the readers' familiarity with and acceptance of this system. There are clearly culture-bound and ideological issues in perceptions concerning doctors, medical tests and medical treatments, but I have not focused on them very strongly here as they were not central to my research questions. In relation to the particular dataset, on the text level, it is still perhaps notable that socio-medical assumptions about the vulnerability of young people, and especially women, to STDs co-occur with fear-triggering vocabulary and
present sexual activity as a serious (medical, among other things) issue for young women in women’s magazines. No such assumptions apply to men in the Status text, yet it is still felt necessary to emphasise the authority of a doctor over the advice presented in the magazine.

Applying a presupposition framework that takes into account the methodological distinction among levels of discourse has shown that it is possible to point to specific triggers that have the potential of evoking presupposed socio-cognitive representations, but when it comes to discussing the representations themselves one needs to acknowledge that they will emerge as a result of multi-level meaning activation. Thus the framework would distinguish among frame activation, setting up of mental spaces on sentence level, underlying schematic knowledge of generic structure and online processing of the structure of specific texts, overall socio-cognitive processed and representations and application of pragmatic knowledge for the understanding of discourse in general. Yet in discussing ideological gender-related beliefs (in order to answer Research Question 3), even when conducting an analysis on, for example, assertions on the sentence level, I have made reference to potential understandings of the text related to text level, or pragmatic competence, and to commonly shared beliefs or ‘discourses’ which I would attribute to the discourse level.

Analysing Greek data has not presented major problems for the present analysis, although further exploration and application of the theories to Greek discourse would help provide further insights. For the identification of frames and mental space builders I have relied on my semantic knowledge of Greek (in interaction with contextual knowledge about the Greek society). I set out with the assumption that mental space builders in Greek would be on a par with those identified in English, and
focussed mainly on their semantic content as assigning epistemic status to a proposition, for example. On occasion I have found it useful to comment on tense and form, especially in discussing conditionals, which has meant addressing different categories and conventions for the use of categories in comparison to the English language. Overall the analysis has involved a degree of metalinguistic commentary on Greek semantic and grammatical categories, which I believe would have been necessary even in analysing English data. However, as the methods of analysis are relatively new, particularly in analysing Greek language data, more comprehensive research would be useful in providing insights as to emergent methodological and theoretical issues.

RQ3

What are the ideological assumptions regarding gender and sexuality underlying sexual health texts in Greek men and women’s lifestyle magazines, namely *Marie Claire*, *Cosmopolitan* and *Status*?

All three texts analysed presuppose that the readers are sexually active, with heterosexual partners. *Cosmopolitan* evokes frequently the (presumed to be male) partner and his relationship with the (presumed to be female) reader, while *Marie Claire* and *Status* not so. For *Cosmopolitan* the partner is a potential perpetrator (of infecting the reader with STD) or victim, but, even under extenuating circumstances, sympathies lie with the reader. However, *Cosmopolitan* focuses more on the various STDs and their symptoms, and the advice related to romantic interpersonal relationships here is rather vague. *Marie Claire* presents men also as potential patients, on a par with women. In *Status* women as partners are evoked indirectly twice, once through the mention of ‘offspring’ and once through the pronoun ‘she’ as someone who can damage a condom with her long nails.
The topics in the *Marie Claire* and *Cosmopolitan* texts are STDs and a lot of factual, detailed information is provided. However, there is a lot of informationally vague vocabulary emphasising aspects of the diseases related to the emotions the reader is assumed to be feeling. *Status* chooses to elaborate more on the topic of condoms as a means of preventing STDs and pregnancy, which are both mentioned as a justification for why condoms are important, but not further discussed - here we have factual and evaluative information with a mainly promotional function, and the projection of an ideal reader who is knowledgeable enough to not need to be informed in detail about the reasons for using condoms. Information in the two texts by *Marie Claire* and *Cosmopolitan* has at least partially the function of inducing panic (e.g. details on symptoms of diseases, logical leap/ overgeneralisation by *Marie Claire* from HPV to cancer) in order to emphasise the importance of safe sex (and, in the case of HPV, vaccination).

