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Thesis submitted to Lancaster University for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

January 2018
Abstract


The UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) took place between 2004 and 2017, with a mandate to establish a secure and stable environment in the aftermath of a coup that ousted President Jean Bertrand Aristide. In this thesis, I investigate how the leaders of MINUSTAH discursively constructed legitimation and a Latin-American identity in the context of the mission.

To analyse these processes, I develop a comprehensive analytical framework, drawing in critical discourse studies (CDS), theories of identity, international interventions, peacekeeping and postcolonialism. This framework analyses a set of discursive strategies through which legitimation and identity are constructed.

This study comprises a total set of 18 interviews with leaders of MINUSTAH collected on four different fieldtrips, across three different countries and a total span of 11 year. Additionally, it also analyses 18 UN Security Council resolutions for MINUSTAH. My analysis combines different CDS frameworks to study the discursive strategies used by these leaders to legitimise their actions and construct a Latin-American identity.

My analysis finds that the Latin American identity constructed within MINUSTAH is rather problematic and subject to geopolitical power struggles. It also finds that core concepts for a peacekeeping mission such as ‘security’ and ‘stability’ are also problematic and subject to discursive strategies. It is possible to find different strategies of legitimation and argumentation among the leaders of MINUSTAH when it comes to legitimising the mission or how its major challenges were faced.
Acknowledgments

It is widely held that a PhD thesis is somewhat a “lonely journey”, however I could have never completed mine without the company, support, feedback and advice of some key people. I will try to remember all of them here. Hopefully my memory will not let me down, so I do not do the same to anyone.

First of all, Amanda and Luciana. Having your love by my side gives purpose to my life and makes any concerns, stress and insecurities vanish quickly.

My families: Ana María, Mario, Pablo, María de los Ángeles, Cristina, Dezanka, Mauricio and Benjamín. Thank you for all your support and been there when I needed you most.

My mates at the first MADS generation of LAEL at Lancaster University and others that came afterwards: Carola, Carolina, Sten, Kristof, Daniela Silva, James, Daniela Ibarra, all my officemates and very specially: Marj.

My supervisors Johnny and Ruth, for their infinite patience and guidance. Thank you for being a compass in this journey. Alison for helping me in this final push and for a very challenging confirmation panel which helped me a lot. John Heywood for what was way more than proofreading at a critical time.

My examiners Nicholas Lemay-Hébert and Mark Sebba for what was, despite the “beast from the east” taking its toll, a very enjoyable and useful Viva.

My friends at Manchester: the Mantelli-Montt family, Javier, Filo, the GDLers and MCFC, the only team in the city (as la U is the only team in Santiago).

My friends at PdB: Cristóbal, Tito, Ian and Max. For all the entertaining (and procrastination-prone) debates.

All my friends who have managed to be patient enough with all my absences.
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1. Introduction

1.1 Overview

In this PhD research, I investigate the manifold ways in which the United Nations mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) is discursively constructed in its relation with Haiti within the context of a peacekeeping mission. This mission – the first one led and mostly composed of nationals of Latin-American countries (Malacalza, 2016b, 2016a; Heine & Thompson, 2011; Ross, 2004) – started in 2004 after the coup that ousted President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. The intervention was made in order to avoid a civil war and to create the conditions to hold new presidential elections as soon as possible, and, at the same time, reform the Haitian police (United Nations Security Council, 2004b). During the more than 13 years that this mission lasted, it faced several challenges, including demobilising armed gangs, the devastating earthquake in 2010, the subsequent cholera outbreak which killed at least 9,200 Haitians, and revelations of the sexual abuse of Haitian civilians by UN soldiers. Each one of these challenges was also a communicative challenge: how the mission, especially its leaders, should address these issues. My specific interest is to understand how the mission faced these different challenges during these years, and how, at the time, the leaders of the mission, through their declarations, discursively construct what the mission is doing, and why it is doing it.

To date, there is no published empirical research about the self-representation of MINUSTAH and its leaders, although there is research which touches on some similar issues, for example, Baturo et al. (2017) who work on analysing the debates in the UN general assembly. The work by di Carlo (2012, 2014) analyses the resolutions of the UN for North Korea compared with the ones for the second Gulf War. Gruenberg (2009) analyses Security Council resolutions looking for how different countries are treated. Ngo & Hansen (Ngo & Hansen, 2013) looked at identity construction in UN refugee camps. MINUSTAH itself has been the subject of research (see for example (Burt, 2016; Gauthier & Moita, 2011; Harig, 2015; Lemay-Hébert, 2015; Malacalza, 2016a; Napoleão & Kalil,
2015), but none of these studies analyse the discourse of its leaders. In this way, this research project is aimed at a relatively unexplored area. However, it is an important gap to be filled, as it will contribute to a better understanding of the complex situation of an international intervention with vast social repercussions.

Since the discursive construction of this UN mission is the main focus of my PhD, this research will deal with the dynamics of identity (self-)construction and (self-)representation in the context of an international intervention. Therefore, this research will also be a theoretical contribution to the field of critical discourse studies (CDS) by providing critical input to the concepts available for understanding identity/ies construction, legitimation strategies and multi-national organisations.

The relevance of research on this topic lies in the fact that since the beginning of the second half of the 20th century the UN has carried out various multinational interventions, the results of which are often still part of the current geopolitical and conflict management issues. It is for this reason that the abductive approach (i.e.: a constant movement back and forth between theory and empirical data) favoured by CDS – specifically the discourse-historical approach (DHA) – seems to be the best way to explore a phenomenon which is part of the wider issues of human rights and the impact of UN missions. By looking at these issues from this critical perspective, Haiti can be interpreted as an example where all of them fall into place. This study aims to analyse the case of Haiti as a microcosm of global problems.

I am specifically interested in how some of the main actors in the UN Mission constructs the different tensions that arise in such settings, namely intercultural conflicts, help vs. intervention, developmental aid vs. “Western” imposition, and how they propose to cope with them. In order to conduct this research, I will mainly employ theories and methodologies used in CDS to analyse both written and spoken data. An international intervention per se can be regarded as a complex social phenomenon related to manifold power relations and tensions which is why a critical approach suggest itself. These tensions arise between a multinational power and countries that are usually poor and politically unstable with imminent civil wars.
However, this kind of research topic can hardly claim to be only linguistic, and has indeed been studied from the perspective of cultural studies (Escobar, 1988a; Latouche, 1996; Slater, 2006), peace-building (François Debrix, 1996; François Debrix, 1999; Hurd, 2007; Junk, 2012; Lipson, 2012; Mac Ginty, 2008a, 2012; Pouligny, 2006), state-building (Chandler, 2006a, 2010; Jackson, 1990a; Lemay-Hébert, Onuf, Vojin, & Bojanic, 2014; Zack-Williams, 2012; Zanotti, 2008a, 2011) and conflict management (Chetail, 2009; Paris, 2004; Ross, 2004). As Wodak and Meyer (2016) highlight: “CDS is [...] not interested in investigating a linguistic unit per se but in studying social phenomena which are necessarily complex and thus require a multi-disciplinary and multi-methodical approach.” (p. 2).

From the entry point of the Critical Discourse Studies approach this research aims to contribute to the understanding of these issues as part of a complex global problem. In this sense, this thesis, although covering issues relevant to the international interventions and peacekeeping fields, does not claim to be situated in any of those disciplines in particular. I situate this thesis in the field of CDS, particularly the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA), which is eclectic and inter/trans-disciplinary\(^1\) by nature.

### 1.2 Motivation

How I became interested in this issue has more to do with a haphazard encounter, than an interest rooted in my scholarly background. It was a late winter day of 2004 in Santiago, Chile and I was having lunch in a park with an office-mate from the crime research centre where I was doing my internship for my BA in sociology. I was about to go back to the office when I saw an old school friend in the distance whom I had not seen for over 4 years. The last I had heard from him was that he was living in Buenos Aires, Argentina, studying to become a documentary director. We caught up very quickly (we were both on our way to somewhere else) but he managed to tell me that he had just came back from

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\(^1\) This point has been further discussed in Unger’s paper on interdisciplinarity in CDS (2016) and in Weiss and Wodak’s comprehensive volume (2007).
Haiti. He also told me that his father had been named Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), therefore Head of the recently established UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). He had been filming there and he felt that there was very good material, from an intimate and close-to-power perspective of the mission. The problem was that he was very much on his own, using borrowed equipment from his university, and with almost no budget.

At the time, I was also working as the president of a cultural centre in downtown Santiago and I had some experience of applying for ‘cultural projects’ funds. I suggested he met me at the centre and I could help him to apply for funding. After that meeting he invited me to join him, if I wanted to. I could design and conduct some interviews and be the sound operator (a formal name for the person holding the microphone and using headphones). Of course, I said yes and took my scarce savings and went with him four months later. Hence, this research started out as a documentary project about MINUSTAH. Despite our very limited budget (our own savings basically), the fact that the director of the documentary was the son of the then SRSG allowed us to have access to most of the MINUSTAH’s facilities and carry on with the project. We used professional DV cameras and audio systems borrowed from my friend’s university; the crew consisted of just the two of us. However, our UN connections helped us with security and transportation, as well as granting access and permission for the interviews already mentioned.

My main role in the documentary project was designing the interviews (and conducting most of them) and also being the sound operator. The former gave me a lot of control over what questions we were asking and therefore, shaped the focus of the documentary. Since I have a deep interest in identity issues and how power is involved in them, the alleged Latin-American particularity of MINUSTAH caught my attention, especially since this mission was taking place in such a troubled country as Haiti.

The documentary fieldwork in which I participated was basically two trips. The first one of two weeks by the end of January and beginning of February 2005. The second was the second week of May 2006, when René Préval took office (for the second time). Additionally, several interviews were conducted
from September to December 2004 in Chile with the SRSG and former ambassadors who lived in Haiti.

It is no exaggeration to say that going to Haiti changed my life in many levels and that I established a kind of link which never vanished, despite the number of years that the documentary project went into an undefined hiatus (due to lack of funding for post-production among other reasons). Between my last trip to Haiti in 2006 and the start of my MA in Discourse Studies (and my current PhD afterwards) almost five years passed in which I knew I had this very good material and I was able to do some research on it. In 2008 a professor at the University where I had studied sociology invited me to be part of the team of lecturers for a course on qualitative methods. It was then that I became interested in (critical) discourse studies and it struck me as the most suitable framework to work with my data in. From then on it took me a couple of years to start my postgraduate studies in CDS and to be finally working with the data I had collected all those years before.

But it would be unfair to attribute the motivation for this thesis only to the fact that I had material collected for an unfinished documentary project. That documentary project was my entry point to Haiti and its rich and problematic history and, moreover, to the world of a peacekeeping mission. The dynamics of a peacekeeping mission appeared to me very clearly as being articulated by power relations on different levels: within the mission, between the mission and the country being intervened in, between the different countries participating in the mission, between the UN Security Council (UNSC) and the mission, within the UNSC and so on and so forth.

The focus of my interest was to learn about how the leaders of a peacekeeping mission such as MINUSTAH legitimise their actions in the field. More precisely, which discursive resources do they use to in order to justify the existence of an international intervention. Additionally, since both myself and the documentary director consider ourselves Latin Americans, exploring the Latin American dimension of the mission and how a Latin American identity was being constructed in that setting was a subject that interested us from the beginning.

However, once I was already working on my PhD, it became obvious that the data that I had was ‘outdated’. My documentary fieldtrips to Haiti, as
mentioned before, had taken place in 2005 and 2006. The earthquake of 2010, the cholera outbreak that same year and sexual abuse accusations had all taken place after my - at the time - latest data, therefore I wanted to capture the changes that MINUSTAH had suffered since the last time I went. Now in the context of the PhD, I went on a new field trip in 2015 to interview the people occupying the same positions of the people that I had interviewed before. That field trip transformed my thesis making it cover a 11-year span.

1.3 Research Questions

Following on from the above, my thesis aims to answer the following research questions:

RQ1a: How do MINUSTAH leaders discursively construct the mission’s identity through their statements?

RQ1b: Do MINUSTAH decision-makers discursively construct Latin American identity/ies as a potential resource for a successful mission in Haiti? If so, how and why?

RQ1a is aimed at researching the different means of discursive identity construction used by MINUSTAH through interviews with relevant leaders and decision-makers in the mission. RQ1b starts from the findings of the dissertation pilot study (published in (Ferreiro & Wodak, 2014), which established a strong link between discourses about a Latin American identity within the mission, and the consequences that it could have for a potentially successful outcome of the mission. The aim of this RQ is to investigate this feature in more detail and to explore how such discursive constructions of Latin American identity are characterized and which role they might play in the imaginaries about the mission.

The idea is to critically examine the features of this Latin American identity present in MINUSTAH leaders’ statements, focusing on the strategies that could be “covering” an underlying power struggle in geopolitical terms (i.e.: Latin America vs USA). The data examined for my dissertation showed a recurring
RQ2a: How does MINUSTAH engage in the discussion about the legitimacy of international interventions?

RQ2b: How do MINUSTAH leaders discursively construct the meanings of their actions in Haiti?

RQ2c: Which strategies do they employ? How?

In these research questions I will understand ‘legitimacy’ from the normative point of view, i.e: as a “benchmark of acceptability or justification of political power or authority and—possibly—obligation” (Peter, 2010). In other words, legitimacy explains why the exercise of political power from a particular institution is permissible and obeyed as a duty (ibid.). In terms of (van Leeuwen, 2008), legitimation answers to the spoken or unspoken questions “Why should we do this?” or “Why should we do this in this way?” (p. 106). I will discuss the framework for legitimation in section 4.3.3.

It is important to take into account that there is a difference between two discursively intertwined processes: to discursively legitimate actions i.e. trying to make something legitimate through discourse strategies – which is what RQ2b & c address - on the one hand; and the legitimacy of international interventions i.e. the state of legitimacy which is under discussion in the wider sense of any intervention, on the other hand (addressed by RQ2a).

RQ2a is very relevant to the analysis presented in Chapter 6, as it will explore the legitimation strategies already deployed in the UN Security Council resolutions in order to have a better idea of the general UN framework on this
issue, but also to have a contrast with the interviews and compare how MINUSTAH’s (leaders) legitimation strategies align with the UN Security Council’s. Needless to say, the discursive legitimation of MINUSTAH relates to the legitimacy of international interventions as a fundamental starting point, but not the other way around. That is, the legitimacy of international interventions does not need MINUSTAH in order to build its framework. However, MINUSTAH’s outcome and development (successes, failures, abuses, etc.) could be used as an input for the discussion of the legitimacy of international interventions.

These RQs deal with all the strategies deployed by the decision-makers through personal interviews in order to make sense of the operations that MINUSTAH is conducting in Haiti. These questions aim to look at the different strategies used and incorporate not only the legitimation strategies (i.e. the means by which the decision-makers discursively construct MINUSTAH’S legitimacy), but also the de-legitimation strategies which were used by these leaders in my MA dissertation interviews (Ferreiro & Wodak, 2014) against the USA as means of positive-self and negative-other presentation (i.e.: representing USA as a country that had led the previous failed missions in Haiti, and that is unable to grasp the complexity of the Haitian issue).

RQ3: Are there any salient differences in the discursive construction of MINUSTAH between 2004 and 2015?

This RQ addresses the fact that this research is going to have material from two different moments. One that I call the “documentary context” which took place in two different field trips: the first one at the end of 2004 and the beginning of 2005 and the second one in mid-2006. The second moment is what I call the “research project context”, which corresponds to the field trips that took place during the PhD (during 2013 and 2015). This makes the timespan covered by the research comprise over ten years. During these eleven years Haiti suffered devastating storms, an earthquake and a cholera outbreak (which some people blamed a Nepalese UN base for, an explanation that has since been accepted). These events, especially the last two, meant great losses and reshaped the UN
mission in many ways. I am interested in exploring how the discursive construction of MINUSTAH changed between the “documentary context” and the “research project context”. In order to do so I will carefully compare the changes occurring in the Security Council’s resolutions and MINUSTAH leadership interviews whenever possible (bearing in mind these were obtained either by interviewing the same people again up to ten years after the first interview and/or interviewing the people who now occupy the same roles that the original interviewees had years ago).

1.4 Thesis Structure

After this introduction chapter, Chapter 2 provides a contextual overview with a brief reference to Haiti’s main historical milestones and Haiti’s situation in terms of its socioeconomic and development indicators. I will also refer to some contextual information regarding the international interventions and the role of the UN in them. I will explain the main structures of the UN and provide a brief overview of how UN missions have evolved. I will then move on to contextualise MINUSTAH and refer to the most relevant issues for this research which happened in between my 2006 and 2015 fieldtrips. I will provide a specific overview for what I call the “three shocks” of the mission (the earthquake, the cholera outbreak and sexual abuse allegations) which happened during the aforementioned period. Finally, I will briefly refer – as an epilogue – to the two main issues which changed after my 2015 fieldtrip: the end of MINUSTAH and the UN’s recognition of their responsibility in the cholera outbreak.

In Chapter 3, I will present the theoretical framework for this thesis. This means presenting and exploring the main concepts involved in this research. I will start with the problematic concept of Latin America, its relationship with (post)colonialism and its dynamic as a counter-concept (opposed to Europe and the USA, mostly). I will then problematize the place of Haiti within Latin America. Afterwards, I will discuss issues around identity construction and the possibility of multi-national identities. Next, I will refer to the main issues raised by
international interventions. I will follow that with a discussion about the concepts of ‘security’ and ‘stability’ within the different peacekeeping doctrines. Finally, I will present the framework for the importance of studying language in international interventions, which will set the stage for Critical Discourse Studies and its main concepts.

I will present the methodological framework in Chapter 4. In it I will refer to the challenges of transforming a documentary project into a PhD thesis and to what extent this shaped my thesis. I will then present some methodological issues around using interviews as a research method. I will explain how I selected my data and the macro-topics to then move on to the analytical framework for each analysis chapter (Chapters 5, 6 and 7). I will also refer to the analysis of the UNSC resolutions for MINUSTAH, what they are and the framework to analyse them. I will then discuss the challenges of combining data from different genres (such as interviews and security council resolutions). Finally, I will mention some caveats and challenges to take into account when analysing these kinds of data.

Chapter 5 is focused on the analysis of the discursive construction of Latin American identity by the leaders of MINUSTAH. Chapter 6 is about the discursive strategies deployed around the concepts of ‘security’ and ‘stability’; analysed from the UNSC resolutions and the interviews to the leaders of MINUSTAH. Chapter 7 will focus on the discursive strategies used in discussing the “three shocks”, analysed in the interviews with the leaders of MINUSTAH. In Chapter 8 I will provide the conclusions of this thesis, focusing on the main findings, contributions, limitations and possibilities for future research.
2. Context

2.1 Introduction

In this chapter I will present the main contextual elements required to understand the subject of my thesis. I start by providing an historical overview of Haiti, highlighting those elements which allow an understanding of its current situation. I then provide some basic data to understand Haiti’s main socio-economic challenges, which shape the complexities of the issues that have troubled Haiti for such a long time. After that I provide an overview of the wider context of international interventions from their beginnings before zooming in to MINUSTAH. I then provide some contextual information about MINUSTAH and its operations from its inception until the ‘shocks’ which are part of the Analysis Chapters 5, 6 and 7. I will finally provide a brief epilogue, consisting of the relevant further events which happened after my field trips.

2.2 Historical Background

Haiti is mostly known for its natural, social and political disasters and instability, and commonly regarded as a case of a ‘failed state’ (Corten, 2011). However, this ‘bad record’ hides a very important milestone in Haiti’s history: Haiti was only the second nation in the Americas (after the USA) to gain its independence, which it won in 1804. But not only that, that independence process was also an uprising of slaves against their masters, making Haiti the first ‘slave-free republic’ and the first country to fully abolish slavery. This process began in 1791 after a voodoo ceremony called “Bois Caiman”, led by the voodoo priest Boukman. It is no coincidence that voodoo has played such an

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2 This ‘timeline’ was elaborated with data from Lemay-Hébert (2015), Dubois (2012), Zanotti (2011) and Farmer (2006)

3 For a critical review on the limits of the ‘failed state’ framework for the case of Haiti see (Lemay-Hébert, 2014)
important role in Haitian history: it is still widely practised in Haiti, being the major cult (normally combined with other religions such as Christianity).

Between 1793 and 1802 the Haitian revolution was led by Toussaint L’Ouverture, a former black slave who led an uprising that overthrew and forced out the French rulers who had run Haiti as a colony since 1660 and abolished slavery in 1794. Ten years later, in 1804, after Toussaint L’Ouverture’s capture and imprisonment in France, Jean Jacques Dessalines defeated the French troops sent to regain control, and proclaimed Haiti’s independence and himself as emperor. All white people were either expelled or killed. This racial founding element was influential both on Haitian social structure – where, up to the uprising, the white minority still had most of the economic power⁴ - and for its subsequent international isolation: the 'western world' refused to recognise Haiti as an independent republic, mainly because their slave-trade business was being threatened.

In 1817, an important event in Haiti’s relations with Latin America took place: Pétion, Ruler of the South (Haiti was divided into three areas by then), sent military and financial aid to Simón Bolivar to support his quest for Latin American independence from Spain. The explicit condition requested by Petiòn was that Bolivar should free all slaves in the independence process. However, this alliance between Latin America and Haiti weakened in time and vanished when France asked Haiti for compensation in exchange for recognition as an independent nation, as no Latin American countries offered any resistance or support.

During the period of Pierre Boyer's rule (1818-43) Haiti was unified, but he excluded blacks from all participation and representation in power. Boyer himself was a mulatto⁵. Within this period, in 1825 France – the former colonial

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⁴ For a more complete account of Haitian social structure and its historical background see (Bourjolly, 2010; Casimir, 2012; Castor, 2012; Grau, 2009)

⁵ ‘Race’ politics have been very important in Haitian history. I will mention some of the main events throughout this chapter and also in Section 3.3. I am fully aware that the terms ‘race’, ‘black’ and ‘mulatto’ are controversial and heavily loaded in the context of Haiti. For the sake of clarity, ‘black’ refers to people of apparently unmixed sub-Saharan African descent.
power - sent 12 armed ships demanding a 150 million gold francs indemnity (equivalent to £14 billion nowadays) in return for diplomatic recognition, which only came in 1934. By 1914, 80% of the Haitian budget was being used to pay France and French banks this compensation. Regretfully, Latin American countries as well as the President of the USA, then Thomas Jefferson, went along with France and refused to recognise Haiti. This started its profound isolation from the rest of the world that can be illustrated with the following fact: only in 2002 was Haiti finally approved as a full member of the Caribbean Community trade bloc (CARICOM).

In 1915, after escalating friction between blacks and mulattos, the USA decided to invade Haiti in order to protect American property and investments such as coffee, cocoa and sugar cane fields and textile plants. This started a 20-year long intervention in Haiti by the Marines, initiating the long history of the USA's 'direct political' involvement in the country. In 1934, the USA withdrew troops from Haiti but kept fiscal control until 1947.

Between 1957 and 1986 the violent Duvalier dictatorships occurred. First came Francois Duvalier ("Papa Doc") a physician and voodoo priest who proclaimed himself 'President for Life' between 1957 and his death in 1971. Afterwards he was succeeded by his son Jean-Claude ("Baby Doc"), also President for Life, until a popular uprising overthrew him in 1986.

In 1990 Jean Bertrand Aristide, a former catholic priest, was elected in Haiti's first free and peaceful election. However, in 1991, a coup led by Brigadier-General Raoul Cedras ousted Aristide. This triggered sanctions from the USA and the Organization of American States (OAS). In 1994, the military regime relinquished power in the face of an imminent US invasion. American military

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‘Mulatto’ refers to evidently bi-racial people of mixed African and European descent. For a better understanding of this issues in Haiti see Quinn & Sutton, 2013.

6 Graham Greene’s famous novel 'The Comedians' (1966) is a very insightful account of the atmosphere under that regime.
forces oversaw a transition to a civilian government and Aristide finally returned.

In 1995, UN peacekeepers began to replace US troops and Aristide's supporters won new parliamentary elections. Rene Préval, from Aristide's Lavalas party, was elected in December to replace Aristide as president. But before that, Aristide's government had blamed army officials for two coup attempts. Consequently, the army was dissolved. This meant that Aristide had now inadvertently created an armed militia against him in the form of unemployed former military officers. Additionally, as Lemay-Hebert (2015) explains, these former military personnel became part of the UN's policy for Security Sector Reform (SSR) by being incorporated into the police. This meant the police developed legitimacy problems in relation to those sectors of the population opposed to Lavalas and the subsequent politicization of the Haitian National Police and the SSR in general.

In 2000, Aristide was elected president for a second non-consecutive term, amid allegations of irregularities. George W. Bush became President of the U.S. and relations between the two countries deteriorated over Haiti’s economic policy and other issues, leading to a development assistance embargo against Haiti, involving not only the U.S. but also the EU and multilateral institutions like the Inter-American Development Bank (Farmer et al., 2003). Members of the international community provided financial and diplomatic support to Haitian civil society organizations calling for the overthrow of the Haitian government while rebels training to overthrow Haiti's democratically elected government were able to operate training camps across the border in the Dominican Republic. (Concannon, 2018, pp. 147-148).

Between January-February 2004, the celebrations of 200 years of independence turned into popular demonstrations against the government. Aristide resigned and fled, later accusing American marines of kidnapping him and causing the coup. An interim government took over the country. In June, UN peacekeepers arrived to take over security duties from the American-led force
and to help flood survivors. This was the starting point of the ongoing UN mission (MINUSTAH).

During 2008, three “external shocks” (Gauthier & Moïta, 2011) in the form of inflation of international fuel and food costs, the global financial turmoil and a series of hurricanes and storms, resulted in riots in Haiti’s major cities and in the resignation of Prime Minister Jacques-Édouard Alexis.

On January 12th, 2010, a massive earthquake destroyed the capital Port-au-Prince and several other cities. More than 250,000 people died that day (See Farmer et al., 2012 for a first-hand account of the earthquake and reconstruction efforts).

After the earthquake, at least 9,200 Haitians died because of a cholera outbreak, a disease that was believed to have been eradicated from the country for a century. Press reports (‘Haiti cholera “came from UN base”’, 2012) claimed that the cholera came from a Nepalese UN base, unleashing popular outrage against MINUSTAH.

Politically, the period from the earthquake to the time of writing was not very stable. After the presidential elections held in 2010, two thirds of the parliament remained unelected from 2012 until January 2015, when President Martelly decided to dissolve parliament, call for new elections and rule by decree in the meantime. Just before that, Prime Minister Lamothe resigned in December 2014, amid public demonstrations against Martelly. The election of 2015 was followed by massive protests and the run-off, which was originally scheduled for 27th December 2015 was postponed several times. Finally, new elections were held on 20th November 2016, with a reported turnout of 18.11%. Jovenel Moïse was elected president with 55.6% of the votes.

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7 For a more detailed account of problems and demonstrations during this period, see (2016, pp. 173–179)
2.2 Haitian Numbers

To obtain reliable data from Haiti has been very difficult for a long time\(^8\); however, the World Bank website (World Bank, n.d.) provides the most accurate data available along with some of their estimations. The figures below are from the latest year available. Between brackets is the year which the data refer to.

Haiti is the poorest country in the northern hemisphere, according to the usual measures:

- It has a Gross National Income of **US$780** per capita (2016)
- It is estimated that **58.5%** of the population lives under the poverty line (2012)
- It also has the lowest adult literacy rate: **49%** (2008).

Regarding health indicators:

- It has the lowest life expectancy: only **63.11 years** (2015).
- It has the highest mortality rate for children under 5 years old: **67 per 1,000** (2016). In comparison, the mean rate for Latin America and the Caribbean is 23.3. After the earthquake and the cholera outbreak in 2010, it peaked at 208.

Regarding politics, 2011 was the first time that a democratically elected president finished his term uninterrupted and handed over power to a democratically elected president from a different party. In other words, this can be regarded as the first peaceful complete democratic transition between different parties/coalitions in the history of Haiti.

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\(^8\) See (Échevin, 2011; Singh, 1987; ‘Staff and Quality Data Play Critical Role in Haiti Disaster Response — MEASURE Evaluation’, n.d.)
2.3 UN Missions and International Interventions

But being a poor and troubled country does not entail necessarily having an international intervention in times of crisis *per se*. There is a history and an institutional apparatus that together explain why these missions are deployed. In order to understand why a UN mission takes place in Haiti, it is also necessary to contextualise international interventions and how UN missions take place in those contexts.

The Concert of Europe (composed of Austria, Prussia, Russian Empire and the United Kingdom), formed after the defeat of Napoleon with the purpose of maintaining peace in Europe, and which only lasted from 1815-1823, was, nevertheless, for almost a century (1815-1914), “the most comprehensive attempt to construct new machinery for keeping peace among and by the great powers” (Thakur, 2006, p. 28). Therefore, it can be considered the precursor of international peace-keeping organisations. Around the turn of the twentieth century, The Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 introduced a broadening of international relations in participation and agenda. They aimed to establish an emergent extra-European international system, in the management of which the lesser powers could demand a say; and, with their emphasis upon mediation, conciliation and inquiry, they demonstrated a rationalistic and legalistic approach to the problem of international disputes (Thakur, ibid.).

The two major international organisations of the twentieth century were the League of Nations after the First World War and the United Nations after the Second World War. In both instances, people horrified by the destructiveness of modern wars decided to create institutions to avoid a repetition of such catastrophes.

The League was built around Europe as the core of the international political system (Claude, 1971, p. 49). It accepted the sovereign state as the central unit of international affairs and the Great Powers as the dominant participants. According to Claude (ibid) the League “began as the embodiment of
humanity's aspirations for a better world”. The League was prepared to condemn Japanese aggression in Manchuria in 1931 despite no prospect of any collective action being undertaken. The Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 presented the League with its moment of greatest triumph: for the first time, the international community, acting through institutionalised channels, condemned aggression, identified the aggressor and imposed sanctions.

However, even though the League was “killed” by the Second World War, its legacy of international organisation lives on in the United Nations. The most important part of the legacy was the concept, by now firmly entrenched, yet revolutionary in 1919, that the community of nations has both the moral right and the legal competence to discuss and judge the international conduct of its members.

An important development of this idea was the Pact of Paris of 1928 (also known as the Kellogg-Briand Pact (‘Text of the Kellogg-Briand Pact for the renunciation of war’, 1928), wherein the signatories condemn 'recourse to war for the solution of international controversies and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in relations with one another'. The practical significance of the pact was eroded by its non-enforceability and by the many qualifications attached by various signatories, for example the extension of self-defence to embrace colonies. Yet the declaration of the principle that war was henceforth to be treated as an illegitimate method of dispute settlement was of great symbolic significance even if it fell well short of being a contractual obligation.

The closeness with which the UN was modelled upon the League was testimony also to the fact that while the League had failed, people still had faith in the idea of an umbrella international organisation to oversee world peace and cooperation. Apparently the most significant advance from the League to the UN lay in the area of enforcement. The UN incorporated the League’s proscription on the use of force for national objectives, but inserted the additional prescription that force could be used in support of international, that is UN, authority. As proof of the added potency of the new organisation, the UN Security Council (UNSC) was given the power to decide whether international peace was
threatened, whether sanctions were to be imposed and, if so, the nature of the sanctions, including military force. Most importantly, such decisions by the UNSC would be binding upon all the members of the United Nations, even those who had voted against the measures. The appearance of this enhanced effectiveness was a major argument advanced in the UN’s favour in 1945 in comparison to the discredited and discarded League. The UNSC, it was argued, would be the equivalent of a supreme war-making organisation of the international community (Thakur, 2006, p. 30).

During the twentieth century, and mainly during its second half, the number of international organisations rose from 37 in 1909 and 123 in 1951 to about 7,000 in 2000; likewise, the number of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) increased from 176 in 1951 to 48,000 in 2000 (Union of International Associations, 2002, p. 35).

2.4 Main Structures of the UN

In order to understand how the apparatus of the UN is organised and deployed in an operation, I will explain briefly its main actors.

The General Assembly (GA) is the plenary body made up of all the UN member states, each one of which has one vote. There were 51 original members of the United Nations. By 2013 there were 193 member states, the latest addition being South Sudan on the 14th July 2011. This steady expansion has enabled the organisation to meet its goal of universal membership and has been helped by the fact that joining the UN is seen as conferring the final imprimatur of sovereign identity (Thakur, 2006, p. 30), a symbolism that was very important in the recent recognition of Palestine as a non-member state, even though member-state condition has not been obtained yet.

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has fifteen members, of which five are permanent and non-elected, known colloquially as the P5: China, France, Russia, the United States and the United Kingdom. Of the ten remaining
members, each year five are elected by the GA for a two-year period, on the basis of 'equitable geographical representation' from Africa, the Americas, Asia and Europe. There is no immediate re-election for these members (Thakur, ibid).

The UNSC is the executive decision-making organ of the UN system. Its decisions are made by a majority of at least nine of the fifteen votes, including the necessary concurring vote of each permanent member: a requirement known as the veto power (Article 27.3 (United Nations. Dept. of Public Information, 1945)). All the UN resolutions that create and determine the UN's operations are made in the UNSC.

However, the UNSC cannot compel member states to implement resolutions. The efficacy of UN action for the peaceful resolution of disputes is circumscribed by this retention of the principle of voluntarism.

UN multilateral diplomacy differs from traditional interstate diplomacy in some important respects (Pérez de Cuéllar, 1993, pp. 67–69). Guided by Charter principles, it offsets the unfavourable position of the weaker party, aims to establish a just peace as well as a stable balance of power and takes into account the interests of member states as well as the disputants. Gareth Evans (1993, pp. 61–63) has drawn attention to the attractions of using UN channels and modalities for resolving disputes peacefully and to the abysmal imbalance in resources devoted to preventive diplomacy as opposed to “band-aid solutions”.

The majority of disputes that do not find their way to the UN involves the major powers: 'experience has paralleled the understanding implicit in the veto provision in the United Nations charter, that international organisations do not have the capacity to deal with all disputes involving the most powerful states' (Jacobson, 1979, p. 211)

Enforcement measures are outlined in Chapter 7 of the Charter. Articles 42 and 43 in particular authorise the UNSC to 'take such action by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security', and require member states to make available to the UN such 'armed forces, assistance, and facilities' as may be necessary for the purpose. Thus, according to Thakur (2006, p. 32), while as a settler of disputes the UN can only recommend
desirable courses of action to disputing members, as a policeman it can impose
decisions upon violently erring states.

It is worth considering what in H.G. Nicholas’ seminal work ‘The United
Nations as a political institution’ (1975) is described as the UN beyond its
intentions or Charter. In this account from within, Nicholas explains how the
perceived incapacity of the UN to react and solve certain issues is politically
rooted. In other words, as world politics change, so does the UN and its internal
dynamics between the UNSC and the General Assembly.

Similarly, Luard & Heater (1994) explain how the political divisions of the
‘Cold War’ reflected how the UN worked during those years and how changes in
the approaches of the superpowers (specifically the USSR) also meant a re-
activation of the UN and subsequently an increase in the actions of the UNSC,
such as peacekeeping missions.

### 2.5 UN Missions Evolution

While specific UN activities have been varied, the theme common to all is
to promote international stability and support peaceful change outside the axis of
great power rivalry. Peacekeeping operations have been diverse in function and
size, ranging from a few observers (around forty) on the India-Pakistan border
to a 20,000-man force in the Congo (‘MONUSCO United Nations Organization
Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, 2013). In sum,
traditional or classical international peacekeeping forces could never keep world
peace, for the lack of both mandated authority and operational capability to do
so. Yet even while failing to bring about world peace, UN forces have successfully
stabilised several potentially dangerous situations (Thakur, 2006, p. 34-35).

In Pouligny’s view (Pouligny, 2006, pp. 1–3), it was over the Suez Crisis
that the bases of peacekeeping doctrine were really laid down. Operations were
predominantly deployed in cases of inter-state conflicts, even though some of
them had an intra-state dimension. Some missions were even deployed on the
territory of one state only: such as UNFICYP (the United Nations Force in Cyprus), and UNIFIL (the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon). These were interposition forces whose actions took on a routine form from one case to the next: supervising the observation of a cease-fire, surveillance of front lines or buffer zones or even demilitarised strips, exchanges of prisoners and, possibly, monitoring disarmament operations. This routine came to an end with the UNTAG operation in Namibia (the United Nations Transitional Assistance Group,) in 1989-90, both the most complicated and the largest since the operation in the former Belgian Congo in 1960-64. The UN Secretariat turned it into a sort of test laboratory, and the model developed was rapidly transferred to other situations which, for their part, went beyond the still classical framework of decolonisation: El Salvador, Angola, Cambodia, Mozambique, Rwanda, and Haiti. The operations in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia marked a further stage of development with their authorisations to resort to force to protect humanitarian aid; however, the ultimate objective was still held to be the restoration of peace and the support to rebuild state infrastructures. Following Pouligny (ibid), in all these cases, the objective was no longer to interpose between two states or even two armies, but to assist the installation of the foundations necessary for the restoration of law and order in a given society. Peacekeeping in the classical sense has become subsidiary (in El Salvador, Cambodia, Haiti, Mozambique, etc.) or has been subordinated to other aims (such as the distribution of humanitarian aid in the cases of Somalia and Bosnia) in operations that have become definitely more complex than in the past.

Thakur (2006, p. 39) agrees with Pouligny that since the 1990s, UN operations have expanded not just in numbers but also in the nature and scope of their missions. In his words

The newer ‘complex emergencies’ produced multiple crises all at once: collapsed state structures; humanitarian tragedies caused by starvation, disease or genocide; large-scale fighting and slaughter between rival ethnic or bandit groups; horrific human rights atrocities; and the intermingling of criminal elements and child soldiers with irregular forces. Reflecting this, operations had to undertake additional types of tasks like military disengagement, demobilisation and cantonment; policing; human rights monitoring and
enforcement; observation, organisation and conduct of elections; rehabilitation and repatriation; and temporary administration.

The case of the current UN mission in Haiti is a clear example of this. It was deployed after a coup, amidst an incipient civil war. Human rights were being violated, The Haitian police needed urgent reform, elections needed to take place as soon as possible, former military officials demobilised, on top of which a series of storms and tornados culminating in the 2010 earthquake also left a humanitarian crisis that required the mission’s attention as well.

2.6 The Case of Haiti: Background to the MINUSTAH

During the 1990s four UN missions and one international civil mission coordinated by the Organization of American States (OAS)\(^9\) and the UN took place in Haiti. The 90s, as has been said, were a decade with a ‘boom’ in peace operations, mainly because of all the changes brought by globalization, the end of the bi-polar cold-war order and the democratising processes in Latin America and the world. Intra-state, as opposed to inter-state, conflicts became prominent and the Haitian case is one of the first intra-state conflicts during those years.

Aristide had won the UN-observed elections of 1990 with over 67% of the votes, but – as was described above – he was ousted by a coup on 30\(^{th}\) September 1991, ending the hope of Haiti joining the democratising wave then running through Latin America. This coup brought high levels of violence to the country, including political assassinations, extra-judicial executions, missing persons and several human rights violations. Most of the assassinated people were Aristide supporters. Hence, the GA and the UNSC condemned the coup, the use of violence, the military coercion, and the human rights violations perpetrated by the illegal regime, at the same time calling for the restoration of “democratic rule” (United Nations. Dept. of Public Information, 2003b).

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\(^9\) The Organization of American States (OAS) is the world’s oldest regional organization and it is composed of all 35 independent states of the Americas. According to Article 1 of the Charter, its purpose is to achieve among its member states “an order of peace and justice, to promote their solidarity, to strengthen their collaboration, and to defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity, and their independence.” (OAS, 2009)
In February 1993 at Aristide's request, an international civil mission was deployed to observe the human rights situation in Haiti and the return to a constitutional order. This was the first joint mission between the UN and OAS: the MICIVIH (Civil and International Mission in Haiti). However, facing the fact that the diplomatic efforts during the following months failed to achieve the restoration of constitutional order in Haiti, and the intransigence of non-democratic sectors, the UNSC decided in June to impose a weapons and oil embargo against Haiti. Additionally, on the 23rd June, it authorised the deployment of UNMIH (United Nations Mission in Haiti): Haiti’s first peacekeeping mission. Initially, the mandate of the mission aimed to assist in the modernisation of the Haitian Armed Forces and establish a new Police force. However, after little cooperation by the non-democratic government, in May 1994 the UNSC approved several economic sanctions against Haiti. On 31st July 1994, the UNSC approved resolution 940 authorising the Member States to convey a multinational force to put an end to the illegal regime “by any means necessary” (United Nations. Dept. of Public Information, 2003b). This resolution extended the mandate of the UNMIH in order to expand its aim of assisting the legitimate government in creating the proper conditions for conducting free elections. On 15th October 1994, almost a month after the arrival of the new troops, Aristide returned to Haiti and re-took office.

Behind the declared objective of ‘restoring democracy’, political engineering was also being applied in Haiti, though in a more restrained and ambiguous way. On 31st March 1995 the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), following the restoration of the constitutional government, took over from the Multinational Force led by the United States under Operation Restore Democracy. At the time, the mission aimed at maintaining the secure and stable environment created by the Multinational Force, in particular to ensure that legislative elections in June and presidential elections in December could take place in good conditions; providing technical assistance for the organisation of the polls; and assisting in the professionalization of the armed forces and the new Haitian police. The first objective, defined in extremely vague terms, immediately gave rise to divergent interpretations, varying over time. As for the professionalization of the armed forces, it was rendered obsolete by their
dissolution by President Aristide on his return from exile. Consequently, the training of the new police force took on added importance. According to Pouligny (2006, pp. 4–5), “the main task of UNMIH, and the missions that followed, was the monitoring of the new police force, with some elements of on-the-job training. In fact, in view of the inadequacies and limitations of this initial training, UN civpols (civilian police) were called to play a role largely above the one initially forecast”.

In Haiti, it was the deposed but internationally recognised government that in 1993 approached the Security Council to ask that the trade embargo against Haiti recommended by the Organisation of American States, following the coup d’état against the first democratically elected president of the country, should be made universal and binding. Two days before the adoption of Resolution 940 of 31st July 1994, the President of Haiti addressed a letter to the President of the Security Council calling for ‘prompt and decisive action’. One decade later, a letter signed by the President of the Haitian Supreme Court (who provisionally assumed the presidency of the country after Aristide’s forced exile) “authorized” the deployment of international forces (Pouligny, 2006, pp. 7–8).

The UNMIH finished by the end of June 1996. At that point, under the suggestion of Argentina, Canada, Chile, France, USA and Venezuela, a new mission was deployed in order to help in the stabilisation of Haitian democracy since the Haitian police was not ready to guarantee internal peace and order. As a result, on 28th June the UNSC established the UNSM IH (United Nations Support Mission in Haiti) with the aim of preserving the safe and stable environment brought by the UNMIH.

In November Haiti’s new president, René Préval, asked for an extension of UNSMIH’s mandate, which was granted under the consideration that the Haitian authorities were not ready yet to take charge of the democratisation process on their own, and of the strengthening of the institutions required to guarantee the rule of law in Haiti. As a consequence, the UNSC – under resolution 1086 – extended this mission until 31st May 1997 with 300 civpols and 500 soldiers. Finally, under a recommendation of the Secretary-General, on 24th March 1997,
the UNSC extended the mandate until the 31st July 1997. However, in the Secretary-General’s report of July 1997 to the UNSC, it was stated that even though Haiti had made great efforts and improvements, there were still great political and economic challenges. Thus, this document claimed that the permanent support of the International Community was still necessary, given the fact that the Haitian authorities and forces were not able to control serious incidents, which would jeopardise security conditions.

