Deconstructing Diglossia: 
Language Ideology and Change in Revolutionary Egypt (2010-2014)

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Abstract

The language scene in Egypt has witnessed important developments since the turn of the 21st century. Defying the Fergusonian distribution of diglossic functions, the use of Egyptian Arabic (ʿāmmiyā) has spread to domains where Standard Arabic (fuṣḥā) is expected. There is also increasing evidence of the rising prestige and commercial value of English. In addition, Arabic written in Latin script has become a common sight in offline mediums. This study, which began in 2010 and was concluded in 2014, is an attempt to understand the dynamics of this developing situation in the backdrop of substantial political change in Egypt. I investigate what has motivated the recent language developments as well as how they are viewed by the self-appointed protectors of fuṣḥā and by a sample of language users, with particular focus on the role that ideology plays. This involved conducting interviews with ‘agents of change’ (an Egyptian nationalist political party, a leftist publisher, and a mobile service provider), and a focus group interview with ‘resisters of change’ (representing three Arabic language conservation societies). I also carried out a web survey of the language behaviour and attitudes of Cairo-based Internet users. Incorporating the qualitative and quantitative findings from the interviews and the survey, I contend that ideology plays a significant part in the motivation and perception of language change. However, the relationship between language ideologies and language practices is not straightforward. Other factors such as education and age were also salient. These findings contribute to a reframing of diglossia and an attempt to theorise the relationships between language, power and identity in Egypt.
I declare that the work in this thesis is my own work and has not been submitted either in whole or in part for the award of a higher degree elsewhere. Any sections of the thesis which have been published are clearly identified.

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Acknowledgments

(In the name of God, all thanks be to Him; it is with His blessings that good deeds are completed)

Doing a PhD is often described as a lonely journey which requires huge self-discipline and self-motivation, but the truth is the success of a PhD candidate does not rely solely on these qualities or on their own achievement, but often on the quality of the support network they have. In this regard, I have been immensely blessed and therefore have a long list of thanks to give.

First of all, I would like to thank the Department of Linguistics and English Language at Lancaster University and the Lancaster University Friends Programme for the Graduate Teaching Assistantship which has made it possible for me to pursue my PhD studies at Lancaster. I will remain indebted for this opportunity.

I thank my supervisor, Mark Sebba, for his constant guidance, prompt feedback, valuable advice and, above all, for his patience. He will forever be my model of academic diligence and modesty.

I thank my external examiner, Yasir Suleiman, and my internal examiner, Johnny Unger, for a stimulating discussion in the viva. I am grateful for their helpful feedback on the thesis and their advice for future work.

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I thank The Ideology and Sociology of Language Change in the Arab World project team for the valuable tips and inspiring conversations. I feel privileged to be part of this project which has provided a supportive forum for discussing ideas with seasoned Arabic sociolinguists.

I thank all the survey and interview participants who have voluntarily taken part in my research, and I thank everyone who has helped in distributing the survey. I don’t know many of them, and even those I do know are too many to mention by name.
One person, however, deserves special mention: my late friend Bassem Sabry who showed interest in my research and enthusiastically shared the survey – he is remembered with fondness and gratitude.

While it may be academic mentors and colleagues who help you complete a PhD, it is family and friends who help you survive it. I thank all the friends who have been the source of moral support throughout my PhD. In particular, I thank my best friend Zaina Al-Hejin and her family whose companionship and support has made so many aspects of PhD life more bearable. I thank my friend Zahra Al-Lawati, especially for her support during the final year of my studies. I also thank the lively 1pm lunch group in the department for getting me through the toughest of days.

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Finally, two special people are in an acknowledgments league of their own: I thank my mother, Nadia, and my father, Mohamed – I will not even attempt to articulate what for. To them, my dear parents, I dedicate this thesis.
إلهي أمي وآبي
# Table of Contents

Table of Contents .............................................................................................................. i  
List of Figures .................................................................................................................... iv  
List of Tables ...................................................................................................................... vi  
Transcription and Spelling ................................................................................................. vii  
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations .................................................................................. ix

## 1 Introduction ................................................................................................................. 1
### 1.1 Background: So much change .............................................................................. 1
### 1.2 What’s Special about Egypt? ............................................................................... 5
### 1.3 Research questions and thesis structure .............................................................. 7

## 2 Diglossia in Arabic: History and Theory ..................................................................... 10
### 2.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................... 10
### 2.2 A history of Arabic and the origins of diglossia ................................................... 12
### 2.3 The Arabisation of Egypt ..................................................................................... 21
#### 2.3.1 The substratal influence of Coptic ................................................................. 23
#### 2.3.2 The decline, revival and reform of Arabic in Egypt ........................................ 25
### 2.4 Diglossia Defined .................................................................................................. 29
### 2.5 Diglossia and Language Shift .............................................................................. 34
### 2.6 A note on terminology ........................................................................................ 37
### 2.7 The Distance between H and L ......................................................................... 40
### 2.8 Diglossia as problem ........................................................................................... 46
### 2.9 Speaker Awareness ............................................................................................. 51
### 2.10 Summary ............................................................................................................ 54

## 3 Language Policy, Ideology and Practice in Egypt ...................................................... 56
### 3.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................... 56
### 3.2 Language policy and language planning .............................................................. 58
#### 3.2.1 Diglossia and language policy ....................................................................... 58
#### 3.2.2 Arabisation and Language planning ............................................................ 59
#### 3.2.3 Linguistic purism and the role of the language academies ......................... 62
#### 3.2.4 Standardisation ............................................................................................. 65
#### 3.2.5 The question of power ................................................................................. 67
#### 3.2.6 The question of prestige ............................................................................... 70
### 3.3 Language Ideologies ............................................................................................ 72
3.3.1 Language myths: the superiority of Arabic ........................................... 75
  3.3.1.1 The chosen language ........................................................................ 77
  3.3.1.2 Good Arabic and bad Arabic ............................................................ 79
3.3.2 Language and national identity ............................................................. 82
  3.3.2.1 The Colonial ‘hangover’ .................................................................. 85
  3.3.2.2 Pan-Arab nationalism ..................................................................... 86
  3.3.2.3 Egyptian nationalism ................................................................. 91
3.4 Language practices ..................................................................................... 97
3.5 Summary .................................................................................................... 105
4 The Interviews: Agents and Resisters of Change ....................................... 107
  4.1 Introduction ............................................................................................ 107
  4.2 The Liberal Egyptian Party (LEP) ......................................................... 110
  4.3 Malamih publishing house .................................................................... 118
  4.4 Vodafone Egypt ...................................................................................... 128
  4.5 Arabic Language Conservation Societies (ALCSs) ............................... 135
  4.6 Conclusion ............................................................................................. 152
5 The Survey: Investigating Language Attitudes and Practices in Greater Cairo 157
  5.1 Introduction ............................................................................................ 157
  5.2 The Web-based survey as a research method ........................................ 157
    5.2.1 Why web surveys? .......................................................................... 159
    5.2.2 Response Rate Issues ..................................................................... 161
    5.2.3 Sampling Issues .............................................................................. 165
  5.3 Defining the target population ................................................................. 168
    5.3.1 Getting to grips with the demographics ........................................ 169
    5.3.2 Identifying and profiling the sample ............................................. 174
  5.4 Survey Design .......................................................................................... 177
    5.4.1 The technical design ...................................................................... 177
    5.4.2 Addressing the research question ................................................ 180
    5.4.3 Testing and Piloting ........................................................................ 181
    5.4.4 Distribution ..................................................................................... 183
  5.5 The Survey Results .................................................................................. 184
    5.5.1 Overview of the findings ............................................................... 185
      5.5.1.1 The two H varieties: SA vs. English ....................................... 185
      5.5.1.2 Attitudes towards recent language changes .......................... 188
List of Figures

Figure 1. A comparison of Blanc (1960), Badawi (1973) and Meiseles (1980) continuums against Ferguson’s H and L. .................................................................42
Figure 2. Suleiman’s (2008) conceptualisation of Egyptian supra-nationalisms ..................84
Figure 3. The City of Greater Cairo (formal and informal settlements) ........................170
Figure 4. Number of participants filtered out by each screening question ....................184
Figure 5. How confident participants indicated they were in using SA and English (%) ..........186
Figure 6. How frequently participants reported using SA and English in their daily lives (%). ..................................................................................................................186
Figure 7. How important participants indicated SA and English were in their work (%) .......187
Figure 8. Participants’ opinions about the importance of SA and English in education (%) ..188
Figure 9. Frequency of agreement that these changes pose a threat to the Arabic language ..............................................................................................................189
Figure 10. Frequency of agreement that it is good to see/hear EA being used in this way ...190
Figure 11. Number of participants who were not aware of each item ..................................190
Figure 12. Language choice in the medium of email ..........................................................192
Figure 13. Language choice in the handwritten medium ......................................................192
Figure 14. Language choice in the medium of mobile text messages ...............................193
Figure 15. Language choice when the addressee is the participant’s friend ......................194
Figure 16. Language choice when the addressee is the participant’s superior at work ....194
Figure 17. Language choice for email to teacher/lecturer and handwritten letter to principal/dean .............................................................................................................195
Figure 18. Number of males and females who studied in each language .........................196
Figure 19. Percentage of males and females within each SES category ............................197
Figure 20. Age distribution of participants ........................................................................197
Figure 21. Familiarity with LA by mean age ......................................................................198
Figure 22. Distribution of the sample across the computed SES scale .............................199
Figure 23. Language selected to complete the survey by SES (%) ....................................200
Figure 24. Frequency of written SA use by SES (%) ..........................................................200
Figure 25. Confidence in using English by SES (%) ............................................................201
Figure 26. Frequency of English use by SES (%) .................................................................201
Figure 27. Language choice in email by SES (%) ...............................................................202
Figure 28. Language choice in texting by SES (%) .............................................................203
Figure 29. Language choice in the handwritten medium by SES (%) ..............................203
Figure 30. The distribution of participants by highest academic qualification attained .......204
Figure 31. Level of confidence in SA use by language of education (% within level) ........207
Figure 32. Level of confidence in English use by language of education (% within level) ..207
Figure 33. Language choice in email by language of education (%) ...................................209
Figure 34. Language choice in texting by language of education (%) ..............................209
Figure 35. Language choice in the handwritten medium by language of education (%) ....210
Figure 36. Left: the distribution of participants along the political orientation spectrum; Right: the distribution of closed-list parliamentary seats won in 2012 along the spectrum 212
Figure 37. Participants’ national orientation against their political orientation ................213
Figure 38. Participants’ ranking of ‘Egyptian’ identity against their national orientation ..... 214
Figure 39. Participants’ identity ranks by political orientation ............................................. 214
Figure 40. Survey language by political orientation and Egyptian and Muslim identity ranks ...................................................................................................................... 215
Figure 41. SA importance in university education against political and national orientations .................................................................................................................................................................................. 215
Figure 42. Importance of SA in school education against Egyptian identity rank ............ 216
Figure 43. Agreement/disagreement with the statement “I think it is good to see EA being used in this way” (Q25.1) against the various political ideology indices .......... 217
Figure 44. Agreement/disagreement with the statement “I think it is a threat to the Arabic language” (Q25.4) against the various political ideology indices .............................................. 218
Figure 45. Attitudes to new VE messages against Egyptian identity ranks .................... 219
Figure 46. Agreement/disagreement with the statement “I think it is a threat to the Arabic language” (Q28.2) against the various political ideology indices .................................. 220
Figure 47. Attitudes to LA in movie billboards against Egyptian identity ranks .............. 221
Figure 48. Symmetry within the two-dimensional political spectrum .................................. 240
Figure 49. The relationship between Egypt's multiple elites ............................................. 250
List of Tables

Table 1. The research questions and where they will be answered........................................7
Table 2. The conditions of Arabic diglossia in Egypt .................................................................36
Table 3. Language myths in El-Sharkawi’s account of fuṣḥā, ʿāmmiyā and other colloquial Arabics..........................................................................................................................123
Table 4. Ideological topoi in the interviews with Malamih, LEP and ALCSs .........................155
Table 5. Percentage of male and female Internet users in Egypt in 2010 by education (Egypt ICT Indicators)..................................................................................................................175
Table 6. Cross tabulation of school type and the main language of education .................206
Table 7. Cross tabulation of survey language and the main language of education ..........206
Table 8. The main political ideologies/positions of the political parties/alliances running in the closed-list category of the 2011-2012 (lower house) parliamentary elections.........211
Table 9. The indexes of fuṣḥā, ʿāmmiyā and English in Egypt ..................................................263
Transcription and Spelling

- The Arabic transcriptions in this thesis are based primarily on the transcription scheme adopted by the *Encyclopedia of Arabic Language and Linguistics* (2008, Leiden: Brill), with the exception of one consonant (ẓ). However, while the Encyclopedia uses two different schemes for transcribing Standard Arabic and colloquial Arabic, I base mine on the former and follow it consistently. The following table lists the Arabic consonants with the corresponding transcription symbols.

<table>
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<th>Arabic</th>
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<td>ي</td>
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- In addition to these consonants, I use five short vowels (a, u, i, o, e) and five long vowels (ā, ū, ī, ō, ē) in my transcriptions.

- I do not use capitalisation in transcribing my interview transcripts. However, I use capitalisation in the transcription of proper names in the general text and the transcription of Arabic titles in the bibliography.
• I only transcribe the Arabic names of historical figures. The names of contemporary figures (e.g. politicians and authors) are spelled in the form most common on the Internet to make them more searchable.

• Where English words were used in the interviews, these are underlined in the transcripts.

• This thesis uses British English spelling throughout. For the sake of consistency, all quotes have been made to conform to British English spelling.

• Also for the sake of consistency, capitalisation within quoted text has sometimes been altered.
# List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

## Language Varieties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Classical Arabic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EA</td>
<td>Egyptian Arabic = ʿāmmiyya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EL</td>
<td>Egyptian Language</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESA</td>
<td>Educated Spoken Arabic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LA</td>
<td>Latinised Arabic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSA</td>
<td>Modern Standard Arabic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA</td>
<td>Standard Arabic = fuṣḥā</td>
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## Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALA</td>
<td>Arabic Language Academy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALCS</td>
<td>Arabic Language Conservation Society</td>
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<tr>
<td>ATS</td>
<td>Arabs’ Tongue Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUC</td>
<td>American University in Cairo</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAPMAS</td>
<td>Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDA</td>
<td>Critical Discourse Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMESA</td>
<td>Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETLS</td>
<td>Egyptian Translators and Linguists Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F&amp;J</td>
<td>Freedom &amp; Justice (party)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICT</td>
<td>Information and Communication Technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>ITU</td>
<td>International Telecommunication Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>IVR</td>
<td>Interactive Voice Response</td>
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<tr>
<td>LAS</td>
<td>League of Arab States</td>
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<td>LEP</td>
<td>Liberal Egyptian Party</td>
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<td>MB</td>
<td>Muslim Brotherhood</td>
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<tr>
<td>MCIT</td>
<td>Ministry of Communication and Information Technology (Egypt)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>National Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SES</td>
<td>Socio-Economic Status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPAL</td>
<td>Society of the Protectors of the Arabic Language</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VE</td>
<td>Vodafone Egypt</td>
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## Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>Eng</td>
<td>English</td>
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<td>H</td>
<td>High</td>
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<td>Low</td>
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## Glossing and transcribing abbreviations

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<td>first person</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>second person</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>third person</td>
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<td>female</td>
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<td>m</td>
<td>male</td>
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# Introduction

“IDEAS ARE CENTRAL TO THE NOTION OF REVOLUTION, FIRST BECAUSE ALL POLITICAL LIFE IS STRUCTURED IN TERMS OF IDEAS, SECOND BECAUSE REVOLUTION, AN ESSENTIALLY-CONTESTED CONCEPT, IS A LABEL ATTACHED TO EVENTS OR SEQUENCES OF EVENTS WHICH MEAN DIFFERENT THINGS TO DIFFERENT PEOPLE, AND THIRD BECAUSE THE VERY CONCEPT OF CHANGE, THE YARDSTICK WHICH PEOPLE USE TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT A REVOLUTION HAS OCCURRED, IS ITSELF CULTURALLY DETERMINED.”

Peter Calvert (1990: 77), Revolution and Counter-revolution

The language situation in Egypt has long been considered a classic case of diglossia, which is described by Ferguson (1959b: 336) as a “relatively stable language situation”. This description suggests that diglossia is a situation which is not easily amenable to change. However, a close look at the present language scene in Egypt demonstrates that it is anything but stable. I explain why this is so as I provide a background to the present research in Section 1.1. I then address why Egypt is considered ‘special’ in sociolinguistic terms and how this relates to the present research in Section 1.2. Finally, I list the research questions that this thesis aims to answer and outline the structure of the remainder of this thesis in Section 1.3.

## 1.1 Background: So much change

When I embarked on my research in 2010, Egypt’s official language policy had remained unchanged for the past sixty years but several developments since the turn of the century were shaping the language scene. Internet had become more widely available with a free Internet scheme launched in 2002 (Abdel-Hafez & Wahba, 2004) and the number of Egyptian Internet users continued to grow rapidly, reaching 23.02 million users at the end of 2010. Egypt’s Internet penetration rose from an insignificant 1% in 2000 to 29.5% ten years later with an average annual growth rate of 64% (MCIT, 2011). With the largest community of Internet users in the Arab World (MCIT, 2010), Egypt like many other countries was experiencing the linguistic side-effects of becoming more connected in today’s global world. While the Internet was
rapidly becoming more accessible, support for Arabic script was slow to follow. This prompted Arabic speakers to develop their own version of ‘Netspeak’ (cf. Crystal, 2006) which involved using Latin script to write (often colloquial) Arabic (Warschauer et al., 2002). Even as software support became more readily available, the use of Latinised Arabic (henceforth, LA) online did not seem to be decreasing; in fact, it was spreading to offline use. It was clear that this new linguistic form had become an icon of youth identity (Aboelezz, 2012).

Moreover, as Egypt entered a new global age, no one could “miss the growing importance of English as the language of development, education, business and technology” (Atia, 1999). This was demonstrated by the pervasive use of English in computer mediated communication (Warschauer et al. 2002), its significant spread in publishing (Aboelezz, 2012) and its rise as the language of choice in educated circles (Schaub, 2000). Many new International schools boasted education in English (Peterson, 2011), and several new private universities emerged lucratively offering education in foreign languages, which often translates into the absence of Arabic from curriculums.

Although the spread of Global English may be described as a universal phenomenon, and certainly one which has been reported in other Arabic speaking countries (see for example: Badry, 2011; Daoudi, 2011; Palfreyman & Al Khalil, 2003; Said, 2011), some of the linguistic developments Egypt was witnessing appeared unmatched anywhere else in the Arabic speaking world. Since the turn of the century, Egypt has been experiencing a boom in the publishing industry aided by a relaxation of publishing regulations (Atia, 1999). Tens of new periodicals appeared on the market, including many magazines in English, and others in a mixture of English and LA (Aboelezz, 2012). Egyptian Arabic (henceforth, EA), once frowned upon in print (Cachia, 1967), was rising in acceptability and popularity, particularly in publications aimed at young people. The surge in using EA in publishing is perhaps no better exemplified than by the launch in 2005 of a groundbreaking magazine, Ḩnā (henceforth, Ihna) which is written predominantly in EA in Arabic script (Borg, 2007; Dahle, 2012). Soon after, a publishing house called Malāmīḥ (henceforth, Malamih)
was established in 2007, and within three years had published tens of works for young Egyptian writers in English, EA, and English mixed with LA.

However, it was not only in print that EA was gaining a greater footing. In 2007, Vodafone Egypt, one of the biggest mobile service providers in Egypt, replaced its recorded service messages in Standard Arabic (henceforth, SA) with new messages in EA. With this move Vodafone Egypt became the first mobile provider in an Arabic-speaking country to use colloquial Arabic in its service messages. Another development was the emergence of the Liberal Egyptian Party in May 2008. The party emphasised the Egyptian ethnic identity, and called for the standardisation of the Egyptian vernacular as the national language of Egypt. In the same year, Wikipedia approved a proposal for the first (and to date only) version of the online encyclopaedia in an Arabic vernacular and Wikipedia Masry was officially launched at the end of 2008 (Panović, 2010).

**How is this language change?**

These developments at once question the diglossic distribution of functions in classical diglossia as well as challenge the ‘stable’ nature of diglossia. That is, changes in domains of use can be perceived as part and parcel of the natural process of language change. As Ferguson (1977: 9) himself notes, “all languages change in the course of time, and all speech communities change through time in respect to the functional allocations of the varieties of language used in them”. It may therefore be said that language can change on two levels: the first level is the structure of the language (lexicon, grammar, etc.), and the second is the use of the language. Even if we argue that the structure of the Arabic language has remained unchanged since pre-Islamic times, changes in the domains of use of Arabic demonstrate that, despite popular belief (cf. Elgibali, 1996), Arabic is in fact not immune to language change. Ferguson also notes that this latter type of change is usually fuelled by changes in users’ evaluations of language (cf. section 3.3).

Indeed, Boussofara-Omar (2008: 635) echoes Ferguson when she notes that “the ways in which members of a community use language as well as their beliefs about language varieties and their ways of speaking shift and change”. She calls for “a shift
from studying diglossia as a ‘relatively stable situation’ (Ferguson, 1959: 336) to diglossia as sets of practice” (2008: 635). While the present work is not a study of changes in the structure of the Arabic language, it is still a study in language change in that it investigates how the changes in language use outlined above relate to changes in users’ evaluations of language – that is, their language ideologies. Language ideologies can be “illuminated through a micro-analysis of linguistic structures in discourse and macro-analysis of the factors that lead to asymmetries in how languages are perceived” (Stadlbauer, 2010: 1). While it is difficult to conceive of doing the former without engaging at least in some small degree with the latter, it is possible to divide research on language ideologies in Arabic sociolinguistics along rough lines of micro and macro analyses. The present work is firmly positioned in the latter.

**More change**

However, this is not the limit of this work’s interaction with change. Despite the linguistic, technological and social changes which were clearly taking place in Egypt when I began my research in 2010, the political situation appeared quite stable – some might say stagnant. Egypt had been under the rule of Muhammad Hosni Mubarak for almost thirty years and the main political player (in effect, sole political player) was his National Democratic Party (henceforth, NDP). There were no prospects of political change on the horizon. Indeed, as I was collecting data in Egypt in the summer of 2010, the only real contenders for the presidential elections which were scheduled to take place the following year were Mubarak (already over 80) and his son, Gamal Mubarak.

However, one year into my research, a revolution¹ in 2011 signalled the onset of a period of drastic political change. The period spanning this research (2010-2014) witnessed multiple regime changes with a number of governments and interim

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¹ As pointed out in the quote at the beginning of this chapter, ‘revolution’ is an ‘essentially-contested concept’, and even more so the act of labelling it. Mehrez (2012: 1) states: “From ṭawra (revolution) to fawra (uprising) to inqilāb (coup) ... the very naming and framing of Egypt’s revolution attest to the complexity of its meanings and significations”. Since this work is a study in ideology, my primary concern is not what things are, but how they are perceived. Hence, while acknowledging the semantics of this label, I have opted to use the term ‘revolution’ because it translates from the term now ubiquitously used in Egyptian society: ṭawret xamsa w-īṣrīn yānāyir (the January 25 revolution).
governments, one parliamentary election, two presidential elections, and three constitutional referenda. These significant political changes inevitably influenced the research I carried out and for this reason, this thesis is not only about language ideology in Egypt, but about language ideology and change in revolutionary Egypt. One of the main contributions of this work is that it chronicles the interaction of political and language ideologies in Egypt at a time of significant political change.

1.2 What's Special about Egypt?

The language developments described in Section 1.1 suggest that there is something unique to EA and to the Egyptian context which is providing impetus to these rapid linguistic changes. To evaluate this, it is useful to turn to literature on Arabic for some clues. Egypt has always had a special place in Arabic sociolinguistics: there is an abundance of research on EA and on the language situation in Egypt. Indeed, one of the earliest Arabic sources entirely dedicated to studying a variety of colloquial Arabic was Yūsuf al-Maḡribī’s early 17th century manuscript Dafʿ al-Iṣr ‘an Kalām Ahl Miṣr [Lifting the Burden from the Speech of the People of Egypt] (cf. Zack, 2009). EA also attracted the attention of European Orientalists from the 18th century onwards (cf. Section 3.3.2.1). Indeed, the main examples of Arabic diglossia that Ferguson (1959b) gave when he introduced the concept of diglossia were from Egypt.

This scholarly attention that Egypt and EA received suggests the historical and cultural importance of Egypt. This importance has in turn conferred a kind of supra-local prestige on EA. For example, Mitchell (1982: 125) notes that “in the important case of Egypt, the colloquial usage of the cultured classes of the capital city provides spoken norms for the whole country”, “not to mention the frequent incorporation of Egyptian forms in the speech of non-Egyptians”. Elsewhere he alludes to “the degree of acquiescence to the widely known linguistic practices of Egypt” (p.137), stating that “Egypt has developed a standard colloquial language to whose norms educated ... speakers of other dialects conform” (p.134). He also notes that when misunderstandings occur between Arabic speakers of different origins, they “typically appeal either to more widely known regional forms, especially those of Egypt, or to those of M[odern] S[standard] A[rabic]” (Mitchell, 1986: 27).
In the same vein, Maamouri (1998) notes how school children in the Maghreb sometimes use EA forms in their writing under the impression that these forms actually belong to SA, and links this to Egypt’s media influence. Versteegh (2001: 139) cites a similar example from Yemen, where “foreigners who speak Arabic are automatically classed as Egyptians, and in communicating with them Yemenis will tend to use Egyptian words and even take over Egyptian morphology”. Versteegh (2001: 197) explains:

[EA] is universally known in the Arabphone world on account of the numerous Egyptian movies and soap-operas that are exported to all Arab countries. This has led to a situation where most people can understand the Egyptian dialect at least partly, but not the other way round. A second reason is the large number of Egyptian teachers working abroad: thousands of Egyptian teachers were invited to come to the North African countries after independence because of the shortage of people who could teach in Arabic. In recent times, many Egyptians have been working temporarily in the Gulf states and in Saudi Arabia.

The supra-local prestige of EA, together with its evident local prestige, go some way to explain language phenomena which have only been observed in Egypt. For example, Holes (2004: 380) notes that “written dialect in newspapers and magazines is limited to nonserious topics such as sport and fashion, and even here it is only in Egypt that this is at all common”. He also refers to the practice of mixing SA and EA in some published material and observes that this ‘mixed written style’ “appears to be confined to Egypt and points up once more the different attitude that Egyptians have to their native speech compared with that of other Arab nations” (Holes, 2004: 382). Versteegh makes a similar observation, noting that the favourable attitude towards EA is visible in a range of contexts. For instance, “speeches in the Egyptian parliament are often given in something approaching the colloquial language, which would be unheard of in other Arab countries” (2001: 196). Another example he provides is that in pan-Arabic conferences, “Egyptian delegates unhesitatingly use colloquialisms in their speech while delegates from other Arab countries do their best to avoid such colloquialisms at all costs” (2001: 197). Significantly, Versteegh (2001: 196) observes that it is not surprising that “of all Arab countries, Egypt is the
one with the most marked tendency towards the use of the dialect. Egypt has always been characterised by a large degree of regional nationalism aiming at the establishment of an Egyptian identity, and the Egyptian dialect is certainly an important component of this identity”. This important link between language and identity is a central theme in this work and one which I will seek to explore in my discussions.

1.3 Research questions and thesis structure

In light of the foregoing discussions, the main purpose of this thesis is to understand the developing language situation in Egypt by investigating the motives behind some of the changes described in Section 1.1 and exploring how they are received by language users and protectors of SA. The role that ideology plays in the motives and evaluations of these changes is central to the investigation. The aim is to then use the findings to present a contemporary understanding of the relationship between language and ideology, reassess the applicability of the diglossic model in Egypt, and engage with other important concepts such as identity and power on a theoretical level. Table 1 outlines the main research questions that this thesis aims to answer and the chapter where each question will be addressed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research Question</th>
<th>Where it is answered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>RQ1:</strong> What motivates pro-ʿammīyya agents of change? What role does ideology play?</td>
<td><strong>CHAPTER 4</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RQ2:</strong> How are the recent changes perceived by pro-fuṣḥā resisters of change? How is this linked to their ideologies?</td>
<td><strong>CHAPTER 4</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RQ3:</strong> What are the attitudes of language users towards the recent changes and how are these attitudes related to the users’ identities and language practices?</td>
<td><strong>CHAPTER 5</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RQ4:</strong> How can the findings further our understanding of the language situation in Egypt?</td>
<td><strong>CHAPTER 6</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. The research questions and where they will be answered

I have attempted to maintain a kind of chronology in the thesis, so that the reader is brought up to speed as they proceed through the thesis, with the latter chapters
painting the most recent picture of events and language developments in Egypt. The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows:

**CHAPTER 2** focuses on diglossia. In the first part, I provide a historical overview of the Arabic language and the Arabicisation of Egypt with particular attention to the origins and development of diglossia. In the second part, I elucidate what is meant by diglossia as a linguistic concept. Here, I outline Ferguson’s diglossic model and provide a review of expansions and criticisms of the model. I address the relationship between diglossia and language shift, and discuss the different conceptualisations that Arabic linguists have offered of the Arabic language situation, the frequent problematisation of the situation, and native speakers’ awareness of this situation.

In **CHAPTER 3**, I focus on language policy, ideology and practices. I demonstrate that the three terms are closely intertwined and must therefore be discussed together. Under language policy, I discuss the post World War II Arabicisation policies in newly independent Arab countries and issues of language planning and standardisation. I then address language ideology – to which the bulk of the chapter is dedicated. I cover language myths about Arabic and discuss the issue of identity – particularly national identity – at length. Finally, I discuss language practices in Egypt and point to the evident discrepancy between language ideologies and practices.

The first two RQs are addressed in **CHAPTER 4**. To answer RQ1, I conducted three interviews with (representatives of) pro-'āmmiyā agents of change: the Liberal Egyptian Party, Malamih publishing house and Vodafone Egypt. To answer RQ2 I conducted a focus group interview with three pro-fushā resisters of change: representatives of three prominent Arabic language conservation societies in Egypt. I subject the interviews to discourse analysis to investigate how ideology is configured into the interviewees’ arguments – if at all. These interviews were conducted in the summer of 2010.

In **CHAPTER 5**, I explain how a web-based survey of language attitudes and practices of Cairo-based Internet users was designed to address RQ3. I provide a review of the methodology, outlining the advantages and drawbacks of this research method. I then define the population and outline the process of designing, testing and piloting
the survey. Finally, I present the survey analysis and results and acknowledge the limitations of the findings. The survey was carried out in 2012-2013.

CHAPTER 6 addresses RQ4. I paint a more up to date picture of the language situation in Egypt in 2014 and use the findings from the interviews and the survey – along with the relevant literature – to make sense of the language changes in Egypt. I begin by addressing the question of identity and emphasise the prominence of this question at the time of writing. I then adapt existing theories to offer a theoretical framing of the relationship between language and power in Egypt. Finally, I revisit Ferguson’s diglossic model and offer an alternative way of framing diglossia in Egypt by expanding a recently proposed model by Bassiouny (2014).

I conclude the thesis in CHAPTER 7 where I summarise the main contributions of this thesis, reflect on my position as a researcher, and highlight avenues for future research.
2 Diglossia in Arabic: History and Theory

“Later on, corruption affected the language of the Mudar, whose forms, and whose rules governing the vowel endings, had been systematised (as the pure Arabic language). The various later dialects differed according to the (more or less close) contact with (non-Arabs) and the (larger or smaller) admixture of non-Arab (elements). As a result, the Bedouin Arabs themselves came to speak a language completely different from that of their Mudar ancestors with regard to vowel endings, and different in many respects with regard to the (conventional) meanings and forms of words. Among the urban population, too, another language originated, which was different from that of the Mudar with regard to vowel endings, as well as most meanings and grammatical inflections. It differs also from the language of present-day Arab Bedouins. Again, it differs within itself according to the (different) terminologies of the inhabitants of the various regions. Thus, the urban population of the East speaks a dialect different from that of the Maghribis. And the language of the urban population in Spain differs from both of them.”

Ibn Khaldun (1967 [1377]: 456), *Muqaddima*

2.1 Introduction

Notwithstanding the special relationship that Egyptians have with their colloquial (Section 1.2), Egypt tends to be indiscriminately regarded as part and parcel of the Arabic linguistic community. Although discrepancies are occasionally acknowledged, the Arabic speaking world is, more often than not, crudely treated as one homogenous entity with comparable characteristics. As a result, some of the generalisations made about the Arabic speaking world (as a linguistic community) can be very misleading when applied to individual cases (speech communities) such as Egypt (cf. Ferguson, 1991). Throughout the present work, I seek to highlight how the language situation in Egypt diverges from generalisations that have been made about the Arabic speaking world.

However, in spite of any such divergences, Egypt irrefutably shares with the rest of the Arabic-speaking world a historical chapter which saw the arrival of the Arabic
language in Egypt. It is therefore necessary to trace the roots of this language, once restricted to the Arabian Peninsula, and to examine how it has come to be the adopted language of a much wider geographical space today. Such an examination is instrumental to an understanding of the origin of Arabic diglossia and the emergence of different regional varieties of Arabic. It is then important to grapple with the very concept of diglossia; to understand what exactly it means as a linguistic term.

Hence, this chapter begins with two sections on the history of diglossia, while the remainder of the chapter is dedicated to discussing the theory of diglossia. I begin in Section 2.2 by providing an overview of the history of the Arabic language, outlining its fortunes and misfortunes under the Islamic empire. This is a mostly chronological account, with intermittent discussions of how various events influenced the language. I then focus on the history of Arabic in Egypt in Section 2.3, describing the linguistic situation in Egypt before and after Islam, discussing the substratal influence of Coptic, and examining linguistic developments during the modern era as a link to the contemporary language situation. Together, these two sections serve as a necessary prologue to the following sections where diglossia is addressed from a theoretical point of view.

In Section 2.4, I explain diglossia as a linguistic concept – as defined by Charles Ferguson (1959b) – and review the expansions and criticisms of other linguists. In Section 2.5, I discuss the relationship between diglossia and language shift, which has an important bearing on the present research. I then explain some of the key terminology pertaining to diglossia in Arabic in Section 2.6. In Section 2.7, I discuss different perspectives about the distance between the two diglossic poles and different approaches to studying the intermediate varieties. In Section 2.8, I discuss how and why diglossia has been problematised in the literature, with a particular focus on its effect on education. Finally, I discuss speakers’ awareness of diglossia in Section 2.9 before concluding with a summary of the key points from this chapter in Section 2.10.
2.2 A history of Arabic and the origins of diglossia

Arabic is a Semitic language; this refers to a group of languages which belong to the Afro-Asiatic family of languages (cf. Ryding, 2005; Versteegh, 2001). All the other groups in the Afro-Asiatic family comprise languages indigenous to North Africa. It is therefore the Semitic group which accounts for the ‘Asiatic’ in the Afro-Asiatic family, as it was originally the most Easterly based of its sister languages: covering the Levant, the Fertile Crescent and the Arabian Peninsula. The languages of the Semitic subfamily, which are thought to descend from a single “Proto-Semitic” language (Versteegh, 2001), include extinct members such as Phoenician, endangered languages such Aramaic, and survivors such as Hebrew and Arabic. Of these, Arabic is the language in widest use today serving as “the native language of over 200 million people in twenty different countries as well as the liturgical language for over a billion Muslims throughout the world” (Ryding, 2005: 1).

The development of the Arabic language may be divided into five stages: Old Arabic (or Proto-Arabic), Early Arabic, Classical Arabic, Middle Arabic and Modern Arabic (Ryding, 2005). The evidence which survives from the first period (approximately 7th Century BC to 3rd Century AD) is very scarce, and carries little information about the structure of the language. Speculations have been made about the presence of an early form of Arabic in inscriptions which were found in Central Arabia and date as far back as the 6th century BC (Versteegh, 2001), but the earliest evidence of the existence of Arabic as a distinct language seems to lie in an inscription which has been dated back to the first century AD (Holes, 2004). The second stage spans a period of about three centuries, during which Arabic underwent some transitional changes through contact with the surrounding cultures (with Aramaic having a notable influence in the arrangement of the Arabic alphabet) and evolved into a closer semblance of Classical Arabic (Ryding, 2005; Versteegh, 2001).

It is perhaps the Classical period which was the most crucial to the development of Arabic. The earliest evidence from this period survives in pre-Islamic poetry from the 6th century AD which was preserved through an active tradition of oral transmission until it was finally recorded in writing in the 8th century AD (Holes, 2004). During this period, reciting poetry was a highly refined and much admired formal art and tribal
custom. Even at this early stage, there is general agreement among Arab and Western linguists that some regional variation had precipitated in dialectal varieties of Arabic, although it is maintained that such variation would have consisted mostly of minor lexical and phonetic differences which did not interfere with mutual intelligibility (Altoma, 1969; Badawi, 1973; Holes, 2004; Versteegh, 1996; Zakariyya, 1964). It is speculated that the literary koiné of poetic production, though not far removed from the native varieties, would have been used alongside them (Ferguson, 1959a).

Badawi (1973) subscribes to this theory. He acknowledges the claim made by medieval Muslim grammarians to linguistic purity during the pre-Islamic period, stating that the Bedouins of the time spoke ‘perfect’ or ‘sound’ Arabic innately² (this is commonly referred to as the theory of linguistic purity). However, Badawi tells us that linguistic evidence and accounts presented by some of the very same grammarians suggests a contradicting reality. The grammarians had set up a dialectal hierarchy in which the Arabic of the tribe of Quraysh constituted the most perfect variety (Holes, 2004; Versteegh, 1996), inevitably implying some degree of linguistic variation among the tribes and regions of Arabia (Versteegh, 2001). Strictly speaking, such a situation corresponds to what Ferguson (1991) would call a case of “standard-with-dialects” where the standard variety is the mother tongue for a group of people who use it for everyday conversation. However, Badawi goes even further to speculate that the Bedouin tribes had two levels of speech: the varying native vernaculars which were used for everyday communication within the tribes, and a somewhat uniform literary variety for poetic production and formal cross-tribal communication (Badawi, 1973: 19-22). It is the latter, Badawi states “which was the seed of a common language, or ‘Arabic’ [al-ʿarabiyya] as it later came to be known” (p. 20). Badawi describes this situation as ‘linguistic duality’ (izdiwājiyyat al-luḡa), which corresponds to what is known in Western linguistics as diglossia.

The view that the origins of diglossia stem from pre-Islamic Arabia is supported by Elgibali (1996) and Anis (2003 [1973]). According to Elgibali (1996: 8-9), “to presume that Classical Arabic was the native language of any speaker either immediately

² The Arabic expression they used was bi-l-saliqa, literally meaning innately or by nature.
before or at the time of the inception of Islam is, a gross misrepresentation. The texts transmitted to us belong to a literary genre, which was not identifiable with any one native tongue”. Anis argues that this literary language, which drew many of its features from the dialect of Quraysh, was in fact an amalgamation of other Arabic dialects as well: it was a sophisticated poetic *koine* recognised by the Arab tribes of the region and used in oratory competitions, but not itself the native tongue of any one tribe. Eglibali (1996: 9) posits that “it is more reasonable to believe that the literary language emerged as a selective composite and an eclectic blend, marking its manifestations unfit to be considered a valid representation of a homogeneous linguistic competence of a given speech community”. This elevated variety was hence a learned variety, one which was manipulated by tribal elites who would compete in the mastery of intricacies. As Elgibali (1996: 10) observes, “one can easily imagine the importance of such mastery in a society dominated by oral tradition”. He adds that the “history of Arabic abounds with anecdotal evidence of how learning the Classical language has always been a noble yet unattainable goal” (Elgibali, 1996: 12).

The central event which would shape the fate of Arabic did not occur until the 7th Century AD with the emergence of Islam. Muhammad, the prophet of Islam, was born in the year 570 AD in Mecca. From 610 AD and until he died in 632 (22 years), Muhammad preached Islam. At the core of his message was a divine revelation, the *Qur‘ān* (henceforth, Quran), a text which was not only considered the literal word of God, but is considered by multitudes today to constitute Arabic in its purest form; Arabic was “permanently sacralised” (Ryding, 2005: 3). Though differing in stylistic and general textual structure, the Quran is thought to be formulated in the poetic variety of pre-Islamic Arabia (Badawi, 1973; Holes, 2004; Versteegh, 1996). Muhammad was himself from *Quraysh*, an important tribe in Hijāz, the eastern part of the peninsula. It is therefore little wonder that later Muslim grammarians would rank the dialect of Hijāz highest among the pre-Islamic dialects of the Arabian Peninsula (Holes, 2004; Versteegh, 1996).

Soon after Muhammad’s death, his followers recognised the need to preserve the Quran as many of the reciters of the Quran were dying in battle and the increasing
number of followers from outside the Peninsula was resulting in deviant readings of
the Quran (Versteegh, 2001). The codification process was a long and thorough
process overseen by an appointed committee of text editors who had to make many
decisions at the linguistic-level. The first unified text of the Quran, *al-muṣḥaf*, was
completed during the time of the third Caliph, ʿuṯmān bin ʿaffān (r. 644-656) and was
sent to the corners of the fast-growing Islamic empire to displace all deviant texts. *Al-
muṣḥaf* is believed to be the product of the first effort to standardise the Arabic
orthography which included the adoption of diacritic dots to distinguish between
similar letters, a convention which was already in use by some Arabic scribes and
which is thought to have been borrowed from Syriac (ibid.). Other innovations in the
orthography included the introduction of red dots to denote short vowels by Abū al-
Aswad al-Duʿalī, who is traditionally credited with the invention of Arabic grammar
and who also invented the šadda (gemination sign) and the *hamza* (glottal stop). The
development of the system for denoting short vowels into a closer semblance of the
short vowel diacritics of modern Arabic is attributed to the first Arabic lexicographer,
al-Khalīl bin Aḥmad al-Farāḥīdī in the eighth century (ibid.).

Within a century of Muhammad’s death, his followers had formed an empire that
stretched from Persia to Spain, and wherever Islam went, Arabic did too. In fact, it is
indicated that “the first main cultural transformation that occurred after the
establishment of the Islamic empire had more to do with language than with
religion” (Dallal, 1999: 158). While Muslims remained a minority for several centuries
in many parts of the empire (including Egypt), Arabic, the official language of the
empire, was gaining rapidly. In the eighth century, Arabic began to replace Greek to
the West and Persian to the East as the language of administration (Versteegh 2001),
but recognising the prominence of the Greek and Persian cultures, translations from
these languages would later abound, introducing many Greek and Persian loanwords
which survive in Arabic to this day (Holes, 2004). In these early centuries following
Islam, Classical Arabic was not only used as a written language, but also served as
“the spoken language of the élite in formal situations” (Versteegh, 1996: 17).
Between the eighth and the twelfth centuries, Arabic became the language of a great
body of cultural and scientific production which thrived under the Islamic empire.
Indeed, it is argued that what is often dubbed “Islamic sciences” should be more accurately designated “Arabic sciences” because of the central role that the Arabic language played in the development of these sciences (Dallal, 1999). Many of the scholars who wrote in Arabic were not Arab, and some were not even Muslim.

One particular science was quick to flourish; that of Quranic exegesis. The close analysis of the Quran often entailed a linguistic analysis of the text, and soon enough, some scholars began to focus primarily on the language of the text itself rather than its contents (Versteegh, 1997). This was coupled with a growing concern for the Arabic language; medieval grammarians believed that the rapid acquisition of the Arabic language by non-native speakers of Arabic in the wake of the Islamic conquests had resulted in the ‘corruption of speech’ (fasād al-kalām) (Badawi, 1973; Versteegh, 1996, 1997). Grammatical mistakes in assigning the wrong case endings to words were often reported and bitterly criticised by grammarians who took measures to preserve the unity of the language. In the eighth century, the first text to comprehensively compile and describe the rules of Arabic grammar was written by Sībawayh (c.a. 752–c.a. 796), a Persian scholar who studied Arabic in Iraq and was one of al-Farāhīdī’s students (Carter, 2004). Kitāb Sībawayh (Sībawayh’s book), so called because its author died without giving it a name, is still considered by many today as the ultimate reference on Arabic grammar.

Notwithstanding contemporary views concerning the pre-Islamic origins of diglossia, it is worth noting that, to the Arabic Grammarians, there was only one Arabic language; it was used in everyday communication by the tribes of pre-Islamic Arabia, and it is the same language in which the Quran was revealed (Versteegh, 1996). While the Grammarians acknowledged regional linguistic variation among the tribes of Arabia, this was regarded as “equivalent expressions with approximately the same status” (Versteegh, 1996: 16). For centuries after Islam, noblemen would send their children to live with Bedouin tribes so that they may learn to fight and speak ‘proper Arabic’. It was also common for the Arab grammarians of the time to consult Bedouins in arbitrating linguistic questions, suggesting that Classical Arabic (as defined by the grammarians) survived for some time as a living language which was natively spoken by at least some tribal groups. However, over time, the forms put
forth by grammarians as supposedly spoken by a group of people – through expressions like “the Arabs say” – “lost [their] connotation of actual intercourse with living speakers of the Classical language who could be consulted in case of doubt, and it came to denote a methodological fiction” (Versteegh, 1996: 18). The work of the early grammarians was essentially prescriptive; indicating how people should speak (Versteegh, 1996). That the grammarians had to go to such lengths to prescribe how Arabic ought to be spoken is itself proof that whatever core of native speakers the Arabic language had, this was rapidly diminishing.

By the 13th century the Arabic Islamic empire was past its prime. Already weakened by the emergence of independent dynasties and the Crusaders’ inroads, it suffered additional blows from the Mongol invasions in the 13th century (Smith, 1999). This weakened state culminated in the fall of Granada, the last Muslim stronghold in Spain in 1491 and the subsequent expulsion of Muslims from the Iberian Peninsula. What happened to Arabic under the disintegrating empire was perhaps the early Arabic grammarians’ worst nightmare. For one thing, this disintegration symbolised the declining prestige of Arabic. With the loss of Andalucía in Spain, the Islamic world had lost an important centre of cultural exchange (peaking in the 10th century) for which Arabic was the main vehicle of expression (ibid.). Under the independent dynasties in the East, Farsi (a new form of Persian heavily influenced by Arabic) was already replacing Arabic as the language of the court from the 9th century and became the main language of culture in the 10th century. The fall of Baghdad, another Islamic cultural centre, to the Mongols in 1258 undermined the status of Arabic and contributed indirectly to the newfound prestige of Farsi in the entire Islamic East (Lapidus, 1999; Versteegh, 2001). Arabic continued to be revered as the language of Islam, but even as Islam spread further into central and South East Asia, it did so through Farsi (Lapidus, 1999).

Simultaneously, a new force began to emerge from the 14th century onwards: that of the Ottomans. The Ottomans expanded in every direction, annexing to the Islamic empire new territories in Eastern Europe. In its geographical scope; the Ottoman Empire was the greatest of Islamic Empires, reaching the height of its expansion in the 17th century (Lapidus, 1999). The Ottomans were Turkish-speakers and enforced
Turkish as the language of government and administration throughout the empire. As in Persia and further to the East, Arabic continued to function as the language of religion. It was also the language of most cultural production, and crucially, it continued to be the language of the populace in the Arab provinces where less than one percent of the population spoke Turkish (Versteegh, 2001). Turkish became a language which influenced Arabic in the long term, but was also permanently influenced by it.

The above changes fall in the timeframe of what is sometimes known as the stage of Middle Arabic. However, definitions of the time span of ‘Middle Arabic’ vary widely; it extends from (as early as) the 8th century to the end of the 18th century according to some linguists (cf. Versteegh, 2001), while other linguists delimit it to the period from the 13th to the 18th centuries (Ryding, 2005). Holes (2004: 37) does not rule out the possibility of tracing “the developments in Middle Arabic through time”, while Versteegh (2001: 114) argues that “it would ... be a mistake to assign any chronological connotation to the term ‘Middle Arabic’”, and uses it as a “collective name for all texts with deviations from Classical grammar”. In light of this ambiguity, Middle Arabic is perhaps more usefully treated as a developmental phase rather than a time period. However, it is useful to draw parallels between Middle Arabic and what Chejne (1969) terms “the period of decline” of Arabic: from 1258 to 1800

Studies of Middle Arabic usually focus on examining the influence of colloquial Arabic in written texts, though this is not always easy since many texts will have possibly undergone various degrees of editing and ‘correction’ over time, and because the written texts available for study are not proportionately available from all regions of the empire (Holes, 2004; Versteegh, 2001). The general assumption about this stage, however, is that while the literary standard codified by the Classical grammarians remained morphologically and lexically intact, save for borrowings from the substrate languages, the vernaculars experienced morphological simplifications most visible in the loss of inflections and grammatical distinctions.

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3 Chejne (1969) divides the history of Arabic under the Islamic empire into three periods: development (661-750), growth (750-1258) and decline (1258-1800).
The 14th century Tunisian scholar, Ibn Khaldūn (1332-1406) – who is quoted at the beginning of this chapter – testifies to this in his *Muqadimma* (1377), observing that the language of his time is different from that which was codified by the early grammarians (Ibn Khaldun, 1967 [1377]). Ibn Khaldūn is clearly a proponent of the theory of the pre-Islamic purity of Arabic, and attributes any deviation from Classical Arabic to contact with the non-Arabs. He believed that the Arabs had lost their innate ability to speak their language properly when they left Arabia and settled among the non-Arabs; the more contact they had with the non-Arabs the more ‘corrupt’ their language became. Crucially, Ibn Khaldūn notes that the Arabic spoken in his time has lost many of its grammatical inflections and that it has been phonologically influenced by contact with non-Arabs. He also notes regional variation in Arabic, observing that the Arabic spoken by the people of the East (who have been influenced by Persian and Turkish) is different from that which is spoken by the people of the West (who have been influenced by Berber). All the same, Ibn Khaldūn remarks that the Arabic language is just as eloquent in his time as when it was codified by the Classical grammarians (in a clear reference to the literary variety which had retained its Classical features). We may infer from this that Middle Arabic reflects a stage during which the Arabic vernaculars shifted further from the literary standard and grew further apart from one another; a period where distinct regional varieties began to emerge and diglossia became more pronounced.

Although the traditional theory of the purity of pre-Islamic Arabic was “dogmatic in its view of Arabic as a static language”, “not surprisingly, the language itself – unheeded by theoretical prescriptiveness or squabbles – has ceaselessly continued its own journey of change into a multitude of often interrelated and overlapping regional, ethnic, religious, and social varieties” (Elgibali, 1996: 4). What the well-meaning classical grammarians had effectively done, according to Badawi (1973: 38-41), was “freeze” Arabic in its 7th century form, isolating it from successive waves of change. For a language to remain accessible to the ears and tongues of its people the parallelism between the language and society must be maintained so that the language continues to reflect the civilisation of its speakers; but the grammarians could not possibly freeze the Arab civilisation even if they had tried. By defining
sound Arabic so precisely and distinctively, the early grammarians had unintentionally defined two languages instead of one: one which falls within the prescribed boundaries of the language, and one which falls outside them; i.e. eloquent Arabic (fuṣḥā), and the Arabic of the populace (‘āmmiyya). The grammarians had chained the first with linguistic rules, but left the other to roam freely; an image which is romanticised by Badawi (1973: 40):

Fuṣḥā remained in her abode waiting for someone to knock on her door; to seek her where she is, yielding to her demands. If she ever does answer a bold call to come out, she does so hesitantly, in her codified boundaries, and after close inspection of what is permissible and what is not. She does that, if at all, with her eyes forever gazing backwards while the society and those around her are continually moving in the opposite direction. On the other hand, ‘āmmiyya – or that which is not fuṣḥā – kept up with society and fulfilled its every need. She lived in people’s homes, shared their beds, mixed with them in their affairs, closed their deals, rejoiced with them, condoled with them, expressed their innermost emotions and pulsated to their heartbeats. (translated)

However, literary Arabic has not remained completely unchanged since its codification as the above analogy might suggest. The Arabic of the modern period (Modern Standard Arabic; henceforth MSA), which begins approximately from the end of the 18th century, differs markedly from Classical Arabic (henceforth CA). Though MSA is a continuation of the same literary tradition and is morphologically very similar to CA, there is a discernable difference in style and vocabulary reflecting different historical and cultural traditions (Ryding, 2005), (cf. Section 2.6). The cultural changes to which the difference between CA and MSA can be attributed were largely a by-product of the European colonisation which swept through the Islamic world in the 19th century bringing the waning Ottoman Empire to an end and thereby concluding this chapter in the common history of the Arabic-speaking world.

Colonial forces in the Near East were mainly Italian, French or British, though the purpose, manner and length of colonisation differed widely between colonisers and colonies. It was not until the end of World War II that the region became completely independent of European colonisation, although the colonisers maintained a cultural
hold on their former colonies (Nasr, 1999). The extent and nature of the cultural influence of colonisation across the Arabic speaking world was not uniform, though a shared feature is the plethora of foreign borrowings into the Arabic vernaculars from the respective languages of the colonisers (examples include the influence of Italian on Libyan, French on Syrian and Lebanese, and English on Gulf Arabic) (cf. Holes, 2004). However, the most lasting legacy of the colonial era has perhaps been the division of the Islamic and Arab World into territorial nation-states. As the newly found states walked down separate paths of history, they continued to diverge politically and culturally as well as linguistically. I will return to this point in history in the next chapter when I discuss Arabicisation policies in the newly found Arab states (Section 3.2.2), but I shall now rewind and zoom in on the country which is the focus of the present study: Egypt.

2.3 The Arabisation of Egypt

Pre-Islamic Egypt was inhabited by a polyglot society, mostly concentrated in the Nile Valley and Delta, but also populating some of the desert and less arable land to the East (Holes, 2004). The ancient city of Alexandria was the capital of Egypt as well as a major trade port in the Mediterranean. Before the arrival of Islam, the majority of Egyptians were Monophysite Christians who spoke Coptic, a descendent of Ancient Egyptian and a language which, like Arabic, belongs to the Afro-Asiatic family. However, Coptic is not a Semitic language; in other words, if Arabic and Hebrew were sisters, Coptic would be their ‘cousin’ (cf. Holes, 2004; Versteegh, 2001). In Pre-Islamic Egypt, written Coptic, which was heavily influenced by the Greek alphabet, was used in liturgy and in some limited administrative functions. As was the case in Syria, Egypt had been under the political control of the Byzantine emperors for several centuries and Greek was the main language of administration. Arabic had also been on the scene for some time through the migration of Arab Bedouins to the eastern and north-eastern parts of Egypt over a number of centuries. Greek historians record that parts of this region had undergone some degree of Arabicisation by as early as 66 BC (Holes, 2004).

Islam arrived in Egypt in 639 AD within less than a decade of Muhammad’s death. Upon their arrival in Egypt, Arabs set up their garrisontown in Fusṭāt (literally
meaning ‘camp’, now situated in Old Cairo) which subsequently became the new Egyptian capital and developed into an important commercial and cultural centre for the Islamic empire (Donner, 1999). Initially, the ‘province’ of Egypt also included Spain and North Africa (present day Libya, Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco), though these became separate provinces in 705. Around this time, Arabic became the language of administration in Egypt (Holes, 2004; Versteegh, 2001). Although the population of Egypt remained predominantly Christian for several centuries, this administrative change sped up the Arabicisation of Egypt as it meant that Coptic administrators had to learn Arabic if they were to retain their jobs (Al-Sayyid Marsot, 2007). Other developments which took place between the 9th and 12th centuries also favoured the spread of Arabic. These included the large scale conversion into Islam by Egyptian Copts, influxes of Arab migrants into Egypt and the disbanding of the Arab army which allowed Arab garrisons to mix with and marry from the local population (Holes, 2004).

From the beginning, Egypt occupied an important position in the Islamic empire, but its importance was increased dramatically under the rule of the Fatimid caliphs (969-1171) who came from North Africa and made Egypt the seat of their caliphate. The Fatimids formed their capital next to Fusṭāṭ in al-Qāhira (literally meaning ‘the victorious’), giving Cairo its modern name (Donner, 1999). The new capital soon became home to al-Azhar, a great mosque and educational centre which would attract scholars from around the Islamic world and play a substantial role in advancing Arabic and Islamic studies for centuries to come. During this period, Egypt continued to enjoy a reasonable degree of autonomy having already developed a distinct provincial identity under earlier Abbassid rulers: “While an inhabitant of Egypt identified himself as an inhabitant of a village or town, as a member of a religious community, and as being of a specific ethnicity – native Egyptian or Egyptianised Arab – he also recognised the existence of a fixed territory called Egypt to which he belonged” (Al-Sayyid Marsot, 2007: 8).

While Arabic was gaining quickly in towns and urban centres, the Arabicisation of the countryside was much slower. Coptic continued to be used as a liturgical language by Coptic Christians, but in general as the number of Arabic-speakers increased, that of
Coptic speakers decreased. This triggered the concern of members of the Coptic clergy such as Sāwīrīs ibn al-Muqaffa (d. 987), who complained in his history of the patriarchs that most Copts could no longer understand Coptic and could only communicate in Arabic (Gamal El-Din, 2006). Recognising the endangered status of Coptic, dictionaries and grammars of the language began to emerge during the 13th century in an effort to preserve and revitalise the language, but by the 16th century the language was all but extinct (Holes 2004). It was ultimately reduced to a liturgical language, though one which is still used today by Egypt’s Christian Copts who make up approximately ten percent of the population (Al-Sayyid Marsot, 2007). Versteegh (2001) notes that the period of Coptic/Arabic bilingualism in Lower Egypt lasted for about two centuries, which was shorter than the period of bilingualism in Syria and thinks that this may explain the surprisingly limited influence of Coptic on EA.

2.3.1 The substratal influence of Coptic

In the 1960’s, Wilson Bishai wrote a series of articles on the substratal influence of Coptic on EA (Bishai, 1960, 1961, 1962, 1964). In terms of phonology, Bishai (1961) demonstrates that the influence of Coptic was very limited, and where plausible is restricted to dialects of Upper Egypt (a region of Egypt in which Islam and Arabic were later and slower to penetrate). For instance, he notes that the /p/ sound which occurred in Coptic but not in Classical Arabic, had been replaced by /b/ in EA and has re-emerged only recently as a result of contact with European languages. Similarly, the /g/ sound, which is iconic of EA and occurs in the same distribution as the Classical Arabic /dʒ/, cannot be traced back to Coptic where this sound was not common. Other phonological features of EA which set it apart from the phonology of Classical Arabic are often found in similar distribution in other, sometimes distant, Arabic vernaculars suggesting internal developments in the language or a more general process of second language acquisition rather than a substratal influence of Coptic (Versteegh, 2001). For instance, Versteegh notes that the interdentals of Classical Arabic have shifted to dentals in Egyptian Arabic, a feature which is sometimes attributed to Coptic influence. However, because the disappearance of interdentals is part of a widespread phenomenon where marked phonemes were

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4 Better known in the West as Severus of Eshmunein.
replaced by unmarked phonemes in the sedentary Arabic vernaculars (including areas well beyond the influence of Coptic), Versteegh deems it unlikely that this development took place in consequence to Coptic influence.

In terms of grammar, the only two clear influences of Coptic appear to be in the morphological pattern of using 'a plus a personal pronoun prefixing a verb in order to indicate a special kind of past tense in EA and in the use of the particle ma plus the imperfect form of a verb to indicate a special kind of imperative (Bishai, 1962). In both cases, these features occur regularly in Coptic and are not paralleled in any of the other Arabic vernaculars. Bishai also makes a compelling case for Coptic influence on the word order of interrogative sentences in EA. In EA, like Coptic, the interrogative pronoun is delayed to the end of the interrogative phrase whereas it is fronted in Classical Arabic – delaying the interrogative pronoun in Classical Arabic and fronting it in Coptic or EA present marked constructions. Bishai acknowledges the refutations of earlier linguists who believed that inconsistency in the occurrence of this phenomenon and its occurrence in other Arabic vernaculars make Coptic influence an unlikely explanation. However, Bishai demonstrates that the occurrence of the interrogative pronoun in the final position after the verb as a governed element agrees fully with Coptic against Classical Arabic and other Arabic vernaculars. Versteegh (2001: 106) too points out that this feature sets EA apart from other spoken varieties of Arabic and is likely attributed to Coptic, but he posits that this is an instance of language interference which “may have consisted not in the emergence of new phenomena but in the tipping of the balance towards one of two existing alternatives”. The other grammatical features discussed by Bishai (1962) are either more characteristic of Upper Egyptian dialects, or their relation to Coptic is at best probable. For instance, Bishai attributes the use of 'an (of) instead of min (from) in expressing comparative relationships in Egyptian Arabic to a similar usage in Coptic. However, he concedes that both constructions are used in Egyptian Arabic with min being more common in Lower Egypt, and that the use of 'an for comparisons in Classical Arabic is not entirely uncommon. He also acknowledges that Turkish also uses the equivalent of 'an for the same function, making it a possible source for this feature.
The number of words in the lexicon of Egyptian Arabic which may be attributed to Coptic ancestry is again very limited though easier to substantiate (Bishai, 1964). Bishai provides a list of words which are of Coptic origin, but the majority of these would probably appear alien to most speakers of EA today. This is because many of these words are restricted to dialects of Upper Egypt, while others are of specialised use in the Coptic Church. This, as Bishai (1964: 47) notes, “leaves the number of Coptic loanwords used commonly in Egyptian Arabic smaller still; they mainly include names of various kinds of fish, vulgarisms, and names of cooking utensils and foods not used in Arabia”. He even observes that a language such as Turkish, which was never a vernacular of Egypt, has left a more profound impression on the Egyptian Arabic lexicon, echoing Versteegh’s (2001) marvel at the surprisingly small number of Coptic loanwords in Egyptian Arabic.

It therefore appears to be in grammar where the influence of Coptic may be most felt, and even here it is restricted and in some cases hypothetical. Hence, with limited grammatical influence, minimal lexical influence and negligible phonetic influence, the role that Coptic played in the development of EA was very low overall.

Bishai (1960: 229) arrives at his own explanation for this:

The limited influence of Coptic on Egyptian Arabic can only be explained as lack of widespread bilingualism in Egypt during the transition from Coptic to Arabic. This leads to the conclusion that the Copts who were converted to Islam at any one time must have been a minor segment of the population. To judge from linguistic criteria alone, the Muslim Egyptians of today are perhaps right in claiming predominantly Arab ancestry.

### 2.3.2 The decline, revival and reform of Arabic in Egypt

The history of the Arabicisation of Egypt under the Islamic empire did not always proceed at the same pace, and it encountered a few setbacks along the way. Even when the language of administration was Arabic, Egypt was not always ruled by Arabs; the Ayyubids (1171-1250) were Kurdish, while the Mamluks (1250-1516) were of Turkic, Turco-Circassian or Greek origins (Al-Sayyid Marsot, 2007). While Chejne (1969: 101) reports that the Mamluks “took little or no interest in Arabic studies”, Versteegh (2001: 72) notes that there were “many Mamluk scholars who occupied
themselves with the religious and grammatical literature in Arabic”. Whichever the case, Arabic continued to occupy an important position in Egypt during the reign of the Mamluks, as it remained the main literary language (Versteegh, 2001). Indeed, when the Mongols sacked Baghdad in 1258 and after the Mamluks’ success in fending them off, the cultural scene of the Arab World shifted to Cairo (Brugman, 1984). However, even though Cairo was to become the abode of many prominent figures in literature and arts in the course of the 14th century, Brugman notes that these were merely the late buds of a culture which had already passed its zenith, and for that reason Cairo would never compare with 9th century Baghdad.

The trend of non-Arab rulers continued when the Ottomans (1516-1805) seized control of Egypt. Once again, Egypt became a mere ‘province’ in a larger empire, and would remain vassal to the Ottomans until 1914 (Al-Sayyid Marsot, 2007). The Ottomans replaced Arabic with Turkish for administrative functions, although Versteegh (2001) notes that the use of Turkish was restricted to the governing elite who formed a small minority and had to recourse to translators in order to communicate with the people. Most of the documents produced locally were written either in Arabic or in both Turkish and Arabic. Crucially however, Arabic lost its position as a literary language and became chiefly the language of theologians (Brugman, 1984). Chejne (1969) writes that the deteriorating state of Arabic was accelerated by the Arabic speakers who found learning Turkish more functional and speaking it more fashionable. During the four centuries of Ottoman rule, literary production in Arabic became “scarce and sterile”, and by the 19th century Classical Arabic had fallen into disuse (Chejne, 1969: 84).

For all that Arabic may have suffered at the hands of the Ottomans it experienced a brief revival under Ottoman rule in the 19th century. In 1798, Napoleon Bonaparte led a French expedition against Egypt. The expedition itself was very short-lived and proved too adventurous to sustain; the French were driven out of Egypt in 1801 but the legacy they left would impact the position of Arabic for the rest of the century (Chejne, 1969; Holes, 2004; Versteegh, 2001). In many ways, the expedition marked the beginning of a period of cultural influence from Europe – initially from France but later also from England (Versteegh, 2001). For one thing, it resulted in the
establishment of Egyptology which would ensure continued contact between Egypt and the West for a long time to come. Napoleon also introduced an Arabic printing press and his French entourage founded the Institut d’Égypte which provided some instruction in Arabic (Chejne, 1969).

Europe had already gone through the Renaissance, the Reformation and the Industrial Revolution which had given birth to many technologies and intellectual ideals. These were eagerly taken up by Muhammad Ali, a Turkic-Albanian Ottoman whose lineage ruled Egypt from 1805 to 1952, and who had a great zeal for European learning and culture (Brugman, 1984). Muhammad Ali, though paying homage to the Ottomans in Istanbul, was virtually independent of them and ruled Egypt with almost complete autonomy. His reign saw the beginning of the Arabic nahḍa or Renaissance (Chejne, 1969). Of this, Mejdell (2006: 8) writes:

In several respects, the Egyptian (Arab) 19th century cultural renaissance al-nahḍa, which incited the renewal of Arabic as an intellectual medium, was a ‘modern’ phenomena [sic], too. The major impetus and motivation behind it was practical and secular-oriented—the need for technical and scientific development to withstand foreign domination. Ideologically it was inspired by the European enlightenment, with educational reforms and, gradually, nationalist claims on the agenda.

Muhammad Ali’s most significant tribute to Arabic was perhaps in replacing Turkish with Arabic as the official language of administration in Egypt and reinstating it as the vehicle of cultural production (Chejne, 1969). Muhammad Ali sponsored educational missions to Europe to gain specialised knowledge in various educational fields. One of the earliest missions was sent to Italy in 1813 to train type-founders and printers who later worked in the Government Printing Office (Brugman, 1984). Muhammad Ali also founded several schools in Egypt including the school of languages which would produce numerous translations into Arabic under the leadership of al-Ṭaḥṭāwī (1801-73). Secular studies were also later introduced in al-Azhar University.

This intellectual revival made the Arabic scholars and writers aware that Arabic was at a disadvantage in expressing technological terms and modern social and cultural ideas, a problem which was usually resolved by reviving equivalent concepts from the Classical literature, coining new Arabic terms (sometimes under the influence of
Turkish usage), or less commonly by borrowing the European terms into Arabic directly (Versteegh, 2001). Ferguson calls this revival that Arabic experienced nothing short of a ‘miracle’ which is often underestimated or forgotten about. He states that “in the sense of having a literary language that is part and parcel of the life involvement of people; there really was a renaissance, a revival of the language, a renewal of a language that was in a sense not fully alive” (Ferguson, 1997 [1990]: 264).

While printing and publishing flourished in Egypt, elsewhere in the Arabic-speaking world publishing and freedom of speech were more restricted, making Egypt an attractive destination for Arab writers and thinkers particularly from Syria and Lebanon. The 1870s saw the establishment of several significant Arabic periodicals, including the founding of al-Ahrām daily by the brothers Taqlā of Lebanon in 1875 (Chejne, 1969), a newspaper which became the official Egyptian gazette and still boasts very wide circulation today. One clear influence of Western ideas during the Arabic nahda was in the rise of intellectual nationalism. This took different forms in the Arab World: While many thinkers wrote of an Islamic community (umma) with Islam as the unifying factor, in Syria and Lebanon the discourse was of pan-Arab nationalism, while in Egypt there was “an emphasis on the special character of Egyptian society, history and culture” and intellectuals sometimes wrote of an Egyptian nation (watan) which transcends the Muslim umma (Versteegh, 2001: 176), (cf. Section 3.3.2). Versteegh notes however that “although the Arabic thinkers often disagreed among themselves about the future form which their nation should take, they all agreed on its being an Arabic-speaking nation” (2001: 177).

The regained position of Arabic was short-lived; it was cut short by the British occupation of Egypt in 1882. Arabic suffered a number of blows under British rule: English was declared the official language in 1898, the school of languages was closed down and education became only accessible to the privileged elite in either English or French (Chejne, 1969). This was only compensated for by the flourishing career of Arabic in the publishing industry which played a significant role in the dissemination of nationalist ideas (Brugman, 1984). Over the next few decades, Egyptians continued to call for reinstating Arabic as the official language of the
country, a case which was taken up by Egyptian intellectuals and institutions such as al-Azhar. In 1908, Cairo University⁵ was established by a group of citizens with the aim of making education in Arabic available to all Egyptians (Chejne, 1969). The status of Arabic greatly improved with the abolishment of the British protectorate in Egypt in 1922 (Brugman, 1984).

The call for Arabic gained momentum in the 1930s and by 1940 Arabic came to be a recognised language which was widely used in government, taught in schools and universities, and even used in foreign institutions (Chejne, 1969). Coinciding with and contributing to these gains were fervent moves to reform and modernise the Arabic Language, mobilised by the establishment of the Arabic Language Academy (majmaʿ al-luğa al-ʿarabiyya) (henceforth, ALA) in 1932 and the Arab League (offically, League of Arab States; henceforth, LAS) in 1945 (cf. Section 3.2.3). LAS also played an important part in spreading pan-Arab sentiments across the Arabic speaking world (cf. Section 3.3.2.2).

The culmination of nationalist activity in Egypt is often seen in the 1952 revolution where the monarchy was overthrown through a military coup. By then, Arabic and pan-Arab feelings were so deeply entrenched in the Egyptian collective that when Egypt issued its first constitution as a republic in 1956 this was vividly captured in the first and second articles which declared Egypt an Arab state, the Egyptian people an integral part of the Arab community, Islam the religion of the state, and Arabic its official language (cf. Section 6.2.1). I will return to this period in history when I discuss the relationship between language and national identity in Section 3.3.23.3.2.3. Having outlined the origins of diglossia in Arabic, I will now explain what exactly diglossia means in theoretical terms.

2.4 Diglossia Defined

Based on an account by Sotiropoulos (1977), the term diglossia was first introduced in 1902 by a German linguist called Karl Krumbacher in his book Das Problem der

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⁵ Originally named the “Egyptian University” then renamed “King Fuad I University” in 1940, before it was finally named “Cairo University” in 1952.
Neugriechischen Schriftsprache⁶ (The Problem of the Modern Greek Written Language). In this book, Krumbacher dealt with the nature and origin of diglossia in Greek. Zughoul (1980) points out however that there is a common view in the literature that the term was coined by French linguist William Marçais with specific reference to the Arabic language. He defined it as “competition between a learned, written language and a sometimes exclusively spoken vernacular” (1930: 401 quoted in French in Zughoul, 1980).