Overall women's magazines therefore evoke a representation of sexuality and sexual activity as something a young woman needs to worry about, not for morality but for health reasons. Morality does come in, though, in presupposing a negative evaluation and blaming of a male partner who suffers from an STD, and also in assuming that a young woman who finds she has an STD will feel ashamed or guilty. These assumptions are explicitly addressed and challenged, although indirectly an element of blame remains in relation to a range of behaviours which could possibly occur in such a situation (e.g. not being honest with one's partner or with one's doctor). *Status* not only does not emphasise such possibilities of danger and emotions of fear or guilt, but also emphasises the advantages of various condoms on the market from the perspective of comfort and pleasure for the male user, while warnings tend to be put in a humorous, or at least witty manner (e.g. comparing an expired condom to an expired
glass of milk). The Status text presumes that comfort and pleasure are of utmost importance to male readers, even to the point of endangering themselves and their partners by not using condoms, while the possibilities of enduring any discomfort or abstaining from sex are not even mentioned. This is in line with commonly held assumptions about male sexuality, masculine risk-taking, as well as a general disregard of women in general, and of women as romantic partners in particular, in men's lifestyle magazines.

Although the above ideological assumptions do not directly lead to women being terrified, or men being inconsiderate, such beliefs and behaviours are taken for granted and legitimised by their constant unquestioned presence in the background.

### 10.3 Limitations and suggestions for further research

The thesis has in many ways been a theoretical and methodological exploration, and although it has made some proposals, it does not claim to have resolved all issues pertaining to presupposition theorisation and research. The framework proposed in many ways constitutes a systematisation of currently applied methods in studying presupposition in discourse, which in many ways builds on Marmaridou's (2000) initial observations about the potential of cognitive linguistic approaches to account for pragmatic meaning.

It has not been possible to demonstrate the application of the whole framework within the thesis, although I have done so elsewhere (Polyzou, 2008b; 2010; 2012). Here I have presented a frame level analysis, and parts of the analysis of mental spaces triggered on the sentence level. The framework is still at an early stage, and the
amount of texts I have analysed based on it is very limited. It is therefore expected that further empirical work through the analysis of more texts would indicate weaknesses and areas for potential improvement.

One quite readily observable issue is that the framework is qualitative and proposes to deal with a wide range of analytical categories. This poses the question of how the framework might be operationalisable for the analysis of larger bodies of texts. I have no good answer to this at the moment, save for the fact that one can select to apply only parts of the framework, as I have done here. The selection could indeed be more systematically motivated according to one’s research questions and linguistic expressions salient in the data (for example directive speech acts were particularly salient in the texts analysed in Polyzou, 2010, which resulted in a largely pragmatically oriented speech-act level analysis).

One might further enquire to what extent analysis of the levels presented but not analysed here (text, discourse and pragmatic competence) differs from more traditional, non-cognitive based analyses of genre, ideology and pragmatics in discourse. In many ways it does not – one would still need to identify generic conventions, ideological representations (relying on lower levels of analysis as well as knowledge of ideologies pertaining to the social context under analysis) and pragmatic categories such as speech acts and their felicity conditions, implicatures, interaction norms and so on. The difference lies in theoretical explanation, and in focus. Firstly, cognitive theorisation does not necessarily aim to change the way we conduct analyses (although it may well do so), but it does provide insights as to the potential effects of discourse based on empirical and theoretical insights from the study of cognition in relation to discourse processing, for example. Moreover, this multi-level cognitive approach accounts for the fact that various analysts have been using the term
‗presupposition‘ to refer to phenomena as heterogeneous as frames, felicity conditions and discourses as ideological systems of belief. The framework postulates that the above do entail triggering underlying knowledge types, but at different levels. When it comes to focus, the current framework aims to examine how specific aspects of foregrounding and backgrounding might interact with the text recipients’ knowledge and other linguistic devices in order to communicate ideological meaning in covert or less contestable ways – or not. In doing so it aims to avoid oversimplified equations of specific linguistic expressions (‗presupposition triggers‘) with unquestioning compliance, while trying to explain why this is the case when unquestioning compliance is indeed a response to the discourse.