Consequently, Resolution 1123 of 30th July 1997 extended the mission's mandate until 30th November 1997, changing its name again, this time, to the United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH). The main objective of this new mandate was to assist the Haitian government in the professionalization of the Haitian Police, by the training of specialised units. Additionally, the UNTMIH forces would guarantee security and free circulation for UN personnel (United Nations. Dept. of Public Information, 2003c). Also, the activities of the UN system to promote institutional strengthening, national reconciliation and economic rehabilitation were to be coordinated by this mission.

By the end of November 1997, the mission was coming to its end. Under the recommendation of the Secretary-General, the UNSC agreed Resolution 1141 which created MIPONUH (United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti). It lasted from 28th November 1997 till 16th March 2000. Unlike the previous missions, this one would not have military forces attached to it. Its mandate was to keep supporting the Haitian Police, helping in its professionalization (United Nations. Dept. of Public Information, 2003a).

By the end of MIPONUH’s mandate, MICAH (the International Civil Support Mission in Haiti) was appointed by the GA on 16th March 2000, in what was a joint effort between the UN and OAS, again. Its aim was to consolidate the results obtained by MINOPUH and MICIVIH, in order to encourage the respect for Human Rights.
2.7 MINUSTAH - United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti

On 1st June 2004, the Security Council of United Nations (UN) adopted Resolution 1542 which established the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). This replaced the Multinational Interim Force (MIF), which had been authorized by the same Council in February 2004 after the exile of President Jean Bertrand Aristide (in his second time in office) amidst armed conflict that was taking place in different cities of the country (‘United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)’, n.d.).

Resolution 1542 established MINUSTAH for a period of not less than six months. Its mandate was divided into three main intertwined areas, namely: Security and Stability, Political Process and Human Rights. According to Lemay-Hébert (2015, p. 722), MINUSTAH’s mandate

differs from preceding UN missions in Haiti in two ways. First, it has greater emphasis on security exemplified by the contributing countries’ lasting commitment in terms of troops and police since the set-up of the mission. Second, greater importance is given to human rights with Security Council resolutions placing these issues at the heart of the UN presence in Haiti. At the same time, MINUSTAH came to be criticized locally and internationally precisely for its tendency to focus too much on security (through the securitization of social issues) and its track record on human rights.

In order to achieve a secure and stable environment, the mandate indicated that the mission should support the Transitional Government (TG) of Boniface Alexandre; assist the monitoring, restructuring and reforming of the Haitian National Police; assist the TG with the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of armed groups; restore and maintain the “rule of law”; protect UN personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, and protect the civilian population.

Regarding the political process, the mandate established that MINUSTAH
should support the constitutional and political process, fostering good
governance and institutional development; assist the TG in bringing about a
process of national dialogue and reconciliation; assist the TG in organising,
monitoring and carrying out free and fair municipal, parliamentary and
presidential elections as soon as possible, providing technical, logistical and
administrative assistance and continued security; assist the TG in extending state
authority throughout Haiti and support good governance at local levels.

Finally, the mandate indicated that the mission should support the TG as
well as Haitian human rights institutions and groups in their efforts to promote
and protect human rights; and monitor and report on the human rights situation
in cooperation with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights,
including on the situation of refugees and displaced persons.

To be able to cover these three different areas, the mission needed to be
more than a military force (as the MIF had been), hence the mandate appointed
initially 1,622 police, 548 international civilian personnel, 154 UN volunteers,
995 local civilian staff, together with the 6,700 military personnel.

The duration recommended by the Secretary-General for MINUSTAH was
an overall period of 24 months, since his 18th November 2004 report (when the
mission was almost 6 months old) stated “In view of the time line for elections
established by the Provisional Electoral Council, I recommend that the Security
Council extend the mandate of MINUSTAH for a further period of 18 months,

However, the MINUSTAH mandate has been criticised as inappropriate
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter or on the grounds that MINUSTAH is
exceptional (see Faubert, 2006, pp. 4, 8, 34; Gaye et al., 2011, pp. 1–6; Haitian-
Truth.org 2013). This is because unlike any of the peacekeeping missions before
MINUSTAH, there was no peace agreement to secure, just what some view as an
unconstitutional government backed by US troops that were needed for the
Afghanistan and Iraq wars (Howland, 2006; Grandin & Bhatt, 2011). Therefore,
the USA needed to persuade the UN to send in MINUSTAH to free up its military
resources for use elsewhere (Walter, 2017).
The first years of MINUSTAH were not without issues. According to Concannon (2018, p. 146) peacekeepers took part in “several illegal arrests of political dissidents, and even killings, including a 2005 massacre that left dozens of civilians dead after UN soldiers sprayed 22,000 bullets into the poor neighbourhood of Cité Soleil (Pierre & Sprague, 2007).”

2.8 MINUSTAH 2006-2015: Highlights

As one may expect, several events occurred during the years since I first started collecting data. Some of these events have had consequences on how the MINUSTAH is perceived and, accordingly, how the mission has developed its public communications addressing these issues.

In this subsection, I will examine three particular events that have been the subject of MINUSTAH’s public communications and also a focus for MINUSTAH’s critics, namely, the 2010 earthquake, the cholera outbreak and the allegations of sexual abuse of a young Haitian man by a group of Uruguayan soldiers.

2.8.1 The 12th January 2010 Earthquake

Haiti had never been known as an earthquake-prone country; therefore, its structures and people were not prepared to resist a massive earthquake like the one that took place. As matter of fact, this 7.0 on the Richter scale earthquake was unprecedented (International Crisis Group, 2010, p. 1) and impacted over 3 million people, one third of Haiti’s population (United Nations Economic and Social Council, 2010).

Many thousands\textsuperscript{10} of people died that day, including senior government and 3 UN top officials: Hédi Annabi, the Special Representative of the Secretary-

\textsuperscript{10} The fact is that we cannot know exactly how many people died. Estimations range
General; Luiz Carlos da Costa, Principal Deputy Special Representative; and Doug Coates, Acting United Nations Police Commissioner in Haiti (United Nations Secretary-General, 2010). Additionally, 300,000 people were injured and 1.5 million were displaced, half of whom fled to other provinces and cities unprepared to receive them. Over 80% of Port-au-Prince was destroyed, producing urgent reconstruction costs estimated at $11.5 billion. The quake flattened the seats of all three branches of government, including fifteen out of seventeen ministries, 45% of police stations and a number of courts (International Crisis Group, 2010, p. 1).

There are estimations that 1 in every 15 people affected died due to the earthquake, a very high proportion compared with previous similar earthquakes such as the ones in Italy 2009 (1 in every 190) and China 2008 (1 in every 595). The explanation has to do with the extreme poverty of Haiti, the fact that Haitian buildings were not earthquake-proof, and the high urban population density of Port-au-Prince, among other factors (‘Why did so many people die in Haiti’s quake?’, 2010).

The UN Security Council (UNSC) through Resolution 1927 of 4th June 2010, expanded the mission’s force up to 8,940 troops and up to 4,391 police to face this new scenario, taking into account that elections were to be held that year (United Nations Security Council, 2010).

For MINUSTAH the earthquake meant not only the death of some of its officials – including the top three already mentioned – as the headquarters tumbled down, but also new duties dealing with the recovery, reconstruction, relocation of displaced people, and law enforcement in areas where crime and looting started to rise. However, despite the rather dark outlook, the UNSC used the expression that this brought “new obstacles as well as new opportunities” (United Nations Security Council, 2010). This rather optimistic view was also shared by the “Building Back Better” program (Farmer, Gardner, Hoof Holstein, & Mukherjee, 2012, p. 149) led by former US president Bill Clinton who was also
appointed by the UNSC as a Special Envoy for Haiti the previous year (United Nations Security Council, 2009).

Regardless of all the good intentions, a lot of criticism arose from this relief-reconstruction process. Starting with the fact that the aid given seemed not to have been enough for what the country needed (United Nations Economic and Social Council, 2010), but moreover, (as has usually occurred with the money offered for Haiti by major donors) that only a fraction of the pledges actually reached Haiti (Farmer et al., 2012, p. 153). The Haitian president Michel Martelly said, on the occasion of the third anniversary of the earthquake, that the government had directly received only one third of the aid pledged as “most of the aid was used by non-governmental agencies for emergency operations, not for the reconstruction of Haiti” (‘Haiti says quake aid is failing’, 2013). Other estimations (‘What Happened To The Aid Meant To Rebuild Haiti?’, 2013) calculate that 93% of the first $2.5 billion labelled as ‘humanitarian relief’ either went to UN agencies or international NGOs or never left the donor government (‘What Happened To The Aid Meant To Rebuild Haiti?’, 2013).

But a stronger criticism has to do with what was done with the funds that actually made it to Haiti. The New York Times published an entire series of articles titled “Unreconstructed: Haiti After the Earthquake” following the use and development of the reconstruction projects in Haiti. This exposed a range of problems from farmers of unaffected areas being expelled to build factories (Sontag, 2012a), to unused and expensive housing projects (Sontag, 2012b) that spoke more of a dysfunctional international apparatus and business taking advantage of a broken country, rather than a genuine reconstruction effort. This, as President Martelly illustrated, meant great disappointment for Haitians regarding international donors and aid programmes, that seem to have been of little use for Haitians. In this setting, MINUSTAH could only give advice and support in some projects, but it had no formal coordination powers, which meant that if a giving donor or NGO wanted to develop a project in Haiti regardless of its impact, it could be done.

The earthquake changed MINUSTAH’s mandate, giving a sense of urgency
to the immediate disaster relief in the first place and to reconstruction duties afterwards. Even though the Haitian government was profoundly damaged, MINUSTAH remained as a *supporting* entity leaving all decision-making to the Haitian authorities. This path was also encouraged by the NGOs devoted to international crisis (International Crisis Group, 2010, p. ii).

2.8.2 The Cholera Outbreak of October 2010

Directly connected with the earthquake was the ensuing cholera outbreak, which added more deaths and humanitarian disaster to an already battered Haitian population.

The first reports of what was later identified as cholera came around 19th October (Farmer et al., 2012, p. 188). At first, doctors were puzzled by this ‘acute watery diarrhoea’ and thought it was typhoid. Basically, since cholera was eradicated almost a century ago, it was not a likely candidate. Since then, 7,568 people died because of it, 600,885 were ill with it, and, during 2012, 76,981 new cases were diagnosed.

Research found that the strain of the disease was identical to that common in Nepal, where Nepalese troops came from (‘Haiti cholera “came from UN base”’, 2012). The contingent from Nepal was housed in the Mirebalais MINUSTAH camp, near a tributary of the Artibonite River that served to spread the infection (‘The United Nations’ role in Haiti cholera outbreak’, 2012). It was French epidemiologist Renaud Piarroux who first concluded in November 2010 that someone in the MINUSTAH camp must have been responsible for introducing the infection into Haiti (Piarroux, 2011). The soaring criticism against the MINUSTAH from the Haitian population led the UN to convene an independent panel of experts to investigate the source of the outbreak and to issue a public report with its findings. Even though the report stated that they did not find conclusive proof of the origin of the outbreak, it attributed the spread of the disease to a confluence of circumstances such as environmental, economic, socio-political and immunological factors (Cravioto, Lanata, Lantagne, & Nair, 2011, p. 3). However, it did recognise that the disease was *introduced* and that it was
caused by a South Asian strain of the bacterium. Additionally, it recommended more rigorous screenings and prophylactic treatments for UN troops, that the UN should treat its own waste; and that UN forces should provide health training and resources for rehydration.

The UN’s public relations organs seized on the circumstances of the cholera spreading to claim that the organization was not responsible for the cholera epidemic, ignoring the rest of the report which pointed to the evidence for the introduction of the bacterium from outside Haiti (‘Daily Press Briefing’, 2011).

Human rights groups filed a claim against the UN for bringing the cholera back to Haiti advocating for reparations for victims, and greater investment in Haiti’s water, sanitary and health infrastructure. Almost two years later, the UN responded that under Section 29 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, the claims were not receivable (United Nations Secretary-General, 2013).

This long silence without recognising its responsibility in the outbreak brought a lot of criticism that the UN unsuccessfully tried to cover up by funding new initiatives to eradicate cholera in Haiti (United Nations Secretary-General, 2012), all of which seemed ineffective to its critics, adding to how the UN had neglected its role in the outbreak (‘Is the UN repackaging Haiti’s cholera aid?’, 2012).

This led to the authors of the original report writing a new report in 2013 stating explicitly that the UN was the likely cause (Lantagne et al., 2013, §5), increasing the public pressure on the UN to be held responsible to the point that in 2013, the then High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, noted that “she stood by” the victims’ claim for compensation (Lederer, 2013).

According to Brian Concannon, Director of the Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti (IJDH), one of the organizations leading the claims against the UN in this case:

In 2014, in response to a complaint we filed with the UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Right to Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation, three special rapporteurs and the UN’s Independent Expert on Human Rights in Haiti
wrote an allegation letter to the Secretary-General, the first time the procedure had been applied to the UN itself (Rosen, 2015). This process led to the report by the Special Rapporteur for Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, Philip Alston, that called the UN response 'morally unconscionable, legally indefensible and politically self-defeating' (Alston, 2016, p. 4). (Concannon, 2018, p. 144)

This was without a doubt, a significant step forward, but official acknowledgement of the UN's responsibility was still some years away.

2.8.3 The 2011 Sexual Abuse Accusation against Uruguayan 'Blue Helmets'

In the first days of September 2011, five Uruguayan peacekeepers were accused of sexually assaulting a young Haitian man. This was captured on cell-phone video ('UN Haiti forces accused of abuse', 2011). The UN first denied the incident, then labelled as “a game” and “sexual in nature” (Herz, Mosk, & Momtaz, 2011). But when the video went viral on social media, the soldiers were eventually prosecuted (The Haitian Times, 2015).

Again, the immunity of all UN officials meant that the soldiers were recalled by Uruguay under the promise that “severe and exemplary measures” would be taken and to impose the maximum penalty if they were to be found guilty. They were convicted of ‘private violence’, not rape (AlterPresse, 2013).

This case, arguably the most salient (see Concannon, 2018, p. 146) among other 'scandals' during MINUSTAH's period of operation (Klarreich, 2012), made the UN’s spokeswoman reassert its 'zero tolerance policy' against sexual abuse or exploitation. This 'zero tolerance policy' was also published as an official communication on their website ('United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)', 2012).

Unfortunately, sexual abuse and exploitation (SEA) was far from being a new issue for the UN with several cases involving peacekeepers over the years. To each incident promises of 'zero tolerance' had been the answer, but without
any serious effort to build in accountability, as some critics pointed out (see Defeis, 2008; Wolfe, 2015). A report in January 2017 estimated the SEA victims of MINUSTAH personnel to be as high as 600 (Snyder, 2017), in contrast with the 75 allegations documented by the UN Conduct and Discipline Unit (CDU) from 2008-2015. Among all these cases, I chose the one involving Uruguayans not only because of the aforementioned salience that it had at the time, but also because it had Latin Americans as the perpetrators, which connected with the macro-topic of Latin-American Identity. For a more detailed explanation of this choice and how it was approached in the interviews, see Section 4.2.3.

However, it might be the case that the increasingly viral dimension of UN SEA scandals is promoting some changes. In Concannon’s view (2018, p. 147), the UN is now “forced to adapt to this new reality of viral accountability. This has so far mostly generated louder claims to ‘zero tolerance’, but the cascade of scandals is at least forcing a conversation within the UN about taking serious action” (see Guterres, 2017).

2.8.4 Epilogue: Cholera Outbreak and End of MINUSTAH

All my field work was carried out under the circumstances of the UN officially (and quickly) denying any responsibility for the cholera outbreak (Frerichs, 2016, p. 89). Accordingly, this was an issue that in my interviews I took as being debated at the time, understanding that there were two positions about it: those who believed that it was the UN’s responsibility and the official position of UN denying that. However, on 1st December 2016 the then UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon presented a report admitting that “the preponderance of the evidence does lead to the conclusion that personnel associated with the [UN’s peacekeeping] facility were the most likely source” (Section, 2016). He also apologised and presented a plan to eradicate the disease and urged for funding (which has still not been allocated). He still sustained that the UN cannot be held legally responsible due to its immunity, for which he has been criticised as making a “half-apology” (‘UN admits for first time that peacekeepers brought cholera to Haiti | Global development | The Guardian’, n.d.). The issue of
Immunity has been challenged in this context with calls for a revision, specifically from a human rights-based approach (see Freedman & Lemay-Hébert, 2015).

It is worth mentioning that during the process of selecting Ban Ki-moon’s successor in 2016, the issues of the UN’s accountability for both the cholera outbreak and its role as peacekeeper “were persistently raised” (Concannon, 2018, p. 145) in the press, at candidate forums and by civil society (Falk, 2016; Goldberg, 2016; Lindstrom & Mathurin, 2016). The convergence between these two issues that marked MINUSTAH has its roots in the Haitian population. According to Concannon (2018, p. 145), “Haitians link the campaign for cholera justice to addressing peacekeeper SEA and the overall operations of peacekeeping.”

Finally, on 13th April 2017, the UNSC announced that MINUSTAH would “gradually draw down its military component during the next six months, finally withdrawing from Haiti by 15th October 2017” (Section, 2017). The UNSC also approved the establishment of a successor operation, the United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH). This new mission would be devoted to supporting the Haitian government in strengthening its rule of law institutions, supporting the development of the Haitian National Police and engaging in human rights monitoring, reporting and analysis.
3. Theoretical Framework: Main Concepts

3.1 Introduction

In this chapter I cover the main concepts which provide the theoretical framework for this thesis. I start by addressing Latin American identity from the point of view of its conceptual history as a counter-concept and how that shapes a discursive construction of identity which intrinsically refers to the others against whom that identity is constructed. I will also refer to the literature on postcolonialism, its relationship with Latin American identity and the place of Haiti in this discussion.

I will then proceed to present a discussion about the discursive construction of identity and its manifestations in multi-national settings. Afterwards, I will continue summarising the main tensions in international interventions as a preamble to discussing how the concepts of ‘security’ and ‘stability’ are presented across the different peacekeeping missions’ doctrines.

I will then summarise some points about the importance of language in international interventions and how this research situates itself in that field. This will open the discussion to the main concepts of Critical Discourse Studies (CDS) and how this thesis is positioned in relation to them.

3.2 Latin America: the concept, postcolonialism, and the counter-concept

The following subsection is an attempt to put together the concepts of postcolonialism and counter-concept into a framework that allows for the understanding of Latin American identity in contrast to that of the United States. It will also address the difficulties of putting Haiti ‘inside’ Latin America, which may provide a theoretical explanation of why regarding Haiti as Latin American is contestable. Therefore, it will also provide an entry point to the framing of Haiti as Latin American more as a discursive strategy rather than as an actual identity
feature. This will be the main subject of analysis in Chapter 5.

3.2.1 The Concept of Latin America

The concept of Latin America was used first in Spanish (América Latina) and French (Amérique Latine), at least three decades before its first introduction to the English language in 1890 (Feres Jr, 2003, p. 14). However, right from the beginning the “Latin” distinction was crossed by geo-political and colonial tensions. As Mignolo puts it:

The concept of “Latinidad” was used in France by intellectuals and state officers to take the lead in Europe among the configuration of Latin countries involved in the Americas (Italy, Spain, Portugal, and France itself), and allowed it also to confront the United States’ continuing expansion toward the South. (2005, p. 58)

On the one hand, it exists due to a 'distribution' of the American continent between the colonial powers, using the Latin root of the languages as criterion. On the other hand, it already shows opposition to the United States as the other parameter. However, it is important to say at this time that this opposition works both ways. As Feres claims “‘Latin America’ has been construed in American English as a counter-concept to America” (Feres Jr, 2003, p. 14).

Regarding the aspect of colonialism, Mignolo deepens the argument with the following quote:

The distinctions between the North and South of Europe and the North and South of America were not simply “cultural” differences. They masked the colonial power differential that was translated from its construction in Europe and imposed on the Americas. It is precisely the differential of power that permits us to see that what are more generally understood as “cultural differences” are indeed “imperial” and “colonial” differences that have been dictated by leading imperial designers. (2005, p. 80)

What Mignolo is suggesting here is that the division between North and
South America (and hence, between Anglo and Latin America) is dependent on the imperial divisions of Europe. Moreover, he contests the understanding of those differences between the Americas as merely ‘cultural’.

It is worth saying at this point that in the considerable amount of literature regarding Latin-American identity, the seminal work of Sambarino (1980) is one of the few that have argued the non-existence of a common cultural ethos among the Latin-American nations. For him, there is no Latin-American ‘being’. This way, the question about a ‘Latin-American being’ would be a false problem because there are only historic and culturally generated ways of life that have not and cannot have an ontological reality, a kind of immobile legality. Latin America – according to this view – has no common source of cultural creation nor does it display the same cultural features in its countries. There is neither ethnic nor cultural uniformity.

Larraín (2001, p. 12) agrees with Sambarino that it is inaccurate to look for an ontologically constituted Latin-American ‘essence’ but, he argues, there is a relatively common way of life that is historically variable, therefore it is possible to talk about a Latin-American identity as a historically changing “cultural identity”.

Even though at first glance it may look as though Larraín is opposed to Mignolo, it is worth taking into account that Mignolo is contesting the cultural origin of the concept of ‘Latin America’, which is not contradictory to developing a way of life, especially one that has to do with the colonial powers and their tensions/interactions with the creoles in Latin America. Moreover, Mignolo suggests that the way of life referred to by Larraín may be the way of a creole elite, rather than an indigenous one.

The history of "Latin" America after independence is the variegated history of the local elite, willingly or not, embracing “modernity” while

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11 “Creole(s)” is used in this chapter in the sense of ‘local’ rather than its linguistic sense of a ‘hybrid language’ (as in ‘Haitian Creole’).
Indigenous, Afro and poor Mestizo/a peoples get poorer and more marginalized. The “idea” of Latin America is that sad one of the elites celebrating their dreams of becoming modern while they slide deeper and deeper into the logic of coloniality.” (Mignolo, 2005, pp. 57–58)

It is at this point that postcolonialism comes into play, a term that according to Loomba “is the subject of an ongoing debate” (2015, p. 28).

3.2.2 Latin America and Postcolonialism

Similarly with what happens with other ‘posts’ in academic debate, Loomba argues how this prefix should be interpreted in the case of postcolonialism: “It has been suggested that it is more helpful to think of postcolonialism not just as coming literally after colonialism and signifying its demise, but more flexibly as the contestation of colonial domination and the legacies of colonialism.” (2015, p. 32). She follows Jorge de Alva in the sense that the term should be linked to a “post-structuralist stake that marks its appearance” (de Alva, 1995, p. 245) [quoted in Loomba 2015, p. 33]. This basically means that after taking post-structuralist approaches to history into account, postcolonialism cannot be understood as a single, linear history, but rather as ‘multiplicity of histories’. Hence, de Alva advocates for a separation of postcolonialism from formal decolonisation, the latter understood as the process in which a former colony turns into an autonomous country. Following this analytic decision, it is possible to look for postcolonialism in countries, and especially in their people, that are not subject to formal colonial domination anymore. This fits the case of Haiti, having been an independent country since 1804, although also having been subject to several international interventions, including MINUSTAH.

Complicating matters further, colonialism could be replicated again in formerly colonised countries by their creole elites, which were the ones that achieved emancipation from the colonial power. This is what happened in Latin America (and in Haiti, most notably under Boyer’s mulatto rule that excluded
blacks). According to Mignolo:

To conceive themselves as a “Latin” race [...], Creoles in “Latin” America had to rearticulate the colonial difference in a new format: to become the internal colonizers vis-à-vis the Indians and Blacks while living an illusion of independence from the logic of coloniality. Internal colonialism was indeed a trademark of the Americas after the independence and was directly linked to nation-state building. Nation-states in the colonies were not a manifestation of modernity leaving colonialism behind. (2005, p. 86)

This resilience of the logic of coloniality is what enables postcolonialism to contest it, after the end of the formal colonial process. Furthermore, Mignolo seems to suggest that the logic of coloniality is attached to Latin American identity. This is paramount as a theoretical framework for my Research Question 1b: Do MINUSTAH decision-makers discursively construct Latin American identity as a potential resource for a successful mission in Haiti? If so, why and how? If an international intervention can be seen as a form of colonialism, the construction of a Latin American identity in this particular UN mission would fit with what Mignolo is suggesting, i.e.: (internal) colonialism as a trademark of the Americas in their nation-state building processes. In other words, if MINUSTAH can be seen as a form of colonialism, a Latin American identity could be seamlessly constructed in MINUSTAH because of how the logic of coloniality is embedded in Latin America.

Another relevant element mentioned by Mignolo is ‘race’ as a determining factor of what is or is not Latin. Mignolo acknowledges how problematic it is to talk about race, but nevertheless it seems to articulate identities in a colonial framework. Colonialism is, in the end, a domination-by-race system. This point will be addressed again in Section 3.3 regarding Haiti’s status as “Latin”.

At the very end of Mignolo’s quote modernity is mentioned. Mignolo shares Arturo Escobar’s (2004) framework of understanding modernity/coloniality as a single indivisible process. Coloniality is to be understood as one ‘side’ of modernity, and even though modernity can be
discussed without mentioning colonality, colonality itself is only possible within modernity. As a matter of fact, according to Mignolo (2005, p. xii) colonality “points to the absences that the narrative of modernity produces”. This is a strong point for the ‘disenchantment of modernity’ where the ideas of freedom, emancipation and equality have little to do with the institutions and logics that fuelled modernity in the first place (Fischer, 2004).

This economic interdependence between modernity (and its revolutions, both French and industrial) and colonality, where the slave trade and the accumulation of wealth from colonial plantations provided the financial basis for these revolutions (Mignolo, 2005, p. 54), has also been addressed by Susan Buck-Morss (2000), adding to that process the circulation of ideas as mutually interdependent as well. Buck-Morss argues – very convincingly, and providing evidence – that the French revolution not only inspired Haiti’s independence (and slave uprising as an understanding that all human beings are equal), but that Haiti’s revolution itself was the inspiration for Hegel’s (1977) master-slave dialectics, which in turn, was a major influence in both Feuerbach’s and Marx and Engels’ works.

On the other hand,

[i]ntellectuals from the French naturalist Georges Comte de Buffon to the German philosopher Hegel, and including the US president Thomas Jefferson, were articulating an opposition between ‘nature’ and civilized man that pulls all of America on the ‘nature’ side of the opposition. These debates saw the New World as younger and immature; therefore, the American population was expected to evolve accordingly to a state of civilization. (Mignolo, 2005, p.xvi)

This set the trend for a constant and variegated system of oppositions that, at first, defined America in contrast with Europe, and later distinguished Latin from Anglo America.

3.2.3 Latin America as counter-concept
The work of Feres is very illuminating in understanding the importance of counter-concepts in the definition of Latin-American identity. He follows Koselleck (1985) in understanding asymmetrical counter-concepts as “conceptual pairs used by a given human group to confer a universal character to its own identity while denying others a claim to self-assertion.” (2003, p. 14). It is again an uneven power relationship of domination, which seems to fit with a de-(post)colonialism framework. In Feres’ words:

[c]ounter-conceptual pairs share a common semantic structure: the other is construed in opposition to the group's self-image, usually through derogatory expressions and stereotypes that denote perversion, incompleteness, retardation, and lack of the group’s self-bestowed qualities. (Feres Jr, 2003, p. 14)

At this point, it is worth taking a look at some of the most important counter-conceptual pairs used in the definition of Latin America's identity. Regarding the opposition nature/humanity mentioned before, Mignolo makes a point about how “Latin” America has been conceived on both sides of that opposition:

Thus, Creole intellectuals in the nineteenth century, like Domingo Faustino Sarmiento in Argentina and Euclides Da Cunha in Brazil, used the “nature” versus “civilization” paradigm to define the Creole elite against the “barbarian” indigenous inhabitants of South America. [...] the Creole elites were simultaneously self-colonizing by taking on a French idea of themselves as “Latin”, which opposed them to the Anglo, who represented civilization, and located them more on the side of “nature”. (2005, p.xvi)

This ambivalence is consistent with the dimension of postcolonialism explained before in which Latin-American creoles become the new colonisers and maintain the same logic of coloniality against the indigenous people. Hence, they are on “both sides” of that opposition as well. Additionally, this appropriation of “Latin” by the Creole elite opposing them to the Anglo, might be interpreted as an instance of ‘fractal recursivity’ (Irvine & Gal, 2000, p. 38). They define ‘fractal recursivity’ as
“the projection of an opposition, salient at some level of relationship, onto some other level.[...] (the oppositions) provide actors with the discursive or cultural resources to claim and thus attempt to create shifting “communities,” identities, selves, and roles, at different levels of contrast, within a cultural field.

If we take those “levels of relationship” as different contexts, such as the relationship with the indigenous population and the relationship with the Anglo, “Latin” is indeed a form of ‘fractal recursivity’ which shapes that (shifting) Latin American identity by contrast.

In an effort to explain how this division between Anglo and Latin America developed, Mignolo states that

By the mid-nineteenth century, the idea of America as a whole began to be divided, not so much in accordance with the emergent nation-states as, rather, according to their imperial histories, which placed an Anglo America in the North and a Latin America in the South in the new configuration of the Western Hemisphere. At that moment, “Latin” America was the name adopted to identify the restoration of European Meridional, Catholic, and Latin “civilization” in South America and, simultaneously, to reproduce absences (Indians and Afros) that had already begun during the early colonial period. (2005, p. 57)

It is worth mentioning that these “absences” described by Mignolo fit with the process of ‘erasure’ defined by Irvine & Gal (2000, p. 38) as “the process in which ideology, in simplifying the sociolinguistic field, renders some persons and activities (or sociolinguistic phenomena) invisible.”

In addition, Feres provides more counter-conceptual pairs in this widening gap between Anglo and Latin America

In the early nineteenth century US, manifestations of contempt for Spanish Americans were construed along hidden asymmetric oppositions. For each negative qualifier attributed to them – priest-ridden (Catholic), indolent, ignorant, superstitious, and incapable of enterprise or exertion – there was a positive counterpart in the American self-image – Protestant [thus anti-Catholic], disciplined, educated, rational, and industrious. (Feres Jr, 2003, p. 15)
This is what he calls “cultural asymmetric oppositions”, and it represents a form of ‘sophistication’ of the original civilization/nature opposition. However, it is still a form to establish fundamental differences that seem to be unmodifiable between the two Americas. In that sense, it is closer to the idea of “being” that was discussed above. Nevertheless, it is possible to track revisions of these oppositions within Anglo American academia within the emerging field of ‘Latin American studies’ in the early 1960s, which were themselves a form to “to explain, enable, and control the development and modernization of third world nations” (Feres Jr, 2003, p. 16). In other words, a new form of colonialism, this time of Anglo over Latin America. Feres describes this period as one where

Authors who approached Latin America from the perspective of modernization theory [...] explicitly used an idealized American yardstick to describe Latin America, by opposition, as traditional, Catholic, feudal, irrational, personalistic, authoritarian, particularistic, and so on; in sum, as a people who held value-orientations that were inimical to modernization. (2003, p. 16)

Again, we can see how these asymmetric cultural counter-concepts operate by derogating Latin America as almost being ’doomed’ to remain in the dark. This is the construction of a Latin-American identity from the outside, from the new coloniser. A form of colonisation under the name of modernisation. And even though it is true that modernity cannot be equated with modernisation, it seems that the inseparability of modernity/coloniality, proposed before by Mignolo, makes sense here as well.

Now, this separation between Anglo and Latin America has a geopolitical origin which is related, as one might expect, to colonialism.

“Latinidad” is the consequence of imperial and colonial conflicts in the nineteenth century and the way in which the imperial and colonial differences have been constructed. While in Europe “Latinidad” allowed French politicians and intellectuals to establish the imperial difference with the competing forces of the Anglo-Saxon world in Europe (England and Germany), in South America the idea of "Latinidad" was useful to Spanish Creole intellectuals and politicians.
defining themselves in confrontation with the competing force of the Anglo-Saxon in the Americas – the US.” (Mignolo, 2005, p. 89)

Therefore, it seems that the opposition and competition between the colonial powers were inherited by the de-colonised Americas. At the same time, Mignolo highlights the role of this opposition for the definition of a ‘Latin’ identity. So, if France played an important role in establishing “Latinidad”, preventing it from being exclusive to Spanish and Portuguese colonies, it seems necessary now to address where this leaves Haiti.

3.3 The place of Haiti

Explaining the dynamics of “Latinidad”, Mignolo makes the point that “In South America and the Caribbean, “Latinidad” was a transnational identity unifying ex-Spanish and ex-Portuguese colonies that considered themselves the heirs of France. The French Caribbean was always marginal to “Latin” America” (2005, p. 72). What is relevant for establishing the latinity of Haiti, is the idea of a French Caribbean marginalised from “Latin” America. Mignolo himself dedicates several pages of his book to addressing the Haitian phenomenon. In his view

Haiti was “Latin” from day one, since both Spanish and French are Latin languages. In spite of the strong presence of Spanish colonialism in Haiti, Haiti is still peripheral, if not absent, from the “idea of Latin” America. [...] “Haiti” did not fit the pattern of “Latin” America because “Latin[s]” were supposed to be of European descent (and if they were Mestizos/as they were supposed to embrace European cosmology and not indigenous) and not of African descent! Haiti was seen in terms of “Africanidad” rather than “Latinidad” by the engineers of the White subaltern identity of South America and the Caribbean.” (Mignolo, 2005, p. 112)

As was presented above, race is a determining element in understanding identities in the context of (post)colonialism. Mignolo suggests here that the linguistic dimension of “Latinidad” is overridden by race. Haiti, in this sense, has no indigenous creoles. Its people were African slaves because the native Haitians
were exterminated soon after being colonised. Haiti was displaced from Latin America, as being just a part of Africa in the Americas - neither Latin nor Anglo. Additionally, and in a more contemporary note, according to Nicholls (1996) “In all these countries [Caribbean British colonies] as in Haiti itself, ethnic or colour factors are readily available for exploitation by political leaders, so the attention of the masses can be diverted from economic issues.” (p. 214).

Not only did the Haitian Revolution not produce an effect of community with Latin America, but quite the opposite: it was silenced and ignored

The Haitian Revolution offered also the possibility of an epistemic delinking but instead was reduced to silence, as Michel Rolph-Trouillot has convincingly argued. When Chevalier was writing that France was responsible for all the nations of the Latin group in both continents, Haiti was not in his mind. (Mignolo, 2005, p. 86)

Therefore, Haiti appears, according to Mignolo, as a “third way” different from Anglo and Latin America. Returning to the framework of modernity/coloniality, he argues the following:

The roads of (and not toward) modernity/coloniality in the Americas, followed in one instance by US independence and in another by the former Spanish/Portuguese colonies, differ both among themselves and also, considerably, from the road of modernity/coloniality that brought about the Haitian Revolution. In all three cases, however, coloniality was reinscribed almost immediately in the internal colonialism enacted by nation-states emerging from decolonization. (Mignolo, 2005, p. 87)

As a matter of fact, after the Haitian revolution, the logic of coloniality was brutally re-imposed, with wars between blacks and mulattos, mulattos establishing supremacy over the blacks, leaders declaring themselves emperors, among other events. However, this problem of situating Haiti in Latin America also has a counterpart in its place in the Caribbean. In trying to define an ontology for the Caribbean, Holger Henke (1997) said, “Perhaps nowhere else in
the world do so many different people, value systems and logics cohabit in such a limited space” (p. 43). In other words, situating Haiti as part of the Caribbean rather than Latin America would have more to do with geographical proximity rather than its cultural identity.

There is, though, a common ground for the history of the post-colonial Caribbean, marked by “neocolonial dependency, global capital’s assaults on sovereignty, cyclical and mass migrations of population, environmental and cultural ravages, and bitter ethnic tensions among the members of its disparate diasporas” (Puri, 1999, p. 14). These shared historic features of the Caribbean nations make Haiti relevant to be studied from a Critical Discourse Studies perspective, as several of the social problems that had been studied by CDS are part of the history of post-colonial Caribbean (see section 3.8 below for a summary of CDS research interests).

Moreover, as Esposito puts it,

[t]here has also been a widespread tendency in Caribbean studies to focus on literary production, rather than political or media discourse, as a lens to interpret the post-colonial social world. While novelists have been rightly regarded as ‘important guides to uncovering the false naturalness’ (Harney, 1996: 8) of politics, nationalism and identity-building in the post-colonial Caribbean, political discourse from the Archipelago remains understudied from the point of view of discourse analysis. (Esposito, 2017, p. 26)

Even though this thesis is not about the politics, nationalism or identity-building of Haiti, it will address how those processes may happen in Haiti within the context of an international intervention. However, Haiti does share a key element of Latin America as a counter-concept: in 1909-1911 Haiti moved from Europe’s to the USA’s sphere of influence (Quinn & Sutton, 2013, p. 9), starting a process in which USA became the principal neo-colonial power responsible for international interventions. This articulates what has been called the “double dialectic” of Haiti, consisting of an internal dialectic of Black-Mulatto and an external dialectic of foreign intervention/withdrawal (Quinn & Sutton, 2013, p. 10).

Another element, that complicates the matters further regarding the place of Haiti, is that as it was mentioned in Section 2.2 Haiti only joined the Caribbean
Community of Nations trade bloc (CARICOM) in 2002. Moreover, 10 years later, in 2012 they applied to become a member State of the African Union of nations (AU). So far, Haiti has been participating as a guest member with no right to vote. On 17th May 2016 the AU rejected the applications on the grounds that "only African States can join the AU". (‘Press Releases | African Union,’ 2016)

3.4 Identity Construction

The concept of ‘identity construction’ immediately implies that identity is far from being something fixed and it is rather subject to an ongoing process. Most of the literature regarding identity, Ricoeur’s (1994, 1984) concept of “narrative identity” perhaps being the seminal one in this matter, has taken this approach which seems to be the opposite to the logical concept of identity (see Díaz Genis, 2004; Larraín, 2001; Ricoeur, 1994). As Wodak et al. (2009a, p. 11) explain

The concept of identity […] never signifies anything static, unchanging, or substantial, but rather always an element situated in the flow of time, ever changing, something involved in a process. This applies, of course, to all forms of personal and social identity as well as to "ego identities"

In a similar approach De Fina (2011, p. 223) regards identity as “seen as a plural concept, that is, it is argued that people do not have one single identity but draw from an inventory of possibilities for self and other presentation”. This idea is very important in order to understand what to expect when studying identity construction. Identity is not only an active construction process, but it also allows different possibilities to be used in both self and other presentation. Therefore, it is possible to expect different features to be drawn on regarding the construction of a Latin-American identity and those features could even be incoherent and or contradictory. De Fina also incorporates the notion of “self and other presentation”. Benhabib (1996, p. 3) reinforces the idea of the link between self and other with identity by arguing that "every search for identity includes differentiating oneself from what one is not". This differentiating element of
identity construction is very useful for an analysis that seeks for contrasts with other identities. In other words, looking for what Latin American is also means looking for what it is not, in particular, against whom its leaders differentiate from when talking about what is Latin American.

In this matter, Bamberg et al. (2011, p. 189) point out

Using the lens of discourse and the lens of construction and bringing them to focus onto identity, what comes to the fore are discursive practices as the sites for identity formation processes – where the social and the personal/individual are fused and become empirical, as situated, in vivo, interactive processes

Additionally, Díaz Genis (2004) sums up very well how to research Latin-American identity as is going to be attempted in this thesis

I understand that identities can be understood as narrative identities, and in that narration that we Latin Americans particularly do about ourselves, there is a main way that has constituted itself by denying others, denying otherness. Denier of the different “other”, as we will justify, never different or completely other: (p. 23)

3.4.1 (Multi) National Identities

According to Wodak et al. (2009, p. 16) “individuals, as well as collective groups such as nations are in many respects hybrids of identity, and thus the idea of a homogenous 'pure' identity on the individual or collective level is a deceptive fiction and illusion”. Therefore, a collective group as a nation can be also incoherent and full of multiple features and significances. In relation to this thesis, Latin America fits as a “collective group”, thus it could also be a case of hybrid identity. Since the dynamic dimension of identity has already been established and taking into account that its construction takes place discursively, the following question should be “What are the 'building blocks' of identity?” In other words, if identities are constructed from an array of different possibilities
producing hybrid or even contradictory ones, what are they made of?

Benedict Anderson's (2006 [1983]) seminal concept of “imagined communities” establishes that each nation is imagined (members will never know most of their fellow-members, yet in each of their minds lives the image of their communion); limited (it has finite boundaries, beyond them lies other nation(s)); and imagined as a community (despite inequalities, nations are always conceived of as deep, horizontal comradeship). This means that imagination is the key element in constructing the notion of a nation. If it has already been established that nations are a form of collective identity, it seems reasonable to assume that imagination has a similarly important role in the construction of multinational identities as well.

The idea of an imagined community extended to Latin America puts the focus on establishing which are those 'images' that hold that identity rather than looking for an actual clear-cut definition of Latin America with coherent boundaries.

At this point, Billig's (1995) concept of 'banal nationalism' seems to be appropriate as it brings together collective identity construction and discourse. As Wodak (2007, p. 660) summarises, "the 'banal nationalism' (Billig 1995) often uses forms of deixis in newspapers, political discourse, news reports, etc., so that 'here' is assumed to be the national homeland and 'us' the members of the imagined national community." For the matters of this thesis, it is going to be assumed that forms of 'banal multinationalism' can also take place in the case of Latin America and be framed within the discourse of their leaders in the context of an interview.

3.5 International Interventions: Inherent tensions

Even if international interventions may have noble ends, the power tensions that arise in such settings can lead to several problems regarding
sovereignty, international interests, and top-down impositions by the big powers.

Recent research into peace-building and state-building missions has dealt with the tension between international aid and intervention, proving that this is an unsolved problem. Zanotti (2008b, p. 540), for example, summarizes the main discussions about international intervention being the reflection of imperial aspirations, Western hegemony, or the projection of a (real or simulated) centralized power (Chandler, 2006; Slater, 2006; Latouche, 1996; Escobar, 1994, 1988; Sachs, 1992).

More recently, however, Mac Ginty (2008) has argued that scholars in the fields of international relations and development have voiced the need for moving the research agenda beyond analyses that discuss intervention along grand narratives of empire and domination, and thus, for exploring the specific modalities of deployment of international power (Zanotti, 2011, p. 77), such as the exploration of multifarious and contingent forms of government and techniques, both within states and internationally. Thakur (2006) discusses this further in terms of the role of nation-states:

International organisation [...] is characterised by a certain tension. On the one hand, it can be regarded as a step towards the establishment of a world government which would transcend the state system. On the other hand, international organisations are set up and managed by nation-states; the sovereign state remains the basic entity of international relations; and states have shown themselves singularly reluctant to accept significant encroachments upon their sovereignties. Thus, international organisation [...] can also be viewed as merely an agreement by, and for and of states to engage in regular consultation and establish joint machinery for the formulation and implementation of collective decisions. (p. 27)

Most of the criticism about this kind of intervention relates to the way that international state-building separates policymaking from local institutions and political debates. For Chandler (2006), for example, international state-building is the result of international elites’ ‘denial’ of their imperial agenda, whilst
Bickerton (2007) explains this trend as the result of “failed state theories” (Jackson, 1990b) that portray local societies as ‘politically deficient’ and focus on technical initiatives, that is, on building ‘efficient’ administrations. I am interested in finding out which, if any of these applies to the case of MINUSTAH. Understanding via its leaders and official communications how the mission constructs itself discursively, how they understand Haiti, and what the mission is doing in Haiti, might answer the question if this is a case of denial of an imperial agenda, a failed state theory (understanding Haiti as politically impaired), or if it is a case that requires its own category.