However, it is Charles Ferguson (1959b) who is credited with setting out the general principles of the concept of diglossia as we understand it in sociolinguistics today. Arabic was one of the four examples of diglossia that Ferguson presented in his article, with particular reference to EA. He defines diglossia as follows:

Diglossia is a relatively stable language situation in which, in addition to the primary dialects of the language (which may include a standard or regional standards), there is a very divergent, highly codified (often grammatically more complex) superposed variety, the vehicle of a large and respected body of written literature, either of an earlier period or in another speech community, which is learned largely by formal education and is used for most written and formal spoken purposes but is not used by any sector of the community for ordinary conversation. (Ferguson, 1959b: 336)

Ferguson (1959b: 328) uses the terms high [H] and low [L] to refer to these two varieties which have specialised functions in society: “In one set of situations only H is appropriate and in another only L, with the two sets overlapping only slightly”. Moreover, prestige is usually ascribed to the H variety but not the L variety: “there is usually a belief that H is somehow more beautiful, more logical, better able to express important thoughts” (p. 330). Crucially, H is not acquired natively, but must be learned through the medium of formal education, and the speaker is therefore “at home in L to a degree he almost never achieves in H” (p. 331).

Ferguson’s conceptualisation of diglossia has since been extensively discussed, criticised and extended. Versteegh (2001: 190) remarks:

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⁶ The name of the book in Sotiropoulos (1977) is Das Problem der Modernen Griechischen Schriftsprache but the only record I could find was of Das Problem der Neugriechischen Schriftsprache. The translation is the same.
Ferguson’s model restricted the notion of ‘diglossia’ to situations where the low variety was genetically related to the high variety, of which it was a simplified version. In later publications this restriction was lifted and the notion of ‘diglossia’ was expanded to include any functional distribution of linguistic varieties, whether these were languages or dialects or registers. The functional distribution in Arabic-speaking countries is nothing but a special case of a general phenomenon of sociolinguistic variation in all speech communities.

Some of the most notable expansions of Ferguson’s definition of diglossia came in the work of John Gumperz (1962, 1964, 1966) and Joshua Fishman (1967, 1972) who distinguished between a sociolinguistic and a psycholinguistic approach. Gumperz extended the concept to include communities with separate dialect registers or some kind of ‘functionally differentiated language varieties’. Fishman took this a step further by attempting to apply diglossia to cases of compound or coordinate bilingualism, effectively extending the definition of diglossia to bilingual communities where the H and L varieties may be completely unrelated (such as in former European colonies in Africa). Fishman is also credited with introducing the idea of ‘domains’ of use, which are broader than Ferguson’s ‘functions’. Versteegh (2001: 190) notes that in the terminology used by Gumperz and Fishman, ‘diglossia’ “is reserved for the sociolinguistic notion of a functional distribution of linguistic varieties”, while the term ‘bilingualism’ is used to refer to “the psycholinguistic notion of the speakers’ command of these varieties”. Fishman (1967: 34) states that “bilingualism is essentially a characterisation of individual linguistic behaviour whereas diglossia is a characterisation of linguistic organisation at the socio-cultural level”.

Not all sociolinguists accept these expansions of the classical diglossic model. Among these is Ferguson (1991: 218) himself who states that he had aimed to describe a situation “in which the ordinary formal language of the community is one that no one speaks without special effort and no one uses in ordinary conversation: it is acquisitionally and functionally superposed to the primary variety of the language”. He adds that his “intention was that the users would always view the two [varieties] as the same language”; in the case of two different languages the linguistic correlates
and the linguistic nature of the possible outcomes would be different (Ferguson, 1991: 223). Similarly, De Silva (1982: 95) notes that the meaning of the term ‘diglossia’ has been enlarged so much that it could be said to apply to any ‘complex speech community’ “simply by virtue of an interdependency between, on the one hand, differentiations of social roles and, on the other, conventional variations in linguistic behaviour”. In other words, “wherever there is role-bound linguistic variation there would be diglossia; and almost every language seems to fit the bill” (ibid.).

With respect to Arabic, Furguson’s diglossic model has been criticised for three main reasons (Mahmoud, 1986). The main criticism of Ferguson’s model was that it was too categorical and impressionistic, overlooking the alternation found in the speech of particularly educated speakers (cf. Section 2.7). Critics have also contended that the exclusive domains or functions of use he outlined in his article were too hermetically separated. Finally, critics challenged Ferguson’s description of diglossia as a stable phenomenon, citing the existence of intermediate forms of Arabic as evidence that the situation is undergoing dramatic change (cf. Section 2.5).

Mejdell (2006: 43) notes that Ferguson’s table of functions “was hardly realistic at the time, overstating the spoken use of H in education, in parliament, in other public performances—where attested usage rather represents an elevated form of L”. Similarly, El-Hassan (1977: 113) states that Ferguson’s specialisation of functions for H and L cannot be validated by empirical linguistic evidence, “partly because language is a fuzzy phenomenon which defies rigidity”. Ferguson states for instance that religious sermons are conducted in the H variety, but El-Hassan challenges this with an extract from a sermon delivered in a mosque in Upper Egypt, where the preacher clearly alternates between H and L. In addition, El-Hassan states that political speeches are not consistently in H as Ferguson claims, citing the speeches of late Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser (1956-1970) as a case in point. The same, he says, applies to university lectures and to personal letters which can in fact be written in L.
Moreover, Bassiouney (2009: 12) notes that Ferguson’s model does not account for the social factors which “may have a part to play in the negotiation of choice of variety in a diglossic community in specific sets of circumstances”. One such factor, the effect that speakers have on each other, is discussed by Versteegh (2001: 194) who notes that it has received very little attention in the literature. Versteegh refers to radio dialogue transcripts taken from Diem (1974) where a clear shift towards H in one case and L in another takes place in the speech of two speakers who accommodate to the speech of their collocutors. This example highlights why it can be illusive to classify varieties discretely by function alone. Other relevant social factors include class differences, power differentials and social conflict. In his defence, Ferguson (1991: 227) later explains that it was not fashionable to study social factors of this kind at the time he wrote his article in 1959 because it was not considered ‘true science’.

Despite the dichotomous nature of Ferguson’s classical diglossic model, it is worth noting that he did acknowledge the presence of “relatively uncodified, unstable, intermediate forms” which are used to resolve communicative tensions in certain situations (Ferguson, 1959b: 332). In particular, he alludes to:

… a kind of spoken Arabic much used in certain semiformal or cross-dialectal situations [which] has a highly classical vocabulary with few or no inflectional endings, with certain features of classical syntax, but with a fundamentally colloquial base in morphology and syntax, and a generous admixture of colloquial vocabulary. (ibid.)

Ferguson may not have provided a detailed theoretical model or a principled way to analyse the nature of these intermediate forms, but his acknowledgment clearly paved the way for future research (Boussofara-Omar, 2008) – and he later states that this was his intention all along (Ferguson, 1991). In fact, the above definition is very much in line with what later Arabic linguists have termed *Educated [Spoken] Arabic*? (cf. Section 2.7).

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7 It has been speculated that Ferguson’s allusion to a ‘semi-formal’ or ‘cross-dialectal’ variety was in fact in reference to Blanc’s (1960) continuum study (cf. Section 2.7) which was published the following year under Ferguson’s auspices (Mejdell, 2006).
Another aspect of Ferguson’s diglossic model which has received scholarly critique is its ‘stability’. Given the importance of this feature to the work at hand, it is reviewed separately in the following section.

2.5 Diglossia and Language Shift

The stability of diglossia is challenged by Schiffman (1993: 115) who states that “diglossic situations tend to be unstable”, their instability owing “to an imbalance of power between the two (or more) varieties of a language that constitute the diglossic complex” (cf. sections 3.2.5 and 6.3). He adds that “this instability and imbalance of power often lead to language shift, that is, displacement of one variety by another, or even by a third (unrelated) variety”, where the shift takes place “domain by domain (rather than speaker by speaker, or community by community), until the abandoned language controls no domains at all” (Schiffman, 1993: 115). Similarly, Kaye (1970, 1972) considers diglossia in Arabic to be a fluid and flexible situation which is susceptible to change. He states that because colloquial forms of Arabic are learned natively, they must by definition be ‘well-defined’. However, Kaye attempts to discredit the common belief that Modern Standard Arabic (MSA) has a well-defined form. For his purposes, he defines MSA as any type of non-colloquial form of Arabic which is acquired non-natively, for example in schools (a definition which incorporates some intermediate forms of Arabic)\(^8\). Kaye argues that, because it is not natively learned, MSA is an ‘ill-defined’ system. He then states that Arabic diglossia cannot be stable because it involves interaction between two systems, one well-defined and the other ill-defined, and no ill-defined system is stable\(^9\).

Schiffman (1993) presents a useful taxonomy of conditions which may affect the susceptibility of a diglossic situation to language shift. The first being whether the diglossic situation is classical or extended. In cases of extended diglossia where the H and L varieties are not genetically related, H typically “has greater international prestige or is the language of the local power elite or the dominant religious community” (Schiffman, 1993: 116), and is therefore the more powerful variety. This

\(^8\) Compare this to the definition given in Section 2.6.

\(^9\) That is not to say that Kaye’s conceptualisation of well-defined versus ill-defined systems is not without its criticisms. See for example El-Hassan (1977), Parkinson (1990), Eisele (2002) and Walters (2003).
contributes to the fact that extended diglossic situations are generally less stable than cases of classical diglossia where “it remains to be seen whether the same kind of imbalance of power exhibited in nongenetic diglossia can be said to exist” (ibid.)\textsuperscript{10}.

Secondly, Schiffman distinguishes between cases of total and partial diglossia: in totally diglossic linguistic cultures (under which Arabic falls) all speakers exhibit diglossic behaviour and there are no speakers who only speak the H variety (entailing complementary distribution of H and L use), while in cases of partial diglossia, diglossic behaviour is only exhibited by some members of the community (entailing overlap in the functions of H and L). He also notes that the more hermetically separate the domains that the H and L varieties occupy, the more stable the diglossic situation, since their existence in complimentary distribution means less competition between them. In other words, total diglossia is more stable than partial diglossia, although Schiffman stresses that strong differentiation of functions must be maintained for the situation to remain stable. Hence, while Egypt would be classed as a totally diglossic culture in as far as there are no speakers who only speak the H variety, the fact that there is overlap between some of the functions of H and L implies that the situation does not necessarily lend itself to stability with respect to this condition.

A third distinction that Schiffman makes is between homogeneous and heterogeneous diglossia; the first referring to cases where there is a single L variety which “can be used for communication throughout the linguistic culture and with all segments of the speech community” (p.122), whereas the latter refers to cases where more than one L variety may exist, and an occasional need may arise to resort to H as a lingua franca of communication. Most Arabic communities are characterised by the existence of an urban L variety which can be used for spoken communication across each community, e.g. Cairene for Egypt (cf. Section 3.2.6), and would therefore belong to Schiffman’s homogenous category, which he deems more stable than heterogeneous diglossia.

\textsuperscript{10} The question of language and power in the (classically) diglossic Egyptian setting is a central theme in this thesis, and I engage with it in multiple locations: sections 3.2.5, 3.4 and 6.3.
Finally, Schiffman distinguishes between active and passive diglossia: “the former requiring time, money, and effort to learn another variety. The latter require[s] only passive observance. Active diglossias are more threatening (shift-enhancing) than passive diglossias” (p.128). Arabic would appear to belong to active diglossia (cf. Section 2.8), which in this case does not favour stability. The applicability of the four conditions outlined here to the case of Arabic diglossia in Egypt is presented in Table 2 below, painting a mixed picture about the stability of diglossia in Egypt.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Diglossic condition</th>
<th>Stability-enhancing</th>
<th>Shift-enhancing</th>
<th>Stable?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Classical (genetic)</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homogeneous</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passive</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. The conditions of Arabic diglossia in Egypt

Schiffman also discusses other factors which can influence the stability of a diglossic situation. For example, he uses the term *linguistic culture* to refer to “the set of behaviours, beliefs, attitudes, and historical circumstances associated with a particular language. That is, the beliefs (one might even use the term myths) that a speech community has about its language are part of the social conditions that affect the maintenance and transmission of that language” (1993: 120). This description resonates with what Ferguson terms language ‘evaluations’, which he also links to language change (cf. Section 1.1), but more importantly, it relates to ‘language ideologies’ which are discussed at length in Section 3.3.

Here, diglossia must be perceived not as a feature of language or speakers, but of the speech community and its ‘linguistic culture’ (Schiffman, 1993). An example of linguistic culture at work is how beliefs about the purity of H can serve to resist status change in the language; that is, the linguistic community may feel the need to retain domains for H as a result of their linguistic culture. For example, Schiffman notes that “religious concerns are strong indices of solidarity; religious devotion may help to exacerbate and preserve diglossia” (p. 127). Nevertheless, Schiffman notes that “while diglossia as a fact of linguistic culture may be stable, the distribution of
domains reserved for one variety or other can vary: the dominance of a particular domain by a particular variety can shift, with one variety encroaching on domains previously restricted to another” (1993: 120). It is this kind of shift which is the central concern of this work.

Of particular interest here is the importance that Schiffman accords to shifting domains as an index of instability, and to the role of language ideologies in preserving (or perhaps subverting) diglossia. Schiffman’s concept of linguistic culture comes up again in the next chapter and language ideologies are discussed in more detail in Section 3.3. In the meantime, it is perhaps prudent to conclude the discussion on language shift with Schiffman’s suggestion that “the relationship between diglossia and language shift must … be seen as a complex one, not readily predictable without recourse to careful scrutiny of local historical, social, geographical, and economic conditions” (1993: 116). I will now turn to the more urgent matter of terminology.

2.6 A note on terminology

Versteegh (2001: 190) believes that Ferguson’s use of the terms H and L reflects the standing of these two varieties in Arab society: “The low variety is held in very low esteem, and the name by which speakers refer to it normally implies a humble position: 'āmmīyya literally means, ‘common’ or ‘vulgar’”; “the high variety, on the other hand, is prestigious: it is the language of a cultural, and often religious, heritage”. This too is reflected in how speakers refer to this variety: al-fuṣḥā, literally meaning ‘the most eloquent’. The Arabic equivalent for the term diglossia itself is izdiwājiyyat al-luġa (literally, linguistic duality) (Badawi, 1973), although this is an academic term which one would not expect laypersons to use.

Ferguson designates the H variety in the case of Arabic to be Classical Arabic [CA], but Bassiouney notes that there are in fact two types of H in Arab communities. She observes that “Ferguson spoke only about a distinction between H and L, without distinguishing the two different kinds of H such as exist in the Arab World, where there is a distinction between CA and MSA” (2009: 11). I have already introduced the terms Classical Arabic and Modern Standard Arabic in Section 2.2 where they were
described as two different stages in the development of the Arabic language; the relationship there was diachronic. However, the terms CA and MSA are simultaneously used to designate two varieties of Arabic which sustain a synchronic relationship: “CA is the religious language of the Quran and is rarely used except in reciting the Quran, or quoting older classical texts, while MSA could be used in a public speech, for example” (Bassiouney, 2009: 11-12).

Modern Standard Arabic (MSA) can be described as a simplified form of Classical Arabic “which is readable and comprehensible by any literate Arab” (Zughoul, 1980: 206). Ryding (2005: 4) attributes the emergence of MSA to “the spread of literacy, the concept of universal education, the inception of journalism, and exposure to Western writing practices and styles”. Zughoul (1980) notes that it is also referred to as luğat al-jarāyid (the language of newspapers). Crucially, “MSA is not a spoken language; it is nobody’s mother tongue, and the man who wants to talk at all times like a book or newspaper is a decided oddity” (Mitchell, 1982: 124). MSA is uniform across the Arab World; despite some minor differences in lexicon, the structure remains remarkably constant (McCarus, 2008). Mitchell (1986: 8-9) provides this comprehensive definition of MSA:

The label Modern Standard Arabic (MSA) is commonly applied to the written language of contemporary literature, journalism, television, and radio news broadcasts, scientific and technological writing, administration, and diplomacy. Though differences in written Arabic have developed over time and space within the Arab World, MSA nevertheless shares most of its morphology and syntax with the classical Arabic (CA) of the Quran and canonical literature of Islam, so that its prestige as a model of eloquence and excellence is thereby further enhanced.

It is worth noting, however, that MSA is a term which exists only in the scholarly work of Western linguists or specialists who have received their training in the West. The distinction between CA and MSA “is a western invention and does not correspond to any Arabic term” (Bassiouney, 2009: 11). To Arabic native speakers, CA and MSA are one and the same (Bassiouney, 2009; Meiseles, 1980); both the language of the Quran and the language of newspapers would be referred to as
This discrepancy between the native and non-native perspectives is of course problematic (cf. Suleiman, 2008).

Another term which warrants delineating is how native Arabic speakers refer to their language: al-lūga al-ʿarabiyya (literally meaning ‘the Arabic language’). It is also the term used to designate the official language in the constitutions of almost all Arab countries (Maamouri, 1998). Maamouri (1998: 38) notes that “the term is highly ambiguous and reflects the existence of a certain ‘cultural blindness’ which seems to be imposed by the weight of the Arabic-Islamic heritage”. This ‘cultural blindness’ is discussed in Section 2.9, while its impact on education is discussed in Section 2.8.

Indeed, it has been argued that the distinction between CA and MSA has been intentionally blurred in Arabic. Parkinson (1991: 36) for example calls the unity between CA and MSA “a political imperative to be enforced, rather than an empirical question, to be decided by observation”, citing the lack of distinction between archaic and modern meanings in the dictionaries released by the Arabic Language Academy as an example. Grandgillaume (1983, cited in Haeri, 2000) presents a similar view, arguing that ‘modern Arabic’ is essentially a secularised version of CA: the terminological distinction is meant to underscore a historical shift from the emphasis on the religious tradition of CA to more secular concerns. Haeri (2000: 73) glosses Grandgillaume’s argument, perceiving the use of the term MSA in English as “a way of establishing the factual existence of the language that is based on Classical Arabic but also removed from it”. She claims that “those who insist on the existence of ‘modern Arabic’ as distinct from Classical Arabic generally do so to substantiate their claim that secularism has become a major force within the cultural and political life of at least parts of the region” (Haeri, 2000: 74), (cf. Section 3.3.2.2).

In consistency with what has become a scholarly tradition in Arabic linguistics, I will use the term MSA to refer to the official, formal variety which is taught in schools across the Arab World and that Arabic speakers are exposed to from various sources on a daily basis. However, in instances where it is necessary to blur the line between CA and MSA (for example, to capture a native speaker’s perspective) I will be using the term SA (which I interchange with fuṣḥā) instead. I also use the terms EA and
ʿāmmiyya interchangeably to refer specifically to the Cairo-based colloquial of Egypt. The distance between these two diglossic ‘poles’ is discussed in the next section.

2.7 The Distance between H and L

In theory, the H and L of Arabic differ significantly in their phonology, morphology and syntax (for a comprehensive account, see Holes, 2004). Alrabaa (1986: 77) blames these differences for the poor performance of Arab learners in normative aspects of writing in the H variety (see section 2.8), noting that they are a result of the great distance between H and L which “is not merely a formal one of synchronic nature; it also reflects several centuries of chronological distance”. Indeed, some psycholinguists have argued that MSA is a second language to the native Arabic speaker (for example: Eviatar & Ibrahim, 2000; R. Ibrahim & Aharon-Peretz, 2005; Khamis-Dakwar & Froud, 2007).

This view is shared by Eligbali (1996) who turns to cognitive theory for support. He points to Chomsky’s position that the true test for grammaticality is the native speaker’s intuition11, where a shared competence between speakers and hearers determines what is grammatical and what is ungrammatical. The crux of the matter here is that this competence must be the product of native acquisition and not of formal learning – which cannot be said to be true for Arabic. This is demonstrated by Parkinson’s (1991, 1993, 1994, 1996, 2003) work which indicates the variability of MSA skills among educated Egyptians, with generally ‘poor’ grammar skills when it comes to discerning correctness of grammatical forms based on prescriptive ideals (I discuss speakers’ awareness in more detail in Section 2.9).

The view that MSA is a second language to Arabic speakers relies on a dichotomous perspective which treats MSA and colloquial Arabic as discrete varieties. From this perspective, the distance between fuṣḥā and colloquial Arabic has often been exaggerated (Zughoul, 1980). For example, the role of fuṣḥā in the Arab World has been equated by Gumperz (1972 [1968]) with the cases of Latin in medieval Europe and Sanskrit in South Asia. According to Gumperz (1972 [1968]: 222), all these H

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11 It is worth noting that Ferguson (1997 [1990]) uses the case of Arabic diglossia to challenge the strength of native speaker grammaticality judgments as a tool for linguistic analysis.
forms are associated with “elaborate ritual and etiquette” and “can be learned only through many years of special training” which is only available to a socially and economically privileged few. Brame (1970: 1 in Zughoul, 1980) notes this tendency to amplify the differences between fuṣḥā and colloquial Arabic and considers the claim that fuṣḥā is artificial to be ill-informed. To him, “the only really difficult problem for the Arab approaching literary Arabic is the problem of supplying the correct case endings to nouns and mood endings to verbs, as he, understandably, has none in his native dialect”.

The dichotomous perspective of H and L in Arabic is particularly common in the description of written/spoken behaviour. M. H. Ibrahim (1983: 508) for instance states that “the terms ‘standard’ and ‘written’ are synonymous in the Arabic context since Standard Arabic is virtually the only written variety to the exclusion of all spoken vernaculars”. Similarly, Versteegh (2001: 189) notes that, “In written Arabic, the choice between the standard norm and the colloquial language appears to be relatively uncomplicated: in writing, Standard Arabic is always used”. Versteegh mentions two exceptions however: he refers to the case of people who, while writing with a MSA target in mind, their insufficient knowledge of MSA results in a product which falls short of MSA standards, which Versteegh refers to as ‘Middle Arabic’ (cf. Section 2.2). He also refers to writers who deliberately choose to write in colloquial Arabic “for ideological or literary reasons”, but he notes that “even these authors usually mix their colloquial language with elements from the standard language” (ibid.).

In the same vein, Meiseles (1980: 122) refers to “the emergence of that mainly oral (but lately to some extent, also written) use of a language occupying an intermediate position between the extremes of Arabic diglossia”. It is these mixed forms that Mitchell (1982: 129) has in mind when he states that “we should not push the separateness of speech and writing too far”. He elaborates that “linguists have found it fairly easy to describe vernaculars but have always resorted when doing so to an unconfessed purism, editing out without acknowledgment the prestigious, ‘literary’-cum-vernacular forms of the language that are in fact probably its commonest
manifestation” (p. 124). These ‘mixed’ styles, Mitchell contends, “exemplify the vernacular in its plainest form” (p. 140).

These intermediate and mixed styles have received considerable attention in the literature after Ferguson’s (1959b) landmark article in an attempt to bridge the gap between the H and L poles. Some of these works adopt a ‘continuum’ approach to fill that gap; the most cited of these are Blanc (1960), Badawi (1973) and Meiseles (1980). Figure 1 illustrates how these three continuums compare to Ferguson’s original model.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>H</strong></td>
<td>Standard Classical</td>
<td>Classical Arabic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Modern Standard Arabic</td>
<td>Literary or Standard Arabic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Modified Classical</td>
<td></td>
<td>Substandard Arabic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Semi-literary or Elevated Colloquial</td>
<td>Colloquial of the Intellectuals</td>
<td>Educated spoken Arabic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Koineized Colloquial</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>L</strong></td>
<td>Plain Colloquial</td>
<td>Colloquial of the Literate</td>
<td>Basic or Plain Vernacular</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Colloquial of the Illiterate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 1. A comparison of Blanc (1960), Badawi (1973) and Meiseles (1980) continuums against Ferguson’s H and L.**

Despite the marked differences in delineating the nature and boundaries of the levels proposed in each of the three diglossic continuum studies, what they have in common is that they were all motivated by dissatisfaction with the dichotomous view of H and L as two discrete varieties. Elgibali (1996) highlights the importance of Badawi’s study in particular, not solely for its contribution, but because it is a contribution in *Arabic* by an *Arab* linguist who treats colloquial Arabic, not as a corrupt version of CA or MSA (cf. Section 2.2), but as a discrete variety worthy of being studied on an equal footing with *fusḥā*. Elgibali (1996: 6) remarks:
The significance of this leap cannot be overstated, for the study of colloquial Arabic as a discrete entity had previously been undertaken almost exclusively by Western scholars—a situation which, given the accepted dogma of the sacrosanct nature of the Classical language, made these scholars, as well as their findings, suspect. But in Badawi we have an Arab—motives indisputably genuine, ties to the classical heritage unremitting and intimate, and proficiently trained in modern linguistics—who concedes the actuality and bona fide theoretical status of the colloquial varieties, the true native tongues of the Arab peoples.

A fourth, more recent, continuum model was advanced by Hary (1996) who uses the term ‘Arabic multiglossia’ to refer to the language situation in the Arab World. Hary’s approach differs from that of his predecessors in that he does not assign a finite number of discrete levels “as it is impossible and impractical to determine an exact number in the multiglossic situation of Arabic” (Hary, 1996: 71).

The three continuum studies outlined in Figure 1 referred either implicitly or explicitly to a variety which has received its own fair share of attention in Arabic linguistics literature; namely Educated Spoken Arabic (ESA). The most elaborate accounts of this variety appear in a series of articles by Terrence F. Mitchell (1975, 1978, 1982, 1986); the 1986 paper being the most refined of these. Mitchell (1978) describes ESA as a pan-Arabic, koineized form of speech which exists in spoken rather than written form which appears “to serve most purposes and to be infinitely extensible, at least over sizeable areas of the Arab World transcending the boundaries of national states” (1978: 228). It is motivated by the speaker’s desire to proclaim an educated identity, to ‘share’ with Arabs with similar educated backgrounds, to promote pan- or inter-Arabic forms required by the forces of modernisation, and to display sufficient colloquial usage to demonstrate local patriotism or loyalty (Mitchell, 1982, 1986).

Despite the efforts of Mitchell and his project team to outline the form and structure of ESA, the term remains subject to much variation with no clear consensus as to

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what it designates in the literature\textsuperscript{13}. In particular, confusion is caused by the fact that the term ESA is used simultaneously to designate an inter-dialectal as well as intra-dialectal variety (Eisele, 2002). Indeed, Eisele (2002) points to several conceptual contradictions in accounts of ESA even within the work of the Leeds project. The variation in definitions of ESA calls into question the very need for them. Parkinson (2003: 29) points out that despite widespread claims that ESA is rule-governed, no one seems to be able to come up with these rules, and he wonders if this may be because ESA is not actually anything. The same point is raised by Nielsen (1996: 225) who calls ESA a “very badly codified” mixed variety.

The efficacy of the entire continuum approach has been challenged on similar grounds. According to Holes (2004: 345), the continuum model presents a descriptive difficulty because the underlying language levels “are probabilistic, not absolute”. In the same vein, Boussofara-Omar (2008: 631) argues that the outcome of the continuum studies has been “the emergence of a constellation of labels to categorise a tentative taxonomy of ‘ill-defined’ middle varieties of Arabic, and hence, a failure to articulate their description in a coherent manner or to relate these sets of practices to a theoretical linguistic model that can account for them”.

Frustration with the inadequacy of the continuum approach has spurred Arabic linguists to propose alternative ways of studying mixed varieties of Arabic. Boussofara-Omar, for example, favours a code-switching approach (cf. Boussofara-Omar, 2003, 2006). She argues that the complex interactions between \textit{fu\textsuperscript{ṣ}ḥ\textsuperscript{ā}} and colloquial cannot be accounted for simply by “either the Fergusonian idealised paradigm or the vague continuum notion” (Boussofara-Omar, 2008: 355). She concludes that this interaction is both socially motivated and structurally constrained in the tradition of ‘classic’ code-switching between any language pairs. She believes that what was being conventionalised in the continuum studies is not levels such as ESA, but rather the “patterns of switching between the two varieties of Arabic where the dialect serves as the matrix variety in which constituents from \textit{fu\textsuperscript{ṣ}ḥ\textsuperscript{ā}} are embedded” (Boussofara-Omar, 2008: 634).

\textsuperscript{13} For examples of how ESA has been used or adapted in very different ways, see: Ryding (1991); Ezzat (1974); Zughoul (1980).
The code-switching approach has gained currency among Arabic sociolinguists\(^{14}\), although not all of them are as dismissive of the ‘Fergusonian paradigm’ or the ‘continuum notion’ as Boussofara-Omar. Mejdell (2006: 4) for one states:

My preferred term to designate the situation in Arabic speech communities, in a comparative sociolinguistic (typological) framework [...] is the ‘diglossic continuum’. The linguistic properties of this continuum—a product of the interaction of the basic varieties—may be correlated with dimensions of context and style—the informal-formal cline, the casual-careful cline; unplanned vs. planned discourse, and of mode/medium, i.e. spoken vs. written.

However, her use of the term ‘diglossic continuum’ comes with the caveat that “working with natural spoken data, one feels that the data only rarely, or only partially, fit into the levels as defined—so they should be (explicitly) presented as theoretical, abstract categories” (Mejdell, 2006: 45-46). Mejdell proposes a definition of style which links function to form, so that the co-occurrence of MSA variables with colloquial variables can be regarded as a feature of the style adopted by the speaker to serve a certain purpose; to her, code-switching is essentially ‘style-shifting’ (cf. Mejdell, 1996, 1999, 2006). This notion of style-shifting by alternating or mixing between MSA and colloquial Arabic is also adopted by other Arabic linguists such as Eid (2007) and Faust (2012).

In principle, Mejdell (2006) agrees with Ferguson (1991) that diglossia is still the most appropriate label because “the analyst finds two poles in terms of which the intermediate varieties can be described; there is no third pole” (Ferguson, 1991: 226). So does Bassiouney (2009: 13), who states: “It may be that ‘pure H’ or ‘pure L’ does not occur very often, and that there are usually elements of both varieties in any stretch of normal speech, but still one has to consider a hypothetical pure H or L in order to presuppose that there are elements that occur from one or the other in a stretch of discourse”.

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\(^{14}\) Examples of studies employing some kind of code-switching approach to study the language situation in Egypt include: Bassiouney (2003, 2006); Eid (1982, 1988, 2007); Mejdell (1999, 2006).
2.8 Diglossia as problem

Boussofara-Omar (2008: 629) notes that when addressing Arabic diglossia, “a significant number of Arab intellectuals and researchers continue to describe the diglossic situation in terms of a crisis (azma), a cause (qadiyya), or a clash (ṣirā)”, while other scholars construct it as a social problem. This view of diglossia as a problem abounds in the academic literature. Sotiropoulos (1977: 7) describes diglossia generally as a hindrance, stating that “the presence of diglossia in a speech community has limiting and even crippling effects on its expressive capacity”. Similarly, Zughoul (1980: 201) refers to diglossia in Arabic as a “major sociolinguistic and educational problem that faces the Arabic-speaking countries”. Bassiouney (2009: 265) notes that diglossia “has been accused of hindering Arabicisation processes, of causing an increase of illiteracy levels and even of promoting and sustaining non-democratic systems”.

One area where diglossia in Arabic is commonly problematised is education. One of the broadest (and most cited) works on the relationship between education and diglossia in the Arab World is that of Maamouri (1998). Maamouri (1998: 30) cites Neustupný’s (1968: 286) definition of a ‘language problem’ as a situation which relates to conditions “of which the speech community is not fully aware, which have not become a target of language policy, and which are still capable of contributing largely to the tension within the society”, noting that it fits the Arabic situation perfectly. Maamouri states that “in order to get the best understanding of the ‘problem’ of the Arabic language, one has to link it with the current situation of education in the Arab countries” (1998: 12). He writes:

The education structures of the Arab countries are currently characterised by their growing inadequacy and deterioration, the questionable relevance of their curricula, and the unacceptably low level quality of their output. Arab schooling suffers from exceptionally high repetition and drop-out rates, especially in poor rural and suburban communities. (Maamouri, 1998: 5)

Bassiouney uses the word ‘Arabisation’, but this has been changed in accordance with the distinction I make between Arabisation and Arabicisation in Section 3.2.2.

I am specifically referring to education in the Arab World here, but it is worth noting that diglossia is also frequently problematised in teaching Arabic to foreign learners (see for example: Ferguson, 1971 [1963]; Nielsen, 1996; Ryding, 1991; Schmidt, 1986).
In the same vein, Altoma (1974: 280) observes that in order to learn MSA in school, “pupils have to unlearn or suppress most of their linguistic habits while trying to acquire new ones”. He adds that the “burden of internalising or reinforcing these acquired habits is compounded by conflicting practices”: while the actual speech of the pupils is deliberately neglected, the use of MSA does not encompass other subject areas where the teachers themselves are likely to use colloquial Arabic (ibid.). Similarly, Alrabaa (1986) notes that the conditions of language use in Arabic societies do not afford the learners with opportunities to internalise MSA to the extent of achieving full command of it. He reasons that because MSA is not used fully or frequently enough in a sufficient range of circumstances, it will remain an alien form to the speaker. Therefore, Arab learners commonly suffer from linguistic insecurity arising from low understanding of MSA and low identification with its norms.

The detrimental pedagogical impact of this ‘distance’ between MSA and the colloquial (cf. Section 2.7) is emphasised by a number of scholars. For instance, Shaaban (2008: 701) states that, because MSA is not used in everyday communication, “learning Arabic grammar is much like learning the grammar of a foreign language, with one major difference: Arab teachers avoid using foreign-language methodology in order not to be accused of treating the ‘native tongue’ as a foreign language”. M. H. Ibrahim (1983: 511) also compares the Arabic form taught in schools to a foreign language “evidenced by the constant complaints of Arabic teachers of the numerous cases of interference, in all aspects of language, from spoken Arabic into standard Arabic”. In fact, M. H. Ibrahim (1983: 514) concludes his article by categorically stating that “standard Arabic is the learner’s second language and should be treated as such”, adding that “it is no use pretending that standard Arabic is our native language when it is not”.

This point is reiterated by Maamouri (2008: 76) who notes that Arab learners “cannot put their inherent native linguistic competence to task”: “They cannot use their lexical familiarity with their native basic Arabic sounds, forms, structures, and syllabic and prosodic features” as these aspects will differ significantly between H and L despite some similarities. It has been suggested that learning a variety which is
markedly different from their mother tongue “heavily burdens the Arab child, delaying his/her learning of academic skills until the language of literacy (literary Arabic) is mastered, if at all” (Ayari, 1996: 246). This goes against UNESCO recommendations that a child be taught in their mother tongue in the initial stages of education (Ayari, 1996; Shaaban, 2008). Calls to replace MSA with colloquial Arabic as a language of instruction or to reform the grammar of MSA to improve Arabic education were rejected on ideological grounds (Ayari, 1996; Shaaban, 2008), (cf. Section 3.2.2).

Another problem that Maamouri (1998) notes relates to the ambiguity of the term al-ʿarabiyya (the Arabic [language]), (cf. Section 2.6). The fluidity of this term is reflected in the school systems, where the nature of al-ʿarabiyya which ought to be used in education is not clearly defined, causing “a great deal of confusion in the implementation and transferability of pedagogical directions across school systems and country education structures for clear standards of evaluation of Arabic reading and writing and the comparability of their results” (p. 37). Although al-ʿarabiyya is generally equated with fuṣḥā, the term makes no clear distinction between H and L and may in fact be regarded as encompassing L forms in a ‘single system’ (cf. sections 2.6 and 2.9). In a sense, it means that the common use of colloquial Arabic in oral instruction in the classroom does not conflict with the direction to use al-ʿarabiyya as a medium of instruction in schools.

A related point is raised by M. H. Ibrahim (1983) who says that al-ʿarabiyya is considered by teachers and educators to be the pupil’s mother tongue, but the same people are likely to define al-ʿarabiyya in this context with reference to MSA – a variety far removed from the learner’s vernacular – causing major problems in spreading mass literacy. M. H. Ibrahim argues that the classical binary of H and L, though reductionist, is actually valid in the discussion of literacy in the Arab World because the option of intermediate varieties such as ESA does not exist for non-literate speakers: “only diglossia in the classical sense obtains for them. Spoken Arabic is what they have already mastered; Standard Arabic is the target they must aim at if they want to become literate” (M. H. Ibrahim, 1983: 509). The view that diglossia is to blame for illiteracy in the Arab World is shared by other linguists. Kaye
(1972: 47), for example, states: “The Arab countries are massively illiterate (on the whole) and I suggest that the main reason for this fact is that teachers have to teach an ill-defined system (MSA) to speakers of well-defined systems” (cf. Section 2.4).

However, Zughoul (1980: 213) challenges the association between diglossia and illiteracy, claiming that the “high percentage of illiteracy in the Arab World is the result of five centuries of Turkish rule and a century of Western colonial exploitation”. If anything, Zughoul believes that it is this high percentage of illiteracy which has widened the gap between the H and L varieties of Arabic (and not the other way round). Similarly, Ayari (1996: 248) nuances the direct link between diglossia and illiteracy by citing studies which indicate that the gap between MSA and colloquial Arabic “is not necessarily the direct cause of illiteracy and poor academic performance, but is in itself a symptom of a larger problem that should be addressed if the high rate of illiteracy in the Arab World is to be curbed”. Aspects of this ‘larger problem’ that Ayari refers to include: lack of early exposure to MSA, favouring English or French as a language of instruction, and ‘shortcomings’ in the Arabic writing system.

The Arabic writing system is often cited as an impediment to literacy and a hindrance to reading acquisition (Altoma, 1974; Ayari, 1996; Maamouri, 1998). This is usually attributed to two features: the fact that Arabic letters change shape depending on their position in a word, whether initial, medial or final (allomorphs), and the fact that short vowels – which are denoted using diacritics – are absent from most daily reading material in Arabic resulting in a high frequency of homographs. The latter feature means that readers often have to rely on context to disambiguate the meaning of words in a sentence. Maamouri (2008: 77) comments that “because the Arabic reader needs to understand in order to read, the Arabic reading process seems to have completely reversed what is usually the norm in other languages, where people read in order to understand”. M. H. Ibrahim (1983: 512) however is not convinced that these features of the Arabic script “can have such permanent and damaging effects on the learning process”. He cites a study by Mahmoud (1979) who concludes that attributing poor literacy to defects in the Arabic orthography is based on observation and impressionistic evidence rather than empirical research.
Another issue which has been indirectly linked to diglossia in education is poor political participation. For instance, Haeri (2003: 151) blames the “the dire state of pre-college education” in Egypt for making MSA, which is already difficult as it is, even less accessible to Egyptians and therefore creating an obstacle to “participation in the political realm”. She clarifies that this is of course not the only reason for the absence of democracy in Egypt but adds that “there seems to be deeply entrenched political interests in having [MSA] to be the sole official language” (cf. Section 3.2.5).

I have focussed in this section on the pedagogical and literacy dimensions of the ‘diglossia problem’, which are admittedly the mostly widely discussed dimensions. However, diglossia is also commonly presented as a ‘problem’ which is to be entirely blamed on the vernaculars – a puristic attitude which will be discussed in Section 3.3.1.2. Even here, the issue is presented as one of strife between two contending varieties. Boussofara-Omar (2008: 635) comments on this perception:

The conceptualisation of the coexistence of languages/varieties within a speech community in terms of rivalry, clash, tension, conflict, and constraints alone ignores their fluidity, downplays the dynamically ‘positive’ nature of the mutual impact on each other, and disallows any effort to explore the conditions under which the languages come together naturally, either through speech or context, and the complex patterns and configurations of use that arise out of their coexistence.

In general, whatever the concern (pedagogical, social, etc.) and whatever the ideological standpoint, it is very rare to come across works which attempt to paint Arabic diglossia in a positive light: If it is not a problem, it is a burden at best. One of these rare exhibits is Bassiouney’s (2009) Arabic Sociolinguistics where she highlights the ability of children growing up in diglossic environments to “adapt to and later even manipulate the linguistic situation” (Bassiouny, 2009: 267). She cites numerous case studies which demonstrate how “the diglossic situation provided an opportunity for speakers to project their identity and leave an effect on their audience” (ibid.) She concludes that diglossia is “an asset rather than an impediment”, remarking that “diglossia is dragged into the conflict without capturing the fact that diglossia itself is linguistic diversity, and by eliminating it we are suppressing a linguistic richness in Arab society” (ibid.).
2.9 Speaker Awareness

Thus far, I have been giving an account of Arabic diglossia from the point of view of the trained linguist. It is however pertinent to the present work that I take stock of how diglossia is perceived from the point of view of the speakers themselves. Holes (2004), for instance, notes that native speakers may not be as sensitive as linguists assume to the formal variation observed by linguists. In particular, the a priori assumptions about the H and L of the Fergusonian diglossic model are not necessarily shared by “the linguistically naive native” (Holes, 2004: 343):

The model is that of an observing linguist, and the definitions of H and L on which it depends are derived from other linguists’ grammatical descriptions, which are always to some degree idealizations of (or in the case of H often prescriptions for) behaviour.

Hary (1996: 78-79) notes that most of the 93 native speakers he interviewed from Egypt, Syria and Palestine “felt that both varieties are part of one language; they do not consider the two varieties to be separate languages. In other words, both standard and colloquial Arabic are ‘Arabic’ in one system”. The same view is highlighted by Bassiouney (2009: 266-267) who notes that “Arabs do not consider their colloquial another language. It is still Arabic; whether it is good Arabic or bad Arabic that they speak is a moot point”. She mentions expressions such as al-lahga al-miṣriyya ‘the Egyptian dialect’ and al-ʿāmmiyya al-miṣriyya ‘Egyptian colloquial Arabic’ which are used by intellectuals in Egypt to refer to Egyptian Arabic, but notes that “the average Egyptian when asked what she or he speaks would reply automatically ‘Arabic’”. She cites the example of children who watch cartoons dubbed in MSA without complaining that they cannot understand the language.

According to Maamouri (1998: 30), this view by most Arabs that there is one ‘Arabic language’ encases “an ambiguous reality and a symbolic abstraction comprising the old and new language norms and standards of all the linguistic varieties of Arabic”. Maamouri (1998: 34) also highlights “the strong cultural disposition of Arabs to consider fushā a ‘mother tongue’”, labeling this “attitudinal blindness in favour of fushā”. It is a view which appears to owe, at least in part, to a reluctance to admit that colloquial Arabic constitutes an independent system, resonating with Ferguson’s (1959b: 330) statement that speakers in a diglossic situation will sometimes claim
that L does not exist; only H is regarded as a real language, while “people may say that the L variety has no structure, no grammar, no rules, and it is only chaos” (Ferguson, 1991: 226), (cf. Section 3.3.1.2).

However, this is not to say that speakers are not aware of variation within this ‘system’ of Arabic. Native Arabic speakers can make intuitive distinctions between at least fuṣḥā and dialect forms (Parkinson, 1993; 2003; Walters, 1996). Indeed, the difficulty in delineating boundaries by linguists, as described in the previous section, by no means suggests that speakers are not aware of variation within Arabic. Boussofara-Omar (2008: 633) refers to a consensus among scholars “about the native speaker’s consistent ability to linguistically differentiate between mixed forms, fuṣḥā forms, and dialectal forms, despite their apparent fluidity and elusiveness”.

On the one hand, Mejdell (2006:45) notes that “native Arabic speakers do recognise and have a concept of language use which is neither (high) formal fuṣḥā nor everyday spoken ‘āmmiyā”, but that “apart from its ‘in-between’, ‘mixed’, quality, native speakers express rather vague ideas about the linguistic properties” of this middle variety. On the other hand, Schmidt (1974: 10, cited in Boussofara-Omar, 2008) suggests that speakers’ awareness is heightened enough to enable them to make judgments about intermediate levels:

> Although native speakers of Arabic tend to perceive their speech and the speech of others as discrete CA [Classical Arabic] or EC [Egyptian Colloquial], they are able to make judgments, in some cases finely detailed, about intermediate forms and they can arrange these forms into hierarchies.

A notable study which explores speakers’ awareness in a diglossic setting is Parkinson (1991). Parkinson investigated what forms native speakers in Cairo accepted as fuṣḥā and found great disparity in the judgments and attitudes of his informants. To a group in his study, fuṣḥā implied the classical literary ideal of grammatically correct, high-flown, elaborate language. Within this group there were those who favoured this form, while others preferred a less elaborate written style. To the rest of his informants, fuṣḥā meant grammatically correct language, whether classical or modern in style, as opposed to ‘āmmiyā. Even the ‘least correct’ version (containing
the most colloquial features) was judged by 75% of informants to be *fushā*, demonstrating that “most subjects have room in their notion of *fushā* for all of these various styles, even though they are clearly able to distinguish between the styles” (Parkinson, 2009: 58). Educated Egyptians “appear to be clearly aware that their modern formal language differs in many respects from the classical language, but they differ about whether this is a good or bad thing, and about whether they have a right to use the term *fushā* to refer to the modern form” (Parkinson 1991:35).

This evidence of disparity between speakers in their judgments of varieties is significant as it impacts the kind of the questions I ask in the language survey (Chapter 5). The purpose of my study is not to gauge speakers’ awareness of language levels (specifically H and L), but to investigate their attitudes towards them. I must therefore strike a balance between assuming that they have an understanding of what they mean without forcing a definition on them. I therefore use the common Arabic labels of *fushā* and ‘āmmiyya, assuming that speakers can at least distinguish these two levels: I peg *fushā* to the Arabic taught at school, and allow respondents to choose an appropriate definition for ‘āmmiyya (although the focus here is ideological rather than linguistic). I deliberately avoid any questions about intermediate varieties. However, it is important to acknowledge that, ultimately, I will be dealing with the participants’ perceptions; that is, what they perceive to be *fushā* or ‘āmmiyya (cf. Section 5.6). Such perceptions may not reflect actual practices but they are very valuable in a study of language ideology.

This approach is in line with Suleiman (2008: 28) who delimits his discussion to these two terms (*fushā* and ‘āmmiyya) because they “are consistent with the native tradition, in which these two dichotomous categories resonate with how most Egyptians conceptualise the language situation in their country”. Suleiman reasons that “in spite of the criticisms leveled against the empirical validity of Ferguson’s concept of Arabic diglossia, there is no doubt that this concept has a great socio-psychological and cultural validity for most Arabic speakers” (ibid.). Suleiman overcomes the paradox of *fushā* being considered ‘native’ to Arabic speakers by proposing two conceptual chains: the first focuses on the speech community, on mother tongue, and hence on ‘āmmiyya; the second focuses on the linguistic
community, on native language and hence on fuṣḥā. He notes that although designating fuṣḥā a native language deviates from cognitive linguists’ claims that fuṣḥā and āmmiyya behave as different languages, “it reflects a societal attitude which sociolinguistics must capture if it is to come to grips with the social life of a language, and how this language resonates with those who think they belong to it and it belongs to them” (Suleiman, 2013a: 271-272). This designation also captures the common position in Arabic ‘folk linguistics’ (cf. Section 3.3.1). Since I align myself with this conceptual chain, I will conclude this chapter with the following extended quote from Suleiman (2008: 30) which explains the full logic behind his conceptualisation:

The use of mother tongue to link āmmiyya to speech community captures the nature of this form of Arabic as a spoken variety that is informally acquired and as a site of cultural intimacy. The use of ‘native language’ to link fuṣḥā to linguistic community is intended to express the ideological meanings of ‘nativeness’, the fact that although fuṣḥā is not a mother tongue to the Egyptians (due to being acquired formally through instruction in school), it still is a site of belonging and intimacy to them in socio-psychological terms. I believe that these chains allow us access to a more nuanced concept of language in discussing national identity construction in Egypt. In particular, they allow us to excavate layers of meaning that go beyond the instrumental role of language as a means of communication that dominates so much of Arabic sociolinguistics, thus stunting its ability to engage symbolically with politics, sociology, and anthropology.

2.10 Summary

Arabic had a long history in the Arabian Peninsula, although the first chapters of this history are rather obscure. Theories abound about the pre-Islamic language situation in the peninsula, ranging from complete linguistic purity to a situation of standard-with-dialects and even diglossia. However the existence of some degree of regional variation in the vernaculars is hardly disputed. Islam accelerated the development and codification of Arabic as well as brought it to a vast stretch of land where it often replaced the original language. In Egypt, Arabic replaced Coptic and was minimally influenced by it in the process. From the thirteenth century, Arabic went into a period of decline, mirroring the disintegration of the Islamic empire, from which it
did not recover until the nineteenth century. The boom in printing and publishing in Egypt during the *nahda* gave it a central role in leading the linguistic revival and reform of Arabic. Though ruled by a succession of non-Arab rulers for many centuries, and in spite of nationalist emphasis on the Egyptian identity, Egypt emerged in the mid twentieth century as an Islamic Arab state with the Arabic language asserting both identities.

However, by then, diglossia had become deeply entrenched in Egyptian society. Ferguson defines diglossia as a fairly stable situation characterised by the existence of two varieties of the same language in a speech community; a variety of higher prestige (H) and a variety of lower prestige (L), each serving different functions. Ferguson’s conceptualisation has undergone numerous expansions and revisions. In particular, the stability of diglossia has been challenged. Examining the relationship between language shift and diglossia in Egypt provides a mixed picture as to the susceptibility of the language situation in Egypt to language shift.

While the H and L of Ferguson’s diglossia are regarded as two poles, and there is consensus that intermediate varieties exist between these poles, different perspectives abound about the distance between H and L, the nature of the intermediate varieties, and how they can be studied. The distance between H and L is often regarded as a problem in the literature, particularly with regard to education where this distance is amplified. Arabic linguists vary between them in how they frame diglossia, but the terms they use are generally removed from how native Arabic speaker see their language. Even though native speakers generally recognise the existence of two distinct levels of Arabic with a fuzzy in-between, these are considered part of a single language: *al-ʿarabiyya*. 


3 Language Policy, Ideology and Practice in Egypt

“A LANGUAGE EXISTS ULTIMATELY BECAUSE THE COMMUNITY WILLS IT”

Sue Wright (2004: 2), Language Policy and Language Planning

3.1 Introduction

This chapter is dedicated to reviewing three important and intricately linked concepts with respect to the Arabic language situation: language policy, ideology and practice. Referring once more to the concept of linguistic culture discussed in Section 2.5, Schiffman (1996: 276) gives a definition of language policy which provides excellent reasoning for the inextricable link between language policy and ideology:

[Language policy is primarily a social construct. It may consist of various elements of an explicit nature – juridical, judicial, administrative, constitutional and/or legal language may be extant in some jurisdictions, but whether or not a polity has such explicit text, policy as a cultural construct rests primarily on other conceptual elements – belief systems, attitudes, myths – the whole complex that we are referring to as linguistic culture, which is the sum totality of ideas, values, beliefs, attitudes, prejudices, religious strictures, and all the other cultural ‘baggage’ that speakers bring to their dealings with language from their background.]

Language policy is itself shaped by language ideology (or ideologies), typically ones which prevail in the society in question. Language policies do not necessarily exist in the form of a written document, although a distinction could be made between overt and covert language policies as discussed in Section 3.2.1. A closely related term is language planning, which “refers to the efforts to manage, modify or influence the habitual practice of individuals as part of a community” (Bassiouney, 2009: 205); it is “the formulation and proclamation of an explicit plan or policy, usually but not necessarily written in a formal document, about language use” (Spolsky, 2004: 11). I discuss language policy and planning in Section 3.2.

As can be seen already, central to this entire discussion is the concept of language ideology, which is defined by Spolsky (2004: 14) as “a general set of beliefs about
appropriate language practices ... assigning values and prestige to various aspects of language varieties used in it”. These beliefs influence language practices and are influenced by them. Moreover, they inform language planning and are crucial for the maintenance of language policies, although language planning may be specifically intended to alter language ideologies (ibid.). In Section 3.3 I discuss language ideologies associated with the Arabic language – a language shrouded in mythology and embraced as a symbol of nationalism. I also rein in the discussion to focus on language and national identity in Egypt.

In Section 3.4 I discuss language practices in Egypt, looking into other forces at play, such as globalisation and economics. In particular, I focus on “the use of English as symbolic capital linking Egypt to the “prosperity” of the West” (Stadlbauer, 2010: 3-4). This discussion brings the review up to speed on more recent socio-economic trends in the country with a focus on how this impacts language use.

For Spolsky (2004), language ideologies, language practices and language planning are all part and parcel of language policy. He posits that “the language policy of a speech community” consists of three components: “language practices – the habitual pattern of selecting among the varieties that make up its linguistic repertoire; its language beliefs or ideology – the beliefs about language and language use; and any specific efforts to modify or influence that practice by any kind of language intervention, planning or management” (2004: 5). He also argues that all three components must be studied together for a complete unbiased view of language policy. After establishing the link between language policy, ideology and practice, Spolsky (2004: 14) attempts to elucidate the difference between them: “language ideology is language policy with the manager left out, what people think should be done. Language practices, on the other hand, are what people actually do”.

Bassiouney (2009: 204) notes that language practices are more significant than language policies: “If a policy works against language practices, there is no guarantee that it will be successful”. This is because “the dynamic forces at work in the everyday activity of language communities are far more powerful than conscious, ideologically motivated policies” (Spolsky, 2004: 7). Therefore, “For a policy to be
successful, it has to lay claim to both language practices and language ideologies” (Bassiouny, 2009: 204).

It is in fact possible for all three areas (policies, ideologies and practices) to be in conflict. This relates to “the symbolic function of language as opposed to its instrumental function” – after all, “the fact that SA has survived for such a long time even though it is not a spoken language may have to do with its power as a symbol” (Bassiouny, 2009: 203). I must warn from the outset that despite my best efforts to separate the discussion on language policies, ideologies and practices into individual sections, the fact that these three concepts are almost always discussed together in the literature has made it nearly impossible to discuss one concept without referring to the other two.

3.2  Language policy and language planning

This section covers a range of topics related to language policy. In Section 3.2.1, I examine the relationship between Diglossia and language policy, drawing mostly on Schiffman’s work in this area. Then, in Section 3.2.2, I focus on the case of Arabic diglossia by reviewing the Arabicisation policy and related language planning efforts adopted in the Arab World. In Section 3.2.3, I outline the role of the Arabic language academies and their puristic approach to language planning. The concept of standard language and the standardisation of Arabic are discussed in Section 3.2.4, while the relevant concepts of power and prestige are discussed in sections 3.2.5 and 3.2.6 respectively.

3.2.1  Diglossia and language policy

Schiffman (1992: 3) considers diglossia a good example of a social feature which “operates at times in defiance to the explicit policy of the area”. To explain why, he distinguishes between two types of policy: “overt (explicit, formalised, de jure, codified) policies and covert (implicit, informal, unstated, de facto, grass-roots) aspects of the policy”, noting that covert aspects are usually ignored (ibid.). He adds that “diglossic linguistic situations often mask the true nature of linguistic repertoires (and therefore of languages policies) by presenting a view of language that is skewed in favour of the ‘high’ language, ignoring the actual domains of the ‘low’ language”
Indeed, Schiffman notes that “few policies ever take any cognizance of the existence of L variety language, let alone establish guarantees of its domains and registers” (p. 7). In such diglossic settings, official mentions of language “tend to be both in the H version of the language and about the H version ... and give no mention of rights for the L variety” (p. 8). Schiffman notes that this “follows the general practice of assuming that the H variety is the language” (ibid.) (cf. the discussion on al-ʿarabiyya in Section 2.6).

Policy makers in diglossic settings often turn a blind eye to the reality of actual linguistic use within the policies they establish. The overt policies of Arabic-speaking countries would give an outsider a very misleading picture of their linguistic reality, which is perhaps why Bassiouney (2009: 199) states that “to be able to appreciate fully the discussion on language policy in the Arab World, one has to resort to political science, sociology, psychology, anthropology and history as well as sociolinguistics”. Indeed, the very persistence of diglossia “is not so much an overt policy issue as it is a deep-seated cultural behaviour towards language” (Schiffman, 1996: 5). In the next section where language planning is discussed, “diglossia has to be considered to be a given, an underlying assumption, an input to the decision-making process, even an underlying cultural policy if you will, not a result of it, and not something that can be ignored” (ibid.). Schiffman adds that because diglossia “is not part of the explicit policy, it is not amenable to change in the same way that more explicit aspects of policy might be” (ibid.). The resulting disparity between policy and practice in the case of Egypt is discussed in Section 3.4.

3.2.2 Arabicisation and Language planning

Schiffman (1996) feels it is important to distinguish between language policy and language planning: while the former refers to the positions, principles and decisions of a language community towards its linguistic repertoire, the latter refers to concrete measures which aim to direct language roles. Although one might expect language policy and language planning to go hand in hand, they are different in that official language policies may not be implemented by language planning (Bassiouney,
Official policies usually satisfy ideological motives and expectations, whereas language planning may take a more pragmatic route.

All Arab countries adopted a policy of Arabicisation (ta’rib) shortly after gaining their independence from colonial powers in the twentieth century, “mainly as a reaction to years of deliberate suppression or marginalization of their native language(s) and culture” (Shaaban, 2008: 694). Even before independence, Arabic had “served as the rallying point of opposition to the hegemony of the coloniser” (Shaaban, 2008: 696), (cf. Section 3.3.2.1). Hence, when their constitutions were drawn up after independence, all Arab countries (that is, those that identified themselves as Arab) stipulated the adoption of Arabic (al-’arabiyya) as their official language (ibid.). Altoma (1974: 285) defines the policy of Arabicisation as:

[A] process aiming at achieving maximum use of Arabic in different Arab countries in oral and written communication. It covers issues ranging from the general question of making Arabic the official language of the state, the language of instruction, to matters related to the preparation of technical and scientific terminology in Arabic.

The language planning which stemmed from this Arabicisation policy in the Arab World is divided by Maamouri (1998) into two kinds: status planning Arabicisation in the countries of the Maghreb (West), and corpus planning Arabicisation in the countries of the ‘Machrek’ (East; to which Egypt belongs). Status planning Arabicisation involved minimising the use of French in favour of Arabic in the Maghreb countries (cf. Chejne, 1969; Haeri, 2000; Shaaban, 2008), while corpus planning Arabicisation “mainly focused on the ability of Arabic to cope with the demands of education promotion, scientific development and industrialisation” (Maamouri, 1998: 23). This entailed efforts to reform and update the Arabic lexicon to meet the demands of modernisation, as well as a preoccupation with the standards and quality of written production in Arabic. The Arabic language

17 The term Arabisation is alternatively used in some sources (for example: Altoma, 1974; Maamouri, 1998) to designate the same process. This is replaced by ‘Arabicisation’ here as it more accurately captures the intended meaning: Arabicisation “involves the language not the ethnic group” (Shaaban, 2008: 696). Compare this to my use of Arabisation in Section 2.3.

18 The terms status planning and corpus planning were originally coined by the Norwegian-American linguist Einar Haugen (1968).
academies played a central role in corpus planning Arabicisation and Arabic language reform (cf. Section 3.2.3).

Schiffman (1992: 1) notes that “there is a tendency to separate corpus planning and status planning and act as if they are rather unrelated (‘the linguists do the corpus planning and the politicians do the status planning’)”. However, Schiffman suggests that status planning is essentially embedded in overall language planning. Schiffman is primarily concerned with accounting for status planning failures where the aim is to reassign domains from an H (usually exogenous) variety to another indigenous L variety (such as in the case of status planning described by Maamouri in the Maghreb). However, where there are policies in place to reinforce the status and hold of H in certain domains but the L variety seems to be gaining ground anyway (such as in Egypt), it could be said that status planning is also failing, and Schiffman’s explanations seem to apply here too.

A third type of language planning which Wright (2004) includes as part of nation-building language policies is acquisition planning, a term coined by Cooper (1989) and “generally employed to describe the policies and strategies introduced to bring citizens to competence in the languages designated as ‘national’, ‘official’ or ‘medium of education’” (Wright, 2004: 61). This includes aspects such as the spread of literacy – “because a written language can be standardised and monitored more easily than spoken interaction” (ibid.) – and the introduction of a national school system where the (planned) standard language is taught (cf. Section 3.2.4).

Language planning in education is significant as it “can have far-reaching consequences in the structure of the languages involved, in the patterns of communication in the nation, and in the broader political processes within which language policy decisions take place”, which is why it is “most often the focus of political pressure and governmental policy making at the national level” (Ferguson, 1977: 12). I will now focus on a particular aspect of language planning in Egypt, namely the role of the Arabic Language Academy (ALA).
3.2.3 Linguistic purism and the role of the language academies

Wright (2004: 57) notes that “written languages with a literary canon will occasion purist attitudes as scholars and teachers hold up literary models for emulation”, stating that this is particularly true for languages which also have religious significance such as Arabic. She also notes that purism tends to be most intense during nationalist periods: “national education systems in nationalist times inculcate nationalist attitudes along with and through the national language” (Wright, 2004: 61). This ties in with what De Silva calls the ‘colonial hangover’ in most diglossic societies (cf. Section 3.3.2.1), where “any apparent threat to the ‘pure’ language of the liberated is capable of bringing back memories of past colonial experiences” (1982: 113). In such cases, a “declared policy of maintaining and protecting the ‘pure’ language is often politically advantageous” (ibid.), (cf. Section 3.2.4). It is in this context that the role of the ALAs in language planning should be understood.

In 1932, “the Egyptian authorities established ‘The Royal Academy for the Arabic language’ (majmaʿ al-luḡa al-ʾarabiyya al-malaki) to overlook, coordinate and authorise the various developments taking place in the use of Arabic” (Mejdell, 2006: 15). Like other Arabic language academies, the primary objective of the academy in Egypt has been “the preservation and renovation of Classical Arabic as an effective and unified language for all Arabic speaking people” (Altoma, 1974: 302). Its goals also included “preservation of the purity of the language; making Arabic self-sufficient so as to meet the requirements of the arts and sciences; and rendering Arabic a suitable instrument of communication in the modern world” (Chejne, 1969: 105).

In pursuing these objectives, the academies “have continued to resist the penetration of colloquialism from within, and loan words from without” (Altoma, 1974: 302). The Arabic language academies generally reflect the views of language Classicists (Altoma, 1974; Maamouri, 1998), whose position can be summarised in: insisting on the need to preserve fuṣḥā; a desire for fuṣḥā to replace colloquial Arabic as a natural spoken language; undermining colloquial Arabic and rejecting any change in fuṣḥā; a belief that the spread of education and universal literacy would
bridge the gap between *fuṣḥā* and colloquial Arabic; a belief that language planning could spread the use of *fuṣḥā* to all functions in society (Maamouri, 1998: 24).

However, it is worth noting that some academy members diverged from this position, “[tolerating] the study and use of the colloquial and [accepting] the need for modifications and enrichment” Maamouri (1998: 25). Two famous examples are Ahmad Luṭfī Al-Sayyid (1872-1963; henceforth, Ahmad Lutfi Al-Sayyid) and Ṭāhā Husayn (1989-1973; henceforth, Taha Husayn) who presided over the Arabic language academy in Egypt in 1945-1963 and 1963-1973 respectively. Al-Sayyid (1937, cited in Zughoul, 1980) recognised the need for reforming *fuṣḥā* and called for ‘linguistic tolerance’; “that is, using loan words and [colloquial] lexical items in writing” (Zughoul, 1980: 209). Al-Sayyid “was aware that *fuṣḥā* was in need of lexical and stylistic modernisation, a task he tackled from the perspective of an Egyptian nationalist who believed in the Egyptianisation of *fuṣḥā* (*tamsīr al-luġa*), perhaps to make it fit for defining Egyptian national identity at some future date” (Suleiman, 2008: 32), (cf. Section 3.3.2.3).

Husayn (1996 [1937]), who was less ‘radical’ in his views than Al-Sayyid, highlighted the need for reforming the grammar of *fuṣḥā* to make it more accessible to learners. Husayn saw a paradox in the puristic position of those who resisted Arabic language reforms, pointing out “that failure to reform the grammar, under the pretext that any reform of this kind would willy-nilly constitute an infringement of the integrity of the text of the Quran, will inevitably lead to depressing literacy in the schools and to heightening the danger which the colloquial poses to the standard form of the language in Egypt” (Suleiman, 2003: 193). It is the same paradox highlighted by Wexler (1971: 342-343) who notes that while “purism contributes to the maintenance of diglossia by protecting the written norm from encroachments from the dialects”, it simultaneously “assists in the resolution of diglossia by enabling the spoken norm to displace the previous written norm from its functions.”

It is perhaps the role of figures such as Al-Sayyid and Husayn which causes Altoma (1974: 302) to single out the Egyptian academy for being “most involved in attempts to modernise the language”. Such modernisation efforts usually entailed a struggle against the influence of al-Azhar in Cairo, an institution “charged with the
responsibility for perpetuating the traditional approach ... which was, until the late thirties, in charge of training teachers of Arabic in Egypt” Altoma (1974: 294), (cf. sections 2.3, 2.3.2 and 6.2.1). Giving an account of the Arabic language academy in Egypt, Mejdell (2006: 15) writes:

It is a story of an institution ridden by internal cultural-ideological conflicts between two main tendencies amongst its members: the reformist, ‘modernist’ writers and academics (often bilingual in education) vs. the ‘conservatives’ (mostly with an Azhari connection)—with “l’orientation puriste” nearly always getting the upper hand. This was not because of the conservatives’ numerical strength (they were in fact fewer than the modernists), but more likely because of a certain malaise among most academicians when confronted with charges of undermining the fushā, which made them recede on more radical issues.

One thing which is clear is that, despite the well-documented efforts of the language academy and its members “the decisions they (may) arrive at have no real authoritative force, but may be challenged or ignored at will” (Mejdell, 2006: 17). Altoma (1974) attributes the inefficacy of the Arabic language academy of Egypt in bringing about real change to a number of factors: lack of funds, slow decision-making processes, lack of coordination with other academies and resistance from traditionalists. As a result “there emanates from the Academy only a sort of whispering that nobody in language, education, and culture pays attention to” (Mejdell, 2006: 18-19).

It is also worth pointing to another institution which has played a prominent role in language planning in the Arab World: the Arab League (LAS). Established in 1945, LAS set up a cultural committee which promoted cultural unity in the Arab World through sponsoring conferences in specialised fields and publishing translations and manuscripts in Arabic. LAS also established a committee for Arabic which was concerned with the pedagogical functions of Arabic and sought to standardise scientific and technical terms in Arabic (Chejne, 1969). The linguistic endeavours of LAS played an important role in modernising Arabic and in many ways have contributed to the development of MSA.

Before concluding this section, it is worth pondering the role of language academies more broadly, and musing at the hegemony of the linguistic purism which has
effectively curtailed any substantial efforts to reform the Arabic language. After all, linguistic purism is itself a kind of language policy (Schiffman, 1996). Schiffman characterises linguistic purism as an attempt to control the language premised on a ‘belief system’. Language academies in the Arab World play a fundamental role in maintaining this purism (Spolsky, 2004), and the ‘beliefs’ that Schiffman lists aptly capture the ideology of the Classicists in their midst:

- A belief that there exists somewhere, perhaps in the past, or in a particular textual tradition, a state of ‘purity’ that the language can aspire to, or return to.
- A belief that there are people with special knowledge, capable of making decisions about what is pure and what is not.
- A belief that purity is a good thing, capable of renewing or strengthening the moral fibre of the language, its linguistic culture, or its speakers.
- There may also be a belief that purity is associated with a religious state, that is by keeping the language pure we keep religion pure, which helps keep the world from disintegrating.
- Purism may be associated with religious fundamentalism and fundamentalist movements, with political movements, nationalism, national integration, millennialism, and many other kinds of social, political and cultural phenomena. (Schiffman, 1996: 62)

For the Arabic language, the state of ultimate purity exists in the Quranic texts, and more broadly in the Arabic of early Islam. It is believed that traditional Arabic linguists, having usually undergone Islamic education or ‘heritage studies’, are in a position to safeguard the purity of the language. The purity of Arabic is often seen not only as linguistically, but as morally important: to preserve the Arabic language is also to preserve the ideals and traditions that it embodies. Conversely, a decline in the state of Arabic is perceived as a decline in the state of Islam and Islamic societies. It is therefore no surprise that religious and nationalist arguments are often invoked for the preservation of the Arabic language in its ‘pure’ state. These and other ideas are explored further in Section 3.3.1. I shall now turn to the subject of standardisation, another important component of language planning.

3.2.4 Standardisation

In its most basic sense, standardisation is “the imposition of uniformity upon a class of objects” (Milroy, 2001: 530). Applying this to the ‘object’ of language, language standardisation is essentially a by-product of corpus planning (cf. Section 3.2.2),
whereby “citizens should exhibit minimal variation of form and maximum variation of function” (Wright, 2004: 52). It is the process of producing a ‘legitimate’ language, a ‘semi-artificial’ language, a ‘theoretical norm’; and effectively a ‘standard’ “against which all linguistic practices are objectively measured” (Bourdieu, 1991: 45). “Standardisation is in part a fiction” (Wright, 2004: 53, also cf. Milroy & Milroy, 1985), but it is also “the means by which large groups become and remain communities of communication” (Wright, 2004: 54).

Typically, the language ‘norm’ is determined and codified by a central group empowered by the state. It is then disseminated in the form of a standard ‘official’ language and policed by state institutions – most notably the educational system which helps to “devalue popular modes of expression” and impose “recognition of the legitimate language” (Bourdieu, 1991: 49). To maintain its claim to legitimacy, a standard language “has to be sustained by a permanent effort of correction” (Bourdieu, 1991: 60):

The official language is bound up with the state, both in its genesis and in its social uses. ... Ignorance is no excuse; this linguistic law has its body of jurists – the grammarians – and its agents of regulation and imposition – the teachers – who are empowered universally to subject the linguistic performance of speaking subjects to examination and to the legal sanction of academic qualification. (Bourdieu, 1991: 45)

All of these efforts involved in maintaining the standard language constitute language policy and planning.

Standardisation is “a highly political and ideological business, which relies on the imposition of arbitrary norms of usage by authority” (Wright, 2004: 53), and accepting the standard also signals accepting the language attitudes which are typically circulated within the community. It could therefore be said that standardisation is motivated by, as well as perpetuates, a standard language ideology; “a bias toward an abstracted idealised, homogeneous spoken language which is imposed from above, and which takes as its model the written language. The most salient feature is the goal of suppression of variation of all kinds” (Lippi-Green, 1991: 45).

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19 Bourdieu’s use of the qualifier ‘legitimate’ semantically incorporates both ‘standard’ and ‘official’.
1994: 166, my Italics). This ideology is a ‘kind of belief’ which “affects the way in which speakers think about their own language and about ‘language’ in general” (Milroy, 2001: 530). Citing Lippi-Green’s definition, Walters (2008: 655) notes that “in many regards, we can claim that diglossia of the sort found in Arabic represents the most complete instantiation of standard language ideology”. While I agree with the general point that Walters makes, I believe that the phrase ‘homogeneous spoken language’ in Lippi-Green’s definition should not be overlooked. In this respect at least, standard Arabic diverges sharply from a ‘typical’ standard language as Mejdell (2006: 44) notes:

While *fuṣḥā* is as prototypical a High variety as you get in diglossia (with modified claims on discreteness of codes and functions), ... it may hardly be considered typical as a ‘standard’ variety: although it shares certain properties and functions with a typical standard, most Arabic language users tend increasingly to shun it for other than written functions.

Immediately, this highlights a complexity in the case of standard Arabic. The following two sections explain why this has implications for two key attributes which are traditionally associated with standard language in Western linguistics: power and prestige.

3.2.5 *The question of power*

Language policy is inextricably linked to power, more specifically “the power and legitimacy to enforce a policy” which pushes an official, standard language (Bassiouney, 2009: 201). Spolsky (2004: 40) observes that “in the modern world, states are an obvious locus of power, with a constitutionally established authority of governments over their citizens”. This power enables governments to establish and enforce language policies. The relationship between language policy and power is mutually reinforcing: “The implementation of language policy requires power” and “a strong centralized language policy enhances the power of the central government” (ibid.). In relation to this point, Wright (2004: 7) notes that “in non-democratic societies it serves to mark class and caste acquired through non-linguistic means; in democratic societies it is power itself, since authority in a democracy derives ultimately in a leader’s ability to persuade the electorate to accord that authority.”
All of this makes language “a potentially powerful political issue which is capable of deciding the fate of politicians and political parties” (De Silva, 1982: 112-113). De Silva adds that “linguistic emotions can be harnessed to divert people’s attention from more fundamental economic and political issues, and administrations are aware of this” (De Silva, 1982: 113). He relates this to diglossic situations where “endeavours to maintain the ‘purity’ of the High variety of the language is a significant political weapon that can be used in the name of national heritage and interest in order to divert attention from other problems” (ibid.). In such cases, a “declared policy of maintaining and protecting the ‘pure’ language is often politically advantageous” (ibid.).

It is clearly in this spirit that Carter (1983, cited in Versteegh, 1996) argues that the works of early Arab grammarians – which sought to standardise the Arabic language – served as a political tool in controlling Muslim society. Indeed, Brustad (2011) argues that what was revived during the nァhdァ (cf. Section 2.3.2) was not CA, but the standard language ideology associated with it. She states that “the MSA that resulted by mid-twentieth century and that is taught in schools across the Arab World is an anti-literacy MSA that serves, whether by design or not, as a form of social control”. Elsewhere, she argues that the standard language ideology associated with MSA is used by regimes as “a tool for curbing public discourse” (Brustad, 2012). That is, “by ‘educating’ people that the appropriate code to use in public discourse is hopelessly complex and an unachievable goal, the political elite furthered their own aims” (ibid.).

Walters (2008: 655) notes that the ‘symbolic loadings’ resulting from the association between Standard Arabic (fušحァ) and Islamic heritage (cf. Section 3.3.1), have meant that SA “has understandably come to be imbued with near-totemic power”. Haeri (2000: 68) also points to the ‘textual authority’ of Standard Arabic which derives from the fact that it is the language of a significant body of classical texts emanating from Islamic civilisation, and owes to the centrality of such texts. However, Haeri is quick to point out that “the language of these texts does not belong to any social group as their ordinary means of communication” (ibid.). This is essentially what Mejdell (2006) means when she points out that the ‘validity domain’ of Standard
Arabic is much greater than its ‘practice domain’. This latter point raises the question of the accessibility of Standard Arabic and, by extension, of the power it denotes, motivating Ferguson (1991: 227) to observe that “the proportion of the community competent in the H variety and the social position of the H-competent group make a big difference in terms of access to power”.

It is useful here to refer to Bourdieu’s (1991: 59) discussion on the “dispossession of the dominated classes”. He associates this with “the existence of a body of professionals, objectively invested with the monopoly of the legitimate use of the legitimate language, who produce for their own use a special language predisposed to fulfil, as a by-product, a social function of distinction in the relations between classes and in the struggles they wage on the terrain of language” (ibid.). Bourdieu also links this to the role of the educational system which, “charged with the task of sanctioning heretical products in the name of grammar and inculcating the specific norms which block the effects of the laws of evolution, contributes significantly to constituting the dominated uses of language as such by consecrating the dominant use as the only legitimate one, by the mere fact of inculcating it” (Bourdieu, 1991: 59-60).

This system is responsible for propping up a dominant language (and a dominant culture), and an ideology which favours this language (i.e. standard language ideology). An official language (as a component of ‘dominant culture’) in contributing to the “integration of the dominant class” also contributes to the “fictitious integration of society as a whole”, and hence to “the apathy (false consciousness) of the dominated classes” and “the legitimation of the established order” (Bourdieu, 1991: 167). This ‘ideological effect’ is produced by “concealing the function of division beneath the function of communication: the culture which unifies (the medium of communication) is also the culture which separates (the instrument of distinction) and which legitimates distinctions by forcing all other cultures (designated as sub-cultures) to define themselves by their distance from the dominant culture” (ibid.), (cf. sections 3.4 and 6.3 for further discussion of Bourdieu’s ideas).
Hence, thus far we can understand that, as far as MSA (or more generally, *fuṣḥā*) is a standard, language, it is a variety imbued with power by virtue of its association with Islamic heritage and the fact that it is the official variety sanctioned by the government. In this capacity, it should also follow that MSA has the power to include groups and exclude others in its power domains, and to confer benefits on groups and bar others. All of this would imply a straightforward relationship between standardisation and access to power, whereby a standard variety becomes more or less synonymous with power.

However, there is an important caveat to this relationship: when we speak of language and power, this “refers to both political power and economic power” (Bassiouney, 2009: 201, my emphasis). Of course, it is worth noting that political and economic powers may not be shared by the same entities; “governments can try to impose languages as much as they like, but unless their plans reflect the economic reality, they will not be appealing to the people” (Bassiouney, 2009: 204). As Haugen (1966: 933) points out: “Mastery of the standard language will naturally have a higher value if it admits one to the councils of the mighty. If it does not, the inducement to learn it, except, perhaps passively, may be very low; if social status is fixed by other criteria, it is conceivable that centuries could pass without a population’s adopting it”. I shall defer discussing the economic value of language to Section 3.4. Now, I turn to another concept which is often associated with standardisation: language prestige.

### 3.2.6 The question of prestige

As highlighted in the previous section, Standard Arabic has strong associations with Islamic civilisation and Arab cultural heritage. There is therefore no doubt that, at least as a written variety, MSA is regarded as a prestigious variety. For instance, Mitchell (1986: 8) observes that “written Arabic enjoys very great prestige among Arabic speakers”, while Maamouri (1998: 39) refers to the ‘prestige valuation’ of *fuṣḥā*, which is “explained by Arabs as relating to such qualities as beauty, logic, and a high degree of expressiveness” (cf. section 3.3.1).
However, the complexity of the notion of prestige in the Arabic language context has been pointed out by a number of researchers (see for example: Abd-El-Jawad, 1987; M. H. Ibrahim, 1986; Nader, 1962; Schmidt, 1986). Abd-El-Jawad’s (1987) important work calls into question the essentialising of the link between standard language and language prestige. Contrary to expectation, the Jordanian/Palestinian village women that Abd-El-Jawad studied did not accommodate to the standard forms – which is a deviation from the general pattern seen in sociolinguistic studies of gender and language the world over. In fact, the women studied preferred forms which were urban but not standard over forms which were simultaneously rural and standard. These unexpected results cannot be explained away as a consequence of the inferior social status of women in a segregated society (M. H. Ibrahim, 1986), or lack of access to the standard form (Haeri, 2000). What these findings seem to point to is “that the issue lies not in deviant behaviour from Arab women, but in the unwarranted equation ‘prestige features = standard features’” (Mejdell, 2006: 21).

Commenting on an earlier account of Abd-el-Jawad’s findings (Abd-El-Jawad, 1981), Labov (1982: 79) notes that, “to resolve this apparent contradiction, we must first generalise our notion of prestige, to take into account local as well as national prestige”. This is taken a step further by M. H. Ibrahim (1986: 115) who states that “the identification of H as both the standard and the prestigious variety at one and the same time has led to problems of interpreting data and findings from Arabic sociolinguistic research”. He cites findings from Abd-El-Jawad’s work alongside similar findings from other phonological studies investigating language variation along gender lines in Syria, Iraq and Egypt. They all had “one conclusion in common: unlike women in the rest of the world, Arabic speaking females tend to approximate standard Arabic to a lesser degree than Arabic-speaking males” (M. H. Ibrahim, 1986: 116). M. H. Ibrahim also points to the findings of Clive Holes whose research on Bahraini Arabic (see for example: Holes, 1983, 1986) indicates that Shiite Bahrainis accommodate to the speech of the more socially prestigious Sunni Bahrainis, even though this is an accommodation away from the Standard rather than towards it. M. H. Ibrahim reasons that “to assume that H is the only standard and prestigious

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20 These reasons are stated by Kojak (1982-1983) as the main explanation for her findings in Syria.
variety would entail that all speakers of Arabic who have no functional knowledge of H are sociolinguistically unstratified in regard to these characteristics of H” (M. H. Ibrahim, 1986: 118) – an assumption so ‘absurd’ that it logically follows that “the L varieties of Arabic must have their own hierarchical order of prestige independently of H and any of the latter’s features” (p.119) while “Standard Arabic H is socially neutral and unmarked with respect to the speaker’s class” (p. 124-125). M. H. Ibrahim’s argument is so compelling that his conclusions about standard and prestige varieties in Arabic are widely accepted by Arabic sociolinguists today (see for example: Bassiouney, 2009; Haeri, 2000; Mejdell, 2006; Walters, 2008).

There is however one important point which goes unspoken in this literature (perhaps because it is so obvious it does not need stating). In the studies cited above, prestige is dealt with in relation to the spoken form only. This is subtly pointed out by M. H. Ibrahim (1986: 124) who argues that women use locally prestigious forms because they are “socially prestigious … at least when it comes to speaking” (my emphasis).

What needs to be spelled out here is that this does not necessarily detract from the prestige valuation of MSA as a written form (as pointed out in Section 3.2.4), especially since it is this written form which is the object of the language standardisation process after all (cf. Haugen, 1972 [1962]). Indeed, M. H. Ibrahim himself states in an earlier article that “the terms ‘standard’ and ‘written’ are synonymous in the Arabic context since standard Arabic is virtually the only written variety to the exclusion of all spoken vernaculars” (1983: 508). The discrepancy in prestige between spoken and written MSA is a topic which has not received sufficient elucidation or investigation in the Arabic linguistics literature. I have therefore split valuations of fuṣḥā in the survey (Chapter 5) into spoken and written use to avoid conflating the two in a single (misleading) category.

3.3 Language Ideologies

Language ideologies are terminologically packaged in a manner of ways in the literature. I shall begin this section with defining some key terms and phrases, starting with the most obvious two: language ideology and language attitudes.
According to Walters (2008: 651), “language attitudes are psychological states related in complex ways to larger abstract language ideologies”. Language ideology is “the cultural (or subcultural) system of ideas about social and linguistic relationships, together with their loading of moral and political interests” (Irvine, 1989: 255). As Woolard and Schieffelin (1994: 55-56) point out, language ideologies go beyond language itself to “envision and enact links of language to group and personal identity, to aesthetics, to morality, and to epistemology”. These linkages, they add, “often underpin fundamental social institutions” (ibid.).

Although the two are often conflated, we tend to speak of discrete, isolated attitudes, while language ideologies “function as systems, linking aspects of language to aspects of social organisation and to various sorts of positioned interests” (Walters, 2008: 651). When an Arabic speaker regards ʿāmmiyya as inappropriate for written use, we speak of language attitudes. On the other hand, when this ‘inappropriate use’ leads to judgments of the language user as uneducated, unpatriotic, overtly secular, etc, then we are entering the realm of language ideologies. In general, the term ‘language attitudes’ lends itself to the discipline of psychology, while ‘language ideology’ invokes a more anthropological line of inquiry (Walters, 2008).

Some authors appear to get around the confusion caused by these two terms by devising their own terminology. For instance, Ferguson (1977: 9) speaks of ‘evaluations’, stating that:

All users of language in all speech communities – speakers, hearers, readers, writers – evaluate the forms of language(s) they use, in that they regard some forms as ‘better’ or ‘more correct’ or ‘more appropriate’ than others either in an absolute sense or for certain purposes or by particular people or in certain settings.

Ferguson points out that the role of such evaluations is central to determining the course of language change. He uses the term rationalised evaluation to refer to cases when “language evaluation is explained by members of the speech community in terms of particular reasons” such as the purity, beauty and efficiency of a language (Ferguson, 1977: 15). Such rationalised evaluations can be central to processes of language planning. The term evaluations is also mentioned by Walters (2008) who
notes that, based on the psychological tradition, ‘evaluative responses’ to language may be cognitive, affective, or behavioural: “Cognitive responses involve beliefs, and affective responses involve emotions, feelings, and sympathetic nervous system activity, while behavioural responses involve overt actions” (Walters, 2008: 650).

One of the most elaborate frameworks addressing language ideologies and attitudes in Arabic sociolinguistics is perhaps that devised by Eisele (2002) who assumes the presence of ‘authorising discourses’ in society, which he terms *regimes of authority*:

Each of the regimes of authority present in a society/culture may have an effect on the kind of language which is valorized, and on the metalinguistic views of language in general, and ultimately on the views and analyses of language professionals themselves (linguists, grammar specialists, language teachers, L1 and L2), who participate as well in their own discursive regimes of authority. (Eisele, 2002: 5)

However, Eisele (2002: 6) notes that “individuals do not always adopt the value system of one regime of authority alone and for all time, but rather manipulate the various regimes of authority and their differing systems of values (and thus the meanings that inhere in them) in fashioning their own identity”.

Building on Ferguson’s myths about Arabic, Eisele recognises four recurring ‘topoi’ underlying the value system of the most dominant regime of authority about the Arabic language (Eisele, 2000, 2002). These are motifs which frequently emerge in the narrative about the Arabic language; namely: unity, purity, continuity and competition. The topos of *unity* underscores the value of the Arabic language as uniting pre-Islamic Arabs in a single culture. This topos has been more recently “reinterpreted in the service of various nationalisms, initially Islamic but most strongly and successfully for Arab nationalism and Arab unity” (Eisele, 2002: 7), (cf. Section 3.3.2.2). The topos of *purity* encapsulates the traditional preoccupation to protect the Arabic language from ‘contamination’ resulting from interaction with non-Arab populations following the spread of Islam (cf. Section 2.2). In the modern period, this is exemplified in the prescriptivist role of education and language academies in maintaining the purity of “the classically derived modern written language” and stigmatisation of the Arabic vernaculars (Eisele, 2002: 7), (cf. Section 3.3.1.2). *Continuity* is linked to the “development of a complex and highly esteemed
written tradition, which is passed down through the generations and in which inheres the most highly valued features of the culture” (ibid.). In modern times, this topos can be seen in the 19th century revival of Arab culture and the Arabic language with an emphasis on the classical literary canon as a source for modern values (cf. Section 2.2). Competition involves rivalry with other languages, initially other Islamic languages such as Persian and Turkish, but more recently European colonial languages, particularly English (cf. sections 3.3.2.1 and 3.4). I find Eisele’s approach particularly valuable in unpacking some of the ideological positions manifested in the interviews I carried out (Chapter 4).

One thing which should be pointed out about language ideologies in the Arabic language situation in general, and in the Egyptian language situation in particular, is that they are many, complex and overlapping – attempting to provide a faithful account of these is nothing short of a mammoth task. As Woolard and Schieffelin (1994: 56) observe, even where language ideologies are not explicitly named, their underlying presence cannot be ignored in “studies that address cultural conceptions of language, in the guise of metalinguistics, attitudes, prestige, standards, aesthetics, hegemony, etc.”. Indeed, all of these terms pop up in the Arabic sociolinguistics literature as will become apparent in this section, in addition to another term which is often invoked in relation to Arabic: language myths (cf. Section 3.3.1). In reviewing this literature, some recurring themes emerge. Some of these have already been covered (purism in Sections 3.2.3, standard language ideology in Section 3.2.4, hegemony or power in Section 3.2.5, and prestige in Section 3.2.6). This section aims to cover the remaining themes which are structured under two main headings. Section 3.3.1 deals with the theme of the superiority of Arabic and examines the relationship between language and religion. Section 3.3.2, which is considerably longer, is dedicated to the themes which fall under the topic of language and identity – a vast and multi-layered topic which covers several themes including colonial heritage, nationalism and territorialism.

3.3.1 Language myths: the superiority of Arabic

Language myths are a type of language attitudes: they are ‘ideas’ – or perhaps more accurately – ‘beliefs’ about language which have become a well-established part of
the culture of a speech community (Bauer & Trudgill, 1998). That is, while “ideologies serve particular interests which they tend to present as universal interests, shared by the group as a whole”, myth “is a collective and collectively appropriated product” (Bourdieu, 1991: 167). As Schiffman (1996: 67) notes:

[M]any linguistic cultures have myths about language and these beliefs are often strongly cherished by members of the linguistic culture. Where they affect policy is in the area of attitudes toward the language, attitudes about other languages (and their speakers), the rights of other language speakers, and in challenges to the established policy.

Elgibali (1996: 1) describes Arabic as “a language long shrouded in mythology and confined by dogmas, a language whose self-appointed keepers believed in its supremacy over all other languages”. In an article which deals specifically with language myths about Arabic, Ferguson (1997 [1959]: 150) describes language myths as attitudes and beliefs which are “probably current about the language of the community as well as about other languages and language in general. Some of these are true, i.e. correspond very well to objective reality, others are involved with esthetic or religious notions the validity of which cannot be investigated empirically, and still others which purport to deal with facts are partly or wholly false”. This conceptualisation of language myths corresponds to what Suleiman (2008) calls “folk linguistics”. Ferguson’s article covers three central themes: the superiority of Arabic, dialect rating (that most dialect speakers perceive their respective dialects to be better and closer to fuṣḥā than other dialects)\(^2\), and the future of Arabic (the belief by many Arabs that all Arabs will speak and write a single unified variety of Arabic in the future, representing some simplified form of fuṣḥā). In this section, I deal with the ‘myth’ of the superiority of fuṣḥā. Indeed, the majority of Ferguson’s article is dedicated to this myth, which he summarises under the points of beauty, logic, lexical richness and religious aspects. I structure the discussion of the superiority of Arabic into two main themes: the divine selection of Arabic as the language of revelation, and hence its superiority over other languages (Section 3.3.1.1), and the purity of fuṣḥā Arabic, and hence its superiority over colloquial forms of Arabic (Section 3.3.1.2).

\(^2\) Ferguson’s remarks on this point are critiqued by Nader (1962) and Z. Ibrahim (2000).
3.3.1.1 The chosen language

Schiffman (1996: 55) notes that “one of the most basic issues where language and religion intersect is the existence, in many cultures, of sacred texts”. He adds that “for cultures where certain texts are so revered, there is often almost an identity of language and religion, such that the language of the texts also becomes sacred, and must be controlled, kept pure, kept out of the wrong hands (or wrong ears)”. This statement is true of the Arabic language which is “the chief instrument and vehicle of the sacred message of Islam”, and “analysis of its roles and functions over the past 14 centuries has taken a predominantly ideological orientation because of this” (Maamouri, 1998: 19). Maamouri adds that the view of Arabic as a sacred language has “led to the prevailing traditional ideology which has validated and preserved until now the cultural and historical uniqueness of Arabic by manifesting a highly pronounced sensitivity for purism and a low level of tolerance (and even some disdain) towards mistakes and error [sic] of common language use” (1998: 21).

This purist ideology affected Muslims in particular, further highlighting the inextricable link between language and religion in the case of Arabic. Indeed, referring to an earlier work by him (Hary, 1992), Hary (1996: 75) notes that Christian and Judeo-Arabic authors “were unaffected by the ideal of al-ʿarabiyya, and therefore allowed Colloquial elements to enter their writings”. He adds that the “pressure of the doctrine of the inimitability of the Quran (ʾiʿjāz al-qurʾān), which has been so effective for Muslims, did not apply for Christians and Jews, since their sacred texts were not written in Arabic” (ibid.). On the other hand, Boussofara-Omar (2008: 636) refers to “the relentless efforts to reinforce the sacred and divine origin of fuṣḥā together with the majestic aura in which it is – and must continue to be – shrouded,” noting “the exaggerated focus on the high reverence that Arabs have for fuṣḥā, its perfection and purity of speech or eloquence (faṣāḥa), remain as widely prevalent and advocated as they were in the pre-Islamic era”.

Ferguson (1997 [1959]: 253) states that it is easy to imagine an unanswerable argument as to the superiority of Arabic: “God is all-knowing, all powerful; he knows and can utilise all languages; he chose Arabic as the vehicle of ultimate revelations to the world; consequently, the Arabic language must be, in important respects, better
than other languages.” However, Eisele (2003) points out that while this argument may be ‘unanswerable’ from a theological perspective, “religiously inspired views of language also have political and social aspects to them, which are answerable and can be dealt with”. In particular, Eisele criticises the absence of the political dimension in Ferguson’s article. He considers Ferguson’s treatment of language attitudes to be ‘limited’, ‘selective’, ‘essentialising’, ‘impressionistic’ and based in part on anecdotal evidence. Nevertheless, he does not question the truth value of Ferguson’s observations and in fact seeks to build on them (Eisele, 2003). In particular, Ferguson’s views on the sacredness of the Quranic text are reflected in the question of translating it into colloquial Arabic. Nader (1962: 26) notes that “no one would conceive of paraphrasing the [Quran] in colloquial Arabic. So we could say that colloquial Arabic and [Quranic] sayings are mutually exclusive”. The same view is expressed by Haeri (2000: 75) who cites this evidence from her research:

In my own fieldwork in Cairo, Egyptians of diverse backgrounds were not only greatly surprised at the question of whether the Quran should be translated, they also gave similar answers as to why that cannot and should not be done. They argued that the form and meaning of the holy book cannot be separated. That is, the form is as important as the meaning and because one cannot translate form, much can be lost in translation. In other words, they do not consider, in this case, the relation between the signifier and the signified as arbitrary. The language of the Quran, they explained, is after all the word of God and one must read His word and not some translation of it. Furthermore, they said that as they are “Arabs” and already speak “Arabic,” there is no need for translations.

In 2010, news emerged of a translation of the Quran into the Moroccan vernacular (darija) in what could best be described as an ‘Internet scandal’ (Al-Shalh, 2010). The

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22 It is worth noting that the idea of ‘translation’ here is usually understood to mean a written translation. The Quran is otherwise ‘translated’ into colloquial Arabic on a daily basis by religious scholars across the Arab World, where the transfer takes the form of a written-to-oral translation/explanation (described as Quranic exegesis). A prominent example is the highly popular collection of televised Quranic exegesis by the late Egyptian Islamic scholar Muhammad Metwalli Al-Sharawi (1911-1998). One might argue that this act of ‘translation’ is not contested because it operates within the functional domains of diglossia. It would therefore follow that the question of translating the Quran into colloquial Arabic becomes more a question of recognising ‘ummiyya as a separate code and professing its validity in written form. For a detailed review of the ideologies surrounding the inimitability and untranslatability of the Quran, I refer the reader to Suleiman (2013b).
web is full of incredulous posts, pages and campaigns attacking the translation. The fact that the translator was a Moroccan convert from Islam to Christianity with missionary motives and professed antipathy towards Islam made it easy to denounce the translation on religious grounds: the argument goes that the sanctity of the Quran is bound to the sanctity of its form, therefore any action which is perceived to undermine this form must surely be intended to undermine Islam itself, and in this case at least, it was glaringly true. More recently, a campaign page surfaced on Facebook calling for the translation of the Quran into Egyptian ʿāmmiyya. This attracted negative attention rapidly enough, that by the time I had heard about the page and attempted to visit it, it was already gone as a result of reports for ‘abusive content’. While the controversy of the Moroccan translation seems to have now blown over, leaving only a whisper in its wake about the real linguistic issue at stake, the response to it is in itself testimony to the continuing validity of the views reported by Haeri (2000). The final statement in the long quote from Haeri above is echoed in the response of one Moroccan religious scholar to the Moroccan translation; he is quoted to have said that, because ɗârîja originates from [fuṣḥâ] Arabic, “there is therefore no need to translate the Quran into ɗârîja because everyone understands Arabic” (Al-Shalh, 2010, translated). The attitude captured in this statement is elaborated in the next section.

3.3.1.2 Good Arabic and bad Arabic

Inherent to the exaltation of fuṣḥâ and its superiority is the inferiority of colloquial Arabic. Maamouri notes that “fuṣḥâ carries in its own etymology the myth about its eloquence and high degree of correctness” (1998: 39), reflecting the “superiority that Arabs bestow on their heritage language” (1998: 38). This superiority results in a “quasi-general denial” of the existence of the spoken colloquial forms, which are “despised” and regarded as degraded and corrupt forms of the language (ibid.). Echoing this and articulating the attitude referred to at the end of the previous section, Bassiouney states that colloquial Arabic “is considered a corrupted version of [fuṣḥâ]. [Fuṣḥâ] is the ‘Arabic tongue’, the real language; dialects are not Arabic” (2009: 203). That is, most Arabs believe fuṣḥâ “to be the real language of which the spoken counterparts are inadequate renditions (Alrabaa, 1986: 78).
In a sense, the Arabic vernaculars have “come to represent symbolically the absence of everything the fushā is claimed to be” (Walters, 2008: 655). While fushā “enjoys very great prestige among Arabic speakers, to the extent that many of them, not least among cultural elites, indulge a chimerical desire for written norms to replace those of the greatly divergent vernacular Arabics of the several Arab countries”, “spoken Arabic of any kind is all too often subject among Arabs to strangely unreasoning scorn” (Mitchell, 1986: 8). Indeed, Arabic vernaculars are often likened to a form of disease which needs to be overcome (see for example, Zakariyya, 1964).

Not only are the native languages of Arabs “simply not worthy of any attention according to the overwhelming majority of Arabs who are willing to venture an opinion on this matter”, but “anyone who deals with spoken Arabic, including Arab linguists who have studied certain aspects of their dialects, is looked upon with suspicion” (M. H. Ibrahim, 1983: 513-514). Moreover, for many Arabic-speakers, “to seek to write the dialect or legitimate its use as a written variety is to engage in heresy or to favour national over pan national interests, thereby playing into the hands of those who would destroy the Arab World” (Walters, 2008: 662), (cf. sections 3.3.2.1 and 3.3.2.3). As Maamouri (1998: 38) explains:

The common ideologically acceptable and politically correct attitude with regard to the place of the colloquials in Arabic diglossia is total non-acceptance of colloquial Arabic forms in most formal situations. The use of colloquial Arabic becomes suspicious and may show an unacceptable lack of linguistic loyalty equal to treason to ‘Arab Nation’ feelings. This ‘zero-tolerance’ and high sensitivity of Arabs to ‘linguistic diversity’ seen as a symbolic reflection of ‘political disunity’ has been and still is a marking position in pan-Arab politics. It has turned any consideration given to Arabic dialects and to the problem of ‘dialectal variation’ by Arabs into a serious political taboo.

Indeed, departments of linguistics in Egypt’s public universities continually resist supervising research in this area. When it is studied, on rare occasion, the researchers clearly subscribe to the dominant language ideology about the superiority of Arabic (again, Zakariyya, 1964 is a good example). Most of the
academic work about diglossia in Arabic emanating from Egypt is published by the non-public American University in Cairo.

That is not to say, however, that the debate is absent from non-academic spheres. Indeed, Haeri (2000: 63) notes that “within the Arab World, there is hardly an intellectual who has not written on “the language question”. From time to time, language debates flare up in the Egyptian media, mostly engaged in by non-specialists and permeated with strong ideological overtones (see Mejdell, 2008 for an excellent review). As Mejdell observes, “that the cultural establishment today is deeply concerned about the status of the Arabic standard is (re)confirmed by the attention given to it in later [sic] years in fora that do not usually occupy themselves with linguistic matters” (2006: 22). For example, she refers to a special session by the cultural committee of the Egyptian parliament in 1998 devoted to the “degradation (imtiḥān) of SA in the country and the threat it represents to Arab identity” (ibid.). She also refers to a roundtable panel at al-Ahrām (cf. Section 2.3.2) in 1997 to discuss the state of Arabic in Egypt and the “challenges and dangers” that the language is facing from the inside and outside. She also notes the “radical” position taken by some writers such as Fathī Imbāba who claims in a 1997 article that a contemporary Arabic has developed as a result of modernising influences, freeing it from the shackles of the medieval grammarians in spoken form, although it has yet to be liberated in written form. The same argument has been reiterated more recently in a book by Sherīf El-Shubāshi (2004) titled Litahyā al-Luġa al-ʿarabiyya, Yasqut Sībawayh [Long live the Arabic language, Down with Sibawayh] which caused some controversy when it was published. However, as is the case with so many contributions to the debate, the arguments forwarded by the authors are “general and political rather than linguistic in scope and argument” (Mejdell, 2006: 23).

The ‘radical’ views of these authors are clearly on the periphery of the language debate which has at its core a public so ideologically resolute on the superiority of SA that their attitudes police the language against acts of “linguistic disobedience”. For instance, Mejdell (2006: 24) observes that when the weekly newspaper al-Dustūr started using Egyptian Arabic phrases in the headlines, it was faced with protests
“against what many readers obviously felt was not only an act of defiance, but an act close to indecency”.

Explaining resistance to calls for using the vernacular as a language of instruction, Ayari (1996: 247) effectively summarises the main concerns that surround any “upgrade” in the status of colloquial Arabic:

Opponents of the vernacular argue that the vernacular is itself an outcome of illiteracy and does not have the expressive power (i.e. rich vocabulary) to be used as a vehicle of knowledge acquisition. They also argue, and justifiably so, that replacing ә fәshә with the vernacular would cut off future generations from the vast body of works in literary Arabic over the centuries ... In addition, the replacement of literary Arabic with the vernacular would undermine efforts to strengthen the unity of Arabic-speaking countries .... Even among illiterates who speak only colloquial Arabic, negative attitudes towards local vernacular make it difficult, and even impossible, to introduce it as a means of learning reading and writing skills.

Mitchell makes a similar point with regard to proposals to codify colloquial Arabic in written form. He notes that it is not “orthographic or orthoepic difficulties that inhibit the ‘transcribing’ of spoken Arabic of whatever kind but rather the almost mystical regard in which Arabs hold their written language to the detriment of spoken counter-parts” (1978: 227). I shall conclude this section thus, but the points raised here will be invoked again when discussing language and identity in the next section.

3.3.2 Language and national identity

It is almost impossible to speak of language ideologies in relation to the Arabic language without grappling with the question of identity. The significance of this question links to its potential in bringing about language change. Fasold, for example, states that “language shift will only occur if, and to the extent that, a community desires to give up its identity as an identifiable sociocultural group in favour of an identity as a part of some other community” (1984: 240, cited in Omoniyi, 2006). For, “while identity is conditioned by social interaction and social structure, it at the same time conditions social interaction and social structure” (Block, 2006: 38).
The question of identity, particularly national identity, is also closely linked to language policy and planning (Wright, 2004). Wright states that academic interest in language policy and planning first emerged in the age of nationalism. It established itself as an academic discipline in universities in the wake of post WWII decolonisation with a focus on the language needs of new ‘nations’. The work of Yasir Suleiman (1996, 2003, 2004, 2006a, 2006b, 2008, 2011, 2013a, 2013b) is an invaluable resource on language and identity in the Arab World, hence I will be citing his work extensively in this section. In discussing the relationship between language and nation in Arabic, Suleiman (2006a: 126) argues that “nation- and state-building in the Arabic speaking world are two of the most important sociopolitical projects of the modern era, with thick manifestations that extend to other semio logies of nationalist signification”. What is of particular interest here is how these projects “construct language as one of their cornerstones” and how “the role of language in these projects is the subject of ideological contestation and political conflict which involve language in complex ways” (ibid.).

This section addresses the relationship between the Arabic language and identity as constructed in the debate on language and nation in Egypt. Central to this debate is the ideological concept of a ‘nation’ which does not correspond to the political concept of a ‘state’. Whereas the term state entails a structure which exercises sovereign powers over a given territory and legislates laws to regulate interactions between the inhabitants of this territory, the term nation is primarily linked to “the psychological dimension of belonging to a community” (Bassiouney, 2009: 206). According to Bassiouney, a nation is “attached geographically to a specific territory and may have a specific religion”, it “may have its way of perceiving itself in relation to history, and may even “have its own myths” (ibid.). This distinction is important in understanding the ideological significance of fuṣḥā:

Ideologically fuṣḥā has a very strong symbolic force among most people. However, it is a transnational standard—or rather a trans-local/regional national variety, which is perceived as a unifying force for the Arab nation, not the local (Egyptian) state—rather emphasising the Arab character of the people and state. To many people it is additionally a symbol for the even wider Muslim community (umma) of believers, for
whom Arabic (fuṣḥā) is a holy language, the language of Revelation. Thus, for ideological reasons, pan-Arab nationalism, cultural pride and a strong sense of Muslim identity, the validity of fuṣḥā as such is not challenged. (Mejdell, 2006: 19).

Discussing nationalism in Egypt, Suleiman (2008: 39) paints a picture of “concentric nationalist circles” which is illustrated in Figure 2. Significantly, he uses the epithet “Egyptian” at the beginning of each label because of the central role that Egypt is perceived to play in each of these nationalisms. It is worth noting that he distinguishes between two types of Egyptian nationalism. Closer to the core is a more separatist nationalism which views Egypt as entirely removed from the Arab World, while integral Egyptian nationalism captures a view of Egypt as distinct from the Arab World but “with strong non-national links with the Arabic speaking countries” (ibid.). Suleiman’s notion of Eastern nationalism also warrants some glossing; this according to him “emphasises Egypt’s separate national identity but highlights its similarity of culture with nations such as China and Japan” (ibid.).

Against this backdrop, this section will focus on the identities encapsulated in the three inner circles of the above diagram given their salience in the language
question. I begin with a discussion of the colonial linguistic legacy of Egypt and the role this played in shaping language-based national identities in Section 3.3.2.1. I then discuss the two main currents of nationalism in Egypt – pan-Arab nationalism and Egyptian territorial nationalism – and their impact on language in sections 3.3.2.2 and 3.3.2.3 respectively.

3.3.2.1 The Colonial ‘hangover’

The dichotomy between Standard Arabic and Colloquial Arabic was first recognised in the West by European schools which started programs for teaching Colloquial Arabic, the earliest of which was in Naples, Italy in 1727 (Zughoul, 1980). While there was a simultaneous interest in Classical Arabic texts by European Orientalists in the following centuries (Eisele, 2000), colloquial Arabic continued to attract European interest when the Arab World was under European colonisation. This is particularly true of Egypt during the period of British colonisation (1882-1922), which is the period Stadlbauer (2010) argues present-day language ideologies in Egypt stem from. The British colonisers in Egypt “initiated anti-Arabic, pro-English language policies that assigned symbolic value to these languages: Arabic was depreciated because it was perceived as chaotic and random, while English was projected as being modern, prestigious, and desirable” (Stadlbauer, 2010: 2), (cf. Section 2.3.2).

These ideas are most notably associated with one “British irrigation engineer and amateur language planner” in Egypt, William Willcocks (1852-1932), who magnified the “the problem of diglossia” out of proportion (Mejdell, 2006: 10). In a series of articles and lectures, Willcocks “attributed the backwardness of the Egyptian people and the lack of inventions and creativity of thinking to the use of [fushā], which he termed a dead language” (Zughoul, 1980: 208). Willcocks openly called for doing away with fushā and replacing it with ṣūmmiyya in reading, writing and education, which “may explain why Arabs have looked with suspicion and fear at every suggestion for reform in the language, especially if it originates in the West or is propagated by a westerner” (ibid.).

This also explains why, even though calls to reform and modernise the Arabic language emerged relatively early in Egypt compared to other Arab countries
(Bassiouney, 2009), interventions for the reform of Arabic were linked to initiatives for the expansion of the scope of foreign languages in education in the late 19th century. Both were “vehemently contested on what may be called ‘nativist’ grounds: they were considered attempts to weaken the resistance to occupation by loosening people’s ties with Islam and with the other Arabs—and a way for the foreigners to strengthen their grip on the population, by having easier access to their language” (Mejdell, 2006: 11).

Since the call to use ‘āmmiyya instead of fuṣḥā in education was first promoted by British colonising powers in Egypt, this call continues to be “associated in the mind of native speakers in general and intellectuals in particular with colonisation and Orientalist thinking” (Bassiouney, 2009: 265). This, Haeri (2000: 64) notes, is because, unlike fuṣḥā, Arabic colloquials “threaten to divide rather than unite the Arabs”. Indeed, Arab intellectuals often claim that the problematisation of diglossia and exaltation of ‘āmmiyya were part of a colonial separatist agenda (see for example, Hussein, 1984; Zakariyya, 1964). The association is exacerbated by the fact that discussions of the ‘problems’ of fuṣḥā, “including difficulties of its orthography, often show an unabashed admiration for European languages on the part of some intellectuals, particularly those who advocated modifying it or changing it to the Latin alphabet” (Haeri, 2000: 71), (cf. Section 3.3.2.3). Bassiouney notes that the scepticism is even greater when this call comes from non-Arabs: “For Arabs such calls are considered a conspiracy to divide the Arab nation” (Bassiouney, 2009: 266). This sceptical position captures what De Silva terms the “colonial hangover” of diglossic societies. It is an ideological position which ensures “a defensive kind of unity at least among the more nationalist sectors of the community” (De Silva, 1982: 113). The construction of fuṣḥā as a unifying element against a foreign other is the focus of the next section.

3.3.2.2 Pan-Arab nationalism

The Arabic word for nation is umma, and it is commonly used in the two expressions al-umma al-‘arabiyya (the Arab Nation) and al-umma al-islāmiyya (the Islamic Nation). The first term is used to refer collectively to the peoples of al-waṭan al-
ʿarabī (the Arab fatherland), while the latter is “a universal term rather than particular to a specific community with a shared culture and history” (Bassiouney, 2009: 207). Fuṣḥā is constructed as a means of symbolic identification for Arab and Islamic nationalists simultaneously. By and large, Islamic and Arab nationalisms are not perceived as at odds with each other: “In intellectual, if not political terms, Islamic nationalism could imperceptibly fade into pan-Arabism without subscribing to its secularism, thus underpinning the move towards the strongest expression of the fuṣḥā-national identity link that is so characteristic of pan-Arabism” (Suleiman, 2008: 40). In other words, although language is the unifying force in Arab nationalism and religion is the unifying force in Islamic nationalism, the two nationalisms are reconciled by the fact that fuṣḥā is valued in both of them. Indeed, the term “Islamic Arab nation” (al-umma al-ʿarabiyya al-islāmiyya) is not uncommon in Arabic rhetoric (see for example, Shaker, 1972).

However, while there is no denying the well-established link between Arabic and Islam (cf. Section 3.3.1), this link is sometimes overemphasised in the literature (see for example, Haeri, 2003) to the extent that the ‘secularisation’ of fuṣḥā (a term used by Haeri herself, cf. Haeri, 2000: 74) is either completely overlooked or not emphasised enough. To understand how this secularisation came to be, we must go back to the 19th Century, a time when much of the Arab World was under Ottoman rule. The Ottomans shared the majority religion of Arabs, but not their language. This ruled out religion as a mobilising force by the cultural elite who resisted the Ottoman rulers and their Turkification policies, and language became the obvious ‘othering’ tool. However, to achieve this, it was necessary first to undercut the link between religion and language:

Attempts at decoupling, or loosening, the exclusive link between Arabic and Islam in the 19th century served as the foundation for launching the argument that the ties of language between Muslims and Christians, for whom Arabic is a mother tongue, were (or ought to be) more important in group identity terms than the bonds of Islam that linked the Arab Muslims to their Turkish coreligionists in the Ottoman Empire. (Suleiman, 2006a: 127)
The relationship between language and nation in the Arab World came to the forefront in the twentieth century, featuring “in government constitutions, in language academies, among Arab intellectuals and in the media more broadly” (Bassiouney, 2009: 207). As Arab countries gained their independence, “each country officially declared its adherence to pan-Arab nationalism [qawmiyya] with the Arabic language as the national language of all Arabs” (Versteegh, 2001: 196). Fusha became the “mainstay of Arab nationalism” (Zughoul, 1980: 204). It was increasingly perceived by Arab intellectuals as “a language of independence, tradition, glorious past, and even the language in which a sound moral system could be explained and maintained” (Bassiouney, 2009: 210).

The clearest representation of the ‘the Arab nation’ in modern times is the Arab League (LAS) (cf. Section 3.2.3), which Bassiouney (2009) notes is primarily an ideological entity (as opposed for example to the European Union, which is a functional political and economic power). LAS consists of 22 countries which have Arabic as an official language, and in fact describes itself as “an association of countries whose peoples are Arabic speaking” (Bassiouney, 2009: 209). Walters (2008: 653-654) notes that “because definitions of ‘Arab’ often claim that an Arab is ‘one who speaks Arabic’, the language itself becomes an essential, nondetachable component of group membership – often the single such component”.

While “in ancient times the only true ‘Arab’ was the Bedouin Arab”, with kinship and lineage playing a central part (Bassiouney, 2009: 208), today the term ‘Arab’ indexes a concept of nationalism which transcends ethnicity. As Maamouri (1998: 7) observes, “an ‘Arab’ is defined in terms of a set of speech habits even when these habits do not belong to his/her own ethnic group”. He adds that the “linguistic focusing which is common to the countries of the Arab region frequently overrides ethnic identity and relates to concepts of linguistic unity and the uniformity of language standards”. Bassiouney (2009: 208) observes that “the Arab nation is not a political entity but an ideological one”, explaining that “a nation can be built on language ideology rather than language practice, as long as the ideology is a vessel

23 Normally numbering 22 states, there are only 21 LAS members at the time of writing as the membership of Syria – one of the founding states – was suspended by LAS on 12/11/2011 over the conflict in Syria.
for forming a sense of belonging between members of a specific community”. In the same vein, Versteegh (2001: 196) notes:

Since the standard language is regarded by most Arabs as the most significant unifying factor of the Arab World, it also serves as a symbol of Arab unity. Most political parties in the Arab World at least officially propagate this unity, so that politicians are under severe pressure to use standard language, even though their constituents do not understand it.

Although the impetus for pan-Arab nationalism had emerged in previous decades, expressions of pan-Arab sentiments peaked during the Nasserite era in the 1950s and 1960s, (Suleiman, 2008). The process was aided by increased contact, stronger trade links and improved transport in the Arab World, in addition to cultural coalescence owing in part to the spread of Egyptian audiovisual and printed media across the Arab World, as well as the unifying effect of the Palestinian issue. Suleiman (2008: 40) concludes that “pan-Arab nationalism in Egypt was not, therefore, a completely ideological creation, but one that is also rooted in objective material conditions with discernible social and cultural consequences”. Pan-Arab nationalism afforded Egypt with the opportunity to enhance its cultural and political influence and was therefore “laced with a healthy degree of political calculation and enlightened pragmatism” (Suleiman, 2008: 41).

The Nasserite era was a period of major political and social changes in Egypt. The revolution which resulted in the upheaval of the monarchy in 1952 aimed to close the gap between social classes, and one outcome was making free school education available to the Egyptian population and making primary school education compulsory (Khidr, 2000). Fuṣḥā (or more specifically, MSA) was at the centre of these new educational policies, with an eye on developing a new image for the young Arab generation where fuṣḥā was a unifying force between different Arab nationals (Bassiouney, 2009). As a “new image of Egypt was being formed: that of Egypt as part of the Arab nation” (Bassiouney, 2009: 242), the attitude towards fuṣḥā developed positively. Schools started teaching classical Arabic literature and poetry to enhance young Egyptians’ sense of belonging in a new, independent Arab World. Calls to reform and simplify fuṣḥā, which had previously surfaced, were drowned out and temporarily forgotten, and Egyptian Arabic was relegated to everyday language
status once more. Not only did MSA become the official language of Egypt, but it effectively “gained the status of a prestige language, which carries political significance” (Bassiouney, 2009: 242).

This was a period characterised by linguistic optimism. It was common among Arabs to predict a future where all Arabs would speak a single unified language modelled after *fuṣḥā* (Ferguson, 1997 [1959]), which indeed seemed to be the ultimate goal of the educational systems set up during this period (Eisele, 2002). Blanc’s (1960) study (cf. Section 2.7) which was conducted during the Nasserite period captures this attitude. Blanc (1960: 87-88) notes that the participants in his study believed that the difference in their spoken dialects was a direct result of a lack of contact between the Arabic-speaking regions as a result of political boundaries imposed by foreign powers. They also believed that these boundaries were now being progressively removed\(^2\), and that with them would come the removal of dialectal differences, ultimately resulting in linguistic unification which will be enhanced by increased education. The perceived result would be a language very close to *fuṣḥā* and very far from colloquial Arabic, with a lexically unified Arab World but with regions retaining their own peculiarities of pronunciation: they likened it to the language they were speaking which they termed ‘the language of the educated’ (cf. Section 2.7). They estimated that this linguistic unification would come into effect in the space of 50 years – something which of course has not happened.

While pan-Arab nationalism was, and still is, an important aspect of politics in the Arab World, it is important to look beyond it to better understand the history of contemporary debates related to language and identity. An important side to this debate centres around territorial nationalism. It is common in the literature to find a chronological review of nationalisms in Egypt which begins with territorial nationalism and ends with pan-Arab nationalism (see for example: Bassiouney, 2009; Suleiman, 2003, 2008), suggesting either implicitly or explicitly that the former has been superseded by the latter. Haeri (1997: 798), for example, expressly states that “pan-Arab ideology overrode other ideologies on the issue of language” (emphasis in

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\(^2\) This is likely in reference to the short-lived Egyptian-Syrian union (1958-1961) which was in effect at the time that Blanc’s (1960) article was written.
original). I find that this arrangement can generate a prejudiced reading of events, and have therefore deliberately discussed pan-Arab nationalism before territorial Egyptian nationalism, working my way inwards across Suleiman’s nationalism circles (cf. Figure 2 above). My purpose is to present the two nationalisms as co-existing ideologies, with one occasionally overtaking the other in line with the political atmosphere.

3.3.2.3 Egyptian nationalism

In the same way that language was operationalised as an instrument of unity in pan-Arab nationalism, it was used as an instrument of separation by territorial nationalists in ‘Arab separatism movements’ which called for the adoption of the colloquial variety as a national language (Zughoul, 1980). In Egypt, Egyptian territorial nationalism – which originated in the latter part of the 19th century – was given an enormous boost in the 1920s due to:

… the pride the country felt in the 1919 revolution against British colonial rule, the establishment of a parliamentary democracy in 1922-3, the excitement following the discovery of the tomb of Tut-Ank-Amon in 1923 and the success of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in promoting Turkish nationalism with its keen interest in language reform, which the Egyptian territorial nationalists looked to as a model. (Suleiman, 2008: 32)

Suleiman (2008) summarises the ideological positions of Egyptian nationalists in two main attitudes. First, that “fuṣḥā was not seen to be invested with the power to define Egypt’s national identity” (p. 37). To accept fuṣḥā as a marker of Egyptian identity would be to concede that Egypt is an Arab country. To refute this connection, Egyptian nationalists resorted to an “acute application of the principle of alterity in national self definition: the greater the substantive linguistic similarities between national Self and significant Other, the greater the desire to deny or explain away these similarities as a basis for a shared national identity between this Self and the Other” (p. 38). Second, Egyptian nationalists showed “a strong and sustained interest in language reform [which was linked] to the socio-economic modernisation of their country” (ibid.). The reforms they proposed ranged from reforming the grammar of fuṣḥā (Husayn, 1996 [1937]), Egyptianising fuṣḥā (Al-Sayyid, 1937), to
replacing the Arabic script with a Roman script (Musa, 2012 [1945]), (cf. Section 3.2.3).

Egyptian nationalists shunned the link to Arabic-speaking countries and looked elsewhere for self-definition. They felt a direct racial and psychological link to the ancient Egyptians, and as heirs to such an ancient civilisation, they felt superior to and more advanced than Arabs (Suleiman, 2003, 2008). As Suleiman notes, “it is a general feature of all nationalisms to emphasise continuities with the past, and to use these continuities to endow themselves and those whom they ‘nationalise’ with pedigree and authenticity” (2008: 28).

Suleiman (2008: 33) observes that “some territorial nationalists went so far as to claim that to be true to their history, the Egyptian Copts, as the legitimate heirs of ancient Egypt, must abandon Arabic and revert to Coptic”. This claim was usually anchored in projecting “the seventh-century conquest of Egypt as an Arab invasion or occupation” and in painting “Arabic as an imperial language, equating it symbolically with English as the language of the British colonial rule” (ibid.). The Arab component of Egypt’s past was treated “as historical rupture, which Egypt repaired through its ‘historically proven’ assimilatory powers” (ibid.). This view is expressed in the work of two prominent Egyptian writers: Salāma Mūsā (1887-1958; henceforth Salama Musa) (Musa, 2012 [1945], 2013 [1956]) and Lewīs ʿawaḍ (1915-1990; henceforth, Louis Awad) (Awad, 1989 [1947], 2006 [1981]). Significantly, both of them were born to Coptic parents, even though Musa had professed atheist inclinations (cf. Musa, 2012 [1912]).

Salama Musa is described by Eisele (2000) as a “language maven” heavily influenced by Marxist thought, and by Suleiman as a territorial nationalist who shunned language as the basis for national self-definition while paradoxically showing “a sustained interest in it as the object and means of modernisation” (Suleiman, 2008: 35). Musa “constructed a dire picture of fuṣḥā, painting it as lexically defective in dealing with the exigencies of science, industry, and modernity at large owing to its origins in a desert ecology and culture from which it has been unable to break completely free” (Suleiman, 2008: 34). He claimed that fuṣḥā had “fossilised to the
point where it could be declared (almost) a dead language” (ibid.). On the other hand, Musa “strongly promoted the Pharaonic theme in the nationalist ideology, considering this theme as the major authenticating and motivating force for Egypt” (ibid.). He also “called for the revival of the Coptic language, the demotic form of ancient Egyptian, which he stated was still alive in the monasteries of the Coptic Church” (Suleiman, 2008: 35), and proposed using the Roman alphabet to write colloquial language to facilitate borrowing from European languages and keep up with modern technology.

Musa’s views are generally shared by Awad who “believed that Egyptian creativity was permanently handicapped” by fuṣḥā, and that Egyptians needed to nurture ‘āmmiyya to embark on a modern era “unfettered by the linguistic shackles of the past” (Suleiman, 2008: 37). He also argued that EA “has developed its own phonology, morphology, syntax, lexicon, and prosody, and that it had done so under the influence of an Egyptian substratum (Coptic) that made it distinct from other ‘āmmiyya varieties outside the borders of Egypt” (ibid.). In fact, Awad even went as far as to claim that EA was “an outcome of the special physiology of the Egyptian vocal tract”; EA “therefore separated Egyptians from non-Egyptians in a genetically coded manner” (ibid.).

While Musa and Awad represent Egyptian nationalism in its most separatist forms (the first circle from the centre in Figure 2 above), there were other Egyptian nationalists with a more integral disposition towards the Arab World (the second concentric circle). One such example was the Azhar-educated writer, Taha Husayn (cf. Section 3.2.3), who believed that education was “the most secure basis for bringing about cultural redefinition of the national identity in a manner which preserves and enhances the national unity of Egypt” (Suleiman, 2003: 192). While Husayn looked to Europe as a model, as Musa did, he believed that Egypt “should aim at integration with the West and not at assimilation” (Bassiouney, 2009: 241). He argued that the very foundations of European culture were influenced by ancient Egyptian civilisation, and hence Egypt would be betraying its own historical legacy if it were to stay outside the scope of modern European culture (Suleiman, 2003).
However, unlike separatist Egyptian nationalists, Taha Husayn did not “see Egypt as distinct from the surrounding countries” (Suleiman, 2003: 197). Rather than isolate itself from the region, he believed “that an independent Egypt has a duty towards its Arab neighbours, and that it can execute this by inviting Arab students to come to study in Egypt or by opening Egyptian educational institutes in these countries” (ibid.). Husayn stressed the importance of MSA in education, but also recognised the need for reforming Arabic grammar and script. Moreover, at no point did he call for elevating ʿāmmiyya because he felt it was “unfit for literary expression, and that its adoption would deprive Egyptians of a link with their literary heritage” (Suleiman, 2003: 194). The same could be said of another Egyptian nationalist and Arabic language reformer, Ahmad Lutfi Al-Sayyid (cf. Section 3.2.3), who did not support ʿāmmiyya, but rather held it in contempt “as a corrupt form of Arabic” (Suleiman, 2003: 173).

According to Suleiman, Egyptian nationalism dwindled towards the middle of the 20th century as Egyptian nationalists were engulfed by “the currents of political thinking towards supra-forms of national identification” (Suleiman, 2008: 35). Suleiman adds:

> The attempts of some Egyptian nationalists to endow ʿāmmiyya with ideologically impregnated symbolic meanings, to make it a durable marker of a territorial national identity, failed because of the historically sanctioned position of fuṣḥā in Egyptian society, the lack of political will to go down this nationalist route, and the lack of resources – for example dictionaries, grammars and school curricula – that could carry this nationalism forward institutionally. (Suleiman, 2008: 42)

It did not help either that some of the most vocal voices associated with this nationalism like Salama Musa and Louis Awad came from the Coptic minority in Egypt, which made their motives immediately suspect. A telling example is Shaker’s (1972) pointed criticism of Louis Awad, where the latter is called a “charlatan”, a “clown”, a “missionary”, a puppet of foreign intelligence, and a begrudging and malevolent “lie-telling crusader” harbouring ill-intent towards Islam and its people.

However, the surge in pan-Arab nationalism and heightened sense of Arab identity were to abate as the Nasserite era drew to a close (1970), particularly following the signing of the peace treaty with Israel in 1979 during Anwar El-Sadat’s presidency.
(1970-1981), resulting in Egypt being excommunicated by many Arab states. During this time, feelings that Egyptians were different from other Arabs began to fester once more, the importance of colloquial Arabic as part of this distinct Egyptian identity surfaced again, and Egyptian nationalists, such as Louis Awad, marginalised for decades, found a fresh voice (Bassiouney, 2009). Sadat’s ‘open-door’ economic policies also encouraged Egyptians to learn foreign languages, particularly English, as promoting relations with the Western world (which had waned during Nasser’s presidency) became a priority for the new government (cf. Section 3.4). This change in the attitude towards Egyptian identity was reflected in educational policies: starting in the 1980’s school children were taught that Egyptian identity came before Arab identity: their affiliation is to their country first, then to the Arab nation, followed by their religion (usually Islam) (Bassiouney, 2009).

These conditions have clearly favoured the revival of Egyptian nationalism – a point which receives very little attention in the academic literate, if at all. Indeed, in the same article where she states that Egyptian nationalism has been overtaken by pan-Arab nationalism, Haeri (1997: 798) reports in a footnote that during her fieldwork in Egypt, she heard of “a group with a Pharaonic name” which opposed fushā on the grounds that it was the language of “Arab invaders”. It has been more recently noted that Egypt was experiencing a ‘surge in Egyptian nationalism’, evidenced in attempts at “raising the nation’s awareness of its ancient spirit” (Darwish, 2007: 22). In particular, Darwish points to the celebration of the (ancient) Egyptian New Year under wide media attention in September 2007, where “for the first time in modern history Egyptians publicly revived the old rituals in Giza” (cf. Section 4.2). Darwish links “this feverish revival by Egyptians of their ancient spirit” to the momentum of Egyptian nationalism, which he argues is at its strongest since the early twentieth century (ibid.).

However, that is not to say that pan-Arab nationalism died with Nasser. In a study conducted by Khidr (2000) in 1991-1992 and involving 270 postgraduate students at a prominent university in Cairo, the participants were asked to submit essays

25 It is not inconceivable that this was some earlier form of the Liberal Egyptian Party, which was then known as Masr el-Umm [Mother Egypt] (cf. Section 4.2).
articulating how they envisioned “the future of the Arab fatherland” (Khidr, 2000: 135). While Khidr reports a proportion of pessimistic responses about the future of the region, the majority of responses demonstrated a deep faith in the inevitability of Arab unity, with Egypt playing a central, leading role. Similarly, Boussofara-Omar (2008: 629) notes that the exaltation of fuṣḥā as “the sole unifying force of an otherwise politically and economically divided Arab World” is still pervasive today. She refers to an inaugural speech by the president of the Arabic Language Academy in 2001, where he claimed that colloquial Arabic was intruding on the uses of fuṣḥā and warned that this would dismantle the ties between the peoples of the umma. She also notes that “allegiance to ‘perfect’ fuṣḥā (fuṣḥā salīma) continues to be constructed as allegiance to the unity of the Arab World, its glorious Golden Age and magnificent heritage” (ibid.). In the same vein, it is suggested by Peterson (2011), who conducted his fieldwork in Cairo a decade ago, that pan-Arabism is a component of a hybrid modern identity for young Egyptians in Cairo.

More recent studies addressing the question of national identity in Egypt are needed to further our understanding of how the Arab Spring (and the ensuing and unfolding chain of events) has impacted pan-Arabism in Egypt. What is certain however is that the question of identity has come to occupy a prominent position in Egyptian thought during and after the 2011 revolution. Reem Bassiouney (2012, 2013, 2014) has made some valuable contributions which shed light on the role of language and identity during the revolution, particularly how code choice played a part in stance-taking and indexing group membership. I draw on her framework of indexes when I discuss my findings in Chapter 6. It is hoped that the identity component of the language behaviour and attitudes survey in Chapter 5 will contribute in some way towards an understanding of the relationship between language and identity following the 2011 revolution. The question of identity – with a particular focus on political identity – is revisited in Section 6.2.

26 Significantly, instead of the less ideologically marked term ‘Arab World’ (al-ʿālam al-ʿarabi), Khidr (2000) uses the term ‘Arab fatherland’ (al-watan al-ʿarabī) which, although admittedly common in Arabic discourse, itself has strong connotations of pan-Arabism.
3.4 Language practices

As discussed in section 3.2.1, it is not always possible to trace the language policy of a speech community to an official written document, and in the case of the diglossic Arab nations where such a document exists (in the form of the constitution), it is in fact a poor reflection of their linguistic reality. This section is dedicated to discussing the disparity between language policy and practice in Egypt in an attempt to paint a fuller picture of its linguistic reality. While I have been primarily concerned with *fuṣḥā* and *ʿāmmiyya* in this chapter, this section brings in another language variety into the equation – English – which has a prominent position in Egypt’s linguistic reality. This triggers a discussion on the role of globalisation and of the ‘economics of linguistic exchanges’ (cf. Bourdieu, 1977) in Egypt.

To understand where English fits into the language practices of Egyptians, it is worth dwelling on both its historical and global significance in Egypt. Since the 19th century, and well into the 20th century, both English and French were regarded as languages of prestige in Egypt – more in their capacity as European languages of enlightenment than as (ex-) colonial languages. Competence in English or French (and to a lesser degree, German) was a sign of affluence and good education. Their spread was aided by 18th century policies which regarded European civilisation as a source of modern culture and progress, and by the many missionary schools which were established in Egyptian cities (Schaub, 2000). Of the two, French was the more highly valued language during most of the 19th century, but English started to make significant gains in education towards the end of the 19th century with pro-English educational policies under British occupation (ibid.). Some of these policies were reversed in favour of Arabic in the early 20th Century (Bassiouny, 2009; Suleiman, 2003), and enrolment in foreign language education remained steady, if it did not decline, under Abdel-Nasser in the 1950s and 60s at the height of pan-Arab nationalism (Schaub, 2000), (cf. Section 3.3.2.2). However, Sadat’s ‘open door’ policy ushered a new age of Western-oriented education and lifestyle with a focus on English (Bassiouny, 2009; Schaub, 2000), by which time English had completely overtaken French as the preferred language of foreign education. At the turn of the century, Schaub (2000) described a state of ‘hysteria’ for learning English in Egyptian society. While this
historical and political backdrop is important, the role of English in Egypt today is perhaps better understood in the context of globalisation.

Bassiouney (2009: 268) notes that there are “changes affecting the world at large, whether social political, or economic, and related directly to globalisation”, causing one to wonder “to what extent official language policies influence language practices”. Two social dimensions of globalisation impact language indirectly. The first is ideological, the second economic; and the two are not completely separate. At the ideological level, the concept of identity (cf. Section 3.3.2) comes up once more. As far as language is concerned, “globalisation has meant that increasing numbers of people find themselves needing to communicate or access information outside their primary language group”, “leading to a situation where increasing numbers are functionally bilingual, with their language of group identity not the language that they need in most of their acts of communication” (Wright, 2004: 7). In fact, people in contemporary societies “appear more and more willing to free themselves from society and, rather than cultivate on citizenship, want to profit from the improved flow of social interaction due to the development of new technologies” (Martin et al., 2006: 500-501). Martell (2010) notes how globalisation is seen as detrimental to traditional nationalism because it challenges some of the core tenets of nationalist self-definition. Globalisation is encouraging people to view themselves as part of a greater global collective that transcends their national boundaries. It is a view promoted by media consumption in Egypt, and younger generations are growing up to grapple with hybrid identities which tout both the local and the global (Peterson, 2011). It is in this spirit that Suleiman (2008: 43) highlights the need for research into “the impact of globalisation on the continued ability of fushā to provide a robust definition of the national self in Egypt” (cf. Section 6.4).

Closer to the heart of the issue of language practices in Egypt is the economic dimension of globalisation. Indeed, the very definition of globalisation – as “the (dire) possibility of ubiquitous competition around the globe from the products and employees of fiercely competitive multinational companies” (Martin et al., 2006: 503) – is economic in nature. Similarly, Wright defines globalisation in terms of global Capitalism which “can be seen as deriving from American led thinking and existing
within a framework of institutions dominated by the United States” (2004: 145). She adds that “it is this framework that has led many to speak of ideological domination”, which in turn “has meant that economic globalisation has led to Anglicisation” (ibid.). Hence, returning to the ideological dimension, because globalisation has at its centre an Anglophone global market dominated by Western values, to identify with this market is perceived to be pro-West at some level.

This ideological/economic question is mirrored in Lambert’s (1967) integrative/instrumental dichotomy. Walters (2008: 660) observes that “questionnaires about language attitudes often demonstrate that students across the Arab World exhibit instrumental, rather than integrative, motivations for studying Western languages”. However, he problematises Lambert’s (1967) dichotomy arguing:

One might contend that students who report wanting to master English in particular, because of its current global status – a motivation that might traditionally be seen as instrumental – simultaneously seek to integrate themselves into a globalised economy that uses English as its language and is much influenced by Anglo-American capitalist practices that currently may have little to do with American or British culture directly. (Walters, 2008: 660)

Whether or not it is regarded as a marker of Western culture, English has come to dominate the global market by dominating discourse within it as well as about it. Aiding the penetration and spread of English is “the psychological support given by the omnipresence of the language in the aggressive marketing and publicity to increase the consumption of the products produced by the TNCs [transnational corporations]” (Wright, 2004: 146). Cities all over the world are “bristling with adverts, signs and slogans in a variety of international English” (ibid.). It is therefore no surprise that the economic role and psychological effect of English “pushes parents to demand provision for learning and state education systems to respond” (Wright, 2004: 148).

The Arab World is no exception: Shaaban (2008: 700) notes that “all Arab countries have recently started to emphasise knowledge of English as a necessity for students of scientific and technical fields, a very rational move in the age of globalisation, in
which English is the language of over 80 percent of scientific and technical research”. Understandably, such students “are loath to cut themselves off from international developments in their fields, which flourish primarily in English; that is, there is an internationally recognised English *register* for these disciplines and one cannot participate in the work of the discipline without doing so in English” (Schiffman, 1992: 5). Educational authorities in Arab countries claim that they cannot wait for Arabicisation efforts by language academies; they resort to foreign languages instead in response to pressure to keep up with modernisation and technology. In fact, Shaaban (2008: 703) states that “Arab citizens themselves believe it is important to get education through the medium of international languages in order to stay competitive in the age of globalisation”. He adds:

Parents who, for economic or ideological reasons, send their children to Arabic-medium educational institutions remain uncomfortable with their decision, as it becomes obvious to them that their children do not have the same competitive edge in the job market as children who have had their education in English- or French-medium schools. (ibid.)

As a result, Shaaban refers to a ‘new utilitarian attitude’ which has come to prevail in the Arab World: “parents seem to be looking for what gives their children an edge in a competitive world of globalisation”, fearing that their children would fail to compete in the job market if they lack a solid base in foreign languages (Shaaban, 2008: 703). Manifestations of this growing reach of foreign languages (particularly English) in Arab countries include “the production of literature in French and English by Arab writers in an attempt to achieve international recognition” as well as the establishment of “many American-style, English-medium universities that teach all specialisations in English” (Shaaban, 2008: 703).

In Egypt, Bassiouney (2009: 254) points to “the great number of private universities that are opening up beside the American University in Cairo, and the increase in private schools that are not supervised by the Egyptian Ministry of Education and in which SA is basically not taught at all”. Mejdell (2006: 35-36) makes the same point, noting that “the socio-economic elite of Egyptian society do not send their offspring to overpopulated government schools, but to private schools, where instruction is conducted mostly in English (or French), where Arabic is taught as a discipline, but
where higher competence is achieved in reading and writing and speaking the foreign language than the national ‘standard’, the H variety, i.e. fuṣḥā.”

It is generally possible to distinguish between two educational systems in Egypt, a public system and a private system, each catering to differing parts of the labour market (Bassiouny, 2009; Haeri, 1996). Broadly speaking, public schools focus on education in fuṣḥā, while private schools focus on education in foreign languages. Government posts are the largest sector of the job market requiring moderate to advanced knowledge of fuṣḥā. On the other hand, more attractive and better paid jobs such as “the ownership of a small and large businesses, (construction, boutique, pharmacy), medicine, television production, positions in international firms of banking as well as research, movie and stage acting” do not require proficiency in fuṣḥā (Haeri, 1996: 163-164). The situation is thus one where the more socio-economically privileged members of society fill the posts requiring proficiency in foreign languages, while those who can only afford public education have limited employment options where fuṣḥā is more important than foreign languages. Haeri (1996: 162) comments on the situation in Egypt saying: “It appears that by and large members of the upper classes in Egypt are not the ones who know the official language the best or use it the most”. Bassiouney (2009: 252) summarises this situation:

The problem in Egypt that may have a direct effect on SA is the clear gap between the elite and the masses ... The elite send their children to private schools, in which they learn English, French or German, and the masses can afford only state schools, in which Arabic is the main language of instruction. With Egypt now moving into a capitalist system and privatising most of the companies owned by the government, knowledge of SA is downplayed and knowledge of English specifically is becoming a must. Since the government is basically failing to provide any jobs, the private sector will set the rules. Indeed, with so many parents sending their children to private schools in Egypt, private education has become ubiquitous. As a result, the competitive job market in Egypt has triggered the rise of a new sect of ultra-refined private schools, referred to as international schools. The “commodification of the schools” in Egypt and the resulting hierarchy of school types is summarised by Peterson (2001: 39):

The free, [public] schools established during the Nasserist revolution of the 1950s, with instruction in Arabic, are almost universally agreed to be in the midst of an
“educational crisis” (*muškilat al-taʿlīm*) caused by untrained teachers, obsolete schooling practices, and overcrowded classrooms. This has stimulated the development of a hierarchy of increasingly expensive private schools. At the top of this hierarchy are the “international schools”... partially staffed by foreign teachers and administrators, offering instruction in European languages and curricula based on American, British, French, or German models. Less expensive, but still out of reach of most Egyptians, is a range of private “language schools”, owned and staffed primarily by Egyptians, but offering instruction in various foreign languages. These language schools often have two tracks, one preparing students for the national exam, the ṭānawiyya ṭāmma, and the other fulfilling the requirements for an international baccalaureate.

These distinctions in type of school translate into class distinctions (Haeri, 1996; Peterson, 2011). Education in foreign languages in Cairo has become a class marker. However, the competencies associated with it “are no mere status symbols; they have real economic consequences for the middle class. Competence in displaying the appropriate symbolic capital is readily transferable into economic capital” (Peterson, 2011: 40). For instance, the ability to distinguish clearly between the /b/ and /p/ phonemes represents a kind of shibboleth which can translate into substantial salary differences (ibid.).

In light of the fact that English language proficiency is the “number one criterion that multi-national recruiters in Egypt cite in looking for job candidates”, “the promise of more money or better jobs that many Egyptians associate with the ‘commodity’ of English” becomes completely understandable (Schaub, 2000: 228). In a country “where social mobility is usually a generational project, parents imagine social futures for their children that are better than their own present” (Peterson, 2011: 33), and one way they can influence their children’s future is by maximising their competitiveness in a job market which accords so much value to English.

This commodification of linguistic competence calls to mind Bourdieu’s conceptualisation of the linguistic marketplace, where language users are conceived as consumers, language itself is perceived as a commodity, and a standard language is no more than “a ‘normalised’ product” (Bourdieu, 1991: 46). Bourdieu (1991: 66) explains the ‘economics of linguistic exchanges’ as follows:

**Linguistic exchange** – a relation of communication between a sender and receiver, based on enciphering and deciphering, and therefore on the implementation of a code
or a generative competence – is also an economic exchange which is established within a particular symbolic relation of power between a producer, endowed with a certain linguistic capital, and a consumer (or a market), and which is capable of procuring a certain material or symbolic profit. In other words, utterances are not only (save in exceptional circumstances) signs to be understood and deciphered, they are also signs of wealth, intended to be evaluated and appreciated, and signs of authority, intended to be believed and obeyed.

In Bourdieu’s conceptualisation, it is standard language (what he calls the ‘legitimate language’) – as the language sanctioned and upheld by the ‘dominant’ groups in society – which possesses the highest symbolic capital and the potential of earning the highest symbolic profit. However, this model is challenged for the case of Arabic in Egypt, where it is competence in foreign languages, not the standard/official language, *fuṣḥā*, which earns the highest rewards (Haeri, 1996, 1997). While it provides a valuable framework for studying languages in economic terms, Bourdieu’s model was proposed for ‘typical’ standard language situations – and I have already established that Standard Arabic is by no means a typical standard language in Section 3.2.4.

One aspect of Bourdieu’s model which is of particular relevance here is the importance he accords to the role of the educational establishment in maintaining the dynamics of the linguistic marketplace. The importance derives from the fact that “this institution has the monopoly in the large-scale production of producers/consumers, and therefore in the reproduction of the market without which the social value of the linguistic competence, its capacity to function as linguistic capital, would cease to exist” (Bourdieu, 1991: 57, my emphasis). Bourdieu has at once presented us with the reason why his model is deficient in accounting for the linguistic marketplace in Cairo, and with the key to reconciling them (that is, the model and the market). In Egypt, the public educational system does not have a monopoly over access to the labour market, “and thus does not alone create linguistic value” (Haeri, 1996: 166). Therefore, Haeri notes that whilst “Bourdieu’s assertion that the labour market is the primary determinant of linguistic value seems to be in part borne out” by her findings, the caveat is that “if one is a member of the dominant group [in Egypt], one does not have more of what others have less. One has an entirely different capital” (ibid., my emphasis); i.e. there is more than one H
variety. The same point is argued by Stadlbauer (2010: 15) when he contends that “despite both English and fuṣḥā being H varieties, they have different symbolic capital, since only the upper-middle and upper classes have access to learning English in private schools”. I engage with these ideas and with Bourdieu’s theoretical model more deeply when I revisit the question of language and power in Section 6.3.

For now, it is worth examining how all of this impacts valuations of Standard Arabic (fuṣḥā) in Egyptian society, in light of the existence of “a new generation of Egyptians who are highly educated and who speak [EA] but who are illiterate in SA because in their private schools SA is not taught at all” (Bassiouny, 2009: 254). The use of foreign languages such as English and French in education “gives the impression that French and English, unlike Arabic, are languages of the sciences and upward mobility” and this discourages Arab learners from mastering fuṣḥā (Ayari, 1996: 249). As a result, “the higher one’s social class, the less likely it is that one will learn [fuṣḥā] well” (Haeri, 2000: 68).

It is a question of utility and calculated profits (or the lack thereof): “Professionals who have a linguistic repertoire that consists of proficiency in English in a professional register do not see the utility of adding to their repertoire knowledge of a register whose usefulness has not been proven.” (Schiffman, 1992: 5). These professionals “see themselves as part of a potential international job market; their skills are portable, and therefore worth more, only if they are based in an international language” (Schiffman, 1992: 6). Learning another register involves extra cost but no clear reward, “i.e. there is a stick, but no carrot” (Schiffman, 1992: 5).

It is therefore no surprise that globalisation is often constructed as ‘a threat to the Arabic language’ (which basically means a threat to fuṣḥā). For example, Suleiman notes that “in recent years, fuṣḥā in Egypt has been perceived to be under attack from the forces of globalisation in a way that compromises its purity and undermines its ability to serve as an emblem of the nation” (2008: 42). In the end, Bourdieu argues, it all boils down to economics:

One cannot save the value of a competence unless one saves the market, in other words, the whole set of political and social conditions of production of the producers/consumers. The defenders of Latin or, in other contexts, of French or
Arabic, often talk as if the language they favour could have some value outside the market, by intrinsic virtues such as its 'logical' qualities; but, in practice, they are defending the market. (Bourdieu, 1991: 57)

3.5 Summary

In this chapter, I have reviewed language policies, ideologies and practices in Egypt. I have attempted to demonstrate the indelible link between these three concepts, as well as their intricate connection to historical, political, economic and social conditions. In Section 3.2 I addressed a number of topics bearing on language policy and planning which illustrate that “language policies do not evolve ex nihilo” (Schifman, 1996: 74) but are rather influenced by religious beliefs and ideologies and by power constructs. I discussed why studying language policies in diglossic societies is particularly challenging as they often don’t reflect the linguistic reality of the language users. I looked at the post-WWII Arabicisation policies in the Arab World and the kind of language planning policies this entailed. I then turned to the role of the ALAs, particularly the Egyptian ALA, in reforming and modernising fuṣḥā. In discussing standardisation, I covered standard language ideology and how it applied to the case of MSA. I also discussed the notion of power, outlining how a standard language can serve a gate-keeping function. Finally, I examined the notion of prestige – which is often equated with standard language in sociolinguistic studies – illustrating that the relationship in the case of Arabic is a complex one, calling for a distinction between written and spoken language prestige.

My discussion of language ideologies in Section 3.3 formed the heart of this chapter. Here, I pointed to the range of terms and topics under which language ideologies are addressed in the literature. The first part of this section was dedicated to myths about Arabic, where I focused on the superiority of fuṣḥā Arabic – both with respect to other languages as well as vis-à-vis the vernaculars – and unpacked the main arguments which are used to assert the superiority of fuṣḥā. In the second part, I engaged with the question of language and national identity, demonstrating how “both languages and national identities are a matter of construction, of manipulation and counter manipulation to suit different historical and political contingencies, orientations, and ideological positions” (Suleiman, 2008: 28). I discussed how the
colonial legacy of Egypt and the main nationalist positions influenced language ideologies in the country. I gave particular attention to pan-Arab nationalism and Egyptian territorial nationalism, noting that the two nationalisms are co-present in contemporary Egypt.

Finally, in Section 3.4, I addressed the discrepancy between the language policies promoted by the Egyptian state, and the actual linguistic practices of Egyptians in Cairo. English comes into the equation as another H variety in Egypt, where the influences of globalisation and the economics of linguistic exchanges prop it up as a highly prized commodity. The effect of globalisation is not purely economic however; on the ideological level it challenges traditional nationalism as it proposes an alternative imagined cosmopolitan identity for the self as part of a wider global community which transcends national boundaries.

In cases where the official language policy provides a poor indication of the linguistic reality of a community of speakers, as is the case in Egypt, “the nature of their language policy must be derived from a study of their language practice and beliefs” (Spolsky, 2004: 8). The present work aims to do just that. The next two chapters present the investigations carried out to study the relationship between language ideologies and (changing) practices in Egypt.
4 The Interviews: Agents and Resistors of Change

“AS LINGUISTS, WE ARE VERY MUCH AWARE THAT ORDINARY PEOPLE HAVE SOME WELL-ESTABLISHED IDEAS ABOUT LANGUAGE ... SOME OF THESE IDEAS ARE SO WELL ESTABLISHED THAT WE MIGHT SAY THEY WERE PART OF OUR CULTURE. IT IS IN THIS SENSE THAT WE REFER TO THEM AS MYTHS ... BUT IN VERY MANY CASES, OUR REACTION, AS PROFESSIONALS, TO THESE ATTITUDES, TO THESE MYTHS, IS: ‘WELL, IT’S NOT ACTUALLY AS SIMPLE AS THAT.’”

Laurie Bauer and Peter Trudgill (1998: xvi), *Language Myths*

4.1 Introduction

This chapter aims to answer the following two research questions:

**RQ1:** What motivates pro-‘āmmiyya agents of change? What role does ideology play?

**RQ2:** How are the recent changes perceived by pro-fuṣḥā resistors of change? How is this linked to their ideologies?

For practical reasons, I limit my response to RQ2 to three specific language developments and investigate the extent to which they were ideologically motivated: (a) the establishment of the Liberal Egyptian Party in 2008, an Egyptian political party with an ideology of separatist Egyptian nationalism and an aim to standardise Egyptian Arabic; (b) the establishment in 2007 of Malamih, a publishing house which published work by young Egyptian writers in a range of language varieties, and crucially championed publishing in ʿāmmiyya; (c) Vodafone Egypt’s replacement of recorded service messages in Standard Arabic with messages in Egyptian Arabic in 2006. Interviews were arranged and conducted with representatives from each of these organisations in June-July 2010. However, since interviewing these agents of language change would have only served to illuminate one side of the picture, it seemed necessary to simultaneously investigate the views of resistors of this change. To this effect, a focus group interview with representatives from three prominent Arabic language conservation societies (henceforth, ALCSs) in Egypt was conducted in June 2010 to answer the second research question.
All of the interviews were semi-structured, however, it was rarely the questions I asked which generated the most important responses. From the outset, I did not intend the interviews to be a purely fact-finding mission, but rather to elicit ideological positions vis-à-vis the language situation in Egypt. Indeed, I argue that although two of the organisations I interviewed (LEP and Malamih) no longer exist, the ideological underpinnings of their agency in language change remain salient.

My analysis of the interviews draws on three main theoretical approaches implemented to varying degrees to each of the interviews. The first approach draws on Eisele’s topoi which underscore the most dominant regime of practice for the Arabic language (see Section 3.3), namely: unity, purity, continuity and competition – to which I add three more topoi: conspiracy, authenticity and superiority. These topoi provide a valuable analytical framework for recurrent themes in the four interviews.

The second approach focuses on the ways interviewees project their identities and how these identities form part of their ideologies. This was particularly relevant in the interviews with LEP, Malamih and the ALCGs. The analysis here is premised on the notion of multiple identities, which is referred to in a variety of ways in the literature. For example, Omoniyi (2006) uses the term “hierarchy of identities”, while Suleiman (2006b: 51) prefers the term “identity repertoire”. Omoniyi, who argues that “an individual’s various identity options are co-present at all times but each of those options is allocated a position on a hierarchy based on the degree of salience it claims in a moment of identification” (2006: 19), offers an analytical framework for studying these identities. He makes a case for “moments as the focus of analysis in identity research”, with the underlying logic that “contexts and acts are constituted of different moments within a stretch of social action” (Omoniyi, 2006: 12). He defines a ‘moment’ as “a temporal unit of measurement and/or monitoring in the identification process” (Omoniyi, 2006: 21). These moments “are points in time in performance and perception at which verbal and non-verbal communicative codes (e.g. advertisements, clothes, walk style and song lyrics, among others) are deployed to flag up an image of self or perspectives of it”. As a means of analysing how co-present identities are encoded in discourse, Omoniyi proposes counting the order in
which identities are foregrounded. He notes that “some texts may suggest more than one identity – a function of different interpretive cultures. Such situations may produce a cluster of identities which in our discussion we then attempt to proffer an explanation for, such as a performer’s deliberate attempt to create a complex or ambiguous self” (ibid.).

In addition to looking at how the interviewees’ personal identities are constructed (where relevant), I also look at how Egyptian identity is constructed. I am guided in my analysis of identity construction in the interviews by Omoniyi’s approach as outlined above, but I focus only on the verbal codes in the interview transcripts. The choice of code itself forms a part of identity construction: “language is an acceptable identity marker” says Omoniyi, “so that the alternative languages not chosen in a given moment within an interaction would be alternative identities that are backrounded or that are less invoked” (2006: 20). I take account of the code(s) chosen in the interviews vis-à-vis the identities and ideologies expressed by the interviewees. The codes chosen were fuṣḥā, ʿāmmiyya, English or a mixture of more than one variety.

The third theoretical framework draws on the discourse mythological approach, a critical discourse analysis approach developed by Darren Kelsey (Kelsey, 2012a, 2012b, 2014) for textual analysis of news stories. In Section 3.3.1, I reviewed language myths about Arabic and I highlighted Ferguson’s (1997 [1959]) definition of language myth which was independent of the actual truth value of the ‘myth’ in question. This is in line with the scholarly use of the term ‘myth’ which “stresses the unquestioned validity of myths within the belief systems of social groups that value them” as opposed to the popular use of the term where it is synonymous with falsehood (Kelsey, 2014). As Kelsey points out, “a myth is not a lie. Rather, it is a construction of meaning that serves a particular purpose through the confirmations and denials of its distortion”. In this sense, myth becomes an expression of values and ideologies; a means of legitimating the speaker’s position while simultaneously discrediting those who do not subscribe to the same values. In other words, myth becomes “a vehicle for ideology” (Kelsey, 2014). By employing CDA conventions of studying dominant tropes and discursive constructions, Kelsey’s approach aims to
underline how ideology is transported through myth. I should point out that I have deliberately broadened the focus from language myths to myths in general because some of the myths which are not directly related to language can still be linked to language ideology – and the discourse mythological approach helps me underline this link.

The three analytical approaches I highlighted have one thing in common: at the heart of all of them is a concern with ideology. My analysis is presented in the next four sections (4.2 to 4.5), with each interview covered in a separate section. I then conclude the chapter with a summary of the main findings in Section 4.6.

4.2 The Liberal Egyptian Party (LEP)

The Liberal Egyptian Party (LEP) was a political party with an Egyptian separatist ideology established in 2008, although it was not officially recognised by the government under laws which restricted the formation of new political parties. LEP was an offshoot of an earlier party founded in 2004 called مشرى أم (Mother Egypt). In the interview, Abdel-Aziz Gamal El-Din explains that the two parties only differ in name; after the application to establish مشرى أم was rejected by the authorities, they could not re-apply under the same name. Both parties, he explains, are an extension of the Egyptian nationalist current which dates back to the early 20th century (cf. Section 3.3.2.3). He notes that the Internet has helped them communicate their views to a wider audience, but describes LEP as ‘a party predominantly for intellectuals, and not so much for the masses’. The activities of LEP have received some attention in recent literature. Panović (2010) mentions that a ‘Masry Wikipedian’ he interviewed is a former LEP member (cf. Sections 1.1 and 6.4), while Darwish (2007) points to the role of LEP (then in its formative stages) in organising a televised celebration of the (ancient) Egyptian new year in 2007 (cf. Section 3.3.2.3).

The party had an agenda focussed on re-asserting the Egyptian ethnic identity, establishing a secular democratic national government emphasising the separation of religion and state, and standardising the Egyptian vernacular. The latter item in the agenda is the reason I identified LEP as an agent of change. It is worth noting
however that following the 2011 revolution and in the lead-up to the 2011-2012 parliamentary elections, LEP assimilated into the Social Democratic Egyptian Party who share LEP’s overarching aims for a secular state, but do not have a language-related item in their official manifesto (cf. Section 6.2.2).

When I contacted LEP and expressed my interest in their language policy, they immediately nominated Abdel-Aziz Gamal El-Din for the interview. It was clear that he was – to borrow Eisele’s (2000, 2003) term – the ‘language maven’ in the party. One of four founding members of the party, Gamal El-Din was seventy when I interviewed him. He spoke in a mixture of fuṣḥā and ʿāmmiyya which is closer to the former than the latter. Gamal El-Din describes himself as a ‘researcher of Egyptology’ (bāḥīṭ fi l-maṣrīyyāt) with a particular interest in ‘the evolution of the Egyptian language’. He has more recently become known for editing and introducing a number of historical works which chronicle specific periods in Egypt’s history (Gamal El-Din, 2006, 2011c, 2012), in addition to authoring books on aspects of Egyptian history (Gamal El-Din, 2007, 2011b, 2013). This recent publishing activity has earned him the title of ‘historian’ (muʾarrīx) in publishers’ descriptions of his works.

It is worth noting here that the focus of Gamal El-Din’s published works is in line with LEP’s Egyptian separatist ideology. Three common themes which run through all of them is a focus on Egyptian Coptic identity (and by extension, Coptic Christianity) as an expression of authentic Egyptian identity27, identifying Arab (and by extension, Islamic) ‘invasions’ as a foreign element in Egyptian history28, and Egyptian nationalism and resistance against oppressors and foreign invaders29. It is worth

27 Such as in his ‘History of Christianity in Egypt’ (Gamal El-Din, 2007) and his introductions to two Christian sources of Egyptian history: ‘The History of Egypt from the Beginning of the First Century to the End of the Twentieth Century AD Based on the Scroll of the History of the Patriarchs by Severus ibn al-Muqaffa’ (Gamal El-Din, 2006) and ‘John of Nikiū’s History of Egypt and the Old World’ (Gamal El-Din, 2011c).
28 The term commonly used in Arabic is al-futūḥāt al-islāmiyya (the Islamic conquests, literally ‘openings’), which has positive connotations. However, Gamal El-Din uses the markedly negative term ǧazw (invasion) instead. Similarly, Gamal El-Din (2013) uses the negatively marked term ʿiḥṭilāl (occupation) to refer to the period of Ottoman rule in Egypt.
29 This is clear in all his authored and edited works. For example, one of the books edited and introduced by Gamal El-Din (2012) is Al-Jabarti’s three-volume history of events in Egypt between the Hijri years of roughly 1070 to 1220 (1659-1805 AD), which includes accounts of Egyptians’ resistance against the French campaign at the end of the 18th century (which Al-Jabarti witnessed). It is also
noting that the first two themes are the same themes which ran through the writings of Egyptian separatists such as Salama Musa and Louis Awad (Suleiman, 2008), (cf. Section 3.3.2.3).

Gamal El-Din also established a printed magazine called *Maṣriyya* in the 70s, which has recently taken the form of an electronic blog. The magazine forwards the same themes mentioned above with particular emphasis on Egyptian nationalism, democracy and secularism. Significantly, one year after I interviewed him, Gamal El-Din published a book titled *Ḥawl Taṭawwurat Luḥatinā al-Miṣriyya al-Muʿāṣira* (On the Evolution of our Modern Egyptian Language) (Gamal El-Din, 2011a). This book fleshes out the view of Egyptian Arabic which Gamal El-Din expresses in the interview. His consistent use of the term ‘Egyptian Language’ warrants glossing. This definition is provided at the beginning of his book:

> From the outset, we must acknowledge that every living language, including our Egyptian language, has a popular everyday level in common use by all the people of this language. In addition to its widespread use, this level has its popular disciplines and art forms such as folktales, poetry, puppet theatre [*masrah ʿaragoz*] and traditional theatre [*masrah al-sāmir*]. Indeed, it also possesses the language of modern theatre, cinema and [TV] soaps.

> From this popular level emanates the official level which some scholars and intellectuals formulate into [grammar] rules and a writing system to be used in the state’s official documents. However, this does not mean that this level of the Egyptian language (i.e. the official level) does not have the capacity for literary creativity for those who wish to employ it.

> Thus, we see that the popular level of the language provides its grammatical basis and evolutionary grounds, and we cannot imagine a language without this level.

*(Gamal El-Din, 2011a: 5, my translation)*

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30 *Maṣriyya* is the female form of the adjective ‘Egyptian’. Gamal El-Din mentions that he has given his daughter the same name.

31 The blog can be found here: [http://masryablog.blogspot.co.uk/2009/01/normal-0-microsoftinternetexplorer4_18.html](http://masryablog.blogspot.co.uk/2009/01/normal-0-microsoftinternetexplorer4_18.html) (accessed 01.07.2014)
In what follows, I will not evaluate the linguistic accuracy of Gamal El-Din’s conceptualisation of the Egyptian language (henceforth, EL)\(^{32}\), but will use this term \textit{prima facie} and comment only on the ideological aspects of the account given of it. According to Gamal El-Din, all the living languages of the world have an official level and a popular level; a language myth which normalises the language situation in Egypt. Gamal El-Din deliberately refrains from using the terms \textit{fuşḥā} and ‘\textit{āmmiyya}. Instead, he refers to the popular and official levels of ‘Egyptian language’. Significantly, even the official level (i.e. \textit{fuşḥā}) is qualified as ‘Egyptian’, and it is the popular level not the official level which is seen as the ‘original source’ of the language. When I used the term ‘\textit{āmmiyya}’ to ask him about his view of language in relation to Egyptian identity, he responded\(^{33}\):

\textbf{SEG1:} The issue of Egyptian ‘\textit{āmmiyya}’ has come to a problem of terminology. I feel that some of those who claim to be linguists invest it to demean the Egyptian language. Meaning that there would be an Egyptian ‘\textit{āmmiyya}’ and an Arab(ic) \textit{fuşḥā}, when, scientifically, this is not really available. What is available is that there is an Egyptian language which has been evolving throughout history and draws from all the languages that have entered it, from Persian to Turkish, to Arabic, to English, to German, to French, to Italian, to Greek... to Nubian and African and Tamazight. All of these have entered the Egyptian language. And all of these influences do not form the majority of the Egyptian language so that we can call it a Greek language or a French language or an English language or even an Arabic language, or Turkish. No, we can call it an Egyptian language influenced by all this, and herein lies the value of the Egyptian language; that, in absorbing all the civilisations that have entered it, it was able to absorb the lexical items which have come to it from these languages. But it has continued, since ancient times and up until our present day, to dwell in its own house of \textit{grammar}\(^{34}\) rules. And this is very clear in the modern linguistic studies which confirm that the modern or contemporary Egyptian language is the daughter of ancient languages in its final contemporary form which is present now, and which will of course evolve into other forms as other forms emergeSEG1.

\(^{32}\) I point the reader to the historical overview of the origin of Arabic and the Arabisation of Egypt and to the section on the substratal influence of Coptic in Chapter 2. Together, these sections should provide sufficient context against which the validity of the concept of EL can be evaluated.

\(^{33}\) The transcription of extended interview segments is provided in Appendix I.

\(^{34}\) Single underlining indicates words which were said in English in the interview.
Two main myths can be noted in this account of EL (noting that this account addresses the popular level of EL; i.e. ‘āmmiya). The first myth is that Egypt has a special assimilatory capacity which has enabled it to absorb various cultures and civilisations throughout history. This myth is extended to language, where EL has absorbed some of these languages through its special assimilatory power. Note that Egypt and EL are frequently conflated in this account. A second myth is that EL is a direct descendant of ancient Egyptian languages and that it has preserved its grammatical form over time. This invokes Eisele’s topos of continuity, which is commonly found in the dominant regime of practice about ḥāṣṣā. Significantly, however, it is essentially applied here to ‘āmmiya. EL is described as ‘the daughter of ancient languages’ and this historical continuity contributes to it superiority.

In line with the definition he presents in his book, Gamal El-Din then proceeded to explain that EL – like any other language – has two levels: an Egyptian ḥāṣṣā and an Egyptian ‘āmmiya; the latter is the level of everyday use and the former is the level used in the writing of ‘newspapers and magazines, etc.’. However, he categorically refuses to refer to this latter level as Arabic ḥāṣṣā, offering the following reasoning:

**SEG2:** ... but for ḥāṣṣā to be called Arabic, I don’t really think that there was, at some point in time, an Arabic ḥāṣṣā language which existed in any clear historical period. There was an Arabic language, which was an amalgamation of many disparate languages which were present in the Arabian Peninsula, and which varied amongst them in the names of things: in the names for palm trees, and the names for lion, and the names for sword. And it is normal for a language which develops in a poor desert community to be less advanced and accomplished than a language which has developed in an agricultural community like Egypt. The agricultural community in Egypt has contributed an ancient civilisation with multiple levels in culture, arts, science, language and literature, which cannot be attained by what I call ‘the tongues’ (al-alsina). And I insist on calling them ‘tongues’ because they were mostly spoken and not written [...] and they were only written belatedly, and when they were written it was at a time when this language had not yet stabilised. [...] Indeed, when the whole region wanted to learn Arabic in the modern, contemporary age, they resorted to the Egyptian teacher. They actually say that the Egyptian is teaching them Arabic; it is impossible for the Egyptian to teach them Arabic, he will
teach them Egyptian [...] If the whole region is Arab then they don’t need an Egyptian teacher to teach them Arabic; but when they learned, they learned EgyptianSEG2.

Again, a number of myths can be traced here. First, the myth that a language which develops in an agricultural environment is more sophisticated than a language which develops in a desert environment. The second myth is that a written language is more prestigious than a spoken language. Two more language myths about Arabic can be found in the excerpt: that the Arabs of the Arabian Peninsula did not speak a single language, and that Egyptian teachers of Arabic teach ‘Arabs’ EL. This latter myth is significant because it implies that the *fuṣḥā* used by ‘all Arabs in the region’ is in fact ‘Egyptian’ (effectively stripping ‘Arabs’ of ‘Arabic’ and of a standard/written language of their own). The topos of superiority is invoked throughout this excerpt, and the myths outlined above help to achieve this: EL is superior to ‘the Arabic tongues’ because it developed in an agricultural environment and was recorded in writing earlier. Significantly, the distinction between EL/Egypt/Egyptians/Egyptian culture is blurred, to the effect that the superiority of EL over ‘Arabic tongues’ becomes synonymous with the superiority of Egypt and Egyptians over Arabs. The result is the following chain of reasoning:

- Egypt has an ancient civilisation which developed in an agricultural environment;
- This ancient civilisation gave rise to a written language which predates the writing of Arabic;
- The reason Arabic was mainly spoken and not written is that it developed in a less sophisticated desert environment;
- Because Arabs were less advanced, they resorted to Egyptians to educate them;
- Because it was Egyptians who educated them, the language they taught them is Egyptian not Arabic;
- Ergo, the Arabs speak Egyptian and there is no such thing as an Arabic *fuṣḥā*.

As Gamal El-Din explains in the interview, it is the popular level of EL (i.e. ‘āmmiyya) which LEP seek to codify to become the official language of Egypt. He argues that the authentic language is that which people use, saying that ‘language is the daughter of the people and the populace not the intellectuals’ (*al-luغا hiya ibnet al-gumhûr wa-l-nâs, miš ibnet al-musaqqafîn*) – employing the metaphor of parenthood a second
time. He asserts that all Egyptians ‘essentially speak the same language, with only slight differences, possibly at the phonetic level but not at the grammatical level’ (SEG3). The codified variety, he explains, should be modelled after the EL found in art forms such as poetry, theatre and cinema ‘where Egyptian fuṣḥā is absent’. Gamal El-Din points to the shortcomings of the Arabic writing system in representing the full range of ‘Egyptian phonics’ and says that this writing system will need to be adapted, or indeed an entirely new writing system adopted, in the process of codifying EL. Significantly, Gamal El-Din makes it clear that the process of codifying EL involves simply recording it, and not laying down rules for it since the people who use it have already established its rules.

Two topoi are invoked in laying out this argument: authenticity and unity. The popular level of EL which LEP seek to make official language is the ‘real’ language which Egyptians – all Egyptians – speak. This in turn suggests the superiority of EL. This is made explicit later in the interview when Gamal El-Din asserts that recent developments such as the relaxation of publishing laws and the spread of mobile phones and the Internet have favoured EL because it is ‘the smoothest and easiest in interaction, circulation and derivation’ (al-aslas wa-l-ashal fi l-tadāwul wa-l-taʿāmul wa-fi l-ištiqāq). He then revisits the point about codification from below:

SEG4: Of course a [pan-]Arabist will tell you “What ruin! What a mess!” and “Whither the Arabic language?”’, “The language of religion and the Quran and so on is lost!”, “All of this is harâm (forbidden)!”, and he will stand in its way. But why? Well, people have already used it; [to the pan-Arabist] sit there and say what you wish while people go about their business normally. […] And unfortunately these words do not enter the dictionary, and the dictionaries are themselves inept; they do not reflect actual language [use]. While dictionaries in the scientific sense must derive from the bottom – that is, from the people – to record in dictionaries, the opposite happens over here. We revert to the speech of Lisān el-ʿarab35 and these archaic things when they are outdated. […] all the dictionaries of the world are developed by deriving from people’s speech and making dictionaries out of them, while we do the opposite: we come up with terms and try to force them into use in spite of the people. Like when the Arabic Language Academy starts using the word muxašlab

35 A Classical Arabic dictionary
instead of izāz or zugāg (glass). Zugāg is faṣīḥa and izāz is ’āmmiyya, but neither is Arabic because the Arabic for it is muxašlab. So I find myself under siege, but this siege lifts despite itself, and it melts like others before it have melted away and vanished from history. Because the nature of life is evolution and progress. The problem is that those who are trying to force [on] people how to pronounce and how to speak do not realise that it is an impossible mission.

The topos of authenticity is invoked once more, with the forms used in EL presented as more authentic than the archaic Arabic forms. Authenticity here seems to be at odds with purity. Purity, which is positively valued in the dominant discourse about Arabic (cf. Section 3.3), is in fact negatively valued in Gamal El-Din’s account. This in turn invokes the topos of competition: EL competes with (and is metaphorically ‘besieged’ by) Arabic. The tension between them is transmitted in a binary of progressive EL on the one hand versus archaic Arabic on the other. This tension is also reflected at the level of identity, where ‘Egyptian’ and ‘Arab’ are seen as contradictory categories. Another aim which LEP declared in their mission statement was to delete the word ‘Arab’ from Egypt’s official title, The Arab Republic of Egypt. Gamal El-Din explains the reason for this in the following excerpt:

SEG5: Well this is the equivalent to [certain] people calling our language Egyptian Arabic. It doesn’t work; I can’t be French English, or Egyptian English, or Egyptian Arabic. You are putting together things... which don’t really go together. I can’t be Arab and Egyptian. How could it be? So they say, well, Arab is qawmiyya and Egyptian is waṭaniyya36. No, I am neither Egyptian qawmiyya nor Arab qawmiyya, I am [concerned with] Egyptian identity.

This Egyptian identity according to Gamal El-Din encompasses anyone who carries an Egyptian identification card (kul man huwa yaḥmil biṭā’a teʾūl ennu masrī fa-huwa masrī). He highlights however the diversity of Egyptians in terms of social, economic, religious, ethnic and class differences. In spite of these differences, Egyptians share a

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36 While both terms would translate into nationalism in English, there is a subtle difference in meaning. The term waṭaniyya derives from the Arabic word watan, while qawmiyya invokes the concept of umma (see section 4.3.2.2). While watan refers to “the place to which a person belongs, the fatherland”, umma refers to “the group of which a person is a member, the nation” (Suleiman, 2003: 114). The term qawmiyya is particularly known for its use as a qualifier in pan-Arab nationalism (al-qawmiyya al-ʿarabiyya).
‘cultural’ identity which dwells in the ‘traditional Egyptian consciousness’ (al-wigdān al-masrī al-taqlīdī) and speak the same language. Crucially, although Gamal El-Din mentions many types of diversity in the make-up of Egyptian identity, linguistic diversity is not among them. Instead, language becomes the one shared feature among an otherwise diverse nation (invoking once more the topos of unity).

Addressing the increasing emphasis on Egyptian identity in recent times, Gamal El-Din attributes this to the ‘failure of the project of [pan-]Arab unity and qawmiyya’. He states that Nasser’s pan-Arab policies were a cause for division. He reasons that pan-Arabism in Egypt came to be associated with Islam, so that when pan-Arabism faded, only Islam was left, which created a problem for the Copts who rejected pan-Arabism because now it would appear as though they are rejecting Islam, resulting in sectarian strife as a by-product of so-called pan-Arabism. Gamal El-Din states that pan-Arab authorities persecuted those who championed Egyptian identity or wrote in ‘āmmiyya such as Louis Awad, and mentions that he himself came under attack when he established his magazine Masriyya (in the 1970s) only because it was named ‘Egyptian’. At the time, speaking in the name of Egypt and Egyptianness was categorically rejected as anti-pan-Arabism. These authorities, Gamal El-Din says, are now no more; they have weakened and retreated, accounting for the ‘return’ to Egyptian identity. He is quick to point out however that pan-Arabism as an ideology still exists and that LEP often comes under attack from pan-Arabists (ʿurūbiyyīn) and those ‘who are still under the illusion that it is possible to resurrect pan-Arabism’. Hence the competition/tension highlighted between EL and Arabic at the linguistic level, and between ‘Egyptian’ and ‘Arab’ at identity level, is extended to tension between Egyptian separatism and pan-Arabism at the ideological level.

4.3 Malamih publishing house

Malamih is a publishing house established by Mohamed El-Sharkawi in 2007 with a mission to empower young Egyptian writers ‘without ideological, national, or linguistic boundaries’\textsuperscript{37}. By the time I interviewed El-Sharkawi in July 2010, Malamih

\textsuperscript{37} From Malamih’s website: http://www.malamih.com/ar/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=5&Itemid=6 (last accessed October 2010). The website is no longer active.
had published more than 75 works for Egyptian writers in a range of language varieties and combinations, including SA, EA, English, French, SA and EA, and English and LA. This overtly liberal attitude towards publishing in varieties other than Standard Arabic is the reason Malamih was identified as an agent of language change. El-Sharkawi emphasises this point in the interview, indicating that other publishers who publish works in ‘āmmiyā are quick to hide behind the author and say that it is the author’s choice and not theirs.

I should point out that Malamih mysteriously closed down towards the end of 2011, shortly after which El-Sharkawi left Egypt. His current whereabouts remain unknown despite my best efforts to locate him. It appears that the closure of the publishing house was financially motivated, although political factors may have also played a part. El-Sharkawi had had his skirmishes with the Egyptian authorities because of his anti-regime views and his affiliation with the pro-democracy group, Kifāya (Enough). He was jailed several times for short periods between 2006 and 2010, the most recent being a little over a month before I interviewed him in 2010.

The issue of identity is particularly salient in this interview; the identity of Malamih as a publishing house is inseparable from the identity of its founder, Mohamed El-Sharkawi. As well as referring to Malamih in the third person, El-Sharkawi alternates between the first person pronouns ‘I’ (anā) and ‘we’ (iḥnā) when he talks about the publishing house. Using Omoniyi’s (2006) ‘hierarchy of identities’ framework, the identity which El-Sharkawi foregrounds the most is his political identity as a leftist, anti-regime activist. At the beginning of the interview, El-Sharkawi addresses Malamih’s declared mission of publishing works ‘without boundaries’ to include the caveat: ‘There are boundaries. In the end I am leftist; I cannot publish something which talks about capitalism for example; I cannot publish something which supports the regime. There is a political dimension in the matter’ (SEG6).

El-Sharkawi’s activist identity is similarly fronted at various other points in the interview, where he highlights his differences with Mubarak’s government, particularly his multiple arrests for his political views. He refers to himself as a ‘highly
confrontational person’ (šaxṣ šidāmi giddan) and a [political] ‘instigator’ (muḥarrīḍ).

He also mentions his previous employment in a leftist publishing house, Merit.

El-Sharkawi was 28 years old when I interviewed him, and his bias to young writers is a bias to his own generation. He refers to his ‘young’ age in various ways throughout the interview. He mentions that he is part of ‘a new generation’ in the publishing industry. At another point he explains that they [Malamih] had initially aimed to publish works by writers no older than 35 because ‘beyond that is a different generation’ (ba’d kida da gīl tānī) and jokes that ‘[being] 40 means you’ve seen Sadat; surely I don’t want to know you!’ (arbi‘īn da ya’nī āntū šuft el-Sadāt; akīd anā miš ’āyīz a’rafak!).

Another aspect of El-Sharkawi’s identity which comes up more than once in the interview is his background. El-Sharkawi mentions at three different points in the interview that he is from Kafr El-Sheikh, a rural governorate in the Nile delta. He refers to his humble upbringing and his father’s small income and how he struggled to buy books which he could not afford.

Returning to Malamih’s language ‘policy’ (if we might call it that), El-Sharkawi emphasises that it sets them apart from other publishers. He explains that the reason they do not enforce ‘linguistic boundaries’ is that ‘language is a means of communication, it should not be an instrument for withholding culture from another’ (el-luğa hiyya adāt tawāsul, fa-mayinfa’s el-luğa tib‘ā adāt man’ saqāfa ‘an āxar). He vehemently states that the books Malamih publishes ‘will not undergo linguistic editing because there is no such thing as editing a writer’s [work]; the writer is free’ (el-kutub miš hayihṣallahā ta’dīl luğawi la’inn ma-fīs ḥāga ismahā inn anā a’addīl ‘alā kātib; el-kātib huwwa ḥur). The only caveat is that the writer does not offend with their writing; that is, El-Sharkawi explains, they are free for example to criticise the idea of religion, but not to criticise one religion in favour of another. It is worth noting that despite Malamih’s ‘no-language-editing’ policy, later in the interview El-Sharkawi mentions a novel written by a young writer from his own home governorate where he had to interfere to ‘correct’ the ‘āmmiyya because it was too ‘regional’. Explaining the corrections he made, it was clear that what El-Sharkawi had
done was ‘convert’ the script to Cairene ʿāmmiyya. This calls to mind the guidelines set out for the editors of Wikipedia Masry, which reflect a clear bias towards Cairene (Panović, 2010).

El-Sharkawi’s attitude towards ʿāmmiyya in particular warrants attention. He refers to it as el-luğa el-ʿāmmiyya el-maṣriyya (the Egyptian colloquial language). What is significant here is the qualifier ‘language’ which is a conscious choice on El-Sharkawi’s part. El-Sharkawi explains that Malamih has been biased to ʿāmmiyya from day one, raising the slogan Yasqṭ Sībāwēh (down with Sībawayh)38. He fervently defends this view:

SEG7:  ... we said from day one that we have a special orientation to support the Egyptian colloquial language. We are a country with our own distinctiveness, whether we like it or not by the way [...] Down with Sībawayh of course! Of course! There is no such thing as Sībawayh! Sībawayh! What have I got to do with Sībawayh? Sībawayh was a man who lived there; in Najd and Hijāz. What have I got to do [with that]?

El-Sharkawi’s view of ʿāmmiyya is inseparable from his view of fushā. He states that, even though he studied Arabic at Al-Azhar University, he could not be less concerned with fushā grammar rules, meter and rhyme, etc. He refers to fushā as luğa aṣīla (pure language)39 to mean that it has not developed from any other language. This he says makes it a very difficult language with complicated grammar. ʿāmmiyya on the other hand, because it is not a ‘pure language’, is easier and more flexible:

SEG8: ʿāmmiyya language gives me more room to express [myself], given that I am Egyptian, and it reaches a lot of people, as opposed to fushā. Not everyone has a taste for fushā, and it is always difficult because... the Arabic language (el-luğa el-ʿarabiyya), meaning the language of the dād40 (luğa ed-dād), is tough and very difficult. It is even classed as one of the [most] difficult languages in the world, like... like German, because German is a pure language and Arabic (el-ʿarabiyya) is a pure language, meaning that it is not derived from anything.

38 A reference to the 8th century Arabic grammarian Sībawayh (cf. Section 2.2)
39 The Arabic word aṣīl (for male, aṣīla for female) is an adjective which denotes authenticity, purity (especially of lineage) and rootedness (i.e. being well-established). It is often used with respect to animals, for example hiṣān ʿarabī aṣīl (horse of pure Arab breed), and is used here in that sense.
40 The Arabic language was labelled ‘the language of the dād’ by early Arab grammarians after a letter in the Arabic alphabet denoting a sound which was thought to be unique to Arabic (Suleimian, 2012). It is worth noting that this label usually invokes linguistic pride, but El-Sharkawi uses it sarcastically.
He elaborates:

SEG9: ʿāmmiyya gives me some room to talk about more topics that are close to the people. Because this is the language that people speak. Like I told you, fushā on the other hand is like... [makes strangling motion with hands] this. Poetry in ʿāmmiyya is always closer to people than [poetry in] fushā. Fushā language (el-luġa el-fushā) sometimes makes me bypass ʿāmmiyya; ʿāmmiyya sometimes makes me elaborate. But this is where the storyteller’s skill emerges. Don’t we have something called el-hakawâṭī ‘storyteller’? This is it. If I don’t have the intense suaveness and ability to maintain my presence - because I’m chattering; ʿāmmiyya makes me chatter; not one word sealed by another41; Arabic (el-ʿarabī) is one word sealed by another. [...] And ʿāmmiyya is also rich with its terminology, but also because many foreign words have entered it and because it is not a pure language – meaning that ʿāmmiyya is not pure. ʿāmmiyya at the end of the day is Coptic mixed with Greek mixed with Hieroglyphic mixed with Arabic. This is not our language; meaning Arabic (el-ʿarabiyya) is not a language of Egyptians. [...] This is why we invented ʿāmmiyya. Why is Egyptian ʿāmmiyya the only one which is understood throughout the – Arab – World? It is impossible for Palestinian ʿāmmiyya to be understood throughout the Arab World – in the Levant [perhaps]; it is impossible for Algerian – not the Tamazight, the Arabic, which is called ‘el-dārga’ [dārija] in Algeria – to be understood [throughout the Arab World].

When asked why it is that Egyptian ʿāmmiyya is the only colloquial Arabic understood throughout the Arab World, El-Sharkawi replies:

SEG10: Because it has its distinctiveness, and because... it is derived from several things, and it’s easy, and I can explain many things with it, it’s verbose; it has verbosity, and it sounds nice to the ear. Algerian doesn’t, Iraqi doesn’t. [...] We are closer to the Arabic language (el-luġa el-ʿarabiyya) than any of the other languages\ dialects, but at the same time it (ʿāmmiyya) gives me space [to elaborate], because it is not a pure language.

These three segments (SEG8 to SEG10) require detailed analysis. While El-Sharkawi refers to ʿāmmiyya in the interview as ‘the Egyptian ʿāmmiyya language’ (el-luġa el-ʿāmmiyya el-maṣriyya) – sometimes contracted to ‘the Egyptian ʿāmmiyya’ (el-ʿāmmiyya el-maṣriyya) or simply el-ʿāmmiyya – the above excerpts highlight that he refers to fushā in a number of ways (wavy underlining). In particular, he uses the words for Arabic (el-ʿarabī or el-ʿarabiyya) to refer exclusively to fushā. At no point in the interview does he use the qualifier ‘Arabic’ in conjunction with ʿāmmiyya. Note

41 The Arabic expression kilma w-rad ǧatāhā (a word and a [one-word] response to seal it) is used to denote brevity and economy of speech.
also that both *fuṣḥā* and *ʿāmmiyya* are referred to as languages. However, El-Sharkawi is not as willing to award the same title to other Arabic colloquials; when he begins to refer to them as ‘languages’ this is quickly repaired to ‘dialects’, a label which he does not use in conjunction with Egyptian *ʿāmmiyya* at all.

There are many language myths which can be extracted from El-Sharkawi’s account of *fuṣḥā*, *ʿāmmiyya* and other colloquial Arabics (summarised in Table 3). These myths invoke a number of topoi. The topos of purity, which is traditionally invoked to exalt *fuṣḥā*, is portrayed here as a短coming: *ʿāmmiyya* is simpler and more flexible than *fuṣḥā* because it is not a pure language. The topos of authenticity is also invoked; *ʿāmmiyya* is closer to the Egyptian people because of their ‘auditory culture’ (šaʿb saqaft samʿiyya). It is worth noting here that although El-Sharkawi paints an overall negative picture of *fuṣḥā* in comparison to *ʿāmmiyya*, he does not explicitly state that *ʿāmmiyya* is superior. For instance, when he compares the restricting conciseness of *fuṣḥā* to the verbosity of *ʿāmmiyya*, he acknowledges that both of these qualities have their advantages and disadvantages. Conversely, when El-Sharkawi compares *ʿāmmiyya* to other colloquial Arabics, he is adamant that the former is better. The ‘rationalised evaluations’ (cf. Section 3.3) provided to support his view invoke the topos of superiority. For example, the theme of inherent beauty which is often associated with *fuṣḥā* (cf. Ferguson, 1997 [1959]) is reappropriated here for *ʿāmmiyya*, which ‘sounds nicer’ than other colloquial Arabics. This is also evident in El-Sharkawi’s choice – conscious or not – to reserve the label ‘language’ to Egyptian *ʿāmmiyya*, but relegate other colloquial Arabics to ‘dialects’.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><em>fuṣḥā</em></th>
<th><em>ʿāmmiyya</em></th>
<th>Other colloquial Arabics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Far from people</td>
<td>Close to people</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pure language</td>
<td>Impure language</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited vocabulary (rigid)</td>
<td>Richer vocabulary (flexible)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concise (restricting)</td>
<td>Elaborative/expressive (liberating)</td>
<td>Not as elaborative/expressive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complex/difficult</td>
<td>Simple/easy</td>
<td>Not as simple/easy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sounds nice</td>
<td></td>
<td>Do not sound (as) nice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closer to <em>fuṣḥā</em></td>
<td>Further from <em>fuṣḥā</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understood throughout Arab World</td>
<td>Not understood throughout Arab World</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. Language myths in El-Sharkawi’s account of *fuṣḥā*, *ʿāmmiyya* and other colloquial Arabics
Another myth outlined in the excerpt is that Egyptians ‘invented’ ʿāmmiyya as a way of forging their own language in response to the foreignness of fuṣḥā. Indeed, El-Sharkawi’s view of ʿāmmiyya is also closely linked to his view of Egyptian identity; both Egypt and ʿāmmiyya are special – they have their ‘distinctiveness’ (xuṣūsiyya, this word is underlined twice in the excerpts above). He uses this term a third time in the excerpt below. When asked whether one of the first poetry collections Malamih published was in fuṣḥā or ʿāmmiyya, he responds:

SEG11: Poems in fuṣḥā, but in our fuṣḥā, not the fuṣḥā of the Bedouins of the [Arabian] Peninsula... I’m sorry, but I’m against\ they don’t\ they... the Wahhabis have ruined Egyptians’ lives generally – even in Islam they have their own interpretations – but also those of the Peninsula ruined the language, I mean ours. In the end this is not our language, but you discover that we have our distinctiveness; our ʿāmmiyya has distinctiveness and it has amazing pronunciation and writing rules, but of course no one cares for them.

This account transports the myth that Egyptians have their own version of fuṣḥā. However, unlike LEP’s Gamal El-Din, El-Sharkawi does not go as far as to claim that the fuṣḥā used everywhere in the Arabic-speaking world is Egyptian fuṣḥā. In fact, El-Sharkawi highlights that the Egyptian fuṣḥā he refers to is different from the fuṣḥā of the ‘Bedouins of the Arabian Peninsula’. However, this belief in the special status (xuṣūsiyya) of Egyptians and the language they speak does not translate into Egyptian separatist nationalism on the part of El-Sharkawi. Unlike, Gamal El-Din, El-Sharkawi’s statements do not carry clear nationalistic undertones. When El-Sharkawi compares ʿāmmiyya to other colloquial Arabics, he places Egypt within an ‘Arab World’, a concept which was completely absent from Gamal El-Din’s account (who refers to ‘Arabs in the region’ instead). At the same time, when El-Sharkawi refers to the Arabs of the Arabian Peninsula, he refers to them as Bedouins, and then uses the Arabic words betū’ šibh el-gezīra (those of the Peninsula) which have a derogatory tone to them. Similarly, to El-Sharkawi, the superiority of ʿāmmiyya does not necessarily imply the superiority of Egypt as a nation. One might argue that while Gamal El-Din expressed Egyptian separatist nationalism, El-Sharkawi is expressing integral Egyptian nationalism (cf. Section 3.3.2).
El-Sharkawi notes that Malamih has two main agendas, change and a secular state (*taqyir w-dawla madaniyya*), and even though they do not necessarily publish works which directly further these agendas, they do not publish works which support a religious state or the status quo. The overlap in the view of religion between Gamal El-Din and El-Sharkawi is worth noting here, particularly their antagonism to the religious influence of the Arabian Gulf countries. Indeed, SEG11 suggests that Egyptians not only have their own distinct version of *fushā* but also of Islam.

El-Sharkawi acknowledges the increase in publishing activity in *ʿammīyya*, owing this to the relaxation in publishing rules and the emergence of more publishers. Writers are no longer forced to publish via government publishers where the approval process alone can take up to seven years. Now there are many private publishers and writers have more choice. However, El-Sharkawi notes that even though works published in *ʿammīyya* are on the rise, they are not presented as such, which is where Malamih stands out: ‘Malamih presents the works it publishes in *ʿammīyya* as being in *ʿammīyya*, other publishing houses do not do this, because they panic’. He adds that other publishers who have published several works in *ʿammīyya* deny that this is an orientation they have. They are quick to state that the opinions expressed in the works they publish are those of the authors. This statement provokes El-Sharkawi who says this is not true; ‘If I am not convinced then I should not publish, because this represents me and represents my orientations, ambitions and ideologies’ (SEG12).

Publishers’ reluctance to support *ʿammīyya* overtly owes to the stigmatisation of publishing in *ʿammīyya*, as El-Sharkawi points out. Even though the flourishing of private publishing has curtailed the policing of the language authorities and the hegemony of the standard language, there is constant tension between those who write and publish in *ʿammīyya* and the upholders of the standard language. For instance, El-Sharkawi mentions how others in the publishing circle frequently criticise Malamih’s language policy and tell him that he must do this or that:
SEG13: It was constantly newspapers and it was constantly... big writers, and it was constantly intellectuals in [cultural] gatherings [who criticized us]. They would start to say “No, Mohamed, you cannot do that” or “Mohamed it is imperative (lāzīm) that you do I-don’t-know-what”. So I tell them, yes, it is imperative, so we will do that which is imperative in another publishing house, but because we established Malamih to break all imperatives, we are doing all the things which are not imperative.

Significantly, El-Sharkawi notes that it was when they started publishing in English that they came under the most attack and Malamih was accused of ‘undermining the foundations of Egyptian culture’ (bitqawwiḍū arkān el-saqqāfa el-maṣriyya). He explains their motive for publishing in English noting that it acknowledges the presence of an audience that prefers to read and write in this language: ‘bilingual people who speak both [Arabic and English]’ (el-nās elli humma bilingual; elli humma beyitkallīmū el-itnēn) or those who think in English. He points to youths educated in prominent private universities, with special reference to the American University in Cairo (AUC). He also cites the economic virtues of publishing in English: books they publish in English, he says, are priced higher, because the target readers are willing to pay more for them. Malamih’s English novels range in price between L.E. 50 and L.E. 80, the Arabic books sell for around L.E. 20. Hence, although the English books do not necessarily sell more than the Arabic books, they generate more revenue. As El-Sharkawi puts it, publishing one book in English enables him to finance 5 books in Arabic. It is clear that Malamih’s motives for publishing in English are very different from the motives to publish in ‘āmmīyya. While El-Sharkawi is clearly passionate about publishing in the latter, the former is more of an economic necessity. On publishing in the two language varieties he says:

SEG14: We want what unites [people] not what divides. The English language divides, it does not unite; in the end of the day how many people will read a novel [in] English? But we started to look at it in a different way: that there is an audience we cannot reach. So, we already produce things which go to the audience that we want to reach, and there is another audience which exists around there [gestures with hands] that we can reach, they’re [just] in Taḥrīr; in the private universities you talked about – I mean the AUC – so let’s go [to them].
The topos of unity is invoked in this account. When El-Sharkawi speaks of the variety which ‘unites’ Egyptian people, he is referring to ʿāmmiyya. The audience he wants to reach is young Egyptians whom he is aiming to attract with a language which is accessible to them in order to trigger their interest in social issues. These he reaches by publishing books in ʿāmmiyya which are priced to make them affordable to a wide range of readers. English, he acknowledges, enables him to reach a different audience: a much smaller audience, granted, (hence the ‘dividing’ capacity of English), but one with substantial economic capital. ‘I want to reach these people,’ El-Sharkawi says, ‘I want to make them read about Egypt in their language, but through my tongue; through me; through my mind’ (ʾāyiz arūḥ li-l-nās dōl [...] ʾāyiz axallihum yīrāʾ an maṣr bi-lugethum bas bi-lisānī; bi-yya; bi-ʾaʿlīn). Later in the interview, El-Sharkawi (calling himself an ‘instigator’) explains that part of Malamih’s mission as he sees it is to produce works which highlight social and political problems, albeit indirectly, in order to engage readers who would not necessarily be engaged with these issues. This involves speaking to readers in the language they prefer in a bid to reach out to them and tell them ‘come, you exist’ (intā mawgūd, taʿalā). El-Sharkawi states that Malamih does not have a specific ‘reader profile’, but is rather willing to tailor its language to reach as many audiences as possible. He says, we tell our readers: ‘Read, Egyptian. Read, and if you like what you read, then try to read what is between the lines’ (iʾrāʾ yā maṣrī. iʾrāʾ, w-law itbaṣṭṭ hāwil tīrāʾ ellī bēn es-suṭūr).

At the same time, El-Sharkawi recognises that the language used by the writer is also associated with the topic of the work, and not only with the target audience. For example, he points out that certain topics are easier to address in English within conservative Egyptian society. These include intimate sexual relations and using swearwords, which is more acceptable in English. He says it is difficult to talk about intimate relations in ʿāmmiyya without sounding cheap or vile, more difficult than fuṣḥā in fact. Similarly, talking about religion and God is easier in English: in Arabic saying ‘you are not here’ (intā miš hinā) is akin to saying ‘you do not exist’ (intā miš mawgūd) leaving the author open to accusations of atheism, but in English they are not synonymous. It is clear from this account that using English is not a mere language choice, but also a cultural one; using English to tap into Western culture.
and values makes it acceptable to address otherwise difficult topics. El-Sharkawi also points out that it is difficult to use ‘āmmiyya when tackling scientific or academic issues. ‘āmmiyya is well-suited for novels because it has a captivating quality in narration. However, if you’re going to talk about the COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa) summit for instance, it will be difficult to use ‘āmmiyya without irritating the reader. Here, El-Sharkawi says, as in certain works of non-fiction such as self-help books, one might resort to el-luğa el-wasiṭa (the intermediate language). El-Sharkawi describes this as a mixture between fuṣḥā and ‘āmmiyya; a variety which incorporates fuṣḥā vocabulary but does not conform to its complex grammar rules; a variety ‘wherein Sībāwayh falls’ (yasqut Sībāwēh fīhā): it is not fuṣḥā and it is not ‘āmmiyya, he says, it is ‘āmmiyya faṣīḥa (eloquent ‘āmmiyya).

4.4 Vodafone Egypt

This interview stands out from the rest, mainly because the arguments presented could not be analysed along the usual lines of language ideology. Vodafone Egypt (henceforth, VE) was launched in 1998 (initially under the brand name Click GSM). It is the second oldest and second largest of the three mobile networks in Egypt. I interviewed Ashraf El-Sagheer, the Self-Help Team Leader at Vodafone Egypt’s Commercial Communication Department. Throughout the interview, El-Sagheer spoke mostly in ‘āmmiyya with frequent code-switching to English. VE was selected as an agent of change because their Interactive Voice Responses (IVRs) underwent a radical change in 2007, essentially from fuṣḥā to ‘āmmiyya. This was an unprecedented move in Egypt and the Arabic-speaking world where such messages are customarily in fuṣḥā. For example, the service message that a caller would hear when they called a switched off VE line used to be:

42 The mobile network market in Egypt is dominated by Mobinil and Vodafone Egypt, which had 26 million and 24 million subscriptions respectively in 2010, according to El-Sagheer. The third network, Etisalat, is a relative newcomer which only joined the market in 2007 and is less established than the other two networks.

43 This refers to a technology which allows customers to indirectly interact with the company. Customers use their keypad (or in more advanced systems, voice commands) to navigate through recorded messages until their need is met. Many companies resort to IVRs to cut costs by eliminating the need for human interaction, although most IVRs will also have the option to speak to an operator. I use the term here to encompass all of VE’s recorded service messages, even non-interactive ones (which is consistent with how El-Sagheer uses it).
‘The mobile you have called may be switched off. Please try again later.’

The message above has now been replaced with this:

‘The mobile you have called is switched off. You may send it a mini-call in your voice: dial star followed by the mobile number and say your message.’

The first message is in MSA both structurally and lexically, complete with case endings. Nevertheless, it is still distinctively Egyptian because of the voiced velar stop /g/ in yurgā (instead of the palatal approximant /j/) which is accepted in MSA reading in Egypt (Bassiouney, 2009; Holes, 2004). On the other hand, the vocabulary and structure of the second message is distinctively in EA. The content of the first half of the two messages is almost identical; compare the following MSA/EA word pairs in this first half: hātif/mubāyl; allāgī/ellī; muḍlaq/maʃūl. Mubāyl (mobile) is an English loan word which has become widely common in EA. Note also the use of the English product name ‘mini-call’ in the EA segment. This is only one of hundreds of messages which VE changed across the board. The main purpose of the interview was to understand the motivation behind this change. The first thing that stands out is how El-Sagheer refers to fuṣḥā and ‘āmmiyya:

SEG15: From [19]99, all of Vodafone’s IVRs were formal. What do I mean by formal?

[Meaning] that I give all the commands or orders to the customers formally. Even the indicational IVR that they [customers] call was also all formal. As I told you: where did the change came from? That\ because... none of the customers were listening to any of the IVRs at all, and they were trying to reach agents in the call centres to understand more from them. We carried out research like I told you, and the majority said that they could not understand anything, and that they prefer to
speak to someone they can understand more from; [someone] they can ask and [who will] respond to them... After we conducted this research we decided that all of Vodafone's IVRs would change from formal to slang. Even the messages we send to customers have all become slang. They don’t have\ there is no order structure, as in ‘you have to do so-and-so’, no, it is now in a manner which is friendly, reaches the customers very quickly, and that they understand. I wish to tell you that since we did that we now have a very big [successful] self-help tool. What do I mean by self-help? I mean that the customer can rely on themselves; they do not need me to provide them with help. I can let them [do everything] from A to Z, from buying the line to making an Internet – ADSL – subscription, all of these things without speaking to anybody. They [can] do everything themselves.

The use of the English words “formal” and “slang” to refer to the old messages in SA (fuṣḥā) and the new messages in EA (ʿāmmiyya) respectively is interesting: while it indicates awareness of a linguistic difference between the old and new messages, this is portrayed as a change in style rather than code (cf. Section 2.7). This is evident when El-Sagheer remarks that the old messages would give the customer orders while the new messages do not order customers, but rather speak to them in a “friendly” way. The fact is both the old and new messages give the customers instructions, and both use imperatives. In fact, the instruction given in the MSA message above to try again later is hedged with yurgā. On the other hand, the form used in the EA message, ʾitlub (call) is a direct imperative. What this seems to suggest is that even though imperatives are used in both codes (indeed, it would be difficult to imagine how instructions can be given to customers without resorting to imperatives), the styles associated with using fuṣḥā and ʿāmmiyya can make commands in the latter sound less overbearing. Hence, the claim that customers are not given orders in the new EA messages is a perception rather than a reality.

This emphasis on style is also clear when El-Sagheer later explains what he means by “slang”. This, he says is not what would be considered ‘weak language’ (miš luğa ēlli beysammūhā rakīka); it is ‘respectable slang’ (slang muḥtaramma) but not very formal (miš formal awī), as opposed to the old messages which ‘were initially totally formal’ (kānit fi l-awwel formal-formal). He also describes the new messages as “friendly” and “interactive”, ‘just as though we were sitting together now’ (akkin be-
\(l\)-\(z\)\(ab\)t a\(d\)\(ī\)n ma\(b\)a\(d\) del\(w\)a\(t\)ī"). The description that El-Sagheer provides and the comparison he draws evidently relate to style.

It is also possible that El-Sagheer may not have the linguistic awareness (or concern) to class the old and new messages as different codes. Indeed, there is a lesson there not to assume such awareness and congruent use of terminology in members of the wider public; I had to check my own use of \(fu\(ș\)\(ā\) and \(ā\)\(mm\)\(i\)\(y\)\(a\) in this interview so as not to cue in terms that El-Sagheer wouldn’t use himself. Another explanation is that El-Sagheer could simply be using terminology which is current in the marketing industry.

Shedding further light on how the change in the messages came about, El-Sagheer explains that the company issues periodical operational reports which indicate the monthly number of calls received by the call centre and how many of these were routed to a call centre agent. Before the change was implemented, 90-95% of messages were routed to an agent. This flagged a problem as the self-help tool clearly wasn’t serving its purpose, and the large volume of calls requiring an agent’s attention was also a substantial cost. It was this problem which triggered the research study in an attempt to cut costs but also achieve customer satisfaction.

The research involved surveying customers, the majority of whom indicated that they could not understand the old messages and that they would prefer messages in “slang” (although El-Sagheer wasn’t clear on the exact word used in the survey). It also indicated that they preferred a female voice. El-Sagheer explains that the most likely reason that many could not understand the messages is that the ‘base’ of their customers is not very ‘well-educated’. He elaborates that their customer core is segmented by subscription plan into pre-paid card holders and premium and platinum customers. Premium and platinum customers are their ‘high customers’ and they make up 10% of subscribers. These are mainly well-educated professionals; what El-Sagheer describes as the ‘crème’ of society. VE’s research showed that these customers always prefer speaking to an agent; they don’t like IVR at all. El-Sagheer explains that their busy lifestyles mean that they usually have an issue they want to fix quickly or they will be late for a conference or an important engagement. Since
they could not change the behaviour of these customers, they had to turn their attention to the majority; their main customer base. This customer base includes customers with humble social and cultural standing, customers with little or no education, and customers living in rural governorates. These customers struggled to understand the “formal” messages, and many would not listen to them point blank.

El-Sagheer explains that the decision and process of changing the messages was not easy. For instance, he highlights how the old message transcribed at the beginning of this section had become an iconic VE message and even featured in some movies. He notes that there was particular reluctance to change this message which had become part of VE’s corporate identity. The process of changing the messages was a gradual one, and this message was the last to be changed. When it was eventually changed, they added the option to send a ‘mini-call’ (voicemail) so that the change would not simply entail replacing the message, but allow the customer to take specific action.

On the challenges they encountered in the process of changing the messages, El-Sagheer says:

SEG16: At first it was very difficult of course. I mean, there are certain words which were very difficult to change from formal to slang. For example, I want to say abl kida (previously; EA); min qabl (previously, SA), I mean that’s how we used to say it before. Words like that were very difficult. But to be honest in the beginning we were dealing with a vendor, an advertising agency, and they prepared this script for us […] until\ I mean, also not very long ago we became in charge and now we prepare the script ourselves, but we got the experience from them [regarding] how to say things.

This segment highlights a number of important points. It illustrates that the process of changing messages from “formal” to “slang” was indeed a process of translating them from fushā to ʿāmmiyya as El-Sagheer’s example suggests. The difficulty that El-Sagheer describes is understandable: they are trying to tap into the informal style of ʿāmmiyya, but without wishing to sound vulgar. This highlights the fact that this unprecedented change involved negotiating the functional parameters of ʿāmmiyya: the boundaries of its functional suitability were pushed in order to appropriate it for this novel function. It is therefore not surprising that VE consulted an advertising
agency at first: ʿāmmīyya, both spoken and written, has long been used in advertising. Later in the interview, El-Sagheer elaborates that it is not always possible to use ‘complete slang’. He says describing the new messages:

SEG17: … they are in a very simplified form and very slang. At the same time there are things I cannot say [in slang], so they have to be converted to formal slightly. So it’s between the two, but not too formal and not too slang. For example I can’t tell them [the customer]: “if you enter on the day after that you will be able to do I-don’t-know-what...” [EA]. I mean, there are certain things where we incorporate a bit of formal because I cannot say it in complete slang. So we are not too slang – that is, talking as though I am talking on the street – and not formal. So it’s between the two. This is what’s really difficult.

This segment points to an awareness of intermediate form(s) between two “formal” and “slang” poles. This description, coupled with the discussed emphasis on style, evokes Mejdell’s (2006) notion of ‘mixed styles’ where code-switching between fushā and ʿāmmīyya achieves style-mixing. El-Sagheer’s description also suggests a virtual scale of formality, whereby one can increase or decrease formality by incorporating elements from ‘slang’ or ‘formal’ which preside on either ends of the scale, very much in line with the concept of the diglossic continuum (cf. Section 2.7). Interestingly, El-Sagheer notes that this intermediate form is the most difficult to script, influenced perhaps by perceptions of (lacking) correctness or naturalness.

With respect to the impact of the change in the IVR messages, El-Sagheer notes that it was a success on many fronts. The company’s self-help tool is now much more efficient, and the volume of calls that agents handle has declined considerably. In the past, when VE launched a new service or offer, the service level of the call centre would crash because of the volume of incoming calls routed to the agent. Now ‘that the customers understand’, El-Sagheer says, the IVR handles up to 26 million calls a month. El-Sagheer even notes that in the previous Ramadan – a month when the volume of calls they receive usually increases – the IVR handled 60% of incoming calls. This was the first time in eleven years that the target service level was achieved. According to El-Sagheer, they have successfully changed the customer’s behaviour and experience. He also feels that this change has given them a
competitive edge, because they are the first network to deploy messages in “slang”. El-Sagheer notes that they have been receiving positive feedback from customers saying that they like the new messages and the female voice. If customers complain that they don’t understand a specific message, VE replace it with a simpler message.

I asked El-Sagheer if they received negative feedback over the replacement of the old messages. Surprisingly, the negative feedback they received was in relation to the English messages: some customers commented on the grammaticality or vocabulary of the new English messages! El-Sagheer explains that they never had a problem with their old English messages (which are used by 5% of their customers, including expatriates), but they had to be changed to match the new Arabic messages. He also notes that they have some product names in (Egyptian) Arabic, like ḥakāwī kul yōm (stories everyday) which they could not translate literally in the English IVRs. He says that customers using the English IVR (and who don’t understand Arabic) can sometimes be taken aback when they hear a string of words in Arabic such as this.

On the flip side, VE also has its English product names, such as ‘mini-call’, which are not translated in the Arabic messages. I asked El-Sagheer if customers with lesser education struggle with these terms. He provided the same reasoning, that these are product names which they expect the customer to learn. He notes however that customers often refer to these products using their own terms. For instance, many customers refer to a “USB modem” as ṣubāʿ el-net (literally, Internet finger). Similarly, customers will understand what is meant by the term GPRS, but will often refer to it themselves as gapris. El-Sagheer notes that this is another way they have influenced customer behaviour: by using the English product name they are forcing the customer to learn it, and even if they have their own way of referring to the product, what matters is that they recognise what is being referred to.

El-Sagheer also mentions that the messages sent out to their customers are either “slang” Arabic or “Franco-Arab” (English mixed with Arabic in Latin script particularly for product names), (cf. Section 1.1). While the majority of messages they send are in Arabic, he notes that many customers opt to receive the latter – even though they are not “foreigners” – because they prefer them to the Arabic messages. It could be
argued that the adoption of these LA messages, like the use of ʿāmmiyya, is a reflection of wider changes in the language community. Indeed, when I asked El-Sagheer if he feels that they have contributed towards a wider change where “slang” is becoming more widely acceptable, he responds:

SEG18: Well, we went with the "cope with the change". That is, we found that this is what people wanted. And we are supposed to be a company which provides services [...] so I have to know the customer’s needs and fulfil them. So, this issue had already started to spread and spread - this issue of slang - even on Facebook, on mobile text messages: all of that was in slang. So we had to cope; we can’t be walking in one direction while people are walking in an entirely different direction. So maybe we contributed to this change, I mean, as part of that change, but the change was already happening.

4.5 Arabic Language Conservation Societies (ALCSs)

So far, the interviews above have presented the standpoint of what I have termed agents of change; that is, groups and individuals who have either directly contributed to or have a vested interest in changing the language situation in favour of ʿāmmiyya. This section presents the findings from the focus group interview with three ALCSs. As resisters of change, these groups have a vested interest in preserving the role and status of fuṣḥā, and hence present the view from the opposite side of the spectrum. The three groups represented in the interview were (as described by their representatives):

- **Jamʿiyyat Lisân al-ʿarab** (Arabs’ Tongue Society, henceforth ATS):

  Established in 1992, the society organises various activities aimed at promoting the Arabic language (that is, fuṣḥā). This includes an annual conference – described as ‘an Arab cultural and linguistic demonstration’ (taẓāhura luğawiyya ʿtaqāfiyya ʿarabiyya) – at the LAS general headquarters, in which more than 50 researchers from the Arab World and some Islamic countries participate. The activities also include organising an annual competition commemorating International Mother Language Day under the auspices of the UNESCO and in partnership with the Ministry of Education or the Ministry of Higher Education.
Notably, the society sought to move the affiliation of the Arabic Language Academy from the Ministry of Higher education to the direct control of the president or the prime minister. The society has more than 200 members, most of whom are not Arabic language specialists. The society was represented in the focus group interview by Fawzy Tag El-Din, the society’s media consultant.

At 61, Tag El-Din was notably older than the other two representatives. He voluntarily shares information about himself, constructing an identity which goes hand in hand with his views about Arabic. In 2005, he presented his papers as a candidate in the presidential elections. He says ‘I am not even fit to be president of a club in a popular neighbourhood’ (anā lā ašluḥ li-ri‘āsat ḥattā wa-law nādī fī ḥāra ša‘biyya), but he presented his papers ‘because of [the strength of] his Arabic language’ (bisabab luġatī al-‘arabiyya). His candidacy was therefore more of a public statement about the state of Arabic. He states that his main objective was to move the affiliation of the Arabic Language Academy from the ‘foreignised Ministry’ (wezāra xawagātī) of Higher Education to the presidency.

- **Jam‘iyat Ḥumāt al-Luġa al-‘arabiyya (Society of the Protectors of the Arabic Language, henceforth SPAL):**

SPAL was established in 2000 and is the second oldest ALCS in Egypt after ATS. It was established by a prominent radio host, Tahir Abu Zeid, who was famous for his concern for the Arabic language, which explains why many of the members are media personalities (particularly of the older generation). The society has about 400 members including specialists and non-specialists. The society holds semi-monthly seminars, in addition to organising conferences in partnership with different bodies such as the Ministry of Culture, the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Higher Education. They also organise competitions aimed at encouraging teachers and students to care for Arabic, and published a book titled

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44 Tag El-Din came to the interview with a photocopy of a newspaper clipping containing an interview that was conducted with him in light of his candidacy. It was clear that this interview he shared was used as an opportunity to focus on the Arabic language.

‘asal al-naḥw (Grammar’s Honey) to this end. Members of the society who work in the media use their professional capacity to talk or write about (fuṣḥā) Arabic, which includes commending efforts to promote or preserve it, and criticising actions which undermine it. The society also liaises with other ALCSs inside and outside Egypt and honours public personalities with a concern for the Arabic language. The society was represented in the interview by Mohamad Salah, who is a member of the society’s board of directors.

- **Jamʿiyyat al-Mutarjimīn wa-l-Luḡawwiyīn al-Miṣriyyīn (Egyptian Translators and Linguists Society, henceforth ETLS):**

ETLS was officially established in 2006, and has over 2000 members (mainly translators). The society was represented in the interview by its president, Hussam El-Din Mustafa. Noting that there is no syndicate or professional code for translators in Egypt, Mustafa states that the society was formed as a coalition for translators seeking to establish and promote the professional standards of translation, and to find solutions for the problems faced by translators. The society’s concern with the Arabic language stems from it being at the centre of their profession, either as a source or target language. Mustafa notes that Arabic to them is a matter of ‘national security’, whether Arab or Egyptian, which is why they have taken a ‘military approach’ (manḥā ʿaskarī) to protecting it. That is, he says that unlike other ALCSs which work from the inside outwards and focus on defensive strategies, ETLS have shifted their activities to the offensive by running Arabic language courses for non-speakers of Arabic. Mustafa says that he has found that one of the main factors which lead to the deterioration of Arabic and the crisis it is facing is the incursion of foreign languages, which is why their offensive strategy focuses on teaching Arabic to ‘those who seek to disfigure the [Arabic] language or influence it’ (ellī beyasʿū le-tašwīh el-luḡa aw el-taṭīr ʿalēhā).

Throughout the duration of the interview, Tag El-Din spoke almost exclusively in fuṣḥā (often complete with case endings). Even when he resorted to ʿāmmiyya, he would flag this switch, for example by saying ʿafwan (excuse me). Indeed, at the beginning of the interview, Mustafa, whose turn to speak followed Tag El-Din
remarks that ‘it is a problem to speak after someone who speaks in fuṣḥā’ (muškila ennik tetkallemī ba’d ḥad beyitkallim fuṣḥā), implying that he cannot match Tag El-Din’s ability to speak fuṣḥā consistently. Salah also spoke mostly in fuṣḥā with occasional switches to ‘āmmiyya, but only rarely used case endings. Mustafa on the other hand spoke in a mixture of fuṣḥā and ‘āmmiyya with a few flagged English words or expressions which were immediately preceded or followed by the Arabic translation. It is worth noting that all three interviewees frequently write in newspapers, appear in the media and participate in various cultural forums with respect to their concern for the Arabic language.

At the beginning of the interview, I asked the representatives of the three ALCSs to define Egyptian ‘āmmiyya. These were their answers:

SEG19: Tag El-Din: ‘āmmiyya is a dialect and not a language, because a language has written and known [grammar] rules. It is not ‘āmmiyya only, all of the languages of the world have a dialect. The ‘āmmiyya dialect is the most famous of all the Arabic ‘āmmiyyas, owing perhaps to Egyptian art which entered these countries in an early period and that most of those artists came to Egypt and became famous in Cairo, so [Egyptian] ‘āmmiyya spread as a result. ‘āmmiyya is considered one of the components of the language of journalism because […] the language of contemporary journalism is the third language; it is more elevated than ‘āmmiyya and lower than fuṣḥā; it is in between them.

SEG20: Salah: My opinion is that Egyptian ‘āmmiyya is a level among the levels of the language, and it is a legitimate daughter of the Arabic fuṣḥā language. […] My definition of the ‘āmmiyya dialect is that it is used in public life at the popular level, away from the official level and official communication.

SEG21: Mustafa: ‘āmmiyya to me is a way of escaping the problematic issues that one might fall into which are dictated by fuṣḥā in terms of adhering to the rules of the language, to a certain level of rhetoric, to certain principles of pronunciation. So to a certain extent ‘āmmiyya represents the escape exit from all of these restrictions, if they may be called restrictions. Indeed they are rules, but they have become restricting rules, so that it is difficult to interact using them over different social levels. Hence ‘āmmiyya has become for everyone a compromise […] as a means of
communication which could link between groups and sectors of society with different cultural levels and social standing.

While all three definitions communicate a perceived inferiority of ‘āmmiyya, there are significant disparities: First, it is important to note how the three representatives refer to ‘āmmiyya. Tag El-Din explicitly states that ‘āmmiyya is a dialect and not a language, and Salah similarly uses the label ‘dialect’ to refer to it. Out of the three, Mustafa is the only one who refers to ‘āmmiyya as a language (although this does not occur in this particular segment). It is also significant that Salah describes ‘āmmiyya as ‘the legitimate daughter of fuṣḥā’, employing the same metaphor of parenthood which was used by LEP’s Gamal El-Din when he stated that ‘āmmiyya was the daughter of ancient Egyptian languages. Tag El-Din refers to an intermediate variety used in journalism which is ‘higher than ‘āmmiyya but lower than fuṣḥā’ and refers to this as ‘the third language’.

The notion that ‘āmmiyya is a dialect while fuṣḥā is a language invokes the topoi of authenticity and superiority simultaneously: ‘āmmiyya is inferior to fuṣḥā because it is not codified; it is not a ‘real’ language like fuṣḥā. Similarly, Mustafa’s statement that ‘āmmiyya links different classes of society – whether he intended it or not – invokes the topos of unity. Moreover, the myth that all the world’s languages have a standard and colloquial comparable to fuṣḥā and ‘āmmiyya normalises diglossia. It is worth noting that the same myth is expressed by LEP’s Gamal El-Din.

Noting the spread of ‘āmmiyya in recent years, the representatives of the ALCSs cite a number of reasons for this. Salah states that media, both public and private often reinforce the use of ‘āmmiyya particularly in programs or magazines directed at youths, ‘and it’s not [even] the elevated ‘āmmiyya dialect or the so-called ‘āmmiyya of the educated, but […] a ‘āmmiyya much lower than the desired and required level’ (SEG22). Salah also blames educational institutions for this ‘bad phenomenon’ (ẓāhira sayyi’ā), pointing to the poor standards of Arabic teaching, particularly in the early stages of education. He adds that universities also share part of the blame, where professors – even of Arabic language – rarely speak in ‘sound Arabic’ (luğa ‘arabiyya salīma). A third reason that Salah gives is the ‘deterioration of general taste
in the Egyptian street’ (inḥidār aḍ-ḍawq al-‘ām fī l-šārī‘ al-maṣrī) which has led to the prevalence of ‘āmmiyya and making those who use fuṣḥā, even at its easiest level, subject to ridicule.

The main reason that Mustafa cites behind the spreading use of ‘āmmiyya is the reconfiguration of social classes (at-taġayyur fī tabaqāt al-muṭṣama‘). He notes that there was a time when speaking fuṣḥā was a sign of respect and dignity (‘alāma min ‘alāmāt el-iḥtirām w-el-waqa‘). This was a time when the “well-educated” owned the economic capital in society. However, when the societal make-up changed (with the 1952 revolution/coup), a class of people who had little or no education got rich very quickly. These people now owned the economic capital in society – which is linked to all kinds of domination imaginable – from public taste to lifestyle, and this extended to language. Hence, ‘āmmiyya – as the language of the less educated – started to dominate because it was the language of the economically dominant class. He adds that the average class of society has become the uncultured class, that is, people who sometimes haven’t completed intermediate education, and therefore don’t have a foundation to enable them to speak in fuṣḥā. Hence, using fuṣḥā – even at an easy or flexible level – is deteriorating. He adds that art plays a role in this deterioration, noting that a few generations ago, songs would be composed in fuṣḥā or a mixture of fuṣḥā and ‘āmmiyya, but now they have reached the ‘lowest level of ‘āmmiyya language’ (adnā mustawayyāt el-luğa el-‘āmmiyya).

Another reason that Mustafa cites is to avoid making mistakes in fuṣḥā, he says ‘someone like me […] is afraid to commit a linguistic aberration and face disgrace in his academic position as a result’, and so uses ‘āmmiyya as a language of communication. Mustafa adds that ‘fuṣḥā has now become confined to the elite, and has therefore become something disregarded […] and it has sometimes come to be considered a kind of condescension’ (SEG23). Mustafa’s use of the term ‘elite’ (nuxba) here is worth noting. This elite is clearly different from the economic elite he described – those who don’t speak fuṣḥā and influence public taste. This is relevant to my discussion of the notion of multiple elites in Section 6.3.
On the other hand, Tag El-Din cites an example which goes counter to the prevalent trend of the expanding use of ʿāmmiyya:

**SEG24:** [in] metro stations, a few years ago [the announcer] used to pronounce in ʿāmmiyya and in a sound which disturbed the commuter, so that instead of moving away from the pavement, they moved closer to it. But when I [now] listen to a (female) announcer with a voice which is beautiful, musical, etc, speaking in beautifully melodious fuṣḥā... I am one of the people, in honesty, I go to the metro stations, not to take the metro, but to listen to [the] sound\ I even thought initially that it was a woman sitting [there] and I requested to thank her, [but] it turned out that it was an audio recording and this was amusing.

This account demonstrates how, as in previous interviews, opinions of ʿāmmiyya are tied to opinions of fuṣḥā. A number of rationalised evaluations are presented to assert the superiority of fuṣḥā. Tag El-Din associates fuṣḥā with beauty and melody, whereas ʿāmmiyya is associated with unpleasantness and even unintelligibility. He adds that fuṣḥā is a language of beauty and elegance (gamāl wa-riqqa) as well as brevity and economy (ixtiṣār wa-iqtisād). He also states that ‘the Arabic language is the only language [...] where all the letters or sounds exist’ (al-luġa l-ʿarabiyya hiyya l-luġa l-waḥūda [...] elli gamī’ el-ḥurūf aw el-aṣwāt mawgūda guwwāhā). Similarly, Mustafa states that ‘the Arabic language [fuṣḥā] is the richest language on the surface of the Earth’ (al-luġa al-ʿarabiyya aṭṭrā luġa ‘alā waqīf el-ard); that is, there is no other language where you can form a root out of two letters. All of the above evaluations invoke the topos of superiority where fuṣḥā is endowed with superior qualities of which ʿāmmiyya and other languages are deficient (cf. Section 3.3.1).

Tag El-Din also invokes the topos of unity, stating that fuṣḥā is what ‘unites all Arabs’. He elaborates: ‘if the Arabs sat in a closed room like this one, and each spoke their language, the proportion of understanding will be 30-40% [...] but when someone speaks in fuṣḥā, everyone will understand’ (SEG25). In the same vein, Mustafa compares language to religion, stating that fuṣḥā is ‘the foundation which unites’ (el-
speakers of different dialects of Arabic, anything beyond this foundation is *igtihād*⁴⁶. He says:

**SEG26:** ‘āmmiyya language [note the label ‘language’] is a language of communication; one of the codes of communication, but I absolutely cannot make it a standard or a basis or a language of unity. [...] ‘āmmiyya to me is a language of igtihād, a kind of agreed signs; phonetic signs which became current among a [small] group and then spread and were transferred from individual to group, and so on and so forth.

Mustafa elaborates by likening *fuṣḥā* to a tree: ‘it has roots, it is easily classified, has known origins and a known history: we know how this seed was planted here and who watered it’ (liḥā guzūr w-sahl inn anā aṣannafhā w-ma’rūf aṣlahā w-ma’rūf tārixhā: el-bezra dī etbazaret hina ezzay w-mīn ellī rawāḥā). ‘āmmiyya on the other hand is a weed: it may look like a plant and behave like it, but it has very limited utility. This metaphor does not only transport the superiority of *fuṣḥā*, but also invokes the topos of competition by painting the image of the tree and the weed which compete for resources (speakers). In addition, the fact that *fuṣḥā* is compared to a real tree while ‘āmmiyya is denied this status invokes the topos of authenticity again, where *fuṣḥā* is considered a real language but ‘āmmiyya isn’t.

The idea of the ‘rootedness’ of *fuṣḥā* also invokes the topoi of purity and continuity. Mustafa elaborates that, ‘no matter how profuse a word in *fuṣḥā* is, and no matter how wide its expressive scope, it is governed [by rules of interpretation]’ (mahmā kānet jazālat el-lafz, w-mahmūthawāh ed-dalālī kebir, lākinu maḥkūm), whereas in ‘āmmiyya ‘everyone interprets as they please’ (kul wāḥid yefassar ‘alā kēfu). Similarly, while in *fuṣḥā* you can trace the roots of a word to the Arab tribe where it originated, Mustafa jokes that in ‘āmmiyya if perchance someone – ‘because they have taken out a tooth – produces a distorted pronunciation of [a word], it enters the lexicon’ (ʿašān xāliʿ ḍirs nāṭa’hā māwūg, bitxušš guwwa el-muḥtawā el-luqawā)! It is this which leads Mustafa to consider ‘āmmiyya ‘one of the grave threats to the language, because one day you will be unable to distinguish between that which is *fuṣḥā* [eloquent] and that which is not *fuṣḥā*, and what the

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⁴⁶ *Igtihād* (MSA: *Ijtihād*) is a religious concept in Islam, referring to the efforts of religious scholars to derive rulings based on independent study and interpretation of the Quran and prophetic traditions.
measure of ḥaṣā-ness (fasāha) is. Is it the prevalence of use? Is it the expressive capacity? Is it the origin? Is it the conjugation?’ (SEG27).

Mustafa elaborates on another aspect of the ‘threat’ of āmmiyya, this time invoking the topos of conspiracy. Commenting on the link between āmmiyya and Egyptian separatism, he refers to a ‘they’ who are aiming to divide peoples of the Arab World into smaller and smaller groups without explicitly naming who ‘they’ refers to. The strategy employed, he says, is to make each group feel different and superior – or persecuted – by playing on race, tribalism, special interests, etc. so that they would seek separation and independence. For instance, Egyptians are encouraged to seek separation from Arabs through claims such as ‘you are the pharaohs! Look at that statue; it resembles you. Look at the tanned colour of the Nile; it resembles you. You have your language. […] Those Caucasians you see in Egypt […] were brought by Amr ibn Al-‘as on camels’ backs! They are not Egyptian’ (SEG28). Acknowledging that these separatist inclinations are common in Egyptian society today, Mustafa says:

SEG29: There was no way that you would one day see – as I’m sure you’ve learned – that you would hear in the days of Gamal Abdel Nasser – I mean the period of course, not that Abdel Nasser was the prophet of qawmiyya, but in that period what was the [popular] song? “The Earth Speaks Arabic” (el-arḍ btetkallim ’arabī’) – there was no way that Egypt would quarrel with Algeria over some [football]. But what happened after the football quarrel? “You are the country of the I-don’t-know-how-many so-and-so” of course, it was no longer ‘martyr’48, it was any other [derogatory] word. “You? Who are you? You are [enemy] agents and Zionists, sons of so-and-so” – that’s in reference to Egyptians. So the rift began to grow deeper. Now they can’t find something to play on; at the end of the day if he places me next to an Algerian and neither of us spoke you would say that we were brothers: the same appearance, the same height, the same hair and the same colour. And if the call to prayer (ādān) sounds you might find us both getting up to pray. So how do you separate us? With language. With dialect. If the Algerian speaks with some of that French they use [he will say] “look, isn’t that who you call my brother in

47 ‘amr ibn el-‘āṣ was the leader of the Muslim troops which brought Islam to Egypt in 640 AD (cf. Section 2.3)
48 Algeria is commonly referred to in the Arab World as “the country of the million and a half martyrs” in reference to the lives lost during the Algerian revolution of independence (1954-1962) from French occupation.
Arabness [‘urūba]? There you go mate, three quarters of his speech is in French!”

[...] So now they are playing on the element of the Orange Revolution in its worst form – based on what? On racism.

Mustafa uses the term naz’a istiqlāliyya (inclination for independence) to describe the goal of such conspiracies. He also draws an analogy between the disintegration of the Arab World and the disintegration of the Soviet Union (hence the reference to the Orange Revolution). This choice of analogy and terminology is interesting because it is applied to the already independent countries of the Arab World. This suggests how powerful and deeply rooted the concept of the ‘Arab nation’ is even though it is an ideological rather than physical entity (cf. Section 3.3.2.2). Mustafa’s account romanticises the Nasserite era as a ‘golden age’ for the Arabic language and Arab nationalism. This is contrasted with the present situation where an apparent conspiracy exists to divide the peoples of the Arab World. In the segment above, the ‘conspirers’ are referred to vaguely using a range of pronouns (underlined with a wavy line), although the reference “my brother” suggests that Mustafa’s perceived conspiracy is not external.

This inference is supported by Tag El-Din’s statement, which follows Mustafa’s: ‘I will rule out conspiracy; the conspiracy this time is from the inside not the outside. That is, conspiracy exists but the source has changed’. He adds, ‘we are obsessed with copying the West even after the West have left’ (SEG30). To Tag El-Din, the rise of national languages based on regional dialects of Arabic is not only a national threat, but a religious one: ‘the fear is also that if the āmmiyyas triumphed and became a codified language or a written language, I ask this; what will we do with the Quran?’. He adds that ‘turning these āmmiyyas into languages – so that we have the Egyptian language and the Tunisian language and so on and so forth; twenty or twenty-two languages – this would be a catastrophe. Why? Because the single noble Quran will be finished!’ (SEG31). While Tag El-Din’s argument proceeds under the topos of unity invoked by Mustafa, the war metaphor transported by the use of the word ‘triumphed’ (intaṣarit) is a clear invocation of the topos of competition.

Mustafa elaborates on this latter point stating ‘the [inimitable] wonder of the Quran lies in its text’ (i’gāz el-qur’ān nafsu fī lafzu), (cf. Section 3.3.1.1). ‘Just chanting the
Quran in recitation’ (mugarrad enn anā a´ud atarannam bi-telāwat al-qur´ān) before someone who does not understand Arabic ‘is a wonder in itself’ (dī iʿgāz le-waḥdahā). He therefore says that when sacred texts like the Quran are translated, what is translated is the ‘content’; the ‘concepts’; the ‘meaning’. Nevertheless, he is adamant that the Quran cannot be translated into ‘āmmiyya ‘because it is not an alternative, foreign or different language’ (la`enn dī miš luğa badīla, miš luğa agnabeyya, miš luğa muxālfa). He adds:

SEG32: ‘āmmiyya is not a language of translation. Maybe, maybe it could be a language of interpretation; a language of explanation; of simplification; but of translation? No. When I translate the noble Quran into the English language, I don’t simplify it. Why? Because interpretation or simplification is a complex level of language that I achieve through a lower level using words and synonyms. [...] that’s for interpretation. But to translate, [this involves] finding an equivalent term – with the same meaning, the same connotation, and the same associative value – and then work with that.

The reasons that Mustafa gives for the impossibility of translating the Quran into ‘āmmiyya are significant. By stating that ‘āmmiyya is not a different or alternative language, he is essentially saying that ‘āmmiyya and fuṣḥā are [levels of] the same language. The other reason he gives is that ‘āmmiyya is considered a level of simplification; that it is not possible to capture the same connotations transported in fuṣḥā via ‘āmmiyya. This resonates with the difficulties expressed by VE’s El-Sagheer when he recounted the challenge of ‘translating’ the IVR messages into ‘slang’ without sounding vulgar (cf. Section 4.4).

Indeed, Tag El-Din goes a step further than Mustafa by stating that ‘āmmiyya itself is untranslatable. What is to be feared if ‘āmmiyya is codified or used in creative writing or science, he says, is that ‘in this case, it will not be translated’ (fī hāzihi l-ḥāla lan tutargam). Mustafa himself does not say that ‘āmmiyya is untranslatable, but notes that the problem with translating it is that the translator must find, not only an equivalent term in the target language, but also an ‘equivalent linguistic level’ (mustawā luḡawī mukāfī) which does not exist in the target culture. This ties in with the indexes of fuṣḥā and ‘āmmiyya which I discuss in Section 6.4.
It is worth noting that all three ALCS representatives hedge their criticism of āmmiyya by emphasising that they are not opposed to āmmiyya. For instance, Mustafa – despite the very serious picture he paints of the ‘threat’ of āmmiyya – says: ‘I am not against āmmiyya’ (anā miš ḍid āmmiyya), but the problem with it is that it removes us from ‘the foundation of communication, which is the original language’ (aṣl el-tawāṣul, ellī huwwa el-luġa el-asliyya). Similarly, Tag El-Din says ‘we are not against āmmiyya’ (nahnu lasnā did el-āmmiyya), ‘but that āmmiyya becomes a language of writing and creativity is the dangerous issue’ (lākin tuṣbih luġat kitāba wa-ibdā’ hāzā huwwa al-amr al-xaṭīr).

Indeed, he goes as far as to say that creativity (ibdā’) – whether scientific or literary – if written in āmmiyya, ceases to be creativity. On the other hand, while SPAL’s Salah (who had mostly remained silent while Mustafa and Tag El-Din expressed unfavourable views of āmmiyya) also uses the ‘I’m not against āmmiyya, but...’ hedge, he is more equivocal in his view:

SEG33: I am not against fuṣḥā and I am not against āmmiyya. I lean more towards fuṣḥā than āmmiyya, but ‘every context has its appropriate speech’ [Arabic idiom]. Fuṣḥā language has its level, and āmmiyya language has its level, but with conditions [...] I am opposed to āmmiyya language\ dialect becoming a language of writing, but I also agree that it becomes a language of creativity. I mean, creativity in āmmiyya language\ dialect is needed because it also has its expressive fields and its required creative and indicational capacities. And creativity in fuṣḥā also has the same. And each of these literary genres, or each linguistic level of literary creativity, has its audience and has those who receive it or have a taste for it.

Salah’s inconsistent use of the labels ‘language’ (luġa) and ‘dialect’ (lahga) to refer to āmmiyya is worth noting. While, his two repairs suggest that ‘dialect’ is the target, and that uses of ‘language’ are mere lapses, it also raises the question of whether āmmiyya is being deliberately relegated to dialect status in the context of this discussion due to the symbolic loadings associated with these two labels. This is interesting because Mustafa, who adopts a more hard-line position against āmmiyya compared to Salah, consistently refers to āmmiyya as a language throughout the interview. This would suggest that the choice between these two labels is not
necessarily an accurate indication of the speaker’s ideological position vis-à-vis the status of *fuṣḥā* and *ʿāmmiyā*.

Although Salah states that he is against the ‘codification of *ʿāmmiyā*’ (*taqnīn el-*ʿāmmiyā*), he believes that if *ʿāmmiyā* ‘occupied its proper place in Egyptian society’ (*axazat waḍ`ahā as-saḥīm fī l-muqtaṭma al-miṣrī*), ‘it could be a good form of language’ (*yumkin an takūn šaklan gayyidan min aškāl al-lūgā*). The essential criterion is the conditions of the use of *ʿāmmiyā*. However, Salah is still ardent in his pro-*fuṣḥā* stance. He states that instead of calling for the codification of *ʿāmmiyā*, we should call for the simplification of Arabic language teaching and regulate the use of *fuṣḥā* in the media and enforce the laws which govern this. For instance, he notes that in 1958 a law was issued to ensure that the names of shops, companies and organisations are in Arabic, but this law has never been enforced. Salah adds that a minister of Supply and Internal Trade in the 1990s tried to enforce this law, but he was faced with severe opposition, and it is said that he was ultimately removed from his position because of his concern for the Arabic language.

Despite the strong views expressed by the ALCS representatives against the ‘incursions’ of *ʿāmmiyā*, it is when the incursion of foreign languages is addressed that these views become very passionate. *ʿāmmiyā* in comparison is the lesser of the two evils. Indeed, referring to the growing use of Latinised Arabic, Tag El-Din remarks that ‘the disaster of *ʿāmmiyā* is much more bearable than the disaster of writing in non-Arabic letters’ (*muṣībat al-*ʿāmmiyā* arḥam bi-kāsīr min muṣībat al-kitāba bi-ḥurūf gēr ʿarabiyya*). He says ‘this is really a catastrophe’ (*dī karsa ḥāʾīn*), and that ‘the goal is to move us away from the constitution of the noble Quran’ (*el-hadaf ib`adnā `an dustūr el-qur`ān el-karīm*). Again, Islam is portrayed as being under threat and the topos of conspiracy is invoked once more.

Accounting for the spread of English and the use of Latin characters to write Arabic, Mustafa reasons that there are deep historical roots. He says that Egypt was occupied by foreigners for thousands of years, which has created a complex inside the Egyptian personality; ‘an inclination to obey the white race; that all that is foreign is sacred’ (*el-mēl li-l-insiyā ʿir-l-gins el-abyād; enn kul mā huwa agnābī fa-huwa*).
muqaddas). By extension, everything which is received from the ‘white man’ – be it
culture, art, fashion, food, speech habits, etc. – is also sacred. That is, occupation has
been transferred from the level of physical military occupation to ‘intellectual
occupation’ (iḥtiilāl fikrī). Even though Britain has left with its troops, Mustafa says, ‘it
left an educational system, it left cultural residues, it left social systems, it left
principles which persuaded the Egyptian people that [...] to be advanced, the concept
of modernity is bound to the concept of alienation, I [have to] borrow from the West’
(SEG34). Incidentally, the point Mustafa makes echoes Diem (1974, cited in Mejdell,
2006) who refers to Arabs’ conviction of their inferiority and the superiority of
Western culture evidenced in parents preferring to teach their children European
languages – a view which Mejdell deems both reductionist and Orientalist.

According to Mustafa, part of the colonial legacy that the West left in Egypt is that
scientific advancement is restricted to the West without any acknowledgment of the
scientific contributions that Arabs made in the past, which created an inferiority
complex in the Egyptian mind. ‘My credit [of knowledge] has become zero, so I
became an importer; I became mentally and intellectually drained, and I started to
import ideas’, he says, ‘until I reached a level of emptiness where I started to import
the language’ (SEG35). Mustafa notes that the associations between foreign
languages and modernity are mirrored in associating Arabic with tradition and
antiquity, and in parallel evaluations of people who speak these languages:

**SEG36:** Now the synonym of culture, the synonym of a person being [deemed] educated, is
blending with Western culture. That is, when someone like my brother Dr
Muhammad Gamaly⁴⁹ sits next to me, a man who – masha’Allah!⁵⁰ – is well-versed
in the grammar of the Arabic language and has memorised the treasures of [Arabic]
heritage and the mothers of books (i.e. classical references), etc. – there is no way
that I would call him cultured, civilised, etc. I will describe him as a Sheikh-like
fellow (mistaşýax); an outdated fellow (antīka); an old-fashioned fellow (me’atta’).
But if he then spoke to me with three-four foreign words, [I will say] “Wow! This
guy is in close touch with modern Western thinking”. So, here in Egypt specifically,

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⁴⁹ In reference to SPAL’s Muhammad Salah.
⁵⁰ Arabic expletive used to express admiration (literally: behold God’s will!)
Mustafa also invokes the topos of conspiracy when he refers to the cultural influence of foreign languages (more specifically English). He notes that satellite channels have contributed to the spread of foreign language use; that TV hosts often mix Arabic with English in their speech. Indeed even the names of many of these channels are in English, because ‘we have grown accustomed that anything good must be stamped with a foreign stamp’. ‘Of course, [the person] from outside giving me this, is not giving me to build my character the way I want it to become,’ Mustafa says, ‘no, he wants to build my character the way he wants it’. He adds, ‘If I am not comparable to him then at least I am aligned with him in the same direction’ (SEG37). Again, Mustafa refers to an ambiguous other (‘he’) who is understood to be working against the interests of Egyptians, but significantly, this time the other is clearly from ‘outside’ (barra).

Foreign language schools and universities in particular are seen as a direct threat to the Arabic language. Tag El-Din recounts how when his granddaughter applied for a place in a ‘language’ school (cf. Section 3.4), her parents had to be interviewed (in English) to ensure that they met the school’s standards. They were even instructed to speak English at home. Tag El-Din considers this a threat because it undermines the child’s Arabic linguistic foundation. Foreign languages are also deemed a threat to the Arab[ic] moral system; language is the vessel through which the moral values of the West are transported. Mustafa notes that the English language introduces words such as ‘boyfriend’ and ‘girlfriend’ which are not translatable into Arabic because the concept itself does not exist in Arab culture. Similarly, Tag El-Din expresses his offence at attending a theatrical performance at a ‘foreign’ university in Cairo because the subject matter of the performance (which took place in English) dealt too openly with intimate sexual relations. Tag El-Din considers this ‘toying with religion’ (ʿabat b-ed-dīn), and asks, ‘Isn’t this targeted?’ (alysa hāzā mustahdafaṭ?). His opinion is that part of the mission of these universities – next to spreading and reinforcing foreign languages – is to corrupt the moral fabric of Arab society. The idea of the inseparability of language and culture resonates closely with the point
made by Malamih’s El-Sharkawi about the appropriateness of topics dealt with in English and Arabic respectively.

Mustafa notes that this spread of foreign languages and Western values has resulted in an identity crisis, where ‘my belonging is no longer to my country or to my language or to anything’ (intimā’ī ma-ba’āš le-baladī wa-la le-‘uqdatī wa-la le-ay ḥāga). Mustafa notes that it is this fear of the influence of globalisation which has triggered an increased concern for the Arabic language as well as Arabisation as a protective, defensive measure:

SEG38: This globalisation has triggered something else. What is it? A fear and horror, based on which a kind of opposite reaction has started to emerge. In what [form]? In that, out of my great fear I started to do what I should have done some time ago; I now started to call for Arabisation, I started to call for the preservation of the Arabic language. Because the content of globalisation, to me, is coming to me like a monster, so we feared that we might be colonised once more. Don’t think all that is happening now in terms of concern for Arabisation and concern for protecting the Arabic language and all that is out of concern for the language. No, we have been concerned for the language since the days... we shall say since the days of the noble Quran. But why did it increase? Because I am now faced with a monster, I don’t know what [part] of me it wants to devour. So now I started to cling to what? I started to cling to my identities.

Hence, according to Mustafa, it is fear of the ‘monster’ (ġūl) of globalisation and fear of the loss of identities (which is significantly expressed in the plural) which triggered the establishment of several ALCSs in recent years (Salah notes that his society counted 26 ALCSs in the world in their latest survey). This increased protectiveness may not ‘restore the Arabic language (fuṣḥā) to its former position in the lead’, Mustafa says, ‘but it will at least protect it from declining and assert its endurance’ (SEG39).

Salah is more sceptical, noting the need for cooperation and coordination between the ALCSs and their lack of resources. He also points to the many shortcomings in the Arabic Language Academy in Egypt (cf. Section 3.2.3). He explains that he attends the Academy’s conference almost every year, and every year it is the same people
talking about the same things. The Academy’s projects take an unreasonably long
time to accomplish – Salah cites a historical dictionary which has been forty years in
the making. Moreover, the Academy is dominated by members of the old generation
(the youngest member being over seventy) and women are not allowed into the
Academy. Salah notes the need for new blood and for engagement with modern
technology within the Academy.

Tag El-Din reiterates this point, stating that the Academy is ‘sacred’ (muqaddas); it
does not allow anyone to come near (lā yasmah le-ahd be-l-iqterāb). He agrees that
the Academy needs more resources and power. He notes that part of his 2005
‘presidential campaign’ included moving the affiliation of the Arabic Academy to the
presidential office like other organisations such as the National Council for Childhood
and Motherhood. He says that in these organisations ‘if a decision is made at 9am it
is fully implemented at 9am, and if the cost of that decision is ten piasters, a hundred
piasters will be allocated to it’. He notes that in 2008, a presidential decree ruled that
the Arabic Academy became the highest authority in the service of the Arabic
language, and adds that although this was not exactly what they had in mind, it is still
a step on the right path.

Tag El-Din expressed his intention to run again in the 2011 presidential elections, and
that his program will include establishing a Ministry of Arabic language, and that the
biggest budget be allocated, not to the military or the Ministry of Exterior, but to the
Arabic language51. He says that even though this is madness, all great ideas begin
with a degree of madness. He notes however that the feasibility of his ideas is not
the point. ‘Of course I am not going to win,’ he says, ‘but I am piquing the stagnant
waters. I mean, it’s the first time it is said that a candidate calls for respecting the
Arabic language’ (SEG40). Tag El-Din is the most optimistic about the future of the
Arabic language. Employing the war metaphor again, he states that despite the crises
facing it now, ‘the Arabic language will triumph in the end and return to its former
glory’ (fī n-nihāya sa-tantāṣir al-’arabiyya wa-ta’ūd ilā magdihā as-sābiq).

51 Tag El-Din collected an application for presidential candidacy in 2012 (but did not become an official
candidate). However, this was drowned out by greater political concerns at the time (cf. Section 6.2)
and he did not receive the media attention he got in 2005.
The interview with the ALCSs is rich with mythology. The myths expressed in this interview – all of which belong to the dominant regime of authority about Arabic – can be summarised as follows:

- All the languages of the world have colloquials (diglossia is normal).
- A (real) language must have written rules (i.e. must be codified).
- ‘āmmiyya is a dialect not a language.
- ‘āmmiyya is untranslatable (into other languages).
- ‘āmmiyya is volatile: new words enter it all the time and it is subject to different interpretations.
- The origins of the words in ‘āmmiyya are not traceable.
- Poor Arabic teaching is aiding the spread of ‘āmmiyya.
- The deterioration of general taste is aiding the spread of ‘āmmiyya.
- The calls to codify ‘āmmiyya into a national language are part of a conspiracy to divide the Arab World.
- If the situation persists, the boundaries between fuṣḥā and ‘āmmiyya will be lost (fuṣḥā will be compromised).
- Fuṣḥā sounds more pleasant and is more intelligible than ‘āmmiyya.
- Fuṣḥā is a language of beauty and economy.
- Fuṣḥā contains all the sounds of the languages of the world.
- Fuṣḥā is the richest language in the world.
- All the words in fuṣḥā have a traceable origin.
- Fuṣḥā unites all Arabs.
- If the regional varieties of Arabic become national languages, the Quran will be lost.
- The Quran cannot be translated into ‘āmmiyya.
- Writing Arabic in Latin script is a threat to Islam.
- Foreign languages are a threat to morality.
- The colonial legacy left an inferiority complex which is [partly] to blame for the uptake of foreign languages and culture.
- The spread of foreign languages is part of a conspiracy to disintegrate the moral and religious fabric of Arab society.

4.6 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have attempted to answer RQ1 and RQ2 by highlighting the ideological underpinnings of some of the activity that the language scene in Egypt was witnessing in 2010, with agents of change on one end (RQ1) and resisters of change on the other (RQ2). The interviews themselves were quite different from one
another. Hence, although I attempted to look at all four of them through three different lenses (Eisele’s topoi, the discourse mythological approach, and the hierarchy of identities), these lenses were not an equal fit for all the interviews. The interview with VE for example was particularly difficult to subject to any of these lenses. This is because I selected them for their capacity to capture ideology, which was arguably not as tangible in this interview as in the other three. Nevertheless, the language attitudes expressed in this interview make it equally important.

The framework for the hierarchy of identities was also only salient in the interview with Malamih, where the identity of the publishing house and its owner were often conflated. However, language choice as an identity marker was important in all the interviews. The heavy use of fuṣḥā in the ALCS’s focus group interview for instance is in line with the expected ideologies they express. So is the identity of the young, educated, professional indexed by the frequent code-switching between ʿāmmiyya and English in the interview with VE. Similarly, the use of ‘elevated’ ʿāmmiyya by El-Sharkawi with occasional English words is in line with the identity of the educated, pro-ʿāmmiyya Marxist. The interview where language choice flouts expectations is that with LEP. Here, Gamal El-Din’s use of a mixed variety which was arguably closer to fuṣḥā than ʿāmmiyya in many points goes against his pro-ʿāmmiyya ideology. To account for this, one must explore the full pool of indexes associated with fuṣḥā and ʿāmmiyya (see Section 6.4).

One of the most notable findings of the interview analysis was the range of terms used to refer to fuṣḥā and ʿāmmiyya. I was sometimes taken aback by this in the course of the interview itself. For example, VE’s El-Sagheer’s use of the terms ‘formal’ and ‘slang’ was not something that I had anticipated. Yet, the language attitude they capture – where the diglossic poles or language levels are treated as different ‘styles’ of the language – is still very important, not least because it challenges our assumptions about the language awareness and perspectives of non-linguistically trained language users. Gamal El-Din’s concept of ‘the Egyptian language’ (al-luġa al-miṣriyya) was equally confounding, and also equally important. The elaborate concept, which was clearly based on an ideological foundation

\[52\] Cf. Section 3.3 for a delineation of the terms ideologies and attitudes.
espousing the superiority of Egyptians, does not only demonstrate the existence of different terminological traditions in Egyptian society (even if they only belong in the realm of ‘folk linguistics’), but also that the same term can mean different things to different people. Compare for example Gamal El-Din’s use of the term ‘Egyptian language’ to El-Sharkawi’s use of the same term: the former used it to refer to a system which encompasses both fushā and āmmiyya (in the same way that al-luğa al-‘arabiyya would be used), while the latter used it to refer specifically to āmmiyya.

I have also found that the (conscious) use of the labels dialect (lahga) and language (luğa) with reference to āmmiyya can be indicative of the speaker’s ideological position. Similarly, it is notable how the notion of some intermediate variety – or varieties – between fushā and āmmiyya came up in all interviews, except the interview with LEP. It was only LEP’s Gamal El-Din who seemed to subscribe to the idea of two discrete levels.

The most important findings were perhaps in the area of language myths. Here, the discourse mythological approach was particularly helpful. Subjecting the interviews to discourse analysis does not only bring out the myths in the discourse, but also demonstrates how these myths are transported through language choice, argumentation, metaphors, labelling, hedging and the use of pronouns. It is important to reiterate here that the term myth is used independently of the truth value of the myth itself; it does not matter whether the ‘myth’ is true or false, what matters is its unquestionable validity to a certain group. Hence, I have deliberately avoided polemics about the truth value of these myths. Some myths have been addressed in earlier chapters, others clearly lend themselves to inaccuracy, and some are neither necessarily true nor false. I have therefore opted to focus on analysing how these myths fit into the broader ideologies of the interviewees.

I have found that the discourse mythological approach complements Eisele’s topoi very well as various topoi are often invoked through myths. What is particularly striking is how the topoi in the (pro-fushā) dominant regime of authority (which were found in the ALCSs interview) were reappropriated in the pro-āmmiyya discourse of the LEP and Malamih interviews. The occurrence of these topoi in the three interviews is summarised in Table 4.
Table 4. Ideological topos in the interviews with Malamih, LEP and ALCS.

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<td>Linguistic: <em>fuṣḥā</em> vs. <em>ʿammīyya</em> Identity: <em>Egyptian</em> Arbil vs. <em>Arabic</em> <em>ʿammīyya</em> Name:</td>
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It is useful to juxtapose the ideological underpinnings of LEP and Malamih on the one hand against those of the ALCSs on the other. In addition to the former’s pro-‘āmmiyya stance and the latter’s pro-fuṣḥā stance, the two stand at opposite ends of the ideological spectrum in many other ways. The professed Egyptian nationalism of LEP and Malamih’s emphasis on the ‘distinctiveness’ of Egyptians is in stark contrast to the taken-for-granted pan-Arabism of the ALCSs. Similarly, while LEP and Malamih were at odds with the government authorities generally and the language authorities more specifically, the ALCSs operated under the auspices and in cooperation with these very authorities.

It is important to point out, however, that even though LEP and Malamih shared a pro-‘āmmiyya ideology, there were significant differences in their arguments. These differences spanned how they viewed ‘āmmiyya and how they viewed Egypt in relation to the Arab World. In particular, while LEP’s Gamal El-Din expressed unequivocal support for ‘āmmiyya, Malamih’s ‘bias’ for ‘āmmiyya was coupled with ‘linguistic liberalism’: an openness to publish in a range of linguistic forms in order to reach different audiences.

Finally, it is important to point to the limitations of the interview findings. My investigation was limited to three agents of change and it could therefore be argued that I only gave a partial response to RQ1. However, because I cannot possibly access or account for all agents of all change, it was never my intention to claim that the positions of these agents of change are representative of all agents of pro-‘āmmiyya change in Egypt. My aim was to study the arguments presented by these agents of change and simply highlight that such views exist.

Even though the interviews were conducted prior to substantial political change in Egypt and two entities (LEP and Malamih) no longer exist in the capacity in which I interviewed them in 2010, their ideological positions are enduring and, in that respect, more significant than the entities themselves. At the end of the day, LEP’s plans to make EA an official language may not have been any more realistic than Tag El-Din’s plans to establish a Ministry of Arabic. What matters is not the feasibility of these plans, but the ideological statements they make.
5 The Survey: Investigating Language Attitudes and Practices in Greater Cairo

“And yet not everyone in Cairo is equally connected, and not everyone is connected in the same ways.”

Mark A. Peterson (2011: 2), Connected in Cairo

5.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to answer the third research question:

**RQ3** What are the attitudes of language users towards the recent changes and how are these attitudes related to the users’ identities and language practices?

In order to answer this question I must first identify who the language users I will be investigating are and how they will be investigated. With respect to ‘how’: a web survey was used to reach the language users. In Section 5.2 I explain why this method was chosen and provide a detailed review of the merits and issues associated with this choice. With respect to ‘who’: a sample of Cairo-based Internet users was targeted for the study. In Section 5.3 I provide a demographic profile of the population of Greater Cairo followed by a profile of the target population. I then explain how the web survey was designed, tested and distributed in Section 5.4. Here, I address how the survey was designed to answer RQ3. The survey analysis and results are presented in Section 5.5 and the limitations are highlighted in Section 5.6. Finally, I conclude with a summary of the survey findings in Section 5.7.

5.2 The Web-based survey as a research method

While using a questionnaire for data collection has the advantage of maximising the number of responses in cases where there is one principal researcher, using questionnaires to collect information about language behaviour and attitudes has its limitations. Walters (2008: 651) observes that, because questionnaires rely on self-reporting, “many find questionnaire-based studies suspect, contending that their findings are best taken as evidence of overt or imagined norms rather than actual behaviours”. In particular, he underscores the difficulty associated with asking a
participant to rate their ability to speak fuṣḥā and the validity of “using self-report data to assess abilities in such a value-laden attitude object” (Walters, 2008: 657). Terms such as fuṣḥā and ʿāmmiyya are after all open to different interpretation by the respondents (cf. Section 2.9).

In addition, Walters cites problems of representativeness and generalisability, noting that “most of the questionnaire-based research on Arabic has polled students or faculty, an elite and important group but hardly representative of society as a whole” (Walters, 2008: 653). Walters also notes that questionnaire-based studies tend to report their findings in “descriptive statistics, rather than inferential statistics”, and that “discussions of reliability and validity with respect to questionnaire items or methods are rarely found” (ibid.). Finally, Walters observes that most research on language attitudes in Arabic is “locked in the past”, noting that researchers have not kept up with empirical and theoretical work in this field.

The present study aims to address Walters’ points by designing a survey which is informed by the latest developments in the language situation in Egypt, and by a careful study of the literature on web surveys. In addition, I give due consideration to issues of representativeness and generalisability, and use inferential statistics in my analysis. While the analysis presented in Section 5.5 illustrates that the survey is reliable in as far as it demonstrates internal consistency of results, the self-reporting nature of surveys remains an inherent limitation which could undermine the validity of these results. I address this by not assuming that participants have a specific, shared definition of fuṣḥā and ʿāmmiyya. Since my overarching concern is language ideologies, that participants say or think they are using fuṣḥā or ʿāmmiyya is equally important. The survey can therefore be more accurately described as a survey of language attitudes and perceived language practices.

In the following sections, I explain why I chose to deploy a web survey and address the issues that this method raises through a review of the relevant literature. In Section 5.2.1, I review the benefits of web surveys (in comparison to paper-based surveys), in Section 5.2.2 I discuss factors which influence response rate in web surveys, and in Section 5.2.3 I address the questions of representativeness and
generalisability in web surveys. I should point out from the outset that although there is an abundance of literature on web surveys from an array of disciplines, I could not find studies which deal specifically with conducting linguistic surveys on the web. Nevertheless, the majority of the principles and findings outlined in the literature can be extended to apply to web surveys in general. More detrimental perhaps is the fact that the literature transports a Western bias; most of the studies are based on work carried out in the United States and Europe. In addition, because this is a field which is rapidly evolving, many of the issues discussed in papers published a few years ago may not be as relevant today. With this in mind, the following discussion focuses only on those points which were deemed relevant to the present time and context.

5.2.1 Why web surveys?

With the advent of the Internet and increasing Internet penetration in many societies, the potential for conducting surveys via the Internet has not been lost on researchers. There are several well-documented advantages to web-based surveys:

**Speed**

The data collection period is significantly reduced: the invitation reaches the subjects instantaneously and responses are recorded and available for analysis immediately after completion. This saves time both in survey administration and data entry. On the other hand, “researchers often end up spending considerable time solving technical problems before and during implementation of an online survey” (Van Selm & Jankowski, 2006: 438). That is, researchers require considerable technical expertise to administer web surveys compared to traditional surveys (Umbach, 2004).

**Low Cost**

Web surveys have an economic advantage over conventional surveys by cutting production costs such as the “cost of copying, postage and data entry” (Duffy, 2002: 84). However, some warn that “the start-up expenses involved in Web based surveys, particularly expenses incurred to secure the necessary expertise for designing instruments, can be quite substantial” (Van Selm & Jankowski, 2006: 437).
On the other hand, the “offsetting” cost of constructing a web survey and placing it online becomes dramatically less significant with big sample sizes (Umbach, 2004; Watt, 1997). In conventional survey methods, the cost will keep going up as the sample size increases.

**Accuracy**

Because the information in the completed surveys can be automatically imported into a spreadsheet application or statistical analysis package, the data entry step is completely eliminated. This automatic transfer of data avoids the various potential human errors which may occur during manual data entry.

**Reach**

This refers to “the ease by which potential respondents can be approached” (Van Selm & Jankowski, 2006: 438). By transcending geographical boundaries, Internet research makes it easier to reach larger, more diverse populations as well as populations with specific qualities. However, the reach of web surveys has its limitations. Although it is claimed that by recruiting from the Internet “one can obtain samples that are heterogeneous with respect to age, education, income, social class, and nationality” (Birnbaum, 2004: 818), certain user demographics are over-represented on the Internet (cf. Section 5.2.3).

**Anonymity**

Gosling et al. (2004: 101) note that “although many traditional methods take steps to ensure participants’ confidentiality, few can claim to provide complete anonymity”. In contrast, web surveys can be considered anonymous as far as they enable participants to complete the survey without disclosing their identity and without ever coming into contact with the researcher. However, this has its pros and cons: while the promise of anonymity encourages participants to provide honest answers, particularly with regards to sensitive issues, it implies less control over the quality of the data as it leaves the survey vulnerable to multiple or false responses (Duffy, 2002; Gosling et al., 2004; Solomon, 2001; Van Selm & Jankowski, 2006). Moreover, it has been argued that full anonymity is difficult to achieve with web surveys, and that confidentiality should be considered a satisfactory alternative (Van Selm &
For example, researchers can assure participants that their responses will be stored securely and that they will only be analysed at the aggregate level. On the other hand, Umbach (2004) points out that no one can guarantee the total security of data collected on the Internet. In particular, data transferred online can sometimes be subject to government surveillance under legislations such as the American PATRIOT Act (cf. de Jung, 2008). Hence, while researchers are of course under an obligation to do their part in safeguarding the information that they collect online, they must also be wary not to over-promise assurances of security and confidentially that they may not be able to deliver.

**Convenience**

The features discussed above demonstrate why web surveys are convenient for researchers, but they are also considered convenient for respondents (Best et al., 2001; Medlin et al., 1999; Umbach, 2004; Van Selm & Jankowski, 2006). This medium offers a lot of possibilities for creating surveys which are attractive, interactive and respondent-friendly, and for making filling out a survey a more pleasant experience:

More than any other survey mode, web-based surveying allows innovative questionnaires to be developed. Visual and audio stimuli can be incorporated, prompts can alert respondents if they skip or incorrectly answer questions, drop-down boxes can present respondents with a range of possible answers, pop-windows can provide additional information, questions can be ordered randomly, skip patterns may be built for ease of navigation, even multi-lingual formats are possible. (Fleming & Bowden, 2009: 285)

### 5.2.2 Response Rate Issues

There are four types of error which a good survey must aim to overcome: coverage error, sampling error, measurement error and nonresponse error (Dillman, Tortora, & Bowker, 1998; Umbach, 2004). Coverage error occurs when all members of the target population do not have an equal chance of being selected for the survey; some members may have multiple chances of selection while others may have none at all. Sampling error occurs when only a portion of the population is surveyed rather than the entire population. Measurement error is the result of inaccurate responses which may be directly linked to poor question presentation, the survey mode or the behaviour of participants. Finally, nonresponse error is a consequence of failing to
secure responses from a segment of participants in the sample who might have swayed results in a certain direction. Where it is not possible to eliminate the sources of these errors, measures should at least be taken to reduce them. Coverage and sampling errors relate to how the target population is identified and sampled, which is discussed in section 3.3. This section will focus on factors that contribute to nonresponse error (and often also measurement error) and the measures that can be taken to reduce these two types of error. It is noteworthy that nonresponse and measurement errors are associated with survey design, and that reducing these sources of error may also contribute to reducing coverage and sampling errors. This section is therefore crucial as it influences some of the design decisions made in Section 5.4.

Response rate is defined as “the percentage of the contacted sample that has answered and returned the questionnaire” (Deutskens et al., 2004: 27). One of the advantages of web surveys is that they can provide a vivid picture of response behaviour. For example, Bosnjak and Tuten (2001) devised a methodology for classifying the response behaviours of web survey respondents, ranging from complete response to complete non-response and covering a number of drop-out patterns in between. Response rates in web-based surveys appear to be generally increasing owing to higher Internet penetration and the fact that web users are becoming more technologically savvy (Greenlaw & Brown-Welty, 2009). Much of the literature on web-surveys is devoted to studying factors which affect response rate and what can be done about them, with consensus that “the best way to deal with non-response error is to increase the response rate through the questionnaire design and deployment process” (Archer, 2008).

Design features which have been noted to negatively impact response rate and alienate novice web-users include ambiguous instructions, open-ended questions, questions presented in tables, pull-down menus, and the absence of navigation aids (Dillman, 2000; Knapp & Heidingsfelder, 1999). The more that specialised skills are required to navigate the survey, the more likely this is to contribute to bias in response rate and quality due to variation amongst respondents in experience and comfort with Internet-based tools (Manfreda et al., 2008; Solomon, 2001).
Moreover, the more sophisticated the design, the longer it will take to load which can negatively impact response rate and intensify the effect of environmental factors (different connection speeds, browsers, etc.) which can influence response quality (Duffy, 2002; Solomon, 2001). Simple design and structure have generally been shown to contribute to higher response rate in web surveys (Dillman, Tortora, Conradt, et al., 1998), although it has also been noted that graphically enhanced surveys appear to result in better response quality (Deutskens et al., 2004).

Deutskens et al. (2004) also investigated the effect of survey length. They found that a short questionnaire had a higher response rate and that the length of the survey negatively impacted the completeness of responses. Another study investigated the effect of the time estimate that the respondents were given for how long it would take to complete a web survey (Trouteaud, 2004). Response rate was significantly higher among those given a shorter time estimate, while respondents who were given a longer time estimate were more likely to wait for a few days before completing the survey. Umbach (2004) recommends designing surveys so that they take no more than 20 minutes to complete, as well as displaying a progress indicator in order to reduce dropout rate.

It has also been reported that respondents are discouraged from continuing the survey when asked to provide their email address (Solomon, 2001), resonating with suggestions that lower response rates may be linked to privacy and security concerns associated with Internet use (Manfreda et al., 2008; Sax et al., 2003; Sheehan & McMillan, 1999; Van Selm & Jankowski, 2006). Conversely, assurances about anonymity (that the identity of the respondent cannot be traced by the researcher or others) or at least confidentiality (that the identity of the respondent will be protected by the researcher) and about the legitimacy of the study are likely to boost respondent confidence and hence response rates.

Response rates can be enhanced in web surveys by getting in touch with potential respondents before the survey is sent to inform them of the intent to survey, personalising email invitations, and following up with non-respondents (Archer, 2008; Schaefer & Dillman, 1998; Solomon, 2001; Umbach, 2004). Deutskens et al.
(2004) note that follow up reminders appear to be the most powerful strategy to maximise responses. Moreover, there is evidence that the wording of the invitation could influence response rate (Trouteaud, 2004). Trouteaud found that invitations/reminders that ‘pleaded’ for the help of the respondent generated significantly higher response rates than invitations that took an offer form, though the author warns that “a fine line exists between asking for help and sounding desperate” (Trouteaud, 2004: 390).

Incentives (e.g. shopping vouchers, prize draws, etc.) have generally been found to increase response rate both in online and offline surveys (Bosnjak & Tuten, 2001; Deutskens et al., 2004; Schonlau et al., 2002; Van Selm & Jankowski, 2006) although there are some contradictory findings. For example, in a study of banner-advertised web surveys, Tuten et al. (2000) found that the banner-ad generated significantly less click-throughs when a chance to win a prize was offered than when the message appealed to the participants’ altruistic motives, such as highlighting the contribution to scientific research. This is congruous with the view that participants in web surveys are typically “true volunteers” who seek out these studies and participate in research for purely intellectual rewards (Duffy, 2002: 84). While such ‘true volunteers’ might have particular motives for completing the survey – posing a potential limitation – self-selected participants have been shown to provide clearer and more complete responses than non-self-selected volunteers (Gosling et al., 2004). The salience of the survey topic to the sampled population has also been found to positively impact response rate (Sheehan & McMillan, 1999).

Some researchers have suggested using a mixed-mode approach (combining a web-based and a paper-based version of the survey) to enhance response rate and eliminate coverage error (Greenlaw & Brown-Welty, 2009; Schaefer & Dillman, 1998). However, the associated cost is considerable and must be weighed against the nature and purpose of the survey. In the end, it boils down to the available resources – both time and money. As Archer (2008) points out, if there are resources to deal with non-response error, then the researcher must utilise these resources to maximise response rate and decrease non-response error. If resources are limited, then the researcher should report only what the respondents contributed without
attempting to generalise the findings. This is of particular relevance to the present study where, with only one principal researcher, a web survey is being deployed for the potential it offers to optimise resources in terms of cost, time and manpower. However, the limitations in generalisability are inevitable and must be considered carefully. This is addressed in detail in the next section.

5.2.3 Sampling Issues

There are three types of samples in Internet research: unrestricted, screened and recruited (Medlin et al., 1999; Watt, 1997). An unrestricted sample is one where anyone on the Internet can complete the survey. Respondents are self-selected and hence this type is deemed highly unrepresentative. A screened sample is one where the researcher imposes certain demographic criteria and only respondents who meet these criteria complete the survey and responses that do not are filtered out, e.g. by using branching logic in the survey. This makes the sample more representative. In addition, a quota may be assigned for each demographic segment in order to obtain a stratified sample. A recruited sample is the type with the most control over the sample composition. Here, access to the survey is restricted to a group of previously identified respondents who meet the required demographic criteria and are selected from an existing sampling frame (e.g. full list of students at a particular university). Access to the survey may then be restricted by assigning passwords to respondents.

Representativeness is a central issue in Internet research and it is always associated with the rate of Internet use among the target population. Duffy (2002: 84) rightly notes that “If only a small percentage of the population of interest has Internet access, then attempting a Web-based study is pointless”. Low Internet penetration in the target population results in what is known as coverage error or bias (cf. Section 5.2.2). A particular concern is that Internet access will be restricted among particular groups. For example, people of a lower socioeconomic level or in disadvantaged or marginalised groups are underrepresented on the Internet (Best et al., 2001; Duffy, 2002). On the other hand, those most likely to have Internet access are “high income, urban, educated individuals” (Gosling et al., 2004: 98). The International
Telecommunication Union (ITU)\(^{53}\) indicated that Internet use in 2010 was much higher among those who were more highly-educated as this often implied higher income and better computer literacy. Although this ‘digital divide’ was found in all the countries surveyed by the ITU, the difference was particularly marked in countries with higher inequality in the distribution of incomes (ITU, 2011). The report also highlights a rural/urban divide in terms of Internet users, with people living in urban areas more likely to be connected than those living in rural areas. Another dominant characteristic of Internet users internationally is young age. This is more pervasive in developing countries where 47% of Internet users are under 25 versus 28% for developed countries. The ITU report reasons that “younger people are more curious, more interested and more active in some of the most popular Internet activities, such as those related to personal communications, and social networks” which have become major drivers for Internet adoption, particularly in developing countries (ITU, 2011: 127). Findings of web survey studies generally support this information about the age, education and income of Internet users (see for example: Bosnjak & Tuten, 2001; Deutskens et al., 2004). It is worth noting that the overrepresentation of participants with higher levels of education and income is not exclusive to web surveys, but has been highlighted in paper surveys as well (see for example: Ekman et al., 2006; Fleming & Bowden, 2009).

Another influential demographic reported by the ITU is gender: more men than women use the Internet (ITU, 2011). The gender gap is generally more pronounced in developing countries, although there are also developed countries where a significant difference exists between the percentages of male and female users (ibid.). It has been noted that gender is a strong predictor in both traditional and web surveys; women are more likely to participate in both mediums, but the difference is less marked in web surveys (Gosling et al., 2004; Sax et al., 2003). However, it could be that the rate of women’s participation in web surveys is not so much an ‘improvement’ over traditional surveys as an ‘offsetting’ of an existing trend caused by the presence of more men to women on the Internet.

\(^{53}\) The ITU is a UN agency which collects and publishes international data on ICT use and user demographics.
ITU data indicates that the issue of unequal representation of the different members and segments of society becomes less of a problem in countries with high Internet penetration. It hence follows that where Internet penetration is high, coverage bias is less of a concern. While earlier studies had emphasised that the proportion of households with Internet access was too small to conduct general public surveys on the Internet, the rapidly growing population of Internet users in many countries has prompted researchers to contemplate the feasibility of this method in large population-based studies. One such study was conducted in Sweden, which, at an Internet penetration rate of 80% at the time was considered a prime candidate for web research (Ekman et al., 2006). Both paper and web questionnaires were used, and the web version yielded a 10% higher response rate.

Thus far, I have been addressing the question of whether findings from web surveys could be deemed representative of the general population. I will now turn to the question of whether they are representative of the population of Internet users. According to Duffy (2002: 84), using the Internet to collect data provides “the ultimate convenience sample”. Since no sampling frame can be drawn to ensure that every user has a chance of being selected, it is impossible to draw a representative sample of Internet users (Best et al., 2001; Birnbaum, 2004; Schonlau et al., 2002; Van Selm & Jankowski, 2006). It therefore follows that we cannot be confident about the representativeness of the findings since “the representativeness of survey marginals requires that every unit in the target population possesses some chance of being selected so that the statistical likelihood of drawing each population unit can be computed” (Best et al., 2001: 132). In other words, it is impossible to guarantee that those excluded from the sample will behave in the same way as those selected to participate in research, making sampling error inevitable.

Hence, web surveys are most appropriate for studies of non-probability samples (Van Selm & Jankowski, 2006). In non-probability samples, researchers cannot calculate the probability of certain values occurring in the population (Best et al., 2001), which means that the results are not generalisable by definition. However, even though web surveys are not representative of the total population because they primarily rely on non-probability samples, they can still be a valuable representation of a sub-
group of the total population. Because it is difficult to overcome coverage and sampling errors in such samples, web researchers are advised to direct their attention to reducing the measurement and non-response errors (Dillman, Tortora, & Bowker, 1998).

Ultimately, the extent to which we can trust data collected from an Internet sample hinges on our ability to make the assumption that the psychological mechanisms governing the decisions, attitudes and/or behaviours under investigation are constant across the population. If such an assumption can be made, then a representative sample of Internet users is not necessary in order to extrapolate the findings to the general population; a diverse rather than a representative sample would suffice to infer relationships within the population (Best et al., 2001). It is the same underlying principle used in psychological experimental studies which rely on samples of undergraduate students to generate generalisable findings. On the other hand, our ability to generalise findings would be restricted if the variable being investigated is perceived as a function of Internet use, that is to say “that the experience of using the Internet [generates or primes] beliefs or attitudes that would directly influence the dependent variable under investigation or indirectly mediate or moderate how other factors influence this dependent variable.” (Best et al., 2001: 133). In such cases, we cannot generalise findings to the general population, but we may still be able to generalise to the population of Internet users if the assumption about the generation of attitudes and beliefs can be made about accessible and non-accessible users. These points are considered when the target population is defined in the next section.

5.3 Defining the target population

The purpose of this section is to describe and profile the target population. Section 5.3.1 sketches out the demographics of Greater Cairo, which is the wider population from which the sample of Internet-users is drawn. The study focuses on Cairo city for a number of reasons. Cairo is the Egyptian capital, and the populous city is considered Egypt’s cultural and commercial centre. More importantly, as pointed out in sections 1.2 and 3.2.6, and clearly demonstrated in the interviews (Chapter 4), although a number of distinct regional Egyptian dialects exist, it is the Cairene dialect
or koine which is invoked to represent Egyptian Arabic. This is also true of the sociolinguistics literature (see for example: Holes, 2004; Kaye, 2001; Mejdell, 2006; Stadlbauer, 2010). Section 5.3.2 follows on to discuss Internet penetration in Greater Cairo and describe the sample profile in the backdrop of what has already been discussed in section 5.2.3.

5.3.1 Getting to grips with the demographics

One of the central issues which exist in discussing the demographics of Greater Cairo is outlining its size and boundaries. Cairo city or ‘Greater Cairo’ is an urban metropolis that spans the Cairo governorate and spills over into a number of neighbouring governorates. The administrative division of the city is at once ambiguous, confusing and inconvenient for research purposes. The fact that Cairo city does not represent a single governorate makes it difficult to extrapolate data which relates specifically to the city. As Sabry (2009: 11) points out, “until May 2008, the city of Greater Cairo was inconveniently divided between three governorates: Cairo, Giza and Qalyoubia. Greater Cairo included Cairo governorate as a whole, Giza city which is in the governorate of Giza and Shubra El Kheima city in Qalyoubia governorate”. In May 2008, Helwan and 6 October – two suburbs of Cairo and Giza respectively – became separate governorates and the new administrative division was reflected in the 2006 census (CAPMAS). This further subdivision has made it more complicated to extract data relating to Cairo city, and even though it was more recently reversed in April 2011 (Dawwa, 2011), this only adds to the complexity as it undermines the comparability of recent data. Figure 1 which highlights the formal and informal settlements of Greater Cairo illustrates how the city used to spread over five governorates: Cairo, Giza, Qalyoubia, 6th October and Helwan.
Figure 3. The City of Greater Cairo (formal and informal settlements)

Source: The Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)
The boundaries of Cairo city are “unclear and ever-changing” (Sabry, 2009: 11). Sabry notes that depending on the boundaries chosen for greater Cairo, the population of the city can be anywhere between 12.5 million to 18 million according to the 2006 population census. According to this census, the sum of the urban populations of the five governorates in which Greater Cairo falls is 13,497,480 and it is believed that Greater Cairo makes up the majority of this figure (Sabry, 2009). However, the distinction between rural and urban areas here is in itself problematic. This is because the census follows administrative criteria in defining what is “urban”, and therefore “areas which are in reality a continuation of the Greater Cairo agglomeration are not included in Greater Cairo’s figures and are considered rural” (Sabry, 2009: 12).

Moreover, the informal settlements shown in Figure 3 present an issue which undermines the reliability of official demographic data. These settlements are directly linked to poverty, which is a central problem in Egypt. According, to a 2002 World Bank report, 19.8% of Egyptians lived on less than two US Dollars a day (World Bank, 2002), a percentage which is thought to have been grossly underestimated “because poverty lines are set too low in relation to the costs of basic needs and because the household surveys which inform poverty line studies under-sample people living in informal settlements as they are based on census data which under-count the populations of informal settlements” (Sabry, 2009: 1). World Bank figures indicated that Egypt’s urban population was more well off than people living in rural parts of the country, and that poverty appeared to be dropping significantly in the country as a whole. However, Sabry notes that growing slums (informal settlements) in the cities shed doubts on these figures. There is a disparity between the reported drop in poverty rates and the under-sampling of slum populations which live in dire poverty and are growing at a much faster rate than the rest of the population; clearly the two figures cannot be reconciled. Sabry also emphasises that the basic costs of living are not sufficiently reflected in poverty reports about Egypt. It is perhaps telling that of those that the World Bank classed as non-poor, 18.2% did not have indoor access to water (2002: x)! Hence, Sabry dispels the grave fallacy underlying the claim that poverty in pre-2011 Greater Cairo was “quite low (in the range of 5–10 per cent
of the city’s population), decreasing and contributing to bringing down the national incidence of poverty” (2009: vii). These figures are usually based on the poverty reports of organisations such as the World Bank and UNDP. Sabry presents sufficient evidence to shed doubt on the accuracy of these reports, and makes a compelling argument that the true figures are likely to be much higher.

While poverty itself may not be of direct relevance to the present study, what is relevant is the conditions that are symptomatic of poverty and that poverty is symptomatic of. The 2002 World Bank report on poverty in Egypt highlights that “the strongest correlate of poverty was education, with more than 45% of the poor illiterate” (p. iii). The report also states that “poverty measures among the urban illiterate persons were about double the rates on average” (p. vii). Official literacy figures from Egypt’s most recent census in 2006 put literacy rates at 70.36%. The census results, published on the website of the government’s Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS) list citizens as either completely illiterate, can “read and write”, having become literate as a result of adult literacy campaigns, or by highest educational level attained (CAPMAS). Of these classifications, perhaps the most ambiguous is the “read and write” category. CAPMAS explain that this category refers to any person, aged 10 or over, who can read and write but has not attained an academic qualification. They also indicate that this declaration is made by the head of a household.

Even if such classifications were to be taken at face value, the inherent ambiguity of this category raises the question: is it possible to assume that a person who has not attained any academic qualification but is classed as someone who can “read and write” in the census can undertake a literacy practice such as completing a self-administered written survey? It is difficult to provide a conclusive answer, but it is likely that there will be individuals within this category who would struggle with this more complex literacy practice which requires more than the baseline ability to read and write. This is important to bear this in mind, considering that the percentage of

54 Population censuses are carried out every 10 years in Egypt.
55 Email Communication with CAPMAS, November 23rd, 2011.
individuals who were classed under the “read and write” category in the 2006 census was a bewildering 6.87 million (CAPMAS)!

It is worth noting that Egypt follows a functional definition of literacy in its censuses. However, it is not the same as the definition that Ayari (1996: 243-244) gives:

Functional literacy has been defined as people’s ability to read print material, such as a newspaper or magazine, and to understand instructions for using common household appliances and comprehend information accompanying common medicines and doctors’ prescriptions. Functional literacy also involves the ability to communicate successfully through writing, for example filling out voting papers, questionnaires, passport appliances and driver’s license forms. Such reading and writing abilities make it possible for people to actively participate in their societies politically, civically and socially.

Egypt follows UNESCO guidelines which define as literate “persons who possess a certain degree of the ability to read and write” (UNESCO, 1951: 2), noting that any extension of the definition beyond the ability to read and write has been abandoned. According to UNESCO, the definition for literacy employed by Egypt in the 1986 census was: “A person is defined as literate if he/she can, with understanding, both read and write a short, simple statement on his/her everyday life”56. However, the definition is missing from UNESCO data for the most recent 2006 census. It is likely that such classifications are also based on a declaration from the head of the household, although it is not clear whether the definition above is disclosed to the head of the household or whether they are left to apply their own interpretation of being able to read and write. This in turn presents a further problem in Egypt, a country where illiteracy is widespread and where being able to “read and write” can be understood as simply being capable of signing one’s name – a distinction that UNESCO deems misleading (1951: 2).

Despite the issues of poverty and illiteracy outlined above, Egypt has a very high mobile penetration rate. At the end of 2012, this was almost 117% at 96.8 million subscriptions (Egypt ICT Indicators), and the rate in Greater Cairo is likely to be

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higher since this is where the service was first launched. These figures would suggest that there is a significant subset of mobile users in Egypt with little or no literacy. Indeed, El-Sagheer refers to this issue in explaining the motives behind changing VE’s messages (Section 4.4). Although this is not directly relevant to the present study, the sociolinguistic implications of the discrepancy between literacy rates and mobile penetration rates in Egypt certainly require researchers’ attention. In the next section, I focus on a more relevant technology demographic: Internet use.

5.3.2 Identifying and profiling the sample

The Egypt ICT Indicators website\(^{57}\) indicates that at the end of 2012 (when the survey was launched), Internet penetration in Egypt was just shy of 40% (32.62 million users)\(^{58}\). However, no data is available on how exactly this figure is distributed across Egypt’s governorates and there appears to be no straightforward way to work out the rate of Internet penetration in Greater Cairo. Nevertheless, if we take into account the facts that Greater Cairo is mainly urban\(^{59}\), and that Internet was first launched in Cairo (the city therefore houses the longest established community of Internet users in Egypt), it seems safe to assume that the rate of Internet penetration in Greater Cairo would be substantially higher than the national average.

Given the difficulty in determining the geographical distribution of Egypt’s population of Internet users, it is perhaps more useful to examine the demographic makeup of this population, which is generally in line with international trends when it comes to income, gender and age. There is evidence that Internet access in Egypt increases in proportion with household income: at the end of 2009, only 19.7% of households with a monthly income below L.E. 1000 (about $167) had Internet access, as opposed to 83.4% of households with an income higher than L.E. 8000 (about $1,333) (MCIT, 2011). Internet use is also higher among males. At the end of 2009, 55.6% of users

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\(^{57}\) The website is run by Egypt’s Ministry of Communication and Information Technology (MCIT)

\(^{58}\) It is worth noting that Egypt experienced a surge in the number of Internet users in 2011 linked to the role that the Internet played in the January 25 revolution (Murad, 2011).

\(^{59}\) Internet use is substantially higher in Egypt’s urban localities: In 2009, 39.7% of households in urban areas had Internet access, compared to 23% in rural areas (MCIT, 2011). Similarly, the ITU reports that the percentage of individuals using the Internet in Egypt’s urban areas in the same year was 30.7%, compared to 14.3% only in rural areas (ITU, 2011). In addition, not all localities have access to the Internet: in December 2010 only 47% of all of Egypt’s localities had access to the Internet (UN, 2011).
were male and 44.4% were female, although the gap is closing compared to previous years (ibid.). In addition, young people make up the vast majority of Internet users. In 2009, 35% of users were under 18 and 60% were under 25. Only 22% were 35 or over and only 7% were over 50 (ibid.). It should be noted here that there is also an age bias within Egypt’s general population reflecting the country’s rapid population growth. In the 2006 census, 63% of the population was under 30, 31% were aged 15-30, and only 13% were over 50 (CAPMAS).

While there is no official information about the distribution of Internet users in Egypt by education, it is likely that any such information will be skewed by the fact that a high proportion of Internet users are of school age. For example, the only data relating to education on the Egypt ICT Indicators website provides the distribution of males and females over four educational levels (the data from 2010 is extrapolated in Table 5). What is particularly noteworthy is the ‘primary or no formal education’ category. This leads us to wonder whether there are people with no formal education accessing the Internet in Egypt – which would have been thought highly unlikely, not only based on international figures, but also based on Egypt’s particular context where illiteracy correlates significantly with poverty (World Bank, 2002).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education Level</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary or no formal education</td>
<td>52.5%</td>
<td>47.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower secondary</td>
<td>53.3%</td>
<td>46.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Upper) secondary or post-secondary</td>
<td>56.5%</td>
<td>43.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5. Percentage of male and female Internet users in Egypt in 2010 by education (Egypt ICT Indicators)

The overrepresentation of higher income and younger groups on the Internet in Egypt would make it problematic to lay any claims about the generalisability of the findings to the general public. Moreover, response bias can occur as a result of the fact that some of the language behaviours and attitudes under investigation (such as those relating to English and Latinised Arabic) may be linked to language practices on the Internet. Hence, in line with the recommendations of Best et al. (2001), rather than rely on an Internet sample and attempt to extend the findings to non-Internet users, I will consider Internet use a necessary condition in the survey respondents.
In light of the above discussion, the present study relies on a screened, self-selected, non-probabilistic sample of Internet users in Egypt. Non-probability is a consequence of using the Internet as a mode to recruit participants and the lack of a sampling frame that would guarantee that each member of the population of Internet users has a chance of being selected. Self-selection has been favoured as an alternative to spamming potential respondents with survey invitations. Another benefit of this approach is the likelihood of receiving more complete and meaningful responses from respondents who choose to complete the survey voluntarily as opposed to those who feel an obligation to participate.

Finally, the sample was screened to ensure that conditions for participation were met. Screening questions were introduced to ascertain that the respondents are Egyptian, live in Greater Cairo, have lived there for the past five years, and have completed the majority of their school education in Egypt. The purpose of these questions is to control for nationality, restrict the sample to Cairo city, and control for the effect of living or being educated outside Egypt. The sample will thus exclude residents of Cairo city who have migrated from other regions of Egypt, as well as Egyptians living or who have lived outside Egypt in the past five years, or who have received their schooling abroad. Imposing the five year threshold on how long the respondent has been living continuously in Egypt is to ensure that they are acquainted with recent linguistic changes in the city, while imposing the restriction on where they received their schooling is to eliminate the possibility that being educated abroad would create a bias in the respondent’s language behaviour or preferences. It is worth noting that restricting participation for Egyptians who are living or have lived abroad effectively excludes a large segment of Egyptians in a country that exports a substantial proportion of its labour force overseas (Feiler, 1991; McCormick & Wahba, 2003). The proportion of participants filtered out by each of the screening questions is outlined in Section 0. The survey design is discussed in more detail in the next section.
5.4 Survey Design

This section outlines the design process. I cover aspects of the technical design in Section 5.4.1. I then clarify how the design addresses RQ3 in Section 5.4.2. I discuss the process of testing and piloting in Section 5.4.3, and explain how the survey was distributed in Section 5.4.4.

5.4.1 The technical design

One of the first design decisions that had to be made relates to the language of the survey. Standard Arabic was the obvious unmarked variety to use for this purpose, but given the popularity of English in the online communication of Egyptian Internet users (cf. Aboelezz, 2009) there was a case for a questionnaire which offers respondents the choice to complete the survey in Arabic or English. To this effect, a professional web survey hosting company which specialises in multilingual surveys was contracted for this study. This approach made it possible to compare the responses of those who chose to complete the survey in each language. On the negative side, designing a bilingual survey is complicated and time-consuming, and it requires extensive testing as discussed in Section 5.4.3.

When respondents clicked on the survey link, they were met with a bilingual message asking them to select a language. They were then redirected to a series of screening questions in the selected language to establish that they met the participation criteria explained in Section 5.3.2. If the participants ‘passed’ the screening questions, they proceeded to the information page. This page is important in web surveys; accepting to proceed with the study after reading the information is the equivalent of signing an informed consent form in other research methods (Duffy, 2002). A short, general introduction about the researcher and study was given in addition to an explanation about the purpose of the study and how the data would be used. The information page also included a link to a webpage with information about my university’s research ethics, and another link to my university

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60 Although the survey also investigates the use of Egyptian Arabic in written form, no survey option was offered in Egyptian Arabic. This is because this choice was deemed too marked given the academic nature of the survey, which would risk aligning the researcher ideologically and raising questions about the purpose of the study.

61 The main website of the survey hosts: http://www.keysurvey.co.uk/
webpage. Because the survey did not record participants’ IP addresses as an extra measure towards protecting their identities, it was not possible for the survey to be completed over several sessions. The participants were therefore instructed that they had to complete the survey in one sitting and told that it is estimated to take 10-15 minutes (cf. Section 5.4.3). Participants were redirected to my university webpage upon completing the survey to provide assurance of legitimacy as well as provide more information about my research for those seeking it.

In line with the advice for ‘best practice’ in web survey design outlined in Section 5.2.2, I kept the design as simple as possible while taking advantage of the media capabilities of this medium. Apart from the institutional logo which appeared on every screen, only five images were used in the survey. These illustrative images were embedded to aid understanding. For instance, when the term ‘Franko-Arabic’ (a popular term used to refer to Latinised Arabic) is first introduced, an image containing an example of LA accompanies the question. In the feedback survey which accompanied the pilot version of the survey (cf. Section 5.4.3), 20 out of 21 respondents said that they found the images helpful. Another example of how I took advantage of the media capabilities of web surveys was to include an audio clip of one of VE’s new recorded messages in ‘āmmiyya\(^{62}\) in the question investigating attitudes towards this change. A download link was also included in case the embedded Adobe Flash player did not work. The survey also included a simple progress indicator in the form of a plain text percentage. Including progress indicators in web surveys has been shown to reduce dropout rates as they give participants a ‘sense of bearings’ (Couper et al., 2001; Umbach, 2004).

One of the greatest advantages of web surveys is the ability to customise the survey so that respondents would only complete relevant questions. In the present study, demographic questions were asked at the beginning of the survey to filter the questions accordingly. For example, only participants who indicated they were employed were asked about their language choice when emailing their superior at work. It has been suggested that presenting the entire survey on a single screen reduces dropout rates as it provides a sense of context (Couper et al., 2001; Dillman, 2007).

\(^{62}\) This is the message transcribed at the beginning of Section 4.4.
Tortora, & Bowker, 1998). However, incorporating skip logic made breaking down questions into separate screens inevitable. Generally, related questions were presented on the same screen except where branching logic dictated otherwise.

While the capacity to force respondents to provide an answer before proceeding to the next question is considered an ‘advantage’ in web surveys over paper surveys, this has been linked to higher dropout rates (Dillman, Tortora, & Bowker, 1998; Medlin et al., 1999; Schonlau et al., 2002). Forcing responses also does not sit well with ethical research practices (Dillman, Tortora, & Bowker, 1998: 11). The present survey was designed to force a response for the majority of questions. This was often necessary as it affected the branching logic of the questionnaire. However, to address the ethical concern and reduce potential dropouts, categories such as “I do not know”, “I do not care” and “other” were provided wherever relevant to maintain response integrity. Moreover, participants were allowed to skip sensitive questions such as religion and the political party voted for.

The most important design decisions were related to the type of questions used in the survey. A range of question types were used: radio buttons, dropdown menus, check-all-that-apply, 5-point Likert scales, and forced rank. In questions which included a list of radio buttons (such as in the language attitude questions) the order of the items in the list (which was repeated almost entirely for each of the relevant questions) was randomised on every screen so as to avoid bias towards the first options (an issue which was reported by Dillman, Tortora, & Bowker, 1998). In general, open-ended questions were avoided in order to ensure data uniformity and make data transfer and cleanup less cumbersome. However, one entry box question was included at the end of the survey for participants to write any additional comments. The comments which were left by the participants provide a richer picture of the respondent’s language behaviour and attitudes. I quote some of these in chapters 6 and 7.

Incorporating different question types in the survey makes it important to include specific instructions on the computer action that the respondent needs to take for each question (Dillman, Tortora, & Bowker, 1998). In the present survey, “floating
“windows” provided specific operation instructions for each action. When the respondent moved the pointer over a question, a small window appeared and floated atop the existing browser widow (e.g. “select only one answer”). The participant could recall this floating window when needed. Similarly, error messages appeared right above the question where the issue occurred, explaining the specific nature of the problem and how it can be solved. These features were already integrated in English, but had to be developed and tested in Arabic.

5.4.2 Addressing the research question

I will now address how the survey was designed to answer RQ3: *What are the attitudes of language users towards the recent changes and how are these attitudes related to the users’ identities and language practices?* The question can be broken down to three components: attitudes towards recent changes, language practices, and identity.

Six identity variables of interest were identified: gender, age, religion, education, socio-economic status (SES) and political ideology. Questions about gender, age, religion and education were asked at the beginning of the survey while political ideology questions were asked at the end so as not to put off participants. There was no direct question about SES. Instead, some of the demographic questions were designed to provide a covert indication of the respondent’s SES (cf. Section 5.5.2.3). These identity variables were treated as explanatory variables in the survey analysis.

Of course, the selected survey language can itself be considered an identity marker. Walters (2006: 660) cites Riguet (1981-1982a, 1981-1982b) who used French and Arabic versions of his survey of attitudes on non-linguistic matters in Tunisia and “found that educated subjects reported different attitudes on some items depending on the language of the questionnaire, with the French-language version favouring certain modernist attitudes”. Although I do not treat the survey language as an explanatory variable, I highlight its relationship to the other variables in the analysis.

Following the initial set of demographic questions, participants were asked a series of matched questions about language practices and attitudes which relate
specifically to SA and English (cf. Section 5.5.1.1). This was followed by a series of questions about language attitudes with a focus on recent language developments (cf. Section 5.5.1.2). The participants were asked about their attitudes towards: EA in printed magazines, VE’s new recorded messages in EA, *Wikipedia Masry*, LA in billboards, and LA in English magazines. Finally, the participants were presented with a set of matched questions about language practices in written communication, where the audience and medium were manipulated (cf. Section 5.5.1.3) before the political ideology questions

5.4.3 Testing and Piloting

The survey was thoroughly tested and piloted before it was rolled out to the target audience. It took three months to develop and test the initial survey. This was piloted in 2010, however, the final survey was not launched until October 2012 after undergoing revisions and further testing (cf. Chapter 7).

Testing the survey included viewing it from different computers and web browsers, to preview the range of experiences of the potential respondents. This was of paramount importance in the present survey where the cursive nature of the right to left Arabic script resulted in a number of display problems in the Arabic version. For example, the text in the pop-up windows in the Arabic version would not display properly in Mozilla Firefox and Google Chrome. In the pilot, participants wishing to complete the survey in Arabic were instructed to use Microsoft Internet Explorer in the survey invitation, but a permanent solution was developed for the final survey.

While the survey design gave respondents a choice to complete the survey in Arabic or English, the final results were collated in a single spreadsheet. This meant that it was crucial to ensure equivalence between the two versions. To do this, my translation of the survey was refereed by three academic colleagues who are also professional translators. I then revised the translation in light of the feedback I received. Another step in the testing process involved sending a mock version of the survey to colleagues, some of whom were based in Cairo. Some of those colleagues

63 The survey printout is attached at the end of this thesis as Appendix III
were asked to test the English version while others were asked to test the Arabic version. No issues were reported in these tests.

With the survey thoroughly tested and all major issues resolved, the next step was to pilot the survey by taking it to a segment of the target population and collecting real data. The survey was piloted for three months between June and September 2010 using a convenience sample and returned 43 valid responses. 35 of these were completed in English and 8 in Arabic, confirming the need for a bilingual survey.

Piloting an instrument provides an opportunity to uncover any problems which have not been detected in the testing process so that these may be resolved before fully rolling out the survey. With this in mind, respondents were invited to complete a short feedback survey about their survey-filling experience at the end of the pilot survey. 22 respondents complied and were automatically redirected to the feedback survey. The responses from the feedback survey were very valuable in understanding the respondents’ experience and the issues that they faced. For instance, it provided an indication of how long it takes to complete the survey. The majority of those who completed the feedback survey reported that it took them between 10 and 15 minutes to complete the pilot survey, which is in line with recommended ‘best practice’ (cf. Section 5.2.2). It is of course worth noting that because of the skip logic, not all respondents would have answered the same number of questions, causing inevitable variation among participants in the length of the customised surveys. The feedback survey also asked respondents about the type of information which they would have liked to see in the survey introduction. The information page of the final survey was revised in light of the responses as discussed in Section 5.4.1.

The final step of the pilot involved analysing the pilot results in order to detect design flaws which impede analysis. Some question types were revised in light of the pilot analysis and one question was completely removed. However, it is worth noting that despite extensive testing and piloting, some design issues did not become apparent except in the course of analysing the final results (cf. Section 5.6).
5.4.4 Distribution

In a bid to maximise the diversity of the sample (an important consideration in light of the discussion in Section 5.2.3), three modes of distribution were used to disseminate the survey. The first mode was email: the cooperation of a number of academic colleagues at Cairo-based universities was secured to distribute the survey to their students. While this mode had the advantage of providing participants with assurance about the legitimacy of the study, it had the disadvantage of creating an ‘educational bias’ in the sample with many holders of higher academic qualifications (cf. Section 5.5.2.4).

Second, the survey was distributed via Facebook. I made a public post appealing for participants and asking for the post to be shared. The post was shared and re-shared by friends and friends-of-friends. The main drawback of this mode is that it is essentially a convenience sample. Finally, the survey was distributed on Twitter: the survey link was tweeted with a request for followers to retweet. In particular, the tweet was channelled through a number of politically active friends who had Twitter followers in the tens of thousands.

Using Facebook and Twitter to distribute the survey has to do with the large population of Egyptian Internet users on these social networks, particularly post-2011 (Amer, 2011; Mubarak, 2011; Newbert, 2011). Employing these three distribution modes together enhanced the diversity of the sample, particularly in terms of education and political ideology. A reference tag was added at the end of the web link distributed over these three mediums to make it possible to monitor the responses received through each medium. In all three mediums, the survey invitation was emailed, reposted and retweeted at regular intervals to ensure maximum reach in this mixed approach. Incentives were not used to recruit respondents; instead, the invitation highlighted the scholarly benefit of participating in a survey which would shed light on the language situation in Egypt. The findings of the survey are discussed in the following section.
5.5 The Survey Results

The survey attracted 2,474 click-throughs. Out of these, 1,969 (78.6%) attempted the survey but dropped out before completing it\textsuperscript{64}. Of the remaining 536 responses, only 389 were complete responses: 136 were filtered out in the first 4 questions because they did not meet the participation criteria (see Figure 4), and a further 11 quit at the information statement page. One response was omitted during analysis as it became clear that it did not meet one of the conditions for participation\textsuperscript{65}.

![Figure 4. Number of participants filtered out by each screening question](image)

Of the remaining 388 participants, 33.5% were recruited by email, 13.9% were recruited from Twitter, and 52.6% from Facebook. In Section 5.5.1, I provide an overview of the survey findings. A full report with basic descriptive statistics and charts is included in Appendix II. In Section 5.5.2, I focus on the main findings in relation to the identity variables and carry out more advanced statistical tests\textsuperscript{66}.

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\textsuperscript{64} Because the survey was designed not to save the respondent’s IP address, it is possible that some of the respondents who abandoned the survey may have completed the survey later.

\textsuperscript{65} The respondent stated in the comments box at the end of the survey that they had in fact lived and studied outside Egypt but completed the survey anyway ‘because they were trying to help’.

\textsuperscript{66} The statistical analysis of the data was carried out using SPSS 19 and SPSS 22. Most tests were performed using values from all 388 responses. Where the number of values is less than 388, this is clearly indicated (denoted as $N$). The number of values fluctuates because some questions were not answered by all participants, either because they were optional or as a result of the survey’s skip logic. I only report statistical findings of a significance value of $p < .02$. 

184
5.5.1 Overview of the findings

The main body of the survey is divided into three parts as explained in Section 5.4. The next three sections overview the findings from each of these parts.

5.5.1.1 The two H varieties: SA vs. English

As noted in Section 3.4, both SA and English may be considered H varieties in Egypt. Participants were given a choice to complete the survey in (Standard) Arabic or English: 59.3% chose Arabic and 40.7% chose English. Questions 16 through 23 of the survey were designed to compare these two H varieties. The questions asked for SA were mirrored for English to allow the comparison of question ‘pairs’. There were four questions for each language variety:

- How confident are you in using ...?
- How often do you use ... in your daily life? (excluding religious rituals for SA)
- In your work, how important is competence in ...?
- In your opinion, how important is it that ... should be part of: (a) compulsory school education? (b) higher education (university)?

There were separate ‘spoken’ and ‘written’ ratings in the first three questions to address the commonly reported written/spoken divide between SA and EA and the different prestige attached to them (cf. sections 2.7 and 3.2.6). The third question only appeared to those who indicated they were employed earlier in the survey ($N = 244$).

Figure 5 illustrates the participants’ responses to the first question. Immediately, the disparity between ‘written’ and ‘spoken’ is clear; the difference is significant for both SA ($Z = -7.255, p = .000$) and English ($Z = -4.658, p = .000$). The higher confidence reported in using written SA than spoken SA appears to support the notion that SA is regarded mainly as a written variety. However, the fact that this difference is also present in English might have something to do with the domain of oral ‘performance’ requiring more confidence than writing. Still, the sharper difference between ‘written’ and ‘spoken’ in SA should be noted. Participants in this sample reported a higher level of confidence in using written and spoken English than written and spoken SA ($Z = -4.212, p = .000$ and $Z = -6.121, p = .000$ respectively), though the difference between the ‘spoken’ items is sharper.
The results from the first question are mirrored in the frequency of use question (Figure 6), but the differences are even more significant. The disparity between ‘written’ and ‘spoken’ is still clear for both SA ($Z = -8.386, p = .000$) and English ($Z = -7.467, p = .000$) – again sharper for SA. In addition, written English is used significantly more frequently than written SA ($Z = -8.313, p = .000$) and spoken English more so than spoken SA ($Z = -11.171, p = .000$) – again, the difference is sharper for ‘spoken’. It is worth noting that there was a significant relationship between level of confidence and frequency of use for the four items, where the former was treated as a predictor for the latter: spoken SA ($Wald = 58.737, p = .000$); written SA ($Wald = 88.893, p = .000$); spoken English ($Wald = 147.645, p = .000$); written English ($Wald = 129.712, p = .000$).
The same general trend sustains in the third question regarding importance at work: written English is seen as the most important and spoken Arabic as the least important. Again there was a highly significant difference between the importance of written and spoken English \( (Z = -3.720, p = .000) \) and written and spoken SA \( (Z = -6.079, p = .000) \) – a bigger difference is seen for SA once more. Moreover, written English is reported as significantly more important at work than written SA \( (Z = -10.031, p = .000) \), as is spoken English than spoken SA \( (Z = -11.443, p = .000) \) – and once more the difference is greater in the ‘spoken’ item. One remarkable finding from this question is the fact that SA (both spoken and written) is reported as being ‘not important at all’ at work by a considerable portion of the participants.

![Importance at Work](image)

**Figure 7.** How important participants indicated SA and English were in their work (%).

The story is somewhat different for the last question. Notwithstanding the fact that SA had the lowest level of confidence, lowest frequency of use and lowest importance at work in the previous questions, the majority of participants indicated that it is extremely important that it should be part of compulsory school education. Indeed, SA is considered significantly more important in compulsory school education than English \( (Z = -4.303, p = .000) \). This is in line with Mejdell’s (2006) observation that the validity domain of SA is greater than its domain of use (cf. Section 3.2.5). However, the picture is reversed in university education where English is considered significantly more important than SA \( (Z = -7.257, p = .000) \). In general, both SA and English were considered more important in school than university.
However, while the difference for English was only marginally significant ($Z = -1.997, p = .046$), the difference for Arabic was not only highly significant ($Z = -12.473, p = .000$), but the difference margin is remarkable! Given the role of universities as gatekeepers to the job market in Egypt, the shift in the emphasis from SA to English between school and university could signal recognition of the greater utility of English in the job market, especially in light of the results from the previous question.

![Figure 8](image.png)

**Figure 8. Participants’ opinions about the importance of SA and English in education (%)**

Two explanatory variables of particular relevance to this section – especially the first three questions – is the participants’ SES (cf. Section 5.5.2.3) and main language of education (cf. Section 5.5.2.4). The relationship between political ideology and the participants’ attitudes towards the importance of English and SA in education is also investigated in Section 5.5.2.5.

### 5.5.1.2 Attitudes towards recent language changes

In questions 25 through 31, participants were asked about their attitudes towards five specific examples of recent changes in language use: the use of EA (in Arabic script) in printed Arabic magazines, Vodafone Egypt’s replacement of a SA service messages with an EA message, the launch of *Wikipedia Masry*, the use of LA in movie billboards, and the use of LA in printed ‘English’ magazines. A short description of the language change item was provided along with a visual example (an audio recording was provided for the Vodafone message and a web link was provided for *Wikipedia Masry*). The participants were then presented with a number of positive and
negative evaluative statements about the item, and they were required to select whether they agreed or disagreed with each statement. Some statements were mirrored across the five items to facilitate cross comparison.

Out of the five items, the two items related to the use of LA generated the greatest consensus over the evaluative statements, highlighting negative attitudes towards LA use in these contexts. The use of EA in print and the launch of Wikipedia Masry were also negatively evaluated overall although the difference was not as marked as in the LA items. Participants were almost equally divided when it came to the Vodafone message, with no clear overall positive or negative orientation. To illustrate this, Figure 9 shows the proportion of participants who agreed to the statement “I think it is a threat to the Arabic language” in relation to the first four items. A McNemar test determined that there is a significant difference between the responses to the Vodafone message item and each of the three other items (p=.000 in all three cases).

Similarly, Figure 10 shows the proportion of participants who agreed that it was good to see/hear EA being used as described in the item. Again, a McNemar test reveals a significant difference between the responses to the Vodafone message item compared to EA in print (p=.008) and Wikipedia Masry (p=.000). That the Vodafone message generated the least negative attitudes could be associated with the fact that it was the only example of oral use in the item list. This could suggest that it is more acceptable for EA to encroach on SA in the spoken domains than in the written
domains, lending credence to the interpretation of the findings in Section 5.5.1.1, and to the validity of the written association of SA.

![Bar chart](image_url)

**Figure 10.** Frequency of agreement that it is good to see/hear EA being used in this way

In general, most of the participants were aware of the language change items; the only exception being *Wikipedia Masry* – 69% of the participants had never heard of it before. Figure 11 indicates the participants’ awareness of the different items.

![Bar chart](image_url)

**Figure 11.** Number of participants who were not aware of each item

Although there are clear differences between how the different language change items were evaluated, running a series of chi-square tests also reveals highly significant relationships between how the participants responded to each of the items; that is to say that a participant who perceived one item as a threat to the Arabic language, was likely to indicate the same with respect to other items. Such relationships could point to ideological motivations in the participants’ responses.
Indeed, in Q25, although 49.7% of respondents indicated that they found it easier to understand the content of magazines with EA, 61.1% disagreed that it was good to see EA being used in this way, and 66% agreed that it was a threat to the Arabic language. That more participants accept this change as an improvement from a literacy point of view than are willing to evaluate it as ‘good’ change can only be explained in ideological terms. This is investigated further in Section 5.5.2.5.

5.5.1.3 Language choice: medium and audience effect

Questions 32 through 39 were language choice questions. Participants were presented with a number of scenarios of written language use and asked to select the language variety they were most likely to use in each case. To allow examining medium and audience effect, the scenarios were manipulated so that either the recipient or medium changed, but the options remained the same: SA, EA in Arabic script, LA, English, and a combination of English and LA. The participants were also presented with an ‘other’ option. A recurring option which came up in the participants’ ‘other’ comments box was ‘SA mixed with EA’. Not including this option in the list was clearly a grave oversight on my part. The scenarios given to the participants were:

- Q32: Writing an email to a close Egyptian friend
- Q33: Writing an email to your superior at work
- Q34: Writing an email to your teacher/lecturer
- Q35: Writing a text message to a close Egyptian friend
- Q36: Writing a text message to one of your parents
- Q37: Writing a handwritten letter to a close Egyptian friend
- Q38: Writing a handwritten memo to your superior at work
- Q39: Writing a handwritten letter to your principal/dean

Questions 33 and 38 were only asked of those who had indicated they were employed, and questions 34 and 39 were only asked of those who had indicated they were students. All participants were asked the remaining questions.

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67 In some cases, more than 10 participants who selected the ‘other’ option indicated that they would use SA+EA. As I could not ignore this, I added an extra entry in the analysis for this option. However, this does not rectify what is fundamentally a design flaw in the survey; this workaround comes with the caveat that, since all participants were forced to choose from the 5 options they were presented with, there is always the possibility that more participants could have chosen SA+EA had they been given this option in the list.
Figure 12 illustrates participants’ language choice when writing an email to a close friend ($N = 368$), to their superior at work ($N = 235$), and to their teacher/lecturer ($N = 150$). Immediately, it is glaringly clear that SA and English are favoured in the two more formal functions of emailing a superior and emailing a teacher/lecturer – in essence confirming the status of SA and English as H varieties. It is particularly worth noting here how English overtakes SA in both cases. The picture is quite different when emailing a friend, showing greater diversity in choice and a preference for EA in Arabic script and English mixed with LA, which are only selected by a minority of participants for the two more formal functions.

![Figure 12. Language choice in the medium of email](image1)

Figure 13 tells a similar story. Again, there is more spread across the language choices when writing a handwritten letter to a close friend ($N = 374$) than when writing a handwritten message to a participant’s superior at work ($N = 222$) or principal/dean ($N = 166$), with SA and English dominating the more formal functions.

![Figure 13. Language choice in the handwritten medium](image2)
Figure 14 compares language choice in the two functions of texting a close friend \((N = 384)\) and texting a parent \((N = 349)\). The premise here is that communicating with a parent is not as informal as communicating with a friend, and that it involves addressing someone who is generationally senior. There is considerable spread across the language choices in both functions, however what is striking here is that the use of LA and English mixed with LA, which are popular choices when texting a friend, decline sharply when texting a parent in favour of EA in Arabic script, English and SA (in this order). This suggests that parents who belong to an older generation may have more difficulty understanding LA than a friend who is likely to be generationally closer. This is supported by the findings in Section 5.5.2.2.

![Figure 14. Language choice in the medium of mobile text messages](image)

To investigate medium effect, Figure 15 illustrates language choice across the three different mediums when writing to a close friend \((N = 378\) for email; \(N = 384\) for text; \(N = 380\) for handwritten letter). The similarity between the two electronic mediums (email and text) is worth noting. That more participants selected LA when texting (25%) than when emailing (10.6%) a friend may be explained by the fact that, as one participant noted in the comments, a standard text message allows more Latin characters than Arabic characters\(^{68}\). In other words, it effectively ‘costs more’ to use Arabic script in text messages. In general, there is a clear preference for the Latin script choices in the electronic mediums, compared to a preference for the Arabic script choices (SA and EA in Arabic script) in the handwritten medium. In particular, SA sustains the greatest ‘increase’ in the handwritten medium (27.3%) when compared to the electronic mediums (9% in email and 3.6% in text).

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\(^{68}\) Most mobile phones use 7-bit encoding for Latin characters (as in English) and 16-bit encoding for non-Latin characters (as in Arabic). Hence, while the limit on a Latin script text message is typically 160 characters, this is reduced to a mere 70 characters for Arabic script.
As Figure 16 illustrates, when communicating with their superior, participants demonstrate greater preference for SA in the handwritten medium ($N = 222, 33.8\%$) than in email ($N = 235, 23.4\%$), although the difference is not as great as in the context of communicating with a friend. A straightforward script explanation does not work here since even EA in Arabic script is selected by 5.1\% in the medium of email, but by 1.4\% only in the handwritten medium. The overall picture is not very different: general preference for the H varieties, but clearly more for English. LA is absent in both mediums, and English mixed with LA is only present in email (1.3\%).

This general preference for the H varieties sustains when comparing email to teacher/lecturer ($N = 150$) with handwritten letter to principal/dean ($N = 166$), as illustrated in Figure 17. The greater preference for SA in the handwritten medium is worth noting here, although this may in fact be the result of manipulating the recipient (communicating with a principal/dean could be regarded as more formal than with a teacher/lecturer). As above, EA in Arabic script is chosen by less participants in the handwritten medium (0.6\%) than in the medium of email (8.7\%). Also, LA is completely absent from both mediums, and English combined with LA is only present in the medium of email (2%).
Overall, the language use questions indicate a clear medium effect particularly between electronic mediums and the handwritten medium where preference for SA increases. In general, there appears to be a preference for the Latin script choices in the electronic mediums, compared to a preference for Arabic script choices in the handwritten medium. This is clearest in the case of writing to a friend. There is also a strong addressee effect: in the more formal contexts a clear preference for the two H varieties can be seen, with low preference for EA in Arabic script, even lower for English combined with LA and complete absence of LA (an order which could suggest their perceived degree of informality). On the other hand, language choice is more spread out in the informal context of communicating with a close friend; here, EA in Arabic script is a popular choice. Moreover, generational difference between writer and addressee in the case of texting parents appears to have a negative impact on choosing LA and English mixed with LA. Other factors which could influence language choice are investigated in Section 5.5.2.

5.5.2 Identity Variables

In the following sections, I treat the identity variables as explanatory variables and investigate the relationship between these variables on the one hand and the participants’ language attitudes and reported language practices on the other. The identity variables investigated are gender, age, socio-economic status, education and political ideology. Religion (RQ5) has been excluded since the sample was not diverse enough for religion to be treated as an explanatory variable: the majority of participants (93%) indicated that they were Muslim, while 12 indicated they were Christian, 11 skipped the question, and 4 selected ‘other’.
5.5.2.1 Gender

154 (40%) of the survey participants indicated they were male, and 234 (60%) indicated they were female. This biased gender distribution is consistent with the higher rates of female participation reported in survey studies (cf. Section 5.2.3). Comparing the responses of males and females reveals a few instances of significant differences: males reported higher confidence and frequency in SA use. There was also a significant difference in code choices between males and females in some of the language use questions. However, it is also worth noting that a significantly higher proportion of females attended private schools and received education in a foreign language. Figure 18 illustrates the significant difference between males and females in terms of language of education ($\chi^2 = 39.265$, df = 2, $p = .000$).

Moreover, as Figure 19 illustrates, survey participants with higher socio-economic status (SES) were more likely to be female ($Wald = 19.639$, $p = .000$). Regression analysis reveals that it is actually the effects of school type and SES (see sections 5.5.2.3 and 5.5.2.4 respectively) confounded with gender, which result in the significant differences between the two groups in a number of the survey items.
5.5.2.2 Age

As illustrated in Figure 20, there was a clear bias towards younger respondents with a mean age of 27.4 years\(^69\). Again, this is in line with the findings of web survey studies (cf. Section 5.2.3), as well as what might be expected given the age distribution of Internet users in Egypt (cf. Section 5.3.2). Three quarters of participants were aged 20-30, with this pattern sustained across genders.

\(^{69}\) The sample includes four participants below the age of 16 – the result of an oversight on my part to include a condition or filtering question to ensure a minimum age for participation.
Generally, age was not a significant explanatory variable for language attitudes except in a few questions pertaining to LA. As one might expect, there was a significant relationship between age and familiarity with LA (Q29), \( N = 388, \rho = .251, p = .000 \), where younger participants reported being more familiar with LA than older participants (see Figure 21). Indeed, the older the participants the more likely they were to agree that it was confusing to read English mixed with LA in printed magazines (Q31), \( N = 388, \text{Wald} = 10.442, p = .001 \).

![Figure 21. Familiarity with LA by mean age](image)

On the other hand, age was clearly important in the language choice questions. When writing an email to a close Egyptian friend (Q32), older participants were more likely to choose SA (\( \text{Wald} = 17.755, p = .000 \)), less likely to choose LA (\( \text{Wald} = 11.289, p = .001 \))\(^70\), and less likely to choose English mixed with LA (\( \text{Wald} = 6.316, p = .012 \)). Similarly, when writing a text to a close Egyptian friend (Q35), older participants were again more likely to choose SA (\( N = 387, \text{Wald} = 22.077, p = .000 \)) and less likely to choose LA (\( N = 387, \text{Wald} = 12.918, p = .000 \)). Older participants were also more likely to choose SA (\( N = 352, \text{Wald} = 15.003, p = .000 \)) when writing a text to one of their parents (Q36). These results indicate a general preference for SA and dispreference for LA among the older participants.

\(^70\) It is worth noting that this option was not selected by any participant above the age of 35.
5.5.2.3 Socio-economic status (SES)

Instead of asking direct questions about income or social standing, a number of questions were included in the survey as a means of ‘diagnosing’ the SES of the respondent\textsuperscript{71}. Four points were used as SES indicators: mobile phone use (Q11-13), computer accessibility (Q14), Internet connectivity (Q15), and type of school (Q08). In general, the results indicate that the survey sample is technologically well-connected with high computer availability and Internet connectivity. In fact, all but one participant had mobile phones, and of these 68.3\% owned a smart phone. More strikingly, 76.8\% owned their own laptop. All of these figures point to a generally well-off sample.

In terms of education, the sample is well-divided between the two major types of schools: 46.7\% for public schools (including experimental), and 53.3\% for private schools (including international). There is a significant relationship between type of education and owning a laptop ($N = 388, Z = -2.777, p = .005$) and a smart phone ($N = 371, Z = -3.313, p = .001$). An SES variable was computed out of these three variables, with a possible range of 1-6: 1 being the lowest possible point on the scale (attended a public school and does not own a smart phone or a laptop) and 6 being the highest (attended an international school and owns both a smart phone and a laptop). The distribution of the sample across this computed SES scale is shown in Figure 22.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{figure22.png}
\caption{Distribution of the sample across the computed SES scale}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{71} Not only would have questions about income potentially deterred participants from completing the survey, but they could also be misleading. For instance a student who has no income of their own may in fact come from a very wealthy family and attend a very expensive school or university.
This SES indicator proves to be a powerful explanatory variable. Significantly, as demonstrated in Figure 23, participants with a higher SES were more likely to complete the survey in English ($Wald = 60.924, p = .000$).

*Figure 23. Language selected to complete the survey by SES (%)*

With respect to the two H varieties (cf. Section 5.5.1.1), Figure 24 illustrates the negative correlation between SES and written SA use ($rho = .224, p = .000$).

*Figure 24. Frequency of written SA use by SES (%)*

On the other hand, there was a significant correlation between SES and English confidence, both spoken ($rho = -.453, p = .000$) and written ($rho = -.365, p = .000$), as illustrated in Figure 25.
Similarly, SES was significantly correlated with English use, spoken (\(\rho = -0.423, p = .000\)) and written (\(\rho = -0.457, p = .000\)), as illustrated in Figure 26. Interestingly, SES was also significantly correlated with the importance of competence in spoken English at work (\(\rho = -0.302, p = .000\)), and with how important participants considered that English should be part of school education (\(\rho = -0.237, p = .000\)) – in both cases, the higher the SES, the more important English was deemed.

SES did not correlate significantly with any of the items in the language attitudes section (cf. Section 5.5.1.2) except for two statements related to the use of LA in printed English magazines (Q31): The higher the participants’ SES the more likely
they were to agree that LA is a convenient way of delivering content which has to do with the Egyptian culture ($Wald = 6.095, p = .014$), and to disagree that it is confusing to read English mixed with LA in a printed magazine ($Wald = 14.208, p = .000$).

On the other hand, SES was significantly correlated with language choice. As Figure 27 illustrates, when emailing a friend, participants with higher SES were less likely to choose SA ($Wald = 13.171, p = .000$) and EA in Arabic script ($Wald = 31.285, p = .000$), and more likely to choose English mixed with LA ($Wald = 37.730, p = .014$). When emailing their superior, they were less likely to use SA ($N = 244, Wald = 25.669, p = .000$), and more likely to use English ($N = 244, Wald = 21.630, p = .000$). Similarly, when emailing their teacher/lecturer, they were less likely to use SA ($N = 158, Wald = 14.214, p = .000$), and more likely to use English ($N = 158, Wald = 25.409, p = .000$).

![Figure 27. Language choice in email by SES (%)](image)

As Figure 28 illustrates, when texting a friend, those with higher SES were less likely to use EA in Arabic script ($N = 387, Wald = 43.051, p = .000$), and more likely to use English mixed with LA ($N = 387, Wald = 43.148, p = .000$). When texting their parent, they were less likely to use SA ($N = 352, Wald = 4.906, p = .027$) and EA in Arabic script ($N = 352, Wald = 33.789, p = .000$) but more likely to use English ($N = 352, Wald = 35.587, p = .000$) and English mixed with LA ($N = 352, Wald = 15.331, p = .000$).
Finally, as Figure 29 illustrates, when hand-writing a letter to a friend, those with higher SES were less likely to use EA in Arabic script ($N = 384$, $Wald = 15.612$, $p = .000$), and more likely to use English ($N = 384$, $Wald = 21.281$, $p = .000$) and English mixed with LA ($N = 384$, $Wald = 23.613$, $p = .000$). When hand-writing a message to their superior, they were less likely to use SA ($N = 228$, $Wald = 23.007$, $p = .000$) and more likely to use English ($N = 228$, $Wald = 27.650$, $p = .000$). Similarly, when hand-writing a letter to their principal/dean, they were less likely to use SA ($N = 170$, $Wald = 23.267$, $p = .000$) and more likely to use English ($N = 170$, $Wald = 23.737$, $p = .000$).
These results indicate that as SES increases, preference for English use increases, as does dispreference for SA use. In addition, there appears to be a ‘script divide’ between participants of lower and higher SES – with Arabic script varieties being preferred by the former, and Latin script varieties being preferred by the latter.

5.5.2.4 Education

62.9% of participants were employed, 43.8% were students, 18.6% were both employed and students, and 11.9% were neither employed nor students. 94.4% of those who indicated they were both employed and studying already had a university degree or higher, i.e. they were pursuing some form of postgraduate study. This is of significance considering that the sample is already very highly educated with several holders of postgraduate degrees (see Figure 30). This is mostly the result of enlisting academic colleagues in Egypt to distribute the survey in their departments (cf. Section 5.4.4). As only one participant selected ‘vocational diploma’ as their highest academic qualification, this category was removed from the analysis.

![Figure 30. The distribution of participants by highest academic qualification attained](image)

Academic qualification correlates with a number of survey items. Those with higher qualifications reported greater confidence in using English (Q20), both spoken \((N = 387, \rho = -0.133, p = .009)\) and written \((N = 387, \rho = -0.142, p = .005)\). They also reported using spoken English more frequently (Q21), \((N = 387, \rho = -0.187, p = .000)\).
Having a higher qualification was also correlated with disagreeing that it was easier to understand the content of printed magazines containing EA (Q25.2), ($N = 387, Wald = 15.564, p = .000$). A possible explanation is that highly educated participants are better able to understand written SA, and therefore would not necessarily find written EA easier to understand. However, this item also correlates significantly with age ($N = 388, Wald = 6.896, p = .009$). To investigate this further, binary logistic regression was performed with both age and academic qualification as predictors. Academic qualification was still significant ($N = 387, Wald = 10.722, p = .001$), while age was no longer significant ($N = 387, Wald = .476, p = .490$). Highly educated participants were also more likely to agree that they found it confusing to read EA in printed publications (Q25), possibly because they are more accustomed to reading SA than those with lower qualifications, ($N = 387, Wald = 7.734, p = .005$).

Regarding language choice, those with higher qualifications were more likely to choose SA when emailing a friend (Q32), ($N = 387, Wald = 13.850, p = .000$). Other marginally significant relationships between academic qualification and language choice were rendered non-significant in regression analysis when age was taken into account. The educational variable which proved more significant in relation to language choice was the main language of education.$^{72}$

As discussed in Section 3.4, language of education corresponds closely to school type in Egypt. In addition to public, private and international schools, the survey options for school type included experimental schools. These are state-funded schools which teach some subjects in English and therefore fall somewhere between public and private schools. The correlation between school type and language of education is illustrated in Table 6 ($H = 185.811, 2$ d.f., $p = .000$)$^{73}$. Since the French-educated participants behaved similarly to the English-educated participants, they were grouped together in the analysis, yielding two categories: Arabic vs. Foreign.

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$^{72}$ For the purposes of this study, the main language of education was defined as the language in which science and mathematics are taught (since it is a government requirement that certain subjects, such as Islamic studies and social studies, are always taught in Arabic).

$^{73}$ Although, strictly speaking, type of school is a categorical variable (and hence the most appropriate test here would be chi-square), it was deliberately coded as an ordinal variable given the SES connotations of the type of school attended (see Section 5.5.2.3), and hence the Kruskall-Wallis test was used instead. Both tests yield a $p$ value at the 0.001 level.
As anticipated, participants’ language of education – like their SES – correlates with the survey language they chose (Table 7), ($\chi^2 = 98.958$, df = 1, $p = .000$). Indeed, regression analysis with both SES and language of education as predictors for the survey language shows both explanatory variables to be significant: ($Wald = 14.711$, $p = .000$) for SES, and ($Wald = 39.113$, $p = .000$) for language of education.

The main language of education also correlates with participants’ responses to the questions about the two H varieties (cf. Section 5.5.1.1). As Figure 31 illustrates, Arabic-educated participants reported greater confidence in using SA, both spoken ($Z = -3.644$, $p = .000$) and written ($Z = -5.354$, $p = .000$) than foreign-educated participants. The former also reported higher frequency of SA use in written form ($Z = -4.477$, $p = .000$), and indicated higher importance for SA in university education ($Z = -2.857$, $p = .004$) than their foreign-educated counterparts.
Conversely, foreign-educated participants reported greater confidence in English use, spoken ($Z = -6.628, p = .000$) and written ($Z = -6.588, p = .000$) than Arabic-educated participants. They also reported higher frequency of English use in spoken ($Z = -6.968, p = .000$) and written forms ($Z = -7.381, p = .000$), (see Figure 32). Moreover, English – both spoken ($N = 244, Z = -3.601, p = .000$) and written ($N = 244, Z = -2.991, p = .003$) – was more important at work for foreign-educated participants. Foreign-educated participants also indicated higher importance for English in school education ($Z = -3.850, p = .004$).

Figure 31. Level of confidence in SA use by language of education (% within level)

Figure 32. Level of confidence in English use by language of education (% within level)
In terms of language attitudes, Arabic-educated participants indicated a less favourable attitude towards EA in new domains than foreign-educated participants. 54.4% of Arabic-educated participants agreed that they found it confusing to read EA in printed magazines because they are not used to reading Arabic in this way (Q25.2) compared to 33.7% of foreign-educated participants ($\chi^2 = 16.804$, df = 1, $p = .000$). Moreover, 56.9% of the former preferred the old VE messages in SA (Q26.6), compared to 42.4% of the latter ($\chi^2 = 8.104$, df = 1, $p = .004$).

On the other hand, foreign-educated participants had a more favourable attitude towards LA than their Arabic-educated counterparts. From the beginning, foreign-educated participants indicated greater familiarity with LA ($Z = -8.007$, $p = .000$). In addition, 37% of foreign-educated participants vs. 24.5% of Arabic-educated participants agreed that LA was a convenient way of writing EA (Q30.2) – a significant relationship ($\chi^2 = 7.082$, df = 1, $p = .008$). Similarly, 37% of the former vs. 22.1% of the latter agreed that LA was a convenient way of delivering content that had to do with Egyptian culture (Q31.2), ($\chi^2 = 10.402$, df = 1, $p = .001$). Conversely, 78.9% of Arabic-educated participants agreed that it was confusing to read English mixed with LA in English magazines (Q31.4), compared to 63.6% of foreign-educated participants ($\chi^2 = 11.199$, df = 1, $p = .001$).

Language of education was most significant as an explanatory variable for language choice in written communication. Figure 33 illustrates participants’ language choices in email by language of education. When emailing a friend (Q32), more Arabic-educated participants selected SA ($\chi^2 = 19.004$, df = 1, $p = .000$) and EA in Arabic script ($\chi^2 = 39.439$, df = 1, $p = .000$). On the other hand, more foreign-educated participants selected LA ($\chi^2 = 7.210$, df = 1, $p = .007$) and English mixed with LA ($\chi^2 = 34.997$, df = 1 $p = .000$). When emailing their superior (Q33), more Arabic-educated participants selected SA ($N = 244$, $\chi^2 = 20.160$, df = 1, $p = .000$) and more foreign-educated participants selected English ($N = 244$, $\chi^2 = 15.468$, df = 1, $p = .000$). Similarly, when emailing their teacher/lecturer (Q34), more Arabic-educated participants selected SA ($N = 158$, $\chi^2 = 10.725$, df = 1, $p = .001$) and more foreign-educated participants selected English ($N = 158$, $\chi^2 = 21.381$, df = 1, $p = .000$).
Language choices in the medium of text messages are illustrated in Figure 34. When texting a friend (Q35), more Arabic-educated participants selected EA in Arabic script ($N = 387, \chi^2 = 35.753$, df = 1, $p = .000$), while more foreign-educated participants selected English mixed with LA ($N = 387, \chi^2 = 33.446$, df = 1, $p = .000$). When texting their parent (Q36), again more Arabic-educated participants selected EA ($N = 352, \chi^2 = 54.115$, df = 1, $p = .000$) and more foreign-educated participants selected English ($N = 352, \chi^2 = 57.874$, df = 1, $p = .000$) and English mixed with LA ($N = 352, \chi^2 = 17.765$, df = 1, $p = .000$).
Figure 35 illustrates the language choices of participants in the handwritten medium. When writing a handwritten letter to a friend (Q37), more Arabic-educated participants selected SA ($N = 384, \chi^2 = 18.973, df = 1, p = .000$) and EA in Arabic script ($N = 384, \chi^2 = 13.841, df = 1, p = .000$). On the other hand, more foreign-educated participants selected English ($N = 384, \chi^2 = 23.554, df = 1, p = .000$) and English mixed with LA ($N = 384, \chi^2 = 24.687, df = 1, p = .000$). When writing a handwritten message to their superior (Q38), more Arabic-educated participants selected SA ($N = 228, \chi^2 = 19.596, df = 1, p = .000$) and more foreign-educated participants selected English ($N = 228, \chi^2 = 23.426, df = 1, p = .000$). Similarly, when writing a handwritten letter to their teacher/lecturer (Q39), more Arabic-educated participants selected SA ($N = 170, \chi^2 = 28.445, df = 1, p = .000$) and more foreign-educated participants selected English ($N = 170, \chi^2 = 27.662, df = 1, p = .000$).

![Figure 35. Language choice in the handwritten medium by language of education (%)](image)

What these results from the language use section point to is not only a general language bias – for SA by Arabic-educated participants and for English by foreign-educated participants especially in formal communication – but also a very clear script bias. Even in the informal context of communicating with a friend – where selections were very diverse across the three mediums – there was a discernible script divide with Arabic-educated participants favouring the Arabic-script choices while their foreign-educated counterparts favoured the Latin script choices.
There are a number of variables in the survey which index political ideology in some form. These include: identity rank (Q40), feelings about Egypt vis-à-vis the Arab World (Q41), and the political party voted for in the 2011-2012 parliamentary elections (Q42). I will begin with the party voted for, which did not only prove to be a significant explanatory variable, but is perhaps one of the most valuable contributions of this survey, given its critical timing.

Q42 was an optional question, which provided participants with a drop down list of all the options voters would have been presented with across the different electoral circuits in Greater Cairo during the 2011-2012 parliamentary elections in the ‘closed-lists’ category. These 21 options were classified by their main political ideology, as shown in Table 8. Political alliances are marked with a double asterisk, and political parties which were not selected by any participants are highlighted in grey. I discuss in detail how I arrived at this ‘spectrum’ of political orientations in Section 6.2.2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Party/alliance</th>
<th>Political Ideology/position</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Al-Nour**</td>
<td>Islamists 1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Freedom and Justice**</td>
<td>Islamists 2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Egyptian Citizen</td>
<td>Political right</td>
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<tr>
<td>Modern Egypt</td>
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<td>National Party of Egypt</td>
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<td>New Independents</td>
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<td>Al-Horeyya</td>
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<td>Conservatives</td>
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<td>Reform and Development</td>
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<td>Al-Wasat</td>
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<td>Egyptian Revolution</td>
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<td>Arab Democratic Nasserist</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Revolution Continues Alliance**</td>
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<tr>
<td>Egyptian Bloc**</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 8. The main political ideologies/positions of the political parties/alliances running in the closed-list category of the 2011-2012 (lower house) parliamentary elections.
348 participants answered this question, but 35 indicated that they did not vote\textsuperscript{74} and 18 indicated that they could not remember who they voted for. The distribution of the remaining 295 valid responses by political orientation is shown in Figure 36 (left)\textsuperscript{75}. For comparison, I also demonstrate how the 332 closed-list seats won in the 2012 parliament were distributed by political orientation on the right\textsuperscript{76}.

![Figure 36](image)

*Figure 36. Left: the distribution of participants along the political orientation spectrum; Right: the distribution of closed-list parliamentary seats won in 2012 along the spectrum*

Since the top of the spectrum corresponds to religious and political conservatism, while the bottom of the spectrum corresponds to religious and political liberalism, I will refer to these ends of the spectrum as the ‘conservative’ and ‘liberal’ ends respectively. One of the things which are immediately noticeable in this political spectrum is that it does not include the dimension of pan-Arabism vs. separatist Egyptian nationalism. This is because political parties touting such nationalisms were spread out across the spectrum and were often part of larger political alliances (cf. Section 6.2.2). A separate variable was used to index national orientation (Q41), where participants were asked to select which of the following statements most accurately described how they felt about Egypt in relation to the Arab World:

\textsuperscript{74} At least 11 of these had not yet reached the voting age of 18 at the time of the 2011-2012 elections.

\textsuperscript{75} It is worth noting – particularly in the following graphs where results are presented as percentages of each category in the political ideology spectrum – that there are only 8 participants in the political right category, and only 6 in the liberal-centre-left category.

\textsuperscript{76} Election results from Abdel Ghani (2012).
• Egypt is an integral part of the Arab World. Egypt and other Arab countries are one and the same. They have a shared identity, heritage and language.

• Egypt is part of the Arab World, but it has its unique identity and heritage. It is misleading to think of Egypt and Arab countries as the same thing.

• Egypt is very different from the Arab states. It has its unique identity, heritage and language. It is wrong to link Egypt with Arab countries since they have very little in common.

This was then coded as an ordinal variable with the top answer indexing pan-Arabism and the bottom indexing separatist Egyptian nationalism. It is worth noting that, as seen in Figure 37, there was a highly significant – though not perfectly ordinal – correlation between national orientation (Q41) and political orientation (Q42), \( N = 295, \rho = -.294, p = .000 \). This is discussed in more detail in section 6.2.2.

![Figure 37. Participants’ national orientation against their political orientation](image)

The dimension of national identity was also weaved into Q40 where participants were asked to rank the following identities from 1 to 3 based on how much they felt they belonged to each of them: Arab, Egyptian, Muslim/Christian. The order of options was randomised and religious identity only appeared if the participant provided an answer in Q05 (i.e. ‘Muslim’ would appear to those who indicated they were Muslim and ‘Christian’ to those who indicated they were Christian). While the ranking for ‘Arab’ identity was not a significant explanatory variable, the rankings for ‘Egyptian’ and ‘Muslim’ were significant (the ‘Christian’ category was too small to use). As Figure 38 illustrates, the ranking for ‘Egyptian’ identity correlates with participants’ national orientation \( N = 385, \rho = -.337, p = .000 \).
On the other hand, the ranking for both ‘Egyptian’ and ‘Muslim’ identities were significantly correlated with political orientation, with Muslim identity ranked higher by those at the conservative end of the spectrum ($N = 273$, rho = .372, $p = .000$), and Egyptian identity ranked higher by those at the liberal end ($N = 293$, rho = -.345, $p = .000$). This is illustrated in Figure 39.
As Figure 40 illustrates, Political orientation as well as Egyptian and Muslim identity ranks were significant predictors of the survey language selected by participants. Arabic was more likely to be chosen by participants who were at the conservative end of the political ideology spectrum \((N = 295, \text{ Wald } = 15.714, p = .000)\), had a low rank for Egyptian identity \((N = 385, \text{ Wald } = 8.251, p = .004)\) and high rank for Muslim \((N = 357, \text{ Wald } = 24.296, p = .000)\).

![Figure 40. Survey language by political orientation and Egyptian and Muslim identity ranks](image)

Political orientation, national orientation and Egyptian identity rank were all significant explanatory variables for language attitudes. With respect to the H varieties, those at the conservative end of the political spectrum were more likely to indicate the importance of SA in university education (Q19.2) than participants at the liberal end \((N = 295, \rho = .180, p = .002)\). Similarly, those with a pan-Arab national orientation were more likely to indicate the importance of SA than those who felt Egypt was very different from Arab countries \((\rho = .163, p = .001)\), (see Figure 41).

![Figure 41. SA importance in university education against political and national orientations](image)
Conversely, the importance of SA in school education (Q19.1) was less highly rated by those who ranked their identity as Egyptians highly ($N = 385$, $\rho = -.166$, $p = .001$) as illustrated in Figure 42. With regards to attitudes towards English, those at the liberal end of the political spectrum were more likely to indicate the importance of English in school (Q23.1), ($N = 295$, $\rho = -.208$, $p = .000$) and university (Q23.2), ($N = 295$, $\rho = -.161$, $p = .006$) than those at the conservative end.

When asked about their attitudes towards EA in printed Arabic magazines (Q25), as shown in Figure 43, participants were more likely to agree that it is good to see EA being used in this way if they were at the liberal end of the political spectrum ($N = 295$, Wald = 13.734, $p = .000$), had a separatist national orientation ($N = 388$, Wald = 6.917, $p = .009$), a high rank for Egyptian identity ($N = 385$, Wald = 16.713, $p = .000$) and low rank for Muslim identity ($N = 357$, Wald = 7.186, $p = .007$).
Figure 43. Agreement/disagreement with the statement “I think it is good to see EA being used in this way” (Q25.1) against the various political ideology indices.

On the other hand, as Figure 44 illustrates, participants were more likely to agree that EA in printed publications was a threat to the Arabic language if they were at the conservative end of the political spectrum ($N = 295$, Wald = 11.969, $p = .001$), had a pan-Arab national orientation ($N = 388$, Wald = 5.861, $p = .015$), a low rank for Egyptian identity ($N = 385$, Wald = 11.668, $p = .001$) and a high rank for Muslim identity ($N = 357$, Wald = 7.444, $p = .006$).
Similarly, when asked about their attitudes towards the new VE messages in EA (Q26), participants were more likely to agree that it is good to hear EA being used in this way if they were at the liberal end of the political spectrum \((N = 295, Wald = 6.734, \ p = .009)\), had a separatist national orientation \((N = 388, Wald = 11.368, \ p = .001)\), a high identity rank for Egyptian \((N = 385, Wald = 15.885, \ p = .000)\) and low for Muslim \((N = 357, Wald = 7.483, \ p = .006)\). Conversely, participants were more likely to agree that the new message was a threat to the Arabic language if they were at the conservative end of the political spectrum \((N = 295, Wald = 12.299, \ p = .000)\), had a pan-Arab national orientation \((N = 388, Wald = 6.675, \ p = .010)\), a low identity rank for Egyptian \((N = 385, Wald = 14.482, \ p = .000)\) and high for Muslim \((N = 357, Wald = 10.889, \ p = .001)\). Moreover, participants were also more likely to indicate that they preferred the old messages in SA if they were at the conservative end of the political spectrum \((N = 295, Wald = 5.531, \ p = .019)\), had a pan-Arab national orientation \((N = \ldots\)
388, $Wald = 5.773, p = .016$), a low identity rank for Egyptian ($N = 385, Wald = 19.419, p = .000$) and high for Muslim ($N = 357, Wald = 5.461, p = .019$). Figure 45 illustrates participants’ responses to these three statements against their Egyptian identity rank (the most significant predictor for this question).

![Diagram](image)

**Figure 45. Attitudes to new VE messages against Egyptian identity ranks**

When asked about their attitudes towards *Wikipedia Masry* (Q27), participants were more likely to agree that it is good to see EA being used in this way if they had a high rank for Egyptian identity ($N = 385, Wald = 15.070, p = .000$) and a separatist national orientation ($N = 388, Wald = 5.917, p = .015$). Conversely, as Figure 46 illustrates, participants were more likely to agree that *Wikipedia Masry* was a threat to the Arabic language if they were at the conservative end of the political spectrum ($N = 295, Wald = 14.020, p = .000$), had a pan-Arab national orientation ($N = 388, Wald = 13.959, p = .000$), a low rank for Egyptian identity ($N = 385, Wald = 10.694, p = .001$) and a high rank for Muslim identity ($N = 357, Wald = 8.101, p = .004$).
Participants’ ranking of Egyptian identity was also the most significant predictor of attitudes towards LA in movie billboards (Q30). As Figure 47 demonstrates, those who ranked Egyptian identity highly had a more favourable view overall of LA in movie billboards: they were more likely to agree that it is fun and fashionable \((N = 385, \textit{Wald} = 10.374, p = .001)\), more likely to agree that it is a convenient way of writing EA \((N = 385, \textit{Wald} = 8.021, p = .005)\), and more likely to disagree that it is a threat to the Arabic language \((N = 385, \textit{Wald} = 5.664, p = .017)\). Similarly, those at the liberal end of the political spectrum were more likely to agree it is a convenient way of writing EA \((N = 295, \textit{Wald} = 9.529, p = .002)\); and more likely to disagree it is a threat to the Arabic language \((N = 295, \textit{Wald} = 16.974, p = .000)\). Those with a separatist national orientation were also more likely to disagree it is a threat to the Arabic language \((N = 388, \textit{Wald} = 7.053, p = .008)\). The ranking of Muslim identity was not a significant explanatory variable for this question.
It was a similar picture with respect to participants’ attitudes towards LA in English magazines (Q31). Participants were more likely to agree that it is fun and fashionable if they had a separatist national orientation \((N = 388, \text{Wald} = 5.725, p = .017)\) and high rank for Egyptian identity \((N = 385, \text{Wald} = 6.982, p = .008)\). Moreover, those who ranked Egyptian identity highly were more likely to agree that LA is a convenient way of delivering content which has to with Egyptian culture \((N = 385, \text{Wald} = 6.893, p = .009)\). Political orientation and Muslim identity rank were not significant.

In terms of language choice, while political ideology indices were not as significant as SES and the main language of education (cf. sections 5.5.2.3 and 5.5.2.4 respectively), they were still significant with respect to whether or not SA was chosen in informal written communication. For example, when emailing a friend (Q32), SA was more likely to be chosen by those who were at the conservative end of the political spectrum \((N = 295, \text{Wald} = 7.164, p = .007)\), had a pan-Arab national orientation \((N = 388, \text{Wald} = 5.651, p = .017)\), and a low rank for Egyptian identity \((N = 385, \text{Wald} = 13.036, p = .000)\).

Similarly, when texting a friend (Q35), SA was more likely to be chosen by those who had a pan-Arab national orientation \((N = 387, \text{Wald} = 7.285, p = .007)\), and a low rank for Egyptian identity \((N = 384, \text{Wald} = 5.977, p = .014)\). Strikingly, participants at the conservative end of the political spectrum were more likely to choose EA \((N = 294, \text{Wald} = 10.264, p = .001)\). When texting a parent (Q36), those who had a low rank for Egyptian identity were more likely to choose SA \((N = 350, \text{Wald} = 7.236, p = .007)\).
When handwriting a letter to a friend (Q37), SA was more likely to be chosen by those who were at the conservative end of the political spectrum \((N = 293, \text{ Wald } = 9.686, p = .002)\), had a pan-Arab national orientation \((N = 384, \text{ Wald } = 9.023, p = .003)\), a low rank for Egyptian identity \((N = 381, \text{ Wald } = 9.277, p = .002)\) and a high rank for Muslim identity \((N = 353, \text{ Wald } = 6.066, p = .014)\).

That political ideology was more significantly correlated with language attitudes than (reported) language practices points to a potential discrepancy between attitudes and practices. To investigate this further, participants’ responses to the language attitude questions were directly compared to their responses about language practices related to the two H varieties and language choice in written communication. The tests returned only one significant result with regard to attitudes to \textit{fuṣḥā}/\textit{ʿāmmiyya}: those who reported using written SA frequently were more likely to consider \textit{Wikipedia Masry} a threat to the Arabic language \((\text{ Wald } = 7.567, p = .006)\). However, running a series of chi-square tests between language attitudes and language choice in written communication revealed a few marginally significant results in either direction. That is, having a negative attitude towards a pro-\textit{ʿāmmiyya} change was inconsistently correlated with using SA in some cases and with not using it in others, indicating that these correlations are not reliable.

On the other hand, a favourable attitude towards English was reflected in (reported) language practices. Participants who indicated the importance of English in school education (Q23.1), were more likely to choose English in an email to their teacher/lecturer \((N = 158, \text{ Wald } = 16.044, p = .000)\), text to their parent \((N = 352, \text{ Wald } = 10.640, p = .001)\), handwritten letter to their friend \((N = 384, \text{ Wald } = 13.842, p = .000)\), handwritten note to their superior \((N = 228, \text{ Wald } = 7.705, p = .006)\), and handwritten letter to their principal/dean \((N = 170, \text{ Wald } = 6.467, p = .011)\).

Attitudes and practices involving LA were similarly aligned: participants who expressed a favourable view of LA were more likely to report using it in informal written communication. There was a positive correlation between agreeing that LA in movie billboards was fun and fashionable (Q30.1) and choosing LA in an email to a friend \((N = 388, \chi^2 = 13.409, \text{ df } = 1, p = .000)\), a text to a friend \((N = 387, \chi^2 = 15.298, \text{ df } = 1, p = .000)\).
df = 1, p = .000), and a handwritten letter to a friend (N = 384, $\chi^2 = 9.666$, df = 1, p = .002). Similarly, there was a positive correlation between agreeing that LA is a convenient way of writing EA (Q30.2) and choosing LA in an email to a friend (N = 388, $\chi^2 = 15.462$, df = 1, p = .000), a text to a friend (N = 387, $\chi^2 = 18.292$, df = 1, p = .000), and a handwritten letter to a friend (N = 384, $\chi^2 = 15.667$, df = 1, p = .000). On the other hand, there was no significant correlation between having a negative view of LA (considering it a threat to the Arabic language or a trend which will soon die out) and not choosing LA in written communication.

In the same way, a positive attitude towards English mixed with LA was also correlated with choosing it in informal written communication. There was a positive correlation between agreeing that LA in printed English magazines was fun and fashionable (Q31.1) and choosing English mixed with LA in an email to a friend (N = 388, $\chi^2 = 18.201$, df = 1, p = .000), a text to a friend (N = 387, $\chi^2 = 18.621$, df = 1, p = .000), and a handwritten letter to a friend (N = 384, $\chi^2 = 27.197$, df = 1, p = .000).

Similarly, there was a positive correlation between agreeing that LA was a convenient way of delivering content that has to do with Egyptian culture in English magazines (Q31.2) and choosing English mixed with LA in an email to a friend (N = 388, $\chi^2 = 19.077$, df = 1, p = .000), a text to a friend (N = 387, $\chi^2 = 18.256$, df = 1, p = .000), and a handwritten letter to a friend (N = 384, $\chi^2 = 15.505$, df = 1, p = .000). On the other hand, there was a negative correlation between agreeing that it is confusing to read English mixed with LA in English magazines (Q31.4) and choosing English mixed with LA in an email to a friend (N = 388, $\chi^2 = 21.504$, df = 1, p = .000), a text to a friend (N = 387, $\chi^2 = 14.568$, df = 1, p = .000), and a handwritten letter to a friend (N = 384, $\chi^2 = 19.684$, df = 1, p = .000).

### 5.6 Limitations

At the beginning of this chapter I demonstrated that web surveys can be a powerful research tool, but there are several issues which must be addressed. Some of these issues have to do with the research medium – the strengths and limitations of web research – while others have to do with the research method – the self-reporting nature of questionnaires. Following a review of the relevant literature, I have demonstrated that a screened, self-selected, non-probabilistic, sample was best
suited for the purposes of this study. The survey was designed based on the ‘best practices’ which have precipitated from the literature, with due consideration to the limitations of this method. The survey was thoroughly tested and piloted before it went live from October 2012 to February 2013.

However, despite thorough testing, some design flaws did not become apparent except during the analysis of the final results. The survey did not specify a minimum participation age, and four participants were in fact under the age of 16 when they completed the survey. Another – greater – oversight was that the choices that were given to participants in the questions about written communication did not include a mixture of SA and EA (which several participants indicated they were most likely to use). Moreover, questions relating to attitudes towards recent language changes included two options: agree or disagree. The survey could have been improved by adding a ‘neutral’ option. In addition, the comparability of the items relating to language choice in written communication could have been improved (cf. Section 5.5.1.3).

I should also point to a number of ‘reductions’ that I have made in the survey design and analysis. The very approach of using identity categories as explanatory variables is essentialist in nature. After all, in the poststructuralist tradition, identity is not “something fixed for life” but “an ongoing lifelong project in which individuals constantly attempt to maintain a sense of balance” (Block, 2006: 35). While this kind of ‘strategic essentialism’ (cf. Omoniyi, 2006) is necessary in language surveys, its limitations must be recognised. Similarly, while the political orientation spectrum I use in Section 5.5.2.5 helps make sense of the political scene in Egypt, it is a simplification of a very complex reality (cf. Section 6.2.2).

There are also important limitations to the survey findings. In asking participants about their use of fuṣḥā and ʿammīyya I have relied on their own perceptions of what constitutes fuṣḥā and ʿammīyya which are likely to vary from one participant to another. This is an inevitable shortcoming of using the self-reporting technique in surveys about Arabic. However, I also note that, in a study about language ideology, the importance of participants’ perceptions should not be undermined.
Moreover, it is important to acknowledge that the findings of this survey are not representative of Egyptian society at large because of the specific characteristics of the population of Internet users in Egypt. The characteristics of the survey sample in terms of age and SES are generally in line with the profile of Internet users in Egypt, however, the very medium of this survey makes it impossible to draw generalisations about wider populations.

The fact that the survey relies on a non-probabilistic sample is reflected in the nature of the analysis. I have deliberately avoided presenting the findings as the \textit{`percentages'} found in the sample because these are of limited value given the survey medium. That is, while the survey indicates that 60\% of participants saw \textit{Wikipedia Masry} as a threat to Arabic, I cannot make a claim that the same percentage would inhere in a different population. However, investigating the internal relationship between the variables is concerned less with representativeness and more with diversity – and it is these relationships which I focus on in my analysis. Because the survey sample contained a good distribution of public vs. private educated participants, and to a large extent a good distribution along the political orientation spectrum, this made it possible to note important correlations in the sample. These findings demonstrate great consistency and are therefore considered highly reliable.

\textbf{5.7 Conclusion}

The main purpose of the survey was to answer RQ3; to investigate the participants’ attitudes towards recent language developments and explore how this related to their identities and their self-reported language practices. In addition to questions which specifically addressed the recent changes, the survey was designed to make it possible to compare how the participants used and perceived the two H varieties (SA and English), and to examine how medium and audience affected their language choices in written communication. The analysis of the survey results involved exploring the relationship between participants’ responses to these questions in relation to five explanatory identity variables: gender, age, SES, education and political ideology. The sample was not diverse enough to analyse religion as an explanatory variable.
Responses to questions about the two H varieties point to a number of interesting findings. Firstly, participants reported both higher confidence and frequency of use for SA and English in written form, but the difference between spoken and written forms was significantly greater for SA. Indeed, participants reported the lowest confidence levels, frequency of use and importance at work for spoken SA, supporting the widely-held view that SA is a predominantly written variety (cf. Section 2.7). In the workplace, English was seen as far more important than SA, an indicator of the greater utility and economic capital attached to the English language. However, this was not mirrored in participants’ ratings of the importance of SA and English in education. Despite participants reporting less confidence, less frequency of use and less importance at work for SA compared to English, participants indicated that it was more important for SA to be part of compulsory school education (by a staggering margin when compared to English).

SES and the main language of education were important explanatory variables for participants’ responses in this section. Those educated in English or French and with higher SES were more likely to report higher confidence and frequency in using English. Significantly, they were also more likely to report greater importance for English at work. The association between language of education, SES and the importance of English at work is important because it points once more to the economic capital of English. It also highlights the role of educational institutions as gatekeepers to the job market (cf. Section 3.4) and to the cyclic effect of this relationship: those with high SES are more likely to attend expensive language schools and are therefore more likely to get higher-paying jobs where competence in English is important, thereby securing their high SES.

Participants’ attitudes to recent language changes were most significantly correlated with political ideology. Here, participants’ political orientation and national orientation seemed to be particularly important. Changes promoting EA and undermining SA were more likely to be perceived as a threat to the Arabic language by those with a conservative political orientation and a pan-Arab national orientation. On the other hand, these changes were more likely to be perceived
favourably by those with a liberal political orientation and a heightened sense of Egyptian identity and nationalism.

Participants’ age was significant in relation to attitudes towards changes involving LA. Older participants reported being less familiar with LA and finding it confusing to read. They were also less likely to choose LA and English mixed with LA in the language choice questions.

Responses to the language choice in written communication questions highlight the differences in participants’ language choices when the medium and audience were manipulated. The greatest range of selections was made in the informal context of communicating with a friend, where EA, LA and hybrid forms (e.g. English+LA, SA+EA) were preferred. In the formal context of communicating with a superior at work, a teacher/principal at school or lecturer/dean at university, the choices coalesced around SA and English, with English being the code of choice in the context of work. This suggests that EA and LA are perceived as informal codes. The communication medium also played a role: The Latin-script choices were selected the most in the electronic mediums of email and text messages, whilst the selection of Arabic-script choices was higher in the handwritten medium. SA in particular was more likely to be selected in the handwritten mediums than in the electronic mediums. Similarly, there was a clear preference for Arabic-script options when texting a parent compared to texting a friend. This points to the role of generational differences, particularly with respect to using LA.

SES and language of education were also important explanatory variables in relation to language choice. English/French-educated participants and those with higher SES were more likely to choose English, and more generally the Latin-script choices, in their communication. Conversely, Arabic-educated participants and those with lower SES were more likely to choose SA, and more generally the Arabic-script choices, in their communication. The political ideology indices were less significant predictors of language choice: they only seemed to have a role in the informal context of communicating with a friend, but not when language choice was already constrained by formality. Remarkably, whilst the Egyptian identity rank was a significant predictor
of whether or not changes promoting EA were perceived favourably, this did not have a straightforward reflection in the language choice questions: those who ranked their Egyptian identity highly were indeed less likely to choose SA, but were not more likely to choose EA. This was also true of political orientation. In fact, those with a conservative political orientation were more likely to choose EA when emailing a friend than those with a liberal orientation. Further investigating the relationship between language attitudes and reported language practices revealed that while language attitudes and language choices (in informal written communication) were clearly aligned in the cases of English, LA, and English mixed with LA, this was not so for SA and EA. These findings highlight the disparity between language attitudes and practices in relation to ḥā and ʿāmmiyya.
6 From Finding to Understanding: Discussing and situating the findings

“baṣṣēt le-nafṣī w-la’etnī
meḥtāg eʾādet naẓār
dawart f zātī
w-allebt šrīṭ ḫayātī
ʿašān ašūf ʾēh ḫaṣāl
ma-fiš tārīḵ; ma-fiš hawīyya
anā nusxa miš āšliyya
zay ʿalāmī w-noṣ kalāmī
zay el-guitar ellī oddāmī”

“I LOOKED AT MYSELF AND FOUND
THAT I NEEDED REASSESSMENT
I SEARCHED WITHIN ME
AND WENT THROUGH THE TAPE OF MY LIFE
TO UNDERSTAND WHAT HAPPENED:
THERE’S NO HISTORY; NO IDENTITY
I’M A COUNTERFEIT COPY
LIKE MY EDUCATION AND HALF MY SPEECH
LIKE THE GUITAR BEFORE ME”

From the song eʾādet naẓār (Reassessment) by Cairokee
(es-sekka šmāl, 2014)

6.1 Introduction

This chapter aims to answer the final research question:

RQ4 How can the findings further our understanding of the language situation in Egypt?

In answering this question, I draw on the literature reviewed in chapters 2 and 3 and build on existing theories to situate the findings and incorporate them into our current knowledge about the language situation in Egypt. I also bring the discussion up to speed with more recent developments in the Egyptian sociolinguistic scene and address the findings in light of these. Identity – one of the central themes in my findings – is addressed in Section 6.2. The question of power is then revisited in Section 6.3, while Section 6.4 discusses an alternative way of conceptualising diglossia in Egypt.

6.2 The Politics of Identity in Revolutionary Egypt

In November 2009, I travelled to Egypt during the early stages of my research. Egyptian flags filled the streets. In those pre-revolution days that could only mean one thing: a major football event was about to take place. The Egyptian football team were about to face their Algerian counterpart for an important tie-breaking match
which would determine which team qualified for the 2010 World Cup. The two teams had already faced each other twice and now had an equal number of points. In the last match, the Algerian team accused the Egyptian (home) team of intimidating their players and fans. The tension between the two sides was so high that the tie-breaking match had to take place on neutral ground. The teams met in Sudan in a media hyped confrontation which the Egyptian team lost. It was a very bitter loss. Backed by the full force of Egyptian media and government, the Egyptian team claimed that they were terrorised by masses of Algerian fans and appealed for a replay.

By the time the Egyptian team returned to Egypt, the matter had escalated into a full blown diplomatic crisis between the two countries. But it was not only the relations between the two countries which suffered: In Egypt, criticism (and indeed, derision) of the Algerian team – which became conflated with the Algerian state, and then with all Algerians – was often coupled with assertions of Egyptian supremacy, not just over Algerians, but over all ‘Arabs’. This was not an ordinary instance of football nationalism; Egyptians from outside the sports world (e.g. government officials and actors) were engaging in this supremacist rhetoric. A Facebook group named ‘I’m Egyptian, not Arab’ was promptly set up in the wake of the match, and less than two months later had over 20,000 members.

The crisis – which has earned its own Wikipedia page – certainly deserves in depth study by scholars in fields other than linguistics. The reason it is mentioned here is because of the Egyptian nationalist sentiments which characterised the discourse around it. That is, when I began my research, Pan-Arabism in Egypt, which had already receded significantly under Sadat and Mubarak (cf. Section 3.3.2.2), had just suffered another major blow. Indeed, the reverberations of this crisis were still felt when I returned to Egypt in the summer of 2010 to conduct the interviews, hence the reference to it in the interview with the ALCSs (Section 4.5).

77 See: [http://ar.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D9%86%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B9_%D9%83%D8%A3%D8%B3_%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85_%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%86_%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B1_%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%B1_2009](http://ar.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D9%86%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B9_%D9%83%D8%A3%D8%B3_%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85_%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%86_%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B1_%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%B1_2009) (Accessed, 01/08/2014)
But did these events signify that pan-Arabism in Egypt was dead? If they did, then pan-Arabism was reincarnated a year later. When Egypt followed in the steps of Tunisia and mass protests calling for the ousting of Mubarak broke out across Egypt in January 2011, pan-Arab feelings appeared to surface once more. During the 18 days of protest in Cairo’s Tahrir Square – culminating with Mubarak stepping down on the 11th of February 2011 in what became known as the January 25 Revolution – there was no shortage of indexes of pan-Arabism (Aboelezz, 2014). Similarly, pan-Arab feelings were high in the euphoric mood that followed the revolution: Egypt was at the centre and the lead of the ‘Arab’ Spring. On the 18th of February 2011, Friday prayers were conducted in Tahrir Square in a massive public celebration of Mubarak’s ouster. Following prayers, a chant reverberated across the square: ‘a l-uds rayhīn; šuhadā’ be-l-malayīn [to Jerusalem we march; martyrs by the million]. It was as though the last four decades of Egyptian history were a mere fissure: Egypt was once more leader of the Arab World and patron of the Palestinian cause (which has historically united the peoples of the Arab World). However, the chant was immediately followed by another: erfa’ rāsak fō’; enta māṣrī (raise your head high; you’re Egyptian) signalling the national pride spurred by the extensive International attention that the revolution received. That is, at that moment, pan-Arabism was coupled with a high sense of national pride.

The role of the Arab spring in reviving pan-Arab sentiments is noted by Phillips (2014: 141), who observes that prior to 2011, “the orthodox position considered Arabism a spent force”, stating that the Arab leaders had “consolidated nation-state identities (waṭaniyya), cynically turning old Arab nationalism (qawmiyya) into empty rhetoric”. However, “the contagious nature of protests illustrated the domestic relevance of Arab identity” or New Arabism (Phillips, 2014: 142). This New Arabism is quite different from Gamal Abdel Nasser’s ‘unitary Arab nationalism’. Perhaps a good example of how the Arab Spring shaped pan-Arab sentiments is this comment (in SA), made by one of the survey participants to explain his choice in the national orientation question (cf. Section 5.5.2.5):

The Arab countries and Egypt do not have a lot in common at present. I suppose if I were filling this survey in the time of Abdel Nasser I would have selected “Egypt is an
integral part of the Arab World”, but now, in light of the political orientations of the Gulf states (towards the US) and orientations of North African countries (towards Europe), I don’t see many commonalities. But, I might find that those who really share [something] with us are the Arab Spring countries (Tunisia, Libya, Syria, Palestine, Yemen, and maybe Jordan). This conclusion is not based only on the notion of governments, but on the notion of peoples as well. I might perceive those who do not share my language (Turkey for instance) closer to my identity than the Arab Gulf states.

Of course this comment must be understood in its political context. At the time that the survey was carried out, Egypt was under the rule of Muhammad Morsi, the MB president who was elected to power in June 2012. The image of Egypt at the lead of the Arab World was one that Morsi was keen to project. However, when the army removed the unpopular president following mass protests a year later, the pendulum appeared to sway in the other direction again. The euphoria of the Arab Spring was already a thing of the past: none of the ‘Arab Spring countries’ seemed to be much better off. The situation in Syria had turned particularly sour and Egyptians had to contend with this first hand as thousands of displaced Syrian families took refuge in Egypt. In particular, the pro-Palestinian actions taken by Morsi (such as opening the Rafah crossing) were quickly reversed by the Egyptian army. After Morsi was deposed, Egyptian media turned against any source of external criticism in a manner reminiscent of Sadat’s post Camp David foreign policy. An emphasis on Egyptian identity and Egyptian interests surfaced once more.

The concern with Egyptian identity was at the forefront of Egyptian politics and social life at the time of writing this thesis. This is of little surprise given successive sharp changes in how Egyptian identity was constructed at the official level over the last four years. Early in 2014, the annual International Cairo Book Fair was launched under the slogan ‘Culture and Identity’ (al-ṭaqāfa wa-l-huwiyya) in a declared attempt “to revive Egyptian identity” (Ali, 2014). Reportedly, the slogan was changed following the toppling of the MB government which was said to have “deprived Egypt of many elements of its identity” and “tried to twist the Egyptian cultural traditions to serve the pure [presumably Islamist] interests of the Brotherhood” (ibid.). In Section 6.2.1, I outline how this shift in the construction of Egyptian identity
relates to language by looking at Egypt’s last 3 constitutions, and in Section 6.2.2, I discuss the post-revolution political map and the relevant research findings.

6.2.1 Language and identity in the Egyptian constitution

Mapping how Egypt is defined in its three most recent constitutions (1971, 2012 and 2014) is a useful exercise which highlights the shifting relationship between nation, language and identity. In the Egyptian constitution of 1971\(^78\) (which did not depart substantially from the first constitution of the republic in 1956, and which remained functional, albeit with various amendments, until Mubarak was deposed in 2011), begins with these two defining articles\(^79\):

**ARTICLE (1):** The Arab Republic of Egypt is a state with a democratic system based on citizenship. The Egyptian people are part of the Arab nation and seek to realise its comprehensive unity.

**ARTICLE (2):** Islam is the religion of the state, the Arabic language is its official language, and the principles of Islamic Sharia are the principal source of legislation.

The 1971 constitution also included this paragraph in the preamble:

**SECOND: Unity is the aspiration of our Arab nation:** stemming from a certainty that Arab unity is a call from history, an invitation to the future, and a necessity by destiny .. and that it cannot be realised except in the protection of a nation which is able to deter and drive out any threat regardless of its source and of the claims which support it.

Language is only mentioned again in Article (40), which stipulates that citizens shall not be subject to discrimination based on “race, origin, language, religion or creed”. Following the 2011 revolution, the 1971 constitution was suspended and public debates ensued about amending Articles 1 and 2. Due to the amount of controversy in these debates, the two articles were retained verbatim in the constitutional declaration which was ratified on the 30\(^{th}\) of March 2011 (following a referendum with 77.27% in favour of ratification). The constitutional declaration did not have an

\(^{78}\) Retrieved 01.08.2014 from: http://www.sis.gov.eg/Ar/Templates/Articles/tmpArticles.aspx?CatID=73#.U_PLP2PCd0Q

\(^{79}\) All of the quoted sections of the 1971, 2012 and 2014 constitutions have been translated from Arabic.
extended preamble. The 2012 constitution\textsuperscript{80}, which was drafted under the MB government and accepted by 63.83% of voters in a referendum at the end of 2012, begins with:

\textbf{ARTICLE (1):} The Arab Republic of Egypt is an independent, sovereign, united, indivisible state, with a democratic system.

The Egyptian people are part of the Arab and Islamic nations, and take pride in belonging to the Nile Basin and the African continent and in their Asian extension, and actively participate in human civilisation.

There was no change to Article (2), but the preamble included these two items:

\textbf{TENTH: Unity is the aspiration of the Arab nation;} a call from history, an invitation to the future, and a necessity by destiny, reinforced by complementarity and fraternity with the countries of the Nile Basin and the Islamic World, a natural extension borne out of the distinctiveness of Egypt’s position and location on the map of the universe.

\textbf{ELEVENTH: Egypt’s intellectual and cultural pioneering} is an embodiment of its soft power, and a model of profusion with the freedom of its innovators, thinkers, universities, scientific and language academies, research centres, its press, art, literature and media, its national church and the noble Azhar which has been throughout its history a mainstay of the nation’s identity, a custodian of the immortal Arabic language and the noble Islamic Sharia, and a beacon for moderate enlightened thought.

The 2012 constitution also introduced an article (Article 4) which granted al-Azhar religious authority and assigned it with the responsibility to “spread Islamic da’wa and the disciplines of religion and Arabic language in Egypt and the world”. In addition, in Article (11), “religious and patriotic values”, “Arab culture”, and the “historical and civilizational heritage of the people” are counted among the morals that the State shall foster. Language is also explicitly mentioned in a number of articles. Article (12) reads: “The State shall safeguard the cultural and linguistic constituents of society, and foster the Arabicisation of education, science and knowledge”. Moreover, Article (59) stipulates that “universities, scientific and language academies, and scientific research centres are independent and the State shall assign a sufficient percentage of the GNP to them”, while Article (60) states that

\textsuperscript{80} Retrieved 01.08.2014 from: http://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/255182
“the Arabic language is a core subject in various stages of education in all educational institutions” and that religious studies and national history are core subjects in all types of pre-university education. In addition, Article (215) assigns the National Media Council with the responsibility to "establish standards and regulations to ensure the commitment of various media to the principles and ethics of the profession, safeguarding the Arabic language, and observing the values and constructive traditions of society".

Hence, the 2012 constitution reinforced Arab affiliation, introduced Islamic identity and added a (symbolic) African dimension. The emphasis on Arab and Islamic identities translated into a focus on the Arabic language with several provisions for the language. When the MB’s Muhammad Morsi was deposed by the army following mass protests in July 2013, the 2012 constitution was suspended and within less than a year Egypt had yet another constitution. The 2014 constitution was accepted by 98.13% of voters in a referendum early in 2014. The newest constitution begins thus:

**ARTICLE (1):** The Arab Republic of Egypt is a sovereign, united, indivisible State, no part of which may be given up. It has a democratic republican system that is based on citizenship and rule of law.

The Egyptian people are part of the Arab nation and seek its integration and unity. Egypt is part of the Islamic world, belongs to the African continent, takes pride in its Asian extension, and contributes in building human civilization.

While the sentence which was added in the 2012 outlining Egypt’s Arab, Islamic and African character was retained, in the 2014 constitution Egypt is significantly described as part of an Islamic *world* rather than an Islamic *nation* (*umma*). The latter is a much more ideologically loaded term (cf. Section 3.3.2.2). Equally significant, the paragraph in the preambles of the 1971 and 2012 constitutions stating that unity is the aspiration of the Arab nation (with some variation), was removed from the 2014 constitution. Instead, Article (1) was altered slightly as seen above to include that the Egyptian people seek the unity and integration of the Arab nation; a milder version of

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Article (1) in the 1971 constitution, and certainly a statement which does not carry the symbolic loadings of the paragraph which was removed from the preamble.

The paragraph referring to al-Azhar was also removed from the preamble, and although the preamble “asserts that the principles of Sharia law are the principal source of legislation”, it refers – for the first time – to a “secular government” as part of a “modern democratic State”. It is worth noting that Article (2) – which states that Arabic is the official language - remained intact in the 2014 constitution as well.

Language is only mentioned in four other locations of the 2014 constitution. The first is in Article (7) outlining the role of al-Azhar as a custodian of religion and the Arabic language. This is essentially the same as Article (4) in the 2012 constitution, but al-Azhar is granted more power in interpreting Islamic jurisprudence in the 2014 constitution. The second location is Article (24) which states that “The Arabic language, religious education and national history – which includes all its periods – are core subjects in public and private pre-university education”. Hence, instead of being a core subject in “all stages of education” (Article 60 of the 2012 constitution), Arabic was equated with religious education and national history which are only compulsory in pre-university education. A third location is Article (53) which states that citizens shall not be discriminated against based on “religion, creed, sex, origin, race, colour, language, disability, social class, political or geographic affiliation, or any other reason” (which resonates with Article 40 in the 1971 constitution, but there was no equivalent article in the 2012 constitution).

Language is also mentioned in Article (48) which includes “The State shall encourage translation from and into Arabic”. This replaces the stipulation that the State shall foster Arabicisation of education, sciences and knowledge in Article (12) of the 2012 constitution. All other mentions of the Arabic language and language academies which featured in the 2012 constitution were omitted from the 2014 constitution. Similarly, the frequent use of the adjectives ‘Arab’ and ‘Islamic’ in the 2012 constitution is not mirrored in the 2014 constitution. Instead, there is an emphasis on “Egyptian identity”.

Whereas, in the 2012 constitution, the word *huwiyya* (identity) is only mentioned in the preamble where al-Azhar is described as the “mainstay of the nation’s identity”,


identity is mentioned twice in the body of the 2014 constitution. Article (19) states that education is a right for every citizen and that it “aims to build the Egyptian character and preserve the national identity”. This identity is defined in Part II, Chapter 3 of the 2014 constitution which is devoted to “Cultural Constituents” and includes articles 47 to 50. Article (47) includes that “The State shall preserve the Egyptian cultural identity with its diverse civilizational components”. In addition, Article (50) states:

**ARTICLE (50):** Egypt’s civilizational and cultural heritage, moral and material, which includes all its major periods – ancient Egyptian, Coptic and Islamic – is a national and human wealth. The state shall preserve and maintain this wealth in addition to the contemporary cultural inventory of architecture, literature and art in their diverse forms. Aggression against any of the foregoing is a crime punishable by law. The state shall give special attention to preserving the components of cultural pluralism in Egypt.

While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to conduct a full comparison between the 1971, 2012 and 2014 constitutions (research in this area is certainly needed), comparing the items related to language and identity alone points to a significant difference in how they are handled. The 1971 constitution which was drafted at a time when pan-Arab feelings were high emphasised the ‘Arab’ character of Egypt, but the Arabic language itself – except being named official language – does not receive further specific mention in the constitution. The 2012 constitution reinforced the emphasis on Arab belonging and added numerous stipulations specifically addressing the Arabic language (which is arguably an extension of that belonging). As well as introducing African belonging (and an Asian extension), the first article of the 2012 constitution also introduced belonging to an Islamic nation. This Islamic dimension was stressed by introducing a number of other items in the constitution which lend it prominence. Most of the articles dealing with language and identity introduced in the 2012 constitution were either scrapped or significantly altered in the 2014 constitution. Instead of the implied Islamic identity in the 2012 constitution (achieved by describing the Islamic institution of al-Azhar as custodian of “the nation’s identity”), the 2014 constitution refers to “Egyptian identity” which is
associated with diversity (\textit{tanawwu'}) and pluralism (\textit{ta’adudiyya}), and – for the first time – incorporates Coptic and ancient Egyptian in this identity.

6.2.2 \textit{The post-revolution political map}

In this section I discuss the broader range of political ideologies illustrated in the Egyptian political map in the wake of the 2011 revolution and how I developed the political ideology spectrum used in the survey (cf. Section 5.5.2.5). The survey was conducted during a ‘golden window’ of political interest and engagement (and arguably, political freedom) in Egypt between February 2011 and June 2013. Following the 2011 revolution, Egypt went from an atmosphere of widespread political apathy to prevalent politicisation. In particular, the few months leading up to the 2011-2012 parliamentary elections saw unprecedented political activity. Literally hundreds of new political parties were formed (although not all of these participated or were registered in time for the elections). This newfound interest in politics was reflected in the high turnout of voters (for the lower house parliamentary elections).

The elections took place between 28 November 2011 and 22 February 2012 over several phases and the electoral system was “extraordinarily complicated” (The Carter Centre, 2012: 22). There are two houses of parliament in Egypt: the upper house (the Shura council) and the lower house (the People’s Assembly or \textit{maglis el-ša’b}). The question in the survey concerns the latter (cf. Section 5.5.2.5). During the 2011-2012 elections, one third of the seats in the People’s Assembly were allocated to two-seat majoritarian constituencies and two thirds allocated to closed-list proportional representation system. In the former, voters from each constituency would elect two individual candidates who may or may not be affiliated with a political party, whereas in the second, voters would select a named list which itself represents either a specific political party or an alliance of political parties. Hence, the survey participants were asked about their closed-list vote and not their two-seat
majoritarian constituency vote since it is easier to associate the former with the ideologies of political parties.\(^{82}\)

According to Egypt’s State Information Service, 65.98% of registered voters participated in the elections for the lower house of parliament (SIS, 2011-2012). This participation rate was the highest of all the referenda and elections which took place post-revolution including the presidential elections of 2012 (Abdel-Jawwad, 2013). Indeed, it is telling that in the survey, 76% of all participants indicated the party they voted for – this rises to 85% when we disregard those who skipped this question, and to 90% if we discount those who indicated that they could not remember who they voted for. This is an impressive response rate to this question considering that roughly 15% of the overall survey sample would not have been old enough to vote in the 2011-2012 parliamentary elections.

One of the biggest challenges that I faced in designing and analysing this question was navigating the sea of new political parties to determine where they stand ideologically. A very helpful resource that I relied on was the map of political parties and alliances published on the Arabist blog prior to the parliamentary elections (El Amrani, 2011). The map provides an overview of where the main political formations stand along a four-dimensional grid composed of two intersecting axes: religious (Islamic) ↔ secular, and right ↔ left. So helpful was this guide to anyone following the elections at the time that The Guardian adopted an interactive version of this map as part of its coverage of the elections (Scruton et al., 2011). However, while it is an outstanding effort, the map contains some inaccuracies, which made it necessary to revisit the individual manifestos published on the websites of the various political parties to ascertain their political ideologies. I also relied on the extensive coverage of the parliamentary elections provided by Ahram Online and their review of all the participating political parties (Ahram Online, 2011-2012). Their coverage has been more recently collated into a published book (Sallam, 2013).

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\(^1\) I refer the reader to (The Carter Centre, 2012) for a detailed explanation of the technical aspects of the parliamentary electoral system, and to (IFES, 2011) for a post-elections assessment of how the system worked.
Useful as this political map was, the four-dimensional grid was not workable for statistical analysis. I therefore reduced it to a two-dimensional spectrum to introduce ordinality. The right-left axis was effectively nested into the Islamist-secular axis, with the underlying aim of having the politically and religiously conservative parties on one end of the spectrum, and the politically and religiously liberal parties on the opposite end. The symmetry within the spectrum is illustrated in Figure 48.

![Figure 48. Symmetry within the two-dimensional political spectrum](image)

I must point out that while the political orientation spectrum I devised is a useful analytical tool for studying the relationship between language and political ideology, it is essentially a reduction of a very complex and multi-dimensional political reality. A significant feature of this spectrum is the two classifications ‘Islamist 1’ and ‘Islamist 2’. Given the abundance of Islamist parties, I make a deliberate distinction between the most conservative Islamists (such as the Salafist Al-Nour party and the parties which joined their alliance in the 2011-2012 elections) and the less conservative Islamists such as the MB’s Freedom and Justice (F&J) party. This was particularly important when assigning votes in the 2011-2012 to ideology because in these elections the F&J led a political alliance which included non-Islamist parties (such as the liberal Al-Ghad, and the Nasserist Al-Karama). It would have therefore been misleading to group the F&J alliance and Al-Nour alliance in a single category.

It is also important to delineate what is meant by the political right. This refers to politically conservative parties with traditional right-wing ideologies (e.g. hierarchical social order, free market economics). Political conservatism here also implies
antipathy to political change. In the 2011-2012 elections the right was dominated by political parties formed by former members of the (by then defunct) National Democratic Party. The military establishment in Egypt is also considered an extension of the political right. It can therefore be said that with Abdel Fattah El-Sisi assuming Egyptian presidency in 2014, state governance is once more situated on the right of the political map.

The use of the term ‘secular’ also warrants some explanation. In a society where religion plays a central role in every aspect of life, the term ‘secular’ must be understood in context. While it is used to refer to political parties with a non-religious agenda in Egypt (aḥzāb ‘ilmāniyya = secular parties), it does not have the Western connotations of irreligion. Indeed, a few of these secular parties include religious Copts as founding members. For example, Coptic billionaire Naguib Sawiris was a founding member of the most prominent secular party, el-Maṣriyyīn el-Aḥrār (founded April 2011), and sits on its Board of Trustees (cf. section 6.3 and 6.4). Secular parties are therefore more usefully seen as the antithesis of Islamist parties.

It is worth noting that the LEP, interviewed in Section 4.2, assimilated into a liberal/secular party. In the 2011-2012 parliamentary elections, this party joined the main secular alliance in the elections: The Egyptian Bloc (el-Kutla el-Maṣriyya), which was led by el-Maṣriyyīn el-Aḥrār. On the other hand, it is easy to imagine Malamih’s El-Sharkawi at home in the liberal, leftist ideology of ‘The Revolution Continues’ alliance which attracted revolutionary youths and included a number of communist and Marxist parties in addition to parties stemming from opposition movements. The alliances of the Egyptian Bloc and The Revolution Continues represent the bottom and second to the bottom categories in the spectrum respectively. This is in line with the survey findings where pro-‘āmmiyā attitudes clustered around these two categories.

One might ask: but where does the pan-Arab / Egyptian separatist dimension figure into this spectrum? The answer is that it doesn’t. In the lead-up to the 2011-2012 parliamentary elections, parties with a pan-Arab or Egyptian nationalist ideology

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83 The National Democratic Party was the ruling political party – led by Mubarak himself. It was dissolved following the 2011 revolution.
were scattered all over the political map, making it impossible to depict them in this spectrum. It is worth noting however that while there were a handful of parties with explicit pan-Arab ideology (both on the left and the right, but mostly Islamist or Islamist-leaning rather than secular), there were no explicitly Egyptian separatist parties. Instead, there were parties which touted ‘Egyptian identity’, most of which were either secular or secular-leaning, and significantly several were formed by former NDP members from the political right. It is therefore not entirely surprising that the survey participants with an Islamist political orientation were significantly more likely to indicate a pan-Arab stance in terms of Egypt’s relationship to the Arab World. Conversely, those at the secular end of the political orientation spectrum were more likely to indicate a separatist stance (cf. Figure 37, Section 5.5.2.5).

It is also worth noting that none of the pan-Arab parties which ran in the 2011-2012 parliamentary elections were considered major political players. Even the most prominent of these did not attempt to ‘sell’ pan-Arabism in their parliamentary campaigns. A good example is al-Karama party, the most prominent Nasserist and pan-Arab party on the political scene. Although not itself an Islamist party, in the 2011-2012 parliamentary elections, al-Karama was part of the Islamist F&J alliance. The founder of the party, Hamdeen Sabahy, joined the presidential race in 2012 and finished third in the first round with 20.7% of votes (2012 Presidential Elections Official Website, 2012)\(^{84}\). Arguably, what attracted his large voter base was not his pan-Arab ideology (which was not a prominent part of his campaign), but his leftist, socialist orientation. Indeed, Sabahi was famously supported by the ʿāmmiyya poet Abdel Rahman El-Abnoudi; what Sabahi and El-Abnoudi have in common is not pan-Arabism, but rather their leftist ideology.

It is also telling that out of the rankings for Egyptian, Arab and Muslim identities in the survey, Arab was by far the most likely to be ranked last while Muslim identity was most likely to be ranked first (Q42 in Appendix II). Moreover, while the rankings of Islamic and Egyptian identities correlate with pro-\textit{fushā} and pro-\textit{ʿāmmiyya} language attitudes respectively (Section 5.5.2.5), the ranking of Arab identity was not

\(^{84}\) Hamdeen Sabahy also ran in the 2014 presidential elections but withdrew before voting closed.
a significant explanatory variable. This appears to be in agreement with Phillips’ (2014: 143-144) observations about nationalism in the Arab World post-2011:

Islam, whether Sunni or Shi’a, appears the main source of mass identity and secularist opposition is framed through national rather than Arab discourses most visibly the post-2013 surge in secular Egyptian nationalism. Ironically the revolutions that New Arabism helped to spread may now create a world where it is no longer relevant.

In other words, if we are looking for an identity binary, then the prominent binary in Egyptian politics at present is not pan-Arabism vs. Egyptian separatism, but rather Islamic identity (which has an incidental pan-Arab element) vs. Egyptian identity. This sheds new light on Gamal El-Din’s statement that he ‘is neither [concerned with] Arab nationalism (qawmiyya ‘arabiyya) nor Egyptian nationalism (qawmiyya masriyya), but rather [with] Egyptian identity (hawiyya masriyya)’ (Section 4.2). It is significant that, despite his party’s clearly separatist nationalist views, Gamal El-Din expresses them in terms of Egyptian identity not Egyptian nationalism.

Further evidence for the salience of this Islamic/Egyptian binary can also be found in the difference between the 2012 and 2014 constitutions: the former implied an Islamic identity while the latter refers to ‘Egyptian identity’. This binary was also expressed in one of the survey comments (in SA):

Some of the other Arab countries want to stamp out the distinctive Egyptian identity by trying to spread Wahhabi thought, which is known as Salafism, to schemingly and spitefully forbid everything which distinguishes Egypt’s identity from other Arab countries. They do this with America’s help by deluding people that holding on to Egypt’s non-religious identity (from their point of view) would make it an easy target for American culture (liberalism).

The first sentence of the comment resonates closely with the views expressed by Malamih’s El-Sharkawi (cf. Section 4.3). The idea of an Arab identity which is nested within an Islamic identity also calls to mind Suleiman’s (2008) observation that Islamic nationalism can easily ‘fade into’ pan-Arab nationalism (cf. Section 3.3.2.2); except that in contemporary Egyptian politics the reverse appears to be true. On the other hand, the reactionary emphasis on Egyptian identity in post-Morsi social and political discourse highlights that this identity is more significantly defined, not in
terms of what it is, but in terms of what it isn’t. For example, the declared motives for changing the slogan of the 2014 Cairo Book Fair would imply that Egyptian identity is not a (predominantly) Islamist one. In particular, the current Egyptian government which stands on the right of the political map is keen to distance itself from the ideology of their Islamist predecessors. Hence, while the political right has traditionally been considered a champion of *fushā*, by applying the concept of alterity (cf. Section 3.3.2.3) to distance itself from Islamist ideology and shifting the emphasis to Egyptian identity, the current government is potentially signalling a significant shift in language ideology as well. That is, as the 2014 constitution indicates, it is difficult to reject an ideology without rejecting its symbols, and in the case of the Islamist ideology, language is a very important symbol.

6.3 Revisiting the Question of Power

So far in this chapter, I have been focussing on the political dimension of the language situation in Egypt. I now revisit the related question of power. In Section 3.2.5, I discussed the relationship between standard language and power. The section focused on political power, and I concluded by pointing to other forms of power which are related to language. I continue this discussion here. I will begin with Bourdieu’s concept of *symbolic power*: a kind of ‘soft power’; a “subordinate power” (1991: 170); an “invisible power which can be exercised only with the complicity of those who do not want to know that they are subject to it or even that they themselves exercise it” (1991: 64). The ramifications of this power can be political, social or economic, and a language through which this kind of power can be exercised is said to have ‘symbolic capital’. Bourdieu (1991: 170) provides this detailed explanation of symbolic power:

Symbolic power – as a power constituting the given through utterances, of making people see and believe, of confirming or transforming the vision of the world and, thereby, action on the world and thus the world itself, an almost magical power which enables one to obtain the equivalent of what is obtained through force (whether physical or economic), by virtue of the specific effect of mobilization – is a power that can be exercised only if it is *recognised*, that is, misrecognised as arbitrary. This means that symbolic power does not reside in ‘symbolic systems’ in the form of an
‘illocutionary force’ but that it is defined in and through a given relation between those who exercise power and those who submit to it, i.e. in the very structure of the field in which belief is produced and reproduced. (Emphases in original)

With this definition in the backdrop, the pertinent question is: can this concept be applied to the language situation in Egypt? In Section 3.4, I presented Haeri’s criticism of Bourdieu’s model of the linguistic marketplace, which itself relies on the notion of symbolic power:

All symbolic domination presupposes, on the part of those who submit to it, a form of complicity which is neither passive submission to external constraint nor a free adherence to values. The recognition of the legitimacy of the official language has nothing in common with an explicitly professed, deliberate and revocable belief, or with an intentional act of accepting a ‘norm’. It is inscribed, in a practical state, in dispositions which are impalpably inculcated, through a long and slow process of acquisition, by the sanctions of the linguistic market, and which are therefore adjusted, without any cynical calculation or consciously experienced constraint, to the chances of material and symbolic profit which the laws of price formation characteristic of a given market objectively offer to the holders of a given linguistic capital. (Bourdieu, 1991: 50-51)

Haeri (1996, 1997) presents a case against the applicability of the model in Egypt because foreign languages are accorded a higher value than the official language in the Egyptian linguistic marketplace. I argue here that an adaptation of the Bourdieuian model can actually provide a valuable way of understanding the power dynamics of the language situation in Egypt beyond the ḥāfa/āmmiyā dimension.

Wright refers to Phillipson (2000) who demonstrates how “English is associated with the reproduction and legitimating of power, both as the language of a dominant speech community internationally and as the language of elites in national contexts” (Wright, 2004: 169). This is the main premise for Haeri’s critique of Bourdieu’s framework of symbolic power: Bourdieu argues that the ‘dominant language’ is the language of the ‘dominant classes’, and therefore the language of highest symbolic capital. In fact, he equates legitimate language practices to “the practices of those who are dominant” (Bourdieu, 1991: 53). However, Haeri (2000: 69) notes that
“although the emergence and imposition of a standard variety always involves forms of power configured and exercised in different ways, this fact alone does not render them identical”. She argues rather convincingly that it is not fuṣḥā, the legitimate language, which holds the highest symbolic capital in Egypt, but European languages like English (Haeri, 1996; 1997).

While Haeri’s critique would appear to invalidate Bourdieu’s model altogether, appealing to wider sociological theory allows us to reconcile the theoretical terms laid out by Bourdieu with the linguistic reality described by Haeri. To accept that access to the labour market in Egypt is not solely controlled by government (cf. Section 3.4), is to accept that there is another group in society which exercises control over this access. In other words, there is more than just one dominant group; more than one elite. Elite can be defined here as a small group of society who have a disproportionately large amount of power, material or symbolic. On the one hand, there is the ruling ‘political elite’, those in government and those who possess political decision-making power. It is usually this group who are accorded with ‘dominance’ in society. However, there are other, equally important but often overlooked non-political elites; privileged groups “who can exercise any influence on those that govern and those who obey, either because of the moral authority they possess or because of the economic or financial power they possess” (Aron, 1988: 150, cited in Martin et al., 2006). Note how this definition is consistent with Bourdieu’s notion of symbolic power.

In Egypt, we can identify three “key elites” (cf. Etzioni-Halevy, 1993) who exercise substantial power over Egyptian social life: a ‘political elite’ (those who possess political power: the government and the state apparatus), an ‘economic elite’ (those

85 The concept of multiple elites or “elite pluralism” (Bealey, 1996) is a well-established sociological concept and it is beyond the scope of this thesis to provide a detailed review of it. However, a few notes can be made in passing: Multiple elites are seen as the product of the development of modern societies where power is no longer restricted to a single dominant group (Keller, 1963). They are particularly important in globalised societies (Martin et al., 2006). There is great variation in the literature regarding the nature and degree of autonomy of multiple elites (see Bealey, 1996 for a review). They are sometimes portrayed as part of the (socio-)political establishment, and other times as groups that the political establishment contends with. To add to the confusion, the term ‘elites’, in plural form and without a qualifier, is often used to mean multiple political elites. I adopt Bealey’s distinction between political (state) and non-political (non-state) elites.
who possess economic power, such as business tycoons and large multinational corporations), and a ‘moral elite’ (those who possess moral authority: religious scholars and institutions, especially al-Azhar). If we accept that there are multiple loci of power in the Egyptian context, then it must also follow that the language varieties present in the linguistic marketplace of Cairo can potentially have different kinds of symbolic capital.

At present, political power in Egypt resides with the same political elite who had a monopoly on this power when I started my research in 2010. It could be argued that the military establishment in Egypt never really lost their far-reaching authority and decision-making power in Egyptian politics over the past three years – even when they were not ruling the country, they were still part of the political elite. This was particularly clear in the military’s management of the transitions of authority in February 2011 and June 2013. The presidency in Egypt today – as it was in 2010 – is an extension of the influence of this powerful political establishment.

Before the 2011 revolution, the ruling regime in Egypt was characterised by linguistic conservatism, and for good reason. Influential politicians such as the then speaker of parliament Fathi Surur used “their expertise in SA to legitimise their political system, almost in the same way that priests in ancient Egypt monopolised certain aspects of knowledge to empower themselves” (Bassiouney, 2013), (cf. Section 3.2.5). In the interviews I conducted, it is telling that the pro-’āmmiya agents of change faced opposition from the government, while the pro-fuṣḥā ALCSs worked with the government. As the legitimate standard language of authority, fuṣḥā was clearly endowed with political capital. However, it is difficult to tell how valid and sustainable this symbolic capital is under the present government. That is, in seeking to distance itself from the previous MB regime the current government appears to be distancing itself from the symbols of Islamist ideology, which includes language (cf. Section 6.2). On the other hand, there is a clear political advantage in maintaining the old regime’s policies: by reproducing the symbolic capital of fuṣḥā as the legitimate standard language of authority, the regime would be reproducing its own legitimacy.
Another important group in Egyptian society is the moral elite. These are Islamic scholars who are seen as the caretakers of social morality. While Islamic scholars are generally aligned with political Islamists in matters of religion, they may not share the same political ideology. In fact, the most influential religious authority in Egypt, al-Azhar (which receives special mention in the 2012 and 2014 constitutions, cf. Section 6.2.1), is politically aligned with the state. By tapping into the associations of fuṣḥā as the language of Islamic morality, religious scholars endow fuṣḥā with moral capital. It is revealing that in the interview with the ALCSs, foreign languages were not just seen to undermine fuṣḥā, but social morality as well (Section 4.5).

Finally, there is the economic elite who control access to the highest paid jobs. The influence of the economic elite in Egypt has been growing since the introduction of Sadat’s open door policy which beckoned an age of privatisation policies and capitalism. The power of the economic elite in Egypt has more recently grown as a result of globalisation which is itself “definable as an erosion of the sovereignty of states and the growth of international organisations” (Wright, 2004: 160). It would therefore seem that the balance of powers is tipping in favour of the economic elite against the political elite.

Significantly, while access to the political and moral elites is strictly controlled, access to the economic elite is possible if one possesses the right symbolic capital: English (cf. Section 3.4). In other words, mastering fuṣḥā does not secure access to the political and moral elites but mastering English can facilitate access to the economic elite. In fact, it is not even necessary for the political and moral elites to use fuṣḥā themselves in order to assert its symbolic capital; they merely need to promote its ideological superiority. For instance Bassiouney (2013) notes that the same politicians who benefit from the legitimising capacity of fuṣḥā do not necessarily master it or even believe in its superiority. Similarly, the bigger role that ʿāmmiyya is playing in the discourse of Islamic scholars (Soliman, 2008) does not seem to contradict their exaltation of fuṣḥā. Given this reality, it is not entirely surprising that the same people who look to fuṣḥā with much pride and admiration, in looking out for the future of their children “behave rationally and realise that access to prosperity and upwards social mobility goes through access to the global market—
which today presupposes English” (Mejdell, 2006: 20). That access to English is linked to access to economic capital in Egypt is supported by the survey findings. The higher the participants’ SES, the more likely they were to report greater confidence in using English, greater importance of English at work and using English in written communication – which one begets the other is a moot point.

Another concept of relevance to the power structure in Egyptian society is that of the *counter-elite* who challenge the hegemony of the state or other dominant groups (Bottomore, 1964). In Egypt, opposition groups on the left of the political map represent a counter-elite; they do not recognise the symbolic capital possessed by the political elite and therefore, according to Bourdieu, cannot be dominated by it. In this light, the use of ʾāmmīyya in Egyptian opposition newspapers (Z. Ibrahim, 2010) and in a youth magazine with anti-regime political sympathies (Borg, 2007) on the one hand, and the pro-ʾāmmīyya bias of Malamih which is owned by a leftist political activist (Section 4.3) on the other, becomes more than just a happy coincidence: using ʾāmmīyya appears to be an act of linguistic resistance (cf. Section 6.4).

Another important counter-elite in Egypt is those who do not recognise the symbolic capital of the Islamic moral elite. This includes seculars and non-Muslims, most notably, the Coptic minority in Egypt. Since the moral elite derive their power from the legitimacy and authority of Islam, it follows that those who do not recognise the validity of Islam cannot be dominated by the symbolic power of the moral elite. In the same way that the ideal of fuṣḥā did not regulate the Middle Arabic writings of Christians and Jews (Hary, 1992); the religious argument for the superiority of fuṣḥā cannot be expected to persuade Egypt’s Copts. Coptic billionaire and media magnate, Naguib Sawiris – a proponent of ʾāmmīyya – is a case in point (cf. Section 6.4).

Figure 49 illustrates the relationship between the three key elites and the two counter-elites described in this section. The overlap between some of the circles is worth noting. In particular, the moral counter-elite overlap with both the economic elite (e.g. Sawiris), and with the political counter-elite (e.g. Malamih’s El-Sharkawi). Likewise, both the moral and political elites overlap with the economic elites. As explained above, for those in the overlapping area, pursuing English for economic
gains does not contradict the ideological exaltation of *fuṣḥā*. I have demonstrated how Bourdieu’s concept of symbolic power is applicable throughout this framework; what is central is whether or not this power is recognised. Moreover, the multiple loci of power in Egyptian society are a departure from Bourdieu’s model, but the symbolic power that the elites possess is exercised in similar ways: *fuṣḥā*, English and even *āmmiyya* are associated with different kinds of symbolic capital. It remains to be said that this adaptation – and its representation in the diagram below – is an attempt to illuminate the relationship between power and language in Egyptian society. However, like the political spectrum in Section 6.2.2, it is a simplification of a rich and complex reality.

Nevertheless, this interpretation reveals how language ideologies are embedded in power structures. When we take stock of the available positions within these structures and the language ideologies associated with them, we come to the realisation that “the available positions to which one can stake claim are limited” (Walters, 2008: 656). As Walters points out, “it is not simply that we, as members of a society, choose to subscribe to particular ideologies, including language ideologies,
but rather that, in a real sense, ideologies choose us, based on our position in the social order, our life experience, and our value commitments of various sorts” (ibid.). In the next section I use the information presented so far in this chapter and the findings of the survey and interviews to demonstrate how language choice can also retrospectively index ‘our position in the social order, our life experiences, and our value commitments’; that is, our identities.

6.4 Beyond the Diglossic Model: Functions vs. Indices

The foregoing discussions and the findings of the survey and interviews raise the pertinent question: is Ferguson’s diglossic model entirely invalid in contemporary Egyptian society? In Chapter 2, I provided a lengthy review of Ferguson’s model, the criticisms levelled against it and the conceptual expansions it underwent. I concluded by pointing to the fact that even proponents of the diglossic continuum and Arabic linguists who study mixed and intermediate varieties assume the existence of two H and L poles, and this appears to be reflected in Arabic speakers’ awareness. Indeed, this served as an underlying premise in my survey design. The interview findings also supported the existence of what are perceived to be, by-and-large, two different varieties, each associated with its own set of values, even if the terms used to refer to these varieties were not consistent. The interviewees were also aware of mixing between the two varieties, and in the interviews with Malamih and the ALCSs a distinct intermediate variety was referred to. Even a non-specialist like VE’s El-Sagheer was aware of the possibility of signalling increased formality/ informality by ‘calibrating’ the distance from either pole. In the interview with LEP where the existence of intermediate varieties was not acknowledged, this appeared to serve the party’s ideology: the more different the language spoken by Egyptians, the more distinct their identity from Arabs.

Hence, it is not really the validity of the H and L poles which is being questioned in the present section, but the validity of their functional distribution or domains of use. To Ferguson’s credit, we cannot assume that the sociolinguistic situation in the Arab World has remained constant since he wrote his landmark article on diglossia in 1959. In fact, in a later article, Ferguson himself dwells on the massive political and social changes which took place in the second half of the 20th century: independence
movements, increase in population and per capita income, mobility between Arab nations, etc. (Ferguson, 1997 [1990]). He argues that in the space of forty years (roughly 1950-1990) the Middle East had seen more change than in the preceding 400 years. One particular change he notes is the surge in literacy. When Ferguson wrote his ‘Diglossia’ article in 1959, “the Arab World was then a society like many others in Asia, where there had been literacy and works of literature for centuries in the society but where the society was overwhelmingly non-literate: there was only a thin layer of traditional scholars and people who used literacy in their own language in their daily lives” (Ferguson, 1997 [1990]: 263).

The role of mass literacy and mass media in creating new domains in Arabic has been highlighted by several scholars (see for example: Boussofara-Omar, 2008; Brustad, 2012; Eid, 2007). Although cultural and technological advancements have naturally created new domains for both fushā and āmmiyya, there is a tendency to view the use of āmmiyya in these domains as encroachments on the uses of fushā (cf. Boussofara-Omar, 2008). Brustad (2012) however asserts that “the new discursive spaces engendered by new media are giving rise to new speech communities, and new patterns of language use” – as well as shifting ideologies. She points to the “plethora of articles and television shows over the past 10 years or so on Arabic being in danger and under threat from various directions, at a time when standard Arabic is used and understood by more people than ever before in its history”, and contends that these have less to do with Arabic itself (as a linguistic system) being perceived as under threat, and more to do with the standard language ideology of Arabic being under threat (cf. Section 3.2.4). Perhaps this aptly frames what has been described as an increase in ‘defensive’ activity on the part of ALCSs (cf. Section 4.5).

While the fact that new domains have introduced new avenues for the use of fushā too is mostly overlooked, the fact that the nature of ‘traditional’ domains has changed appears completely so. That is, it is not at all uncommon to read in an article (scholarly or non-scholarly) about the use of āmmiyya in ‘domains traditionally reserved for fushā’. These domains are typically ‘written’ domains. What is not acknowledged, however, is that what counts as written today is much more diverse than ever before. Of course, one can still write a message using a paper and a pen,
but increasingly, we are ‘writing’ by typing, dialling, swiping, etc., and the nature of the medium in this now diverse written domain has a bearing on our language choices, as evidenced by the survey findings (cf. Section 5.5.1.3).

Returning to the question about the validity of Ferguson’s model then, the answer must not be read as an attempt to discredit the model, but an attempt to reinterpret it, fifty-five years later, in light of the huge social, cultural, political and economic changes in Egypt.

In a valuable book published recently, Bassiouney (2014) addresses the validity of Ferguson’s functional distribution in modern Egypt. She notes that “this function orientation relation between code and context is not enough in understanding diglossia” (Bassiouney, 2014: 108). Nevertheless, the functions can still be used as a general guide about the associations or indexes of fuṣḥā and ʿāmmiyya. Throughout this thesis, I have illustrated through the literature reviewed and the findings made and discussed that the three varieties – fuṣḥā, ʿāmmiyya and English – have multiple (and sometimes contradictory) associations. In Egypt, the associations of these language varieties allows speakers to “take advantage of the social, moral and political attributes of each variety” in order to achieve a range of communicative effects “from showing solidarity with the pan-Arab nationalist ideology to transgressing social and geographical boundaries by tapping into Western communicative styles” (Stadlbauer, 2010: 4). In other words:

... the selective use of language features from different varieties signals as much information as the propositional content of the message: choosing features from one variety over another is a significant marker indexing the position of the speaker in society, their knowledge of political and religious values, or their aspiration for social mobility. (Stadlbauer, 2010: 8)

Bassiouney (2014) uses the concept of language as an index to introduce a framework for understanding the role of language in identity construction in Egypt. The framework relies on the idea of language as resource, which Bassiouney adopts from Heller (2007). The underlying principle is that “whenever individuals use a linguistic resource ... they do so in order to take a stance, while simultaneously
appealing to linguistic ideologies and practices that reflect identity” (Bassiouney, 2014: 40). She elaborates:

The clearest evidence of the immanent role of “access to resources” as a marker of identity is in the way that Egyptian public discourse utilises language as a classification category, as a social variable that categorises a community, similar to ethnicity, locality, or historical context. Code-switching and code-choice are used in this case. That is, in the projection of public discourse, the code that one chooses reflects directly on how one positions her or himself in relation to others: as an insider or an outsider, as an Egyptian or as a foreigner, as an Egyptian with no affiliation to Egypt or as a loyal citizen, as a typical man in the street or as an Egyptian who does not share the same characteristics that unify Egyptians, and so on. (Bassiouney, 2014: 41)

Indexicality is premised on the notion that “a sign is indexical if it is related to its meaning, because it mostly co-occurs with the thing that it is taken to mean” (Bassiouney, 2014: 58). Bassiouney adopts the concept of indexical order introduced by Silverstein (2003) and elaborated by Johnstone et al. (2006). Central to this concept is that linguistic forms serve as non-referential indexes, presupposing and entailing social meaning. This social meaning “includes register, which refers to situational appropriateness; stance, which includes certainty and authority; and social identity, which includes class, ethnicity, and interactional role” (Bassiouney, 2014: 59).

Bassiouney applies these ideas to the language situation in Egypt, drawing a distinction between first order indexes – which she associates with language practices, habits and realities – and second order indexes – which she associates with language ideologies and attitudes. She makes a further distinction between direct and indirect second order indexes, the first are associated with language ideologies, and the second with attitudes. While I seek to build on Bassiouney’s framework, I have not retained this latter distinction because in some of the cases I present the ideologies and attitudes are too intertwined to make such a distinction.

At the level of first order indexes, Bassiouney notes that fuṣḥā “is associated with formality, abstract, and distant contexts, as well as written rather than spoken contexts”, while āmmiyya “is associated with informality, concrete, and intimate
contexts and tends to occur more in spoken than written contexts” (Bassiouney, 2014: 108). This formal/written association of fuṣḥā versus the informal/spoken association of ʿāmmiyya is the only similarity between Bassiouney’s indexes and Ferguson’s functions. Crucially, the indexes presented by Bassiouney are only associations rather than a deterministic distribution of roles. That is, while this thesis has already gone to great lengths to demonstrate that the written domain is not exclusive to fuṣḥā, it is not to say that the association between fuṣḥā and this domain does not hold. This was suggested by the survey findings where participants indicated significantly higher confidence and frequency of fuṣḥā use in written form compared to spoken form (cf. Section 5.5.1.1).

I retain Bassiouney’s spoken association for ʿāmmiyya, but I should point out that this is not as clear cut as fuṣḥā’s written association. Indeed, the survey findings suggest that ʿāmmiyya was significantly more likely than fuṣḥā to be selected when writing an email, text or even handwritten letter to a friend (cf. Section 5.5.1.3). It was only in the formal context of communicating with one’s superior at work or teacher/lecturer that fuṣḥā was more likely to be selected than ʿāmmiyya. Hence it would appear that the formality of the context has more salience than the written/spoken associations of fuṣḥā and ʿāmmiyya. This salience was not only clear in the survey results, but also in the interview with VE, where fuṣḥā and ʿāmmiyya were respectively referred to as ‘formal’ and ‘slang’ (Section 4.4). It was even suggested that ʿāmmiyya (in its most ‘slang’ rendition) could have associations of vulgarity. It could be argued that changing VE’s messages to ʿāmmiyya does not signal a change in the perceived informality of this variety. On the contrary, it is evident that the intent was to make the messages themselves less formal by capitalising on the informal association of ʿāmmiyya. One of the survey participants commented on this formality/informality binary (in SA):

No one speaks to others in fuṣḥā all the time; they would be seen as deranged or pretending to have meaningless superficial cultivation and they would become a joke to everyone, [while] in formal situations fuṣḥā is classier and more beautiful [than ʿāmmiyya]. In short, ʿāmmiyya and fuṣḥā are like classic and casual apparel; each has its time and use.
English on the other hand is not particularly associated with formal/informal situations or spoken/written use. However, the survey findings do suggest an association between English and writing in electronic mediums (texting and email). This is part of a broader ‘script divide’ where there was an apparent preference for the Latin script options in the electronic mediums, but a greater likelihood for the selection of the Arabic script options in the handwritten medium. This was particularly clear in the informal context of communicating with a friend (cf. Section 5.5.1.3).

Since first order indexes in Bassiouney’s framework also relate to language realities, we could add education system to the framework. As discussed in Section 3.4, and corroborated by the survey findings, in Egypt, the public school system has come to be associated with Arabic while the private school system has come to be associated with foreign languages, most notably English. Another item which might be added is the job market for these languages. While government jobs are the sector where competence of fuṣḥā would be valued, higher paying multinational corporations value competence in English (Section 3.4). An often overlooked sector where ʿāmmiyya could be valued is media and advertising, as indicated by the interview with VE (Section 4.4). Similarly, as suggested in the interview with the ALCSs (Section 4.5), there are distinct types of scholarship associated with Arabic and English. Arabic is associated with Islamic and heritage studies while English is associated with technological and scientific studies.

Given that the main concern of this thesis has been language ideology, it can make several contributions at the level of second order indexes. In terms of prestige, while fuṣḥā enjoys both sacred language and standard language prestige (sections 3.3.1.1 and 3.2.4), and English has Global language prestige (cf. Section 3.4), (Cairene) ʿāmmiyya – particularly spoken – enjoys both local and supra-local prestige (cf. sections 1.2 and 3.2.6). Its local prestige is evident in the interviews: Gamal El-Din refers to the ʿāmmiyya of Cairo as a source for a standardised EL and El-Sharkawi ‘corrects’ writing which is not in Cairene. Its (albeit exaggerated) supra-local prestige is also referenced by Gamal El-Din and El-Sharkawi. Even Tag El-Din refers to the regional prestige of ʿāmmiyya in the interview with the ALCSs.
In terms of age, the survey findings indicate a clear preference for the use of SA in written communication among older participants (Section 5.5.2.2). On the other hand, English has been associated with the tastes and consumer behaviour of young Egyptians (Aboelezz, 2012; Peterson, 2011). Youth consumption in Egypt has also been associated with LA (Aboelezz, 2012), an association evidenced in the survey findings by a clear preference for this variety among younger participants (Section 5.5.2.2). Similarly, ‘āmmiyya has been associated with the speech and writing of young Egyptians (Borg, 2007; Dahle, 2012; Rizk, 2007). The ‘generation’ mentioned in the slogan which used to appear on the cover of Ihna magazine – šōt gīl be-ḥālu (the voice of an entire generation) – coincides with the generation that Malamih targeted – the under-35s; the ‘Mubarak generation’ – and crucially, both Malamih and Ihna had a bias for ‘āmmiyya. It is also the generation that Naguib Sawiris’s “youth channel” with ‘āmmiyya news bulletins was intended for (Doss, 2010).

With regard to religion, it is hardly necessary to put a case for the association between fuṣḥā and Islam (but see Section 3.3.1.1 for a review). Fuṣḥā is also associated with being religious; that is, a religious Muslim. The fact that the notion of religiosity in Egyptian society is linked to Islam and excludes Copts ties in with the position of Islam as the dominant religion which defines religious morality and dominates the country’s religious identity. It is quite revealing for example, that in El Amrani’s (2011) political map, the “religious-secular” axis depicts Islamist vs. anti-Islamist parties at its poles. It was around the ‘secular’ pole that Coptic membership and votes coalesced (Marroushi, 2012). This links to the position of Copts in Egypt as a moral counter-elite (Section 6.3).

However, to understand the full symbolic loadings of ‘āmmiyya for Egyptian Copts, one needs to move from the religious paradigm to the national paradigm. While fuṣḥā is associated with pan-Arab and Islamic nationalisms, ‘āmmiyya is associated with Egyptian nationalism (Section 3.3.2.3). Egyptian nationalism has particular appeal to Egyptian Copts for two main reasons: on the one hand it provides an alternative means of national self-definition against Islamic and pan-Arab nationalisms (which are often conflated as demonstrated in Section 6.2), and on the other it promotes an Egyptian identity which emphasises continuity from ancient
Egyptian and Coptic civilisations, hence privileging Copts as rightful heirs of these civilisations. Central to this nationalism is the claim that ʿāmmiyya is a direct descendent of Coptic, bestowing symbolic importance on ʿāmmiyya for Copts.

Seen in this light, it becomes quite logical and understandable that the most separatist of Egyptian nationalists were Copts (Section 3.3.2.3), that many of the ‘Masry Wikipedians’ are Copts (Panović, 2010) and that an important pro-ʿāmmiyya agent of change who subscribes to Egyptian nationalist ideology, Naguib Sawiris, is also a Copt. Noting the role of Coptic users in *Wikipedia Masry*, Panović (2010: 100) states that this should not be underestimated: “Members of the minorities or marginalised groups tend to be more active in the field of identity politics, more eager to look for alternatives to practices and ideologies which members of the dominant group(s) might comfortably and unreflectively adhere to”.

The case of Naguib Sawiris is another example. It has been argued that Sawiris’s investments in several cultural and media (and now political) institutions is part of his attempt to counter ‘Egypt’s Islamisation’ and transport a vision of a ‘liberal Egyptian identity’ which is removed from Arab identity (Gemeinder, 2009). Sawiris’s pro-ʿāmmiyya stance was clear in his launch of the satellite channel OTV (now ONTV) in 2006 (Bassiouney, 2009, 2014; Doss, 2010). The channel, which was aimed at young people and carried the slogan*qanā ʿāmmiyya fi l-ʿāmmiyya* (a 100% Egyptian channel), introduced news bulletins in ʿāmmiyya for the first time (a domain traditionally associated with *fushā*). Very much like in the case of *Wikipedia Masry*, the actual product was not ‘pure’ ʿāmmiyya but ‘elevated ʿāmmiyya’; an intermediate level between *fushā* and ʿāmmiyya (Doss, 2010). It is worth noting that the association between the channel on the one hand and ʿāmmiyya and a young audience on the other is difficult to assert today. In 2009, Yosri Fouda, a former Al-Jazeera presenter joined ONTV. Fouda had already established an illustrious career as a news presenter, and consistent with the language policy of his former employers, he continued to use *fushā* in his programme on ONTV. Moreover, the channel gained wide viewership during and after the January 25 revolution for siding with the protestors and providing an alternative to the State media narrative. It
could be argued that ONTV today attracts both young and old viewers, albeit with a particular political ideology.

To understand the ideological significance of OTV/ONTV it is useful to dwell on a similar earlier project in Lebanon; that of the Lebanese channel, LBCI (Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation International). Established in 1991, the channel “is strongly connected to the Maronite-dominated Phalange Party, which is committed to maintaining a Lebanese identity for Lebanon in which the Maronites play a pivotal role” (Suleiman, 2006a: 131-132). Significantly, LBCI’s local news bulletin is broadcast mainly in Lebanese colloquial Arabic (Al Batal, 2002). Al Batal (2002: 112) relates this to a tension between the ideologies of “[pan-]Arabism” and “Lebanonism” where “the former ideology perceives Lebanon as an integral part of the Arab World both culturally and linguistically, while the latter stresses the cultural and linguistic uniqueness of Lebanon vis-à-vis the rest of the Arab World”. According to Suleiman (2006a: 132), while the former perceives Lebanon as “of the Arab Middle East”, the latter sees it as merely “in the Arab Middle East”. Clearly, there are many parallels between LBCI and OTV/ONTV; what makes them sociolinguistically interesting is “their symbiotic association with the centres of political power in the country” (Suleiman, 2006a: 131).

However, this is not to say that ventures such as OTV/ONTV and Wikipedia Masry are not met with resistance. Like some of the attacks on Salama Musa and Louis Awad which used their Coptic identity to explain their linguistic ideology and accuse them of ‘conspiracy’, both OTV/ONTV (Bassiouney, 2009) and Wikipedia Masry (Panović, 2010) were the subject of such accusations because of their association with Coptic founders. It could be argued that such accusations serve to strengthen the ideological association between Copts and ‘āmmiyya in a cyclical manner.

English is also often associated with ‘conspiracy’. This has partly to do with the ‘colonial hangover’ (Section 3.3.2.1) and the association between English and colonialism. This was clearly evidenced in the interview with the ALCSs (Section 4.5). This association was also expressed by one of the survey participants (in SA):
Here in Egypt we do not use the Arabic language (اللغة العربية) in our daily conversations. This owes to the cultural invasion from Europe in an attempt to eliminate our identity and replace Arabic with English and French, so you find that the Egyptian child speaks English and does not know Arabic.

On a different level, English is also indexical of national disloyalty. Bassiouney (2012, 2014) demonstrates how the identity of protesters in Tahrir Square was questioned during the 2011 revolution. Their linguistic practices were used to discredit them and claim they were conspiring against Egypt: they were not ‘real’ Egyptians because ‘they speak English language very well’ (Bassiouney, 2012: 113).

The national identities indexed by ʿāmmiyya, fuṣḥā and English are each tied to specific world orientations. While ʿāmmiyya is associated with a worldview oriented towards the Egyptian territories, and fuṣḥā is associated with a view oriented towards the Arab and Islamic worlds, English is associated with a Global, cosmopolitan worldview (Peterson, 2011). Nationalism aside, ʿāmmiyya and fuṣḥā can also index political orientation as outlined in Section 6.2.

In terms of social orientation, the religious associations of fuṣḥā have made it indexical of a conservative social outlook, while the worldly associations of English have made it associated with a liberal social outlook. On the flip side, fuṣḥā is indexical of Islamic and Eastern morality while English is indexical of Western (im)morality. This binary was particularly clear in the interview with the ALCSs where the use of English was constructed as a moral threat (Section 4.5).

In the same vein, fuṣḥā can be said to be indexical of tradition and of Arabic and Islamic heritage. English on the other hand is associated with technology and modernity. This was potently expressed by Mustafa where he indicated that someone like Salah who is well versed in Arabic language and heritage studies would not be deemed educated and modern unless he demonstrated a linguistic command of English, highlighting the cultural capital of English (Section 4.5). Of course, the association of English with technology and modernity also endows it with commercial capital. As Stadlbauer (2010: 15) observes, “English in particular conveys an international feel, and some ideologies associated with commercial products are
as important as the linguistic meaning potentially conveyed”, indeed, more often than not “the use of English as a symbol of modernity is more important than communicating through it” (Pimentel, 2000: 211, cited in Stadlbauer, 2010). This was particularly clear in the interview with VE (Section 4.4). The use of English to brand some of VE’s products (like ‘mini-call’) did not seem to contradict VE’s concern that a large proportion of their customer base came from humble backgrounds and had little or no education. That is, the use of English here is not communicative, but a strategic choice which capitalises on the positive commercial value of the commodity of English which is linked to technology and modernity.

The association between English and modernity also entails an association with technological and scientific innovation. Similarly, ʿāmmiyya indexes freshness and linguistic innovation (Bassiouney, 2014; Borg, 2007; Rizk, 2007); it is seen as flexible and malleable, while fuṣḥā is seen as inflexible and static, indexing (particularly linguistic) rigidity. The binary of the flexibility of ʿāmmiyya and inflexibility of fuṣḥā comes up in the interviews. However, while the flexibility of ʿāmmiyya is positively valued in the interviews with LEP and Malamih (Sections 4.2 and 4.3 respectively), it is negatively valued in the interview with the ALCSs (Section 4.5).

Bassiouney (2014) also points to the association between ʿāmmiyya and political opposition (cf. Section 6.2.2). In its capacity as standard and official language, fuṣḥā is associated with the hegemony of the state. Hence, the very act of rejecting the linguistic hegemony of the state becomes a symbolic act of political resistance. While the state uses fuṣḥā to signify authority and legitimacy, those opposed to the state use it to signify authenticity and credibility. Fuṣḥā, which has come to be associated with government bureaucracy and repression, is countered by ʿāmmiyya which is forging an association with resistance and dissent.

Bassiouney (2014) makes a compelling case for the association between ʿāmmiyya and authenticity. She cites evidence from recent Egyptian movies where the protagonists are in search of their identity; their language changes as they go through various stages of self-discovery (indexing different identities), but it is only when they ‘find themselves’ that they speak in ʿāmmiyya alone. This perception of
ʿāmmiyya as an index of authenticity also comes up in the interviews, particularly with Malamih, where El-Sharkawi constructs ʿāmmiyya as an authentic code which has the capacity to unite Egyptians, and which people on the streets can relate to. On the other hand, English is inauthentic and has a dividing capacity (Section 4.3).

The ‘inauthenticity’ of English is also addressed by Peterson (2011: 216) who refers to the struggle of young Egyptians to be at once ‘Egyptian and traditional’ and ‘cosmopolitan and modern’: “This balance is difficult to find because the communities that define modern and global deem Egypt to be backward, while the communities that define local and traditional deem many of the styles adopted by cosmopolitans to be inauthentic”. English is associated with adopting foreign mannerisms “which smack of artifice” (Peterson, 2011: 104); it is associated with pretence; with not being genuine. It is this association, and the identity struggle highlighted by Peterson, which are indexed in the song lyrics quoted at the beginning of this chapter.

The framework of indexes constructed in the course of this section is summarised in Table 9. That a single code can simultaneously carry positive and negative indexes is a hallmark of the framework. Indeed, the very same index can be perceived positively or negatively based on context and stance. For example, the index of Egyptian nationalism can be perceived positively by some but negatively by others. The value of this framework is that it allows us to appreciate the scope of the indexical pool of ʾfuṣḥā, ʿāmmiyya and English in Egypt. In turn, this appreciation helps us understand the often reported rift between language perceptions and realities, and language ideologies and practices (cf. Section 3.1).

86 The lyrics are from a song by the popular Egyptian youth band Cairokee. The band rose to fame in the wake of the 2011 revolution and is known for its political songs.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>1st ORDER INDEXES</strong> (PRACTICES AND REALITIES)</th>
<th><strong>EA</strong></th>
<th><strong>SA</strong></th>
<th><strong>ENG</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>FORMALITY</strong></td>
<td>Informal</td>
<td>Formal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SPEECH/WRITING</strong></td>
<td>Speech</td>
<td>Writing</td>
<td>Electronic writing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SCHOOL SYSTEM</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Private</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>JOB MARKET</strong></td>
<td>Media and advertising</td>
<td>Government jobs</td>
<td>Multinational companies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SCHOLARSHIP</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>Heritage studies + Islamic scholarship</td>
<td>Technology studies + scientific scholarship</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>2nd ORDER INDEXES</strong> (IDEOLOGIES AND ATTITUDES)</th>
<th><strong>EA</strong></th>
<th><strong>SA</strong></th>
<th><strong>ENG</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>PRESTIGE</strong></td>
<td>Local and supra-local prestige</td>
<td>Sacred and Standard language prestige</td>
<td>Global language prestige</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AGE</strong></td>
<td>Young</td>
<td>Old</td>
<td>Young</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RELIGION</strong></td>
<td>Coptic</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secular</td>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>Secular</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NATIONALISM</strong></td>
<td>Egyptian nationalism</td>
<td>Arab nationalism</td>
<td>Colonialism (national disloyalty)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>WORLD ORIENTATION</strong></td>
<td>Egyptian territories</td>
<td>Arab World</td>
<td>Islamic World</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>POLITICAL ORIENTATION</strong></td>
<td>Left</td>
<td>Right</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secular/Liberal</td>
<td>Islamist</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SOCIAL ORIENTATION</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MORALS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>Islamic/Eastern values (morality)</td>
<td>Western values (immorality)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MODERNITY</strong></td>
<td>Fresh (social relevance)</td>
<td>Traditional (heritage)</td>
<td>Modern (technology)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CREATIVITY</strong></td>
<td>(Linguistic) innovation</td>
<td>Rigidity</td>
<td>(Scientific) innovation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SOCIO-POLITICAL RELATIONS</strong></td>
<td>Authenticity/credibility</td>
<td>Authority/legitimacy</td>
<td>Inauthenticity/pretence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Resistance/dissent</td>
<td>Bureaucracy/repression</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9. The indexes of fuṣḥā, āmmiyya and English in Egypt
Drawing on the associations of different codes, language can become a classification category (Bassiouney, 2014), and hence be used to produce stereotypes; that is, third order indexes (Johnstone et al., 2006). Bassiouney provides many examples of such stereotypes in the movies she analyses: such as the Islamist who speaks in *fuṣḥā* and the cosmopolite who code-switches between *ʿāmmiyya* and English. Such stereotypes rely on “a shared ideological model” with the audience (Bassiouney, 2014: 195). That is not to say however that stereotypes – how certain groups are perceived – necessarily reflect reality. The popular depiction of Islamists as persons who speak in *fuṣḥā* in Egyptian cinema and cartoons relies on the ideological association of *fuṣḥā* with Islamism. In reality, anyone who goes about their daily business constantly speaking in *fuṣḥā* would be a true oddity, Islamist or not!

The short-lived elected parliament of 2012 presents a particularly interesting case study. The parliament housed an Islamist majority, and yet one particular MP, Amr Hamzawy, stood out for speaking *fuṣḥā* most consistently and correctly. Hamzawy was not an Islamist, but a secular, liberal MP. It could be said that Hamzawy was using *fuṣḥā* to index formality and authority in a formal situation where authority is valued. Conversely, despite promoting *fuṣḥā* ideologically in the 2012 constitution, the MB’s F&J party were using written *ʿāmmiyya* in their political campaigns (Bassiouney, 2014) in what appeared to be an attempt to tap into the indexes of authenticity, freshness and young age to attract – especially young – voters.

The multiple indexes of English also became apparent in Egyptian political life over the past few years. While English was used to discredit the protestors who spoke it fluently in Tahrir Square (Bassiouney, 2012; 2014), the MB president Muhammad Morsi was widely ridiculed in early 2013 when, during a visit to Germany, he made “scandalous” attempts to speak in English, demonstrating his less-than-impressive command of the language (Al Arabiya, 2013). To understand why both fluency and lack of fluency in English were valued negatively, we must look at the range of indexes associated with English in Egypt. In the case of the protestors, the indexes of inauthenticity and national disloyalty were invoked, while in Morsi’s case, the indexes of modernity and cosmopolitanism are invoked – that is, Morsi’s lack thereof.
The findings of the survey and interviews also offer examples of discrepancy between language ideology and practice. While the participants’ ideologies were significant predictors of their language attitudes, the relationship between ideologies and language practices was not direct. In informal written communication, political conservatism, viewing Egypt as an integral part of the Arab World and having a low ranking of Egyptian identity generally correlated with selecting SA. Conversely, political liberalism, having a separatist view towards the Arab World and a high ranking of Egyptian identity – all variables which correlated with pro-‘āmmiyya attitudes – did not correlate with choosing ‘āmmiyya in written communication. They only correlated with not choosing fushā. Moreover, there was no significant relationship between political ideology and language choices in formal written communication: here, the first order index of formality appeared to trump second order ideological indexes in favour of SA and English.

A related example is Gamal El-Din’s use of fushā in the interview despite his pro-‘āmmiyya ideological position (Section 4.2). Gamal El-Din’s use of fushā’s evokes authority and legitimacy which in turn projects the image of the knowledgeable expert. Ironically, in using fushā while advocating ‘āmmiyya, Gamal El-Din is in fact, to borrow Bourdieu’s terms, producing and reproducing “the game and its stakes by reproducing ... the practical commitment to the value of the game and its stakes which defines the recognition of legitimacy” (Bourdieu, 1991: 58). In other words, while Gamal El-Din is petitioning for ‘āmmiyya as a legitimate language, his actual practice is reinforcing the legitimacy of fushā.

### 6.5 Summary

This chapter has sought to incorporate the findings of the survey and interviews into the existing body of knowledge about the language situation in Egypt while simultaneously bringing in new artefacts of knowledge for a more up-to-date picture of events. My purpose was not simply to discuss my findings, but to offer meaningful ways of viewing these findings in light of other contributions to the field.

In answering the final research question I have attempted to use my findings to further our knowledge of the language situation in Egypt by: (a) outlining the
changing political landscape in Egypt and relating my findings to the politicised issue of language and identity; (b) using the findings to adapt Bourdieu’s concept of symbolic power to the language situation in Egypt by proposing a model which incorporates multiple power elites with different types of symbolic capital; (c) addressing the relevance of Ferguson’s distribution of diglossic functions in modern Egypt and building on Bassiouney’s (2014) orders of indexicality as an alternative, where I incorporate my findings into the indexes.
7 Conclusion

“THERE’S BEEN SOMETHING DIFFERENT, SOMETHING VERY SPECIAL, ABOUT THE QUALITY OF THE ATTENTION THE EGYPTIAN REVOLUTION HAS ATTRACTION: IT’S BEEN — PERSONAL.”

Ahdaf Soueif (2012: 183), Cairo: My city, our revolution

I started the thesis by pointing to the special status of Egypt in sociolinguistic studies. Not only is EA considered one of the most well-known colloquial Arabic varieties in the Arab World, but the language situation in Egypt is one of the most studied cases of Arabic diglossia. However, the political upheavals of the past few years have given Egypt a fresh relevance and lure, not only to sociolinguists but to scholars from an array of disciplines. While Egypt’s moment in the media spotlight may have passed, it does not look like research on Egypt will diminish any time soon. Keeping abreast of all the new literature which has emerged about Egypt in the past few years was a particular challenge, but I have sought to make this thesis as relevant and as up-to-date as possible at the time of completion.

The time period during which this project was undertaken presented some serious hurdles. When the 2011 revolution took place, I was already more than a year into my research; I had already conducted the interviews and piloted the survey (the final version of which was originally scheduled to go live at the end of January 2011). A year of uncertainty followed. Less than a year after I had conducted the interviews, two of my ‘agents of change’ – Malamih and LEP – had become defunct. I saw my research in real danger of losing relevance. At the same time, the situation in Egypt was still unfolding – it arguably still is. The outcomes were not clear and there was the other danger that any data I collected just then would have limited relevance in the long run.

But despite the inevitable delays and among the moments of political and scholarly uncertainty, I also recognised that this unfolding situation presented unique research opportunities, and I was keen to seize these. The survey – which had to undergo major revisions – could now incorporate political orientation. Moreover, the rapid
rise in the number of Twitter users following the 2011 revolution made it a valuable platform for distributing the survey. My challenge then was to determine a period of relative political calm to launch the survey. I decided that the 2012 presidential elections would be my cut-off point, and indeed, the final survey went live from the 25th of October 2012 to the 5th of February 2013. Six months later, I was confronted with yet another regime change!

In the end I accepted this project for what it had become; from a study about language change, to a study of change amid change. I decided to shed my concern about ‘relevance’. Gradually, this gave way to recognition that both the interviews and the survey derive value from their timing. If I were to re-launch the survey today, I would likely have to scrap the dimension of political ideology completely. The situation now may not be the same as the situation in 2010 six months before the 2011 revolution, or in 2012 months after Morsi was elected to power, but it is precisely because these situations cannot be recreated that this data is now important. I ultimately decided to present the interviews as they were, for what they were. The timing of this research has inevitably become part of its essence.

A direct influence of the period in which this research was conducted is the fact that ideology came to be a defining component. The unique opportunity to study political ideology and relate it to language ideology shaped the central contribution of this thesis. Somewhere along the way, my research also caught the ‘identity bug’. That the question of identity features so prominently in this thesis is at once a reflection of its inextricable link to language ideology as well as its salience in Egyptian public and political discourse at the time of writing. I reflect on my own identity as a researcher in Section 7.2 and identify areas for future work in Section 7.3, but first, I highlight the main contributions and limitations of this thesis in Section 7.1.

7.1 The Main Contributions

The main contributions of this thesis fall into three categories: findings, analytical contributions and theoretical contributions.
7.1.1 Findings

In terms of findings, the interviews in Chapter 4 capture the ideological arguments in the discourse of pro-ʿāmmiyya agents of change vis-à-vis the arguments of pro-fuṣḥā resisters of change. Through discourse analysis, I have demonstrated how the topoi of superiority, unity, authenticity, purity, continuity, competition and conspiracy are invoked through language myths in the discourse of both agents and resisters of change. Significantly, I have shown through the interview with VE that not all pro-ʿāmmiyya change entails a pro-ʿāmmiyya ideology in the conventional sense. Moreover, I have shown that while there is overlap between Malamih and LEP’s pro-ʿāmmiyya ideologies, there were also significant differences in their arguments.

One limitation of the interview findings is that they can only account for the motives of the interviewed agents of change. Although the interviews appear to capture prominent pro-ʿāmmiyya arguments, it is likely – especially in light of the discussions in Chapter 6 – that interviewing different agents of change will point to different motives. Another limitation in Chapter 3 relates to the very conceptualisation of agents and resisters of change. The idea was that pro-ʿāmmiyya agents seek to change the linguistic situation by expanding the role of ʿāmmiyya in Egyptian society while resisters try to preserve the status quo. However, this can be misleading as it implies that only agents of change have agency while resisters of change are passive actors. The interview findings show that this is not true: the ALCSs are also actively seeking to expand and reinforce the use of fuṣḥā in Egyptian society. This is particularly evidenced by their attempts to promote the spoken use of fuṣḥā. Perhaps a more apt conceptualisation would be to depict agents and resisters as forces of change and counter change. This would capture the ‘defensive’ nature of the ALCSs’ activities which was noted in the interview.

The survey in Chapter 5 provides rich results which illuminate the relationship between identity and language attitudes and practices. In terms of language use, the most salient identity variables were language of education and SES, which correlated significantly with participants’ responses to the paired questions on Arabic and English and to the questions on language choice in written communication. Overall, foreign language-educated participants and participants with higher SES were more
likely to complete the survey in English and to report higher confidence and frequency in using English. They were also more likely to report greater importance for English at work. Conversely, Arabic-educated participants and participants with lower SES were more likely to complete the survey in Arabic. Arabic-educated participants reported higher confidence in using Arabic and higher frequency in using written Arabic. The findings also showed an interesting ‘script divide’ in the choices of participants in written communication based on SES and language of education: foreign-language educated participants and participants with higher SES were more likely to favour Latin script options (English, LA, English mixed with LA), while Arabic-educated participants and participants with lower SES were more likely to favour Arabic script options (SA, EA, SA+EA). Age was also a significant predictor of SA and LA use. Older participants were more likely to choose SA in written communication and not to choose LA or English mixed with LA. They were also more likely to have negative attitudes towards LA.

The political ideology variables (except the ranking of Arab identity) were significant predictors of language attitudes. Overall, participants at the conservative end of the political spectrum, those who had a pan-Arab national orientation, and those who had a low rank for Egyptian identity (and in some cases, high rank for Muslim identity), were more likely to perceive the recent changes as a threat to the Arabic language. Conversely, participants at the liberal end of the political spectrum, those with a separatist national orientation, and those who had a high ranking of Egyptian identity were more likely to view pro-ʻāmmiyya changes positively. The relationship between political ideology and language use however was not straightforward.

There are a number of limitations to the survey findings which I discuss in detail in Section 5.6. Some design flaws were only detected during analysis. The self-reporting nature of surveys makes it important to highlight that the language practices questions are tied to participants’ understanding of what constitutes fusḥā and ʻāmmiyya. Finally, although the sample was generally diverse and the results were highly reliable, the method used limits the generalisability of the findings.
7.1.2 Analytical contributions

This thesis makes two main analytical contributions. The first contribution lies in expanding Eisele’s topoi in the dominant regime of practice about Arabic: Eisele proposed four topoi (unity, purity, continuity and competition), to which I add superiority, authenticity and conspiracy. I used Eisele’s approach in conjunction with Kelsey’s discourse mythological approach, a CDA approach with a particular focus on the construction of myths. Marrying the two approaches provides a powerful analytical framework for the study of language ideologies about Arabic.

The second analytical contribution was in introducing the two-dimensional political orientation spectrum representing the dominant political orientations in contemporary Egyptian politics. This spectrum seeks to simplify a complex reality for the sake of quantitative analysis. The symmetry and ordinality of the categories within the spectrum have made it workable for statistical analysis.

7.1.3 Theoretical contributions

In answering the final research question and attempting to incorporate my findings into the existing knowledge about the language situation in Egypt, I have made two theoretical contributions. The first is offering a fresh perspective on the relationship between language and power in Egypt. Here, I integrated Bourdieu’s theory of symbolic power with the sociological concepts of multiple elites and counter-elites. I argued that there were three key elites in Egyptian society with different symbolic capital associated with them: the political elite (who grant fuṣḥā political symbolic capital), the moral elite (who grant fuṣḥā moral symbolic capital) and the economic elite (who grant English economic symbolic capital). In addition, there are two counter-elites – the political counter-elite and the moral counter-elite – both of whom use ūmmiyya to challenge the political and moral elites respectively.

The second theoretical contribution was to expand the framework of first and second order indexes developed by Bassiouney (2014) for the language situation in Egypt. Here I used the literature and my own findings to widen the pool of indexes of fuṣḥā, ūmmiyya and English.
7.2 Looking Back: reflecting on the researcher’s position

The notion of reflexivity is gaining wider currency in social sciences and there is pressure on researchers who study topics such as ideology and identity to address the role of their own identities. Indeed, this is not only desirable but necessary if a researcher’s claims of objectivity are to be taken seriously.

Suleiman (2006b) provides an excellent discussion on the importance of reflexivity. He notes that “for some scholars – particularly linguists – writing about identity may in some sense be driven by personal concerns, even anxieties, about their own personal identity. Writing about identity, a scholar may in fact use the occasion, knowingly or unknowingly, to grapple with issues of personal identity” (2006b: 51). Suleiman provides examples of how “the personal and the scholarly dimensions of a person’s identity can interact with each other in discussions of language and identity” (2006b: 52). He adds that “constructing or deconstructing linguistic identity in scholarly discourses of this kind therefore has great significance because it engages and links that which is interior to the self in the realm of personal identity with what is exterior to it in the social domain of professional and collective identity” (ibid.). He states: “I believe it is important to highlight this link because it raises questions about the nature of ‘science as practice’, in particular about the meaning and limits of ‘objectivity’ in scientific inquiry” (ibid.).

Addressing the quest for objectivity in studies of ideology, Kelsey (2014) notes that “ideology should not only be referred to negatively in accusation or opposition”; “if one criticises something for its ideological intentions, a neutral approach to ideology accepts that one’s own argument might also be ideologically influenced”. This acceptance, according to Kelsey, is conducive of objectivity:

This approach means that the analyst does not need to claim any freedom from ideology; there is an open acceptance that our own perceptions, critiques and ideas are equally influenced by ideology. But since ideology is not an exclusively negative term, it is this neutral approach that exempts the analyst from accusations of hiding their own ideologies behind claims of intellectual or analytical superiority or objectivism.
Hence, while recognising the ‘limits of objectivity’, the very path to objectivity begins by reflecting on my own identity and ensuring a ‘neutral approach to ideology’. I cannot deny the influence of my own personal identity in this research – as an Egyptian and a Muslim, and as an Arabic-speaker with a Western education and an ‘Arab’ upbringing. This identity is arguably what led me to this research topic. Would I have chosen to study the language situation in Egypt if I did not have these linguistic and national ties to Egypt? Likely not. Eisele (2003: 49) – whose own writings provide an excellent model for the reflexive spirit which should characterise research of language ideology – refers to the “‘Europeanist’ view of language, espoused by Arabs trained in the West”. It is a description which probably captures my position.

I consider myself an insider looking from the outside. My position as an ‘insider’ allows me to understand some of the intricacies of the language situation in Egypt, while looking from the outside gives me enough detachment to see aspects of the wider picture that I might have missed were I looking from the inside. In a period when it had become virtually impossible for anyone with personal ties to Egypt not to develop strong political opinions and ideological alignments; being on the outside has made it all a little less ‘personal’.

Throughout the various stages of my research, I have tried to shelve my own ideological baggage: my goal has been not to make ideological judgments but to understand the very workings of language ideology. It is for this reason that I do not evaluate the accuracy of the language myths in the interviews. This was a particular challenge when conducting the actual interviews. On multiple occasions, I had to suppress my scholarly intuition to question the accuracy of some of the arguments while simultaneously probing for elaboration. I reminded myself that I was not there to evaluate the validity of these arguments; the arguments were clearly valid to the interview subjects and this is what mattered. This is my personal interpretation of a ‘neutral approach to ideology’.

However, I became wary in the course of my research that how I saw myself and how others saw me were two different things. In the survey, participants saw an information page at the beginning where I presented myself as an Egyptian...
researcher, and my institutional affiliation indicated that I was studying in the UK. The information page also included a link to my university webpage where the participant would have been greeted with a picture of a woman in a headscarf which does not only immediately identify me as Muslim, but also indexes religious conservatism. As I have demonstrated in Chapter 6, such an identity is readily associated with a pro-
\textit{fushā} language ideology. This might explain why many of the survey participants thanked me in their comments for ‘looking out for Arabic’. This is a sample of such comments:

\begin{quote}
\textit{I would like to thank the person who has prepared this study and wish them luck, and that they play a role in nurturing and enriching the Arabic language as it is in constant decline’} (SA)
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\textit{I am happy to have participated in the survey so that Arabs may know [that] by abusing and scorning the Arabic language and provocatively using the English language they are contributing to the destruction of their Arabic language and their civilisations’} (SA + EA)
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\textit{All thanks for [giving] this attention to the language of the Quran which if we did not master we would not [be able to] understand the words of our almighty Lord’} (SA)
\end{quote}

On the other hand, some participants left ‘defensive’ comments such as the following:

\begin{quote}
I disagree with calling it Egyptian Arabic, lots of linguists would place our language as a language on its own. it has a very big component of coptic vocabulary and its grammer is mainly coptic. it should be called the egyptian language.
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
I would like to point out that I believe that spoken varieties of languages are legitimate languages. The use of Egyptian Arabic (EA) in printed matter should be seen as normal, rather than a threat to Standard Arabic. Finally, even though I do not use what you call Franco Arabic, it seems to be a handy way for young people to communicate in EA using the Latin alphabet.
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
Egyptian Arabic is so natural I no longer think of it being used extensively as a phenomenon anymore. It’s good. And no worries for it as being a threat to the Standard Arabic. Teach Standard Arabic correctly at schools first and then talk about threats!
\end{quote}
It appeared that participants with a pro-

\textit{fuṣḥā} language ideology assumed that I

shared the same ideology, while participants with a pro-

\textit{ʿāmmiyya} language ideology assumed that I was opposed to their ideology. Needless to say, the codes used to write these comments are significant. Comments like this highlight the inseparability of the researcher’s scholarly and personal identities. They also point to the power of indexicality. In the same way that language use can index identity, identity can index language ideology: I did not need to express my language views to be associated with a pro-

\textit{fuṣḥā} ideology; I merely needed to \textit{be} who I was. Walters’ (2008: 656) words that “in a real sense, ideologies choose us” resonate strongly indeed (cf. Section 6.3).

7.3 Looking Forward: avenues for future research

The work presented in this thesis is not meant to be the final stroke; it is an invitation for further research into a generally well-studied language situation, but in specific areas where research is still wanting. While work like Bassiouney’s (2012; 2013; 2014) provides some way forward in studying the relationship between language and politics in post-2011 Egypt, research in this area is still in its infancy and will likely take some years to mature, especially alongside a turbulent political situation. I hope that the ways I have proposed to make sense of this situation will inspire other researchers to offer their contributions. There are two particular areas in need of research which I have flagged in my discussions. The first is the relevance of pan-

Arabism in contemporary Egypt and the Arab World and how this relates to language. The second is how the language ideologies of the traditional political right are evolving in post-MB Egypt. This includes how ‘Egyptian identity’ is constructed at the official level by a government which is keen to distance itself from Islamist ideology. More research into the area of identity politics in Egypt is generally needed.

Another area where research is urgently needed relates to how persons with limited or no literacy interact with technology in Egypt. In Chapter 5, I presented clear evidence that there was a subset of mobile users – and possibly Internet users – with little or no literacy in the country. This was supported by the findings of the interview with VE (Section 4.4). That such persons use technologies which presuppose at least a basic ability to read and write challenges our very understanding of literacy.
Research is clearly needed to shed light on the ‘literacy’ practices of such technology users and how this links to the diglossic nature of their language community.

There is also a dire need, not for research, but to make the research on the Arabic language available in the Arabic language. As noted in Section 3.3.1.2, there is no shortage of interest in the language question in Egypt, and in the Arab World more broadly. However, this interest is not matched by the availability of scholarly work which addresses this interest in Arabic. Scholarly works in Arabic on the language situation in the Arab World are scant, and even more so scholarly works which are pitched at a non-specialist audience. Even where such works exist, they usually belong to the ‘dominant regime of practice’ about Arabic (Eisele, 2000, 2002, 2003), alienating those who do not subscribe to their ideology. The lack of Arabic linguistics research published in Arabic has created an intellectual void which has been filled by ‘folk linguistics’ (cf. Suleiman, 2013a); the work of non-specialists and language aficionados who contribute to the perpetuation of language myths such as those expressed in Chapter 4.

On the other hand, research published in English about Arabic and on the language situations in the Arab World is incessantly growing. This is evidenced by the rise in the number of conferences, journals and book series dedicated to these topics in the West. Much of this research has been fuelled by ‘Arabs trained in the West’; native Arabic speakers with insider knowledge of the language situations they research. Having identified myself as one of these researchers, I feel that we now have a choice: we can continue to talk about Arabic in English amongst ourselves, occasionally listening in on the conversations in Arabic and referring to them, or we can finally start contributing to these conversations.

Finally, it is important to point to research which is already underway. During the latter stages of my project I joined ‘The Ideology and Sociology of Change in the Arab World’ project team. The project is funded by the Norwegian Research Council and includes partners from a number of universities across the world. In addition to the partners’ research contributions, the project involves carrying out two language surveys in Egypt and Morocco. The Egyptian survey was carried out in 2013 on a
representative sample from Greater Cairo and investigates language behaviour and attitudes (with a focus on written practices and on *fuṣḥā* and *ʿāmmiyā*). In contributing to the design of this survey with other partners I was able to draw on the experience of designing the web-based survey for my own study. I have been fortunate to become part of a project with the resources to carry out this large scale survey on a population which I was only able to capture a glimpse of in my research. The tabulation report which includes the preliminary results from the Cairo survey was recently published (Kebede et al., 2013). My research efforts beyond this thesis will be concentrated on using this exciting new data to gain a better understanding of a language situation which will likely continue to attract research interest for many years to come.
Bibliography


CAPMAS. Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics. 
http://www.capmas.gov.eg/?lang=1


Eviatar, Z., & Ibr...


Appendix I: Interview Transcripts

SEG1.

... mawdū’ āl-ʿāmmiyya l-maṣrīyya daxal fi muškil muṣṭalaḥ. anā baḥiss enn huwwa baʿd el-
... muddaʿī ʿilm el-luḡa biyastasminhūr li-l-ḥaṭṭ min mustawā el-luḡa el-maṣrīyya. bi-maʿnā enn
tibʿā fī ʿāmmiyya maṣrīyya wa-fuṣḥā ʿarabiyya, baʿnāmā ʿilmīyyan da šēʾ miš mutawwafir
yaʾni. al-mutawwafir anna hunaka luḡa maṣrīyya tataṭawwur ʿabīr al-tārīḫ taʿxuz min kūl el-
luḡāt ellī daxalīt-lahā min awwel el-fārisīyya ilā l-turkiyya ilā l-ʿarabiyya ilā l-īnḡīzīyya ilā l-
almānīyya ilā l-īrīsīyya ilā l-īlātīyya ilā l-yūnānīyya... ilā en-nūbiyya wa-l-īfrīqīyya wa-l-
amāzīqīyya. kul da daxal fi el-luḡa l-miṣriyya. ku-l-qullin min ḥāzīhi l-muʿāṣirāt la tuṣaḵkīl
gālibeyīt al-luḡa l-maṣrīyya biḥēs niʿdar nisammīḥ biʿinnāha luḡa yūnānīyya aw luḡa
fīrīsīyya aw luḡa ingleṣīyya aw luḡa ʿarabiyya ḥattā, aw turkiyya. laʿ niʿdar nisammīḥ luḡa
miṣriyya mutaʿāṣira bi-ḵūl da, w-di ḍīmēt el-luḡa l-miṣriyya; ennāhā istaṭāʾat an tastawʾīb,
min dimm ma-staw abet kull el-haḍārāt ellī daxalīthā, tistawʾīb el-mufradāt ellī gat-lahā min
ḥāzīhi el-luḡāt. wa-lākīn zallat, munzu l-qidam wa ḥattā el-yōm, taskun fī bēt al-qawāʾīd
wa-la-grammar al-xāṣ bīhā. w-da wāḏīḫ giddan fī el-dirāṣāt al-luḡawīyya l-hadīṣa ellī
biṭuʾakkiḍ en al-luḡa l-maṣrīyya l-hadīṣa wa el-muʿāṣīra liyya luḡa ibnāt al-luḡāt el-ʾādīma fi
šaklahā n-nīḥāʾī el-mawgūd al-muʾāṣir el-ʾān, w-ellī ḥa-yittawwur ṭaʿbān ilā aškāl uḵrā
bīzuhūr ṣīḵūr uḵrā.

SEG2.

... amma ann el-fuṣḥā ʾīṣṭammā hiyya l-ʿarabiyya fa-anā yaʾni maʿ-ʿazonneṣ enn fī, fī waʿt min
el-awāʾid kān fī luḡa ʿarabiyya fuṣḥā mawgūda fī āy fatrā tārīxiyya waḏḥa yaʾni. kān fī luḡa
ʿarabiyya, hiyya gīmā li-šīṭāt al-ʿadīd min al-luḡāt ellī kāt mawgūda fī l-gaṣīra el-ʿarabiyya w-
elli kānēt bitaṭalīf fī-mā baynāhā fī ʾasmāʾ al-āṣyāʾ: fī ʾasmāʾ el-naḵīl wa ʾasmāʾ el-ʿaḍad wa
ʾasmāʾ el-sēf [...] wa-huwa min at-taṭābbīʿi inn el-luḡa ellī biṭanšaʾ fī muṯgammāʾ faʿārī ṣāḥrāwī
takūn qaqal ṭāṭawwuran wa-ingāzān men luḡa ʿaṣṣāʾat fī muṯgammāʾ ẓīrāʾī zay maṣr. el-
uṯgammāʾ el-zirāʾi fī maṣr ʿaddīm haḍārā qadīma zāta mustawāyāt ʿādīda fil-saʿqāfā wa-fī
l-fann wa-fī l-ʾilm wa-fī l-luḡa wa-fī l-adab, lā yūmkin an tatawwafar fī mà yūsammā bi-l-
lāsīna, w-anā ba uṣṣīr ʿalā anā anā assammīḥa al-sīna laʿennāhā kānēt tuṯtaq wa-lā tuktab fī l-
ḡālīb [...] wa-lam tuktab illā mutaʾāxirān, wa-ʾīndamā kutabāt kānā fī awqāt līsā ḥāzīhi al-
luḡa lam tastaqīrr [...] ḥattā anna kul el-manṭāʾiʿa ʾīndamā arādat fil-aṣr el-ḥadīs l-wa-l-muʾāṣir
an tataʾallam al-luḡa el-ʿarabiyya kanat talqa ilā al-mudārisīs al-maṣrī. humma fī l-ḥaʾiʿa
beysammīḥa el-maṣrī beyalʾelshem ʿarabī; miṣ muṃkin el-maṣrī yeeʾalshem ʿarabī, ha-
yʾalshem maṣrī [... ] kul el-manṭāʾiʿa ʾižā kānūʾ ʿarab fa-humma miṣ fī ḥāgā ilā l-mudārisīs maṣrī
yeeʾalshem ʿarabī, wa-lākīn ʾiẓāmat tīʾallīmū tīʾallīmū maṣrī.

SEG3.

el-kull beyitkallim luḡa taʿrībān wāḥda, el-fuʿrī bēḥnā fuʿrī basīṭa, w-muṃkin tekūn fī baʿd el-
ṣawtiyyāt, innāmā miṣ fī qawāʾīd el-luḡa biṭāʾithum.
SEG4.

ṭab’an wāḥid ‘urūbī ha-y’ullik “ēh el-xarāb dal!” we “ēh el-bawāzān dal!” we “fēn el-luja el-arabiyya?”, “dā’ī luğet ed-dīn w-el-qur’ān w-kaza!” we “kul da ḥarám!” w-yo’af did da. ṭab lēh? ṭab xalās en-nās istaxdimethā. u’ud intā ba’ā w-ūl ēli intā ‘ayiz tu’ūl w-en-nās šagġāla ‘ādi. [...] w-el-kalimāt dī lil-asaf ma-bitxuššē el-qamūs, w-el-qawāmiṣ nafsaha qawāmiṣ ‘āgīza; ya’ni lā tu’ābbir ḥaqiqatān ‘an el-luja el-qā’ima. wa kamā anna l-qawāmiṣ fi ma’nāhā al-’īmī yagib an tu’azz min toht, mina n-nās, ilā al-tasgil fi l-qamūs, ihnā ēli biyiḥṣal ‘andinā el-’aks. el-qamūs benerga’ li-l-kalām bitā’ lisān el-’arab w-el-haḡat el-adīma, baynamā dī ḥaḡat intahit. [...] kull el-qawāmiṣ fi l-dīnyā betī’timel, betittāxid min luğat en-nās w-tit’mel qawāmiṣ, ihnā be-l’-aks bini’lebḥā; bengib mufradāt w-n-hāwil nimašṣiḥa gaṣb ‘an en-nās. zay mā beyiḡi magma’ el-luja l-’arabiyya yistaxdimiḥ kilmet el-muṣalāb badal el-izāz; el-zugāg aw izāz. mahu l-zugāg tīb ā fāsiḥā w-el-izāz tīb ā ’almiḥyāa. innāmā el-etnēn miṣ ‘arabī, la inn el-’arabī bita’hā muṣalāb. fa-anā barā’i nafsī fi l-nihāyā mitḥāṣir, wa-lākin ḥażā l-hiṣār gaṣbin ‘annu biyanfakk wa yazūb kamā żāba ḡayruhu min qabīl wa intahā mina l-tārīx. la’enn sunnit al-hayā al-taṭawwur wa-al-ťaqaddum. el-muṣkili enn elli beyhawilī yefeqdū ‘alā en-nās tinṭa’ izzāy w-titkallim izzāy miṣ mudrikīn enn di muhemma mustaḥila.

SEG5.

ma-hu na nafs el-mu’ādīl le-fikret en nās te’ullik [...] ‘alā l-luğa btā’ītnā ye’ullik el-’arabiyya el-maṣriyya. mā huwwa ma-yīnfa’s; ma-yīnfa’s ab’ā el-inglīziyya el-firnīsiyya, aw el-inglīziyya el-maṣriyya, aw el-’arabiyya el-maṣriyya. ya’ni intī biṯuṭṭi ḥaḡāt... ma-timīṣṣ yā’ni. ma-yīnfa’s ab’ā ‘arabī w-maṣrī. izzāy ṭiqī? fa-y’ollak la’, mā l-’arabiyya di l-qawmiyya w-el-maṣriyya di l-waṭaniyya. la’, anā lā qawmiyya maṣriyya wa-lā qawmiyya ‘arabiyya, anā hawwiyya maṣriyya.

SEG6.

fi ḥudūd. fi l-āxir anā yāsārī; miṣ ha’-dar anṣūr ḥāga betītkallim ‘an el-ra’simāliyya, masalan; miṣ ha’-dar anṣūr ḥāga ma’a l-nizām. fi bu’d siyāsī fi l-mawdā’.

SEG7.

... ihnā min awwel yōm ulnā enn ihnā ‘andinā tawagguh xāṣ bi-da’īn el-luğa l-’āmmiyya l-maṣriyya, ihnā balad lenā xusūṣiyya. shīnā am abēnā ‘alā fiḳra [...] yasqat siḥbūwē tab’an! tab’an! ma-fiṣ ḥaḡa ismahā siḥbūwē! siḥbūwē! anā mālī be-siḥbūwē? siḥbūwē da rāgil kān ‘āyiṣ hināk; fi nqad w-el-hiḡāz. anā mālī?

SEG8.

el-luğa el-’āmmiyya betiddīnī barāḥ aktar fi t-ta’bīr, bimā inni maṣrī, w-betewsāl li-nās kētīr awi, ’aks el-fusḥa, el-fusḥa miṣ kul en-nās bitatazawwaghā, w-tūl el-wa’īt hiyya ša’ba la’inn. el-luğa el-’arabiyya, luğet ed-dīd yā’ni, qawwiyya w-sa’ba giddan. Ḥattā hiyya musannafa min el-luğāt el-sa’ba fi l-’ālam, zay... zay el-almaniyya, la’inn el-almaniyya luğa aşīla w-el-’arabiyya luğa aşīla, ya’ni miṣ muṣtaqqā min ḥāga.
SEG9.

el-ʻāmmiya bitiddi raḥāba šwayya enn anā atkallim fi mawādī’ aktar urayyiba li-n-nās. la’inn en-nās hiyya di el-luğa elli betikallim bihā. zay mā uitellik, el-fushā ba’ā ... kidda. tūl ew-wa’t ši’r el-ʻāmmiya a’rab li-n-nās min el-fushā. [...] el-luğa el-fushā bitxallini sa’āt at’addā el-ʻāmmiya; el-ʻāmmiya bitxallini sa’āt ašrāḥ. bas di bitbān udret el-ḥakawātī. miš iḥnā ‘andinā ḥāga ismahā el-ḥakawātī ‘storyteller’? huwwa da. law anā ma-’andiš ba’a el-labāqa el-ṣedīdā giddan w-udriti ‘alā el-hudūr tūl el-wa’t - la’inn barqī; el-ʻāmmiya bitxallīnī arqī; miš kilma w-rad ḡatāḥā; el-ʻarabī kilma w-rad ḡatāḥā. [...] w-bardu el-ʻāmmiya  ganiyya bimufradāthā, bas la’inn bardu daxal ‘alēhā kalimāt daxila keteer w-la’innahā luğa miş aşila, ya’ni el-ʻāmmiya miş aşila. el-ʻāmmiya fil-ʻakhir ibti ‘alā yūnāni ’alā hirūḡīfi ’alā ’arabi. di miš luqetnā; ya’ni el-ʻarabīya miş luqet maṣrīyyīn. [...] ’ašān kida iḥnā ikṭara nā el-ʻāmmiya. el-ʻāmmiya el-maṣriyya lēh hiyya el-wahiya ellī betitfihhem fi kū hitta fi l-’ālam, el-ʻarabī? mustahil el-ʻāmmiya el-filistiḥīyya titfihhem fi l-’ālam el-ʻarabī kullu – ‘and el-šawām; mustahil el-gazā’irīyya – miš el-amāzīg, el-ʻarabīya, elli betīt’āl ‘el-dārqa’ fi l-gazā’īr – titfihhem.

SEG10.

la’ann hiyya laḥā xusūsiyya, w-la’inn... hiyya mittaxda min kaza ḥṣa, w-sahla, w-ba’dar ašrāḥ bihā haqāt kītīr, mushība, ya’ni fiḥā isḥāb, w-ḥilwa waq’ahā ‘a-‘a-l-wedn. el-gazā’īri la’a, el-ʻirāt la’a. [...] iḥnā a’rab li-l-luqā el-ʻarabīya min el-luqāt\ el-lahagät et-tanya bas fi nafs el-wa’t hiyya betiddini barqī, la’inn hiyya miş aşila.

SEG11.

ši’r be-l-fuşhā, bas be-l-fuṣhā btā’ītnā, miš bifuṣhet el-badw betū’ šibh el-gezīra... I’m sorry, bas anā dida’humma miš ūhumma... el-wahhābiyyin bawwazū ḥayāt el-maṣrīyyin ‘umūmān – ḥattā fi l-islām ya’ni’ anduhum tafsirāthum – bas kamān betū’ šibh el-gezīra bawwazū l-luġa, ya’ni biṭā’ītna iḥnā. iḥnā fi l-ʻakhir dī miš luqetnā, bas intī taktaṣīfī enn iḥnā līnā xusūsiyya. el-ʻāmmiya liḥā xusūsiyya w-liḥā qaṭā’id nut’ w-kṭāba rahiya, bas ṣāb’ an ma-haddīs beyīb’ā māni bihā.

SEG12.

 SEG13.

ṭūl el-waʿt kān garāyid w-ṭūl el-waʿt kān... kuttāb kubār, ṭūl el-waʿt kān musaqqaftī ʿaʿadāt w-yebdaʿ y uulu “laʿa yā mhammad ma-yinfaʿ š teʾmil kida” aw “mhammad lāzim miš ōrfa teʾmelū ēh”, fa-baʿulla awya m-ḥu da lāzim fa-l-lāzim da ha-niʾmilu fi dār nāṣr tanā, bas bimā inn malāmīḥ ‘amalnāḥā ṣāʿān niksar bīhā l-lāzim fa-iḥnā beniʾmil kul el-hagāt ellī hiyya miš lāzim.

 SEG14.

iḥnā ʿayzīn ellī ᵉyegamā’a ma-yfarrāʾš. el-luḏa el-ingilīziyya bitfarraʾ ma-bitgammaʾš; el-riwāya fil-ʾāxīr kām wāḥid ha-yiʾrāhā ingilizī? bas iḥnā baʾina basṣīn-lahā bi-šākī tānī; enn iḥnā fi gumhūr miš adrīn nurūḥlu. fa-xalās iḥnā bintallāʾ ḥāgāt bitrūḥ li-l-gumhūr ellī iḥnā ʿayzīn nurūḥlu, w-fi gumhūr tānī mawgūd hināk kidda munkin nurūḥlu; da fi l-taḥrīr yaʾnī; fi l-gamʾāt el-xāṣṣa ellī entīʾ ʿulīʾiʾ alēhā – el-AUC yaʾnī baʾsud – fa-xallīnā nūḥ.

 SEG15.

kān min tesʾa w-tēsʾīn w-eḥnā l-IVRs kullahā btāʾet Vodafone... formal. formal bemaʾnā ēh? enn anā baddī el-commands kullahā aw el-orders le-l-customers formally, w-el-indicational ḥattā ʾIVR ellī beykalamūḥā bardū kānīt kullahā formal. zay mā ʾultelīk: geh el-taḡīr menēn? enn huwwa laʾinn el-... customers kulluhom maḥaddīs beyismaʾ ay ḥāga xālis min el-IVR w-beyhawlí yewsalū le-agents betūʾ el-call centres ʿāsān ʿefhamāʾ menhum akīr. ʿamalnā research zay mā ʾultelīk, w-kān el-majority betʾūl enn humma miš faḥmīn ḥāga, w-ennu humma bey-prefer enn huwwa yekkallim maʾ ḥad ʿifham mennu akīr; yisʾalū, yerad ʿalēḥ... baʾdāʾ mā ʿamalnā el-research da fa-qarrārnā enn iḥnā kul el-IVRs bītāʾīt Vodafone ha-tītgayar min el-formal le-l-slang. ḥattā kāmān el-messijjāt ellī benebʾathā lel-customers baʾet slang. ma-fhāsī, ma-fīṣ šīg̱et el-order, ellī huwwa ʿinta lāzim teʾmil kazaʾ, laʾ, baʾet beṭāriʾa friendly... w-tēwsāl le-l-customers be-surʾa giddan, w-yefhamūḥā... awīz aʾullek yaʾnī men sāʾīt mā ʿamalnā kida baʾāʾ fi self-help tool kebīra giddan. self-help yaʾnī ēh? yaʾnī el-customer yaʾtamid ʿalā nafsū; miš miḥtāq enn anā addiḥluh musaʾda. anā munkin axallīh yaʾnī min A to Z, min awwel mā yestēri el-xat liyāyit mā yaṣṭirīk fi l-Internet, fi l-ADSL, kul ḥāga min ġēr mā yetkallim maʾ ʿay ḥad; kul ḥāga huwwa yaʾmiḥlā bi-nafsū.

 SEG16.

fi l-awwel tabʾan kān saʾb awī. yaʾnī fi kalām keda kān saʾb awī enn anā ağayyarūn men formal le-slang, zay ʿayz ʿaʾūl masalan ʿabl kidaʾ; ʿmin qabīl, yaʾnī abl kida kunnā beniʾulāh. fi kalām kida kān beyiḥā saʾb awī. bas fi l-awwel bṣāraḥa kunnā metʾāmlin maʾ vendor, advertising agency, hiyya ellī kanet beteʾmellēn ēl-script da [... ] li-ġāyit lammā; yaʾnī men uraṣyib bardū xalās baʾā ʾel-mawdūʿ maʾānā iḥnā ellī bneʾmel el-script bas xadnā el-experience menhum, el-hagāt tetʾāl েzay.
SEG17.
... bi't bi fronts of the al-wa't fi kalām bardu ma-
darā a'ūlu, fa-lāzim beyt'ebib formal swayya. fa-hiyya\ huwwa mā bēn el-etnēn, bas miš formal awī wa-lā slang awī. ya'ni ma-'darā a'ūlu "inta law daxalt fi l-yām ellī ba'd kida miš 'ārif hati dar te'mel." ya'ni, fa-fi ḥagāt kida betb'bā\ bendaxxal fīhā formal swayya la'inn anā ma-yinfa's a'ūlu slang xālis. fa-ihna ya'ni wa-lā slang awī, ellī huwwa ba'ā bakkallim ka-
enni bakkallim fi l-šāri', wa-lā formal. fa-hiyya mā bēn el-etnēn, di elli șa'ba awī.

SEG18.
wa-lālahi iḥnā mešēnā ma' el-ya'ni\ "cope with the change". ya'ni huwwa\ la'inn el-nās hiyya ellī 'āwza kida. w-eḥnā el-mafrud\ enn iḥnā širka bit'addim services [...] fa-anā lāzim a'raf el-
customer needs w-āmelhā. fa-huwwa el-mawdū' kān bada\ yantašir, yantašir – enn huwwa xalāš mawdū' el-slāg da – w-hatta 'al-facebook, 'ala el-mobile el messijjāt: kul da slāg. fa-
kān lāzim ne-cope; ma-yinfa's enn anā ab'ā māsi fi ḥitta w-el-nās fi ḥitta tanya xālis. fa-
mumkin nekūn ya'ni sāḥīmā ya'ni ka-part men el-ta'gyīr, bas already el-ta'gyīr kān mawgūd.

SEG19.
al-āmmiyya hiya lahga wa-laysat luğa, li'anna l-luğata lahā qawā'īd maktūba wa-ma'rūfa. wa-
laysat al-āmmiyya al-miṣriyya faqat bal anna kulla luğata fi l-ālam lahā lahga. al-lahga al-
āmmiyya hiya ašhar al-āmniyyat al-arabiyya, wa-la'allia l-sabab fi Ḧāzā huwwa al-fann al-
miṣri allazi xalāš hāğhi al-bilād fi Ḫatra qadīma wa anna mu' zam hā'ulā' al-fannanin gā'ū ilā miṣr wa-lama'ū fi l-qāhira, fa-ntašarat al-āmmiyya min Ḧāzā al-muṭalaq. al-āmmiyya tu'tabar ihdā mucawwināt luğat al-sahāfa li'anna [...] luğat as-sahāfa al-mu-'āsira hiya l-luğa as-sālīsa. hiya arqā min al-āmmiyya wa-aqal min al-fuṣhā; hiya wasat mā baynahum.

SEG20.
el-āmmiyya el-miṣriyya, anā ra'yī innaḥā mustawā min mustawayāt el-luğa wa-hiya ibna šar'iyaa lil-luğa al-arabiyya al-fuṣhā. [...] el-lahga al-āmmiyya ta'īfī līhā ennaḥā tustaxdam fi el-ḥayā l-ʾamma fi el-mustawā eš-šā'ī ba’idan ‘an el-mustawā er-rasmī aw el-mukātābat er-rasmīyya.

SEG21.
el-āmmiyya be-n-nisbālī hiyya ṭarī līl-hurūb min el-iškāliyyāt ellī mumkin yaqa' fīhā eš-saḥṣ ełli bi'tastad'īhā el-fuṣhā min nawāḥī el-iltezām be-qawā’īd el-luğa, be-mustuwā mu’ayyan men el-balāgā, be-usus nutq mu’ayanna. fa-l-āmmiya ilā ḥaddin mā betumassil el-mahrab min kul ḥālīhī el-qyūd, izā ġāza tasmīiyethā bel-qyūd. wa-hiya fi'lan hiyya qawā’īd wa lakkinaḥa asbahat qawā’īd muqayyida beyib'ā men es-sa’eb el-ta’āmul biḥā 'alā mustawayāt igtimā’iyyya mutafawta. fa-āsbaḥit hiyya l-ʾāmmiya ben-nisba le-l-gami’ī hāl wasat [...] ka-nō' men awā' el-tawāsul mumkin en huwwa yerbūt bēn fi’āt wa-šarā’iḥ igtimā’iyyya muxtaliyf es-saqaðfāt wa-muxtaliyf el-awdā’ el-igmā’iyyya.
SEG22.

w-miš el-lahga el-ʾāmmiyya el-rāqiya aw ʾāmmiyyet el-musaqqafīn kamā yuqāl ʾanḥā, wa-lākin [...]ʾāmmiyya aqal kaṭīrān min al-mustawā al-margū wa-l-matlūb

SEG23.

wāḥid zay halātī [...] xāyiʿ enn huwwa yeddī saqaṭāt luḥawiyya fa-tuḥṣab ʿalēh fa-yuhān fī waḍʾu el-akādīmī. [...] aṣbaḥet el-fuṣḥā qāsira ʿalā el-nuxba, fa-aṣbaḥet šeʾ mustahgān [...] wa-aṣbaḥet beye tebrūḥa fī baʾd el-ahyān nōʾ men anwāʾ el-esteʿlāʾ.

SEG24.

maḥṭṭāt al-metro, munz sanawāt kāna yantiq be-ʾāmmiyya wa-bi-sawt yusabbīb inziʿāg li-rrākīb, fa-badallan min an yabtaʾidʾ an er-rasīf yaqṭarīb. ammā hināmā ʿusḥī ilā muzīʿa zāta sawt gamīl wa-šaخيyya ilā āxiruhu, tataḥaddas bi-fuṣḥā munaqqama gamīlā... anā wāḥid min an-nās ḥaqiqātān aẓhab ilā maḥṭṭāt al-metro, lā le-rukūb el-metro, wa-lākin li-samāʾ sawtḥ ḥattā zanantu fī l-awwel annahā imrāʾa taglis wa ṭalābt an aškurahā, fa-izā bihi annahu tāṣgīl yaʾnī sawṭī wa-hāzā kāna mumtiʿ.

SEG25.

ṭumma anna mā yagmaʾ al-ʾarab gamīʾan... yaʾnī rubammā la ṭawās kāna rubammā inziʿāg fi-ruḥra muqāla qatīl hāziwi, wa-taḥaddas kullun minhum bi-luḥātīh, nisbet el-fahm sa-takūn ṭalāṭīn aw arbiʾin fī l-miʾa [...] lākin ḥināmā yataḥaddat aḥad bi-l-ʾarabīyya al-fuṣḥā, sa-yafham al-gamiʿ.

SEG26.

el-luṣa el-ʾāmmiyya hiya luṣet tawāṣul; šafra min šafarāt et-tawāsul, lākin mayinfaʾš ʿalā l-ʾiṭlāq enn anā qal minhum mīqyās aw miʿyār aw luṣat tawwahūd. [...] el-ʾāmmiyya be-n-nesbālī luṣet iqṭīahād; nōʾ men anwāʾ el-ʾalāmāt el-muttafaq ʿalēhā; ʿalāmāt šawtiyya darugat bayna fīʾa, tawasaʾet, intaqālet min fard le-magmūʾa, wa-hākazā, wa-hākazā.

SEG27.

el-ʾāmmiyya di [...] anā ba-tahebrehā men el-maxātēr es-ṣadīda ellī biṭaddid el-luṣa. laʾenn enta ḥatiṭi ẓī fī yōm men el-ayyām mīš ʾāṣer temayyiz min el-faṣiḥ w-mīš ellī miṣ faṣīh, w-ēh miʿyār el-faṣiḥā. hal huwwa šuyūʾ el-ʾistixdām? hal-huwwa l-qudra ed-dalāliyya? hal huwwa l-ʾaṣl? hal huwwa t-taṣrīf?

SEG28.

dantu l-faraʾna! bussū l-timsāʾ; šabah-kū. bussū samār el-nil; šabah-kū. entu li-kū luğa. el-ʾiṣṣī ellī entu šayfinhum mawgūḏīn fī maṣr dōl [...]ʾamr ibn el-ʾaṣ gāḥhum warāḥ ʿalā ḍhūr el-gemāl dōl mīš maṣrīyyīn.
SEG29.


SEG30.

anā ha-stab’id el-mu’amra; hiyya l-mu’amra en-nōbādī ba’ā min ed-dāxīl miš min el-xārīg. ya’nī el-mu’amra mawgūda lākin el-maṣdar ʾixtalaf [...] naḥnu mūla’ūna bi-taqlid el-ṭarb ḥattā ba’d an raḥala l-ṭarb.

SEG31.

e-l-ṭarf barḍu ennu izā l-ʾammiyyāt intaṣarit wa-aṣbaḥit luğā muqā’ada aw luğā maktūba, as’al su’yāl; māzā sa-naf’al be-l-qur’ān? [...] taḥwil ḥāzihi al-ʾammiyyāt ilā luğāt – yib’ā ‘andinā l-luğā l-mišriyya wa-l-luğā t-tānisīyya, wa, wa... ilā āxirīhī; ’išrīn aw etnēn w-ʾišrīn luğā – hinā kārisa. leḥ? la’innu al-qur’ān el-al-karim al-wāhid sa-yantahi!

SEG32.


SEG33.

anā lastu ʾid el-fuṣhā wa-lastu ʾid el-ʾammiyya. anā amīl ilā l-fuṣhā okṭar mina l-ʾammiyya, wa-lākin likul maqām maqāl. el-luğā l-fuṣhā laḥā mustawā, wa-l-luğā el-ʾammiyya laḥā mustawā fī t-twāsul wa-lākin bišurūt [...] anā ʾid an takūn al-luğā\ al-lahga l-ʾammiyya luğet kitāba, lākin attafaq aydan ennahā takūn luğat ibdā’. ya’nī, al-ibdā’ bel-luğā\ bel-lahga l-ʾammiyya matluḥ l’enn barḍu lahu huqūlū d-dalāliyya wa-lahu tāqātu l-iḥāʾiyya wa-l-ibdā’iyya el-maṭlūba. wa-aydan al-ibdā’ bi-l-fuṣhā barḍu lahu nafs ḥāzā l-ʾamra. wa-le-kul nō’
adabi, aw kul mustawā luğawī fi l-ibdāʾ el-adabi, lahu gumhūrū wa-lahu l-mutağawwiq aw el-mutallaqi l-xāš bih.

SEG34.
... tarakit nizām taʿlim, tarakit rawāsib taqāfiyya, tarakit nuzum igtimāʾiyya, tarakit mabādiʾ aqnaʾit es-šaʾb el-mašri be-ʿinn [...] ʿāsān tibʾa mutaṭawwir, mafhūm el-ḥadāsa baʾā muqtarīn be-mafhūm el-īghtirāb, enn anā aqtabis men el-ĝarb.

SEG35.
ašbah raṣīdī šifr, fa-ašbaḥt mustawrid; ašbaḥt anā mufarraq ʿaqliyyan wa-fikriyyan, w-badaʾt astawrid; astawrid el-afkār [...] le-daragit enn anā wasal biyyā al-xuwwāʾ le-daragit enn anā astawrid el-luĝa.

SEG36.

SEG37.
... laʾenn inā ḥanā axadnā enn kul šēʾ ḥelw lā-bud yeḵūn madmūg be-damḵa agnabeyya [...] ūtab an elǐ byeddīnī barra da ma-byeddīnīš ʿāsān yebnī šaxṣiyeyti elīi anā ʿayezhā teṭā, laʾ, huwwa ʿayiz yebnī šaxṣiyeyti zay mā huwwa ʿayez-hā. [...] in ma-kunteš šabīh līh, laʾ fa-ʾal-aqal abʾā muwāʾim aw maʾāh fi nafs el-etegāḥ.

SEG38.
el-ʾawlama di walledit amr axar. ēh huwwa? xōf w-roʾb badaʾ yizhar ʿalā asāsu nōʾ min anwāʾ raddīt el-feʾl el-ʾaksiyya. fi ēh? fi enn anā baʾēt min kutr xōfī badaʾt aʾmel elli anā el-mafrūd aʾmelu men zaman. badaʾt enn anā delwaʾti anādī be-l-taʾrīb, badaʾt delwaʾti enn anā anādī be-l-hifāzʾ ʿalā l-luğa l-ʿarabiyya. kwayyīs? laʾenn muḥṭawā l-ʾawlama be-n-nesbāli anā gayli ka-gūl, fa-hnā xufna enn yuʾād istīʾmān marrā maṭraʾ. yaʾni, ma-tiftekriš en kull elli byehšal delwaʾti men hiršʾa t-taʾrīb w-men hirš ʿalā ḥmāyet el-luğa l-ʿarabiyya w-da kullu, hīršan ʿolā l-luğa. lā mā-hnā ḥariṣīn ʿalā l-luğa min ayyām... hanʾūl men ayyām el-qurʾān el-karīm. lākin lēh tazāyad? laʾinn anā ašbaḥ udāmi gūl anā miš ʿārif huwwa ʿayiz yeblaʾ mennī ēh. fa-badaʾt anā atšabbas b-ēḥ delwaʾti, badaʾt atšabbas be-l-huwiyyāt betaʾti.
SEG39.

... in lam ya’mal ‘alā i’ādet el-luğa l’-’arabiyya ilā mā kanat ‘alēh fi mawḍī’ er-riyāda, fa-huwa ‘al-aqal ha-yehmiḥā min at-taraddī w-y’akkid sabāt-hā.

SEG40.

anā miš ha-ngah ṭab’an [...] lākin anā baḥarrak el-miyāh ar-rākida. ya’nī le-awwel marra yit’āl en murašṣaḥ beyʾūl ihtirām el-luğa el-’arabiyya
Appendix II: Survey Report

Q1 Referring tag\textsuperscript{87}: 

\textbf{Q2 Survey language:} 230 (59.3\%) Arabic; 158 (40.7\%) English

\textbf{Q3 Age:}

\textbf{Q4 Gender:} 154 (39.7\%) male; 234 (60.3\%) female

\textsuperscript{87} This was not an actual question in the survey; the referring link was automatically recorded.
Q5 Religion:

![Bar chart showing the distribution of religions. The majority are Muslim.]

Q6 Employment: 244 (62.9%) employed; 144 (37.1%) not employed

Q7 Highest academic qualification:

![Bar chart showing the distribution of academic qualifications. The majority have an undergraduate degree.]

Q8 Type of School:

![Bar chart showing the distribution of school types. The majority attend public schools.]
Q9 Main language of education:

Q10 Are you a student now? Yes: 170 (43.8%); No: 218 (56.2%)

Q11 Do you have a mobile phone? Yes: 387 (99.7%); No: 1 (.3%)

Q12 Is it a smart phone? \(N = 387\)

Q13 How many mobile phone handsets have you owned in the past? \(N = 387\)
Q14 How available is computer access in your immediate surroundings?

Q15 How do you access the Internet?

Q16 How confident are you in using SA?
Q17 How often do you use SA in your daily life?

Q18 In your work, how important is competence in SA? (N = 244)

Q19 In your opinion, how important is it that SA should be part of (a) compulsory school education, (b) higher education (university)?
Q20 How confident are you in using English?

Q21 How often do you use English in your daily life?

Q22 In your work, how important is competence in English? (N = 244)
Q23 In your opinion, how important is it that English should be part of (a) compulsory school education, (b) higher education (university)?

Q24 In your opinion, which of the following statements is the most accurate definition of EA?

Q25 Attitudes towards publications primarily in EA:
Q26 Attitudes towards VE’s new recorded message in EA:

Q27 Familiarity with Wikipedia Masry:

Q28 Attitudes towards Wikipedia Masry:
Q29 Familiarity with LA:

Q30 Attitudes towards LA in movie billboards:

Q31 Attitude towards LA in printed English magazines:
Q32 Language choice when writing an email to a close Egyptian friend\(^8^8\):

Q33 Language choice when writing an email to superior at work \((N = 244)\)\(^8^9\):

Q34 Language choice when writing an email to teacher/lecturer \((N = 158)\)\(^9^0\):

\(^{88}\) ‘SA+EA’ category imposed retrospectively based on recurring answers in the ‘other’ option.

\(^{89}\) ‘SA or English’ category imposed retrospectively based on recurring answers in the ‘other’ option.

\(^{90}\) ‘SA or English’ category imposed retrospectively based on recurring answers in the ‘other’ option.
Q35 Language choice when writing a text message to a close Egyptian friend \((N = 387)^{91}\):

![Bar chart showing language choice]

Q36 Language choice when writing a text message to parent \((N = 352)^{92}\):

![Bar chart showing language choice]

Q37 Language choice when writing a handwritten letter to a close Egyptian friend \((N = 384)^{93}\):

![Bar chart showing language choice]

\(^{91}\) ‘SA+EA’ category imposed retrospectively based on recurring answers in the ‘other’ option.

\(^{92}\) ‘SA+EA’ category imposed retrospectively based on recurring answers in the ‘other’ option.

\(^{93}\) ‘SA+EA’ category imposed retrospectively based on recurring answers in the ‘other’ option.
Q38 Language choice when writing a handwritten memo to superior at work \((N = 228)\):

![Bar chart showing language choice for handwritten memos.]

Q39 Language choice when writing a handwritten letter to principal/dean \((N = 170)\):

![Bar chart showing language choice for handwritten letters.]

Q40 Rank the following identities based on how much you feel you belong to each of them:

![Bar chart showing rank of identities.]

Arab
Egyptian
Muslim
Christian
Q41 Which of the following statements most accurately describes your feeling about Egypt in relation to the Arab World?

![Bar Chart]

Q42 Which party did you vote for in the 2011-2012 parliamentary elections [qawa'īm category]? (N = 348)

![Bar Chart]
Appendix III: Survey Printout

A printout of the English version of the survey is attached on the next pages (pp. 314-326), followed by the Arabic version (pp. 327-338).
Language Behaviour and Attitudes in Egypt

Choose a language

اختار اللغة

☐ English

اللغة العربية

Please answer the following screening questions to establish whether you meet the required criteria for completing this survey.

Are you Egyptian?

☐ Yes

☐ No

Has Egypt been your primary place of residence in the past five years?

☐ Yes

☐ No

Are you a resident of Greater Cairo?

(Note: for the purposes of this survey, Greater Cairo includes Giza, Helwan, 6 October and Shubra El-Kheima)

☐ Yes

☐ No
Have you completed all or most of your school education in Egypt?

- Yes
- No

Thank you for completing the screening questions. Please read the following statement from the researcher before proceeding to the survey.

Hello,

I am an Egyptian PhD student studying at the Linguistics department of Lancaster University in the United Kingdom. This survey is part of my doctoral research to study the shifting language roles and powers in present-day Egypt. By completing this survey, you will be contributing to a better understanding of the language behaviour and attitudes of Egyptian, Cairo-based Internet users. This will shed valuable light on emerging linguistic trends and preferences and contribute to a contemporary scholarly understanding of the language situation in Egypt.

The survey takes about 10-15 minutes to complete. You will be asked to provide an answer to each question before you can proceed to the next one, with a few exceptions. Where it is possible to skip a question this will be clearly indicated. You will not be able to continue where you left off if you close the window or navigate away from the page, so you will have to complete the survey in one sitting. This was done to protect your privacy. You are free to quit the survey at any point, and any part-responses will be discarded. You are kindly asked to complete the survey only once.

The data collected in this survey will be saved securely and I will not release it to any third parties. The survey results will be reported without identifying participants and only general statistics will be provided. I will only use the data for academic purposes, and I am bound by my university’s research ethics. You will be redirected to my webpage at the end of the survey where you can find out more about my work.

I thank you in advance for your time and for your valuable contribution to this study.

Mariam Aboelezz
PhD candidate, Lancaster University

- I have read and understood the researcher’s statement
- Quit survey

Please select your year of birth.

- Please select one...

Gender

- Male
- Female
Religion (optional)

- Muslim
- Christian
- Other

Are you employed?

- Yes
- No

What is the highest academic qualification you have received?

- Below secondary school
- Secondary school (thanaweyya `amma or equivalent)
- Vocational diploma
- University degree
- Masters
- PhD
- Other (please specify) ________________________________

What type of school do/did you go to?

- Public school
- Experimental school
- Private school
- International school

What is/was the main language of education at your school?

(Note: the main language of education is the language in which sciences and mathematics are taught).

- Arabic
- English
- French
- German
- Other (please specify) ________________________________

Are you a student now?

- Yes
- No
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Options</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Do you have a mobile phone?</td>
<td>Yes, No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is it a smart phone?</td>
<td>Yes, No, I don't know</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How many mobile phone handsets have you owned in the past?</td>
<td>The mobile phone I have now is my first handset, I have owned 1-2 other handsets in the past, I have owned 3-5 other handsets in the past, I have owned more than 5 other handsets in the past</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How available is computer access in your immediate surroundings?</td>
<td>I have my own laptop, I have my own desktop computer at home, I share a computer with other members of my family, More than one member of my family has their own computer/laptop, I do not have a computer at home, Other (please specify)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How do you access the internet?</td>
<td>Using a dial-up connection at home, Using a DSL/ADSL connection at home, Using a USB modem (dongle), From my mobile phone, From wi-fi hot spots using my laptop, Other (please specify)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
### How confident are you in using Standard Arabic (*fus-ha*)?

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Extremely confident</th>
<th>Very confident</th>
<th>Fairly confident</th>
<th>Not very confident</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spoken</td>
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<td>Written</td>
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### How often do you use Standard Arabic in your daily life (excluding religious rituals)?

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<th></th>
<th>Always</th>
<th>Frequently</th>
<th>Occasionally</th>
<th>Rarely</th>
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<tr>
<td>Spoken</td>
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<td>Written</td>
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### In your work, how important is competence in Standard Arabic?

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Extremely important</th>
<th>Very important</th>
<th>Fairly important</th>
<th>Not very important</th>
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### In your opinion, how important is it that Standard Arabic should be part of:

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<th>Extremely important</th>
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<th>Fairly important</th>
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<td>compulsory school education?</td>
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<td>higher education (university)?</td>
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### How confident are you in using English?

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Extremely confident</th>
<th>Very confident</th>
<th>Fairly confident</th>
<th>Not very confident</th>
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### How often do you use English in your daily life?

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<th>Frequently</th>
<th>Occasionally</th>
<th>Rarely</th>
<th>Never</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spoken</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Written</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In your work, how important is competence in the English language?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Extremely important</th>
<th>Very important</th>
<th>Fairly important</th>
<th>Not very important</th>
<th>Not important at all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spoken</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Written</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In your opinion, how important is it that English should be part of:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Extremely important</th>
<th>Very important</th>
<th>Fairly important</th>
<th>Not very important</th>
<th>Not important at all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>compulsory school education?</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>higher education (university)?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In your opinion, which of the following statements is the most accurate definition of Egyptian Arabic (*ammīya*)?

- Egyptian Arabic is a way of speaking Arabic
- Egyptian Arabic is a dialect of the Arabic language
- Egyptian Arabic is the language spoken by Egyptians
While it has been customary to find a range of reading material in Standard Arabic in Egypt, this was not always the case for Egyptian Arabic. Today, there is an increasing number of publications which are written primarily in Egyptian Arabic. How do you feel about this? (Indicate whether you agree or disagree with the statements below)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>It is good to see Egyptian Arabic being used in this way</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I think it is a threat to the Arabic language</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I find it easier to understand the content of these magazines</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I find it confusing, I am not used to reading Arabic in this way</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This is not of interest to me</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I was not aware of this</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Listen to this audio clip:

(If you cannot see the above Flash player, please click here to download the clip.)
This is an example of a recorded voice message in Egyptian Arabic which was introduced by Vodafone Egypt to replace older messages in Standard Arabic. How do you feel about this change?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I was not aware of this</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I find this easier to understand than the older messages</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I think it is a threat to the Arabic language</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This is not of interest to me</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I prefer the older messages in Standard Arabic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is good to hear Egyptian Arabic being used in this way</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 2008, an Egyptian Arabic version of Wikipedia was launched: Wikipedia Masry. It is currently the only version of Wikipedia in a regional variety of Arabic. How familiar are you with Wikipedia Masry?

- I have never heard of Wikipedia Masry before.
- I heard of Wikipedia Masry before but have never used it.
- I have used Wikipedia Masry in the past and found the content difficult to understand.
- I have used Wikipedia Masry in the past and found the content easy to understand.
- I use Wikipedia Masry regularly.

How do you feel about the launch of Wikipedia Masry?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>This is not of interest to me</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is good to see Egyptian Arabic being used in this way</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is unnecessary</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I think it is a threat to the Arabic language</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
For many years now, people have been using a combination of Latin (English) characters and numerals to write Arabic online, as in the example above. Some people call this Franko-Arabic. How familiar are you with Franko-Arabic?

- Very familiar, I use it all the time
- Fairly familiar, I use it from time to time
- I can understand it but I rarely use it
- I can understand it but I never use it
- I don’t use it and I don’t understand it

In the recent past, Franko-Arabic has become increasingly visible in Cairo’s streets. One example of this is movie billboards. How do you feel about this?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>This is not of interest to me</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I think it is a threat to the Arabic language</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I think it is fun and fashionable</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I think it is a trend which will soon die out</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I think it is a convenient way of writing Egyptian Arabic</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I was not aware of this</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Franko-Arabic has also spread to other offline mediums; it can now be found in a few printed magazines which identify themselves mainly as English publications. How do you feel about this?
### If you are writing an email to a close Egyptian friend. Which of the following are you most likely to use?

- Standard Arabic
- Egyptian Arabic (in Arabic script)
- Franko-Arabic
- English
- A combination of English and Franko-Arabic
- Other (please specify) __________

### If you are writing an email to your superior at work. Which of the following are you most likely to use?

- Standard Arabic
- Egyptian Arabic (in Arabic script)
- Franko-Arabic
- English
- A combination of English and Franko-Arabic
- Other (please specify) __________

### If you are writing an email to your teacher/lecturer. Which of the following are you most likely to use?

- Standard Arabic
- Egyptian Arabic (in Arabic script)
- Franko-Arabic
- English
- A combination of English and Franko-Arabic
- I don't send emails to my teacher/lecturer
- Other (please specify) __________

### If you are writing a text message to a close Egyptian friend. Which of the following are you most likely to use?

- Standard Arabic
- Egyptian Arabic (in Arabic script)
- Franko-Arabic
- English
- A combination of English and Franko-Arabic
- Other (please specify) __________
If you are writing a text message to one of your parents. Which of the following are you most likely to use?

- Standard Arabic
- Egyptian Arabic
- *Franko-Arabic*
- English
- A combination of English and *Franko-Arabic*
- I don't send text messages to my parents
- Other (please specify)

If you are writing a handwritten letter to a close Egyptian friend. Which of the following are you most likely to use?

- Standard Arabic
- Egyptian Arabic (in Arabic script)
- *Franko-Arabic*
- English
- A combination of English and *Franko-Arabic*
- Other (please specify)

If you are writing a handwritten memo to your superior at work. Which of the following are you most likely to use?

- Standard Arabic
- Egyptian Arabic (in Arabic script)
- *Franko-Arabic*
- English
- A combination of English and *Franko-Arabic*
- I don't write handwritten memos to my superior at work
- Other (please specify)

If you are writing a handwritten letter to your principal/dean. Which of the following are you most likely to use?

- Standard Arabic
- Egyptian Arabic (in Arabic script)
- *Franko-Arabic*
- English
- A combination of English and *Franko-Arabic*
- Other (please specify)
Rank the following identities based on how much you feel you belong to each of them (1= most; 3=least)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>〇</td>
<td>〇</td>
<td>〇</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egyptian</td>
<td>〇</td>
<td>〇</td>
<td>〇</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Which of the following statements most accurately describes your feeling about Egypt in relation to the Arab world?

- Egypt is an integral part of the Arab world. Egypt and other Arab countries are one and the same. They have a shared identity, heritage and language.
- Egypt is part of the Arab world, but it has its unique identity and heritage. It is misleading to think of Egypt and Arab countries as the same thing.
- Egypt is very different from the Arab states. It has its unique identity, heritage and language. It is wrong to link Egypt with Arab countries since they have very little in common.

Which party did you vote for in the 2011-2012 parliamentary elections {qawa'im category}? (optional)

Please select one...

You have reached the end of this survey. You may use the space below to provide any further information. Thank you very much for taking the time to participate in this study!
السلوكيات والتوجهات اللغوية في مصر

Choose a language

각 언어

لغة العربية

هذا الاستبيان جزء من بحث علمي يهدف إلى دراسة السلوكيات والتوجهات اللغوية في مصر. يرجى الإجابة على الأسئلة التالية للتأكد من استيفائك للشروط المطلوبة للمشاركة.

هل أنت مصري/مصريّة؟

نعم ☐
لا ☐

هل كانت مصر هي مكان سكنت وتواجدك الأساسي خلال السنوات الخمس الأخيرة؟

نعم ☐
لا ☐

هل تقيم في القاهرة الكبرى؟

(ملحوظة: لأغراض هذا الاستبيان، تشمل القاهرة الكبرى الجيزة وحلوان و 6 أكتوبر وشرق الخيمة)

نعم ☐
لا ☐

هل أتممت جميع أو معظم مراحل تعليمك المدرسي في مصر؟

نعم ☐
لا ☐
شكرًا لإجابتك على الأسئلة السابقة. يرجى قراءة الرسالة التالية من الباحثة قبل الشروع في الاستبان.

أخلاص:

أتمنى أن تكون هذه الرسالة قد أثرت في معرفتك ووعيك بخصوص موضوع البحث الذي نعمل عليه. يرجى منك القبض على أي من الإجابات التي تعتقد أنك تحتاج إلى مزيد من التوضيح أو الشرح.

مرحبًا،

أنا أرغب في استلام الرسالة التالية:

الجنس:
- ذكر
- أنثى

الديانة (هذا السؤال اختياري):
- مسيحي
- مسلم
- آخر

هل لديك أية استفسارات أخرى قم بطرحها في السؤال التالي:
- نعم
- لا
ما هو أعلى مؤهل علمي حصلت عليه؟

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>مؤهل</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>أخر (يرجى التحديد)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ماجستير</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>كردار</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>دكتوراه</td>
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<tr>
<td>دبلوم سطحي</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>شهادة جامعية</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>متوسط (دبلوم صناعي، زراعي، إلخ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ثانوي (حاصل على شهادة الثانوية العامة أو ما يعادلها)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>أقل من تانوي</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ما نوع المدرسة التي كنت أو مازلت متتحفا بها؟

| مدرسة حكومية |
| مدرسة خصوصية |
| مدرسة دولية |
| مدرسة تجريبية |

ماذا كنت - أو ما هي - لغة التعليم الأساسية في مدرستك؟

| اللغة العربية |
| اللغة الإنجليزية |
| اللغة الفرنسية |
| اللغة الألمانية |
| اللغة الألمانية |

هل تدرس حاليًا؟

| نعم |
| لا |

هل لديك هاتف محمول؟

| نعم |
| لا |

هل هو "هاتف ذكي" (سمارت فون)؟

| نعم |
| لا |
| لاحدي |
يرغب اختيار جميع العبارات التي تنطبق عليك:

- الهاتف المحمول الذي لدي الآن هو أول جهاز هاتف محمول مملكته
- قد امتلكت جهاز أو جهازين أخرين في الماضي
- قد امتلكت 3-5 أجهزة أخرى في الماضي
- قد امتلكت أكثر من 5 أجهزة أخرى في الماضي

ما مدى توفر أجهزة الكمبيوتر في محيطك المباشر؟ يرجى اختيار جميع العبارات التي تنطبق عليك.

- لدي جهاز كمبيوتر محمول (لابتوب) خاص بي
- لدي كمبيوتر مكتبي خاص بي في المنزل
- أشارك بعض أفراد عائلتي في استخدام جهاز واحد
- يمكنني أكثر من فرد واحد في عائلتي جهاز كمبيوتر أو لابتوب خاص بهم
- لا يوجد لدي كمبيوتر في المنزل

أخير (يرجى التحديد)

كيف تصل شبكة الإنترنت؟ يرجى اختيار جميع العبارات التي تنطبق عليك.

- عن طريق خط الهاتف الأرضي في المنزل (دايل-إب)
- بواسطة خدمة الإنترنت السريع (DSL/ADSL) في المنزل
- باستخدام مودم USB
- من خلال هاتف المحمول
- من الأمكان التي تتمتع بجودة واي-فاي

أخير (يرجى التحديد)

ما مدى تفككك في استخدام اللغة العربية الفصحى?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>غير واقع أبداً</th>
<th>ثقة محدودة</th>
<th>ثقة عالية</th>
<th>تفاوت ثقة</th>
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محصورة
كتابية

إلى أي مدى تستخدم اللغة العربية الفصحى في حياتك اليومية (مع استثناء الشعائر الدينية)؟

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>أبداً</th>
<th>نادرًا</th>
<th>أحيانًا</th>
<th>كثيرًا</th>
<th>دائمًا</th>
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</tbody>
</table>

محصورة
كتابية

ما مدى أهمية إجادة اللغة العربية الفصحى في عملك؟

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>أهمية قصوى</th>
<th>أهمية كبيرة</th>
<th>أهمية محدودة</th>
<th>غير مهمة أبداً</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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</tbody>
</table>

محصورة
كتابية
في رأيك، ما مدى أهمية أن تتراوح اللغة العربية القصصية جزءًا من:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>أهمية قصوى</th>
<th>أهمية كبيرة</th>
<th>أهمية محدودة</th>
<th>غير مهمة أبداً</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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</table>

التعليم الإنجليزي في المدرسة؟

التعليم العالي (الجامعة)؟

ما مدى تلك في استخدام اللغة الإنجليزية؟

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ثقة تامة</th>
<th>ثقة عالية</th>
<th>ثقة نسبية</th>
<th>ثقة محدودة</th>
<th>ثقة واقع أبداً</th>
</tr>
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</table>

ما مدى تستخدم اللغة الإنجليزية في حياتك اليومية؟

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>دائماً</th>
<th>كثيراً</th>
<th>أحياناً</th>
<th>نادراً</th>
<th>أبداً</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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ما مدى أهمية إعداد اللغة الإنجليزية في عملك؟

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>أهمية قصوى</th>
<th>أهمية كبيرة</th>
<th>أهمية محدودة</th>
<th>غير مهمة أبداً</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

في رأيك، ما مدى أهمية أن تتراوح اللغة الإنجليزية جزءًا من:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>أهمية قصوى</th>
<th>أهمية كبيرة</th>
<th>أهمية محدودة</th>
<th>غير مهمة أبداً</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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</tbody>
</table>

التعليم الإنجليزي في المدرسة؟

التعليم العالي (الجامعة)؟

في رأيك، أي العبارة التالية هي التعريف الأدق للعربية المصرية؟

- العربية المصرية هي أحد أطر النظرية باللغة العربية
- العربية المصرية هي لهجة من لهجات اللغة العربية
- العربية المصرية هي اللغة التي يتحدثها المصريون

331
لا أتفق

أريد أن هذا يُرى كتحدي للغة العربية

أرى أن هذا يجعل قراءة اللغة العربية

أجد سهولة أكثر في قراءة بعض هذه المجلات

من الصعب قراءة اللغة المصرية المطبوعة بهذه الطريقة

لا يعني هذا الأمر

لم أكن أدرك هذا

لا أتفق

أجد بعض الرسائل الجديدة أسهل من الرسائل القديمة

أرى أن هذا يُرى كتحدي للغة العربية

لم أكن أدرك هذا

من الصعب قراءة اللغة المصرية المطبوعة بهذه الطريقة

أفضل الرسائل القديمة باللغة العربية

(إذا كنت لا تستطيع رؤية مشغل الفلاش أعلاه فأضغط هنا لتحميل المصغّر)
في عام 2008، انطلقت نسخة من موسوعة ويكيبيديا باللغة المصرية تحت عنوان "ويكيبيديا مصرى". وهيا حاليا النسخة الوحيدة من ويكيبيديا التي تم استخدامها في مصر. تم استخدام ويكيبيديا مصرى في الماضي، ووجدت صعوبة في فهم المحتوى. ما هو شعورك حيال إطلاق ويكيبيديا مصرى؟

لا أتفق

آتي أن هذا يشكل تهديدا للغة العربية

آتي أنه غير ضروري

من الجدير رؤية اللغوية المصرية تستخدم بهذه الطريقة

أتفق

لا يهمي هذا الأمر

منذ عدة سنوات، والكلورون يستخدمون مزيجاً من الحروف اللاتينية (الإنجليزية) والأرقام في كتابة العربية على الإنترنت، كما في المثال أعلاه، يطلق البعض اسم "فرانكو-عربي" على طريقة الكتابة هذه. ما مدى معرفتك بـ "الفرانكو-عربي"؟

معرفة قوية، فأن أستعملها طوال الوقت

معرفة ملحوظة، فأن أستعملها من حين لأخر

معرفة محدودة، ولكن نادراً ما أستعملها

معرفة قليلة، ولكن لا أستعملها أبداً

لا أستعملها ولا أفهمها
أصبح من الممكن مؤخرًا رؤية "الفرانكو-عربي" بشكل متزايد في شوارع القاهرة. أحد الأمثلة على ذلك هو استخدامها في إعلانات الأفلام. ما هو شعورك حين ذلك؟

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>لا أتفق</th>
<th>أتفق</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>لم أكن أدرك هذا</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>لا يهمني هذا الأمر</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>أظن أن هذه طريقة عملية لكتابة العامية المصرية</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>أظن أن هذا مسلم وعربي</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>أظن أن هذه مجرد موضة وسرعان ما ستنتهي</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>أرى أن هذا يشكل تهديداً للغة العربية</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
لقد انتشر "الفرانكو-عربي" أيضًا إلى وسائط أخرى خارج نطاق الإنترنت حيث يمكن العثور عليه في بعض المجلات المطبوعة التي تعتبر نفسها مطبوعات إنجليزية في الأساس. ما هو شعورك حيال ذلك؟
إذا كنت تكتب رسالة إلكترونية (إيميل) لصديق مصري جميم، أي الخيارات التالية ستستخدم على الأرجح؟

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>اللغة العربية الفصحى</th>
<th>عملية thiếtم الرسالة (باشتخدام الكتابة العربية)</th>
<th>عربي فرنسو-</th>
<th>اللغة الإنجليزية</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>مزيج من اللغة الإنجليزية والفرنسو-</td>
<td>عربي</td>
<td>أخرى (برمجي التحديد)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

إذا كنت تكتب “إيميل” لرئيسيك في العمل، أي الخيارات التالية ستستخدم على الأرجح؟

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>اللغة العربية الفصحى</th>
<th>عملية أفلاطون الرسالة (باشتخدام الكتابة العربية)</th>
<th>عربي فرنسو-</th>
<th>اللغة الإنجليزية</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>مزيج من اللغة الإنجليزية والفرنسو-</td>
<td>عربي</td>
<td>أخرى (برمجي التحديد)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

إذا كنت تكتب “إيميل” لمدرس في مدرستك أو لعميد في كلبك، أي الخيارات التالية ستستخدم على الأرجح؟

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>اللغة العربية الفصحى</th>
<th>عملية أرسطو الرسالة (باشتخدام الكتابة العربية)</th>
<th>عربي فرنسو-</th>
<th>اللغة الإنجليزية</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>لا أرسل إيميلات إلى مدرسي في مدرستي أو عموين في كلبي</td>
<td>عربي</td>
<td>أخرى (برمجي التحديد)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

إذا كنت تكتب رسالة نصية (اس. ام. اس.) بواسطة هاتفي المحمول (الموبايل) لصديق مصري جميم، أي الخيارات التالية ستستخدم على الأرجح؟

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>اللغة العربية الفصحى</th>
<th>عملية فيكتور الرسالة (باشتخدام الكتابة العربية)</th>
<th>عربي فرنسو-</th>
<th>اللغة الإنجليزية</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>مزيج من اللغة الإنجليزية والفرنسو-</td>
<td>عربي</td>
<td>أخرى (برمجي التحديد)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
إذا كنت تكتب رسالة نصية بواسطة موبايلك لأحد والديك، أي الخيارات التالية تستخدم على الأرجح؟

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>اللغة العربية الفصحى</th>
<th>اللغة العربية الفصحى (استخدام الكتابة العربية)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>فرانكو-عربي</td>
<td>اللغة الإنجليزية</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>زج من اللغة الإنجليزية والفرنسية-عربي</td>
<td>أخرى (برجي التحديد)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>لا أرسل رسائل نصية بواسطة الموبايل لوادي</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

إذا كنت تكتب رسالة خطية لمدير مدرستك أو لعميد كلبك، أي الخيارات التالية تستخدم على الأرجح؟

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>اللغة العربية الفصحى</th>
<th>اللغة العربية الفصحى (استخدام الكتابة العربية)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>فرانكو-عربي</td>
<td>اللغة الإنجليزية</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>زج من اللغة الإنجليزية والفرنسية-عربي</td>
<td>أخرى (برجي التحديد)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>لا أكتب مذكرات خطية لرئيسي في العمل</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

إذا كنت تكتب رسالة خطية لصديق مصري جدي، أي الخيارات التالية تستخدم على الأرجح؟

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>اللغة العربية الفصحى</th>
<th>اللغة العربية الفصحى (استخدام الكتابة العربية)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>فرانكو-عربي</td>
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<td>زج من اللغة الإنجليزية والفرنسية-عربي</td>
<td>أخرى (برجي التحديد)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>لا أكتب مذكرات خطية لصديقي في العمل</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ما هي العبارة التي تعبر بصورة أدق عن شعورك حيال مصر نسبة للعالم العربي؟

- مصر جزء لا يتجزأ من العالم العربي، مصر والبلدان العربية واحد، حيث يشتركون في الهوية والتراث واللغة.
- مصر جزء من العالم العربي، ولكنها تمتلك هويتها وتراثها المميزين. ومن المضللين أن نفكر في مصر والبلدان العربية على أنهم نفس الشيء.
- مصر مختلفة جداً عن البلدان العربية، حيث أنها تتميز بتراثها الفريد وبهرجيتها ولغتها الخاصة. ومن الخاطئ أن نربط بين مصر والبلدان العربية حيث لا يوجد الكثير من الأمور المشتركة بينهم.

ما الحزب الذي صوت له في انتخابات مجلس الشعب 2011-2012 (نظام الفوتوت)؟ (هذا السؤال اختياري)

يرجى اختيار الإجابة...

لقد وصلت إلى نهاية الاستبيان، يمكنك استخدام هذه المساحة لتقديم أية معلومات إضافية، شكرًا جزيلاً على تطوعك بفتحة المشاركة في هذه الدراسة!