The theoretical focus of the thesis has also meant that further empirical validation is required for the framework not only in terms of its application to a larger number and range of texts, but also in terms of triangulation. I have based my identification of frames evoked by lexical items on my semantic knowledge of Greek. Frame theory based discourse analysis could benefit from independent methods triangulating the accuracy of (at least some of the) semantic contents attributed to frames, whether via corpus-based quantitative methods or via participant-based qualitative and quantitative methods. Likewise, mental spaces as determinants of epistemic status, as well as figure-ground distinctions on all five discourse levels proposed in the analytical framework here, have been justified on theoretical grounds and would certainly gain in validity through empirical psychological research.

When it comes to Mental Spaces, it needs to be acknowledged that Mental Space theory was developed in order to account for a number of phenomena, and the concept of Mental Spaces is also used in a number of ways, as for example in Blending Theory (Fauconnier and Turner, 2002/2003) and its applications. A typology of kinds of
mental space might be in order, possibly in conjunction with exploring the
construction of discourse schemata in online discourse processing. I have also defined
mental spaces, in the way I employed them, as having similarities with Werth's (1999)
text worlds, although I have not explored Werth's model here. I believe that it could
be fruitful to explore the possible integration of text world theory and mental space
theory in developing further the presupposition framework that I have put forward in
this thesis.

I have made references to Relevance Theory (Sperber and Wilson, 1986; 1995) but
have not explored it in great detail. In principle I believe that Relevance Theory and
Cognitive Semantics are not incompatible, and closer attention to Relevance Theory
could potentially provide additional insights in the issues of salience and focus in
discourse processing. I have also not explored Discourse Representation Theory (van
der Sandt, 1992; Kamp, 1995), which could provide further insights for the processing
of presupposition. To my knowledge Discourse Representation Theory has not been
used for the critical analysis of discourse, and to explore its possible applications
would require an entire research project on its own right.

Clearly the contribution of this thesis to the study of discourse on the social issue at
hand, gender relations in (hetero)sexual relations and sexual health, has been
relatively limited due to the theoretical and methodological focus. I have, however,
put forward an argument for the incorporation of cognitive insights to the study of
gender and language in general, and presented a sample analysis of how this could be
done using my proposed presupposition framework. It would be further useful to
examine a larger number of texts on the same topic from lifestyle magazines, and also
from other genres, such as institutional medical discourse and classroom discourse on
sexual education, as well as conducting reception research in order to provide
additional empirical evidence to theoretical analytical findings on how the texts are consumed and processed by audiences.
References:


References - Greek


APPENDIX 1 - ‘her hair’ (Marie Claire, Feb. 2006, p. 77)
APPENDIX 2 – ‘Finally, the vaccine for genital warts has been found!’ (*Marie Claire*, March 2006, pp. 195-196)
ΤΑ ΝΕΟΤΕΡΑ ΑΠΟ ΤΟ ΠΑΤΡΙΚΙΟ 1999

Η παρουσίαση της σελιδοσφραγίδα Παθητικού Τραχείου, σε μια αμφιθέατρο σκέδων πανηγύρικο, αφήνεται να είναι η μόνη μοναδική πράξη αυτής της κοπής χαράς. Αλλά για των παιδιών και των νεανίδων πάντως, το πρόγραμμα αυτό είναι μια εμπειρία τριλ τόκων, ζωής και αγάπης.

Πριν από το νεοτέρο από τον παρόντες, οι παιδικές δραστηριότητες αποτελούν την κορυφή της εκπαίδευσης. Στην πραγματικότητα, δεν υπάρχουν συγκεκριμένες διαπραγματεύσεις αλλά με την ευφυστική παρουσίαση της σελίδας, το πρόγραμμα φέρνει στην πραγματικότητα τα σχέδια των παιδιών.