As Paris (2004) highlights, both former Secretary-Generals of the United Nations, Kofi Annan (1998, para. 65) and Boutros Boutros-Ghali (Boutros-Ghali & United Nations. Dept. of Public Information, 1995, para. 49) pointed out that peace-building involved identifying and alleviating the underlying sources of conflict within a war-shattered state, which required a thorough understanding of local conditions (p. 3).

That is precisely the point Pouligny (2006) makes when she argues that even though it seems that peace operations are largely conceived in the antechambers of international negotiations, their implementation is mainly discussed and decided in the corridors of the United Nations Secretariat and the Security Council. However, it would be naïve to take this top-down approach as the only one available within the development of the UN missions. According to Pouligny (2006):

(T)he 'crisis' to which the operation is supposed to respond is analysed and qualified according to parameters that often have very little to do with the local and regional context. Yet what is played out in New York is not totally unrelated to the changing situation in Port-au-Prince, San Salvador, Phnom Penh, Mogadishu, Maputo or Sarajevo: the main actors in the conflicts bring those parameters into their own strategies, in particular trying both to anticipate international reactions, and to influence them, just as they are trying to impose their own moving representations of the situation. It is in this muddy situation that a United Nations peace operationlands in a country and begins to deploy over its territory. (p. 1)
In other words, the main actors of the conflicts where UN missions are deployed also take into account the way the conflict is understood by the decision-makers in the UN, and develop their own strategies considering the way UN works. The power struggle for the representation of the conflict is indeed complex and interrelated. That is the main reason why understanding how the mission seeks to represent itself and the conflict is also to understand an important part of the very same conflict.

3.6 The Concepts of Security and Stability in the Doctrines on Peacekeeping Missions

However, this mission is also part of a wider context of peacekeeping missions which are the subject of different doctrines. In this section, I will present those doctrines and how the concepts of Security and Stability have been understood. These concepts are the main subject of analysis in Chapter 6.

When trying to classify the different kinds of peace support operations (PSOs) scholars seem to agree that "for both analytical and operational purposes, therefore, it is key to distinguish between PSOs imposed by international initiative and those invited to deploy by the local parties themselves, usually to implement a peace agreement" (Durch et al., 2006, p. 4). This division (imposition vs. request) has led to different doctrines and categories being outlined by the main PSO actors.

Additionally, some scholars have established that “peace support operations” with robust implementation mandates are a synonym for “stabilization forces” (Chetail, 2009). I will take this approach in order to present these different doctrines.

3.6.1 The US Doctrine

The US doctrine has traditionally labelled as 'peacekeeping' operations based on the consent of the parties involved in the situation which requires the
intervention. Conversely, 'peace enforcement' are those operations based on coercion (Durch et al., 2006, p. 22).

In 2004, the same year that MINUSTAH was deployed, the US Joint Forces Command released the Joint Operation Concept document, which defined 'stability operations' as:

(m)ulti-agency operations that involve all instruments of national and multinational action, including the international humanitarian and reconstruction community to support major conventional combat operations if necessary; establish security; facilitate reconstruction among local or regional adversaries; establish the political, social, and economic architecture; and facilitate the transition to legitimate local governance. (Durch et al., 2006, p. 29)

It is clear how 'stability' calls for a more complex composition of the mission, where security is one of the many elements necessary for such missions. However, it might be worth putting this in context and remembering that “The (George W.) Bush administration endorsed 'stability operations' as the preferred umbrella term for a range of military operations other than war that included peacekeeping and peace enforcement.” (ibid., p. 26). In that sense, 'stability operations’ can go beyond the consent / coercion categories and comprise both scenarios.

Two years later, the US Joint Forces Command released the “Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations Joint Operating Concept (JOC), version 2.0, December 2006” in its second and third pages there is a definition of the central elements of Stabilization, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) operations:

Stabilization involves activities undertaken to manage underlying tensions, to prevent or halt the deterioration of security, economic, and/or political systems, to create stability in the host nation or region, and to establish the preconditions for reconstruction efforts. Security involves the establishment of a safe and secure environment for the local populace, host-nation military and
civilian organizations, as well as U.S. government and coalition agencies, which are conducting SSTR operations. Transition describes the process of shifting the lead responsibility and authority for helping provide or foster security, essential services, humanitarian assistance, economic development, and political governance from the intervening military and civilian agencies to the host nation. **Transitions** are event driven and will occur within the major mission elements (MMEs) at that point when the entity assuming the lead responsibility has the capability and capacity to carry out the relevant activities. Finally, **Reconstruction** is the process of rebuilding degraded, damaged, or destroyed political, socio-economic, and physical infrastructure of a country or territory to create the foundation for longer-term development. (Szayna et al., 2009, p. 3)

It is worth noting that under these definitions, ‘security’ is embedded in ‘stabilization’. In other words, ‘stabilization’ includes protecting the “security system” (along with economic and/or political systems), whereas ‘Security’ only involves establishing a “safe and secure environment”. Even though these may sound redundant, suffice to say that security has a narrower scope than stabilization has.

According to Mac Ginty (2012)

In relation to peace and conflict, the term ['stability'] truly ‘arrived’ with the establishment in January 1996 of the Stabilization Force (SFOR) for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Its association with the military alliance NATO is telling; it was inflected by a military paradigm of security rather than a more optimistic peace paradigm. ‘Stabilization’ was embraced in the US policy community. (p. 23)

Marquis et al. (2010) prefer to refer to SSTR operations just as “Stability operations”, recognising that it is an evolving and variously named concept. They argue that

[h]istorically, the U.S. military tended to relegate operations that do not involve full-scale combat to several overlapping but not identical categories: small wars; low-intensity conflicts; military operations other than war; small-scale contingencies; peace operations; stability and support operations; stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) operations; or simply stability operations. Despite their differences, all of these concepts refer to military
operations in civilian environments. According to Department of Defence (DoD) Directive 3000.05, military support for SSTR operations consists of DoD activities "that support U.S. Government plans for stabilization, security, reconstruction and transition operations, which lead to sustainable peace while advancing U.S. interests. (p. xv)

The key point here is the importance of advancing U.S. interests in this operations, as an overarching goal that goes side by side with the specific aims of stabilization, security, reconstruction and transition operations.

3.6.2 The British Doctrine(s)

Another doctrine in PSO is the British one. Initially, this also used consent as the crucial element to define an operation as 'peacekeeping'. The use of force was meant to be only in “volatile tactical situations, provided that consent was maintained at national or "strategic" level (i.e.: amongst national leaders of a political faction, as opposed to their provincial or lower-level commanders)” (Durch et. al., 2006, p. 23). One can observe here how hierarchy and nation remain at the core of this doctrine. On the other hand, 'peace enforcement' was what occurred when such consent was lost.

The 'New British doctrine' understood Peace Support Operations as encompassing both 'peacekeeping' and 'peace enforcement', creating in this way a conceptual and operational continuum between both concepts. In that sense, every PSO should be able to enforce peace should the situation of losing consent come.

The '2003 British doctrine' took this continuum between the two concepts even further: it was now a “one doctrine concept”. Instead of defining boundaries between different kinds of missions, the new approach portrayed a fluid mission space in which any given force must be capable of taking any of three “stances” - enforcement, stabilization, or transition - as circumstances require. In this framework, 'enforcement' emphasizes the coercive and deterrent use of force to uphold a mandate in an environment that may entail a high risk of conflict
escalation; 'stabilization' normally would warrant the use of force in self-defence alone; and 'transition' emphasizes the reform, training and reconstitution of indigenous forces and planning for mission handover or exit (Durch et al., 2006, p. 27).

3.6.3 The French doctrine

The French doctrine seems to be based heavily on the UN Charter. It defined 'Peacekeeping' as those operations authorized under Chapter VI of the UN Charter and based on the consent of the parties to the conflict, with a mission to monitor and facilitate the implementation of a ceasefire once hostilities have ceased. 'Peace restoration' are those operations authorized under Chapter VII, and they attempt to reconstitute peace in a country where hostilities are continuing and the security of populations is not assured, but without designating an enemy or an aggressor. 'Peace enforcement' are limited war operations authorized under Chapter VII to impose peace through the use of force against an identified enemy (Durch et al., 2006, p. 23).

3.6.4 The UN doctrine and the concept of Stability

In addition to what was explained before, it is worth adding to some of the core elements in categorising PSOs, which are both influential and influenced by the aforementioned doctrines.

After the UN Brahimi report of the year 2000, PSOs were seen as having convergence and impartiality (adhering to the Charter), but not necessarily neutrality, because one side might be violating the Charter principles. But because the United Nations were often asked to accept responsibility for continuing a mission that a coalition had initiated – as in Somalia, Haiti and East Timor\textsuperscript{12} in the 1990s and, in 2004, Haiti once again – it was important that UN

\textsuperscript{12} For a critical view on the "empty-shell" approach taken in Timor-Leste (and Kosovo), see Lemay-Hébert, 2011.
forces would be able to shoulder the burden of security that such missions entailed (Durch et al., 2006, p. 25).

In virtually every other instance in which UN-led military forces were deployed, they have done so on the basis of local consent, either at the request of a government (for example, Haiti in 2004) or on the basis of an invitation embedded in a peace accord that in turn triggers a Security Council mandate (Durch et al., 2006, p. 31).

Returning to the concept of ‘Stability’ the UN Security Council (UNSC) has authorized five missions bearing the word “stabilization” in their titles (including MINUSTAH, of course). Nevertheless, as Napoleão and Kalil (2015) point out: “stabilization might therefore be the missing link of the conceptual, academic and diplomatic debate regarding UN peacekeeping since the end of the Cold War” (p. 96). Moreover, they track the origin of this conceptual vacuum to the discussions started with the report ‘An Agenda for Peace’ (Boutros-Ghali & United Nations. Dept. of Public Information, 1995) and the subsequent controversy over the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention that ultimately led to the adoption of the concept of Responsibility to Protect by the 2005 World Summit. As they claim:

Yet this intellectual tour de force omitted any meaningful definition of the words “stability” and “stabilization” in the context of peacekeeping operations and related endeavors. The glossary of the Capstone Doctrine noticeably fails to define these terms, even if the document contains a graph vaguely suggesting that stabilization might be the initial phase of a peace consolidation effort, when post conflict tasks in twelve extremely varied areas (infrastructure; employment; economic governance; civil administration; elections; political process; security operations; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration [DDR]; rule of law; human rights; capacity building; and humanitarian assistance) could be fostered by the United Nations and its partners. (Napoleão & Kalil, 2015, p. 96)

In his attempt at a definition, Coning (2014) has claimed that the difference between stabilization and peacekeeping is that ‘stabilization’ attempts to “achieve peace by managing or removing an aggressor”, while ‘peacekeeping’ aims “to arrive at and maintain a cease fire and/or implement a peace agreement
among the parties to a conflict”. However, in the work of scholars such as Paris (2004), Chandler (2010) and Campbell et al. (2011) there is criticism over the effects of the so called “liberal peace”. This is because they understand that “liberal peace” involves Western inspired institution building and policymaking, in fragile or post conflict scenarios.

However, Muggah (2014) defines stabilization as “a ‘transition’ from large scale peacekeeping operations in areas affected by widespread insecurity to smaller scale program with targeted security and development packages”. Additionally, as I mentioned at the introduction to Section 3.6 above, Chetail (2009) treats “stabilization forces” as “peace support operations with robust implementation mandates”.

A more critical view is the one held by Mac Ginty regarding the political use of ‘stabilization’. He refers to the shortcomings of the indicators and the means of applying such surveys, focused on protection against crime and violence instead of other preoccupations that would be more urgent to the population concerned. In his words: “The ascent of stabilization needs to be examined within the wider context of the securitization of aid and peace support intervention” (Mac Ginty, 2012, p. 24).

It seems difficult to establish clear-cut definitions for both ‘security’ and ‘stability’ as these concepts are the subject of debate and contrasting opinions. In the case of ‘security’, it seems to be considered as part of ‘stability’, either as a prerequisite or as one of the goals to achieve ‘stability’. ‘Security’ tends to have a narrower, more specific scope, but the attempts at definition tend to sound redundant (“secure and safe” environment). ‘Stability’ can appeal more broadly to the “sustainability” of peace and security, making these concepts intertwined and recursive.

However, even though their definition is an unfinished task, their importance in peacekeeping missions is beyond debate. This makes them a focal point for this research and therefore, the role of an analysis with the focus on language seems paramount.
3.7 Language and International Interventions

At this stage, it might be straightforward to establish the importance of language in international interventions and how different concepts might entail different kinds of operations (as was the case with ‘peacekeeping’ and ‘peace enforcement’ in section 3.6).

Additionally, the lack of definition of certain concepts leaves a ‘grey area’ which brings its own problems. The “politically loaded concepts of stability and stabilization remain ill-defined in the ever growing literature on international peacebuilding and statebuilding” (Napoleão & Kalil, 2015, p. 93).

In the case of ‘Security’, the work of Paul Chilton (1996) more than twenty years ago, in what was deemed at the time as “the rhetorical turn” in international relations, explored how that concept was constructed in western discourses via metaphors. At the time, that insight remained unexplored with a few exceptions such as Jim George’s book "Discourses of Global Politics" (1994).

That has changed recently, and the body of work in the field of international relations, and specifically regarding peacebuilding, has increasingly paid attention to the need to explore the semantic dimensions of the field. A good example is the book by Lemay-Hébert et al. (2014), who state, in their introduction that:

[w]e look for the meaning that social practices and material conditions have for the people engaging in these practices. We do not presume actors’ intentions or have direct access to the conditions in which they find themselves. Our task is to sort out what they find meaningful on the ground, so to speak, and render it meaningful at a distance. Such a stance assumes that meaning always matters – socially and materially – in making our world what it is. (p. 3)

This thesis has a very similar approach to language and its imbrication with social practice. However, even though these authors refer to the concept of “semantics”, this thesis will approach language through its discursive dimension,
with discourse also understood as social practice *per se*, where meanings are constructed socially and contextually. I will now provide some core concepts regarding discourse and Critical Discourse Analysis as the framework in which this thesis is situated.

### 3.8 Critical Discourse Studies: Main Concepts

Since its start in the late 1980s, Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) (from now on Critical Discourse Studies [CDS]) has become a well-established field in the social sciences. CDS cannot be regarded as a discrete academic discipline in any traditional sense, with a fixed set of theories, categories, assumptions or research methods. Instead, CDS can be seen as a problem-oriented interdisciplinary research programme, subsuming a variety of approaches, each drawing on different epistemological assumptions, with different theoretical models, research methods and agenda. What unites them is a shared interest in the semiotic dimensions of power, injustice and political-economic, social or cultural change in our globalised and globalising world and societies. The roots of CDS lie in rhetoric, text linguistics, anthropology, philosophy, sociology, psychology, cognitive science, literary studies and sociolinguistics, as well as in applied linguistics and pragmatics.

In general, CDS is characterised by a number of principles: for example, all approaches are problem oriented, and thus necessarily interdisciplinary and eclectic. Moreover, CDS is characterised by a common interest in demystifying ideologies and power through the systematic and retroductable investigation of semiotic data (written, spoken or visual). CDS researchers also attempt to make their own positions and interests explicit while retaining their respective

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13 This section is based mostly on the first two sections of (Ferreiro & Wodak, 2014)
14 ‘Retroductable’, a translation of the German term *nachvollziehbar*, means that in the Humanities and Social Sciences (and in qualitative research in general), we cannot test hypotheses or prove them like in the quantitative paradigm. In contrast, though, qualitative analyses must be transparent, selections and interpretations justified, and value positions made explicit. In this way, the procedures and meanings of qualitative analyses remain intersubjective and can, of course, also be challenged (Ruth Wodak, 2012, p. 643)
scientific methodologies and while remaining self-reflective of their own research process.

It would be too lengthy to summarize and quote the many different definitions of CDS from overview articles, handbooks or introductions to CDS here (cf. Caldas-Coulthard & Coulthard, 1996; Fairclough, 1992a, b, 2010; Fairclough & Wodak, 1997; Fairclough, Mulderrig & Wodak, 2011; Forchtner, 2012; Fowler et al., 1979; Keller, 2011; Le & Short, 2009; Locke, 2004; Machin & Mayr, 2012; Van Dijk, 2008; Van Dijk, 2012; Van Leeuwen, 2005, 2008; Weiss & Wodak, 2007; Wodak & Chilton, 2007 (2005); Wodak, 2011a, b; Wodak & Meyer, 2016; Young & Harrison, 2004). The significant difference between Discourse Studies and CDS lies in the constitutive problem-oriented interdisciplinary approach of the latter. CDS does not therefore study a linguistic unit per se but rather social phenomena, which are necessarily complex and thus require a multi-/inter-/transdisciplinary and multi-methodical approach. The objects under investigation do not have to be related to negative or exceptionally 'serious' social or political experiences or events; this is a frequent misunderstanding of the aims and goals of CDS and of the term 'critical', which, of course, does not mean 'negative' as in common sense usage (Chilton et al., 2010). Any social phenomenon lends itself to critical investigation, to be challenged and not taken for granted.

3.8.1 Salient Concepts: Discourse, Power, Ideology and Critique

CDS has never been and has never attempted to be, or to provide, one single or specific theory. As Van Leeuwen (2006, p. 234) rightly states, "critical discourse analysts engage not only with a range of discourse analytical paradigms, but also with critical social theory. In more recent work social theory may even dominate over discourse analysis". It seems to be the case that more differentiated debates are needed and better justification of why a particular social theory might lend itself to discourse-analytical purposes without combining or integrating quite contradictory approaches (see Weiss & Wodak, 2007).
It is worth mentioning that even though one of CDS’s volitional characteristics is its diversity, a few stable elements can be detected:

- CDS works eclectically in many aspects. The whole range between grand theories, middle-range theories (both drawing on critical theory and the social sciences) and linguistic theories is adopted, although each single approach emphasises different levels.
- Interdisciplinarity is inherently necessary to grasp complex social phenomena.
- There is no accepted canon for data collection, but many CDS approaches work with existing data, that is, texts not specifically produced for their respective research projects. However, ethnography and fieldwork have become more common as many scholars recognise the inherent limitations of written data or ritualised and staged data like parliamentary debates, public speeches, and so forth.
- Operationalisation and analysis are problem oriented and imply linguistic expertise.

The most evident similarity is a shared interest in social processes of power, hierarchy building, identity politics, globalisation and glocalisation, inclusion/exclusion and subordination. In the tradition of Critical Theory, CDS investigates the discursive aspects of societal disparities and inequalities. CDS frequently detects the linguistic means used by the elites in power to stabilise or even intensify the inequities in society, in public and in private domains, frontstage and backstage. All CDS research entails systematic linguistic (rhetorical, pragmatic, text-linguistic, argumentative) analysis, self-reflection at every point of one’s research, and distance from the data that are being investigated. It is important to keep description and interpretation apart, thus enabling transparency and retroduction\(^{15}\). Of course, not all of these recommendations are consistently followed, and they cannot always be implemented in detail because of time pressures and similar structural

\(^{15}\) See note on “retroductable” above.
constraints; therefore, some critics will continue to state that CDS is torn between too much linguistic analysis or too much focus on context; social research and political argumentation or de-contextualised micro-analysis; quantitative data or qualitative case studies; traditional data such as newspapers or ethnography and new social media and so forth.

In the following sections I will provide a brief overview of the main concepts that are referred to by CDS scholars and how they relate to different trends of social theory.

3.8.1.1 The Notion of Discourse

The notions of text and discourse have been subject to a hugely proliferating number of usages in the social sciences. Almost no paper or article is to be found which does not revisit these notions. We can find notions such as racist discourse, gendered discourse, discourses on un/employment, media discourse, populist discourse, discourses of the past and many more – thus stretching the meaning of ‘discourse’ from a genre to a register or style, even from a building to a political programme. This must and does cause confusion – which also leads to much criticism and more misunderstandings (Blommaert, 2005; Reisigl, 2007; Ruth Wodak, 2008; Ruth Wodak & de Cillia, 2006). This is why one needs to focus on specific meanings when reading particular contributions and drawing on a specific approach to CDS.

The term ‘discourse’ is used very differently by different researchers and also in different academic cultures. In the German and Central European context, a distinction is made between ‘text’ and ‘discourse’, relating to the tradition in text linguistics as well as to rhetoric (Ruth Wodak & Koller, 2008). In the English-speaking world, ‘discourse’ is often used both for written and oral texts (Gee, 2004; Schiffrin, 1994). Other researchers distinguish between different levels of abstractness: Lemke (1995) defines ‘text’ as the concrete realisation of abstract forms of knowledge (‘discourse’), thus adhering to a more Foucauldian approach (Jäger & Maier, 2009).
The Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA), in which I position myself, views ‘discourse’ as structured forms of knowledge about social practices, which may be aligned to differing ideological positions, whereas ‘text’ refers to concrete oral utterances or written documents (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, 2015, Wodak, 1986, 2001, 2011c).

3.8.1.2. Critique

Critical studies of language, Critical Linguistics (CL) and Critical Discourse Analysis (CDS) have from the beginning had a political project: broadly speaking that of altering inequitable distributions of economic, cultural and political goods in contemporary societies. The intention has been to bring a system of excessive inequalities of power into crisis by uncovering its workings and its effects through the analysis of potent cultural objects – texts – and thereby to help in achieving a more equitable social order (Kress, 1996, p. 15). The explicitness of the social and political values which inform research interests in CDS is not acceptable to certain linguists (such as Widdowson, 2004; see Wodak, 2013 for a discussion of various criticisms of CDS).

‘Being critical’ in CDS includes being self-reflective and self-critical. In this sense, CDS does not only mean to criticise others. It also means to criticise the ‘critical’ itself, a point that is in line with Habermas and which was made in 1989 (Wodak, 1989) and again 10 years later (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999, p. 9). Critical analysis itself is a practice that may contribute to social change. The same point about self-reflection in the sampling and analysis of texts is made, for example, in Reisigl and Wodak (2001, p. 32ff.). There, while presenting the foundations of the DHA, they distinguish between ‘text-immanent critique’, ‘socio-diagnostic critique’ and ‘prospective (retrospective) critique’. While text-immanent critique is inherently oriented towards retroductable careful text analysis, socio-diagnostic critique is based on integrating the socio-political and structural context into the analysis and interpretation of textual meanings.

At this level, the aim is to reveal multiple interests and contradictions in the text producers on the basis of the evidence of the text and its context. Prospective critique builds on these two levels in order to identify areas of social
concern that can be addressed by direct social engagement in relation to practitioners and wider audiences (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 34). Reisigl and Wodak (2001, ibid.) draw specifically on the critical tradition of Habermas; the integration of the Frankfurt School and Habermas with the concept of critique and CDS is further elaborated by Chilton et al. (2010) and Forchtner (2012) in important ways, which emphasise the role of Habermas’ validity claims for an explicit normative stance in CDS.

In any case, CDS researchers have to be aware that their own work is driven by social, economic and political motives, like any other academic work, and that they are not in any superior position. Calling oneself ‘critical’ only implies explicit ethical standards: an intention to make one’s position, research interests and values explicit and one’s criteria as transparent as possible, without feeling the need to apologise for the critical stance of one’s work (Van Leeuwen, 2006, p. 293).

3.8.1.3. Ideology and Power

Although the core definition of ideology as a coherent and relatively stable set of beliefs or values has remained the same in political science over time, the connotations associated with this concept have undergone many transformations. During the era of fascism, communism and the Cold War in the twentieth century, totalitarian ideology was confronted with democracy; thus, a Manichean distinction between ‘good’ and ‘evil’ was constructed. Moreover, if we speak of the ‘ideology of the new capitalism’ (see Wodak, 2013), ideology once again has an inherently negative connotation.

From within linguistics and literary studies, the work of Mikhail Bakhtin (1986) has proved relevant to CDS (Lemke, 1995). In addition, Voloshinov’s (1973) work was the first linguistic theory of ideology. It claims that linguistic signs are the material of ideology, and that all language use is basically to be perceived as ideological. Bakhtin’s work emphasises the dialogical (and ideological) properties of texts, while also introducing the idea of ‘intertextuality’ (see also Kristeva, 1986).
It is important to distinguish between ideology (or other frequently used terms such as stance/beliefs/opinions/Weltanschauung/position) and discourse (Purvis & Hunt, 1993, p. 474ff). Quite rightly, Purvis and Hunt state that these concepts “do not stand alone but are associated not only with other concepts but with different theoretical traditions” (ibid.).

Thus, ‘ideology’ is usually (more or less) closely associated with the Marxist tradition, whereas ‘discourse’ has gained much significance in the linguistic turn in modern social theory ‘by providing a term with which to grasp the way in which language and other forms of social semiotics not merely convey social experience but play some major part in constituting social objects (the subjectivities and their associated identities), their relations, and the field in which they exist’ (ibid.: 474). The conflation of ‘ideology’ and ‘discourse’ thus leads, I believe, to an inflationary use of both ideologies and discourses, both concepts thus tend to become empty signifiers simultaneously indicating texts, positioning and subjectivities as well as belief systems, structures of knowledge and social practices (see Wodak, 2008).

Power is another concept that is central to CDS, as it often analyses the language use of those in power, who are responsible for the existence of inequalities. Typically, CDS researchers are interested in the way discourse (re)produces social domination, that is, power abuse by one group over others, and how dominated groups may discursively resist such abuse. This raises the question of how CDS researchers define power (i.e. the relationships where power is negotiated, established, enacted or performed) and what moral standards allow them to differentiate between power use and abuse – a question, which has so far had to remain unanswered (Billig, 2008).

Much CDS research is concerned with differentiating the modes of exercising power in discourse and over discourse in the field of politics (Holzscheiter, 2005). Holzscheiter (2005, p. 69) defines power in discourse as actors’ struggles over different interpretations of meaning. This struggle for ‘semiotic hegemony’ relates to the selection of ‘specific linguistic codes, rules for interaction, rules for access to the meaning-making forum, rules for decision-making, turn-taking, opening of sessions, making contributions and interventions’ (ibid., p. 69). Power over discourse is defined as the general
‘access to the stage’ in macro- and micro contexts (ibid., p. 57), that is, processes of inclusion and exclusion (Wodak, 2007, 2009). Finally, the power of discourse relates to ‘the influence of historically grown macro-structures of meaning, of the conventions of the language game in which actors find themselves’ (ibid., p. 61). The individual influence of actors might contribute to changing these macro-structures. Power struggles are obviously not always related to observable behaviour.

Michel Foucault primarily focuses on ‘technologies of power’: his notion of discipline is a complex bundle of power technologies developed during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Power is thus exercised with intention – but it is not individual intention. Foucault relies on what is accepted knowledge about how to exercise power (Jäger & Maier, 2009; Wodak, 2011b). He recommends an analysis of power with a rather functionalist strategy: in his historical analysis in “Surveiller et Punir” (Foucault, 1975), Foucault raises questions concerning the social functions and effects of different technologies of surveillance and punishment: how things work at the level of ongoing subjugation, at the level of those continuous processes, which subject our bodies, govern our gestures and dictate our behaviours? In texts, discursive differences are negotiated; they are governed by differences in power that are, in part, encoded in and determined by discourse and by genre. Therefore, texts are often sites of struggle in that they show traces of differing discourses and ideologies contending and struggling for dominance where subaltern discourses articulate as a discursive ‘resistance’ to power (Foucault, 1978, p. 95).

3.8.1.4 Legitimation

When theorising about the State, Max Weber (1977) said that “Every system of authority attempts to establish and to cultivate the belief in its legitimacy” (p. 325). One of the means to establish this belief is language. As Berger and Luckman (1966) put it:

Incipient legitimation is present as soon as a system of linguistic objectification of human experience is transmitted. For example, the transmission of a kinship vocabulary ipso facto legitimates the kinship structure.
The fundamental legitimating “explanations” are, so to speak, built into the vocabulary. (p. 112)

In other words, language produces legitimation immediately. With language playing such an important role in it, it is no surprise that legitimation has been the subject of research by several CDS scholars (see for example KhosraviNik, 2015; van Leeuwen, 2008; van Leeuwen & Wodak, 1999). However, it has not been discussed enough as a concept but rather operationalised into analytical frameworks.

In this thesis, I will take a normative approach to ‘legitimacy’, i.e. as a “benchmark of acceptability or justification of political power or authority and—possibly—obligation” (Peter, 2010). In other words, legitimacy explains why the exercise of political power from a particular institution is permissible and obeyed as a duty. In van Leeuwen’s terms (2008), legitimation answers to the spoken or unspoken questions “Why should we do this?” or “Why should we do this in this way?” (p. 106).

It is important to take into account that there is a difference between two discursively intertwined processes: to discursively legitimate actions i.e. trying to make something legitimate through discourse strategies – which is what Research Questions 2b & c address - on the one hand; and on the other hand, the legitimacy of international interventions i.e. the state of legitimacy which is under discussion in the wider sense of any intervention (addressed by Research Question 2a).

I will discuss the framework for legitimation in section 4.3.3.

3.8.2 Some features of the Discourse-Historical approach (DHA)

Within CDS, I work using the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA). The entire framework and methodology of the DHA are elaborated elsewhere (see Wodak 2001a, 2001b; Reisigl and Wodak 2001). Therefore, I will focus on some salient features which are relevant to this research.

The DHA enables the systematic, explicit and transparent (thus retroductable) analysis of the historical (i.e. intertextual) dimension of discursive
practices by exploring the ways in which particular genres of discourse are subject to change over time, and also by integrating social theories to explain context. Following Foucault (1972), ‘historical context’ can also mean the history and sub-system of meetings and narratives in an organization or any other institutional or everyday event (Wodak, 2000); intertextuality can, for example, also encompass media-reporting about specific events, over time, which is all interrelated in a complex way by re-contextualizing quotes, arguments or specific stances and positions (Triandafyllidou et al., 2009).

‘History’ can indicate how perceptions of specific events have changed, over time, due to conflicting narratives and accounts of a specific experience – a phenomenon which can be frequently observed in the discursive construction of national or transnational identities (Heer et al., 2008; Stråth & Wodak, 2009; Wodak et al., 2009b). Kwon et al. (2009) and Wodak et al. (2011) have recently shown that DHA can be used to shed new light on how meaning and action in organizations are shaped discursively through power, hegemony and ideology. This ability to link critical theory with rigorous empirical investigation is a crucial feature of the DHA.

In the case of this research, I will focus both on the construction of a multinational identity as in the case of Latin America and the legitimation of MINUSTAH, understanding these processes within a peace-keeping mission of an international powerful organisation as is the United Nations. I will further develop the analytical framework used in this research in relation to the different kinds of data used in Chapter 4.

3.9 Summary

In this chapter I have attempted to summarise the main discussions around the core concepts involved in this research, as well as provide an overview of the main theoretical frameworks of CDS and its main concepts. I have also summarised the main features of the DHA, in which this thesis is positioned.

To sum up, I am working under the assumptions that ‘Latin America’ is a problematic identity and that it is perhaps easier to establish as a counter-
concept to Europe and USA (mostly) than to agree on its ontological or cultural features. Additionally, postcolonial tensions are embedded in its history and identity construction. Haiti and its identity is no less problematic itself, either seen within the Caribbean or as a Latin American country. These make the issues of being Latin American and the place of Haiti highly contestable, and therefore subject to discursive construction.

In addition, I adhere to a notion of identity which is closer to a ‘narrative’ in form and therefore under constant (discursive) construction. This, I argue, applies to multi-national identities as well, as is the case with Latin America.

I also situate this research within an understanding of international interventions as places where the power dynamics of hegemony are in place. This makes the case to examine postcolonialist dynamics again as a suitable subject for CDS study.

In terms of the language of international interventions, I have discussed how ‘security’ and ‘stability’ are concepts that remain relatively undefined, hence are important to be studied from a CDS perspective.

Finally, I have said how and why the CDS approach taken in this thesis is suitable for analysing these issues.
4. Methodology

4.1 Introduction

In Chapter 3 I provide an overview of the main concepts relevant for the analysis. In this chapter I will explain how I identified, categorised and analysed those concepts.

First, I will explain the most salient methodological challenges arising from turning a documentary project into a PhD thesis and how, to some extent, this shaped my data and research questions.

Then I will present the methodological and analytical framework for the interviews, giving an overview of the methodological challenges, how I selected the topics and how I selected my data, and how I analysed it.

I will then move on to present the methodological and analytical framework for the analysis of the UN Security Council resolutions for MINUSTAH. As in the case of the interviews, I will present an overview of policy papers analysis as a genre, give some details of the particular case of the UNSC resolutions for MINUSTAH, describe the data selected for analysis and explain how I analysed them.

I will finish this chapter with a reflection on the challenges of combining two different sets of data, also mentioning some of the other challenges I had in my analysis.

4.1.1 Turning the Documentary Project into a PhD Thesis

As I explained in Chapter 1, this research started as a documentary project during 2004, just a few months after MINUSTAH was deployed in Haiti. This means that this research started several years before the PhD and, moreover, not as PhD research. In other words, parts of the documentary project (i.e. some of its interviews) were turned into a PhD research project. This had an influence over the PhD and there are methodological entailments that need to be addressed.
4.1.1.1 Latin-American Identity as a Research Question

First, even though this means that I have first-hand data collected over an 11-year time span, it also means that the data that I collected under the documentary project determined the PhD in terms of the topics that could be covered. This meant – to some extent- that some of my research questions were determined by the data that I already had. Hence, the issues I was interested to ask about in the documentary context shaped part of the data that I had for my PhD. In this sense, even though it was me asking those questions almost 13 years ago, I did not have in mind a PhD thesis when asking them –at least not consciously. Nevertheless, my interests back then have not changed dramatically on what concerns Haiti and MINUSTAH.

There are some issues which are not part of this thesis but that were part of the documentary, such as what problems and events were the focus of the media that were reporting in Haiti; the opinions of some Haitians regarding MINUSTAH; or the everyday duties of the blue helmets there, to name the most salient. But I will focus now on those issues which I carried on with in this research.

Perhaps the most relevant and resilient is the one about Latin-American identity as constructed in the context of MINUSTAH. This issue emerged from two sources: on the one hand, some people regarded MINUSTAH as a “Latin-American mission” since its inception. Of course, this is something that cannot be found in the official UN documents\(^{16}\), as it is a UN mission not a regional one. However, this was one of the focal points in the interviews for the documentary, and all the interviewees acknowledged the mission as, if not Latin-American, at least led by and mostly composed of Latin-Americans\(^{17}\). In this sense, Research Questions 1a & 1b [i.e. *How do MINUSTAH leaders discursively construct the mission’s identity through their statements?; Do MINUSTAH decision-makers*

\(^{16}\) However, this Latin-American ‘trait’ of the MINUSTAH can be found in the literature about it (see for example (Malacalza, 2016a, 2016b; Heine & Thompson, 2011; Ross, 2004)

\(^{17}\) For more details about MINUSTAH’s composition, see Section 2.7
discursively construct a Latin American identity/ies as a potential resource for a successful mission in Haiti? If so, how and why?] were part of the documentary and became PhD research questions.

4.1.1.2 Interviewing the Decision Makers of MINUSTAH

The second methodological issue which stems from the documentary project is related to the main data collected and used for this research. Documentaries as a genre tend to use interviews to different extents, and this project was no different. In this sense, before starting the PhD research, I already had collected a significant number of interviews (see details below in section 4.2.4.1) with the decision makers of MINUSTAH, most of them done in situ in Haiti, conducted by me and with enough depth into the issues that would interest me for a thesis. This meant that the focus on interviewing the leaders of MINUSTAH for the documentary determined that all further data collected for the PhD should consider that as its basis. In that sense, my two PhD field-trips (2013 and 2015) consisted of interviews with MINUSTAH decision makers, trying to interview the people in the same positions I had interviewed in 2004-2005 and even interview again the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) that I had interviewed in 2004. This enlarged the scope of my data to an 11-year span and allowed me to compare the changes in the MINUSTAH’s leadership’s discourses.

4.2 Analysing the Interviews

In the previous section I explained how the documentary project shaped some elements of the PhD thesis. In this section I will explain how the data selection is related to the scope of the thesis and its research questions.

4.2.1 Interviews as a research method

Since my research interest lies in the processes of the discursive

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18 There are exceptions, of course, which are labelled under the “non-narrative documentaries” sub-genre. Notable directors such as Ron Fricke and Godfrey Reggio are among the representatives of this trend.
construction of identity, legitimation and meaning-making, a qualitative approach seems to be the better fit for answering these kinds of questions. Additionally, since I am more specifically interested in how the leaders of MINUSTAH (its decision-makers and most powerful figures) convey those meanings from their positions, interviews appeared to be the most suitable method for collecting that data. Time constraints (both the interviewees' and my own) made more time-consuming methods, such as ethnography, oral history or open-ended interviews, impracticable. Similarly, methods such as focus groups not only had the difficulty of getting extremely busy people in the same place at the same time; but also the fact that some of my interviewees were direct subordinates of other interviewees would probably cause power-relations issues within the group, preventing them from speaking freely.

Interviews as a method also pose some epistemological and methodological challenges that relate to the fact that the interview itself is a co-constructed interaction (see Abell & Myers, 2008; Hennink et al., 2011; Rapley, 2004; Silverman, 2006). This has been framed as the distinction between “interview data as resource” (i.e. the data reflecting the interviewees' reality outside the interview) and “interview data as topic” (i.e. data reflecting a reality jointly constructed by the interviewee and interviewer) (Seale, 1998; Rapley, 2004, pp. 16-17). I position myself in the latter approach, so that I will deal with those issues while providing as much information about the context of the interview situation as I can (for a description of DHA’s four dimensions of context see Reisigl & Wodak, 2015; Wodak, 2007, 2011), and applying all the transcription coding mentioned in section 4.2.8 to my interventions as interviewer.

Another issue, somewhat connected with the previous one, is the interviewer’s neutrality. Rapley (2004, pp. 19–20) sums it up into three strands: that neutrality is an essential practice; a bad practice; and a misleading practice. Since I consider this research part of the Critical Discourse Studies tradition, I do not aim for neutrality, but rather to have a critical position towards the phenomena I am studying. Thus, I will adhere to the last strand: neutrality is a misleading practice. This means that even though I will do my best to avoid
asking leading questions, I will “just get with the interacting” with my interviewee as naturally as possible\textsuperscript{19} (which is also key for building rapport). This means that the analysis will also consider how my interaction produced a certain trajectory and how the contents were co-constructed. In that regard, I will also provide my field notes in order to try to explain my own emotions, thoughts and impressions about each interview.

4.2.2 Interview Schedule

Below there is an interview schedule which comprises the questions most frequently asked across the different interviews. Since they were semi-structured interviews (as opposed to questionnaires), not all the interviews were the same either in terms of the questions asked or in the order in which they were put.

1. Can you tell me which are your functions here and how long have you been working in MINUSTAH?

2. Which are the main features of the UN mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)?
   • To what extent is this mission different from other ones?
   • What does it mean for the MINUSTAH to have a large amount of Latin American troops working in it?
   • To what extent this has been an advantage/disadvantage? Why?
   • Do you believe the mission will be successful?

3. Which are the reasons that justify this mission?
   • To what extent has the mission been able to fulfil its mandate?
   • Has the mission been able to communicate what it is doing in Haiti and why?
   • Do you think that the Haitian people have been able to understand what the mission is doing and why?

4. How has the earthquake impacted what the mission is doing in Haiti?
   • How has the mission coped with the new challenges after the earthquake?

\textsuperscript{19} See section 4.2.7 below for more details.
• In your opinion, how have the Haitian people perceived the actions of MINUSTAH after the earthquake?

5. How has the Cholera outbreak impacted the MINUSTAH and its communications?
   • How has the mission coped with the outbreak?
   • In your opinion, how have the Haitian people perceived the actions of MINUSTAH after the cholera outbreak?

6. How have the sexual abuse accusations impacted the MINUSTAH and its communications?
   • How has the mission coped with those accusations?
   • In your opinion, how have the Haitian people perceived the actions of MINUSTAH after the sexual abuse accusations?

7. It seems that 'Security' and 'Stability' are the core concepts in the UNSC resolutions about MINUSTAH. In your opinion, how do these concepts relate to each other/differentiate/overlap?

8. Which are your worst and best experiences working in MINUSTAH?

Rather than being a closed questionnaire, the sub-questions in 2-6 were actually topical probes (Hennik et al., 2011 p. 120) which were meant as guidelines to start talking about a topic and not to elicit a straightforward short answer.

Following the categories offered by Hennik et al. (2011, p. 112), Question 1 would be an opening question; Questions 2-6, the key questions; and Questions 7 & 8, the closing questions.

There were some interviews in which time constraints forced me to drop some of the opening or closing questions to focus directly on Questions 2, 3, 4, 5 & 6 which have a more straightforward connection with my research questions.

More than once, the flow of the interview would make the interviewee answer some of the latter questions, making it unnecessary to ask them afterwards.

Additionally, five out of the eighteen interviews were conducted in the
'documentary project context’, at least seven years before the 'PhD project context' and therefore, before the 'three shocks'. Obviously, this meant that Questions 4, 5 and 6 were not asked because the events had not happened yet, and Question 7 was not asked because it only emerged as an issue while analysing the UNSC resolutions for the PhD thesis.

4.2.3 Selection of Macro-topics

As presented in Chapters 5, 6 and 7 (each of the three analysis chapters), there are three macro-topics which structure the foci of this thesis, namely ‘Security and Stability’, ‘Latin-American Identity’ and ‘The Three Shocks’. In Chapter 3 (Theory chapter) I provide an explanation about these concepts and why they are relevant in the context of this research topic and in the literature. However, since I position myself within the tradition of the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) to Critical Discourse Studies (CDS), I do adhere to the notion of research as recursive analysis. In that sense, I will explain how I arrived at these macro-topics, having the input from the data itself, the previous ‘documentary project context’ and also my own research interests.

When I joined the documentary project, the ‘Latin-American Identity’ of the mission was already a focus of interest. Of course this was something which had been talked about before our project, as MINUSTAH was regarded as composed of and led by Latin Americans (Ross, 2004). Additionally, Latin-American identity has been a topic which I have been interested in (probably the fact that I consider myself a Latin-American plays a big part in that). Therefore, I seamlessly took that documentary focus as a research interest. This meant that this macro-topic runs throughout the whole research and I asked about it in all my fieldwork trips since 2005.

The concepts of ‘Security’ and ‘Stability’ were not originally part of the documentary project, although some interviewees did address them at the time, there was no intentional focus on our part as interviewers. Once in the 'PhD context', they became salient as core concepts in international interventions –
even more in stabilization missions (see Chapter 3, for a more in-depth explanation of the concepts). Additionally, they are already built into the acronym MINUSTAH (United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti) and in the executive organ of the UN that governs all peacekeeping missions, namely the Security Council. As they became part of the focus of the resolutions analysis I did prior to my 2015 field-trip (see Section 6.1), it made sense to keep them as a macro-topic to be explored in the interviews too. Moreover, they became an entry point to compare the official UNSC discourse in the resolutions with the one reproduced by the leaders of MINUSTAH. In other words, a way to examine how ‘official’ was the discourse held by MINUSTAH officers. I will explain this further in sections 4.2.5.4 and 4.3 in this chapter.

The ‘Three Shocks’ are part of the context in which MINUSTAH operated from January 2010, roughly half-way through the mission. When I started with the PhD, these ‘shocks’ had already taken place and it became obvious to me that MINUSTAH had become a different mission from the one I had visited in 2005 and 2006. I knew that these challenges meant several changes (see Section 2.8 for a more detailed explanation) and via analysing the resolutions for MINUSTAH, I could confirm that they were – via different strategies – being addressed by the UNSC. Therefore, it became reasonable for me to address them in the interviews on my ‘PhD context’ field trips.

The obvious disaster that was the 2010 earthquake in Port-au-Prince, for Haiti and also for MINUSTAH, made it a very straightforward decision as the first ‘shock’ (see section XX in Chapter 2 for a more detailed description of the earthquake’s impact on Haiti).

The second ‘shock’, the cholera outbreak, was a humanitarian crisis in itself. Especially considering that it was only 8 months after the earthquake, in what had been a slow ongoing reconstruction process. But the fact that MINUSTAH was publicly blamed for the outbreak, and that the UN denied any responsibility

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20 For an account of the “three external shocks” that Haiti suffered around 2008 (Food and fuel crisis, Natural disasters (storms and hurricanes), and Global financial turmoil) see Gauthier & Moita (2011)
until August 2016 (after all the field-trips for this thesis had been completed), made it a core challenge for MINUSTAH. This was because they were, on the one hand, trying to help to contain the outbreak and, on the other, addressing the communications challenge which was trying to deny responsibility when several voices were pointing in their direction.

Unfortunately, there have been more than one case of sexual abuse accusations during the 13 years of MINUSTAH (see Section 2.8.3 above). I chose as the third ‘shock’ the one involving Uruguayan soldiers and that took place in September 2011 which was recorded on video and went viral on social media. I chose that one because at the time it was very salient and occupied significant time in the media. It also involved Latin-American soldiers, which was a way to connect with another macro-topic of my research. However, most of the time my interviewees talked about sexual abuses in general terms, rather than the specific case mentioned. The same happened when trying to trace it in the UNSC resolutions for MINUSTAH as there was no explicit mention of this particular case. In that sense, it is safe to say that the discourse on the sexual abuse accusations researched in this thesis covers a wide range of the sexual abuses occurring in this period, rather than just one example.

Choosing these three ‘shocks’ also provided a good variety in terms of agency when analysing discourse. The earthquake is a natural phenomenon which has no human agency attached to it\textsuperscript{21}. The cholera outbreak on the other hand, has human agency, although it is arguably non-intentional: there are people responsible – or negligent – without whom this event would have never occurred. Finally, sexual abuse entails the full agency of its perpetrators, who act intentionally on their victims and are fully aware of the criminal nature of their actions. This allows the comparison of discursive strategies across the different levels of agency which these ‘three shocks’ represent.

\textsuperscript{21} Of course, it could be argued that there is some agency in terms of preventing the damage caused by the earthquake, from insisting on anti-seismic buildings to training the population in how to react in the event of an earthquake. However, the last earthquake with a magnitude as destructive as the one in 2010 was as long ago as 1842 in Cap-Haïtien with 5,300 recorded fatalities. More recent, albeit less intense earthquakes took place in 1994 and 1953 with 4 and 2 casualties respectively (see ten Brink et al., 2011 for more details). Since the last destructive earthquake was almost 170 years before the 2010 earthquake, it is hard to blame the authorities of the poorest country of the hemisphere for not taking more precautions.
4.2.4 Data selection

A key decision in all qualitative analysis is choosing which material to use to analyse and moreover, which to present as examples. The availability of the interviewees limited the former in the sense that I only have the materials from the interviews that I managed to conduct (see data set in Table 4.1 below). Even though I have some comprehensive coverage of the key positions in MINUSTAH, there are three SRSGs (the civilian leader of the mission) that I could not interview for either time constraints, schedule clashes or fatal circumstances (*in between parenthesis their tenure as SRSG*):

- Mariano Fernández (2011-2013), who cancelled several times due to schedule clashes or time constraints.
- Nigel Fisher (interim January-July 2013); who was unavailable due to time constraints.

In order to arrange the interviews during the documentary project, we coordinated with the communications office of MINUSTAH who arranged the interviews schedule for the higher officers of MINUSTAH, including SRSG, Force Commander (military leader of the mission) and Spokesperson. Other interviews were arranged by ourselves *in situ*. During the PhD project field trip, I contacted the SRSG office at MINUSTAH where a liaison official was designated to coordinate and arrange an interview schedule which included all key officers of MINUSTAH, although the SRSG's interview was only confirmed during my field trip, when I was already in Haiti. Additionally, when interviewing the communications officer of MINUSTAH, she put me into contact with Mr. Edmond Mulet's office (SRSG during 2006-2007 & 2010-2011 and Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations during 2007-2010 & 2011-2015) to arrange an interview at the UN headquarters in New York City. Other interviewees such as SRSG assistants or military officers were contacted for
interviews in a similar ‘snowball’ way: via the recommendations of other interviewees.

The second issue involving decisions for data selection has to do with which data to present in the analysis. Taking into account that all the interviews considered for this thesis amount to a total of 125,000 words (not considering translations), there is an obvious need to select which extracts to present in the analysis. Following Bauer and Aarts (2000, p. 31), the criteria chosen for selecting the extracts was a cyclical process conducted until saturation. The procedure was to transcribe all the interviews and then using the software *Atlas.ti* to code every piece of text that would become an extract. The main coding criteria were to establish which of the macro-topics of the thesis each extract belonged to (Latin-American Identity, Three Shocks, Security & Stability)\(^\text{22}\). Afterwards, with all the extracts from each macro-topic grouped together, each extract was analysed and coded according to the findings (in terms of which discursive strategies each exhibits). Similar findings were grouped together until no new findings emerged (saturation) and the process of selecting the extracts to display in the thesis was intended to present different kinds of findings, rather than to repeat similar kinds of extracts. The extracts selected are an illustration of the most paradigmatic cases. In that sense, there are interviews that even though they were analysed, are not presented in the extracts of this thesis. In that sense, as all qualitative analysis, the reader will have to trust my judgment that I am presenting the most illustrative extracts from among all the vast amount of data.

4.2.4.1 Data set: Interviews

\(^{22}\) There were some cases, such as extracts 5.4 and 7.2, which involve more than one macro-topic. In those cases, they were presented in the chapter according to which macro-topic is the most salient in the extract, but the interaction between macro-topics was analysed as well. As a matter of fact, for obvious reasons, those extracts were the most interesting kind for this thesis.
In order to answer the research questions presented in Section 1.3, this project will analyse two different genres, namely interviews and policy papers (UNSC resolutions for MINUSTAH).

Regarding the interviews, I collected roughly 5 hours in my first two trips to Haiti in 2004-2005 and 2006. This set of interviews comprised the leadership of MINUSTAH and relevant officers in the area of communications. However, as I already mentioned, several things changed in MINUSTAH after my first field trip and it became obvious that it was necessary to make another field trip to conduct new interviews and to be able to compare two moments of the (at the time) 11-year timespan of the mission: the beginning and the end of it.

A second field trip was carried out in December 2013 in Santiago, Chile, where one of the original interviewees from 2004-2005 (the SRSG between 2004-2006) was interviewed again as well as a new interviewee who had worked in/with the mission since it started. The first interview is 1hr. 45 minutes long and the second one, 2 hours long.

The third field trip took place in May 2015 in Haiti and New York. Roughly 9 hours of interviews were collected from 11 interviewees. These comprised the leadership of MINUSTAH in all relevant areas, including communications, and also a former leader (SRSG) of MINUSTAH during two periods (2006-2007 and 2010-2011) who was at the time of the interview in charge of all UN peacekeeping operations. Overall the data capture almost 15 hours of the opinions of the decision-makers of the mission in the beginning, middle and final stages of the mission. The questions asked, as I showed in section 4.2.2 above, consisted of similar questions to those asked in the previous interviews (to have a 'panel-wise' comparability) regarding Latin American identity and the rationale for the intervention; questions about the events in between (earthquake, cholera outbreak, sexual abuse accusations); questions regarding the actual challenges (drawdown of the mission); and finally, questions about the concepts of 'stability' and 'security'.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of the interview</th>
<th>Interviewee (tenure)</th>
<th>Length of the Interview (in minutes)</th>
<th>Number of words</th>
<th>Place of the interview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; October 2004</td>
<td>SRSG (2004-2006) I</td>
<td>51’</td>
<td>8,257</td>
<td>Santiago, Chile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; December 2013</td>
<td>SRSG (2004-2006) II</td>
<td>82’</td>
<td>13,511</td>
<td>Santiago, Chile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; May 2015</td>
<td>SRSG (2013-present)</td>
<td>32’</td>
<td>3,785</td>
<td>Port-au-Prince, Haiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; May 2015</td>
<td>Force Commander (2014-2015)&lt;sup&gt;†&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>47’</td>
<td>5,667</td>
<td>Port-au-Prince, Haiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; May 2015</td>
<td>Police Commissioner (2014-present) (He was also Deputy Commissioner for the Development of the Haitian National Police between November 2012)</td>
<td>80’</td>
<td>10,941</td>
<td>Port-au-Prince, Haiti</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>23</sup> These numbers are based on the word count in MS Word, which counts strings of letters between spaces or certain punctuation.  
<sup>†</sup>Deceased on 30<sup>th</sup> August 2015
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; May 2015</td>
<td>Deputy SRGS/Rule of Law (2013- present)</td>
<td>42'</td>
<td>4,036</td>
<td>Port-au-Prince, Haiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; May 2015</td>
<td>Civilian Officer (2013-2015)</td>
<td>59'</td>
<td>8,997</td>
<td>Port-au-Prince, Haiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2005</td>
<td>Special advisor to the SRSG (2004-2006)&lt;sup&gt;†&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>61'</td>
<td>6,932</td>
<td>Pétionville, Haiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt; December 2013</td>
<td>Special advisor to the SRSG (2011-2013) (He had been working in/about Haiti in diplomatic positions since 2000)</td>
<td>120'</td>
<td>19,420</td>
<td>Santiago, Chile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; May 2015</td>
<td>MINUSTAH Spokesperson and Deputy Chief Communications (2006-2011 &amp; 2013- present) (She also was Advocacy and Outreach Officer 2004-2006)</td>
<td>73'</td>
<td>10,610</td>
<td>Port-au-Prince, Haiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2005</td>
<td>MINUSTAH's official photographer (2004-2006)</td>
<td>14'</td>
<td>873</td>
<td>Fort Liberté and Port-au-Prince, Haiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; May 2015</td>
<td>Force Commander</td>
<td>23'</td>
<td>3,608</td>
<td>Port-au-Prince, Haiti</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>†</sup>Deceased on 12<sup>th</sup> September 2012
4.2.5 Analytical Framework for the Interviews

In this section I will explain what are the main analytical frameworks that I used in the analysis of the interview data. I will first present the different discursive strategies that I focus on in the analysis chapters. Afterwards, I will explain which specific strategies features in each chapter. I will do this going chapter by chapter (i.e. by macro-topic) explaining what I did in each of them and how that relates to my research questions.

4.2.5.1 Discursive strategies studied in the analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Discursive Strategy</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Devices / Features</th>
<th>Chapter in which is featured</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Argumentation strategies** (Wodak & Meyer, 2016). | Justify or back a claim. Also to question other's claims. | • *Topoi*  
• Fallacies  
• Contradictions  
• Inconsistencies | • Latin-American Identity  
• The Three Shocks  
• Security & Stability |
| **Strategies of reference and nomination**  
(Reisigl & Wodak, 2001) | **Discursive construction of Social Actors** | • Membership categorization devices, deictics, anthroponyms, etc.  
• Tropes such as metaphors, metonymies and synecdoches  
• Verbs and nouns to denote processes and actions | • Latin-American Identity |
|-------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|--------------------------|
| **Social Actors Representation**  
(Van Leeuwen, 2008) | **Discursive construction and representation of the social actors** | • Exclusion (suppression, backgrounding)  
• Inclusion (activation, passivation, personalization, impersonalization, abstraction, objectivation, individualisation, collectivation, aggregation, etc.) | • Security & Stability |
| **Predicational strategies**  
(Wodak, 2007) | **Discursive qualification of social actors, objects, phenomena, events/processes and actions (more or less positively or negatively)** | • Stereotypical, evaluative attributions or positive traits (in the form of adjectives, appositions, prepositional phases, relative clauses, conjunctural clauses, infinitive clauses and participial clauses or groups)  
• Explicit predicates or predicative nouns/adjectives/pronouns  
• Collocations  
• Explicit comparisons, similes, metaphors and other rhetorical figures (including metonymies, hyperboles, litotes, euphemisms)  
• Allusions, evocations, and presuppositions/implicatures, etc. | • Latin-American Identity |
| **Perspectivization strategies**  
(Reisigl & Wodak, 2009) | **Positioning speaker's point of view (expressing involvement or distance)** | • Deictics  
• Direct, indirect or free indirect speech  
• Quotation marks, discourse markers/participles  
• Metaphors  
• Animating prosody, etc. | • Latin-American Identity |
| **Mitigation and Intensification strategies**  
(Reisigl & Wodak, 2009) | **Modifying the illocutionary force of utterances** | • Diminutives or augmentatives  
• (modal) particles, tag questions, subjunctives, hesitations, vague expressions, etc.  
• Hyperboles, litotes  
• Indirect speech acts (e.g. question instead of assertion) | • Latin-American Identity |
| Legitimation strategies (Van Leeuwen, 2008) | Providing a justification for an action or stance | Authorization: legitimation by reference to the authority of tradition, custom, law, and/or persons in whom institutional authority of some kind is vested.  
- Rationalization: legitimation by reference to the goals and uses of institutionalized social action and to the knowledges that society has constructed to endow them with cognitive validity.  
- Moral evaluation: legitimation by (often very oblique) reference to value systems.  
- Mythopoesis: legitimation conveyed through narratives whose outcomes reward legitimate actions and punish non-legitimate actions. | Latin-American Identity  
Security & Stability  
The Three Shocks |

(Based on Reisigl & Wodak, 2015)

The analysis procedure was carried out in four steps. First, all the answers to similar questions were grouped into macro-topics. The second step was to go through the different discursive strategies for each extract. In the third step, the positioning (perspectivization) of each interviewee with each discursive strategy was analysed looking for patterns. Finally, the patterns are interpreted looking for an explanation.

4.2.5.2 Latin-American Identity

In Chapter 5 I adapt the Critical Discourse Analysis framework offered by Reisigl & Wodak (2001b) and Wodak et al. (2009a) on the discursive
construction of national identity. I seek to mainly answer Research Questions 1a (How do MINUSTAH leaders discursively construct the mission’s identity through their statements?) and 1b (Do MINUSTAH decision-makers discursively construct a Latin American identity/ies as a potential resource for a successful mission in Haiti? If so, how and why?). This framework seems appropriate for my research for two main reasons: first, in doing research I adhere to the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) to Critical Discourse Studies (CDS) in which those works are positioned. Second, the focus on the discursive construction of national identity is what I am exploring in my research, although not being a single nation Latin-America offers a case of multi-national or regional identity. In that sense, the DHA has also been used extensively in supranational institutions such as the European Union and the European Commission (see Krzyżanowski & Wodak, 2011; Ruth Wodak, 2007; Ruth Wodak & Boukala, 2015).

Additionally, I also use the legitimation strategies taxonomy developed by Van Leeuwen (2008). Even though Van Leeuwen’s work is one of the variations within CDS, it cannot be positioned exclusively in the DHA. However, it has been used by DHA scholars and a very good example is Van Leeuwen & Wodak (1999). The main reasons for looking for legitimation strategies in the discursive construction of Latin-American identity/ies are given by the context in which MINUSTAH is situated: first, since the position of Haiti as part of Latin-America is rather problematic (see Section 3.3, for more details), it was interesting to see if there were any legitimation strategies which could link Latin-America and Haiti, hence justifying a strong Latin-American presence. Second, as MINUSTAH was regarded as being led by and mostly composed of Latin-Americans, I was also interested in exploring if there were any legitimation strategies which would represent Latin-Americans as having an advantage in this mission, therefore, making MINUSTAH different and giving it more chances of success than its predecessors in Haiti.

4.2.5.3 Security and Stability

As I argued in Section 3.6, there is an abundant array of literature which establishes these two concepts at the core of international interventions,
peacekeeping and state-building. Moreover, as I mentioned in section 4.2.3 above, these two are also the main concepts in the names of both the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), thus, their importance is salient.

Additionally, they were at the core of the analysis of the UNSC resolutions for MINUSTAH (see section 4.3 on this chapter), which provided an entry point to compare the arguments provided by the interviewees. In other words, to examine if (and to which extent) do the official UNSC arguments about security and stability match the ones given by the leaders of MINUSTAH.

The research questions that this analysis is aimed to answer are 2a (*How does MINUSTAH engage in the discussion about the legitimacy of international interventions?*), 2b (*How do MINUSTAH leaders discursively construct the meanings of its actions in Haiti?*) and 2c (*Which strategies do they employ? How?). To answer these questions, the main foci are argumentation and legitimation strategies and social actor representation (Van Leeuwen, 2008).

My interest in the use of legitimation and argumentation strategies about security and stability is to explore the role of these two concepts in the discourse about international interventions, in the context of MINUSTAH.

Social actor representation complements the analysis by observing how the different social actors involved in the processes linked with security and stability are represented. In other words, I am interested in how the actions of MINUSTAH are justified and how the actors involved in those actions are represented, all in the context of a discourse with security and stability as core concepts.

4.2.5.4 The Three Shocks

In Chapter 7 I will adapt Van Leeuwen's (2008; van Leeuwen & Wodak, 1999) legitimation framework. His framework relies heavily on systemic functional grammar (Halliday & Matthiessen, 2004; Young & Harrison, 2004), and therefore the terminology used comes from this perspective. However, that does not mean that it will be the only kind of approach to grammar terminology used in this thesis (see Section 4.2.8 below).
As I explained in section 4.2.3 above, the ‘three shocks’ convey different levels of agency from non-human agency (the earthquake) to full human agency (sexual abuse). This allows for a comparison between the different strategies used for each ‘shock’ and to explore if any of them remains constant across them. I aim to mainly answer Research Questions 2b (How do MINUSTAH leaders discursively construct the meanings of its actions in Haiti?) and 2c (Which strategies do they employ? How?)

What both argumentation and legitimation strategies have in common is that they are used for justification. Moreover, I argue that their distinction is more analytical than practical as they are often used intertwined or embedded one in the other.

4.2.5.5 Changes in between 2004 – 2015

Additionally, Chapters 5 has a specific section in which the relevant discursive changes throughout the different data collection field-trips are discussed. This is aimed at Research Question 3 (Are there any salient differences in the discursive construction of MINUSTAH between 2004 and 2015?). Of course, not all the topics allow for comparison (as the ‘three shocks’ all happened at least 5 years after my first fieldtrip), but whenever comparison was possible, it is discussed. Latin-American identity is a topic covered in all fieldtrips. And even though ‘security and stability’ were not among the questions asked in 2005, when those topics emerged they were also considered for comparison.

4.2.6 Ethics

As mentioned before, there are two different sets of interviews used in this thesis. The first one belongs to the documentary project and were conducted at least 7 years before starting this PhD project. Therefore, no departmental consent forms exist for these interviews. However, I did use some of the documentary interviews for my MA in Discourse Studies dissertation at Lancaster University (see Ferreiro & Wodak, 2014, for a published version of the samples used). At that time, I discussed the ethical issues with the departmental
research ethics officer. He said that since the interviewees had already agreed to be on camera for a documentary, that should be enough to be considered consent. In other words, the criterion is that if they were willing to have their opinions made public in a documentary, it is reasonable to assume that they would be willing to have them used in a research project.

The second set of interviews were held within the PhD project; all the ethical approvals were obtained and each interviewee signed a consent form after the project and the purpose of the interview was explained to them (see appendix).

Most of my interviewees come from the diplomatic/international organisations arena and have held or hold positions of power. Some of them were very critical with their opinions or were willing to talk about delicateategic issues. Taking that into account, a potential ethical issue is that those opinions may cause them some problems in their current/future positions.

But even though some of the interviewees were willing to have their names made public, I will work under a position-rather-than-name policy, meaning that I will not use their names but mention their positions instead. However, in the cases where full anonymity was requested, I will not mention their position either, as the interviewee's identity could otherwise be inferred in most cases.

4.2.7 Interview dynamics and strategies

Considering the co-construction dynamics of the qualitative interview, there were some strategies which I deliberately used as an interviewer and that, as part of my self-reflection process within these dynamics, I will make explicit now:

- **Not asking about a Latin-American identity definition, but asking about its supposed advantages:** One of the core issues of this thesis is the discursive construction of Latin-American identity/ies in the context of MINUSTAH. As such, it was paramount to have a strategy on how to ask about this. Rather than asking directly for a definition of Latin-American
identity, I decided to ask whether Latin-Americans had any advantage for working in Haiti. This kind of question prompted my interviewees to speak about different features that Latin-Americans allegedly have, but also to talk about Haitian features that would ‘fit’ with Latin-Americans’. Since I am very interested in Haiti’s (contested) position in Latin-America (see sections 2.2 and 3.3), this strategy allowed me to obtain answers that would cover both Latin-America and Haiti in the same context.

- **Asking about communications:** As can be observed in questions 5 and 6 of the interview schedule, I asked about how the cholera outbreak and sexual abuse accusations were a challenge for MINUSTAH’s communications. This strategy had a double rationale, on the one hand, it distanced both challenges from MINUSTAH’s responsibility. I wanted to avoid short answers pointing to open litigation processes which would have been a dead end in terms of data. Whereas asking about the communications challenge pointed to an undeniable issue (that regardless of responsibilities, they were indeed communications challenges) addressed by MINUSTAH. On the other hand, in asking about communications I also intended to prompt answers more linked with discursive strategies, as it made it more likely for interviewees to answer referring to the different arguments and communication issues about the challenges.

- **Stressing that I am not interested in assessing responsibilities:** In connection with the previous point, when asking about the ‘three shocks’, specifically the cholera outbreak, I stressed to my interviewees that I was not interested in talking about MINUSTAH’s responsibility (which at the time was still officially contested by the UN). Again, I did not want to engage in a discussion about official truths and blame avoidance, which would have most likely led to another dead end, as was the case with a couple of interviewees. Hence, this and the previous strategy were used in tandem most of the time: stressing that I was not interested in assessing responsibilities and that I wanted their view on the

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24 One of them did not agree to talk about this on the record. The other one said that she did not want to talk much about it because it was “subject of litigation”.

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communications challenges that it meant for MINUSTAH.

- **‘Go with the flow’**: Finally, and as is the most common recommendation for semi-structured qualitative interviews, I went ‘with the flow’ of the interviews. This meant that sometimes the order of the questions would be altered or some questions not asked due to the dynamics of the interviews. It was very common that on answering a question the interviewee would go on and talk about other questions on my schedule, making it unnecessary to ask them later.

- **Outlining the ‘route map’**: Before each interview, when I was in the process of introducing myself, explaining the project and giving my interviewees the consent forms, I would also point briefly to the main points that I was intending to cover during the interview. This was not only for transparency purposes, but also helped to engage my interviewees with my research interests. In other words, they would know that the interview would be finished only once we had covered all the issues I mentioned at the beginning. This applies to the interviews done post-2006, already in the ‘research context’.

### 4.2.8 Transcription and Translation

Even though I am aware that the transcription process has its complexities and theoretical issues (Ochs, 1979), along with issues of validity and reliability (Peräkylä, 1997), I will explain the decisions I made on these issues.

The focus of the interview analyses is more on discursive strategies such as social actor representation, argumentation, nomination and predication (see section 4.2.5 above), rather than features relevant to Conversation Analysis (CA) (for an overview and discussion on CA see Silverman, 1998; ten Have, 1999) or Phonetics (Hutchby & Wooffitt, 1998; Peräkylä, 2004). For this reason, I follow the style of transcription exemplified by Culpeper (2011, p. 223), and to convey something of the prosody, I indicate clear pauses with full stops, indicate in parentheses the duration of pauses longer than one second, and put exceptionally
heavily stressed words in bold. “Uhms”, “ahms”, stuttering and audible hesitations are all transcribed too, and overlapping between interviewer and interviewee indicated with brackets. In this sense, the set of transcription conventions used is a slight modification of the “Simplified Transcription Symbols” presented by Silverman (2006, pp. 398–399). See Table 4.3 below for a summary.

Table 4.1: Transcription conventions used

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Symbol</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>.</td>
<td>Small pause (≤1s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(number of seconds)</td>
<td>Long pause (&gt;1s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>Overlap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>=</td>
<td>Latching</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(xxx)</td>
<td>Unintelligible words</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt; simultaneous/&gt;</td>
<td>Simultaneous speech</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[...]</td>
<td>Denotes text not transcribed in the extract</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

More than half of the interviews were conducted in Spanish (the rest in English), which obviously must be taken into consideration in a linguistics thesis written in English. However, grammatical features do not play a preeminent role in the analysis of the interviews. As a matter of fact, and following the eclectic features of CDS explained in Section 3.8.1 above, when mentioning grammatical features, I do not adhere to an exclusive grammar theory framework. The focus, then is on discursive strategies, which work similarly in both English Spanish. Thus, following the work done by Wodak et al. (2009) on national identity in Austria, I analyse the Spanish interviews in Spanish and present the analysis results in English in the thesis. I always present the original transcription next to the English translation of it for more transparency. If there is only an English version of the extract that means that the interview was conducted in English.

When necessary, I provide footnotes clarifying any 'lost in translation' issues, local idioms, polysemic words, and specific metaphors or expressions.
4.3 Analysing the UNSC Resolutions for MINUSTAH

In addition to the interviews, as I explained earlier, I also analyse the United Nations Security Council resolutions for MINUSTAH. This analysis, as it is based on the concepts of Security and Stability, is part of Chapter 6 which also covers those concepts in the interviews. This is not only for the sake of topical continuity, but also because of having the reference of the official UN discourse next to the interviewees’, which allows for a close comparison (see section 4.2.5.3 above).

In this section I explain the data set used, how I selected them, which framework I used to analyse them, why they are important to be analysed, and provide an overview of their structure.

4.3.1 Policy Paper Analysis of UN Security Council Resolutions for MINUSTAH

In the following section I provide a brief introduction to Policy Papers as a genre and how CDS scholars (and specifically those within DHA, on which I heavily base my analysis) have approached it. I will also explain what UN Security Council Resolutions are and why it is relevant to analyse them in this thesis. Then, I offer a framework for analysis and its connections to my research.

4.3.1.1 Policy Papers

According to Jenkins (2007) there are some propositions that, taken together, may offer a model of policy:

- Policy is an attempt to define, shape and steer orderly courses of action, not least in situations of complexity and uncertainty.
- Policy involves the specification and prioritisation of ends and means, and the relationships between competing ends and means.
- Policy is best regarded as a process, and as such it is ongoing and open-ended.
• The policy process is, by definition, an organisational practice.
• The policy process is embedded in and is not distinct from other aspects of organisational life.
• Policy appeals to, and is intended to foster, organisational trust – that is, external trust of organisations, and trust within organisations – based upon knowledge claims and expertise.
• Policy appeals to, and is intended to foster, organisational trust based on legitimate authority.
• Policy is about absences as well as presences, about what is not said as much as what is said.
• Policy may be implicit as well as explicit. (pp. 25–26)

One or more of these propositions can become relevant at different instances and be approached by different theoretical perspectives. Since the main focus of my thesis is not on the UNSC resolutions per se, but rather the legitimation strategies deployed by MINUSTAH leaders, what is relevant in the analysis of the resolutions are the common points between them and the interviews. In other words, I am interested in how the resolutions provide a 'legitimation framework' for the leaders of MINUSTAH, i.e. which (if any) arguments from the resolutions are also used by MINUSTAH leaders (including modifications, adaptations, recontextualizations, etc.). I am also interested in how the concepts of 'security' and 'stability' are constructed in the resolutions and by the leaders of MINUSTAH. Additionally, I want to pay attention to the differences and similarities between how the resolutions represented the 'three shocks' (i.e. the massive earthquake on 12 January 2010; the cholera outbreak that came afterwards in October 2010; and accusations of sexual abuse committed by Uruguayan soldiers against a Haitian boy in September 2011) and how they were represented by MINUSTAH leaders. Finally, I am also interested in how the resolutions have evolved regarding these strategies and concepts through time.

These points address some of my Research Questions: 2a (How does MINUSTAH engage in the discussion about the legitimacy of international interventions?), 2b (By which means do MINUSTAH leaders discursively construct
the meanings of their actions in Haiti?) and 2c (Which strategies do they employ? How?) and Research Question 3 (Are there any salient differences in the discursive construction of MINUSTAH between 2004 and 2015).

Since what is involved in point C directly addresses events in time, an important focus of the analysis is precisely to study those changes across the resolutions. This also agrees with Krzyżanowski that “Of particular importance here is also the application of the DHA to diachronic analysis of policy (and policy-communication) discourses by pointing to their transformation and change” (Krzyżanowski, 2013, p. 4).

The underlying presupposition here is that context and its changes are reflected in the resolutions. I follow Krzyżanowski & Wodak (2011) in relying on the multi-level analysis of context (Reisigl & Wodak, 2009) “which integrates the influence of changing socio-political conditions (i.e. macro-level of context) on the dynamics of discursive practices (policy documents, etc.) with an in-depth analysis of relevant texts or text extracts” (Krzyżanowski & Wodak, 2011, p. 117-118). This is not entirely possible to do with the interviews, as most of the interviewees only work for a maximum of two years in MINUSTAH, therefore it is not possible to have MINUSTAH officers who have endured all 'three shocks'. However, I have managed to interview the relevant leaders who were present at each of those events (see Table 4.1 above).

4.3.1.2 What the UN Security Council Resolutions are (and why it is important to analyse them)

As I showed in Section 2.4 above, the UN Security Council (UNSC) is the executive decision-making organ in the UN system, and, as such, it determines the existence of a threat to peace or an act of aggression. In those situations, the UNSC can impose sanctions or authorize the use of force to maintain or restore international peace and security. UNSC resolutions are the means in which those kinds of decisions are formalised.

In the case of missions (like MINUSTAH) the resolutions present an assessment of the situation, providing the context which justifies the deployment
of an intervention. Additionally, it sets the mission’s goals, how long it is authorised to operate and what its resources are (number of troops, police, etc.). Thus, since they provide an assessment of the situation and therefore, a justification for the deployment of the mission, they provide the ‘official’ legitimation of the mission. Additionally, as preliminary findings from the interviews have shown (see Ferreiro & Wodak, 2014), the Security Council resolutions are a constant ‘source’ of legitimacy for the leaders of MINUSTAH. Therefore, as I have mentioned before, studying the discursive legitimation of MINUSTAH and how it engages in a broader discussion about the legitimation of international interventions is among my research interests (Research Questions 2a: *How does MINUSTAH engage in the discussion about the legitimacy of international interventions?* and 2c: *Which strategies do they [the leaders of MINUSTAH] employ? How?). Thus, it seems crucial to analyse the resolutions which provide the framework for the mission. Hence, to understand better how the interviewees use different discursive strategies to legitimise what they were doing in the mission, it is necessary to understand their main reference point. This addresses in part my research question 2b (*By which means do MINUSTAH leaders discursively construct the meanings of their actions in Haiti?*).

4.3.1.3 Structure of the Resolutions

UN Security Council resolutions are a form of policy paper with certain features that remain constant (cf. di Carlo, 2012, 2014; Gruenberg, 2009). In the case of the resolutions for MINUSTAH, they range from just under 240 words to over 3,000 words. They are normally written in third person, and there are no specific authors of the resolutions. They are full of intertextual references to previous resolutions (which involves repeating and modifying paragraphs from previous resolutions) and other UN documents like the UN Charter, reports by the Secretary-General or by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. Their vagueness (di Carlo, 2012, 2014) and how they engage in power relations and legitimation (Gruenberg, 2009; Shepherd, 2015) have both been studied recently.
Regarding their structure, they are basically composed of two main parts which di Carlo calls (2014, p. 671) 'preambulatory' and 'operative'. I would like to call them 'rationale' and 'mandate' as I believe those terms capture their function better.

'Rationale' tends to provide both the assessment of the situation where the intervention will take place and the justification for the intervention. The paragraphs of this section start with verbs such as: *(Re-)Affirming, Welcoming, Noting, Recognizing, Acknowledging, Emphasizing.*

'Mandate’ tends to be the 'technical' part where the future actions, number of forces and organisms in charge are established. However, several principles are invoked here as well.

The paragraphs of this section start with verbs like: *Decides, Authorizes, Requests, Supports, Stresses, Encourages, Calls, Demands*25

As the examples show, it is not just the case that the rationale paragraphs consist of participial clauses while the main verbs in present simple are in the mandate paragraphs, but rather the kind of verbs used already gives a good idea of how there are in fact two different parts inside the same document. Moreover, I argue that this structure (rationale first, then the mandate) is how legitimation works in all UNSC resolutions, as it sets the scene, provides the context and reasons to intervene, and then presents concrete actions to be taken.

### 4.3.2 Data set for the Resolution Analysis

The UN Security Council resolutions are available in the public domain both on the UN’s and MINUSTAH's websites.

For this analysis, I chose seven out of the eighteen UNSC resolutions for MINUSTAH to date. The criteria for choosing them was taking the first, the one before and after each major 'shock' of the mission (earthquake (12 January 2010), cholera outbreak (October 2010) and sexual abuse accusations (September 2011), and the last one26. That is, Resolution 1542 (adopted on 20

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25 Gruenberg (2009) provides a comprehensive account of the different words used in UNSC resolutions dividing them into three categories: Emotive, Instructive, and Modifiers. However, he does not offer categories for the different sections of the resolutions.

26 The last resolution analysed was effectively the last one available at the time when I started
April 2004, 1,609 words), 1892 (adopted on 13 October 2009, 2,628 words), 1908\textsuperscript{27} (adopted on 19 January 2010, 236 words), 1927 (adopted on 4 June 2010, 997 words), 1944 (adopted on 14 October 2010, 2,266 words), 2012 (adopted on 14 October 2011, 2,906 words), and 2119 (adopted on 10 October 2013, 3030 words). See Table 4.4 below for more details.

\textsuperscript{27} Resolution 1908 was released a week after the earthquake. As can be inferred from the amount of words (236) it is very short and it is basically an expression of sorrow, gratitude and the announcement of the rapid enlargement of the mission. Moreover, this resolution does not contain either the word ‘stability’ or ‘security’. Additionally, the structure and content of its paragraphs do not display any continuity with either previous or forthcoming resolutions. Therefore, it was impossible to establish any kind of transformation (see section 4.3.3).
4.3.2.1 Data set table: UNSC Resolutions for MINUSTAH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Relation to the 'three shocks'</th>
<th>Resolution number</th>
<th>Number of words</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20th April 2004</td>
<td></td>
<td>1542</td>
<td>1,609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13th October 2009</td>
<td>Earthquake [12 January 2010]</td>
<td>1892</td>
<td>2,628</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19th January 2010</td>
<td></td>
<td>1908</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th June 2010</td>
<td></td>
<td>1927</td>
<td>997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14th October 2010</td>
<td>Cholera Outbreak (officially announced by Haitian gov.) [22nd October 2010]</td>
<td>1944</td>
<td>2,266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14th October 2011</td>
<td>Sexual Abuse Accusations [2nd September 2011]</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2,906</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th October 2013</td>
<td></td>
<td>2119</td>
<td>3,030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14th October 2014</td>
<td></td>
<td>2180</td>
<td>3,245</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.3.3 A Framework for Analysing the Resolutions

The UN structures and documents have been analysed in different ways, besides the works by di Carlo (2012, 2014), Gruenberg (2009) and Shepherd (2015) mentioned in section 4.3.1.3 above, Catherine Hecht (2016) studied the UN General Assembly debates showing quantitative and qualitative results of a
manually-coded content analysis of the debates between 1992 and 2014, compared with 1982. Her focus was to illustrate variation in the frequency and content of state representatives’ references to democracy and the use of democratic governance as symbol of status. Although not an example of CDS, attention is drawn to the use of language. She counted terms associated with democracy and coded the texts as having or not those words. Even though it is true that identifying trends in the use of words can be an entry point to study some discursive changes, I will prefer a more detailed analysis which, in line with the tradition of CDS, pays close attention to the context in which words are used. In that sense, I will also be interested in changes, but not variations in frequency but rather changes in the discursive construction of legitimation.

I will base my analysis on the framework offered by Van Leeuwen & Wodak (1999), in which they analyse a particular legal document, i.e. the Bescheide (notices rejecting family reunion applications for migrants in Austria). It may appear as a rather different subject from my own, although since they were looking for legitimation, on the one hand, and since I share their view of discourse as a social practice and their CDS approach to it, it seems that there are enough reasons to adopt and adapt their framework and see how it might be helpful for this analysis.

For this resolution analysis, it is important to consider strategies of transformation, as in this case of different resolutions being produced for the same mission over time, paragraphs are often repeated, transformed slightly. In that regard, I followed what they call “the classical types of transformation” in the context of processes of recontextualization:
1) Deletion
2) Rearrangement
3) Substitution
4) Addition
(Van Leeuwen & Wodak, 1999, p. 96)
Additionally, they also propose the following categories of legitimation, which I also used to analyse the interviews in all three analysis chapters (see Table 4.2 above):

1) Authorization (authority)
2) Rationalization
   i) Instrumental
      a) Objective strategy legitimation
      b) Result
   ii) Theoretical
      a) Definitions
      b) Explanations
3) Moral evaluation
   i) Values of scientific objectivity and precision
   ii) Values of leadership
   iii) Values of health and hygiene
   iv) Economic values
   v) Values of 'public interest'
4) Moral abstraction
   i) Economic values
   ii) Values of integration and adaptation
5) Mythopoesis: One story or event is taken as evidence for a general norm of behaviour.
(Van Leeuwen & Wodak, 1999, p. 104).

As mentioned already, since these categories were defined taking into account a different subject (different problem, different actors, different dynamics), I adapted some of these categories and disregarded those that do not make much sense in the context of these resolutions. For instance, mythopoesis has no place in the resolutions and some of the values of the moral valuation category (like health and hygiene) are not referred to either.

Additionally, and matching the analytical framework for the interviews on the same topic, in this case ‘Security & Stability’ (see section 2.5.4 above), I also
explored the Social Actor representation and argumentation strategies. I paid attention to Social Actor representation (van Leeuwen, 1996, 2008) to understand how the different actors are represented by the UNSC (as more or less powerful, with or without agency, etc.). In terms of argumentation, I also examined the different topoi and fallacies (Reisigl & Wodak, 2009) that are used in the resolutions as discursive strategies to convey support towards certain actions.

4.3.2.5 Steps of the Analysis

In the analysis for these resolutions I adhere to what Krzyżanowski points out: “[i]n the majority of critical-analytic explorations of discourse, topics are also defined here by way of inductive analysis, i.e. by means of decoding the meaning of text passages – usually taking place via several thorough readings – and then ordering them into lists of key themes and sub-themes.” (Krzyżanowski, 2013, pp. 29-30)

That is precisely what I did in this study. By reading comprehensively the resolutions, 'security' and 'stability' quickly emerged as the main concepts throughout them. This, of course was consistent with the peace-keeping discourses, as was shown in Chapter 3. The first step was identifying all the occurrences of the words “stability” and “security” in each of the resolutions. The verb and adjective forms of the words were also considered (i.e. secure, stable, stabilizing, securing, etc.).

The second step was to examine the different discursive strategies outlined in sections 4.2.5 and 4.3.3 above, their linguistic realisations and to consider the different levels of context. At this stage of the analysis, each of the main concepts was closely examined with regard to the argumentation strategies and Social Actor representation. Also, they were examined diachronically in order to find out if there were any changes.

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28 To avoid being redundant, I will not explain again those strategies here, but rather refer the reader to section 4.2.5 above and Table 4.2 specifically.
This analysis is inevitably both diachronic and synchronic. It is synchronic in the sense that each main concept is analysed regarding its context, and taking into account the other key concept, its similarities and differences. On the other hand, as Krzyżanowski suggests: “Of particular importance here is also the application of the DHA to diachronic analysis of policy (and policy-communication) discourses by pointing to their transformation and change.” (Krzyżanowski, 2013, p. 4). Therefore, this analysis is also diachronic in the sense that I am interested in the changes (if any) that these concepts have undergone throughout the resolutions, paying special attention to the aforementioned three main 'shocks' of the mission.

Similarly to what I explained in section 4.2.4 above, it would go beyond the reach of this thesis to present all the extracts of all the resolutions analysed. Thus, I applied the same 'saturation' principle explained in relation to the interview extracts. In other words, I will present the most extracts which best illustrate the different strategies and changes in the resolutions.

4.4 Combining data from different genres

In the tradition of the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) – where I position myself with this research – the combination of data from different genres is encouraged under the concept of 'triangulation', which is regarded as one of the salient features of the DHA (see Reisgl & Wodak, 2001, 2015; Titscher et al., 2000). Since social phenomena are complex, it is better to approach them through different disciplines (i.e. 'interdisciplinarity', see Unger, 2016), methods and theories. Triangulation specifically refers to “grasping many facets of the object under investigation” (Reisgl & Wodak, 2015, p. 57).

As I have explained, I use data from two different genres aimed to answer either different research questions or different aspects of a research question in a complementary manner (see section 4.3 above). The use of different genres is a common feature in DHA research (see for example Krzyżanowski & Oberhuber,
2007; Unger, 2013; Wodak, 2011). Even though it is safe to say that the 'core' of my data lies with the interviews – as they are meant to provide data for all my research questions – from an analytical point of view there is a recursive relation between my two sets of data.

This means that by analysing the UNSC resolutions, I aim to identify the key arguments and legitimation strategies and then compare them with the ones used by the leaders I interviewed. Since the former are framed inside the United Nations, they cannot be seen as arbitrary, but rather as grounded in the UN charter, international law, human rights or humanitarian reasons, just to give a few examples. In that sense, the (discussion of the) legitimacy of an international intervention (Research Question 2a) is located within each UN mission and has been since the start of the UN as an organisation itself (Durch et al., 2006; United Nations. Dept. of Public Information, 1945).

Thus, the resolutions for MINUSTAH provide both general arguments for the intervention, but also specific ones for MINUSTAH and the situation in Haiti. Thus, by analysing the resolutions it will make it easier to separate the UNSC (i.e. the official UN view) from the views of the leaders in the field. This is also crucial to exploring the power relations and tensions between the UNSC and MINUSTAH, which are a relevant part of the wider context.

I have already mentioned that I will combine Van Leeuwen’s frameworks with argumentation features widely used in CDS in general and in the DHA in particular. Since in my research I am interested in legitimation which, as Van Leeuwen puts it “is the answer to the spoken or unspoken ‘why’ questions” (2008, p. 106), my analysis will proceed as follows: I will first try to use Van Leeuwen’s categories to establish what kind of legitimation strategy is dominating that specific piece of text. I will then proceed to focus on the detailed argumentation strategies (such as topoi and fallacies) which are used in the argument. In other words, I will present what is the legitimation strategy ‘framing’ the detailed argumentation strategies which, and this is my standpoint, serve the wider purpose of legitimising.
The rationale for that decision is based on the understanding that argumentation strategies can serve multiple purposes (persuasion, deception, distraction, etc.), as it is the case that there can be multiple ends for an argument.

### 4.5 Caveats and Challenges

There are, inevitably, several assumptions behind any research method and I will try to outline in this section those which are behind my research. First and foremost is what Habermas considered as the sincerity (or truthfulness) pragmatic presupposition: “participants must mean what they say” (2008, p. 50). In other words, even though it might seem obvious, I assume that my interviewees are being sincere, and therefore my data reflects their beliefs and thoughts about what I am asking them. Additionally, as they are (and are used to being) in positions of responsibility and authority in which they can be held accountable for what they say. Considering that on some occasions it is very difficult, if not impossible, to establish if someone is being deceptive, building a rapport and guaranteeing full anonymity if requested should help to mitigate the possibility of deception.

All the interviews ‘post-the three shocks’ were held before the UN admitted its responsibility in the cholera outbreak. This could be seen as ‘outdated data’, but I argue that it is even more revealing to examine the strategies used when the official policy was to deny a responsibility that later was admitted. This helps to better distinguish official arguments from critical ones.