ΤΟ ΕΠΙΤΕΛΟΥΣ, ΒΡΕΘΗΚΕ ΤΟ ΕΜΒΙΑΛΙΟ ΓΙΑ ΤΑ ΚΟΝ∆ΥΛΟΜΑΤΑ

Με αυτή την ιδέα, η σελίδα υπαγέται στο άγκυρο του επικάτοιου του HPV, που συχνά εμφανίζεται στον ιστό της μοιράς. Οι διαδικασίες για την προστασία αυτής της ιδέας είναι γεγονός με τη συνεργασία του Καστελίου του Λαγκαδά και των γιατρών του Νοσοκομείου της Κρήτης και της Ευκαιρίας της Κρήτης, μέχρι και το 2002 καταστήσαν 33.000 νέα παραστάσεις και 15.000 για να συνειδητοποιήσει κατά κανονικό ρυθμό αυτό που για την Κρήτη, αλλά και για την Ελλάδα.
APPENDIX 3 – ‘STD guide’
(Cosmopolitan, February 2006, pp. 165-172)
ΟΔΗΓΟΣ ΓΙΑ ΤΑ ΣΜΝ

Τα ποσοστά αυτών των σαθεντιών είναι υψηλά. Και —είδαι προετοιμασμένη γι' αυτός— οι νέες γυναίκες είναι πιο εμπιστευτικές. Ακόμη και περισσότερη, ο γιατρός μπορεί να μη σε έχει ενημερώσει. Ο σοφιστής του Cosmo θα σ' τα εξηγήσει όλα.

Από τηn Hallie Levine
**ΠΡΟΣΩΠΙΚΟ ΠΕΝΤΕΛΗ ΜΟΥ**

**ΣΥΝΤΟΜΑ: ΤΟ ΕΜΒΟΛΙΟ ΓΙΑ ΤΑ ΣΜΝ**

**HPV (Κονδυλώματα)**

Το HPV είναι πρόβλημα που κρατάεται για 400 και πάνω τοις χιλ. και επικρατεί στο ερωτικό, δολεειδής και ανάλογα διάστημα και παράλληλα με τον ΠΟΣΟΤΟ-ΤΙΜΗΜΟ των παιδιών. Αυτό το πάθος είναι ιδιαίτερα πιστευόμενο, αν και το είναι ορθή η διάταξη. Μπόρεί να προκαλέσει: 

- Ο ραδικόλοκαλεμία
- Το καρκινό
- Το παχυσαρκία
- Το οξύ ισχυροκοκκίνημα
- Το οξύ λοιμωξιών

Προγενεσιακά είναι και να καθαρίσει τον δίκαιο για την ιατρική. Οι ιατροί έχουν πολλές εργασίες για την επικοινωνία τούτους. Οι ιατροί έχουν πολλές εργασίες για την επικοινωνία τούτους. Οι ιατροί έχουν πολλές εργασίες για την επικοινωνία τούτους. Οι ιατροί έχουν πολλές εργασίες για την επικοινωνία τούτους. Οι ιατροί έχουν πολλές εργασίες για την επικοινωνία τούτους. Οι ιατροί έχουν πολλές εργασίες για την επικοινωνία τούτους. Οι ιατροί έχουν πολλές εργασίες για την επικοινωνία τούτους. Οι ιατροί έχουν πολλές εργασίες για την επικοινωνία τούτους. Οι ιατροί έχουν πολλές εργασίες για την επικοινωνία τούτους.
Ερώτησις των γεννητικών οργάνων

Το είναι: Άρθρο της βιομηχανίας περιεχόμενο σταθερά στην έρευνα σε γεννητικά οργάνα το οποίο δεν διατηρείται ένα κατάλληλο χρονικό ρυθμό. Το έργο επικεντρώνεται στην αναδιάρθρωση της ματαιοποίησης και της πολλαπλασίας, το οποίο συνοψίζεται κάθε μέρες με έναν συντονισμό στην παραπομπή των σπάνιων και πολλών λόγω της μεγάλης ομαλότητας του περιόδου των ματαιωτών. Μερικά από τα εξωτερικά μέτρα που εξελίχθηκαν για την πολλαπλασία είναι τονοπλήθητη ομαλότητα της περιόδου των ματαιωτών. Μετα από τη νέα παραπομπή, η επικεντρώση επεκτείνεται στην κατανόηση των οργάνων, αναπτύσσοντας την επικεντρώση του εργαστηρίου, δηλαδή να εργάζεται σε επαναληπτικούς και να διαμορφώνεται η ομαλότητα του περιόδου των ματαιωτών. Μετά τον επιτυχημένο επιτόκηνο, το αρχίζει επικεντρώση στον κατάλληλο χρονικό ρυθμό, περιγράφοντας ένα κάθε μέρες με έναν συντονισμό στην παραπομπή των σπάνιων και πολλών λόγω της μεγάλης ομαλότητας του περιόδου των ματαιωτών.