As I explained briefly in section 4.1 above, this research has interview data from two different “settings”. On the one hand, interviews conducted during the years 2005-2006 in the context of a documentary project. On the other hand, data collected in the context of the PhD. Even though I have managed to address most of the issues from the documentary project interviews in the PhD interviews - in order to have some comparability and continuity, there are some challenges that need to be addressed. These challenges mainly have to do with the fact of analysing video data (Heath, 1997), analysing visual images (Silverman, 2006) and re-analysis of previously collected material (Akerstrom et al., 2004).
5. **Latin-American Identity Construction**

In this Chapter I will present the analysis of the most representative extracts of the interviews regarding the discursive construction of a Latin-American identity. This chapter mainly aims to answer Research Question 1b: *Do MINUSTAH decision-makers discursively construct Latin American identity/ies as a potential resource for a successful mission in Haiti? If so, how and why?* and part of Research Question 3: *Are there any salient differences in the discursive construction of MINUSTAH between 2004 and 2015?*

I first provide a summary of my field notes, reflecting on both the context of the interview and my role as interviewee. I go chronologically through each interview. I then move on to the analysis of the extracts grouped into the macro-topics which emerged in the analysis: the experience of poverty, the experience of institutional breakdown and the geopolitics of being Latin American. Afterwards, I summarise the main changes across the interviews. Finally, I provide a summary and discussion of the findings of the analysis.

### 5.1 Field notes

#### 5.1.1 SRSG Interview in 2004

This was actually my first interview in the documentary. It worked as a way to familiarise myself with MINUSTAH and Haiti’s situation. This interview was held on the 15th October 2004 in Santiago, Chile, at the interviewee’s house. Extracts 5.1, 5.6, 5.7, 5.8 and 5.10 are from this interview. The interview was mostly conducted by me, with the exception of the question in Extract 5.10, which was asked by the director of the documentary. As I mentioned in Section XX in the Introduction, the director of the documentary – a very good friend of mine - happens to be the son of the interviewee. I believe that this did not interfere much in the interview as their interaction was very limited, but of course it was a source of tension that I was very aware of.
The setting of the interview being the interviewee’s living room, it is fair to say that he was reasonably comfortable and relaxed, which allowed him to produce long answers that sounded sincere to me at the time.

In 2004 I was just becoming involved in the documentary project and I did not have in mind doing any further research (such as a PhD) at the time of the interview. My position as interviewer was more about trying to understand and learn as much as possible rather than challenging my interviewee in an aggressive fashion. I am not saying that I carried out any of the rest of the interviews in a challenging/aggressive manner, but I believe that it is worth making clear what my disposition was. This meant that the tone of the interview was more similar to a teacher-student dynamic than a political interview. Besides, he was my friend’s father, which also explains the asymmetrical-but-close dynamic.

5.1.2 Force Commander Interview in 2005

The interview where Extracts 5.2 and 5.3 come from was held in February 2005 in the neighbourhood of Bel Air in Port-au-Prince during a military/humanitarian operation of cleaning rubbish from the streets which was at least 3 metres tall and as wide as the road. This interview was arranged by MINUSTAH’s press department and it meant spending all the morning until lunch with the then-Force Commander, General Heleno.

Bel Air was, at the time, one of the two most dangerous places in Haiti (the other one being Cité du Soleil) and that meant that we had to wear helmets and bulletproof vests. In the background, a loader was removing the mountain of rubbish and putting it into tipper lorries. A couple of locals were helping with spades, help which was more symbolic than effective when compared to what the loader could remove, but for the military it was key to have the people involved. That meant gaining support from the local population and a higher chance of getting intelligence for further military operations.

Everyone working there was using a mask as a sanitary measure and even though it was February, it was very hot. I, being outside in a short-sleeved shirt, could hardly imagine how the soldier operating the loader could cope, wearing
thick military clothes besides a helmet and bullet-proof vest, in a closed cabin that looked like it was creating a greenhouse effect. I remember that day as one of the most important moments in changing my view of the military (coming from a country where the military is still strongly associated with dictatorship and human rights violations).

It was still possible to see leaflets and posters of the deposed president Aristide there. He had very strong support in that area, and that was part of what made Bel Air dangerous.

General Heleno, on the other hand, was already a ‘myth’ for us before interviewing him: everyone spoke highly about him, stressing what a good person he was and how different his approach in Haiti was from those of other military leaders.

A man who had become an expert in communications before becoming the first Force Commander of MINUSTAH was very easy to talk to and very clear and expressive. But in addition to his charisma, he expressed a very humanitarian point of view that one would expect more from an NGO activist rather than a General.

As an interviewee, he is the one I remember most fondly. I really enjoyed meeting him and admired his approach.

The dynamic of the interview was certainly more ‘professional’ than those with the SRSG for that matter, since we have never met before. However, he was very close and open. I believe that I was both also, because of his charismatic personality and our good predisposition towards him.

5.1.3 SRSG interview in 2013

This interview where Excerpts 5.4, 5.5 and 5.9 come from was held on the 26th December 2013 and, in common with the one held 9 years before, took place at the interviewee’s home again. However, this time the context was the PhD and not a documentary. His son was not there (although another friend of mine did record the interview in video), removing that tension.

The dynamic was different in the sense that I now had an ongoing PhD project and several hours of interviewing behind me. I had been in Haiti twice
and I knew a bit more about the subject than the first time I had interviewed him. That meant a less asymmetrical dynamic and also a relaxed and confident interview.

Additionally, at the time of this second interview he had ceased being the SRSG more than seven years before. That allowed him to speak more freely about different issues, not necessarily assuming an 'official' UN standpoint. Needless to say, this also allowed him to speak with more knowledge about Haiti and MINUSTAH than nine years before.

5.2 The experience of Poverty

As was illustrated in section 3.2 above, a common ‘way of life’ could play an important role in defining Latin-American identity. Hence, the experience of poverty, either by presenting Latin America as being in poverty or, in the best-case scenario, as having a recent past in poverty emerges as an identity feature. As Haiti is the poorest country in the region, it is crucial to examine this feature as a possible link in identity constructions of Haiti and Latin America.
**JMF:** erm. The other subject that I am interested in if you could go deeper. has to do with the Latin-American specificity of the MINUSTAH um. What does it mean – in practice – the fact that um it is in the hands of Latin American armed forces?

**SRSG:** Well, um... look, um. from the point of view. of military strategies, let's say... I think that. one can imagine certain categories: What does the presence of Latin Americans mean in terms of. military tactics (inaudible)? Someone could say that Latin Americans are "softer", in the sense that they have a concept – because they are used to poverty – therefore they have a certain reaction of. “closeness” with poverty and they understand perfectly that poverty brings violence and that violence cannot be faced only with weapons, but there have to be other elements in order to dissuade that violence. You have there a difference that you would say "well, countries of that kind, a military leadership of that kind, is different to the traditional American leadership or to the colonial that actually considers that um you have to use force, period.

**JMF:** Ehh. El otro tema que me mmm interesaba pudiera profundizar. Tiene que ver con esta particularidad latina en la MINUSTAH ehh. En la práctica, el hecho que ehh esté en manos de fuerzas latinoamericanas, ¿Qué significa?

**SRSG:** Bueno, ehh... mira, ehh. Desde un punto de vista. de estrategia militar digamos, yo creo que tiene. uno uno puede imaginar ciertas uno uno puede imaginar ciertas categorías: ¿Qué significa la presencia de latinoamericanos desde en términos de. las tácticas de los militares (inaudible)? Alguien podría decir de que los latinoamericanos son más blandos, en el sentido de que como tienen un concepto, porque han estado acostumbrados a la pobreza, por lo tanto tienen una cierta reacción de. cercanía con la pobreza y entienden perfectamente que la pobreza engendra violencia y que no se puede enfrentar a esa violencia simplemente con las armas, sino que tienen que haber otros elementos para disuadir esa violencia. Tienes ahí una diferencia que tu dirías "bueno, países de esa naturaleza ., una conducción militar de esa natu de ese tipo, es distinta a la conducción tradicional americana o bien a la colonial que en realidad considera que ehhm hay que aplicar la fuerza y punto".

This question goes directly to the meaning of the alleged 'Latin-American specificity' of the MINUSTAH, which is connected with Research Question 1b, i.e. “Do MINUSTAH decision-makers discursively construct a Latin-American identity/ies as a potential resource for a successful mission in Haiti? If so, how and why?”. This issue was brought up by the interviewee himself earlier in this interview, and it is relevant from the self-presentation point of view since the interviewee was, at the time of the interview, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) and he happened to be Chilean as well. This made him part of the 'Latin-American members of the mission in-group'. However, it has to be taken into account that he was also in a very powerful situation and that he was a representative of the UN Secretary-General. This is relevant as we can expect to hear not only a Chilean or Latin-American 'voice', but also a voice from the UN, related with international organizations and diplomacy.

The first thing that the interviewee does in this answer is to re-frame the question in terms of military tactics. This implies that the 'openness' of the question is 'controlled', allowing a concise approach. This is salient when taking into account that the mission is not only a military one (as the interviewee himself had pointed out when referring to the developmental process); moreover, that he is the civilian leader and not the Force Commander of the mission, who is in charge of the military actions.

In addition to what was presented in the previous paragraph, he uses both strategies of mitigation and perspectivization. Among the former, the modality in using “can”, “could” and “would” mitigates the assertion “that Latin Americans are “softer”” by constructing it in terms of 'possibilities'. About the latter, he assumes a distant perspective through the use of an external speaker: “Someone could say...” and “...a difference that you would say...”.

In terms of reference and nomination, what was argued in the previous paragraph may explain the use of third person (“they”), for example when he is referring to Latin Americans. In other words, rather than excluding himself from 'Latin Americans' as a group, it seems as if he is talking about the Latin-American military, which then makes more sense of his talking about 'them' in the third person.
The argument is that Latin Americans’ experience and understanding of poverty may explain differences in their military leadership compared to the North American or French (implied by the use of ‘colonial’) military. This allows for the idea that the experience of poverty and development is both a cognitive experience (i.e.: it is something that can or cannot be understood and at the same time its experience is paramount to understanding and dealing with certain issues) and an identity feature (i.e.: it is a way to establish a contrast with the USA and other developed countries).

In this argument there is an explicit causal relationship (marked with the use of “therefore”) between having the experience of poverty and understanding the complexities of poverty and violence. It seems reasonable to suggest that since he is trying to provide reasons for the alleged advantage they have – which would be useful for the mission - fits better with causal argumentation. This strengthens the argument providing quasi-objective ‘proof’ for it. Needless to say, it is a case of positive presentation of Latin Americans in contrast with the previous negative presentation of Americans.

Americans (and French) are referred to as armies willing to use force without proper consideration. It is implied that there is a causal link between not experiencing nor understanding poverty and a direct use of violence. Therefore, the contrast places Latin Americans as being ‘softer’ in their use of force due to their joint experience of ‘poverty’ with Haitians. This takes into account the complexity of the origins of violence, hence that fighting violence is not only concerned with military tactics, but also about fighting poverty.

The main knowledge presupposed by this answer implies that neither the USA nor France understand or are used to poverty. Moreover, they do not seem to understand the complexities of violence linked with poverty, which should require a less straightforward use of military force.
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<th><strong>JMF:</strong> Do you think that MINUSTAH's civilian personnel's lack of contact is due to a UN regulation or to...?</th>
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<td><strong>FC:</strong> [...] They lack experience, a strategic vision of some of the issues, that is normal in any organization there are people that need to learn, there are people with more experience already. That is needed many times, experience, sensitivity, people that in their countries have never seen a slum, that changes a lot. For me being here...of course I can't say that I am ok, sure one feels bad, one feels bad here, but I am used to the landscape here, poverty exists in my country, misery exists. For me misery is not a disease, misery is a social problem. Not a disease. And I think that for some seems like misery were a disease, as it could be solved with repellent. It's not like that. Misery has to be faced with actions against misery, social actions, humanitarian actions to change people's situation.</td>
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<th><strong>JMF:</strong> ¿Crees que la falta de contacto de la gente civil, la gente que está trabajando hoy en MINUSTAH, responde a un reglamento de Naciones Unidas o a...?</th>
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<td><strong>FC:</strong> [...] Les falta experiencia, una visión estratégica de algunos problemas, eso es normal en cualquier organización hay gente que tiene que aprender, hay gente que ya tiene más experiencia. Eso muchas veces hace falta, la experiencia, la sensibilidad, gente que en su país nunca han visto una favela, eso cambia mucho. Yo para mí acá...claro no voy a decir que estoy bien, claro se siente mal, uno se siente mal acá, pero yo estoy acostumbrado con el paisaje acá, la pobreza existe en mi país, la miseria existe. Para mí la miseria no es una enfermedad, la miseria es un problema social. No es una enfermedad. Y yo creo que para algunos parece que la miseria es una enfermedad, como si la miseria se pudiera resolver con repelente. No es así. La miseria la tiene que tratar con acciones contra la miseria, acciones sociales, acciones humanitarias para cambiar la situación de la gente.</td>
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**Force Commander 2004-2005 (in 2005)**

There is a reference to the (non-Latin American) civilian personnel, characterised as lacking experience, which in his view proves the necessity of having a strategic vision. Having this experience, in contrast, creates sensitivity to poverty. This is the same argument used in Extract 5.1 by SRSG, namely that the experience of poverty allows for an empirical perspective. This immediately
juxtaposes the people from countries with poverty and misery, with the people from countries without poverty and misery, possibly an attempt at negative other-presentation.

He answers the question in the first person, using “I”. He positions himself as coming from a country with poverty, misery and slums. That makes the landscape a ‘familiar’ one for him expressed in the “I am used to...”. This experience allows him to understand misery not as a disease but as a social problem that requires complex policies to solve it. It is possible to interpret this advantage - in contrast with the inexperience analysed in the previous paragraph - as positive self-presentation.

The use of the metaphor of misery\textsuperscript{29} as a disease and the “repellent” to fight it is very significant, because of the actual use of mosquito repellent that is required to work there, especially in rubbish removal. However, both the notion of disease and repellent evokes attacking and defensive images (disease attacking the body and the immune system, repellent as repelling an attack), which are consistent with the critique also mentioned in Extract 5.1 of Americans just resorting to force instead of having a more complex understanding of poverty and violence.

In this extract he positions himself as a Brazilian (even though he does not mention his nationality explicitly) and as working in the mission. There is no explicit mention of being Latin American. Conversely, the others are referred to as inexperienced members of the mission, but there is no explicit mention of their nationalities.

\textsuperscript{29} There is a body of research about this metaphor, see for example Goatly, 2007a, 2007b; Musolff, 2016
<table>
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<th><strong>JMF:</strong> Do you think that for Latin Americans, since we have the chance to have more contact with slums, more poverty, more misery than Europeans or North Americans, it’s an advantage in order to work in these situations or to cope with the work in Haiti?</th>
<th><strong>JMF:</strong> ¿Tú crees que para los Latinoamericanos, que tal vez tenemos la oportunidad de estar en contacto con más favelas, con más pobreza, con más miseria que los europeos o los norteamericanos, es una ventaja para trabajar en estas situaciones o para sobrellevar el trabajo en Haití?</th>
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<td><strong>FC:</strong> No, I think that our history has a bigger link with this misery, poverty issue than developed countries, because they don’t have extreme poverty in their countries, rarely. Of course, there are some, but the general situation is not what we have - I am not going to generalise for the whole of Latin America – but we have in Latin America a considerable level of poverty. Therefore, it seems to me that we are used to being in contact with poorer people, perhaps we already have that in our heads, our hearts, our souls that there is a need to do something, so I think that that gives us the opportunity to share the little things we have...we have little things and the fact of sharing the little things we have I think that ennobles us, it is good for us, we feel good to share the little things we have. [...] I think that is the problem of almost every country which is contributing with troops here from South America, Latin America, they have poverty but they decided to share a little bit, the little they have with someone that is in a worse situation. I think that is good for the conscience of our people, our historic development, for the</td>
<td><strong>FC:</strong> No, yo creo que nuestra historia tiene un enlace más grande con ese asunto de miseria, de pobreza que la historia de los países desarrollados, porque ellos no tienen pobreza extrema en sus países, muy raramente. Claro, hay algunos, pero el aspecto general no es lo que tenemos –no voy a generalizar en toda América Latina– pero tenemos en América Latina un nivel de pobreza que es considerable. Entonces me parece que nosotros tenemos el hábito del contacto con la gente más pobre, tal vez ya tengamos eso en la cabeza, en el corazón, en el alma que hay necesidad de hacer alguna cosa, entonces eso me parece que nos da la oportunidad de dividir un poco lo que tenemos...tenemos poco el hecho de dividir el poco que tenemos yo creo que nos engrandece, es bueno para nosotros, nos sentimos bien, dividir el poco que tenemos. [...] Yo creo que ese es el problema de casi todos los países que están acá contribuyendo con tropas de América del Sur, América Latina, tienen pobreza pero decidieron dividir un poco, lo poco que tienen con alguien que está peor que nosotros. Eso me parece muy bueno para la conciencia de</td>
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The question is a leading question, which makes him speak about Latin-American and developed countries explicitly. Having said that, he answers the question in the first person, using “our”, “we”, “us”. He clearly positions himself as a Latin American and by opposition refers to the people from developed countries as “they”. He uses “Latin America” three times and “South America” once, immediately re-phrased as “Latin America”. There is not enough evidence in the text to hypothesise a difference in meaning between the two categories, and since he does not talk about South America separately, it seems reasonable to assume that he used them as synonyms.

From the point of view of predicational strategies, Latin Americans are described as having an advantage because of their own experience of poverty. This is a topic I had introduced in the question, framing the answer. However, he does end up agreeing with the idea of the importance of contact with poverty. This – in his view – is good for the conscience, historic formation and maturation of the Latin-American people. It is worth considering that Latin-American history is mentioned twice in this answer: first to point out that poverty is something that is part of our history; secondly, the just mentioned “historical formation”. This fits the topos of history, a legitimation via history which can formulated as “an action should / should not be performed if history teaches us that it has consequences”. We could formulate the first case as “history teaches us that poverty is tough and facing it and sharing makes us feel good, therefore we can understand Haiti’s situation and share with them what we have”. In the second case, it is more of a ‘future’ case of the topos of history that could be formulate as ‘we should help Haiti because it will be a good lesson for our historical development’.
5.3 The experience of Institutional Breakdown

As was briefly exposed in Section 2.2 the political history of Haiti is full of different kinds of institutional breakdown through coups, foreign occupation, military and civilian dictatorship, civil war and international interventions. Peaceful democratic transition is a rather recent phenomenon in Haiti. The history of Latin America also contains many institutional breakdowns and several military dictatorships between the 1930s and the 1980s, such as El Salvador 1931-1944, Paraguay 1954-1989, Brazil 1964-1985, Uruguay 1973-1985, Chile 1973-1990 and Argentina 1976-1983. Taking into account that it was a military coup in Haiti which triggered MINUSTAH in 2004, there were many references in the interviews linking the history of institutional breakdowns of both Haiti and Latin America. In this subsection I will examine some of the main discursive strategies used to this effect.
As with the case of poverty in Extract 5.3, in this part of the dialogue, there is also an attempt to present Latin Americans explicitly as having an advantage over Americans. And this advantage exists in the cognitive domain as well, when presenting Haitian politics as something which is *understood* better by Latin Americans. However, there are also two caveats which are relevant in terms of discursive strategies. The first one concerns the interviewee himself (as an SRSG) as further in the interview he constructs much positive self-presentation specifically, when he defines himself as being intellectually curious and eager to learn about the socio-political issues of Haiti.
The second caveat is of crucial importance: it concerns the USA. It is the USA that is presented as granting a greater or lesser degree of freedom to the SRSG – and not the UNSC, the organisation he is actually accountable to according to the UN regulations. This makes the case for a ‘shared responsibility’ scenario where the USA appear as having the final say on what the leader of the mission can do. I argue that this is also part of an embedded power relationship between the USA, Haiti and Latin America, performed on the stage of the UN.

By reducing all Haitian issues (such as development and security) to a single “Haitian issue” helps the interviewee to make the case that Latin Americans have an advantage over Americans. In other words, there is a single issue in Haiti (politics) and Latin Americans understand it better.

Additionally, by stating “That is a reality” without evidence or explanation to back that claim, he presupposes that that assessment will be accepted and shared by the interviewer. This fits the topos of reality, which can be formulated as “a particular action needs to be performed given the way reality as it is”. In this case, the reality is that as Latin Americans understand the political dimension better, therefore they can perform better in Haiti. This is also a case where this topos of reality is embedded in a topos of definition, which can be paraphrased as “it is reality because I define it as a reality”.

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The interviewee explicitly positions himself as ‘author’ of the transitions-to-democracy link between Latin America and Haiti. This illustrates not only his own agency over the argumentation, but also about how this idea was not necessarily widely (or institutionally) shared. In other words, it also works as a
caveat to make clear that this argumentation link is only his and not an official position.

There is a weakness in this argument, though: transitions to democracy and reconciliation processes after dictatorships are processes that have taken place in other regions and continents, some in Europe, Africa and Asia more recently than in Latin America\textsuperscript{30}. However, these are processes that have not taken place in the USA since the Civil War in the 19\textsuperscript{th} century.

Additionally, it is worth remembering that Aristide’s regime was not a dictatorship \textit{per se}, let alone a military one (as the army was disbanded by Aristide), although there were, indeed, deep divisions within Haitian civil society, that left the elite and educated classes in opposition to Aristide and the working classes allied with him.

The SRSG’s presuppositions in Extract 5.5 concern a shared diagnosis with the UNSC of the situation in Haiti before the mission took place, more crucially, of the events that prompted the deployment of the mission, namely, the inevitability of either a civil war or a peaceful solution of the controversies within the Haitian society. As a legitimation device it works on two levels: on the one hand, it legitimises the mission itself under the official UN discourse that an action was needed to prevent further violence (\textit{topos} of threat/urgency), on the other hand, it provides a link to make the case for the similarities with Latin America, as illustrated above.

5.4 The Geopolitics of being Latin American

Two of the most common macro-topics in the discourse about Latin-American identity and its relationship with Haiti (i.e. the experience of poverty and institutional breakdown) have been examined so far. Through the interviewees a third macro-topic was mentioned, which is the relationship

\textsuperscript{30} Just to take the example mentioned by the interviewee himself, Chile’s dictatorship ended when the democratically elected Patricio Aylwin took office on 11\textsuperscript{th} March 1990, 24 years before MINUSTAH was deployed in Haiti.
between Latin America and the USA. This relationship, as was shown in section 3.2.3 above, is crucial in shaping Latin-American identity. At the same time, Haiti itself has also had a rather problematic relationship with the USA (see sections 2.2 above) with several interventions by the Americans in the Caribbean country.

In this subsection, I will show how the opposition “Latin America vs USA” (see Section 3.2.2 above) plays a crucial role in both legitimising MINUSTAH and in discursively constructing a Latin-American identity.
**JMF:** erm. The other subject that I am interested in if you could go deeper. has to do with the Latin-American specificity of the MINUSTAH um. What does it mean – in practice – the fact that um it is in the hands of Latin American armed forces?

**SRSG:** […] And the same thing with the fact of the participation of Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay, Guatemala has a whole symbolism which is very important for Latin America that, watch out! is not intervening in a conflict in Paraguay. because a government collapses and there is a military coup attempt, but is intervening, in a country in the north and that is of direct interest to the USA. Hence, there is the accidental fact that the USA is intervening in Iraq with full dedication to the war in Iraq, which makes the USA being grateful for the participation of a group of Latin Americans in a situation in a small country that, even though um it’s a country with no great relevance in the international context and in what we may call the set of international crises um, it is evident that it is a country that has caused a lot of difficulties for the USA for more than a century, um, therefore, or, or almost a century.

**JMF:** Ehh. El otro tema que me mmm interesaba pudiera profundizar. Tiene que ver con esta particularidad latina en la MINUSTAH ehh. En la práctica, el hecho que ehh esté en manos de fuerzas latinoamericanas, ¿Qué significa?

**SRSG:** […] Y lo mismo el hecho que se participe a nivel de Argentina, de Chile, de Paraguay, Uruguay, Guatemala, tiene toda una, también una una una simbología muy importante para América Latina, ¡que ojo! no está interviniendo en un conflicto en Paraguay. porque se cayó un gobierno y hay un intento de golpe militar, sino que está interviniendo, en un país que está, al norte y que es de interés directo de EE.UU. Por lo tanto, se plantea allí un hecho que es casual, el hecho que EE.UU. esté interviniendo en Irak, y tenga una dedicación total a la guerra de Irak, hace que EE.UU. agradezca la participación de un grupo de latinoamericanos en una situación en un pequeño país que si bien, es ehhh es un país que no tiene una relevancia mayor en el contexto internacional y en la, en lo que podríamos definir el conjunto de crisis internacionales ehh, es evidente que es un país que le ha causado una enorme cantidad de dificultades a EE.UU. desde hace más de un siglo, ehh, por lo tanto, o, o muy luego un siglo.

**SRSG. 2004-2006 (in 2004)**
The first sentence of this extract extends the analysis to Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay and Guatemala. The joint involvement of these countries in the mission is of enormous symbolic importance for Latin America.

Latin America itself (again named as a geopolitical region and not only referring to military force) is realised in the third person; in this way the interviewee rather than including himself in the actions of these Latin-American countries, assumes the perspective of an external observer. There is another reference in the extract where he refers to these countries as a “group of Latin Americans”, implying that even though all the countries mentioned are Latin Americans, not every Latin-American country is part of the mission.

The USA is also referred to in this extract four times. The first one is to point out that Haiti is a country of direct interest for the USA. In that same sentence, the fact that Haiti is in the northern hemisphere is also stated as relevant, implying that the northern hemisphere is a matter for the USA rather than for Latin America.

The second time, the USA appear as an active actor intervening 'full time' in Iraq. This is described as an “accidental fact”, which seems to be inaccurate if it is referring to a war (fighting a war requires an intentional decision). This may suggest that for the argument – since the focus is on the Haitian situation and not on Iraq – the USA putting its military attention on Iraq constitutes a 'disruption', which explains the ‘unexpected’ fact that they are not involved in Haiti as they should. In other words, with Haiti being part of the USA’s sphere of direct interest, it would be expected for the USA to be part of an intervention in Haiti. However, this has been diverted because of their full involvement in the war in Iraq.

The third time that the USA is referred to is as an active actor “being grateful for” this “group of Latin Americans” for taking care of an American issue. This 'gratitude' expressed in the pragmatic act of “thanking” configures a situation in which the solution of the Haitian crisis seems to be the USA’s responsibility and not Latin America’s. At least, this is how the interviewee refers to the American approach to the Haitian crisis. This seems to display the USA as
patronising. In terms of perspectivization, the interviewee is taking the USA’s point of view, speaking on their behalf.

The fourth time the USA is referred to passively as being affected by the Haitian problems. At the same time the phrase 'almost a century of difficulties' reinforces the view of why Haiti must be an American issue.

Haiti is not directly named here (as it was not named in the previous extract), although it is referred to implicitly. From a reference and predicational point of view, Haiti has a double dimension: on the one hand, it is presented as important due to its hemispheric location and being part of the USA’s sphere of direct interest. On the other hand, it is presented as a small and irrelevant country. This apparent contradiction is solved in favour of the USA’s aims/ends. In other words, even though Haiti is a small and irrelevant country in the worldwide context, it is perceived as causing problems for the USA and therefore it is argued, it is in their direct interest and important enough to provide 'symbolism' to the Latin-American-led mission there.
From the point of view of the reference and nomination strategies employed, the first salient issue is the discursive construction of a separation between Brazil and South-America marked with the use of "and", as if they were two separate entities. Since Brazil belongs to South America, to name them separately works – in this context – as highlighting the predominance of Brazil over the rest of the South (and Latin-) American countries in this mission. Brazil has a predominance in MINUSTAH both in terms of having the largest number of troops and that the Force Commanders had always been Brazilians.
On the other hand, Brazil being the biggest and most powerful country in the region, it is possible to analyse this separation - in Foucauldian terms, as a discursive ‘resistance’ to power. The SRSG is Chilean and, in terms of perspectivization, would be assuming the point of view of ‘the rest’ of the South-American countries which, discursively, ‘resist’ powerful Brazil as ‘not being part of us’.

Latin America is referred to again in this answer; however, it is specified with its troops. There is a switch from “Brazil and South America” to “Latin-American troops”, which are later exemplified (not just as troops) with the personified reference to Brazil, Argentina and Chile (the three South American countries with more troops in the UN mission).

North America is also referred to here as a region. The relationship is established between the hemispheres (South America and North America), where there is an approach from the South to the North. What is relevant about naming North America is that it evokes the USA, whereas a more precise reference like 'the Caribbean' – which fits both Haiti and Cuba – excludes the USA. This, as it was discussed before, helps to construct the argument in terms of an opposition between Latin/South America and the USA.

Cuba is mentioned twice as an example of the location of a possible serious crisis. Mentioning Cuba has a double impact: on the one hand, its geographical closeness to Haiti makes the example one 'closer' to reality. On the other hand, Cuba has a history of facing and opposing the USA. The discussions of the prospects of what would happen in Cuba if the regime fell normally involves the role the USA would take in that case. Needless to say, USA foreign policies against Cuba are politically relevant for the USA’s 'Latin’ community, especially in states like Florida.

The USA is also referred to here following the argument described above, namely whether or not Cuba is their exclusive issue. However, in this answer he goes deeper and makes explicit a hypothetical distinction between Brazil, Chile and Argentina (as the major suppliers of Latin-American troops) and the USA about the 'single-ownership’ of the solution for a crisis in Cuba. As a matter of fact, he claims that this involvement in the UN mission was creating a precedent
that would give them the right to intervene in Cuba. Using the adverb 'rightfully' he attempts to intensify and legitimise the claim.

Haiti is mentioned once in this extract in what we could call a 'utilitarian' way. In other words, Haiti, as a country where a UN mission with Latin-American troops is taking place, serves the purpose of providing the right to these Latin-American countries to take part in the solution of a hypothetical crisis in Cuba.

In this extract the interviewee positions himself from a very 'safe' place by framing this argument not as his own, but with the perspectivization strategy “And there are people that have said...”: a diplomat who does not want to appear as holding polemic views that involve delicate issues such as a crisis in Cuba, a challenge to the USA from Latin-American countries and the fact that this UN mission might be a means to that end.

Moreover, he reinforces the strategy with mitigation using the adjective “interesting” for that hypothetical situation as well as the vague use of modality “could bring consequences”. Thus, he assumes an 'external observer' point of view, excluding himself from the Latin-American forces involved.

From the point of view of the knowledge being presupposed, what is described as a “rapprochement” between Brazil and South America and North America implies that there is some sort of 'distance' between the two hemispheres and that this kind of intervention helps them to get closer.
**JMF:** erm. The other subject that I am interested in if you could go deeper. has to do with the Latin-American specificity of the MINUSTAH um. What does it mean – in practice – the fact that um it is in the hands of Latin American armed forces?

**SRSG:** [...] there are a lot of factors that could make that society that is way more Latin American than the Caribbean Anglo-Saxon ones..., that is Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Bahamas, countries that have no relation with Latin America. [...] but the truth is that they do not have the cultural structure that these countries have. Haiti has it, much more despite the fact that they speak French, they are Latin, they have the Catholic church, they had an independence process, um their leaders dressed like Bolívar, O'Higgins and San Martin. um Somehow they felt themselves. as part of this history and therefore, I believe that in that sense, the most important issue and one that is more difficult to address is to convince the Latin Americans that they have to incorporate Haiti here. [...] there is a certain degree of closeness between these countries and Haiti that makes Haiti – that is always going to be referred to the USA and. to France too, for cultural reasons – feel that their escape is on the Latin-American side.

**JMF:** Ehh. El otro tema que me mmm interesaba pudiera profundizar. Tiene que ver con esta particularidad latina en la MINUSTAH ehh. En la práctica, el hecho que ehh esté en manos de fuerzas latinoamericanas, ¿Qué significa?

**SRSG:** [...] hay una cantidad de factores que podrían hacer que esa sociedad, que es mucho más latinoamericana que las anglosajonas del caribe ..., o sea Jamaica, Trinidad y Tobago, Bahamas. son países que no tienen ninguna relación con América latina. [...] pero la verdad es que no tienen la estructura cultural que tienen estos países. Haití si la tiene, la tiene mucho más a pesar de que hablan Francés, son latinos, tenían la iglesia católica, hicieron la independencia, ehh sus líderes se vestían como Bolívar, O'Higgins, y San Martín. ehh Se sentían ehh de alguna manera. parte de esta historia, y por lo tanto yo creo que en ese sentido, la parte más importante y la que cuesta más mover, la que cuesta más mover es convencer a los latinoamericanos que tienen que incorporar a Haití para acá. [...] hay un grado de cercanía entre estos países y Haití que hace que Haití –que va a ser siempre referido a EE.UU. También . y a Francia por razones culturales- sienta que su escape está por el lado de Latinoamérica.

**SRSG.** 2004-2006 (in 2004)
This extract starts with a comparison between the Haitian and the Anglo-Saxon Caribbean societies. The reference to ‘societies’ rather than to ‘countries’ helps focus on cultural and societal issues rather than geopolitical ones. From this point of view, the argument is constructed aiming to construct a sense of ‘community’ that provides a different kind of evidence to support the idea that Latin America has a ‘right’ to intervene in Haiti. In other words, Haiti shares more cultural and societal features with Latin America than the Anglo-Saxon-shaped Caribbean societies.

The use of “Caribbean Anglo-Saxon [societies]” - exemplified with the reference to Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago and Bahamas – goes beyond the language spoken in those countries. Indeed, he states that the fact that Haiti is a French-speaking country is not a reason to not consider it a Latin-American country by stating “despite the fact...”. The presupposition is the shared language in Latin America, but the case that Brazilians speak Portuguese makes it problematic. However, after this expression he states that they are “Latin”. It seems that language plays an ambivalent role in this argument, where the Latin language (as the root of French, Portuguese and Spanish) seems to be what is being shared in “Latin America”. As will be shown in this analysis, there are other features that are more relevant to consider (or not): for example, that a Caribbean society shares a common space with Latin America rather than a language. However, this opposition between 'Anglo-Saxon' and 'Latin-American' helps to establish an opposition between Latin America and the USA. The USA shares with the Anglophone world, along with the English language, historical, political and juridical descent from the Anglo-Saxons (in the form of being a former British colony).

It is worth considering the expression “more Latin American than...” used at the beginning of the extract, in more detail. Since the point of comparison is 'Anglo-Saxon' society – which, by definition is not Latin American – it would suffice to just establish the contrast by saying, for example, “Haitian society is Latin American whereas Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago and the Bahamas are Anglo-Saxon”. However, the expression “more than” allows the speaker to put them together in a continuum of different ‘degrees of Latin-Americanness’. This
only makes sense if the 'Latin-Americanness' of Haiti is disputable. In other words, it seems that Haitian society is 'more Latin American' than the Anglo-Saxon Caribbean ones because, although Haiti is not completely Latin American, it shares some Latin-American features.

By looking closer at these Latin-American features that the interviewee provides, it is possible to find that they are all framed under the expression of “cultural structure”. This “cultural structure” comprises the Catholic church, the fact of experiencing an independence process and the way their original leaders dressed. One may argue whether these features suffice to talk about a shared “cultural structure”, and whether you could find them elsewhere. It seems plausible that some African countries could also claim to be Latin (if not American) on the grounds of having inherited a Latin language, the Catholic Church and been through an independence process. All the former British colonies have been through an independence process too, although not necessarily involving uprising and revolution.

On the other hand, the way the independence leaders dressed both in Latin America and Haiti was an inherited European colonial way of dressing.

The argument of shared cultural structure does not seem to be very strong at this point. The only point that could be held in this argument is mentioned afterwards, namely, that “they felt themselves as part of this history”. This sense of sharing a common history seems to be a strong argument in favour of being a part of Latin America.

However, even though there are some connections between Haitian and Latin-American history (see sections 2.2 and 3.3), it may be hard to prove that there is still a 'feeling' of a shared history with Latin America, and recent evidence illustrates that they actually feel like sharing a common past with African countries. Indeed, as was shown in Section 3.3, the historical relationship between Haiti and Latin-American countries has hitherto been rather problematic.

The references to Latin America are mixed in this extract. When he is talking about Haitians feeling a shared history with Latin America, he uses the
deictic expression “this history”. He refers to himself as a Latin American and as sharing that history. But the sentence “convince the Latin Americans that they have to incorporate Haiti here” is ambiguous. On the one hand, “Latin Americans” are treated in the third person, using “they”. On the other hand, the deictic expression “here” is used including the interviewee in Latin America. In other words, although he talks as not being part of the “Latin-American group” but at the same time he includes himself in “Latin America”.

A way to sort out this apparent contradiction is to use contextual information in order to understand what the difference between “Latin America” and “Latin Americans” is. The first obvious difference is that “Latin America” refers to a region whereas “Latin Americans” to a group of people.

However, the question now is which specific group of people is implied when he positions himself as an outsider. Obviously, he is talking about a group of people that are not convinced of incorporating Haiti. This means two things: on the one hand, he is implying that he is convinced of incorporating Haiti into Latin America, which is consistent with his previous arguments. On the other hand, this means that he is talking about Latin-American 'decision-makers' who can take the necessary measures to incorporate Haiti into Latin America. Thus, he is talking about Latin-American leaders and he is excluding himself from that category.

In sum, he tends to present himself as an international diplomat/UN representative rather than as a Latin-American leader or politician.

Haiti, on the other hand, appears as a country which has not yet been incorporated into Latin America. At the same time, it is presented as being “always” referred to both by the USA and France, which operates as presupposed knowledge. When talking about France, the reference to Haiti is “for cultural reasons”. I argue that this weakens the argument of the “cultural structure” presented before in the same extract (and discussed in the previous paragraphs). If the 'culture' is used to establish links between Haiti and both Latin America and France at the same time, this is not a feature that can exclusively establish a Latin-American connection.
By the end of the answer he uses the expression “their escape is on the Latin-American side”. This expression treats the situation in terms of a conflict. This “escape” is from a bad situation, and in this case, a situation where the USA and France are involved. The use of the word “side” is consistent with this 'confrontational language' where the implicature is that Latin America is on one side and France and the USA are on the other. Haiti then appears in between these two sides. It is possible to interpret this utterance as a positive self-presentation of Latin America and a negative other-presentation of France and the USA.

Text extract 5.9

**JMF:** That this was somehow a mission that unlike the previous ones had this Latin-American feature, right? erm that meant some pros, um, um, for Haiti. I would like you to tell me a bit about it. How do think that it crystallised, at least on what you were able to see?

**SRSG:** [...] I think that . the Latin-American theory of Haiti is built ex-post. It is not, let’s say, an a-priori construction, I mean, no one says that Latin America should not be concerned about this little historic, heroic and suffering country, but in the moment that produced this coming together, for different reasons, because do not think that this happened only because the USA called, no. They went because the UN Secretary-General asked for it too, because many countries had interests, the case of Brazil is the most evident of all. Brazil has been desiring a permanent seat in the UNSC for quite a long time. Its

**JMF:** Que era una misión que de alguna manera a diferencia de las otras anteriores tenía esta particularidad latinoamericana ¿no? Eh, que significaba algunos pro, eh, eh, para Haití. Me gustaría ver si me pudieras hablar un poco de eso ¿cómo, cómo crees que cuajó al menos, dentro de lo que tú pudiste ver?

**SRSG:** [...] Yo pienso que . la teoría latinoamericana de Haití se construye ex-post. No es una construcción a priori, digamos, o sea nadie dice por qué América Latina no debería preocuparse de este paísito histórico, heroico y doloroso, sino que en el momento en que se produce la confluencia, por distintas razones, porque no se vaya a pensar por lo que yo digo de que se partió sólo porque Estados Unidos llamó por teléfono, no. Partieron porque también lo pidió el Secretario General de Naciones Unidas, porque muchos de esos países tenían intereses, el caso de Brasil es el más evidente de todos. Brasil viene hace
The interviewee admits that what he calls “the Latin-American theory of Haiti” was constructed after the deployment of the mission, rather than it being a ‘self-conscious’ Latin-American regional intervention from the beginning. After stating that “ex-post” condition, he continues to mitigate possible interpretations that this could imply that Latin America is not concerned about Haiti, by precisely denying it explicitly. Thus, the argument implies that the main reasons for intervening had to do with a request by the USA, the UNSG and with geopolitical interests.

There is a caveat after the first “because” that needs to be closely examined: the interviewee does not want us to think that Latin-American countries went to Haiti “only” because the USA asked for it but because the UNSG asked for it “too”. It implies an attempt to diminish the influence of the USA over Latin-American foreign policy decisions. In this sense, mentioning that the UNSG also requested the participation of some Latin-American countries in this intervention achieves a more international scope.

A somewhat utilitarian reasoning lies behind the argument that Brazil’s interest in becoming a permanent member of the UNSC is driving its participation in the mission in Haiti. In other words, the mission in Haiti is just
another means to that end. In that sense, the mission in Haiti becomes ‘interchangeable’: it could be in any country around the world, as long as it boosts Brazil’s CV in participating in global issues. The presupposition here, after “as it is widely known”, has to do precisely with being acquainted with the UNSC procedures and requirements to become a permanent member\textsuperscript{31}. In other words, he presupposes that we know that participating in UN peacekeeping operations is necessary to be a permanent member of the UNSC.

In terms of predicational strategies, Haiti is presented as "little, historic and heroic", which sounds patronising\textsuperscript{32}. This belittlement of Haiti stands in the immediate context in which powerful actors such as the USA, the UNSG and Brazil are staged, thus reducing the matter of the mission in Haiti to the interests of those three.

\textsuperscript{31} Although no new permanent members have been admitted in the UNSC since the People’s Republic of China in 1971.

\textsuperscript{32} Specially in Spanish, using the diminutive "ito".
I2: It would be [an American protectorate with military bases throughout Haiti] a “progressive dictatorship”, like Baba said. Wouldn’t it?

SRSG: It would be, well no, It would be colonialism. The US would turn into a colonial power declaring that Haiti cannot create a government by itself, decides to invade and allocates a president who will act as a governor that ., well, Puerto Rico is an American dependency, with the difference that Puerto Ricans live an ideal life compared to the rest ., it is an extraordinarily nice country; once I went there the Puerto Rican socialist party told me that they wanted to show me some extreme poverty ., and they took me to some buildings where the workers and exploited lived that were like the Tajamar Towers [upper working class-middle class buildings in Santiago] ., so I told them: “you should take a trip to Latin America first, before showing the Puerto Rican poor to Latin Americans, because it makes us laugh what you have here as poverty”.


The first sentences of this extract continue with the hypothetical case of an American protectorate in Haiti clarifying that the way to call it is “colonialism”

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33 This interviewer is not myself but the director of the documentary.
rather than Baba’s “progressive dictatorship”. This hypothetical example with a
governor allocated by the USA takes him to a real example: Puerto Rico.

Puerto Rico is presented here as an American dependency and compared with
the situation of a protectorate. Puerto Rico is presented as an “extraordinarily
nice country”. Puerto Ricans are presented as having an “ideal life compared with
the rest”. It is hard to tell what or who he means by “the rest” (these could be
other American dependencies or the neighbouring Caribbean countries Haiti
would be included with). Since the answer is framed in an interview about Haiti,
it seems more likely that he is making a comparison with the Caribbean
countries.

Immediately after mentioning the positive features of Puerto Rico he
narrates a personal anecdote that seems to back this idea of the good life of
Puerto Ricans. This anecdote, which fits ‘mythopoiesis’ as a legitimation category
(i.e. a story that is taken as evidence for general norm), gives some key elements
to establish the features of Latin-American identity from his point of view.
Basically, the anecdote is about the socialist party showing him the Puerto Rican
“misery” by taking him to where the “exploited” and “workers” live. Those
apartments resemble some Chilean upper working-class / lower middle-class
apartments. In other words, conditions far from being considered as “misery” for
him (or for any Chilean). Poverty, as in Section 5.2, appears again as an identity
feature of his conception of the Latin-American experience. Latin America seems
to be constructed as an ’authority’ in poverty issues, and what Puerto Rico does
not have is ’real’ poverty. In his words, it “makes [a Latin American] laugh”.

However, the expression “take a trip to Latin America” immediately
emphasises the fact that Puerto Rico is not part of Latin America geographically.
This is reinforced by the use of “[showing the poor] to Latin Americans”, implying
that Puerto Rico is not a Latin-American country whereas Chile is. Since Puerto
Rico is not an Anglo-Saxon country (they speak Spanish) and shares the Spanish

34 “Baba” was a Haitian woman in charge of personnel training for those who arrived in Haiti
for MINUSTAH. She was in charge of teaching them about the most relevant issues about
Haitian culture to help with the basics of settling in and dealing with day-to-day matters. She
was interviewed for the documentary project where she expressed a very critical point of view
about how MINUSTAH was dealing with Haiti in terms of cultural understanding.
colonial heritage, it seems appropriate to wonder why Haiti – which is geographically close to Puerto Rico - could qualify as Latin American in “cultural structure” mentioned in Extract 5.8 whereas Puerto Rico does not. One reason could be that Puerto Rico never had an independence process; however, having an independence process is far from being an exclusive Latin-American feature. Probably the way the answer was framed is also key to understanding this exclusion of Puerto Rico: they not only do not have ‘real’ poverty, they are an American dependency. And it has been shown how this contrast between Latin America and the USA is a recurrent identity issue across the interview. Even though by the end of the answer he uses “Latin Americans” in the third person, it seems more a rhetorical device rather than a self-exclusion from that group.

5.5 Changes across the Interviews

These ten extracts are taken from three interviews and two different interviewees, i.e. two with one interviewee, and one with the other. In strict terms, changes can be established between two interviews as the interviewee occupies the same role (SRSG), and is the same person interviewed nine years after the first interview. In this sense, there is also a process of self-reflection which can tell us both about his own personal processes and changes of the mission itself, as he remained linked with Haiti and MINUSTAH in the interim.

Extracts 5.1, 5.6, 5.7, 5.8 and 5.10 are taken from that first interview held in 2004. Extracts 5.4, 5.5 and 5.9 are taken from the 2013 interview. The most salient change is the role of politics in the Latin America / Haiti links.

Extract 5.5 puts emphasis on the experience of transition to democracy in Latin-America after dictatorship, making it relevant to the experience in Haiti after the coup which brought MINUSTAH in.

Extract 5.4 makes the argument that it is easier for Latin Americans to understand that the underlying issue in Haiti is political, although they have “to devote time” to it. This seems to have a biographical element to it. After 9 years, there is enough hindsight to be able to grasp Haiti’s political challenges. Nevertheless, it is this dimension added to the challenges of using military forces
to deal with poverty (as in Extract 5.1), which seems consistent with the fact that
at the beginning of the mission the urgent tasks were more about stabilising Haiti
and preventing the outbreak of civil war after the coup.

Extract 5.9 represents a relevant change from the points made in Extracts
5.6 and 5.7. In those extracts the role of the USA is central as Haiti is represented
as part of their “direct interest”. Moreover, in Extract 5.6 the interviewee
explains the involvement of Latin-American troops (and the absence of troops
from the USA) because of the full commitment of the USA with the war in Iraq.
Extract 5.9, on the other hand, mitigates this scenario saying explicitly that the
Latin-American involvement was not only due to a request from the USA, but also
from the UN Secretary-General. He also adds the interest of Brazil in becoming a
permanent member of the UN Security Council, which would also explain their
willingness to be a relevant actor in MINUSTAH.

5.6 Discussion and Summary

The interviewees consider themselves as Latin-Americans and they talk
about some of the features that contribute to a Latin-American identity in
connection with what it means to work in the mission. They both have a similar
idea of how those features are an advantage for working in that mission in Haiti;
thus this mission provides an opportunity to reinforce Latin-American identity
elements.

SRSG constructs this Latin-American identity both from an 'external' and
an 'internal' point of view, contrasting these features with Anglo-Saxon
Caribbean societies, the USA, France and Puerto Rico. On the other hand, he
believes that some of those features share a 'common ground' with Haiti. The
Latin-American identity elements are put both in contexts of the use for military
taxtics and in the “cultural structure” - where history, church, independence
processes and the garments of the leaders are mentioned.

FC constructs the Latin-American identity from an 'internal' point of view
where those features are put in the context of working in the mission (ironically,
not in terms of military tactics as SRSG did) and also in more 'spiritual' ones, as it
is the case with the concepts of “conscience of our people”, “historic formation” and “maturing of our society”.

Since the analysis illustrates that there is some kind of Latin-American identity constructed within the UN mission, I will now indicate the salient dimensions.

The extracts analysed from SRSG’s interview provides evidence for four distinct dimensions. The first one refers to the experience and consequent understanding of poverty and its complexities, including its relationship with violence.

The second one relates to what he calls “cultural structure”. Even though the analysis showed that most of the elements named under that concept are rather problematic. The one referring the 'shared history feeling' allows an interpretation closer to the concepts of identity examined in chapter 3, as well as with Anderson's concept of “imagined communities” (see Section 3.4).

The third dimension refers to the institutional breakdowns during the second half of the twentieth century in Latin-America. It is at the same time the experience of those dictatorships and coups and of dealing with the reconciliation processes afterwards. However, as shown above, those processes are hardly exclusive to Latin-America.

The fourth is oriented towards territorial arguments, related with power struggles: the contrast with the USA. Sometimes the contrast is extended with the 'northern hemisphere', France is also mentioned once, and a contrast is established with Puerto Rico – but I argue that Puerto Rico’s condition of being an American territory makes it an ‘indirect’ contrast with the USA. Finally, in Extract 5.4 there is also a contrast with the Anglo-Saxon Caribbean societies.

In the case of FC, he shares the first two dimensions with SRSG, namely, that Latin-Americans have an experience with poverty and misery. This experience gives them a certain perspective and room to develop solidarity. The second dimension refers to the importance given to history as something shared by a community. He adds to that the elements of ‘society maturation’ and ‘people’s conscience’.
Other features like the language or the geographical borders of Latin-America seem to be ambivalent and not clear-cut at all. Regarding language, it seems that Latin as a root would be the 'minimum common ground'. Taking that into account, it seems that there is no single shared language for Latin-America.

Regarding borders, it is fair to say that these were never mentioned explicitly, but when examples of countries were given, they were mostly South-American countries and a Central-American country (Guatemala). No Caribbean country was ever mentioned as Latin-American. Guatemala was the only northern hemisphere country mentioned maybe because along with El Salvador (not mentioned in the extract), they are the only ones from Central-America with troops in the mission. A big and important country like Mexico has no troops in the mission, thus, in the interviews there was no context nor opportunity to determine if they are considered Latin-Americans despite of what common sense might indicate.

However, even though there was a shared notion of the experience of poverty having a sense of 'cultural identity' in terms of Larraín presented in Section 3.2.1, there was also a strong role in contrast, rather than 'self-affirmation' in this Latin-America identity. In this sense, we could appreciate how Latin-America can work as counter-concept from a Latin-American point of view. This contrast was established mainly against the USA. Indeed, since Latin-America is not a continent by itself, the USA acts as a 'border' of what is and what is not Latin-American.

It is this idea that allows Haiti's condition as Latin-American to be disputable. Haiti can be Latin-American if it takes the Latin-American "exit" from the USA and France. It is also the main reason why SRSG does not consider Puerto Rico as part of Latin-America. Apparently, the fact of being an American territory 'disqualifies' them.

It is possible to find in SRSG's extracts a mechanism through which the 'Latin-Americanism' of Haiti seems to be more a means to legitimise the 'right' of Latin-American-led intervention in the "direct interest" of the USA. This challenges American hegemony and legitimises a Latin-American claim for the right to participate in the solution of an eventual crisis in Cuba. And this is an
input for a reflection on postcolonialism. On the one hand, there is an opposition
to colonial and postcolonial powers (such as USA) which articulates the Latin-
American identity and establishes links with Haiti. However, the mission itself
and the possibility of participating in a similar intervention in Cuba are not
problematic as forms of (post)colonialism. Additionally, these geopolitical
implications in a UN setting (such as a peacekeeping mission) have been,
according to Nicholas (1975) and Luard & Heater (1994), part of UN dynamics
for years. The international politics and interests of each country shape the UN’s
dynamics (see Section 2.4 above). Therefore, we could expect Latin American
geopolitics to play a significant role in MINUSTAH.

When SRSG tried to name Latin-American identity features none of them
were indisputable or totally coherent, reinforcing the 'utilitarian' view of Haiti.
Put simply, 'Haiti is Latin-American because that way we can legitimise our
presence there, in USA’s backyard and challenge their hegemonic power in a
future conflict in the region'.

Latin-American identity seems to be far from being a coherent concept,
and is rather subject to power struggles. But it can also be used 'peripherally' (in
the case of Haiti) as a disguise (or excuse) for power struggles. All this seems to
back the idea that Latin-America 'needs' the USA in order to construct its identity
by contrast with the superpower. Additionally, the role of Brazil within the
conceptualization of Latin-American identity emerges as a source of tension. On
the one hand Brazil breaks the otherwise all-Spanish-speaking 'consensus' of
Latin/South-American countries, which – linguistically - establishes a difference,
therefore it opens the door for non-Spanish-speaking countries (such as Haiti) to
be considered Latin American. On the other hand, Brazil is also the largest and
most powerful country of the region and, according to one of the interviewees,
has an interest in becoming a permanent member of the UNSC (Extract 5.9).
Moreover, in Extract 5.8 this same interviewee says “Brazil and South America”,
establishing a difference between the two entities, when Brazil is geographically
part of South America. This power struggle within Latin/South America, where
Brazil appears as the superpower, emerged as an issue that would be relevant to
explore in further research.
6. Legitimation and Argumentation on Security and Stability

As was explained in Chapter 4, this analysis chapter is focused on the concepts of security and stability. This chapter is different from the other two analysis chapters (5 and 7) in that this has a section in which the UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions for MINUSTAH are analysed before the interviews. As also explained in Chapter 4, the analysis of the resolutions provides an entry point to the official discourse of the UNSC on the concepts of Security and Stability, in the context of MINUSTAH.

I will not discuss here the nature of these two concepts nor their role in the literature about peacekeeping missions, as this has already been presented in Section 3.6. The focus of this chapter is therefore on how these concepts are used in the data analysed.

This chapter aims to answer Research Questions 2a (How does MINUSTAH engage in the discussion about the legitimacy of international interventions?); 2b (By which means do the leaders of MINUSTAH discursively construct the meanings of its actions in Haiti?) and 2c (Which strategies do they employ? How?). To answer these questions, the main foci are argumentation and legitimation strategies and social actor representation (see Section 4.2.5).

This chapter begins with an analysis of the UNSC resolutions for MINUSTAH, first presenting examples of each concept, then of both concepts together, this section ending by providing a summary of the main findings.

Then I move on to an analysis of these two concepts in the interviews. I first present my field notes and then the analysis divided into four macro-topics (“A Complex Relationship”, “Threats and Urgencies”, “The Acceptance of the People” and “The Interests of Business”). Finally, I present an overall summary and discussion.

6.1 Security and Stability: UNSC Resolutions for MINUSTAH
In Section 4.3 it has already been explained what the UNSC resolutions are, what their structure is and the analytical framework I apply in this chapter. In relation to how I present the findings here, as explained in Section 4.3.2.5, the main challenge is the dual conceptual and chronological dimensions of this kind of data. Having raised that issue, I present the findings according to the propositional content of the texts. This means analysing the way that each concept changes over time, presenting the extracts side by side as opposed to analysing them resolution by resolution, separately.

I have two main reasons for doing it this way, the first one is practical: analysing the resolutions sequentially one after the other would most likely result in a rather repetitive presentation of the results, mainly because there are several paragraphs that remain unchanged or only slightly changed throughout the resolutions. This takes me to my second reason, which is an "ontological" one: the nature of the resolutions is inevitably intertextual, always taking previous resolutions into account (see Section 4.3.1.3).

I present the analysis going through each main concept (i.e. 'Security' and 'Stability') in turn, and I treat the co-occurrences of both concepts as a separate case. Since I am interested in highlighting the differences (if there are any) between the two concepts, it seems to be relevant, on the one hand, to examine each concept on its own and, on the other, how they relate together.

Since this section addresses the complex discursive construction of the concept of 'security' and 'stability' in the UNSC resolutions in the context of the legitimation of the intervention in Haiti, the chosen samples illustrate the kind of concepts which these two main concepts associate with, hence, providing a rich view of how broad and intertwined they can be.

The first occurrence of the paragraph is taken as the 'template' and it is shown in normal black fonts. I will highlight in grey what is new (additions or substitutions) and underline rearrangements (i.e. words that have been switched from other places within the paragraph) from previous resolutions.
6.1.1 Security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resolution</th>
<th>Table 6.1: Security Samples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R.1892 (2009)</td>
<td>Recognizing the interconnected nature of the challenges in Haiti, reaffirming that sustainable progress on security, the rule of law and institutional reform, national reconciliation and development are mutually reinforcing, and welcoming the continuing efforts of the Government of Haiti and the international community to address these challenges,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.1944 (2010)</td>
<td>Recognizing also the interconnected nature of the challenges in Haiti, reaffirming that sustainable progress on security, the rule of law and institutional reform, national reconciliation and development, including the combat against unemployment and poverty, are mutually reinforcing, and welcoming the continuing efforts of the Government of Haiti and the international community to address these challenges, in line with the government's priorities set forth in its “5Es” policy programme (employment, education, environment, energy and the rule of law),</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.2012 (2011)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.2119 (2013)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.1.1.1 What remains unchanged across the resolutions

The paragraph analysed in this example is present in 4 out of the 7 resolutions analysed, but absent from the first one (1542), the one released immediately after the earthquake (1908) and the one after that (1927)\(^{35}\), both of which were considerably shorter than the rest of the resolutions. This paragraph is part of the 'rationale' half of the resolution and, as such, begins with a verb in

\(^{35}\) See section 4.3.2.1 for details about the resolutions analysed.
present participle form *recognizing*, constituting the formal acknowledgement of a situation or a claim. Additionally, the –ing form tell us that it is a subordinate clause, not the main clause.

The use of the word “challenges” in the following complex noun phrase avoids being more precise and, as a matter of fact, since there is no conjunction after the comma following ‘Haiti’, it is not absolutely clear whether the following phrases are examples of those challenges, especially since the verb “reaffirming” - which also is a mental verb - starts a different clause. However, looking at the immediate context, “mutually reinforcing” and “interconnected” (the challenges) appear semantically close enough to assume that the following are examples of those challenges. And grammatically, two -ing clauses juxtaposed paratactically would normally be read as both applying to the same situation. The list of those examples comprises “sustainable progress on security”; “rule of law”; “institutional reform”; “national reconciliation”; and “development’. ‘Security’ appears linked with neighbouring concepts from the domains of law enforcement, development and politics. Moreover, the aforementioned descriptions of those challenges as “interconnected” and “mutually reinforcing” make the case for an understanding of ‘security’ as a complex concept closely co-dependent on its neighbouring concepts.

The next participial verb is “welcoming”. It is preceded by a comma and the conjunction “and” after the aforementioned examples. This marks a switch from being part of the exemplified challenges. What is being welcomed are the “continuing efforts of the Government of Haiti and the international community to address these challenges”. By referring to the efforts as “continuing” the idea of an ongoing process is highlighted. In other words, addressing these challenges is something which started before the resolution and is expected to continue afterwards. It could also suggest that those efforts have not been very successful. In terms of social actors, the Government of Haiti and the international community are the only ones mentioned in this paragraph. The Security Council as a social actor is backgrounded, as it is assumed from the beginning of the resolution that it is the addressee (although it is written in third person). This is a
feature of the genre. Both are activated social actors, having full agency in addressing those challenges. However, both the Government of Haiti and the international community are being genericised as well. The case of the Government of Haiti looks like a classic example of collectivisation. Several different actors are put under one collective entity (the Government of Haiti), as if it were a whole addressing those challenges rather than specific individuals within the government. This dilutes responsibilities and makes accountability harder to establish. Although it is a very common feature of the genre.

The “international community” is an even better (although more complex) example of collectivisation. First of all, the word “community” is, in itself, a form of assimilation of different entities. However, this is a rather abstract concept as it is less specific than the case examined before. We do not know for sure which entities (most likely countries/nations) are included under this label. Unlike the Government of Haiti, there is no single organisation that represents the “international community”, there is no address, nor a clear representative of it, nor defined rules of membership. As a matter of fact, if there is an entity that could claim to be representing the international community, that would be the United Nations itself\(^{36}\). However, there are academics who have pointed out that this concept refers either to “the West” (Jacques, 2006) or, more specifically, as Chomsky puts it in his article in *Foreign Policy* (2002):

> "The literal sense [of "international community"] is reasonably clear; the U.N. General Assembly, or a substantial majority of it, is a fair first approximation. But the term is regularly used in a technical sense to describe the United States joined by some allies and clients."

\(^{36}\) As a matter of fact, in his address at the 52\(^{nd}\) DPI/NGO Conference in New York on 15\(^{th}\) September 1999, the then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan talked precisely about the meaning of "international community": *What binds us into an international community? In the broadest sense there is a shared vision of a better world for all people, as set out, for example in the United Nations Charter. [...] There is equally our sense of shared opportunity, which is why we build common markets and, yes, institutions – such as the United Nations. Together, we are stronger. Even though he never says explicitly that the international community is represented by the UN, there are enough references to understand that implicitly.*
And it is that “technical sense” which he carries on criticising through the article. Apparently, these critiques were far from new more than ten years ago, and in 1999, Kofi Annan addressed them in a speech at a conference. He even went on to say: “The international community does exist. It has an address. It has achievements to its credit. And it is the only way forward.” (Annan, 1999). Unfortunately, he never said explicitly which address it is, but taking into account that the conference was held at the UN headquarters in New York, and the numerous references to the United Nations and its missions, we can assume that the address he intended was precisely where he was speaking at the moment.

Despite the fact that “international community” is a term used widely by politicians, newspapers, in international relations and in diplomatic contexts, it is far from being clear-cut defined. Therefore, for the purposes of this analysis I would like to highlight the fact that it is a contested concept and subject to power struggles. Going back to the paragraph analysed, taking into account that normally UN resolutions name the UN institutions concerned, we can interpret this use of “international community” as not necessarily meaning the UN General Assembly, but rather involving the different countries and NGOs who have been working in Haiti on a bilateral basis and not necessarily under the UN frame.

However, there is a point raised by both Chomsky (2002) and Jacques (2006) which I adhere to: “international community” is a device that – by means of collectivisation - works by implying that there is a wide consensus (“a shared vision” in Kofi Annan’s words) which legitimises what the “international community” does.

6.1.1.2 What changed through the resolutions

The first addition is the word “also” after “Recognizing”. It is difficult to explain this addition in terms of the first level of context (that is, the immediate co-text), since the preceding paragraphs are mostly the same throughout the previous analysed resolutions. However, none of those immediately preceding paragraphs (including the one preceding resolution 2119) start with “Recognizing”. In terms of other paragraphs starting with this word (although not
the ones immediately preceding the one analysed here), there are no cases in resolution 1892, one paragraph in resolution 1944, three in resolution 2012. In resolution 2119, there are four previous paragraphs starting with Recognizing, but none of them precedes immediately the one analysed here. In short, there are no immediate co-textual reasons that could explain this particular addition.

The second addition is “, including the combat against unemployment and poverty,” which is being inserted in between “national reconciliation and development” and “are mutually reinforcing”. This prepositional clause specifies two issues that are part of “development” (unemployment and poverty) as examples, and therefore defining development. In that sense, there is an attempt to highlight those issues and to make them explicit.

A rhetoric of war is being used here, as both unemployment and poverty are presented as enemies in an ongoing war, where the Government of Haiti and the “international community” are implied to be on the side fighting them. War rhetoric (as in the case of “war against terror” or “war against drugs”) tends to imply that they can be won (or lost), therefore resources and strategic planning should be allocated to them.

The third addition is “in line with the government’s priorities set forth in its “5Es” policy programme (employment, education, environment, energy and the rule of law37).”. It should be taken into account that the “5Es” policy programme was announced, as such, in October 2011 (Cohen, 2012, p. 6; Fu-Bertaux, 2011). Before that, it was a “4E” programme (environment was included later in October 2011) as part of President Martelly’s presidential campaign of 2010. This means that the “5Es” were announced 4 days before the release of resolution 2012, in which they are not mentioned. It is possible that 4 days was not enough time for the UNSC to acknowledge and include this policy programme in Resolution 2012 and therefore it was only included in the following resolution, which is 2119. However, this does not explain the absence of the previous “4Es” policy programme in Resolution 2012. In any case, this addition takes the government

37 “Rule of law” in French translates as état de droit. Hence the “E”. 161
“on board” and aligns both the Haitian government’s programme with the UNSC resolution. In other words, this makes the UN goals for MINUSTAH coincide with those of the Government of Haiti.

In the phrases immediately preceding this addition, the efforts of the Government of Haiti (and the international community) were already acknowledged. This redundancy cannot be explained for stylistic reasons, it rather seems to be more an effort aimed at enhancing the participation and agency of the Haitian government.
6.1.2 Stability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resolution</th>
<th>Text</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R.1892 (2009)</td>
<td>Recognizes the ownership and primary responsibility of the Government and the people of Haiti over all aspects of the country's stabilization, recognizes the role of MINUSTAH in supporting the Government's efforts in this regard, and encourages the Government of Haiti to continue to take full advantage of international support to enhance its capacity, with a view to the eventual resumption of full responsibility.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.1927 (2010)</td>
<td>Reiterates that the ownership and primary responsibility for stabilization and development lies with the Government and people of Haiti, and recognizes the supporting role of MINUSTAH in this regard.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.1944 (2010)</td>
<td>Recognizes the ownership and primary responsibility of the Government and the people of Haiti over all aspects of the country's stabilization, welcomes the steps taken by MINUSTAH to provide logistical and technical expertise, within available means, to assist the Government of Haiti, as requested, to continue operations to build the capacity of its rule of law institutions at the national and local level, and to speed up the implementation of the government's resettlement strategy for displaced persons, in the knowledge that such measures are temporary and will be phased out as Haitian capacity grows, and calls on the Mission to proceed swiftly with activities in this regard as recommended by the Secretary-General.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.2012 (2011)</td>
<td>Recognizes the ownership and primary responsibility of the Government and the people of Haiti over all aspects of the country's stabilization; encourages MINUSTAH to intensify its efforts to provide logistical and technical expertise, within available means and consistent with its mandate, and coordinating as appropriate with the United Nations country team and others active in stabilization efforts, to assist as requested by the Government of Haiti, to continue to implement decentralization efforts and build the capacity of its institutions at the</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6.1.2.1 What remains unchanged across the resolutions

These paragraphs also have an acknowledgement of the Haitian government’s agency, although this time it is right at the beginning. This is done first with the word “ownership”. After that, “primary responsibility” is the expression used. The use of “primary” implies that there are other (secondary) responsibilities over the stabilization of Haiti, which is consistent with the role of MINUSTAH as supporting the government. This can be seen in the following clause and in other paragraphs of the resolutions.

In terms of social actors, not only is the “Government of Haiti” being acknowledged metaphorically as the owner of, and therefore responsible for, its stabilization processes, but also “the people of Haiti”. The fact that the people are presented after the government of Haiti is an indication of who is being taken as the key actor for the UN Security Council. This can be seen co-textually (i.e. in the immediate level of context, the co-text), as in the same paragraph the Government of Haiti is mentioned three times, but the people just once. Moreover, by presenting the government and the people as two separate entities, instead of the former as the representative of the latter, the UNSC leaves the interpretation open to questioning how aligned the government is with its people.

As was shown in Section 6.1.1.1., collectivisations are used again in the form of “the Government of Haiti”, “the people of Haiti”, “MINUSTAH” and a rather vaguer kind of assimilation than that already seen in “the international community” in the form of “international support”. Even though the co-text throughout the resolution (for example the paragraph in Table 6.1) makes it
most likely that they are talking about the same “entity”, “international support” is weaker in terms of assimilation. While “community” refers to a group of people with some degree of shared characteristics, “support”, on the other hand, refers to means, funds, or the act of helping. There is no particular group of people (or countries) implied in the concept of “international support”, although obviously that support comes from real people, NGOs or countries.

This “international support”, carries a goal set by the UN Security Council (although never commanding, but rather “encouraging”) to the Haitian government, namely to enhance its capacity in order to resume full responsibility. The opening word – Recognizes – is the same mental verb as in the paragraph in Table 6.1, only this time it is in present indicative form. In contrast to 6.1 where the present participles indicated a preamble (fitting with rationale), here the verbs indicate main clauses (mandate), which is a typical feature of the paragraphs in the ‘mandate’ section of the UNSC resolutions. This verb is used twice: at the beginning of the paragraph and in the second clause right after the second comma. This is only the case in Resolution 1892 though, because, as will be shown in the next subsection, the second “recognizes” disappears in the following resolutions.

The first recognition is – as explained before – of the ownership and responsibility of the Haitian people and government regarding the country’s processes of stabilization.

The second is about the role of MINUSTAH in supporting that (i.e. the government’s efforts towards the stabilization of Haiti).

The third verb in indicative form is “encourages”, which comes – separated by a comma – in the following clause. This one addresses the Government of Haiti to undertake certain actions, i.e.: “to continue to take full advantage of international support to enhance its capacity, with a view to the eventual resumption of full responsibility”. The first part echoes again the paragraph in Table 6.1, as there is a partnership between the Haitian government and international support/community which is being assessed as taking care of

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38 See section 4.3.1.3 for the structure of the resolutions.
the security/stability issues. Also, in both cases this partnership is acknowledged as something ongoing (continuing/to continue). However, the second part (“with a view to the eventual resumption of full responsibility”) brings a counterpoint to what had just been established in the first clauses of the paragraph, that is, the fact that the ownership and primary responsibility of Haiti’s stabilization is the Government’s (and the Haitian people’s). It makes sense to contrast “primary responsibility” with “full responsibility”, as it is implied that the latter has been put on halt and is to be ‘resumed’. Overall, during this paragraph it is implied twice that the Haitian government still has not taken all the responsibility over the country’s issues.

6.1.2.2 What changed through the resolutions

A caveat might be necessary at this point: as can be seen, the paragraph from resolution 1927 seems different from the other resolutions, mainly because of its length and the word with which it starts: “Reiterates” instead of “Recognizes”. What has to be taken into account is that Resolution 1927 is a kind of ‘outlier’ in the sense that it was, similarly to Resolution 1908, an ‘emergency’ resolution released after the earthquake. It is significantly shorter than the others (just 997 words, whereas the rest have at least 1,600 words), and therefore, it compresses the usual content and paragraphs. I decided to include it as the core of the first half of the paragraph was there (i.e. “ownership and primary responsibility for stabilization”, “the government and people of Haiti” and “the supporting role of MINUSTAH”), although keeping in mind that most of the changes, especially the deletions, are most likely to be explained by the earthquake-emergency context of this particular resolution, rather than because of discursive-strategic reasons. The paragraphs in the following resolutions, significantly larger, back this claim that Resolution 1927 is an ‘exceptional’ one. However, there are some changes in that resolution that are relevant to analyse.

The first change, as it was mentioned already, is the substitution of “Recognizes” with “Reiterates”. This intertextual reference highlights the importance of what is being said as something that has previously been said that
is worth being repeated. While “the ownership and primary responsibility” remains intact, the following propositional phrase is shortened and summarised from “over all aspects of the country’s stability” to “for stabilization and development”. The explicit mention of “the country” disappears, “stabilization” is rearranged from the end of the phrase to the beginning, and “development” is added. The subject of the sentence (interestingly left unexpressed) is presumably the UNSC.

The next set of changes comes in Resolution 1944, and they remain unchanged in Resolution 2012. This means that although this paragraph changed after the earthquake, it was unaffected by the cholera outbreak.

It is possible to observe that the first clause remains exactly the same as in Resolution 1892, although the following clauses, after the comma, are significantly different. First of all, “the role of MINUSTAH” is no longer recognized but there are “steps taken by MINUSTAH” which are welcomed. ‘To welcome’ has a more straightforward positive connotation than ‘to recognize’ and, on the other hand, “steps taken” has a more active connotation – implying actions have already happened – than ‘the role’. Also, there are now more specific areas in which MINUSTAH is helping the Haitian government, in the shape of “logistical and technical expertise”. There is also the addition of “within available means” regarding this assistance. This expression can be understood in the broader context of the aftermath of the earthquake, when MINUSTAH lost a significant amount of personnel and resources, as well as the many difficulties that the earthquake posed per se. Afterwards, there is another addition, in between commas: “as requested”. Unfortunately, it is not completely clear whether this request to assist the Government of Haiti within the means available has been made by the UNSC or by the Haitian government itself. A clue can be found in Resolution 2119, as one of the changes in this paragraph is precisely to make explicit that it is the Government who is requesting this assistance.

39 Because of the reasons explained in the previous paragraph, I will regard resolution 1927 as an ‘outlier’ and compare the changes of Resolution 1944 with the original paragraph of Resolution 1892.
The next couple of clauses added to Resolution 1944 exemplify more specifically the operations where MINUSTAH is being requested to provide that assistance to the Haitian government: “to continue operations to build the capacity of its rule of law institutions at the national and local level” and “and to speed up the implementation of the government’s resettlement strategy for displaced persons”. The first of these clauses presupposes that those kinds of operations are already underway and, at the same time, puts “rule of law institutions” as part of the neighbouring concepts associated with ‘stability’. Needless to say, this also presupposes that even though the Haitian rule of law institutions do exist, their capacity is insufficient to deal with the country’s needs. The second clause also presupposes an ongoing operation, but this time a government one. However, it is worth bearing in mind that the recipient continues to be MINUSTAH, who in this second clause is being welcomed to assist in the speeding up of this government’s resettlement strategy. This is a topos of urgency (Wodak, 2000, p. 90), which can be formulated as “A decision / action needs to be made if an event requires such a response” where what is being signalled as the action to take (i.e. the resettlement strategy) is not only taken for granted as something that needs to be done, but is also urgent. This implies that for the UNSC the government’s strategy implementation has been too slow for the requirements.

Even though it has not been mentioned explicitly, these displaced persons who need to be resettled are a consequence of the earthquake destroying their homes. Since this paragraph remains unchanged in Resolution 2012 from Resolution 1944, these problems and needs which are either implicitly or explicitly being addressed here, remain also unchanged in the view of the UNSC a year later.

The following clauses, between commas, assert “in the knowledge that such measures are temporary and will be phased out as Haitian capacity grows”. These clauses work, in terms of predication, to establish the temporary condition of those measures. The question now would be: which measures? And, again, the answer seems to lie in the set of previous infinitive clauses, only separated by commas listing the various steps taken. Therefore, it could refer to the logistical
and technical expertise provided by MINUSTAH to the Haitian government, the building of the capacity of the rule of law institutions, and/or the government’s resettlement strategy for displaced persons. The co-text does not quite clarify this issue because if it did refer just to the resettlement strategy, it is obvious that the condition of being displaced assumes a degree of temporariness, regardless of how long a person remains without a definitive home. However, I assume that “as Haitian capacity grows” put broadly and without further specifications refer to all the issues mentioned. This is also consistent with the fact that MINUSTAH is supposed to be a temporary mission until the Haitian government can continue on its own, which is the point of asserting its ownership in the first clause of the sample. In terms of the addressee, it seems fair to assume that this is the UNSC telling the Haitian government that all this is provisional and they are expected to build their capacity and take charge of their own issues.

Finally, MINUSTAH is being called “to proceed swiftly with activities in this regard as recommended by the Secretary-General”. One may wonder if this last clause of the paragraph is redundant (and, as matter of fact, it is deleted in Resolution 2119), or if indeed the logistical and technical expertise, and the assistance to the government of Haiti do not involve any activities, which by all means seems unlikely. In any case, this clause does assign direct agency to MINUSTAH in contrast with the second one in the paragraph in which MINUSTAH appears to be only assisting the Haitian government’s actions.

The final mention of the Secretary-General (which is deleted in Resolution 2119), is a subtle display of how power relations actually work within the UN: while the Secretary-General recommends actions to MINUSTAH, the UNSC calls for them. In this way, the UNSC makes clear that they are the executive organism and MINUSTAH is under its command.

The first change from Resolutions 1944-2012 to Resolution 2119 (which was released two years after Resolution 2012) is a change in the first verb that

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40 The problem of displaced persons in Haiti remains an issue more than 7 years after the earthquake, with the camp of Canaan being the most infamous example. An overpopulated camp outside Port-au-Prince in a rather hostile and dry area, about which there is still no clear data about how many people live in it, over 100,000 being the most conservative estimation.
refers to MINUSTAH: *welcomes* is substituted by *encourages*. This change shows the UNSC asserting a rather more active role over MINUSTAH. What comes after, as a form of substitution, is also consistent with a change in the tone set in the corresponding clauses in the previous resolutions: instead of *welcoming the steps taken by MINUSTAH* now MINUSTAH is being encouraged “to intensify its efforts” to provide logistical and technical expertise. While before there was an acknowledgement of what MINUSTAH was doing, now there is a mitigated request to increase the efforts being made. This, of course, presupposes an assessment that those efforts were insufficient over the two years between Resolution 2012 and Resolution 2119 being released.

Another addition later in the same clause works again as a form of making the power relations explicit: after the expression “*within available means*” introduced for Resolutions 1944 and 2011, there is the addition in between commas of the adjective phrase “*and consistent with its mandate*”. This balances out the more ‘variable’ sense of “within available means” with a more fixed and compulsory reference to the UNSC’s mandate for MINUSTAH. Afterwards, there is another clause added in between commas: “*and coordinating as appropriate with the United Nations country team*41 and others active in stabilization efforts,”. This clause not only establishes UN institutions as neighbouring concepts for stability, but also sets up a concrete role for MINUSTAH regarding those UN agencies. Finally, that “*and others*” entails some vagueness in specifying which are the parties involved in Haiti’s stabilization.

The next clause in between commas is a rearrangement mentioned before: “*as requested*” now is being put before “*by the Government of Haiti*”. This now clarifies who is making the request, which was not defined in the previous resolutions. What is being requested, though, changes. While “*to continue [...] to build the capacity of its institutions at the national and local levels*” remains unchanged, there are several new additions and a couple of deletions. The clauses about the resettlement of displaced persons (and that those measures

41 The UN country team comprises all the UN agencies (like FAO, UNESCO, UNICEF, UNDP, etc.) which are deployed in a country where a UN mission takes place. They are coordinated by one of the two deputy SRSGs.
were temporary) are no longer in the paragraph, even though that problem was still an issue in Haiti at that time. Instead, now there are “decentralization efforts” to be implemented. In this paragraph, the building of the Government’s institutions’ capacity has both a rearrangement and an addition. In the previous resolutions, those institutions were specified as being rule of law institutions. Now there is no specification and the rule of law is rearranged as part of the aims behind building this capacity. This is now expressed as “with a view to enhance further the Government of Haiti’s ability to extend State authority throughout Haiti and promote good governance and rule of law at all levels”. This implies that at the point of the resolution’s release the Government of Haiti was still unable to extend the State’s authority, and that good governance and rule of law were elements still missing.

6.1.3 Security and Stability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6.3. Security and Stability samples</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Resolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commending MINUSTAH for continuing to assist the Government of Haiti to ensure a secure and stable environment and expressing gratitude to the personnel of MINUSTAH and to their countries and paying tribute to those injured or killed in the line of duty,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recognizing the critical role of MINUSTAH in ensuring stability and security in Haiti, and commending MINUSTAH for continuing to assist the Government of Haiti to ensure a secure and stable environment, and expressing gratitude to the personnel of MINUSTAH and to their countries and paying tribute to those injured or killed in the line of duty; commending also the wide range of reconstruction efforts in Haiti and the successful work achieved by MINUSTAH’s military engineering units.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 0-3 6.3 Security and Stability samples

There are seven social actors represented in the paragraphs analysed. Five of them (The UNSC, MINUSTAH, the Government of Haiti, personnel of
MINUSTAH, those injured or killed, their countries) appear in the text of all four resolutions. One (MINUSTAH's military engineering units) is only added in the last resolution (2119). The UNSC is backgrounded and, as such, can be inferred by the reader, as at the beginning it is revealed as the resolution's addresser. It is presented in the third person (a feature which is very common in the genre), but it is also activated as a social actor. It is also worth mentioning that the UNSC council itself is a case of collectivisation, under which several different actors are assimilated as a single unit. MINUSTAH is included as a social actor and is activated, as it has direct agency under the mandate of the UNSC over assisting the Government of Haiti.

The personnel of MINUSTAH is a case of a social actor that has been passivised, as actions happen to them (e.g. getting killed or injured). It is also a case of a functionalised social actor, as several different social actors are grouped under one category defined by their function or occupation (personnel). This implies that the UNSC reduces the agency of MINUSTAH’s personnel, presenting it as less powerful and vulnerable.

As social actors, “their countries” is a collectivisation by means of metonymy (taking the countries as the people who live there), and also passivised, specifically being beneficialised as receiving the gratitude of the UNSC. It puts them at the same level as the personnel of MINUSTAH, and therefore below the UNSC and with no agency.

Resolution 2119 introduces another social actor: “MINUSTAH's engineering military units”. It has been functionalised as they are defined by their function or occupation, and it has also been passivised, specifically as subjected. This happens by means of nominalising their actions: “the work achieved by...“.

The paragraphs are mostly processes (commending, expressing gratitude, paying tribute, recognizing) in which the UNSC has the agency. And it is within these processes that it is possible to find other processes attributed to other social actors (e.g. Commending MINUSTAH for continuing to assist the Government of Haiti...). In other words, the first level of these sentences are a
sequence of clauses in which the UNSC has the agency, with the clauses relating to other social actors being embedded in them as a sub levelare. This is expected in this genre.

There is an ambiguity that makes it hard to establish the agency of who is supposed “to ensure a secure and stable environment”. The manner in which the sentence was grammatically structured does not allow us to define whether it is the Government of Haiti in charge of doing that, or if it is MINUSTAH. MINUSTAH could either be responsible for assisting the Government of Haiti (who has to ensure a secure and stable environment); or be responsible for assisting (the government) to ensure a secure and stable environment, implying that the security and stability are MINUSTAH’s responsibilities. The addition at the beginning of the paragraph in Resolution 2119 (see Table 6.3 above) of “critical role” underlines the high importance of MINUSTAH in achieving security and stability, but it is not an explicit mention of MINUSTAH as being held responsible for the security and stability in Haiti. Moreover, looking at the immediate context (co-text) in other paragraphs of this same resolution, we find explicit mentions that the main responsibility lies with the Government of Haiti. In terms of context, in Resolution 2119 the amount of personnel allocated to MINUSTAH is being reduced, quite the opposite of the three previous resolutions analysed, in which there are successive sharp increases of personnel. This process of downsizing (with the final aim of withdrawing completely) is also a process of “passing the baton” to the Government of Haiti to assume “full responsibility”.

The concepts of ‘security’ and ‘stability’ are at the core of the paragraphs analysed. They originally appear in adjective form (secure and stable), but are also added to the last resolution in their noun form. This confirms that their importance seems to grow with time. But, looking at them more closely, it is possible to see that they are the focal point of the UNSC’s assessment and assignment of responsibilities, as shown before regarding the MINUSTAH–Government of Haiti relationship.
6.1.4 Summary and Discussion of the Resolutions Analysis

Regarding the main concepts, it seems difficult to establish an exclusive domain for either 'security' or 'stability'. It rather seems that both can be related to the same kinds of concepts (such as development or law enforcement), even though – as one would expect – ‘security’ is significantly more related to concepts about law enforcement. It is also hard to establish a clear-cut relationship between both concepts. This will be an issue to analyse carefully in the latest interviews as well.

Taking a closer look at the forms of legitimation, it is possible to find strategies of authorization, where the authority of the Security Council, Secretary-General, the Government of Haiti, and MINUSTAH are constantly invoked in order to establish the justification for actions taken as well as the responsibilities for those actions. In the case of the Government of Haiti, the authorization becomes clear when compared with how little mention “the people of Haiti” have.

It is also possible to find forms of instrumental rationalization, mainly focused on achieving certain results (like reconstruction, decentralization, institutional reform, extension of the rule of law, security sector reform, etc.).

Economic values, such as having stable and sustainable development, more employment and economic growth are constantly referred to.

It is also possible to find some instances of the values of public interest. This can take place in the form of “public security” or “national reconciliation”. The linguistic realisations of these legitimation strategies can be in the form of addition, deletion, rearrangement and substitution. Some of the transformation strategies were aimed at establishing powers and responsibilities. The most common was withdrawing MINUSTAH’s agency and responsibilities and shifting it towards the Government of Haiti. This is especially important as it helps to distance the mission from the idea of its being an “occupation force” and safeguards Haiti's sovereignty, which remains one of the core principles of the UN. However, even though in comparison with the government of Haiti
MINUSTAH’s agency is reduced throughout the resolutions, the UNSC does move towards giving more specific goals and actions to be taken by MINUSTAH. This is expressed in changes towards verbs which establish a clearer dominion of the UNSC over MINUSTAH. But asserting the temporary condition of MINUSTAH is something that has been added more frequently to the last resolutions, which is consistent with the turn towards downsizing and eventual withdrawal of the mission.

Another kind of transformation was a pattern of moving from vagueness to specification, making the main concepts more concrete through examples, although the use of vague concepts such as “international community” remained throughout the different resolutions. This vagueness is relevant as “international community” points directly to the UN itself.

The topoi found in the analysis came as later additions. Both concerned urgency/swiftness, which is also consistent with the UNSC adopting a more active role over MINUSTAH, in other words, consistent with a more ‘commanding’ UNSC.

Additionally, the concepts which are related to the main concepts are all pillars of legitimation, that is, law enforcement, development, the rule of law, the authority of UN institutions, respect for political processes and institutions are all sources of the mission’s legitimacy. Each of them justifies its existence, as ‘stability’ and ‘security’ proved to be the main axis of the mission.

Regarding the “Three Shocks” it is possible to observe the huge impact that the earthquake had, as all the resolutions after it have references to reconstruction and not only resulted in the sharp increase in MINUSTAH’s forces, but also shifted the priorities of and the threats to the stabilisation process. However, even though the cholera outbreak is mentioned a couple of times after, the “official truth” of denying MINUSTAH’s responsibility in the outbreak is expressed in the resolutions by simply not referring to the origin of the outbreak. The neglect of the sexual abuse accusations is even more blatant. There is no explicit mention of sexual abuse as events that happened. The closest to it is a reminder of the “zero tolerance policy” and that “all gender-based violence” is
condemned. I have shown in sections 2.8.2, 2.8.3 and 2.8.4 above not only how costly was for the UN denying both the outbreak as well as the sexual abuse scandals, but also how these two issues ended up being linked by Haitians demanding cholera justice and that peacekeeper SEA be addressed.

In terms of the representation of social actors, the UNSC remains the most powerful social actor, establishing the assessments, action guidelines and evaluations of what MINUSTAH has done and what Haiti needs. The Government of Haiti is represented passivized, and the deletion of its agency contributes to presenting it as less powerful, helping to legitimise the UN mission itself.