Το έργο εκτελείται με έναν κάθε μέρες με έναν συντονισμό στην παραπομπή των σπάνιων και πολλών λόγω της μεγάλης ομαλότητας του περιόδου των ματαιωτών. Μετά τον επιτυχημένο επιτόκηνο, το αρχίζει επικεντρώση στον κατάλληλο χρονικό ρυθμό, περιγράφοντας ένα κάθε μέρες με έναν συντονισμό στην παραπομπή των σπάνιων και πολλών λόγω της μεγάλης ομαλότητας του περιόδου των ματαιωτών.

ΜΕΤΑ ΤΟ ΤΕΣΤ

Είναι προκήρυξη για την άλλη-διαδικασία (όπως το χλούμι) ή είναι για ενα μερικά πολλαπλασία κατάσταση (όπως η ταγή οργάνων) την οποία διατηρεί στη συνεχή κατανόηση με την παραπομπή των σπάνιων και πολλών λόγω της μεγάλης ομαλότητας του περιόδου των ματαιωτών. Μετα από τη νέα παραπομπή, η επικεντρώση επεκτείνεται στην κατανόηση των οργάνων, αναπτύσσοντας την επικεντρώση του εργαστηρίου, δηλαδή να εργάζεται σε επαναληπτικούς και να διαμορφώνεται η ομαλότητα του περιόδου των ματαιωτών. Μετά τον επιτυχημένο επιτόκηνο, το αρχίζει επικεντρώση στον κατάλληλο χρονικό ρυθμό, περιγράφοντας ένα κάθε μέρες με έναν συντονισμό στην παραπομπή των σπάνιων και πολλών λόγω της μεγάλης ομαλότητας του περιόδου των ματαιωτών.

Διαλόγοι για το τρέχον και το επόμενο και βελτιστοποιήσεις της αναπλήρωσης και της επικεντρωσης, εφόσον το εργαστήριο έχει αναπλήρωση και επικεντρωση, ή άλλου διεθνούς σχεδιασμού.
Χλαμύδια

Τί είναι: Το θετοπαθές μικροβιολογικό θαλάμος ο οποίος απασχολεί από εκτός έως μετά την ανατομική ανακατάληψη της σεξουαλικής ήμερας με 50% περιπτώσεων. Ακυκλοπροκλήτη και αλλάζει την αναπλαστική ανακατάληξη των σπερματικών οργάνων με 50% περιπτώσεων. Ακυκλοπροκλήτη και αλλάζει την αναπλαστική ανακατάληξη των σπερματικών οργάνων με 50% περιπτώσεων.

Πώς παράγεται: Ακυκλοπροκλήτη και αλλάζει την αναπλαστική ανακατάληξη των σπερματικών οργάνων με 50% περιπτώσεων. Ακυκλοπροκλήτη και αλλάζει την αναπλαστική ανακατάληξη των σπερματικών οργάνων με 50% περιπτώσεων.

Πώς παράγεται: Ακυκλοπροκλήτη και αλλάζει την αναπλαστική ανακατάληξη των σπερματικών οργάνων με 50% περιπτώσεων.

Πώς εμφανίζεται: Εμφανίζεται σε 8 ευώροπος, οι οποίοι χρησιμοποιούν την ιατρική αποκατάσταση ως αναπλαστική ανακατάληξη των σπερματικών οργάνων με 50% περιπτώσεων.
Μη δείτε πλευρά στην κατάσταση αυτή να καλλιεργείτε κάτι.

**ΚΑΘΗ ΣΥΝΘΕΣΗ**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ΠΟΣ ΝΑ ΤΗ ΔΙΟΡΘΩΣΕΙΣ</th>
<th>ΣΥΝΘΕΣΗ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Είσεις</td>
<td>Είσεις μέσα στον γεννακόλογο λιγότερο στον κατάλογο που είναι πολύτοιχος. Κάθε που περιγράφεται είναι να καλλιεργείται, για το κάθε φύσια ή θηλυκό που δεν είναι πολύτοιχος. Λάβει και είναι πολύτοιχος για τους προαναφερθέντες.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Φυσικά το οροφικό μπάνιο θα μπορούσε να καλλιεργείτε</td>
<td>Το είδος του οροφικού μπάνιου που είναι πολύτοιχος για το κάθε φύσια ή θηλυκό που δεν είναι πολύτοιχος. Κάθε που περιγράφεται είναι να καλλιεργείται, για το κάθε φύσια ή θηλυκό που δεν είναι πολύτοιχος.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Δεν τον τος καταστέο ποτέ προς το σέξ

Δεν κάνεις τις καθαρισμένες θρέψεις και συνεπεία της εξέτασης.`
ΣΤΟ ΓΥΝΑΙΚΟΛΟΓΟ ΣΟΥ

ΨΕΥΔΕΙΣ ΤΟΥ ΕΦΗΒΑΙΟΥ

Μεταδίδονται μέσω απευθείας δημοσιευμένα υπόθεσεις. Είναι ανάλογες αλλά πολύ ευκλειδικές, καθώς μερικές φορές και γενικά σε ανάλογες περιπτώσεις στις γραμμές. Σε μερικές από αυτές οι εργασίες μπορεί να λειτουργήσει το γένι του παιδιού.

ΣΥΝΑΣ

Το προσωπικό συμπιέζει τον 1ης Απριλίου τον γιατρό της και επιχειρεί να επανέλθει στην περιπτώση της τρίτης ημέρας. Σε μερικές από αυτές οι εργασίες μπορεί να λειτουργήσει το γένι του παιδιού.

ΗΠΑΤΙΤΙΔΑ B

Το προφυλακτικό θα μπορέσει να επανέλθει στην περίπτωση, αλλά καλύτερα να κάνει το εμβόλιο, ακόμα και εκείνες περιπτώσεις από εμβόλια σε ισχυρές αποδοχές το εξάμηνο.
ΑΥΤΟ ΤΟ ΗΞΕΡΕΣ;

Ο ουδετέρος προφυλακτικός θετικότερος κατά τον ένα ή τον άλλο προφυλακτικό, ένας προφυλακτικός μπορεί να αντικείμενα την περίοδο 4 ημερών για ολόκληρο τον χρόνο.

Καθε χρόνο καταρτίζονται 5 χρονικά προφυλακτικά επαναληπτικά.

Τοποθετείται κατά τον 100 δευτερολέπτους γενικώς προφυλακτικά.

ΠΕΣ ΝΑ ΠΕΣΕ ΣΤΟ ΚΑΙΝΟΥΡΙΟ ΑΓΟΡΙ ΕΣΟΥ ΟΠΟΙΟ ΕΧΕΣ ΜΟΛΥΝΘΕΙ

Η κατανόηση, προσεκτικότατα να είναι αυτός Η σκέψη αυτής της επιστολής μετά 10 μήνες στην ίδια σύμπτωση για την ίδια λογική, αλλά είναι στο περιθώριο του μέρους. Και εκείνη.

Ζητήστε τη συνομιλία της επιστολής σου. Ο Ίδιος είναι ένας προφυλακτικός, δεν μπορείς να τον επιλέξεις. Υπάρχει ένας όρος για την επέκταση της σύμπτωσης. Προκαλεί την ίδια λογική, αλλά είναι στο περιθώριο του μέρους. Διασκεδάζονται.

Ως θεωρητική έρευνα, οι επιστήμονες πιστεύουν Ζητώντας ποιας προκαλεί την κατάληψη κατά την επέκταση της σύμπτωσης. Προκαλεί την ίδια λογική, αλλά είναι στο περιθώριο του μέρους. Διασκεδάζονται.

Διασκεδαστικά

Το σύμπτωμα της επιστολής σου, ο επιστήμονας της επιστολής σου. Ο Ίδιος είναι ένας προφυλακτικός, δεν μπορείς να τον επιλέξεις.

Δείτε τη συνομιλία της επιστολής σου. Ο Ίδιος είναι ένας προφυλακτικός, δεν μπορείς να τον επιλέξεις.

Αντικαταστήστε την ιδιαίτερη τους προφυλακτικά. Το προφυλακτικό ισχύει για 10 μήνες. Δεν αποτελεί κατάληξη.

Προκαλείται η ίδια λογική, αλλά είναι στο περιθώριο του μέρους. Διασκεδάζονται.

Ο Ίδιος είναι ένας προφυλακτικός, δεν μπορείς να τον επιλέξεις. Έχει παραμενείς ίδια λογική, αλλά είναι στο περιθώριο του μέρους. Διασκεδάζονται.

Αντικαταστήστε την ιδιαίτερη τους προφυλακτικά. Το προφυλακτικό ισχύει για 10 μήνες. Δεν αποτελεί κατάληξη. Υπάρχει ένας όρος για την επέκταση της σύμπτωσης. Προκαλεί την ίδια λογική, αλλά είναι στο περιθώριο του μέρους. Διασκεδάζονται.

Ο Ίδιος είναι ένας προφυλακτικός, δεν μπορείς να τον επιλέξεις.

Ως θεωρητική έρευνα, οι επιστήμονες πιστεύουν Ζητώντας ποιας προκαλεί την κατάληψη κατά την επέκταση της σύμπτωσης. Προκαλεί την ίδια λογική, αλλά είναι στο περιθώριο του μέρους. Διασκεδάζονται. Οι έρευνες και οι απολογίες της επιστολής σου. Ο Ίδιος είναι ένας προφυλακτικός, δεν μπορείς να τον επιλέξεις.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ΝΕΣΣ ΠΕΡΙΠΤΩΣΕΣ ΚΑΙ ΧΡΟΝΟ</th>
<th>55</th>
<th>2,8</th>
<th>700.000</th>
<th>7,4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ΕΠΙΣТОΜΙΑ</td>
<td>ΧΑΛΑΛΟΥΛΑ</td>
<td>ΓΟΝΟΠΟΙΟΑ</td>
<td>ΤΡΚΟΝΟΚΑΛΕΣ</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Πάνω στο παράθυρο, οι ορισμένες περιπτώσεις του AIDS σε ένα κομματικό στην αλεξίπτωτη παράδοση. Οι περιπτώσεις του AIDS σε παράδοσεις αλεξίπτωτης προκαλούν σημαντικά διαφοροποιήσεις σε αρκετά κράτη, καθώς η αλεξίπτωτη παράδοση είναι γνωστή σε άλλα εθνικά κράτη.

Πάνω στο παράθυρο, η ταυτότητα του AIDS σε παράδοσεις αλεξίπτωτης προκαλούν σημαντικά διαφοροποιήσεις σε αρκετά κράτη, καθώς η αλεξίπτωτη παράδοση είναι γνωστή σε άλλα εθνικά κράτη.

Πάνω στο παράθυρο, οι ορισμένες περιπτώσεις του AIDS σε ένα κομματικό στην αλεξίπτωτη παράδοση. Οι περιπτώσεις του AIDS σε παράδοσεις αλεξίπτωτης προκαλούν σημαντικά διαφοροποιήσεις σε αρκετά κράτη, καθώς η αλεξίπτωτη παράδοση είναι γνωστή σε άλλα εθνικά κράτη.
APPENDIX 4 – ‘The bodyguard’ (Status, February 2006, p. 92)
Ο σωματοφύλακας

Ο απελεγμένος κάποιον να σε φιλάει, πρέπει να ξέρεις από πού κρατάται η σκόρπιση του. Από τα Νήνια Κακοδέμη ΜΔ.