MINUSTAH is presented in an active mode, but clauses expressing this are always embedded within ones where the UNSC has the agency. This actually happens with all the clauses of the rest of the social actors. In other words, every process in the paragraph is either executed by the UNSC or subject to one of the ones executed by the UNSC.

However, there is no full responsibility attributed to MINUSTAH with regard to achieving security and stability in Haiti. The additions to the last resolution reinforce the importance of MINUSTAH in this task as well as in the reconstruction. This sets the objectives for MINUSTAH and grounds its legitimacy, but at the same time does not interfere explicitly with Haiti’s sovereignty, a crucial source of tension in international interventions. It is worth mentioning that the features of this genre and its restrictions may have shaped some of these choices. However, it would be necessary to conduct an ethnographic study to observe the dynamics of drafting and re-drafting of these resolutions.

6.2 Security and Stability: Interviews to MINUSTAH Leaders

Although these are not in the examples presented here.
In this section I present the analysis of the interviews with MINUSTAH leaders regarding the concepts of Security and Stability. I start by providing a summary of my field notes for each interview and then I move on to analyse some extracts of the interviews. As with chapters 5 and 6, I have grouped the extracts into the main macro-topics that emerged during the analysis, each working as a subsection.

Finally, I present a summary and discussion of the analysis, making the relevant connections and identifying counterpoints to what was found in the resolutions analysis.

6.2.1 Field notes

In this section I present data from five interviews each with a different interviewee. All this data was collected in my last field-trip in 2015, four of them in the MINUSTAH Headquarters in Port-au-Prince, Haiti and one in the UN Headquarters in New York City. I will present a summary of my field notes respecting the order in which the interviews were conducted.

6.2.1.1 Deputy SRSG Rule of Law (2013-2016) Interview on 12th May 2015

I remember that I arrived slightly late to this interview. Mostly because it was my first time in the MINUSTAH headquarters (called "Log Base") and it took a lot of time to get the security clearance to be allowed in. Additionally, the maps of the site were not very good and it took me some time to find my way to the Deputy SRSG Rule of Law office. The office, as almost the whole MINUSTAH headquarters complex, was a portable module which resembled a container, although it was furnished and air-conditioned.

I apologised and explained my late arrival and he was very polite and nice. I explained briefly the subjects I wanted to cover during the interview and started asking about himself: his role and the main challenges in MINUSTAH. I knew that he had a background working in the Department of Justice in the USA and that his role in MINUSTAH was linked with assisting the rule of law structures in Haiti in order to get them operating at acceptable levels.
Time was against me and he had a slow pace for talking, which made me a bit anxious about not being able to cover all the subjects. Apparently, I managed not to show my anxiety (or if I did, it did not affect him) because the interview went smoothly and we were able to cover all the issues.

As an interviewee, he was very aligned with the official discourse and he had no critical comments to make towards MINUSTAH or the UN, which I cannot say that it surprised me.


My previous interview with a Force Commander, General Heleno, in 2005 (see Section 5.1.2) was a ‘game changer’ in the sense of how he changed my view of the military. I would not say that I was expecting the same character as General Heleno was. Mainly because I was aware that General Heleno ended up being too critical of MINUSTAH and I would not expect MINUSTAH repeating itself in this sense. Still, I felt very positive about this interview in advance, probably partly because of that previous good experience and probably I share the widely held positive stereotype about Brazilians in which they are generally perceived as nice, relaxed and happy people.

He was a very nice interviewee indeed, with a very good sense of humour and he did not commandeer reverential respect, but rather some closeness which made for a relaxed atmosphere during the interview.

He was nowhere near as critical as Heleno had been and he tried to be very careful in not expressing his opinions about certain sensitive issues which might involve criticism of the UN or the civilian leadership of MINUSTAH.

This interview was held in “Delta Camp”, which was a few miles away from the MINUSTAH headquarters in “Log Base”. “Delta Camp” was mostly the military and police headquarters, whereas the civilian administrators were mostly in the MINUSTAH headquarters.

43 Unfortunately, he died in a helicopter accident a few months after this interview.
His office also consisted of portable modules, although this one was very big in comparison with other offices I visited. We were never alone throughout the interview and other Brazilian Army officers were nearby in the room. I cannot rule out that this fact might have prevented him from speaking freely or being more critical than if we had been alone, but it is impossible to be sure about it.


When I arrived in Haiti, this interview was still not on my schedule and it was only confirmed two days before it was conducted. Apparently, her tight schedule did not allow for too much anticipation of my interview and I was confirmed for the first available half an hour in between meetings that she could give me.

I felt the pressure of trying to cover all the issues in a short interview time, in addition to her very slow way of talking, all of which made me feel very anxious. Despite this, we managed to talk about all the core issues.

The interview took place at her office in “Log Base”, also made of portable modules and a bit smaller than the Force Commander’s. We sat at a small round table and her assistant was there with us almost all the interview. That might not have been an issue, but the assistant’s phone rang a couple of times, which accounted as small interruptions, and the assistant had a role as ‘timekeeper’ which put a lot of pressure on the last questions as she was reminding the SRSG that she had other commitments.

For all these reasons, I perceived the atmosphere of this interview as very formal and not relaxed. Building rapport was very difficult and I always felt that she was adhering strictly to the official UN discourse. There was no room for her to express criticism, but that did not surprise me either.

This was arguably one of the best interviewees that I had in this field trip. She asked for full anonymity, as she argued that what she could tell me under that condition would be more useful for my thesis than the things she would be able to tell me if she could be identified. That meant that she spoke freely and made several critical remarks towards MINUSTAH and the UN throughout the interview. Additionally, we shared some similar academic backgrounds, which I believe helped to build rapport, when I remarked that I had an academic interest and I was not a journalist (a seemingly unnecessary clarification which I made in my spoken introduction to almost all the interviews in this field trip).

The fact that she made her critical views explicit gave the data I collected in that trip more diversity which made me very excited at the time. I was coming from interviewees closer to the ‘official’ discourse, so this was a very refreshing interview.

The atmosphere was very friendly, relaxed and open, although there was a note of pessimism around it. I think that had to do with her critical observation of the way of doing things in the ‘peacekeeping area’ which entailed a certain impotence in her, and even more regarding Haiti and its complexities which do not allow for easy, clear-cut or quick solutions.

As I identified with her point of view, it was easy to feel empathy for her and the positions she took.

This interview was held in her office in the MINUSTAH headquarters in “Log Base”, an office similar in size to the SRSG’s, though maybe a bit smaller, and with a view over the nearby airstrip.

6.2.1.5 SRSG (2006-2008/2010-2011), then UN Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Interview on 19th May 2015

This was the last interview of the trip and there was a ‘stroke of luck’ element to it. In one of my last interviews on the day before I left Haiti, my interviewee (Spokesperson and Deputy Chief of Communications) offered to put me into contact with this former SRSG, then one of the most important figures in the UN structure. This interview was confirmed literally only 12 hours before it
was conducted, upon my arrival at New York, while collecting my bags at the airport.

When I arrived at the place where I was staying in Manhattan, I decided to update my knowledge about this interviewee. Even though this was the natural thing to do, I had always asked myself whether it was a good idea or not. The reason is that he was a controversial figure in his home country as he was involved in adoption schemes while there was a guerrilla uprising. These irregular adoptions by Canadians and Americans had been labelled as “child trafficking” and that was definitely not a concept which I was comfortable with seeing a future interviewee associated with. I spent time during the night trying to put those thoughts behind me. And the same the morning after on my way to his office. I knew that this had nothing to do with my research and that despite my eagerness to know his side of the story, it would be detrimental to my interview to bring up that subject. It would either consume the time allotted for the interview or it could upset him and make him badly disposed towards the interview. So, my real challenge was to be able to put those thoughts away and to be able to focus only on what he was telling me during the interview.

In the end, it was a very successful interview. I managed to keep the focus on the interview and he was very generous with his time and we were able to comfortably cover all the subjects.

The atmosphere was friendly and he was a very good talker, with several stories and anecdotes, which made for a very entertaining interview. I was surprised by the kind of stories he was willing to share with me, although he asked not to be identified for some of them. In that sense, this was one of the most ‘eye-opening’ interviews that I had, making explicit what I felt was the most Machiavellian aspects of the peacekeeping settings in general, and of MINUSTAH in particular. His point of view, despite having been SRSG for MINUSTAH in two tenures, was more aligned with his then current position in the UN. That meant that he empathised more with the need to “consolidate” MINUSTAH (which meant ending it as it was) in order to move on and have new peacekeeping missions in other places of the world, rather than with giving more resources to or prolonging MINUSTAH.
The interview took place in the impressive UN headquarters building in Manhattan. His office was on the 20th floor overlooking the East River, and it had pictures and handicraft from different places including a Haitian painting that depicted him and his successor in MINUSTAH as the preventers of a killing.

6.2.2 A Complex Relationship

If there is a clear consensus among the different interviewees then this consists of the idea that both the concepts of security and stability are intertwined. This finding is consistent with the analysis of the UNSC resolutions presented in section 6.1.4.

Text Extract 6.2.1

| JMF: Erm, I would like, I would like if you could, start, um, telling me which are the greatest, er, challenges that, that the Force Commander has, er, today at this stage of the mission. |
| FC: [...] Let’s divide there those two concepts...of the stabilization mission with two pillars: security and stability, stability and security interrelated, |

| JMF: Emm, me gustaría, me gustaría si usted, eh, pudiera partir, emm, contándome cuáles son los grandes, ehh, desafíos que, que tiene el Force Commander, eh, hoy en esta etapa de la misión. |
| FC: [...] Entonces, vamos a dividir ahí esos dos conceptos ... de la misión de estabilización con dos pilares: seguridad y estabilidad, estabilidad y seguridad interrelacionadas, |


Extract 6.2.1 above presents a quote that exemplifies the claim. Suffice to say that there are similar quotations in at least five other interviews where this intertwined relationship between both concepts was made explicit.

In this case, the Force Commander takes both concepts as “pillars” of the mission. This is a widely used architectural/construction metaphor which
indicates that the mission relies on these two concepts, in other words (which are also metaphorical), that ‘security’ and ‘stability’ hold the mission up.

Their intertwined nature is not only reinforced by explicitly saying that they are “interrelated”, but also by the use of chiasmus, repetition of the two concepts inverting the order (“security and stability, stability and security”). This has a symmetrical effect, where the order of the concepts is interchangeable.

As a matter of fact, this close relationship between both concepts admits different analytical ‘entry points’ regarding time and hierarchy. If we start with the time axis, the question would be which, if any, of the two comes first; in other words, whether in order to achieve stability it is necessary to first ensure security, or if it is the other way around.

Most of the interviewees who explicitly put them in chronological order put security first, as a means to achieve stability.

Text Extract 6.2.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JMF: You, that, that also have had the, the, let us say, virtue of being there and here, erm how, how do you relate these concepts, how do you tell them apart and how do you relate them?</th>
<th>JMF: Usted que, que ademáes, eh, ha tenido le-, la, digamos, la virtud de haber estado allá y haber estado acá, ehh ¿cómo, cómo relaciona estos conceptos, cómo los diferencia y cómo los relaciona?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SRSG: [...] So, ...erm, the presence of a blue helmets peacekeeping mission is, erm, is a deterrent force many times, to, erm, erm, guarantee immediate security. And afterwards proceeds the stabilisation stage, stabilisation has to do with political processes, dialogue, reconciliation, ceasefires, ceases of hostilities, peace agreements. Erm, erm, the involvement of other actors too.</td>
<td>SRSG: [...] Entonces, ...eh la presencia de una misión de mantenimiento de la paz cascos azules es, ehh, es una fuerza de disuasión muchas veces, para, eh, eh, garantizar la seguridad inmediata. Y después pasa a la etapa de estabilización, que estabilización tiene que ver con procesos políticos, diálogo, reconciliación, ceses del fuego, ceses de hostilidades, acuerdos de paz. Ehh, ehh, el involucramiento de otros actores también.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SRSG 2006-2008/2010-2011, then UN Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations (in 2015)
In Extract 6.2.2, SRSG explains that a peacekeeping mission works as a “deterrent force”, therefore having an impact guaranteeing “immediate security”. This implies that security is achievable in the short term and is the first impact of a UN peacekeeping mission. Moreover, he reinforces this idea but then makes explicit that the “stabilisation stage” comes “afterwards”. This is a clear example of ‘security’ presented before ‘stability’ and as a precondition to achieving stability.

It is worth taking into account that he provided a first definition of stabilisation while associating it with “political processes, dialogue, reconciliation, ceasefires, ceases of hostilities, peace agreements”. It is also worth noting that both “ceasefires” and “ceases of hostilities” could also be argued to be part of ‘security’, reinforcing the idea that both concepts at least can have some overlapping.

It is possible to find six other similar quotes. Extract 6.2.3 shows the Force Commander’s (FC) point of view.

Text Extract 6.2.3

**JMF:** erm, I would like, I would like if you could er, start, um, telling me which are the greatest, er, challenges that, that the Force Commander has, er, today at this stage of the mission.

**FC:** [...] But in that moment the military component, had a more robust position, a more aggressive position, which aimed for conquering and keeping security, peace. Security seen as a solid basis for building stability.

**JMF:** Emm, me gustaría, me gustaría si usted, eh, pudiera partir, emm, contándome cuáles son los grandes, ehh, desafíos que, que tiene el Force Commander, eh, hoy en esta etapa de la misión.

**FC:** [...] Pero en aquel momento el componente militar, tenía una postura más robusta, una postura más agresiva, que buscaba la conquista y el mantenimiento de la, de la seguridad, de la paz. La seguridad vista como una base sólida para la construcción de la estabilidad.

FC contextualises the initial aggressiveness in order to establish and maintain peace and achieve security as part of “that moment” (i.e. the first years of MINUSTAH). By saying “more robust” and “more aggressive” he implies that in 2015 MINUSTAH is less aggressive than in 2004. This entails that the security and peace challenges of 2004 are relatively under control in 2015. This legitimises the use of force in contexts where peace and security are at stake.

Security is also presented – with another architectural/construction metaphor – as a “solid basis for building stability”. This reinforces the view that ‘security’ comes before ‘stability’ as a prerequisite for it.

However, it is also possible to find quotes stating the opposite. What is important is that these quotes all came from the same Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) quoted in Extract 6.2.2. I will now analyse what he says in Extract 6.2.4 now:

**Text Extract 6.2.4**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JMF: You, that, that also have had the, the, let us say, virtue of being there and here, erm how, how do you relate these concepts, how do you tell them apart and how do you relate them?</th>
<th>JMF: Usted que, que además, eh, ha tenido le, la, digamos, la virtud de haber estado allá y haber estado acá, ehh ¿cómo, cómo relaciona estos conceptos, cómo los diferencia y cómo los relaciona?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SRSG: [...] Erm, sometimes is the stability phase, stabilization first, the most important, and afterwards the mission stays guaranteeing security</td>
<td>SRSG: [...] Eh, a veces es la fase de estabilidad, de estabilización es primero, la más importante, y después se queda la misión garantizando la seguridad</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SRSG 2006-2008/2010-2011, then UN Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations (in 2015)

In this extract, SRSG explicitly states that the order can be (“sometimes”) interchangeable, depending on the mission and its context. He explicitly establishes a hierarchical order linked with a chronological order where what comes “first” is the “most important”. In this case, achieving stability would be the first aim and considered more important than security. This could imply that
when it is the opposite and security is placed first, it is security that is the most important goal.

6.2.3 Threats and Urgencies

It was shown in the analysis of the resolutions that the topos of urgency/swiftness was used as a strategy which justifies the intervention of Haiti by MINUSTAH. Under this macro-topic I will examine how these references to threats and urgencies can be found in the interviews.

Text Extract 6.2.5

| JMF: You, that, that also have had the, the, let us say, virtue of being there and here, erm how, how do you relate these concepts, how do tell them apart and how do you relate them? |
| SRSG: In Haiti I think that, erm, the first stage was stabilisation, because Haiti was in a moment, with Aristide’s exit and all, a moment at breaking point,...at the edge of a, erm, big hole, of a big precipice there. So the presence of the mission helped to stabilise, to stabilise that. And other actors too, etc. And after the, of having achieved that stability, , of having, that that presence, erm, erm, erm, reduced . erm, the intentions of the, erm, Haitian former armed forces, for example, etc., erm, I think that that helped to stabilise. |
| JMF: Usted que, que además, eh, ha tenido le-, la, digamos, la virtud de haber estado allá y haber estado acá, ehh ¿cómo, cómo relaciona estos conceptos, cómo los diferencia y cómo los relaciona? |
| SRSG: En, en Haití yo creo que, ehh, la primera etapa fue la de la estabilización, porque Haití estaba en un momento, con la salida de Aristide y todo, un momento al quiebre de un, ... al borde de un, ah, de un gran hoyo, de un gran barranco ahí. Entonces la presencia de la misión ayudó a estabilizar, a estabilizar eso. Y otros actores también, etc. Y después la, de haber logrado esa estabilización, , de haber, de que esa presencia, ehh, ehh, ehh, redujera . eh, las intenciones de los, eh, ex, ah, fuerzas armadas de Haití, por ejemplo, etcétera, ehh, creo que eso ayudó a estabilizar. |

JMF 2006-2008/2010-2011, then UN Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations (in 2015)

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44 See section 6.1.2.2
This extract immediately connects with Extract 6.2.4 as it is part of the same answer. In Extract 6.2.4 SRSG said that stability could come first and then security. In Extract 6.2.5 he presents the mission in Haiti as an example where stabilisation came first. He argues that this is because of the “breaking point” situation after Aristide was ousted.

Here there is a clear *topos of threat*, which can be formulated as *An action should be performed because there is a threat*, in the form of the “edge of the precipice” metaphor, where an action (in this case the multinational military intervention) is needed in order to avoid a disaster. This metaphor is preceded by a *because [porque]* and succeeded by a *so [entonces]*, which marks an argument for justifying the mission in order to confront the threat. In this case, what it is being implied is that stability is what should be achieved, what drives and justifies the mission. Otherwise Haiti would have ‘fallen’ into this “hole” or “precipice”.

It is important to note that he not only mentions MINUSTAH in this stabilisation efforts, but also “other actors”. This vague reference acknowledges that MINUSTAH was not the only agent responsible for achieving stability, however it is not determined who these other actors are.

Stabilisation is exemplified with a milestone which is a reduction of the former armed forces “intentions”. They were indeed one of the groups fighting against Aristide and one of the first groups to declare a ceasefire and surrender arms.

At this point it is important to discuss some differences of opinion that emerge in a context such as a peacekeeping mission.
JMF: So, um, I’m particularly interested in, in the relationship the s-, between the concept of security and stability=

CO: =yeah=

JMF: =Here. I’ve been examining the, ... the resolutions, um, and it's been very hard to tell them apart through the resolutions, even though one would have an, you know, a common-sense difference or that. When you look at them, which are the, let's say ... semantic fields of each of them, they seem to be so intertwined and very hard to tell them apart. However, I imagine that you have a very ... clear understanding of, of the, the role of the two concepts and how they ... differentiate and they relate to each other.

CO: [...] this is in short my view of the link between stability and security, that ... that there is a very clear . link, but it is totally (3.0) inadequate to think that ... by providing security, that you have necessarily contributed to . sustainable stability. No, I, I, I, I don’t think at all it’s enough and I don't think we realise and understand that, and it's one of the discussions I've had with the peacekeeping panel, that I think that we go into these missions time after time, because I’ve been in this business for 30 years, er, I’ve been in the humanitarian world for 25 years and then I've done ... political missions, and peacekeeping missions. We do this every time, you know, we know we get ... basically . into, I mean, into heart surgery with, with plumbing instruments=

The metaphorical expression “heart surgery, with plumbing instruments” situates the reader in a ‘Haiti as a sick human body’ metaphor (which fits the topos of urgency), where the rescuers are not equipped with what is required for a delicate and complex task such as a heart surgery. This implies that (“sustainable”) stability is the long-term goal and that security is one of the means necessary to achieve it, but not sufficient (“I don’t think at all it’s enough”).

This view is legitimised with an argument of authority based on the 30 years of experience of the interviewee in the “business”, and also it is a view which the interviewee presented as being expressed by her in relevant settings (such as the peacekeeping panel). This reinforces the idea that the problem is real, it has been discussed. The frustration expressed by the interviewee comes
from the hyperbole “We do this every time”, which entails that MINUSTAH is no different from other UN peacekeeping missions and, at the same time, includes herself by using the first-person plural form.

The criticism continues and the same metaphor is applied to close the argument:

Text Extract 6.2.7

| JMF: So, um, I'm particularly interested in, in the relationship the s-, between the concept of security and stability= | CO: =yeah= |
| JMF: =Here. I've been examining the,… the resolutions, um, and it's been very hard to tell them apart through the resolutions, even though one would have an, you know, a common-sense difference or that. When you look at them, which are the, let's say … semantic fields of each of them, they seem to be so intertwined and very hard to tell them apart. However, I imagine that you have a very … clear understanding of, of the, the role of the two concepts and how they … differentiate and they relate to each other. |
| CO: […] Because we are not equipped ... to do what we really have to do. And if you read the mandates and you see what really needs to be done, … and then you look at the means that are being given, there is a mismatch to all, between all these things. It’s fundamentally wrong what we, our, our starting premises, and we, you can't expect a plumber to do, to do heart surgery. And that’s exactly what we're, we're, we're being asked to do. |

Civilian officer at MINUSTAH (in 2015)

The reference to the mandates is an indirect reference to the UN; more specifically, to the Security Council, which drafts the resolutions for those mandates.

The “mismatch” between what should be done and what can be done is presented again with the heart surgery/plumbing metaphor. However, in this occasion there is a shift from objects (“plumbing instruments”) to subjects/roles (“a plumber”).

When the metaphor was about not having the proper means (instruments) to perform a task (heart surgery), it was easier to relate it to the
lack of resources to achieve sustainable stability. But when it switches to not having the proper qualification/training (being a plumber) to perform a task (heart surgery), it also entails that there is also a lack of people with the necessary knowledge to help achieve what “needs to be done”. This can be understood as a focus on personnel in charge of security (military, police) rather than on civilians who can address the developmental and political challenges which are also outlined in the mandates.

6.2.4 The acceptance of the People

Taking the perspective of the Haitians affected by this mission, the acceptance of the population is one of the main legitimation devices, used as a sign of success in achieving ‘security’. The following extract addresses this issue.

**Text Extract 6.2.8**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JMF: Regarding the concept of security and stability at at many times=</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SRSG: mmhm</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JMF: through the resolutions, there seems to be so intertwined and so difficult to tell them apart so what would be your view in these ... two concepts?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRSG: Well, um er let me just say that (4.5) populations, everywhere, (2.5) in every country want. to be assured that ... an environment, a security environment, is provided and, ultimately, the security environment that the role of the State is to ensure that that security environment is provided</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRSG 2013 – present (in 2015)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Here we can see the use of an *argumentum ad populum* (an appeal to ‘masses’ or ‘people’) by which an undefined number of people (“populations”) in “every country”, “everywhere” are taken as wanting a “security environment” to
be provided. It could be implied that she is talking about everyone and thus seems to appeal to common sense.

A *genericisation* of people who want security in terms of total ubiquity ("everywhere" and "in every country") is used to set the goal of security as absolute and undisputed. But it also attributes that responsibility to the State. This acknowledgment, as we will see further on, is related to the core/constitutive element of the legitimation of MINUSTAH: *Haiti remains a sovereign State and this mission is not an invasion.*

6.2.5 Interests of Business

In the following paragraph, the SRSG continues to develop the argument about the importance of security as a means to achieve other ends.

**Text Extract 6.2.9**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JMF: Regarding the concept of security and stability at many times=</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SRSG: mmhm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JMF: through the resolutions, they seem to be so intertwined and so difficult to tell them apart so what would be your view of these two concepts?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRSG: [...] There needs to be security, because these financial interests are looking to ensure that they have a framework in which to operate, that will provide them security and that will provide security to their investments. And that has to do with the rule of law, and the full respect for the rule of law, it has to do with strong justice systems, it has to do with human rights, and the way in which the state organises itself to be able to give its citizens the best opportunities possible for their own personal development, which will ultimately redound to the development of the country. And that, of course, has to be within a stable functioning of the state, on a basis of predictability, on a basis of respect for constitutional order, and to provide for predictability that will ensure socioeconomic development.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SRSG 2013 – present (in 2015)
This paragraph is a very good example of a neoliberal discourse in which private investment is at the core of every economic and social development. Moreover, the economic role of the State is, on the one hand, to provide the guarantee for investment. On the other hand, the role of the State also consists of providing opportunities for the self-development of individuals. And it is the sum of those individuals’ development which becomes the development of the country.

Of course, the role of the State is also to ensure respect for human rights, and the rule of law as the minimum normative framework for individuals and financial interests.

The need for security is being argued (after the “because”) as something required for investment\textsuperscript{45}. Moreover, here the rule of law, the justice system, human rights and state organisation are included. The change of social actors from “financial interests” to “citizens”, which are two forms of collectivisation (although “financial interests” is definitely abstract) is also a change in their agency. On the one hand, the “financial interests” are presented as active agents whereas the citizens even though beneficiaries are being passivised.

Additionally, this kind of legitimation fits the category of “rationalization”, as the goals of the institutionalized social action that the law enforcement and justice institutions are meant to achieve are explained. There is also a “rationalization” legitimation strategy behind the goal of “socioeconomic development” which could be achieved if security is provided for investors.

A similar argument can be found in the following paragraph.

\textsuperscript{45} This is also a very good example of Gramsci’s concept of hegemony: the interests of investors are presented as the interests of the whole. If we accept the idea that the financial sector is currently the “ruling class”, this could be an expression of their cultural hegemony.
In the first part of the extract the D-SRSG links explicitly the “rule of law” (which is his expertise in MINUSTAH), with “stability” and “economic development”. He elaborates the point by pointing to an effective and fair police force and justice system as necessary ingredients for economic development. This kind of legitimation also fits the category of “rationalization”, in a very similar fashion to Extract 6.2.9.

Again, a “rationalization” legitimation strategy is behind the goal of “economic development” and the creation of jobs. Both “economic development” and “employment” are claimed as rational goals socially recognised.

The argumentum ad populum emerges again as being crucial. This time, it is people’s confidence in the justice system which favours investment. At the same time, it works itself as a metonym, or more precisely a synecdoche, of the part-for-whole kind, which means that a part of all the people in Haiti (i.e. investors) are taken as if they represented everyone in Haiti. It seems that the interviewee is referring to the investors as the people who should have that confidence.
The legitimation of investors as a focus on what needs to be brought about in Haiti is reinforced by the claim \textit{money = jobs}. Even though here is not the appropriate place to discuss whether all investments bring jobs or how many jobs a given investment can bring, or how good are those jobs, suffice to say that the identification of money invested with jobs shifts the goal of the actor from the financial domain towards labour. From that point of view, the implied unemployment works as form of \textit{argument ad misericordiam} where you cannot oppose private investors as that would mean opposing people getting a job.

As social actors, investors are represented in a similar fashion to Extract 6.2.9, i.e. as active actors who are also beneficiaries of the conditions that would encourage them to invest. The Haitian workers that would benefit from the jobs created by these investors are backgrounded as they are not mentioned.

6.2.6 Summary and Discussion of the Interview Analysis

The first match between the data from the interviews and those from the resolutions analysis has to do with the intertwined character of both the concepts of ‘security’ and ‘stability’. It is true that this intertwined character was presupposed in the phrasing of the question asked, however all of them agreed with the statement. They brought what comes first, and even though most of the extracts point to ‘security’ as coming before ‘stability’ it is also possible to find extracts pointing in the opposite direction.

Another match, which is closely related to the previous one, has to do with the kinds of neighbouring concepts that these two main concepts relate to. Similar to the resolutions, it is possible to find these concepts related to development, law enforcement and the rule of law. These neighbouring concepts, as in the resolutions, are linked with the rationalization kind of legitimation.

Additionally, the \textit{topos} of urgency also appears in the interviews, although in a metaphorical expression. \textit{Topoi} of threat are also used, and they are also used with metaphorical expressions.

In the resolutions analysis, I discussed how MINUSTAH never appears as the sole agent responsible for achieving security and stability in Haiti. As a
matter of fact, the resolutions always reaffirm Haiti’s sovereignty. That is also found in the interviews, where the Haitian State is represented as being responsible for providing security and stability.

In terms of social actors, it was discussed in Section 6.1.4 how the UNSC appears to be always enacting processes. In the interviews, the role of the UNSC is less central, although there are some references to MINUSTAH’s mandate and some criticisms expressed towards the UN in general too, the main actors represented in the interviews are MINUSTAH and Haitians (including their institutions and government).

In this sense, “the people” and its subsequent argumentum ad populum are used to legitimise the need for MINUSTAH in Haiti, especially in relation to what it has to do with providing security. However, this appeal to “the people” neglects those people in Haiti who challenge MINUSTAH’s practices and even its legitimacy (see Sections 2.7 and 2.8 above).

It is possible to find in the interviews a more clear-cut neo-liberal discourse in which security and the rule of law are meant to be guarantees for investment. That investment is supposed to bring jobs and improve the economic situation. The function of the Haitian government/state seems to be limited to providing suitable conditions for investors rather than having an active role in the economy and development.

There are interviewees who represent a UN discourse which is very non-critical and closer to what can be found in the resolutions (expressed in how the main concepts relate to other concepts). But there are also interviewees who express a more critical point of view which openly challenges the discourse of the resolutions. This reaffirms the idea that a peacekeeping mission has its own inner tensions and that it is far from being a coherent one-sided structure. These inner tensions are features shared by the UN and its institutions, as I have shown in Section 2.4 above.
7. Legitimation and Argumentation on the ‘Three Shocks’

As was explained in Section 2.8 before, there were at least three distinctive events in the ten years between my first data collection trip (January-February 2005) and my last one (May 2015). These events appeared extensively in the media and presented different kinds of challenges for MINUSTAH. I worked under the assumption that these events - or ‘shocks’ as I prefer to call them - meant that MINUSTAH had to re-shape itself in different degrees in reaction to each one and, therefore, that the impact of these shocks should also be detectable in its discourse.

I have already shown to some extent in section 6.1.4 how these shocks were portrayed in the resolutions of the UNSC for MINUSTAH, and how different discursive strategies were deployed (i.e. the omission of any mention of MINUSTAH’s responsibility in the cholera outbreak; or avoiding referring to any particular sexual abuse accusations and, rather, generalising them in a normative framework). In this section, I will explore how the interviewees discursively construct these shocks and which strategies they use to deal with them. This chapter aims to answer Research Questions 2b (How do MINUSTAH leaders discursively construct the meanings of its actions in Haiti?) and 2c (Which strategies do they employ? How?). The foci will be on both argumentation and legitimation strategies as they both have in common that they are used for justification.

There is a twofold rationale to displaying the shocks in the order that I do in this section: first of all, it is indeed the chronological order in which these events happened. But secondly, and even more important for analytical purposes, the order is also a progression from events involving no agency by MINUSTAH to events occurring entirely due to by MINUSTAH’s agency (or that of members of its staff). First, the earthquake was a natural event. Second, the cholera outbreak was an event which had human responsibility attached to it, though unintentional. And finally, a case of sexual abuse, for which its perpetrators were fully responsible.
This order will allow me to examine which legitimation and responsibility avoidance strategies remain constant through the three events and which, if any, are used specifically for each level of agency/responsibility.

This chapter is structured in a similar fashion to the previous analysis chapters: first I provide a summary of my field notes for the interviews. I then move on to the analysis of the extracts grouped into the major topics, i.e. the 2010 Earthquake, the Cholera Outbreak and the Sexual Abuse Accusations. I then finish with a summary and discussion of the findings.

### 7.1 Field Notes

In this chapter I am presenting extracts from 5 different interviews. As I have presented my field notes for each of them before, I will briefly point to where each of those notes can be found.

One was the second interview with the first SRSG (2004-2006) which was held in Santiago, Chile on 26th December 2013 (see Section 5.5.3).

The field notes for the interview with the SRSG (2006-2008 and 2010-2011, then UN Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations) held in New York on 19th May 2015 are in Section 6.2.1.5.

The field notes for the interview with the third SRSG (2013-2017), held on 15th May 2015 at the MINUSTAH headquarters in Port-au-Prince, can be found in Section 6.2.1.3.

The field notes for the interview with the D-SRSG Rule of Law (2013-2016), held on 12th May 2015 at the MINUSTAH headquarters in Port-au-Prince, are in Section 6.2.1.1.

Finally, the field notes for the interview with the Civilian Officer (2013-2015), held on 15th May 2015 at the MINUSTAH headquarters in Port-au-Prince, are in Section 6.2.1.4.
7.2 The 2010 Earthquake

The first major shock for MINUSTAH (and for Haiti overall) was the earthquake that occurred on 12th January 2010. An overview of the disaster was presented in Section 2.8.1, therefore I will not go into those details again here. I have also established in Section 4.2.3 the rationale for selecting this and the other two major topics of this chapter, and in Section 4.2.5.4 the analytical framework for this chapter.

I will present now the main findings of the analysis of the interviews regarding the 2010 earthquake.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JMF: So, if maybe we could start with your, with, with, with your assessment of which were the main challenges you faced in your two tenures.</th>
<th>JMF: Entonces, si pudiéramos empezar tal vez con sus, con, con, con sus apreciaciones de cuáles fueron los principales desafíos que le tocaron en sus dos periodos.</th>
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<td>SRSG: [...] I arrived in Haiti the day after the Earthquake. And then the challenges were different. erm, when I arrived I met in the airport with president René Préval and it was a very . emotive embrace and we both cried very strongly and um &lt;clears throat&gt; and there, well, it was mostly to (2.5) coordinate, to support, to back. The first ... effort that we had to make was . to put the mission on its feet. I told them that it was like when one goes on an aeroplane and, arhm, the cabin loses pressure and the, the arhm (3) fall in order to breathe. Then, the instructions are to 'put it on yourself first, then you put it to the child or to people nearby'. I told them 'it is the same example. Let's put ourselves back on our feet first, the mission, in order to be efficient and work afterwards'. And that was how we did it. But naturally, the first days, weeks, was about recovering the wounded, the dead, our corpses. The farewell ceremonies, the funerals, arh, all that, very hard, very hard &lt;clears throat&gt;.</td>
<td>SRSG: [...] Llegué a Haití al día siguiente del terremoto. Y ahí los retos eran distintos, eran diferentes. Ehh, ahí me encontré en el aeropuerto cuando llegué con el presidente René Préval y fue un abrazo . muy emotivo y lloramos los dos muy fuerte y a- &lt;carraspea&gt; y ahí, pues, era más bien (2.5) coordinar, apoyar, respaldar. El primer ... esfuerzo que tuvimos que hacer era . poner la misión en pie. Yo les decía que era como cuando uno va en un avión y, ahh, la cabina es despresurizada y caen las ah, los ah (3) para poder respirar. Entonces las indicaciones son 'colóquese usted primero, y después se lo coloca al niño o a las personas, a la vecindad'. Yo les decía 'es el mismo ejemplo. Pongámonos nosotros en pie primero, la misión, para poder después ser eficientes y trabajar'. Y así fue como lo hicimos. Pero naturalmente los primeros días, semanas, fue recuperar los heridos, los muertos, los cadáveres de nosotros. Las ceremonias de despedida, los entierros, eh, todo eso, muy duro, muy duro &lt;carraspea&gt;.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SRSG 2006-2008/2010-2011, then UN Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations (in 2015)
The SRSG starts talking about the aftermath of the earthquake with an emotional account of him meeting the Haitian president. The throat clearing and long pauses record what was indeed an emotional recalling during the interview. Just after mentioning that in his second tenure the challenges were about supporting Haiti after the earthquake, he goes on to say that the first priority was putting the mission back on its feet.

This is legitimised by a combination of authorization, rationalization and moral evaluation. The moral evaluation is done via an analogy between the emergency de-pressurisation procedures in an airplane and prioritising the restoration of MINUSTAH before attending to the needs of Haiti. By analogy, focusing first on MINUSTAH’s needs and damages because of the earthquake was the right thing to do.

The authorization takes the form of the impersonal authority which underlies the guidelines/protocols of emergencies on airplanes. In other words, when he says “the instructions are” the SRSG is presupposing the authority of those indications.

The rationalization is of the instrumental, means-oriented kind, i.e. taking care of the mission first was the best way to help Haiti afterwards and be efficient.

The fact that this is presented in reported speech (“I told them…”) reinforces his own position as an authority and at the same time implies that proceeding this way needed to be legitimised, needed to be explained.
**Text extract 7.2**

**JMF:** I would like, ehm, to take you to another tragedy. ehm <simultaneous>

**SRSG:** Earthquake <simultaneous/>

**JMF:** The earthquake, yes, and, and I would like, ehm, if you could, ehm, um, . refer obviously to the earthquake and the changes yo saw, ehm, for . for MINUSTAH, . hopefully to focus on that, on how it was reformed

**SRSG:** [...] Now, regarding MINUSTAH, ...MINUSTAH has a shortcoming which is a product of its, in its ing-, its, its origin...which has to do with the following: (2.5) MINUSTAH responds to a decision of the UN Security Council to call Haiti a threat to peace and international security. A threat to peace and international security is linked, essentially, with security issues, (2.5) not with natural catastrophes issues, - at least is not the first definition. Therefore, all development work, quote unquote, . ehm, done by MINUSTAH, is done dependent on securing the. military's task of. watching over the population's security, and the country's. If that is the way it is, . ehm, the idea of a group of Ecuadorian and Chilean engineers building highways to allow Haitians to communicate their cities with each other, is seen as a development goal that has no relation, at least not directly, maybe indirectly, but not directly with the region, with the mission. And countries like, . more distant, at the least, . countries more
The interviewee starts by explaining the limitations of the mission in facing the challenges of the earthquake via referring to the authority of the UNSC. This seems close to Van Leeuwen’s (2008, pp. 107–109) category of *Personal Authorization*, although, strictly speaking, it is an institution – the UNSC via means of collectivisation – rather than individual people being referred to. I suggest that this could be a new category called “institutional authorization”.

Nevertheless, since considering that the situation in Haiti as a “threat to international peace and security” is an expression present in all the UNSC

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46 This it is not exactly the same wording as it appears in the resolutions, but due to its semantic and lexical similarity and its context, I will treat it here as if they were the same.
resolutions for MINUSTAH, it could also be argued that there are some elements of *Impersonal Authorization*, which according to Van Leeuwen, refers to “laws, rules and regulations” (ibid, p. 108). As I showed in Section 4.3.1.3, there are some normative elements in the resolutions, even though they are not regulations *per se*. However, since the interviewee did not explicitly mention the resolutions here, I would regard this legitimation strategy as mostly Personal Authorization.

In terms of argumentation, after mentioning the UNSC, there is a *topos of definition* (which can be formulated as “Haiti is called a threat to international peace and security by the UNSC, therefore it is a threat to international peace and security”) that is used at the beginning of the argument.

As mentioned in the previous paragraph, the interviewee states that it is the Security Council’s definition of Haiti as a “threat to peace and international security” that explains the limitations of MINUSTAH and its shortcomings when facing natural disasters. This allows him to distance himself from the argument. Additionally, this is framed under the concept of ‘security’ which, as was shown in Chapter Section 3.6, has little to do with ‘developmental work’ for non-Latin Americans.

Overall, the argument that the SRSG expressed here, which is within the the UNSC’s perspective, presents Haiti via a *topos of threat*. This can be formulated as “Haiti is a threat to peace and international security, therefore something [the peacekeeping mission] must be done”. Thus, we have here three levels of embedding: a *topos of threat* embedded in a *topos of definition* embedded in a *Personal Authorization* legitimation strategy, referring to an institution rather than a person.

The interviewee continues with an example that is not clear whether it is hypothetical or not47, in which Ecuadorian and Chilean engineers would be doing developmental reconstruction work that is not supposed to have a place within MINUSTAH’s remit – unless it is directly related with security issues. What is interesting about this example is that, again, different views on development and what the mission should be able to do are framed in geopolitical terms. Here the

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47 Chilean and Ecuadorian engineers did work together for MINUSTAH doing different kinds of construction tasks.
contrast is made with two Latin-American countries on the one side and Russia and China on the other side. These countries are presented as members of the (UN Security) Council “distant from the situation in the western hemisphere”. Of course, as we have seen in Section 2.4, these two are permanent members, which means that they have the power to veto. Therefore, their opinion about what the mission should be doing has an inherent “Personal Authorization strategy behind it.

The expression “distant from the situation in the western hemisphere” can be interpreted as ambivalent. On the one hand, both China and Russia are geographically distant from the “western hemisphere”. On the other hand, “the situation” also involves more than just territorial distance but also something that involves a shared context which they cannot relate to in the same way. As I argued in Chapter 5, Latin America can also be represented as having different ideas about development and security from the ones held by countries within the “western hemisphere” (i.e. the USA, Europe). Therefore, it is safe to assume that which hemisphere or countries Latin America can be associated or presented as belonging with is far from being settled or indisputable.

This extract has elements which relate to the topics of Chapter 5 (Latin American Identity) and Chapter 6 (Security and Stability). However, since both the question and the main point of the answer refers to the earthquake, I decided to analyse it in this chapter. However, it is worth bearing in mind those other two topics and realising that they can all converge and interrelate.

7.3 The Cholera Outbreak

Following the earthquake, nine months later, on the 22nd October, 2010, it was officially recognised by the government that there was a cholera outbreak in the country. The disease spread via the Artibonite river and its impact was significant (at least 8,000 people died), especially considering that cholera is a disease that had been eradicated from Haiti more than a 100 years ago. At the
time, the responsibility for the outbreak pointed towards a Nepalese base (as the strain of cholera was from Nepal) which was near a tributary of the Artibonite.

I will not go deeper into the context now, since it has already been presented in Section 2.8.2. Likewise, Section 4.2.3 presents the rationale for choosing this topic and Section 4.2.5.4 the analytical framework.

This “shock” for the mission had a significant impact in Haiti and internationally, with the reputation of MINUSTAH being severely damaged as it was perceived responsible for the outbreak. Therefore, this was an issue on which I deemed it paramount to have input from the leaders of MINUSTAH.
JMF: In, in that regard, you mentioned just now that the, the one crisis after the other. Can I just bring you to this crisis before you were here?

D-SRSG: Mhm

JMF: The, namely, earthquake, cholera, sex abuse. And, can I have your view about how these crises, um, somehow reshaped ... MINUSTAH and ... if, if so, and if the-, they were somewhere, um, as a background for your own work here?

D-SRSG: [...] And the cholera issue, . I don't want to get too, er, deeply into that because it is a matter that is the subject of, you know, litigation and potential litigation and I don't want to say anything that could be misinterpreted. But definitely, er, one would have to, er, er, ... be clear that, er, it has changed, er, er, the reputation of, er, the UN, here in Haiti, er, ... and it's something that we're working very very hard to turn around. And how are we doing that? we have in the, er, er, in the past several years we have helped, er, the government of Haiti to establish treatment centres . across the country, er, so that, er, people who are affected, er, can go and, er, get treatment. We have helped, er, to build wells, so that people can . get, er, er, er, er, you know, treated water for, to cook and to drink, and to go about their daily lives. Um, and, er, during the dry season, er, we work very hard with, er, er, Ministry of Health, ... er, to make sure that the hospitals and these clinics, er, er, these centres are equipped to address, er, a cholera incidence. So, er, ... and I think that has helped. Er, the ... Ministry of Health is grateful that we're there to, to assist them, er, but, you know, it is, er, an incident that, er, ... er, ... has had a, not so positive impact on the reputation of the UN, and, now, we're, um, doing what we, er, need to do to, er, to assist the Government's programme. Er, we have, basically, integrated ourselves into what the government is doing in supporting their efforts to deal with, er, with, er, cholera outbreaks.


The D-SRSG avoids talking about the outbreak itself. He legitimises not talking about the cholera outbreak by means of authorization, specifically impersonal authority in the form of pending legal processes. By means of using formal legal language such as “subject to litigation”, he nominalises the process
(instead of saying ‘being sued’ for example) which is consistent with a distancing strategy. It makes it more ‘impersonal’.

In an answer full of hesitations and pauses, by the end (of Extract 7.3) he uses mitigation “not so positive impact” (even though the impact has had no positive aspects about it, only negative ones), and moves on to what MINUSTAH is doing to deal with the outbreak. This is an obvious shift from what has been the negative impact of the cholera outbreak on the UN’s reputation in Haiti, to a focus on how MINUSTAH is helping the Haitian Government to deal with the outbreak. In other words, from avoiding talking about the outbreak (and therefore MINUSTAH’s responsibility for it) he moves on to talk about palliative measures taken to face its challenges.

In this shift towards the ‘humanitarian’ work of MINUSTAH after the outbreak, he combines moral evaluation and authorization. D-SRSG presents the Ministry of Health and the Government of Haiti as the authorities which are “grateful” for MINUSTAH’s presence. This ‘gratefulness’ is the moral evaluation embedded in this authorization. In other words, these two authorities assess MINUSTAH’s actions as ‘good’.

There is point that needs to be addressed at this stage: even though I asked about the impact on MINUSTAH, D-SRSG never mentions MINUSTAH specifically in this extract. He talks about the UN or the “UN in Haiti” instead. One way to interpret this shift is that this issue had escalated enough to become an issue for the UN as a whole. That is consistent with how the UNSC spoke about it in the resolutions for MINUSTAH and the panel set up by the UN to investigate this issue.
Text extract 7.4

**JMF:** However, after the earthquake, um, boom? October comes the cholera outbreak, at least it’s recognised in October as, as cholera. And, er, (2.5) regardless of what has been officially said about whether the cholera, where, where the cholera came from, the, it is a fact that there was a perception that, er, MINUSTAH and even the UN was somehow responsible of, of this outbreak and, therefore, the human loss, er, i-, in that, in that respect. Um, ... how that event and that public perception, er, about the cholera outbreak meant a challenge, if so, er, for your, for your role here, even if it’s a couple of years after <overlapping> that

**C.O.:** Yeah <overlapping/> No, I... certainly the perception is that, not just locally, but internationally. And, um, (2.5) there's been, there's been, you know, more speculation in, in, in that regard, I mean, and we can't deny that. Er, that, and that perception is extremely important. Now, at the end of the day I think the UN, ... um, has to show compassion, right from the beginning. [It] has to, er, also make clear where it stands on, on these things and, and, and I don’t think that was necessarily the case. I think the UN left it very much in the middle and took a very formalistic attitude, and I’ve a very strong opinion and I, I don't even off the record- I don't necessarily want to give this to an outsider, I’ve certainly within the UN I have people know where I stand, and I’ve been very clear on this. Um, now, this cholera thing is extremely complicated, now, um, (3) leaving at some <unclear> not talking about, strictly about the responsibility

Civilian Officer at MINUSTAH (in 2015)

As is the case with Extracts 6.2.6 and 6.2.7 in Chapter 6, the Civilian Officer (CO) provides a critical point of view about the way UN operates in challenging contexts. She starts by acknowledging the perception of MINUSTAH and UN’s responsibilities in the outbreak remarking that is not just a local (in Haiti) perception but also international. This also has to do with the way my question leads her towards discussing the perception of MINUSTAH’s responsibility and not towards directly assessing and assigning responsibility (see Section 4.2.7).

However, she also stresses that she has a “very strong” opinion. This hyperbole is complemented by her saying that “even off the record” she does not “necessarily want to give this to an outsider”, implying that her opinions are controversial and far from the official UN discourse on this matter. She does
legitimise her stand of not sharing those opinions with me via a form of institutional authorization, in which she refers to the authority of the UN as an institution where she has made her opinions known. Implying at the same time that that is the proper place to do it and that she has tried to play her part in improving what is deems to be the wrong way of facing these challenges.

Having said that, she expresses some criticism towards the UN appealing to a form of an argument ad misericordiam: “the UN has to show compassion right from the beginning”. Here, she implies that if the UN has shown compassion, this has been too late and not as an immediate response.

Additionally, she criticises that the UN did not have a clear stand (“on these things”) which implies that the UN’s response has been erratic or even contradictory. This could be consistent with the fact that on the one hand, the UN tried to avoid any responsibility - which can be seen in Extract 7.3 and the argument about this issue being “subject of (potential) litigation” - and, on the other hand, the UN allocating resources in order to face the cholera challenge. She goes on to criticise UN’s attitude as they left “very much in the middle” and “too formalistic”. This reinforces her previous arguments. The first one (“very much in the middle”) makes an echoing contrast with her “very strong opinion”. The second (“too formalistic”) contrasts with the need to “show compassion”. Again, this seems to allude to the legal approach taken by the UN as a strategy for avoiding blame for the outbreak.
Text extract 7.5

[This extract follows on from 7.4. Due to the lengthy exchange that preceeds the answer, I will not repeat that again here]

**C.O.** [...] why cholera went so fast, for the same reason why any outbreak of any contagious disease, chikungunya, whatever you call it, would be extremely fast here. There is no sanitation, clean drinking water is still a rarity for people, so [...] that certainly is a very important fact on why cholera spread as quickly as it did and, and for me it, it means a different focus because if we exclusively focused on cholera we would be wasting tremendous resource and a tremendous opportunity to help this country further in terms of any future type of disease. If we build up an infrastructure where people use toilets, where people have much more access to clean drinking water and whereby hospitals and clinics can treat cholera and other diseases, rather than having special treatment centres, which is the direction we went, I think we, we, we are in a bet-, much better track.

[...] So, it won't go away, but at least we will leave behind the ... hopefully a legacy whereby we, we've helped the country cope better with this kind of, of issues. Er, as I said, you know, talking about (3.5) the more sensitive issues for me, it’s, it’s, er, something bad but ... I have my own opinion about, which I, I’m certainly known within the UN as, as having, you know, expressed very clearly. It's, it’s ... for the UN, and this is something that you really have to understand, it's, this is a very fundamental question in terms of, you know, ... the UN ... being financially accountable for any of this type of issues. Peacekeeping, (4) without any exception, will create ... adverse ... effects. Whether that is ... collateral damage in terms of ... a very robust, aggressive, peacekeeping mission in a certain situation, by mistake, (2.5) making victims amongst the local population.

Civilian Officer at MINUSTAH (in 2015)

As was already mentioned in relation to the previous extract, the issue of responsibility is being avoided. As a result, this interviewee moves on to speak about why cholera spread so fast in Haiti rather than how cholera ended up in Haiti in the first place. By shifting the focus in that way, her arguments are about the shortcomings of Haiti’s infrastructure.

This allows her also to express another criticism, in this case, about how this lack of basic sanitary infrastructure should be the focus for UN measures in
Haiti (to prevent any kind of outbreak), rather than just cholera-specific treatment centres.

In the final paragraph of the extract she makes explicit again the fact that she has her own opinion on the “sensitive issues” which she has made “known within the UN”. This is a reinforcement of the strategy analysed in extract 7.4 above, in which she both expresses loyalty to the UN (by not making public those strong opinions) and also makes it clear that she has a critical opinion, which she has made explicit to the UN.

It is interesting that even though the UN’s responsibility over the cholera outbreak is not discussed directly, there are some ‘peripheral’ references to it. In the case of this extract, she uses a legitimation that fits the category of “economic values”. In this form of legitimation, the financial costs for the UN (in terms of compensations for law suits) are used as an explanation for UN taking recourse to the immunity and not taking responsibility for the outbreak explicitly.

The fact that this is a controversial (“sensitive” in her words) issue is reinforced by expressions alluding to perspectivization strategies such as “and this is something that you really have to understand” and hyperbolic expressions such as “this is a very fundamental question”. The pauses she took while explaining these issues may indicate this ambivalence between understanding why UN peacekeeping missions work under immunity, and having a critical stance towards how the issues have been managed by the UN.

Moreover, the closing argument in this extract is in the form of a topos of reality, where she states that “Peacekeeping without any exceptions will create adverse effects”. This is taken as an inevitable part of a peacekeeping mission and not as something contingent or contestable. This kind of argument justifies any wrongdoing by the mission as “collateral damage” and as inevitable.

7.4 The Sexual Abuse Accusations

As explained in Section 4.2.3, more than one sexual abuse accusations were made during the 13 years of MINUSTAH. However, when I had to make the
issue explicit in interviews, I would refer to the one which occurred on 2\textsuperscript{nd} September 2011 involving Uruguayan soldiers. More details about this case can be found in Section 2.8.3.

However, when the issue was raised, most of the interviewees (and certainly in all the extracts presented here) would talk in general terms about these acts, rather than pointing to this specific case. This was also the case with the UNSC resolutions.

As is the case with the other shocks, the rationale for choosing this is laid out in Section 4.2.3 and the analytical framework in Section 4.2.5.4.
JMF: Would you put, er, the, the accusations of, um, of sexual abuse into the same frame? Into something that, er, there is a, ... a higher probability within time passes?, with soldiers being human and so, and going beyond the rules=

C.O.: =no=

JMF: some of them and]

C.O.: [no, no, clearly not, no, I mean, there is, this individual, ... individual behaviour. This is very different from ... a bullet going in the wrong direction, this is very, very different. Er, this is individual ... misbehaviour, er, it's, it's, it's a, it's a wilful negation of standards . that are being made very clear and that people are clearly . in their induction and training, er, so, it's a choice they make, and no, you cannot say 'well, you know, my mind wandered off for a while'. No, absolutely not. So, this is in a different category, because it's a wilful deliberate . act against something that you clearly know has been, er, has been made very clear, and this is why in the United Nations, that we, we, we set certain centre, we are not Supermen or Superwomen but we should know ... our limits and we should know the parameters in which we, we, we work and otherwise we shouldn't be working for the UN. That's a, an entirely different matter, altogether, for me=

JMF: =Ha-, has that, er, er, that case has also meant, er, changes for, for your role as, as maybe cholera was at, to some extent or was this something more, um=

C.O.: You know it's, ... it, it, it certainly doesn't help . your image and your credibility, that is, because you will have to work extra hard after you, after this type of, of, of diversions from standards are, are, are, are made. It doesn't help you in terms of your authority, speaking up with authority and, and with credibility. So, of course it, it, it affects, so you have to really, first of all, you have to prevent this from happening, and second if it happens you have to act, you have to discipline and, and . we do . discipline people, and then we clearly expect and hold accountable member states for pursuing . er, (3) staff members, whether they're military, they're uniformed or, or whether they are civilians for, for this behaviour.

JMF: mhm
This extract starts with a question that was a follow-up to the argument the C.O. started to develop at the end of extract 7.5. In that argument, she was making the point how every peacekeeping mission creates “adverse effects”. My question asked whether the sexual abuse could be counted as part of those. Her denial is very emphatic and she even interrupts and overlaps my question to say three times “no” and one “clearly not”. Then she explains how the fact that “this is individual behaviour” makes it different from other kinds of “collateral damage” such as “a bullet going in the wrong direction”. There is a form of topos of definition when she establishes it as individual behaviour. This is something that could be contested since, for instance, in the case of the Uruguayan soldiers, the sexual abuse was carried out by a group of people and not just an individual.

Still, it seems that the point of comparing individual behaviour with a hypothetical stray bullet making unintended damage is similar to my point that sexual abuse implies the full agency of those responsible. This argument is reinforced by her statement that “it’s a choice they make”, and an informed choice, since UN rules are clear about it and would also have been mentioned in their induction. Therefore, she implies that the UN has done everything to make it very clear that sexual abuse is unacceptable behaviour. Let us remember that, as was the case with Extract 7.5, the issue of immunity also plays a part here: these accusations are not prosecuted in Haiti even if they happened there.

The hyperbolic expression of “we are not supermen or superwomen” works as a rhetorical device in which she is not claiming that UN workers, both military and civilian, should have perfect behaviour and superhero standards, but that there is a minimum expected for people working in the UN who “should know our limits” and “the parameters in which we work”. The implicature is that sexual abuse perpetrators are not supposed to be part of the UN mission, which
is consistent with the claim that these cases do not qualify as a kind of the “collateral damage” to be expected in every peacekeeping mission.

When asked if these cases have affected her work as the cholera did, she uses the mitigated expression that this “doesn’t help you” in terms of credibility, authority and image. She says that these make her have to work “extra hard” to face the challenges of the damage that this causes to MINUSTAH in particular and the UN in general. She moves on to how “you have to prevent this from happening”, although she does not make it explicit how you could do that. But if it does happen “you have to discipline people”, although she immediately brings up the fact that it is the member states (the countries perpetrators come from) who are expected to pursue the people who have done these acts. This brings us back to the issue of immunity and explains why the UN cannot be fully responsible for the punishment of these acts.

Finally, before reiterating that they hold countries responsible for the misbehaviour of their nationals (although not making explicit how they are to be held responsible), there is an argument about why these things are harmful. She does that via the hyperbolic expression that the UN is “the moral conscience of the world” and that they “uphold human rights”. This status of being the “moral conscience of the world” is a legitimation strategy in the category of ‘moral evaluation’ where, despite saying before that the UN are not “supermen or superwomen”, it is implied that acts which are immoral have no place within the UN.
| JMF: Right, I (2.5), would like if, if ehm... if you could tell us about, about...if MINUSTAH has had or not the capacity to communicate what they are doing and why it is doing what is doing, um, in, in Haiti, to the Haitian public, sort of speaking. And I would like, hopefully, if you could, within your answer about the, the, this capacity of MINUSTAH to communicate what it is doing in Haiti and why, um, refer to some of the issues that I know did not happen during your tenure, but that, you probably observed, such as the sexual abuse accusations and the issue of the cholera outbreak, which were also part of the communicational <simultaneous> concerns |
| SRSG: Horrible <simultaneous/> |
| JMF: Ya, en (2.5), me gustaría que, que mm,... que pudieras hablarnos de, de, acerca de la capacidad que ha tenido o no MINUSTAH para comunicar lo que está haciendo y el porqué está haciendo lo que está haciendo, ehhhh, en el, en Haití, al público haitiano, por llamarlo de una manera. Y me gustaría, ojalá, si pudieras, dentro de esta, de, dentro de tu respuesta acerca de, de, de esta capacidad de la MINUSTAH de, de, de comunicar lo que está haciendo. en Haití y el porqué, ehhhh, referirte a algunos problemas que yo sé que a ti no te tocaron, pero que, probablemente, observaste, como fue el tema de los abusos sexuales y el tema del cólera, que también fueron parte del, de las preocupaciones <simultáneo> comunicacionales |
| SRSG: Horrible <simultáneo/> |
| JMF: digamos de, de MINUSTAH. |
| SRSG: [...]Si uno agrega a eso (3.5) dramas que son propios de la presencia de soldados en territorios que no son los propios, o de soldados, solamente, en territorios donde hay grandes poblaciones sos-, eh, (2.5) que están vinculadas, eh, bueno, violaciones, abusos, pequeños abusos, eh, soldados que hacían brutalidades, eh, (2.5) y este tema del cólera que, naturalmente, (3.5) es un tema que... obviamente Naciones Unidas debería haber previsto al origen, no ahí en Haití. |
| SRSG. 2004-2006 (in 2013) |
This former SRSG provides a counterpoint to the CO’s argument in Extract 7.6. He labels these acts as acts which are “part of the presence of soldiers in territories which are not theirs”. He does not go either explicitly or implicitly to the role that immunity could play in these acts, but he does imply that these are acts to be expected in those circumstances.

It seems that he shifts the responsibility from the soldiers in terms of “individual behaviour” (as the CO put it in Extract 7.6) to external causes such as being in a foreign country and/or being in a country where these kinds of abuses are more frequent. The controversial point of this argument seems to be that under those kinds of circumstances there will be soldiers who cannot avoid perpetrating that kind of abuse. If the context is a poor country with weak law enforcement institutions, and the soldiers have guns and immunity, this seems to be a very delicate case not only of sexual abuse but moreover, abuse of power.

Conversely, he does imply a UN responsibility in the cholera outbreak as something that they “should have anticipated at the outset, not there in Haiti”, which implies that cholera was brought to Haiti. Moreover, it implies that it was in the UN’s hands to prevent the outbreak from happening. It seems to point to failure in screening staff members before going to Haiti.

Text extract 7.8

JMF: After the the facts that I mention, or more than two years, which were the earthquake, the Cholera outbreak, and the sexual abuse accusation. um I have to say now that er um, regarding the the the Cholera outbreak or the sexual abuse, I’m I’m not really interested in. in assessing responsibilities or so. um I’m rather interested in in how those er, issues er meant some sort of pub-public unrest, and some sort of er um, if you like to say er a … an image damage for for MINUSTAH at that point, and, so. I would like to know, knowing that that the changes that you are facing have to do more with the elections, the forthcoming elections, with the downsizing of MINUSTAH, and with, perhaps, the … Dominican Republic deportation of Haitians that. I know that. is. er. source of concern for MINUSTAH, as well, erm … I would like to know if still er these issues the the earthquake, the Cholera, and the and the sexual abuse, shape somehow er your job here (3.5)
The SRSG starts using the naturalization form of moral evaluation. She presents the criticisms towards the mission as something to be expected “in a situation such as this”, therefore as almost unavoidable. Regarding the sexual abuse accusations specifically, she applies authorization in the form of the UN Secretary-General’s and the UN’s regulations, meaning that these acts are condemned explicitly by the UN, although she does not explain what “the organization will not turn away from” means.

The responsibility is shifted towards the contributing countries of the mission, which is in a similar vein to the CO’s arguments in Extract 7.6. It is another form of authorization through the norms and procedures of the UN missions. In this case she is not mentioning explicitly what the procedures are, but she describes the overall relations with the member states. This is a form of moral abstraction, by which she talks of abstract positive values such as “collaboration” and “good cooperation”, rather than of concrete events.

She alludes to the “member states” in a similar fashion as was done by the CO before in Extract 7.6. She emphasises that MINUSTAH, “depends” on their
collaboration. This again puts the responsibility for punishing these acts beyond MINUSTAH or the UN.

7.5 Summary and Discussion

The first thing that can be said about the analysis of these extracts is that it is possible to establish counterpoints between the different interviewees. There are critical standpoints and ‘official’ ones, and even some interviewees that could be critical up to some point and ‘official’ in others.

These critical views pointed towards how MINUSTAH had reacted to these shocks, especially both the earthquake and cholera outbreak. In a nutshell, these are criticisms of the shortcomings and the limited nature of the approach instead of one that could be more long-term and sustainable.

It was possible to identify a more ‘official’ UN discourse when the interviewees showed they would rather not discuss the responsibility for the cholera outbreak. Moreover, it was possible to find arguments pointing towards how the conditions in Haiti and its lack of infrastructure had allowed cholera to spread fast, rather than talking about how a disease which had been long eradicated from the country suddenly appeared there. These were the arguments that the UN deployed in 2011 as soon as the first report of experts was published (see Sections 2.8.2 and 2.8.3 above).

Also, when talking about the sexual abuse accusations, it was possible to find views closer to those found in the resolutions and official UN communications, i.e. that perpetrators should be held responsible (“zero tolerance policy”) and that these are not acts to be expected in a peacekeeping mission (see Section 2.8.3). However, it was also possible to find an opposite argument, from a former SRSG, that these kinds of issues are likely to happen in these settings.

The issue of immunity emerged, either explicitly or implicitly, in these extracts. Even though it was not on my original interview schedule\(^{48}\), it was

\(^{48}\) I had decided not to include it because I deemed it a controversial issue which goes beyond MINUSTAH, and therefore was likely to result in an abstract discussion instead of talking about the concrete issues in the context of MINUSTAH which referred to immunity such as the cholera outbreak and the sexual abuse.
brought up by two of the interviewees in the context of these ‘shocks’. The debate about whether there should be immunity in peacekeeping missions is hardly new and it re-appears each time there are wrongdoings by members of the missions. MINUSTAH is no exception and both the cholera outbreak and the sexual abuse cases brought that debate back.

In terms of argumentation, the topoi of definition, reality and threat were used by the interviewees in these extracts. It was possible to find instances where one topos was ‘embedded’ in another, making it a double argumentation strategy.

Arguments *ad misericordiam* and hyperboles were also used, and perspectivization strategies, especially when trying to explain controversial UN positions.

Additionally, there was a use of legitimation strategies such as authorization (where I suggest a new category of “institutional authorization”), moral evaluation and economic values. These strategies could also be found embedded in or embedding argumentation strategies such as topoi. This results in more complex strategies in terms of the number of layers.
8. Conclusions

8.1 Summary of Findings

In the introduction to this thesis I presented my aim and motivation: understanding how in a setting of an international intervention in Haiti, the leaders of a UN mission could legitimise their actions and discursively construct an identity, specifically, a Latin American identity. As discussed in Chapter 2, Haiti as a troubled country intervened in several times throughout its history is already a particularly salient context as the site of recurring power struggles. Additionally, MINUSTAH, in particular, was not only made up of a majority of Latin American forces, but also had endured certain challenges (the ‘three shocks’) which had reshaped it at least discursively.

In Chapter 3 I elaborated on how Latin America, as a concept, is rather problematic and also discussed its dimension as a counter-concept, that is, an identity that can only be properly defined in opposition to the USA and Europe. I also presented its position in the framework of postcolonialism, a discussion which brings out how former colonies (as all Latin American countries are) reproduce (post-)colonial structures within their societies. This opens the question to whether an international intervention fits this framework. I also discussed the problematic place of Haiti within Latin America, which brings into question any attempt to consider Haiti Latin American, and therefore legitimise a Latin American intervention on those grounds. I also discussed how the concepts of ‘security’ and ‘stability’ are constructed in the different peacekeeping doctrines, with a special emphasis on the UN doctrine. That discussion pointed towards ‘security’ and ‘stability’ being rather undefined and intertwined concepts, despite (or perhaps in spite of) their importance. I also discussed the importance of having a focus on language to study international interventions and the main concepts of Critical Discourse Studies.

I will now discuss my research questions, explaining how I have addressed them with the analyses presented in Chapters 5, 6 and 7.
RQ1a: How do MINUSTAH leaders discursively construct the mission’s identity through their statements?

RQ1b: Do MINUSTAH decision-makers discursively construct a Latin American identity/ies as a potential resource for a successful mission in Haiti? If so, how and why?

The leaders interviewed in Chapter 5 both identified themselves as Latin Americans, and they both expressed similar ideas on how Latin-American features, in the social and cultural sense, could be an advantage for working in the mission in Haiti. This means that MINUSTAH does provide an opportunity to reinforce its Latin-American identity elements. One SRSG constructed this Latin American identity by contrasting these features with those of Anglo-Saxon Caribbean societies, the USA, France and Puerto Rico. This fits with the counter-concept approach to Latin America explained in Section 3.2.3. Additionally, in the postcolonial frame, there is an opposition against the former colonial powers. But there are no interpretations of the current mission as a postcolonial one. The UNSC explicitly establishes Haiti’s sovereignty at all times and the Government of Haiti’s agency in all areas. Moreover, the emphasis on this is something that has increased with time.

The salient dimensions of that Latin American identity are structured in four dimensions: 1) the greater experience and subsequent understanding of poverty and its complexities, including its relationship with violence; 2) what SRSG calls a “cultural structure” in Extract 5.8, although the elements named under that concept proved to be problematic. There are references to a “feeling of shared history”, which fits the concepts of “narrative identity” and Anderson’s “imagined communities” discussed in Sections 3.4 and 3.4.1; 3) the institutional breakdowns during the second half of the twentieth century in Latin-America. The relevance of these to working with Haiti is at the same time having had the experience of those dictatorships and coups and of dealing with the reconciliation processes afterwards, (although it is also problematic as those processes are not exclusive of Latin America); 4) territorial arguments, related with power struggles: the contrast with the USA. Sometimes the contrast is extended to the ‘northern hemisphere’, France is also mentioned once, and a
contrast is established with Puerto Rico – but I argue that Puerto Rico’s condition of being an American territory makes it an ‘indirect’ contrast with the USA. Again, this fits the framework of Latin America as a counter-concept.

The Force Commander shared dimensions 1) and 2). In the case of 1), he adds that this experience with poverty gives Latin Americans a certain perspective and the capacity to develop solidarity. In the case of 2) he shares the importance given to history as something shared by a community. He adds to that the elements of ‘society maturation’ and ‘people’s conscience’. Other features, such as the languages or the geographical borders of Latin-America seem to be ambivalent and not clear-cut at all. When examples of countries were given, they were mostly South-American countries and a Central-American country (Guatemala). No Caribbean country was ever mentioned as Latin-American. Guatemala was the only northern hemisphere country mentioned. Regarding language, it seems that having Latin as its root (in grammar, syntax and lexicon) would be the ‘minimum common ground’. Taking that into account, it seems that there is no single shared language for Latin America.

When the SRSG tried to name Latin-American identity features none of them were indisputable or totally coherent, reinforcing the ‘utilitarian’ view of Haiti. Put simply, in a hypothetical presentation: ‘Haiti is Latin American because that way we can legitimise our presence there, in the USA’s backyard and challenge their hegemonic power in a future conflict in the region’. The Latin-American identity seems far from being a coherent concept, and is rather subject to power struggles. But it can also be used ‘peripherally’ (in the case of Haiti) as a disguise (or excuse) for power struggles. All this seems to support the idea that Latin America ‘needs’ the USA in order to construct its identity by contrast with the superpower. Additionally, this also fits with what was discussed in Section 2.4 above: that there is a shared condition in which national interests and international politics shape UN institutions.

*RQ2a: How does MINUSTAH engage in the discussion about the legitimacy of international interventions?*
It is true that the data set used in the UNSC resolutions cannot directly nor completely answer this research question, as the author of the resolutions is the UN Security Council (UNSC) and not MINUSTAH. However, the UNSC engages MINUSTAH with the legitimacy for interventions providing the rationale for its existence via the resolutions.

Taking a closer look at the forms of legitimation in Chapter 6, it is possible to find strategies of Authorization, where the authority of the Security Council, Secretary-General, the Government of Haiti, and MINUSTAH are constantly invoked in order to establish the justification for actions taken, as well as the responsibilities for those actions. In the case of the Government of Haiti, the authorization becomes clear when compared with how little mention “the people of Haiti” have. It is also possible to find forms of instrumental rationalization, mainly focused on achieving certain results (like reconstruction, decentralization, institutional reform, extension of the rule of law, security sector reform, etc.). Economic values, such as having stable and sustainable development, more employment and economic growth are constantly referred to. It is also possible to find some instances of expressing the values of public interest. This can take place in the form of “public security” or “national reconciliation”.

The linguistic realisations of these legitimation strategies can be in the form of addition, deletion, rearrangement and substitution. Some of the transformation strategies were aimed at establishing powers and responsibilities. The most common was withdrawing MINUSTAH’s agency and responsibilities and shifting those towards the Government of Haiti. This is especially important as it helps to distance the mission from the idea of its being an “occupation force” and safeguards Haiti’s sovereignty, which remains one of the core principles of the UN. However, even though in comparison with the government of Haiti MINUSTAH’s agency is reduced throughout the resolutions, the UNSC does move towards giving more specific goals and actions to be taken by MINUSTAH. This is expressed in changes towards using verbs which establish a clearer dominion of the UNSC over MINUSTAH.

Another kind of transformation was a pattern of moving from vagueness to specification, making the concepts of ‘security’ and ‘stability’ more concrete.
through examples. Although vagueness in concepts like the “international community” remained throughout the different resolutions, this vagueness is relevant as the use of “international community” points directly to the UN itself.

The topoi found in the analysis came as additions. Both were related to urgency/swiftness, which is also consistent with the UNSC taking a more active role over MINUSTAH, in other words, consistent with a more ‘commanding’ UNSC. In terms of social actors, the UNSC remains the most powerful social actor, establishing the assessments, action guidelines and evaluations of what MINUSTAH has done and what Haiti needs. The Government of Haiti is presented in a passive mode. The deletion of its agency contributes to presenting it as less powerful, helping to legitimise the UN mission itself.

MINUSTAH is presented as active mode, but its clauses are always embedded within ones where the UNSC has the agency. This is also true of all the clauses pertaining to the rest of the social actors. In other words, every process in clauses is either executed by the UNSC or subject to a process executed by the UNSC. However, MINUSTAH is never attributed with full responsibility to with regard to achieving security and stability in Haiti. The additions to the last resolution reinforce the importance of MINUSTAH in this task as well as in the reconstruction. This sets the objectives for MINUSTAH and grounds its legitimacy, but at the same time does not interfere explicitly with Haiti’s sovereignty, a crucial source of tension in international interventions.

Concepts such as law enforcement, development, the authority of UN institutions, the respect for political processes and institutions are all sources of the mission’s legitimacy. Each of them justifies its existence, as ‘stability’ and ‘security’ proved to be the main axis of the mission. However, it seemed difficult to establish an exclusive domain for either ‘security’ or ‘stability’. Rather, it seemed that both can be related to the same kind of concepts (such as development or law enforcement), even though – as one would expect – ‘security’ is significantly more related to concepts about law enforcement. It was also hard to establish a clear-cut relationship between both concepts.
When analysing the interviews in Chapter 6, the first match with the resolution analysis is that the interviewees agree on the intertwined character of the concepts of ‘security’ and ‘stability’. Even though most of the extracts point to ‘security’ as coming before ‘stability’ it is also possible to find extracts pointing in the opposite direction.

Another match, which is closely related to the previous one, has to do with the kinds of concepts that these main concepts relate to. Similar to the resolutions, it is possible to find these concepts related with development, law enforcement and the rule of law. These concepts, as in the resolutions, are linked with the rationalization kind of legitimation. As was the case with the resolutions, MINUSTAH never appears as the sole agent responsible for achieving security and stability in Haiti. In the interviews, the Haitian State is represented as responsible for providing security and stability. “The people” and the subsequent *argumentum ad populum* are used to legitimise the need for MINUSTAH in Haiti, especially in what it has to do with providing security.

*RQ2b: How MINUSTAH leaders discursively construct the meanings of their actions in Haiti?*

*RQ2c: Which strategies do they employ? How?*

In Chapter 6 there are some interviewees who represent a more official UN discourse which is very non-critical and closer to what is found in the resolutions (expressed on how the main concepts relate to other concepts). But there are also interviewees who express a more critical point of view which openly challenges the official one. This reaffirms the idea that a peacekeeping mission has its own inner tensions and that it is far from being a coherent one-sided structure. In Chapter 7 there are critical standpoints, official ones, and even some interviewees who could be critical up to a point and official in others. These critical views point towards how MINUSTAH reacted to the three shocks, especially both the earthquake and cholera outbreak. In a nutshell, these are criticisms of the shortcomings and limitations of the approach, as opposed to one
that could be more long-term and sustainable. A more ‘official’ UN discourse was possible to find when the interviewees would rather not discuss the responsibility for the cholera outbreak. Moreover, it was possible to find arguments pointing towards how the conditions in Haiti and lack of infrastructure allowed the rapid spread of cholera, rather than talking about how a disease which had long been eradicated from the country suddenly reappeared there.

Also, when talking about the sexual abuse accusations, I found views closer to those found in the resolutions and official UN communications, i.e. that perpetrators should be held responsible (“zero tolerance policy”) and that these were not acts to be expected in a peacekeeping mission. However, it was also possible to find an opposing argument, from a former SRSG: that these kinds of issues are likely to happen in these settings.

The issue of immunity emerged, either explicitly or implicitly in these extracts. Even though it was something that was not on my original interview schedule⁴⁹, it was brought about by the interviewees in the context of these ‘shocks’. The debate about immunity in peacekeeping missions is hardly new and it re-appears each time there are wrongdoings by members of missions. MINUSTAH is no exception and both the cholera outbreak and the sexual abuse cases brought that debate back.

In terms of argumentation, the topos of definition, reality and threat were used by the interviewees in these extracts. It was possible to find instances where one topos could be ‘embedded’ in another, making it a double argumentation strategy. Arguments ad misericordiam and hyperboles were also used. And perspectivization strategies, especially when trying to explain controversial UN positions. Additionally, there was a use of legitimation strategies such as authorization (where I suggest a new category of “institutional authorization”), moral evaluation and economic values. These strategies could

⁴⁹ I had decided not to include it explicitly because I deemed it a controversial issue which goes beyond MINUSTAH, and therefore was likely to bring an abstract discussion instead of talking about the concrete issues in the context of MINUSTAH, which also referred to immunity, such as the cholera outbreak and the sexual abuse.
also be found embedded in, or embedding, argumentation strategies such as *topoi*. This makes for more complex strategies in terms of the number of layers.

**RQ3: Are there any salient differences in the discursive construction of MINUSTAH between 2004 and 2015?**

One of the changes that emerged in Chapter 5 is that there is a link constructed between Haiti and Latin America around the role of politics. The SRSG who establishes that link argues that Latin Americans understand better that the underlying issue in Haiti is political. Another change is the attempt to present (in 2013) the power of USA as less important than how it had been presented before (year 2004). Conversely, the role of Brazil gains importance.

Regarding the “shocks” analysed in Chapter 7, in the resolutions analysed in Chapter 6 it is possible to observe the huge impact that the earthquake had, as all the resolutions after it have references to the reconstruction and not only resulted in the rapid increase of MINUSTAH’s forces, but also shifted the priorities and the threats to the stabilization process. However, even though the cholera outbreak is mentioned several times after, the “official truth” of denying MINUSTAH’s responsibility in the outbreak is expressed in the resolutions by simply not referring to the origin of the outbreak. The neglect of the sexual abuse accusations is even more blatant. There is no explicit mention of sexual abuse as an event that happened. The closest to it is a reminder of the “zero tolerance policy” and that “all gender-based violence” is condemned50.

### 8.2 Contributions

I adhere firmly to what Billig (2013) deems as one of the current problems in academic writing in the social sciences: the ongoing creation of new concepts in the form of noun-based technical terms (p. 10). I agree with him that this makes language more difficult to understand, which is a problem *per se*. Additionally, creating new concepts, when there is an array of available concepts

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50 Although these are not in the examples presented here.
to develop, discuss and construct with, seems unnecessary. But not only unnecessary, most of the time these ‘new concepts’ are indeed combinations of existing concepts with new names, and that isolates academic debate instead of opening it out. Hence, I do not aim to present my contributions in the form of a new concept. At the level of theory, this thesis integrates frameworks from identity construction, postcolonialism, international interventions and CDS, highlighting how crucial concepts such as ‘Latin America’, ‘Security’ and ‘Stability’ are problematic and undefined. And it is this lack of definition that allows for different discursive strategies to be deployed.

In terms of methodological framework, this thesis contributes by illustrating the adaptation and eclectic combination of different analytical frameworks as explained in Chapter 4. Additionally, different genres (interviews and resolutions) are analysed and there is a dialogue between what is found in each of them. It is in this combination of frameworks that a small contribution can be suggested: the category of “Institutional authorization” as a legitimation strategy which refers to the authority of an institution (such as the UNSC) rather than a specific figure or position.

However, I believe that the most salient contribution of this thesis is in the domain of the data. For the reasons explained in the Chapter 1, I have sets of data which cover a 11-year span collected first-hand. On the one hand, this thesis makes a contribution in the sense that it integrates data obtained in the setting of a documentary and data obtained in a PhD research setting. On the other hand, it allows me to be able to cover very different moments in the mission, which would have been impossible in the sole context of a PhD thesis. Even a funded research project would be unlikely to cover 11 years.

Overall, this thesis contributes to bridging a gap in research in the domain of CDS regarding peacekeeping missions, specifically, of the discursive construction of a peacekeeping mission by its leaders. This domain remains largely unexplored and it where this thesis positions its contributions.
8.3 Limitations and Future Research

Even though, as mentioned above, I have had the advantage of working with data collected by myself over 11 years, the timing of this thesis cannot coincide completely with that of MINUSTAH. I stopped collecting data in 2015 and MINUSTAH carried on for 2 more years. In those years a major development occurred: the UN admitted its responsibility in the cholera outbreak. My data was collected before that fact meaning that several of my interviewees had to support the then-official truth, which was that the UN was not responsible and that the issue was subject to litigation. Even though my data has a value in the context it was collected, it is impossible not to wish to have been able to go one more time after this recognition of responsibility and interview the leaders again and document any further changes in their discourse.

There was also a downside to this project having started as a documentary. In hindsight, I would probably have asked some questions differently and gone deeper into some subjects. In particular, I wish I had asked about the concepts ‘security’ and ‘stability’ back in 2004, 2005 and 2006. For better or worse, what I asked when originally filming that documentary shaped this thesis. It seems obvious that 8 years later, having studied CDS among other things, I had become a different person to some extent.

In terms of future research, the first thing would be to arrange an interview with the only SRSG that I was not able to interview due to all sorts of schedule clashes and bad timings. That would be the ‘missing piece’ on SRSGs interviews.

In the domain of research topics, several issues emerged while doing this research. One of them is the rise of Brazil as a key player in Latin America and in the context of international interventions. This is because of the widely held idea that Brazil wants to become a permanent member of the UNSC and therefore is anxious to prove that they can be protagonists in the peacekeeping system. This is definitely an issue that I would like to explore in future research, specifically
how Brazilian leaders discursively construct their role in peacekeeping. Another topic that I would like to approach from a CDS perspective is the concept of “International Community”. It emerged during the literature review and during the interviews. It seems clear to me that this is another undefined concept which entails power relations and therefore is the subject of discursive strategies.

Finally, when studying the discursive strategies for both the cholera outbreak and the sexual abuse accusations, it became very clear to me that the concept of “immunity” is paramount. Of course, as is the case with the other aforementioned concepts, it has been studied in the fields of international relations. I would like to explore it from a CDS perspective.

8.4 Final words

There is no secret to the fact that my research is about powerful people, people who are in decision-making positions, in a troubled foreign country, mandated by a council composed of five superpowers as China, France, Russia, UK and USA (plus 10 non-permanent members). These kinds of interventions are life-changing for the people who live in the countries intervened in. However, nobody asks them if they approve of a peacekeeping mission or not, even if that mission has, in its mandate, the task to enforce democratic institutions. Nobody asks the people of the participant countries directly either. In some cases, the countries contributing troops need the approval of their parliaments to participate. But that is rarely part of the election campaigns of their political parties, therefore it is hard to establish whether they are representing their constituencies when approving to send troops to a peacekeeping mission. Nobody asks the people from the countries participating in the UNSC directly whether they approve an intervention that is going to be launched.

Democracy seems to be the "elephant in the room" when it comes to how the decisions are made in all the stages that lead to a peacekeeping mission, missions that tend, ironically, to enforce democracy. This is why critical scholars have a role to play. This is why all kinds of social practices, no matter how noble their intentions or how fair the flags that are being waved, need to be scrutinised for the power relations which are at their core.
Several people have asked me what is my personal position towards MINUSTAH, whether I approve of it or not. And as I have positioned myself within CDS, I am expected to have a clear and explicit position towards social problems, injustices and power relations. But the truth is that I do not have a clear yes-or-no position and I have carried that tension all through my research. On the one hand, I have little doubt that if it were not for MINUSTAH, Haiti would have probably been immersed in a very lengthy civil war. MINUSTAH prevented that. On the other hand, the loss of life because of the cholera outbreak is an enormous harm equivalent to a civil war. But even if we disregard that cholera outbreak because it was non-intentional, the fact that an international intervention is necessarily an imposition over people is something I believe is wrong.

In that sense, I am not saying that peacekeeping missions should be scrapped altogether, but I have no doubt that the attempts to gain democratic consent to allow them should be improved and extended. And the same goes for accountability. Immunity gets too close to impunity in some cases.

51 I am fully aware that several of these missions are deployed when democratic institutions are broken or non-functional, and therefore it would be impossible to exercise democratic consent. However, several missions (including MINUSTAH) include in their mandate the priority to secure fair elections. That could be an opportunity to revise consent to the mission too.
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Appendix: Ethics documentation

Participant information sheet

Title: The Discursive Construction of the UN Mission in Haiti

Researcher:

José Manuel Ferreiro
Department of Linguistics and English Language
Lancaster University
Lancaster, LA1 4YL
United Kingdom
j.ferreirogomez@lancaster.ac.uk

You are invited to take part in this research study. Please take time to read the following information carefully before you decide whether or not you wish to take part.

What is the purpose of this study?

I am carrying out this study as part of my Doctoral studies in the Department of Linguistics and English Language. The aim of the study is to explore how the UN Mission in Haiti communicates what they are doing and how the people that make the decisions in it describe its main features and characteristics.

What does the study entail?

My study will involve analysing the mission’s official communications and press releases, as well as analysing statements by the key actors in the decision-making processes of the mission.

Why have I been invited?
I have approached you because I am interested in understanding the views of the actors involved in the mission’s decision-making process.

I would be very grateful if you would agree to take part in my study.

What will happen if I take part?

If you decided to take part, this would involve the following: a recorded interview conducted by myself with an expected duration between 30 minutes and 1 hour.

What are the possible benefits from taking part?

Taking part in the interview will allow you to reflect on your own experiences working in the mission, the challenges you have faced, and any thoughts that you could share to contribute to the understanding of the mission itself.

What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part?

It is unlikely that there will be any major disadvantages to taking part. However, taking part will mean investing 30-60 minutes of your time for an interview.

What will happen if I decide not to take part or if I don’t want to carry on with the study?

You are free to withdraw from the study at any time and you do not have to give a reason. If you withdraw while the study takes place or until 2 months after it finishes, I will not use any of the information that you provided. If you withdraw later, I will use the information you shared with me for my study.

Will my taking part in this project be kept confidential?

All the information collected about you during the course of the research will be kept strictly confidential. Any identifying information, such as names and personal characteristics, will be anonymised in the PhD thesis or any other publications of this research. The data I will collect will be kept securely. Any paper-based data will be kept in a locked cupboard. Electronic data will be stored on a password protected computer and files containing personal data will be encrypted.

However, it might be necessary, for research purposes, to indicate your position or area of the mission in which you work. That could mean that it might not be possible to completely anonymise you.

What will happen to the results of the research study?
The results of the study will be used for academic purposes only. This will include my PhD thesis and other publications, for example journal articles. I am also planning to present the results of my study at academic conferences.

**What if there is a problem?**

If you have any queries or if you are unhappy with anything that happens concerning your participation in the study, please contact myself or my supervisor

Em. Professor Ruth Wodak  
Distinguished Professor and Chair in Discourse Studies  
Lancaster University/University Vienna  
r.wodak@lancaster.ac.uk

**Further information and contact details**

José Manuel Ferreiro  
Department of Linguistics and English Language  
Lancaster University  
Lancaster, LA1 4YL  
United Kingdom  
j.ferreirogomez@lancaster.ac.uk

*Thank you for considering your participation in this project.*
Consent Form

Project title: The Discursive Construction of the UN Mission in Haiti

1. I have read and had explained to me by José Manuel Ferreiro the information sheet relating to this project.

2. I have had explained to me the purposes of the project and what will be required of me, and any questions have been answered to my satisfaction. I agree to the arrangements described in the information sheet in so far as they relate to my participation.

3. I understand that my participation is entirely voluntary and that I have the right to withdraw from the project any time, but no longer than 2 months after its completion. If I withdraw after this period, the information I have provided will be used for the project.

4. I understand that all data collected will be anonymised and that my identity will not be revealed at any point.

5. I have received a copy of this consent form and of the accompanying information sheet.

Name:

Signed:

Date: