How does neoliberal performance management affect teachers’ perceived motivations to ‘improve’?

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I declare that the thesis is my own work, and has not been submitted in substantially the same form for the award of a higher degree elsewhere. The word-length conforms to the permitted maximum.
Abstract

This study investigates teachers’ perceptions of the factors that motivate them to ‘improve’ or develop their practice. In the neoliberal policy context of the education system in England, performance management represents a motivational approach because of its linkage of outcomes with reward or punishment. This study contributes by evaluating the intrinsic and extrinsic motivations which might incentivise (or dis-incentivise) teachers to change their practice. The concept of performativity is considered, examining the extent to which teachers perceive they are motivated by influences such as the school inspection system, performance-related pay and numeric targets. The fraught concept of ‘improvement’ is discussed, including the potentially conflicting notions of ‘performance management’ and ‘professional development’. The emphasis of this mixed methods study is on teachers’ voices, which are often silenced or marginalised within the present neoliberal policy context. The study therefore conducts an ordinal factor analysis of a survey of qualified teachers, using self-determination theory as the underlying construct. This is further subject to Kruskal-Wallis tests for variance between groups. Qualitative data is gathered from semi-structured interviews with working teachers and examined using a hybrid inductive/deductive thematic approach to analysis. Based on a complementary synthesis and drawing on an integrative theorisation of motivation extending beyond self-determination theory, two overarching areas of teacher motivation are identified as being in tension: constitutive motivation, which includes the educational best interests of children, the pleasure of teaching and a sense of autonomous mastery, and instrumental motivation, arising from external impetuses to ‘perform’. Teachers’ constitutive motivations are found to engender authentic professional development and this has clear implications for effective school leadership.
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1. Introduction

This study is predicated on three key ideas. Firstly, that neoliberal performance management is pervasive in the English educational context (Stevenson, 2017; Courtney, 2016; Ball, 2003). Second, and crucially, that this policy agenda is ‘a motivational approach’ (Ryan and Weinstein, 2009, p225), because of the core emphasis on the reward and punishment of required behaviours and ‘outcomes’. Thirdly, that those who dissent from the neoliberal orthodoxy are marginalised or silenced (Courtney and Gunter, 2015; Stevenson and Gilliland, 2015). Therefore, taking these factors together, teachers’ perspectives on what motivates them to develop professionally are important in the current context. As an initial definition prior to fuller discussion in Section 2.1, neoliberalism can be described as an ideology dedicated to the commodification and marketisation of education (Venugopal, 2015; Fisher, 2009). It is predicated on a belief in the power of high-stakes competition, resulting in the ‘success’ and ‘failure’ of competitor-participants (Carr, 2015a). Allied to this is the concept of managerialism (again, see Section 2.1). This organisational philosophy emphasises the importance of hierarchical oversight by a professional class of managers, characterised by bureaucratic measurement, intensive accountability and controlling diktat (Freidman, 2004).

In this study, self-determination theory (Ryan and Deci, 2000) has been selected as a primary lens through which to examine teachers’ perceptions of their motivations to develop professionally. Both theoretical work in the English context (Carr, 2015a) and empirical work in the broader European context (Gorozidis and Papaioannou, 2014; Wilkesmann and Schmid, 2014) has shown that self-determination theory (SDT) has real applicability to the question of teacher motivation in the neoliberal context. In the present study, SDT enables the examination of a spectrum of teachers’ potential developmental motivations, both intrinsic and extrinsic, which they may perceive to incentivise ‘improvement’ or offer an impetus for professional development. It is fundamentally interested in the ‘why’ of motivation, offering a typology of six categories (Ryan and Deci, 2000): amotivation (the absence of purpose or impetus), external regulation (reward and punishment), introjection (ego, self-worth, the esteem of others), identification (motivation through increasingly shared values), integration (a more fully internalised form of identification) and intrinsic motivation (inherent pleasure and satisfaction). These travel on a continuum in the order given above, from more controlled to more autonomous motivations. SDT is informed by the notion that there are three basic psychological needs (Ryan and Deci, 2000) which influence the extent to which motivation is internalised: autonomy (the
need to feel autonomous), competence (the need to feel competent) and relatedness (the need to share values and goals). A fuller discussion can be found in Section 2.3. However, the study will not be rigidly confined to this theoretical construct, but instead allow for other possibilities through both including an inductive approach and by engaging with related theoretical frameworks, inclusive of achievement goal theory (Senko et al., 2011) and motivation-hygiene theory (Stello, 2011; Herzberg et al., 1959). Emergent theorisation will also form part of the discussion.

In sum, given the applicability of a motivational lens in the present context of neoliberal performativity, a clear opportunity emerges. Indeed, this research is considered to be particularly relevant at a time of heightened performativity (Courtney, 2016) and the introduction of performance pay for teachers (DfE, 2015). It can be argued that external regulation of motivation through reward and punishment is reaching a new intensity. Studies in the current English context which explore working teachers’ perceptions of their developmental motivations are therefore needed, with a self-determination theory-informed study using mixed-methods means yet to be undertaken. Similarly, it may be the case that new theoretical perspectives on teacher motivation emerge through the study.

The present section introduces the rationale for this study. Section 2 will explore extant literature in relation to, in turn: the neoliberal educational context in England; the particularly timely issue of performance pay for teachers; the relevance of SDT and other motivational perspectives in the consideration of teachers’ professional development and performance management. The third section will set out the case for a mixed methodology, alongside the meta-theoretical critical realist perspective which underpins it. It will then detail the quantitative methodology, including the piloting of this approach. Lastly, it will describe the qualitative methodology, inclusive of the inductive/deductive hybrid thematic analysis that will be used (Fereday and Muir-Cochrane, 2006). The fourth chapter will then present the quantitative analysis, inclusive of the ordinal factor analysis (Lorenzo-Seva and Ferrando, 2013; Basto and Pereira, 2012) and the comparison of group differences through Kruskal-Wallis tests. The fifth chapter will present the inductive/deductive thematic analysis, exploring the survey open responses and interview data in turn. Moving on to the sixth section, a synthesis and discussion of key findings from the qualitative and quantitative strands is made. This adopts an innovative approach which first synthesises, then discusses, each of the most salient combined findings in turn. Lastly, conclusions are drawn as to teachers’ perceptions of their developmental motivations and the implications that this has for the present neoliberal context, alongside the limitations and contributions of the study.
2. Literature Review

2.1 Introduction

This literature review seeks firstly to outline the neoliberal educational context, before moving to a specific consideration of the implications that this has for teachers and schools. Subsequently, the focus is narrowed to a key and emblematic feature of neoliberalism, performance pay and an evaluation is made of the most pertinent existing literature in respect to its efficacy as a motivator. Moving on, the study’s primary theoretical framework is delineated, with a review undertaken of its specific application to the educational context. Self-determination theory (SDT) is a lens for the structured analysis of motivation which has been shown to have a much applicability to the phenomenon of neoliberal performativity within education. Following on, the link between SDT and other constructs is explored, chiefly achievement goal theory. After this, other relevant insights into the motivation of teachers are examined, with related international studies being taken into consideration. Conclusions are then drawn in respect to the opportunities available for the present study.

2.2 The neoliberal context

Neoliberalism can be an evasive concept. Anderson (2000) has written of neoliberalism as being ‘the most successful ideology in world history’ (p17), however, in spite of this (or perhaps because of it), the definition of the term ‘neoliberalism’ can prove most difficult (Venugopal, 2015). This is at least perhaps partly due to a lack of formal articulation on the part of its proponents. Similarly, its pervasiveness across various aspects of society makes it mutable and therefore chimerical. In the words of Brenner et al. (2009), it exhibits ‘a perplexing mix of overreach and underspecification’ (p2). One possible response to this problem is to define neoliberalism as it presents itself within a specific context. Davies and Bansel (2007) describe the impact of a neoliberal educational system ‘where things go horribly wrong [because of marketisation], and the logic of the market prevents them from being put right’ (p258). Levin (2005) has also described the negative effects of the commodification and consumerism which are inherent to neoliberal educational reforms. Fisher (2009) has used the apt phrase of a ‘business ontology’ to describe how ‘capitalist realism’ has created a culture whereby ‘it is ‘simply obvious’ that everything...including education...should be run as a business’ (p16). Similarly, Carr (2015a) has noted how ‘neoliberal reforms in education have nudged state provision towards privatisation and marketisation’ (p18), with the word ‘nudged’ helping to convey what can be at times the subtly insidious
nature of this change. Freidson (2004) examines the impact of these neoliberal market forces on the working practice of professionals: ‘in a free market...prices must be kept as low as possible and, in so far as cost is associated with the quality of work, quality must be as low as it can be and still sell’ (p202). It is interesting to consider the public sector in these terms given its increasing marketisation, reconfiguring Freidson’s phrase, so that ‘prices’ reads as ‘taxes’ and ‘costs’ reads as ‘salaries’. In educational terms, the implication of this is perhaps that teachers would be paid the least possible for providing the lowest possible ‘consumer-acceptable’ standard of service. It is unsurprising therefore that both Menter et al. (1997) and Apple (2004) attribute the de-professionalisation of teachers to the influence of market forces. Such a prevailing (and apparently intensifying) neoliberal environment is clearly of real relevance for the present study, given the impact that these conditions may be having on teachers’ developmental motivation.

The role of managerialism in achieving these neoliberal ends is pertinent here. Schools (irrespective of their designation, such as ‘comprehensive’, ‘academy’, ‘grammar’) can perhaps be seen to some extent as corresponding to Max Weber’s notion of managerialism, defined by Freidman (2004) as ‘hierarchical...formal...supervisory’ (p8-9), entailing the ‘rational-legal...bureaucratic division of labour’ (p49) with a ‘labour market...specifying differential wages...[and] job ladders’ (p68-9). On first examination, this definition of managerialism could seem merely a statement of the obvious and that such a widespread approach would, for reasons of simple pragmatism, naturally coalesce into existence. However, Freidman’s (2004) important observation is that ‘managerialism’ is a logic rather than a natural state of affairs, as conceptual as any notion of autonomous professionalism and therefore as open to question. Both Kalleberg (1996) and Littek and Charles (1995), for example, observe that such hierarchical notions may be increasingly less relevant in the modern world, where a more open dynamism could be of greater utility. Indeed, it is with some irony that Freidman interprets Weber’s managerialism as being ‘patently inspired by the state civil service of Imperial Germany’ (2004, p8), with the sense of anachronism that this implies. Yet, however antiquated, it may be seen as very much alive, not least in the state education sector. Here, the extent to which school leaders are reluctant, enthusiastic or indeed resistant managerialists may bear some consideration. Indeed, with the introduction of performance pay in the English educational system, there is a clear impetus for timely research which explores teachers’ perspectives on how they are managed and how this influences their perceptions of their motivations to develop professionally.
Yet the relationship between managerialism and neoliberalism also bears some consideration. If the marketisation of education is a neoliberal goal, adhering to the implicit assumption that consumer-driven services are desirable, then the extent to which managerialism inhibits or facilitates this process is worthy of consideration. If Freidman is correct, and managerialism does not prioritise the consumer (which in this instance is the student/parent), then this has significant implications for neoliberal initiatives such as performance pay. Indeed, if a process like performance pay can be said to rely on intensive managerialist accountability in schools (in other words, that managerialism is the means through which the neoliberal end is achieved), then this implies significant tensions. Can these two competing logics dovetail together (or perhaps, more properly, can one be subordinated to the needs of another)? If performance pay is a neoliberal attempt to introduce what is perceived by its adherents as the beneficial effects of marketisation, then it might be questioned as to whether such a process can ever truly occur in a consonant way within the state apparatus. If the end of managerialism is perpetuation of the bureaucracy and its advantaged hierarchy, rather than to be a servant of the consumer, then can it truly be the means to the neoliberal end? And if managerialism and marketisation are at odds, then perhaps only a true market, with the pupil/parent as an empowered external consumer (equivalent in process to private sector education), could release the dynamism that neoliberals purport to desire. However, attempts to introduce such a measure on a national scale in a developed economy have proven very fraught, with New Zealand's 'voucher system' being a prime example (Eley and Clark, 2017). Perhaps a de facto equivalent system already exists to some extent in England, given the funding that follows each student and the emphasis on parental choice inherent to the publication of league tables and Ofsted reports.

A noted attempt at a hybridisation between neoliberalism and managerialism can perhaps be found in the form of New Public Management (NPM). In practice, as Verger and Curran (2014) have noted, this manifests itself as ‘the promotion of school autonomy…market-driven competition between schools…[and]…outcomes-based incentives for schools and teachers’ (p4). Again though, the word ‘autonomy’ gives some particular pause here in the English context, not least because financial autonomy is questionable in an era of real-terms cuts in school budgets. Similarly, pedagogical autonomy is dubious given the existence of a prescriptive curriculum and a punitive inspection regime. Take, for instance, the tension (or contradiction) that exists in the ‘academisation’ process, whereby a school is at once granted autonomy and at the same time placed under central control by the Department of Education. The irony here is that the government shifts accountability onto schools, absolving itself of ‘blame’, whilst being covertly controlling and ultimately culpable (Apple, 2004).
Nonetheless, the appearance of greater autonomy seems to be a facet of NPM. In terms of its overall efficacy as a model of school organisation, it is worth referring to Tolofari (2005), who has detailed at length the deleterious impact on the education sector of ‘NPM...[which is] characterised by marketisation, privatisation, managerialism, performance measurement and accountability’ (p75). The work of Apple (2004) is again of considerable interest here, who describes an uneasy alliance: a ‘power bloc...[which]...combines...[those who are] committed to neoliberal marketized solutions...[and those] who are committed to the ideology of...accountability, measurement, management’ (p15). While noting the tensions that exist between these factions, Apple (2004) nonetheless conclude that this alliance is a powerful one, despite (or perhaps because of) its having a ‘seemingly contradictory discourse...[which]...has created such a din that it is hard to hear anything else’ (p15). In the English context, teachers’ perspectives on the motivational impact of such neoliberalism/managerialism often appears absent from this debate, making the focus of the present study all the more pertinent, given the context of recent school reforms. These reforms are radical, disruptive and transformative, and, as Apple (2004) notes elsewhere, would be denounced as such, were they not emanating from the supposedly conservative political tradition. As such, there is an urgency to the need to ensure teachers’ voices are heard.

Indeed, the practical implications of neoliberal managerialism for teachers are considerable, particularly if, as Leaton-Gray (2006) contends, ‘managers become a distinct occupational group [rather than]...a professional peer’ (p311). Mualuko et al. (2009) assert the potentially negative impact on teachers’ professional development of such pyramidal hierarchies, arguing instead for decentralisation. Similarly, Courtney and Gunter (2015) have written of how such a trend works to eliminate individuals and practices which depart from ideological norms, exerting a kind of subtle totalitarianism in the name of the school leadership’s ‘vision’. This aligns with the silencing or marginalisation of teacher voice described by Stevenson and Gilliland (2015). Likewise, Woods (2005) distinguishes between ‘consultation’ and ‘discursive rationality’ (p12-13) arguing for more democratic leadership in schools. ‘Consultation’ entails superficial empowerment for reasons of managerial expediency, with ‘discursive rationality’ being true dialogue. Massy et al. (1994) express this notion of ‘consultation’ as ‘hollowed collegiality’ (p11), differentiating it from meaningful collaboration. Plowright and Barr (2012) argue that unless teachers are actively empowered, then line management will ‘threaten to undermine their professionalism’ (p1). The extent to which it is ‘teacher-leaders’ or ‘managers’ who are judging teachers is also of relevance; Rapp (2010), for example, juxtaposes English and Swedish headteachers, where, in the latter case, headteachers are bureaucratic managers only and pedagogy is the preserve of teachers.
themselves. However, Rapp’s notion of English headteachers as pedagogical leaders rather than bureaucrats is perhaps more true in the comparative sense than in its own terms. In practice, it may be the case that schools are ever more similar as a consequence of managers being ever more compliant towards an aggressively neoliberal national agenda (Apple, 2004). Courtney (2015), for example, has written of the rise of a ‘corporatised leadership’ (p214) in schools, characterised by the adoption of private-sector practices for neoliberal ends. Apple (2004) describes the consequences of this being that schools invest more in maintaining their corporate goals: ‘on maintaining or enhancing a public image…and less time and energy is spent on pedagogic or curricular substance’ (p23), in the form, for example, of league table manipulation or Ofsted ‘grade-seeking’ (England’s school inspectorate).

Yet moving on from the role of school leaders/managers, there is another interesting factor in respect to the rise of neoliberalism in education: the implicit involvement of teachers themselves. Some might argue that teachers are victims of the neoliberal process, but they could be regarded as inadvertent perpetrators of it through passive acceptance: ‘a tacit invoking of the invisible hand by the profession’ allowing teachers to do what is ‘best for themselves (ie. conform to government policy)’ (Leaton Gray, 2006, p313). But neoliberal conditioning is also a potential factor here, with Sugarman (2015, p15) describing this as a ‘reformulating [of] personhood’ whereby, in the words of Read (2009, p28) ‘homo-economicus…[becomes a]…competitive creature’. This suggests that teachers may be habituated into perceiving neoliberal policy as ‘natural’ or the norm. Conversely, it may be that teachers are more consciously supportive of neoliberalism, if one accepts the view that an ‘expression of concern for the quality of work is in fact mere rationalisation masking [financial] self-interest’ (Freidson, 2004, p201). In other words, on this basis, teachers might covertly welcome the introduction of neoliberal initiatives such as performance pay. Yet this perspective perhaps exposes a neoliberal prejudice against the notion of authentic professional integrity. Instead, Eliot Freidson argues that ‘both aims must be acknowledged in evaluating the ideological struggle over professionalism’ (ibid). This willingness to consider both professional integrity and personal material gain perhaps offers a more holistic viewpoint when considering the motivation of teachers.

But in respect to teacher professionalism, as Leaton-Grey (2006) highlights, there are ‘different models that seek to address this problem…such as classical professionalism…a body of knowledge closed to outsiders’ and ‘democratic professionalism…in which teachers build partnerships with [other] stakeholders’ (p309). Concerning classical professionalism, it could be argued that in the present context this might be seen as neither possible nor desirable, being indicative as it is of authoritarian
didacticism. However, the ‘democratic professionalism’ offered by Whitty (2002), could prove to be a more viable option than the consumer-driven neoliberalism currently in the ascendancy. Sahlberg (2011) similarly asserts that the success of the Finnish model is built upon the deliberate empowerment of teachers as independent practitioners: ‘professionalizing (sic) teachers' work...enhancing trust in teachers and schools’ (Sahlberg, 2011, i). Popkewitz (1994) concurs with this approach, arguing that a process of re-professionalisation is needed in contexts where teachers have been divested of such. Crucially, however, Kolsaker (2007) and Leaton-Gray (2006) would argue that this needs to be driven in part from within the profession, by teachers being less acquiescent to the neoliberal agenda. The implications of different notions of professionalism for teachers’ developmental motivations may prove very relevant.

But here, it may be appropriate to trace how we have arrived at this need for re-professionalisation as a consequence of policy change. Leaton-Gray (2006) identifies the 1988 Education Reform Act as a key moment in the neoliberalisation of English education, encompassing intensified school inspection, greater standardised testing, school league tables and a prescriptive curriculum. The consequence of this was the ‘effect of turning the status of teachers from autonomous professionals into directed technicians’ (Leaton-Gray, 2006, p307). This legislative moment can arguably be said to have provided the essential foundation for the recent introduction of performance pay. However, it is worth noticing the by-partisan nature of the neoliberal agenda in the intervening period. Bartlett (2000), for example, delineates a timeline which begins with the previous Conservative government’s introduction of teacher appraisal in 1991. This trend is traced through the Labour administration, when it significantly intensifies, even before the 2006 performance management changes which occurred under New Labour (Bartlett, 2000; Leaton-Gray and Whitty, 2010). Similarly, it is possible to trace contractual changes, with teachers’ terms and conditions of employment becoming increasingly precarious and fraught (Courtney and Gunter, 2015; Gunter, 2012; Gunter, 2008). Moreover, such concerns are not solely specific to the English context, with similar policy agendas evolving in Europe and North American (Arriazu Muñoz, 2015; Apple, 2004). Arriazu Muñoz (2015), for example, details what can be seen as the development of a ‘reductionist economic perspective based on the competitive models of efficiency and growth’ (p33) at the European Union educational policy level.

In respect to the legislative context, a consideration of the primary sources can help to delineate the intensification of neoliberal education policy over the last 30 years. Policy development initially focused on teacher performativity through high stakes inspection that included formal classroom observation,
and later developed as explicit performance review and performance-related pay. The 1988 Education Reform Act is a key starting point, ushering in the control of the curriculum by government, with teachers instructed to teach specific content. In 1992, with the Education (Schools) Act, another key moment occurs: the creation of Ofsted and the more aggressive and punitive approach to school inspection that this entailed. Increasing teacher performativity proceeded unabated with a change of government, as a ‘New Labour’ government introduced the Excellence in Schools White Paper in 1997 (which was critical in the introduction of the ‘target culture’ and the School Standards and Framework Act (which included yet more punitive powers for Ofsted) in 1998. Subsequently, in 2000, this government also introduced the Performance Management Framework, entailing the creation of a performance ‘threshold’ that teacher must meet for future pay progression. In 2006, further performance management reforms were enacted, triggering more intensive documentation of performance related activities and the widespread formal grading of lessons. With the coalition government of 2010 onwards, the neoliberal agenda of teacher performativity intensifies once more with ‘The Importance of Teaching’ white paper: ‘making schools more accountable to their communities, harnessing detailed performance data’ (DoE, 2010, p7). A final key instance of performativity is the introduction of the new Teacher Standards with the Education (School Teachers’ Appraisal) (England) Regulations of 2012. This brings us to the 2013 introduction of performance pay, explored in detail in the Section 2.3.

As a consequence of this pervasive agenda, we may now be reaching the apex of what Ball (2003) has so powerfully described as a culture of teacher performativity, reaching a culmination in the form of performance pay. Ball (2003), influenced by Foucauldian notions of power, writes at length of the issues associated with teacher performativity in the neoliberal context, describing the pervasive effects of a market-ideology driven agenda and its deleterious effect on both teachers’ motivation and their ability to focus on the constitutive aspects of their work.

In a similarly Foucauldian vein, Perryman (2006) draws on the notion of the educational ‘panopticon’ in order to express the experiences of teachers working in a neoliberal environment. This relates to Foucault’s (1977) metaphorical use of the ‘panopticon’ as an expression of social surveillance and control, based an original design for an ‘inspection house’ by Jeremy Bentham (1791). This design for an ‘inspection house’, in Bentham’s view, could be applied to range of institutional buildings and features a central observation post encircled by backlit ‘cells’. The central post is designed so that the observers cannot be seen, meaning that the observed must always assume they are being watched. Perryman
(2006) describes a culture of teacher surveillance based on neoliberal performance measures which negatively influence a teacher’s capacity to work effectively as a professional. Defining ‘performativity’ as being ‘about performing the normal within a particular discourse’ (Perryman, 2006, p151), she delineates panoptic performativity as the perpetual sense of being scrutinised against these ‘accepted’ norms. Perryman’s (2006) notion of panoptic performativity arguably has real relevance to the present study, given the ever greater intensification of teacher surveillance in the English context.

However, other conceptions of surveillance may be relevant here, as it may be possible to over-rely on the panopticon as a metaphor. For example, Latour (2005) offers the notion of the ‘oligopticon’ as an alternate conception of surveillance. This might be articulated as a kind of ‘keyhole’ surveillance, whereby not everything is visible, but ‘what they do see, they see well’ (Latour, 2005, p181). Manley et al. have described how this might manifest itself as ‘data as a mode of surveillance’ (2012, p306), with Gad and Lauritsen (2009) supporting this view. In an educational context, this might take the form of ASP (‘Analysing School Performance’), a new data system which purports to offer a perpetual ‘keyhole’ on each school’s performance. However, this data is to some extent based on that which schools generate and submit (and which may therefore be subject to fabrication because of performance pressures), casting doubt on whether what is ‘seen’ is in fact seen ‘well’. This may therefore be a less useful conception, but could be of importance, given the implications that external control and performance pressures may have for teachers’ motivations to develop professionally.

Of potentially greater utility in the contemporary context is the concept of ‘post-panopticism’ (Courtney, 2016). This notion shares the same sense of being subjected to permanent visibility as the panopticon, but is different in important ways. The original notion of the panopticon arguably has a more fixed sense of the norms to which individuals must conform. However, Courtney argues that in a post-panoptic environment, these norms ‘are purposively in flux, transient and fuzzy’ (2016, p629). The ‘purposive’ element is key here, as the intention is to thereby create a culture of failure in which individuals are unable to dissemble: ‘the goal of post-panopticism is to expose subjects’ inevitable failure to comply…its consequence is to disrupt subjects’ fabrications that had been predicated on stability’ (Courtney, 2016, p629). In other words, it does not merely wish to control a stable ‘captive’ population, but rather to keep it perpetually off-balance, punishing it for a failure to comply with ever-changing and unachievable criteria enforced through external judgement. Importantly, in relation to the earlier discussion of neoliberal marketisation, Courtney (2016) also notes that impact of such a regime is variable, depending on a school’s position within the ‘market’. Taken in its entirety, the ‘post-panopticon’ could be
considered expressive of the present neoliberal context and provide insights into the performance management conditions which impact upon teachers’ motivation to develop professionally.

Drawing on the notion of the panopticon, Page (2015) offers an alternative conceptualisation of performativity using the metaphor of ‘glass’. He differentiates between the visibility and invisibility of performance management. On the one hand, this can be the highly ‘visible’, characterised by management practices such as ‘learning walks’ (no-notice classroom observations), constant data tracking and school leaders interviewing children/students about teacher performance. In respect to the ‘glass’ metaphor, the important point is that the observer is as visible as the observed – but in the sense that the observer wants to be seen. This differentiates it from the panopticon, which has an ‘unobserved’ observer. Another difference that follows here is that with the panopticon there is the potential for being observed, whereas the metaphor of glass and the visible observer implies that the act of surveillance is actually happening. Yet invisibility is also an important notion for Page (2015), describing as he does the times when the glass becomes ‘opaque’ due to the secrecy or confidentiality that attends the performance management of teachers deemed to be ‘failing’. Such neoliberal conditions, if indeed true, may prove to have considerable relevance to teachers’ developmental motivations.

Yet it may be, as Gad and Lauritsen (2009) argue, that the notion of perpetual visibility proves fraught and there are practices that evade surveillance. They argue that the ‘the position of the ‘god-eye’ is unachievable’ and that it ‘can easily involve resistance from creative actors’ (Gad and Lauritsen, 2009, p56). They describe a surveillance culture that can, in practical terms, prove partial and sporadic, being unevenly distributed over contexts and involving a range of participants. As such, it may be that the findings suggest conceptualisations of performativity which extend beyond the panopticon. This may have its implications for performativity and hence teachers’ developmental motivations.

Lastly, in respect to the notion of performativity, it can be argued that the question of greatest importance is the effect of this on learners. If there is a negative causality between intensive teacher performativity and improvements in students’ learning, as both Peterson (2000) and Weisberg et al. (2009) have asserted, then the educational situation for children and adolescents has perhaps never been worse. Therefore, how teachers’ motivations to develop professionally have been shaped by this ‘crescendo’ of neoliberal policy represents a clear and urgent opportunity for deeper enquiry at the present time.
2.3 The neoliberal orthodoxy in respect to pay

‘Performance pay’ can be considered a totemic aspect of neoliberal performativity and its strong emergence in the English context (DfE, 2013) makes it a particularly salient area when considering what motivates teachers to develop professionally or ‘improve’. In an international study of performance related pay, PISA (2012) made the interesting claim that ‘the overall picture reveals no relationship between average student performance...and performance related pay’ (PISA, 2012, p2), which on face value suggests a worrying finding for the neoliberal pay agenda. However, they go on to argue that a relationship between teacher pay and student performance can be observed when considering ‘how well teachers are paid overall in comparison to national income’ (Ibid.). Their claim is that where teacher salary is lower than 15% above GDP per capita, then financial incentives have a greater impact, whereas ‘where teachers are relatively well paid (more than 15% above GDP per capita), the opposite is true’ (Ibid.). PISA conclude from this that ‘countries which do not have the resources to pay all [my italics] well’ (Ibid.) should give performance pay due consideration. This is an intriguing finding, suggesting that where the base rate of pay is lower, additional incentives carry greater weight. However, this claim may have limitations. Firstly, the study does not adequately acknowledge the relative affluence of certain countries. For example, material quality of life could significantly differ in Norway and Estonia, though both pay teacher salaries below 80% of GDP per capita. Similarly, it is worth noting that Dalton and Marcenaro-Gutierrez (2011) have produced research drawing on 39 different countries which argues there is a causal link between teacher quality and higher basic remuneration in relation to GDP only (ie. not enhanced through bonus payments), a view supported by Carnoy et al. (2009); in other words, they would argue teachers need simply to be paid well to start off with. Likewise, the PISA study analyses ‘performance pay’ in what is perhaps too general a way, not fully disaggregating different countries’ approaches. For example, in some countries, performance pay means permanent salary gains, whereas for others, it is an annual bonus system, where any gains can subsequently be lost. A final consideration in regard to this PISA study is that average reading performance is used as its sole indicator of teacher performance. Taking a country which PISA claims operates a relatively successful performance pay system (Sweden) and correlating this against other evidence sources (such as Lundstrom, 2012), it would appear that reading scores alone are a very limited indicator of the efficacy of performance pay. Lundstrom’s qualitative study of the perceptions of Swedish teachers argues that performance pay not only fails to produce positive outcomes, but is in fact counterproductive, due to factors such as an absence of transparency, arbitrary reward, absence of dialogue and problematic measurement of
performance. Given such a negative qualitative picture, in contrast with PISA’s positive single quantitative measure, the case for a broader range of mixed data seems compelling.

A broader examination of purely quantitative indicators of the efficacy of teacher performance pay has been conducted by Woessmann (2010), who asserts that ‘countries that adjust salaries for outstanding performance in teaching perform about 25% of a standard deviation higher’ in maths with ‘similar associations for reading and...smaller, but...significant associations for science’ (p2). With a data range of 190,000 representative 15 year olds across 28 OECD countries, such a claim might seem compelling. However, in the finer detail of the analysis, Woessmann (2010) has to acknowledge that around ‘70%’ of the data was based on maths testing, with ‘less detailed testing of science and reading’ (2010, p7), which makes his initial claim for a broader evidence base a little less impressive. Similarly, it emerges that France and Canada had to be dropped from the sample due to their inadequate provision of data in response to the OECD survey of teacher salaries. Perhaps most crucially, the author concedes that ‘the form of incentive and the method for identifying outstanding performance varies across countries’ (2010, p5); of the 13 countries with performance pay, 7 award this at a school level, 5 at a local/regional level and 3 at national level, suggesting a very considerable variation in how performance is measured. Further, differing socio-cultural interpretations of what constitutes teacher excellence is a factor not representable in his findings, nor is the potential issue of political manipulation of national statistics. Indeed, Woessmann’s (2010) own selective interpretation of the data according to percentile differences can also be brought into question; for example, differently analysed, it can be seen that 6 out of the 8 highest achieving nations (with a PISA Maths score of 520 or higher) have no form of incentive payment for outstanding performance. Yet while Woessmann’s (2010) work can therefore be subject to significant scrutiny, it is clear that he acknowledges many of these issues himself. Similarly, given the scope of the study, its findings cannot be entirely disregarded and a potential causal link between pay and performance may be worthy of further examination. However, as Woessmann (2010) himself concludes, much greater analysis is needed, both in terms of contextual variance and in regard to richer, mixed-methods data.

One further finding from PISA (2012) and Woessmann (2010) pertains to the impact of performance pay on the desirability of tertiary qualifications for teachers. Both studies remark upon what appears to be a correlation whereby the implementation of performance pay leads to a devaluation of tertiary teacher qualifications such as Masters degrees. This may link to Parson’s (1937) notion of alternative (ie. other than monetary) reward pursued by professionals such as teachers. Perhaps a performance pay system
diminishes such a notion of alternative reward and recognition, creating a situation whereby teachers are incited to behave in a more mercenary way. Related to the notion of alternative rewards, Frase (1989) observed that when teachers were given a choice between personal financial reward and funding for professional development, that those who chose the latter exhibited greater subsequent job enrichment and intrinsic motivation. Such an observation may have valid implications for the allocation of resources, but it is also worth noting that the self-selecting teachers who chose the second type of reward may have been already pre-disposed towards greater job satisfaction and intrinsic motivation.

Specific to the present context, in a quantitative study of performance pay linked to upper school student test outcomes in England, Atkinson et al. (2009) assert a positive causal link: ‘value added increased on average by about 40% of a grade per pupil’ (2009, p251). This study pertained to the previous ‘threshold’ system whereby pay increased with years’ service for 6 years, with progression ‘through the threshold’ to the upper pay scale based on a one-off evaluation of performance. Perhaps most persuasively, unlike the PISA/OECD studies, Atkinson et al. were able to ‘link individual pupils to the specific teachers who taught them, subject by subject’ (2009, p252). This ability to make associations between specific performance pay with specific pupils’ outcomes suggests a more compelling ultimate finding. However, on further inspection, issues are evident. Firstly, the study uses as its measure eligibility for performance pay, rather than applications for it; in other words, it cannot show a clear causal link between specific financial gains and pupil outcome. Second, there are no appreciable differences between individual teacher performance, financial incentive and pupil outcome at KS3 – the ‘gain’, assuming it exists, occurs at GCSE only, according to their study. Third, the study shows no performance enhancements for teachers who were already in the lowest quartile. In other words, it may be that performance pay incentivises already good teachers, but cannot assist/incentivise those whose performance is in greatest need of development. Fourth, the study focuses on threshold progression, which has two implications: (a) that this is a watershed ‘event’, and it can be questioned as to whether the gains are sustainable in a more longitudinal way (perhaps teachers simply work harder in their threshold year); (b) the typically linear nature of threshold progression means that more experienced teachers are under consideration (could there be a variety of factors as to why more established teachers could be more effective at KS4, other than pay?). Lastly, whilst headteachers were consulted in a qualitative way, it appears that there was no examination of the perceptions of those supposedly being incentivised (ie. teachers). For these reasons, the initial bold claim of a 40% gain as a consequence of performance pay seems less impressive.
Likewise, the study by Atkinson et al. (2009), though relevant because of the principles involved, was related to the previous pay system. In the current English context, the key changes introduced by the Department for Education in 2013 were the removal of pay progression based on years’ service, and the linkage of all pay progression to performance, with individual teachers’ pay increasing at different rates. However, that there is an absence of clarity in the minds of school leaders in regard to these changes is perhaps evident in the Department for Education’s (2015) more recent guidance on remunerating teacher performance. This document is at pains to articulate that ‘schools need to ensure that their pay policies are clear’ emphasising the need that ‘schools should review their pay and appraisal policies annually to clarify their approach’ and reiterating that ‘all pay decisions must be made on objective criteria’ (2015, p5). Such language is perhaps expressive of the ambiguities of the current performance pay system. Likewise, given their statement that ‘no single approach will suit all schools’ (Ibid.) and that ‘schools are free to adopt their own approaches on pay and appraisal’ (2015, p7), it could be argued that a ‘system’ of pay does not exist, but rather a ‘principle’. If approaches to pay can proliferate on such a varied and individualised basis, it can be questioned as to whether the clarity and objectivity emphasised by the DfE can actually be achieved. However, the appendix to this document, ‘Examples of approaches to pay progression based on performance’ (DfE, 2015, p49) does appear to take the notion of systematic incentives seriously. The document recommends specific and transparent increments linked to precisely pre-determined criteria: ‘Teachers will be eligible for a pay increase of £x...if...£y...if...£z if...’ (Ibid.), yet this appears difficult to achieve given the real terms spending cuts to which schools’ budgets have been subject.

Some seemingly progressive attitudes are also superficially evident in this document, such as the argument that ‘Schools should consider carefully the need for targets and objectives that enable teachers to demonstrate performance, rather than simply results.’ (DfE, 2015, p15). This is of particular interest, given the possibly significant extent to which teachers believe themselves to be judged by numeric targets, rather than more holistically. Similarly, the notion that ‘evidence for appraisals must be proportionate and...not add unnecessarily to teachers’ workloads.’ (DfE, 2015, p16), seems an entirely valid statement, though, again, the extent to which this accords with teachers’ perceptions is debatable. By the same token, the perspective that ‘It is not necessary for schools to adopt rigid models [in regard to the] relevant standards...and teachers should not be expected routinely to provide evidence that they meet all the standards’ (DfE, 2009, p18) appears sensible, yet the extent to which teachers find themselves subject to intensively criteria-compliant appraisal is very much open to question. The conflation of TLR (teaching and learning responsibility payments) and UPS (upper pay scale)
responsibilities could also be an area for concern, as the guidance document states that ‘schools should try to avoid confusing...the criteria and factors for...TLR payments with [those for] the upper pay range’ (DfE, 2015, p19), though again, this may prove to be more of an expression of concern over a problem already in existence, rather than pre-emptive in nature.

Yet the extent to which this agenda will motivate ‘improvements’ in teacher performance is open to question. For example, Fryer’s (2011) study of the impact of teacher incentives on student achievement across over 200 state schools in the New York City area presents a startling finding. Whilst some studies demonstrate a neutral effect on student outcomes, Fryer’s study describes teacher incentives as having a negative outcome in respect to achievement. He argues that through ‘explicit cheating, teaching to the test, or focusing on specific, tested objectives...incentives could have a negative impact on student performance’ (Fryer, 2011, p3), with this being especially prevalent in larger schools. In identifying reasons for these student outcomes, Fryer (2011) identifies both insufficiently large financial rewards and an incentive scheme that was too managerially complex, lacking in transparency and containing variables beyond the individual teacher’s control (like the school’s overall local ranking). Another more ambiguous finding related to group incentive schemes, which, when poorly implemented, allowed for the ‘potential for free-riding’ (Ibid., p22), though Fryer simultaneously indicates that group schemes might be potentially valid given the right conditions. Likewise, Hulleman and Barron (2010) offer another review of the link between performance pay and teacher motivation in the context of the United States. They articulate well the negative outcomes of associating pay with quantitative targets, noting the consequences that this has in respect to assessment fraud and manipulation of data. Similarly, they note the mis-applicability of performance pay to non-manufacturing related contexts, using the apposite phrase that ‘Monetary incentives increase performance quantity but not quality’ (p28) and are therefore invalid in complex, dynamic service sector environments. They do make the argument that performance pay may yet prove to be effective because it offers a mechanism for providing higher stakes feedback to teachers, but do not support this with empirical evidence from the education sector, instead using a single generic literary source to bolster their claim. Similarly, they do not acknowledge the point that performance feedback can be delivered in a formal way and made meaningful by other means than simply relating pay to performance. Figlio and Kenny (2007) offer another valuable caveat for those seeking to make claims about a quantitative link between student outcome and teacher performance pay: ‘The association between teacher incentives and student performance could be due to [already] better schools adopting teacher incentives’ (p901). If those schools which are already most managerially ‘efficient’ find it easiest to implement or align with the new approach, then this might result in a
skewing of the data in the direction of more positive achievement. This cuts through to another potential issue with performance, namely, the distinction between relative and absolute performance.

Reward at the whole-school level (which is then distributed) is another factor which might complicate the issue, as Croxson and Atkinson (2001) describe the experiences of headteachers who have reported the positive effects of distributed rewards for whole-school gains. Interestingly, they also describe the negative perceptions of headteachers in respect to individual incentives, especially that school leaders felt it was ‘difficult for some teachers, who were used to seeing themselves as part of a team…it may even have been destructive to those team relationships’ (Croxson and Atkinson, 2001, p15). This observation came in response to the historical introduction of an upper pay threshold in England, but given the intensification of the neoliberal pay agenda since that period, it may be that such a fear in respect to the undermining of collaboration has never been more relevant. Yet their analysis of the attitudes of headteachers is not without ambiguity even in respect to the principle of performance pay, whether it be group or individual incentivisation. Some heads ‘believed that schools, as non-profit organisations, could not in principle fund performance-related pay’ because there is no ‘income source to be recycled’ (Ibid., p19). Other heads were found to believe far more in reward than incentive: ‘to reward effort or to redress inequity’ not ‘motivate staff to better performance’ (Ibid., p20). Others did believe in the value of performance pay, but ‘a number of heads said that they had been unable to use financial incentives because of financial constraints’ (Ibid., p21). Other familiar issues with individual incentives also emerge, with Croxson and Atkinson (2001) describing ‘perverse incentives…focusing on only the subset of pupils with the highest marginal gain…or cheating’ (p2). Such dangers, inhibitive of real educational improvement, have perhaps never been more serious.

In sum, there is much that is contested in respect to performance pay, with this being particularly relevant to a consideration of teachers’ motivation to develop professionally or ‘improve’ in the present context.

2.4 Self-determination theory and the neoliberal context: a different perspective.

Given the contested evidence for the neoliberal belief in pay as an efficacious motivator for teachers to develop or ‘improve’, perhaps another perspective is needed, and this can be offered by Self-Determination Theory (SDT) (Ryan and Deci, 2000). As noted in the present study’s Introduction, in respect to neoliberal performance management, Ryan and Weinstein (2009) have a powerful insight: such ‘reforms are ‘a motivational approach’ (p225), because of their association of outcomes to
rewards/punishments. They therefore argue that teacher performativity can and must be analysed through a motivational lens, such as the SDT framework. More recently, Carr has identified a similarly ‘pressing need to consider…motivational constructs’ (2015b, p1383) in the English educational context.

Sheldon and Biddle (1998) provide a helpful definition of the meta-theoretical basis of SDT: the organismic perspective. They describe this as an outlook where ‘humans are assumed to be inherently active… [but] this does not mean…their interests cannot be guided’ (p166). Sheldon and Biddle (1998) seek to differentiate organismic theory from ‘operant theory, in which people…are inherently passive’ (p167). This is particularly relevant as Ryan and Brown (2005) note an error potentially inherent within neoliberal performance management in schools, which is namely that it seems predicated on classical operant theory, with its accompanying notions of the passive individual stimulated to behave in certain ways by rewards and punishments. However, as Ryan and Brown (2005) argue, Skinner’s (1953) argument is based on the reward and punishment of ongoing behaviours, not outcomes. Given the clear emphasis on ‘outcomes’ in the neoliberal educational environment, Ryan and Weinstein (2009) argue this would inevitably lead to ‘diminished self-motivation’ and a consequent lack of ‘performance enhancements’ (p226). Others support this view, offering empirical work which shows the deleterious effects on levels of teachers’ motivation and pedagogical creativity (Niemiec and Ryan, 2009; Ryan and Brown, 2005) and the resultant impact on student learning (Deci et al., 1999). There is, therefore, considerable scope for examining the ‘operant conditioning’ of teachers in the English context, using the SDT lens to explore the impact of such an approach on teachers’ perceptions of their motivations to ‘improve’ in the light of the most recent wave of performativity measures, including performance pay (DfE, 2015).

Sheldon and Biddle (1998) used SDT to illuminate the potentially negative implications of neoliberal performativity in schools in the American context. Prior to a series of neoliberal reforms focused upon high stakes testing and the external regulation of teachers and students through rewards and sanctions, they drew on the synthesised findings of several SDT studies to highlight the ‘perils’ they felt this might entail. These included: a narrowing of the curriculum; transmission of negative pressure from teachers to children; a stifling of experimentation and creativity on the part of teachers (and by extension, children); a diminishing of learning for its own sake (with minimal intrinsic value placed on subject matter) and accountability as a perpetual distraction from true teaching and learning. Given the educational conditions observed in America more recently (Ravitch, 2010), these predictions might be seen as more than prescient. Sheldon and Biddle (1998) also articulate well the non-transferability of
‘production-line’ performativity into professional contexts, arguing persuasively that ‘teachers are not assembly line workers…schools are complex organisations, with many goals’ (p165). Indeed, Gagne and Forest (2008) demonstrate in a systematic study that neoliberal performativity is predicated on what they have shown to be the mistaken transfer of performance strategies believed to be efficacious for simplistic tasks in the manufacturing sector. Alongside this, Sheldon and Biddle (1998) make a strong case for the power of intrinsic motivation, but also acknowledge what they perceive to be its fragility. This is a valuable insight, as it emphasises how easily a person’s (or profession’s) intrinsic motivations can be undermined. On this basis, teachers’ motivations to be more professionally effective are vulnerable to what can be seen as an increasingly ‘production-line’ orientated school context in England. This therefore makes their motivational perspectives all the more pertinent for examination at the present time.

As a consequence of the context outlined above, SDT therefore represents the primary theoretical lens for the study, providing as it does a framework for the ways in which teachers can be incentivised or disincentivised to develop professionally. By way of parameters for the present research, it should be noted that SDT-informed studies typically consider motivation at the level of conscious, perceived motives (for example, Tremblay et al. 2009) and this will be the case in the present study, unless explicitly stated otherwise at certain points. In other words, where motivation is referred to, it signifies perceived motivations. Similarly, in the SDT sense, ‘to be motivated means to be moved to do something’ (Ryan and Deci, 2000, p54). It can be differentiated from ‘morale’ as this pertains to a state of wellbeing, rather than an impetus for action. Further, it is concerned with not simply the ‘level of motivation (i.e., how much motivation), but also the orientation of that motivation (i.e., what type of motivation)’ (Ryan and Deci, 2000, p54). Its elements are outlined below:
The SDT framework describes a continuum of external motivation to internal motivation, ranging from more controlled forms of motivation through to increasingly autonomous motivations. Here, it is important to note how notions of ‘autonomy’/‘relatedness’/‘competence’ affect the SDT continuum (Ryan and Deci, 2000). A good summary is offered by Ciani et al. (2011) who argue that ‘peoples’ ability to internalize [sic] what they are doing is affected by the degree to which they experience satisfaction of their innate psychological needs of autonomy, competence, and relatedness’ (p227). The ‘needs’ to be competent and autonomous are perhaps more straightforward, but Carr (2015a) offers a helpful definition of relatedness as a ‘sense of belonging and connectedness…feeling that one is integral and accepted by others’ (p93). This notion of internalisation through the satisfaction of these needs is one of the key tenets of SDT (Ryan and Weinstock, 2009; Ryan and Deci, 2000). It is predicated on the supposition that the greater the level of internalised motivation, the more effective the individual is in a given context and that, by extension, the inverse of this is also true. Gorozidis and Papaionnou (2014) have argued particularly persuasively in this regard in respect to teachers’ motivation to develop professionally, with the more ‘internalised’ the motivation, the greater the engagement with educational innovation. In the present neoliberal context of schooling in England, teachers’ feelings of autonomy, relatedness and competence are in potential jeopardy and therefore their investigation is timely.
The notion of the internalisation of extrinsic motivations warrants further exploration. For example, Koludrović and Ercegovac (2014) have explored the relevance of SDT in relation to the motivations of pre-service teachers in the Croatian context. Interestingly, they found that student teachers were most motivated by identified regulation, a form of motivation which is defined by alignment with, and self-endorsement of, initially extrinsically imposed goals which become internalised. They attribute this to ‘responsibility for...their own learning...greater autonomy in their work’ (Koludrovic and Ercegovac, 2014, p33). Keng et al. (2008) also note identified regulation to be a strong motivational factor amongst pre-service teachers because of a perceived self-determination in respect to their implementation and development of the curriculum. However, with a study population of pre-service teachers, they have perhaps yet to experience the more intensive managerialism that would accompany being a qualified teacher. As such, it seems equally valuable to examine the SDT framework with reference to qualified teachers. Intriguingly, Fernet et al. (2008) have written of the effect of identified regulation on qualified Canadian teachers, noting a subtle variation according to gender in the form of higher levels of identified regulation amongst women in respect to ‘class preparation and administrative tasks’ than men (p271). A variation by sector was also noted, with male high school teachers having higher levels of intrinsic motivation and identified regulation (see Figure 1 for these concepts) than their elementary school counterparts, but also, that external regulation was more prevalent in the elementary age-phase too. The potential motivational power of identification and integration (as identified and integrated regulation are otherwise known) should not be understated. For example, in a Norwegian study, Skaalvik and Skaalvik (2011) stressed the importance of ‘value consonance, the degree to which teachers feel that they share the prevailing norms and values at the school where they are teaching’ (p1036), which readily aligns conceptually with identification/integration. Crucially, they make a link between this concept and teacher retention. This has particular relevance to the current English context given the documented and significant issues with teacher retention (Foster, 2016). Retention is pertinent to the present study not least because teachers cannot be motivated to develop professionally if they do not have the motivation to remain in post.

One potential area of relevance to teachers’ perceived motivations to develop professionally are their differentiating characteristics, such as gender. Keng et al. (2008) offer a study of Singaporean pre-service teachers’ positioning in relation to the SDT framework and argue that there are observable differences in the motivations of teachers by gender, particularly that males were proportionally more likely to be amotivated, whereas females were more likely to report themselves to feel externally regulated. Other differentiating factors may also influence teachers’ motivations to ‘improve’, such as years’ service.
Hildebrandt and Eom (2011) found that there were correlations between a teacher’s age and the effects of financial gain (extrinsic regulation) and external validation (introjection) on motivation, with younger American teachers showing a greater susceptibility to being more motivated by these factors. This may be as a consequence of generational circumstances, such as financial security, but the need for greater external validation amongst younger teachers might also be as a consequence of having entered the profession in an era of neoliberal accountability. However, they also found ‘three factors were not significant among the groups of varying ages: motivations for becoming a better teacher, for internal validation, and for collaboration’ (Hildebrandt and Eom, 2011, p421), suggesting that more internalised/intrinsic motivations may be less age specific. There appears to be little disaggregation of teacher motivation according to such variables in recent research in the English context and this represents an opportunity for the present study, possibly allowing for a greater distinction between the motivational dispositions of teachers with differing characteristics.

Overall, however, clean lines of division between the different types of posited motivation are in practice more problematic. Fernet et al. (2008) have found that ‘external and introjected regulations and amotivation are not very specific and could tend to collapse across work tasks. We therefore suggest that external and introjected regulations are probably less differentiated’ (p274). This finding would be corroborated by Guay et al. (2000). Interestingly, in an SDT study in the German tertiary context, Wilkesmann and Schmid (2014) also found an ‘empirical merger between intrinsic and identified motivation’ (p14), again suggesting ambiguity, this time at the opposite end of the SDT spectrum. Wilkesmann and Schmid (2014) have also described the ‘crowding out’ of these combined ‘internalized teaching motivations in academia’ (p20), as a consequence of the intensification of neoliberal extrinsic motivation. This extrinsic ‘pull’ may prove to be a factor in the English school context, and of importance not least because the SDT framework is predicated on empirical data which seems to demonstrate that internalised/intrinsic motivation corresponds with greater effectiveness (and that the inverse is also true). For example, McLachlan and Hagger (2010) have observed the benefits of increased ‘supportive’ autonomy on the efficacy of tutors in the tertiary sector, suggesting a kind of causality. As, in the English context, there is little research using the SDT construct into school teachers’ perspectives on such dynamics, there is the opportunity for the present study to make a clear contribution in this regard.

Likewise, SDT has considerable relevance to the question of teacher burnout. Fernet et al. (2012b), in the Canadian state elementary and high school contexts, have explored the implications for teacher
burnout through the SDT lens. Fernet et al. (2012b) note the link between teacher burnout and imposed workload and oppressive school leader behaviours. Dworkin (2001) also describes the impact of high-stakes testing on teacher burnout. Interestingly though, Fernet et al. (2012b) also note an empirical link between students’ disruptive behaviour and teacher burnout which seems to demonstrate a perception that is often conveyed anecdotally and in the media. This inevitably creates an opportunity to acknowledge an obvious truth: that teacher motivation is multifaceted and cannot be reduced to performance management as the single salient factor. That said, this does not negate the validity of analysing performance management as a key factor in teachers’ developmental motivations. Similarly, Fernet et al. (2012b) conceive of behavioural issues as a constraint on teacher autonomy (ie. it impacts on their freedom to teach as they wish) and therefore has a shared commonality with workload and management style – which also undermine autonomy. Equally, behaviour is more complex than the simplistic operant perspective would allow. Behaviour is not simply an occurrence independent of the learning in a classroom; a constructivist viewpoint would argue that behaviour is expressive of the effectiveness of the learning. Given the deleterious effect that performativity has on deeper learning, it is clear that pupil behaviour is not inseparable from the neoliberal context. However, returning to the key point here, teacher burnout is obviously relevant to a context in which retention and teacher shortages are major issues (NAO, 2016). It is similarly relevant because of the self-evident point that a burnt-out teacher is much less likely to benefit children’s learning. In an era of intensified accountability, greater research is therefore needed to examine the motivational impact of performativity and the extent to which it is responsible for burnout, rather than the ‘improvements’ it intends.

Teachers’ perceptions of how their motivations to develop professionally are influenced by their school leaders is an important factor. Eyal and Roth (2011) offer some valuable empirical evidence to support the perspective that: ‘principals seem to play a major role in teachers’ motivation’ (p267). This to an extent might appear self-evident, but where the study is more interesting is in respect to the notion that ‘transformational leadership was negatively associated with teachers’ burnout’ whereas ‘transactional leadership was positively correlated’ (p266). ‘Transformational’ leadership might be described as an empowering approach, whereas ‘transactional’ is akin to the established norms of a more controlling performance management. This once again points to the not inconsiderable irony that performativity may in fact be prohibitive of better performance.

Perhaps of greatest importance is the impact of performativity on learners, with SDT offering considerable insights in this regard. If teachers are not motivated to develop in terms of meaningful
professional learning, but instead are motivated to ‘improve’ in the sense of their performance in high-stakes testing, then as Sheldon and Biddle (1998) have asserted, these motivational types will be contagious from teachers to students. Assor et al. (2005) note a similar link in the Israeli context, arguing that teachers’ controlling behaviours have a negative impact on children’s motivation and by extension their independence and academic development. These controlling behaviours are posited to be directly consequential from the accountability system which presently prevails. This is particularly interesting given that PISA (2012) argue the Israeli context is one of the few where there is evidence that performance pay works. Similarly controlling behaviours have been noted by other studies, which have shown the negative impact that this has on deeper learning (Niemiec and Ryan, 2009; McNeil and Valenzuela, 2000), with this resulting, for example, in what Torrance (2007) has described as assessment as learning. Others share this view, such as Flink et al. (1990), who noted the irony that children who were controllingly taught to the test actually produced poorer test results, as similarly described by Sahlberg (2011). Contrastingly, Grolnick and Ryan (1987) noted less superficial learning and higher emphasis on inherent interest in a more autonomous group of students, which has been supported by Ryan and Brown (2004) and Ryan and LaGuardia (1999). Perhaps most worryingly, such a culture of higher control/poorer learning has been held to be most prevalent amongst schools which serve the least economically advantaged (Moon et al., 2003). Likewise, it may be most damaging to those with special educational needs (Rogers and Tannock, 2013). Given the degree of performativity that has been delineated in the English context (Courtney, 2016; Carr, 2015a, Ball, 2003), there is a clear need for a greater awareness of teachers’ perspectives on the motivational effects of such an autonomy-limiting approach. Similarly, students’ more holistic development is a factor, with Guay et al. (2003) offering a SDT study which examines the link between a student’s global motivational dispositions (ie. across contexts) and their school-specific motivational dispositions. The study concludes that there is a cross-influential link in terms of motivational dispositions (ie. global to school, and vice versa). This finding suggests that teachers have a considerable role in orientating students’ wider out-of-school motivational dispositions. Given the potentially negative effects of a controlling sense of performativity on teachers’ developmental motivations and by extension on student motivation, this arguably underlines the importance of autonomy-supportive behaviours to a child’s wider development.

There may be some disagreement as to whether ‘performance’ ought to be prioritised at all, but, assuming that it is of relevance, Fortier et al. (1995) have arrived at findings which are expressive of a means of achieving higher performance which is at odds with the neoliberal orthodoxy. In an extensive study involving 263 French-Canadian students, there appeared to be a clear correlation: ‘the more
students were motivated towards education in an autonomous fashion [by their teachers], the higher was their school performance’ (Fortier et al., 1995, p267). Fortier et al. (1995) subsequently acknowledge, and rightly, that performance is complex and cannot be reduced to influence of single variable. Nonetheless, their evidence for autonomy as a significant variable within that mix is difficult to ignore. Equally, if a causal chain in respect to teachers’ autonomy, and, subsequently, students’ autonomy be accepted, then to achieve the performance gains identified by Fortier et al (1995), teachers must be less subject to performativity. Another way of expressing this might be to say that the lesser the performance management, the greater the improvements in teacher performance, though this would doubtless seem counter-intuitive to those with a neoliberal agenda.

In sum, it is clear that SDT has much to offer in terms of the examination of teachers’ motivations to ‘improve’ or develop professionally in the current context of schooling in England. It is, however, important to consider other perspectives and these are explored below.

2.5 Linkage between SDT and other prominent theories of motivation.

Kaplan (2013) argues for a dynamic theorisation of teacher motivation due to its inherent complexity. In the consideration of what motivates teachers to ‘improve’ or develop professionally, therefore, other theoretical perspectives may be relevant. For example, Sweet et al. (2012) hypothesise a link between self-determination theory (SDT) and self-efficacy theory (SET). This assertion is based on an empirical study which synthesises factors inherent to each theory, but also on the observation, that, in respect to meta-theoretical underpinnings, both frameworks are ‘well-aligned because they are based on the ideology that humans are agents of their actions’ (Sweet et al., 2012, p320). However, it is worth noting that of the two hypothesised joint SDT/SET models posited by Sweet et al., only one provided viable correlations, indicating that synthesis is neither automatic nor easy. In the more viable model, a correlation was observed between the SDT notions of autonomy and relatedness with the ‘SET variables: confidence and outcome expectation’ (Sweet et al., 2012, p325). Indeed, other studies have suggested similar correlations (Williams et al., 2006; Fortier et al., 2007). Likewise, in the South Korean context, Clark et al. (2014) found that a teacher’s sense of self-efficacy was a significant factor in respect to motivation. Interestingly, Clark et al.’s (2014) understanding of this is predicated on the assumption that self-efficacy was more strongly influenced by extrinsic factors such as managerially-led support. However, given the linkages between self-efficacy, autonomy and intrinsic motivation articulated by Sweet et al. (2012), it may be that Clark et al.’s association of self-efficacy with extrinsic motivation is
open to question. Overall, an analysis of the initial SDT findings with this in mind may be fruitful, depending what emerges.

Similarly, Ciani et al. (2011) have observed associations between self-determination theory and achievement goal theory, contending that ‘achievement goal [theory]…could help benefit self-determination theorists by giving them more insight into how broad precursor states... instantiate themselves as more specific goals’ (p224). The basic performance/mastery dichotomy of achievement goal theory may be usefully related to self-determination theory, but the finer-grained aspects of the framework can also be linked to SDT. To this end, Pintrich (2000) offers a helpful summary of performance and mastery in their ‘approach’ and ‘avoidance’ states, which can then be associated with SDT:

*Figure 2: Achievement goal theory summary, taken from Pintrich (2001, p100)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mastery orientation</th>
<th>Approach state</th>
<th>Avoidance state</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Focus on mastering task, learning, understanding</td>
<td>Focus on avoiding misunderstanding, avoiding not learning or not mastering task</td>
<td>Use of standards of not being wrong, not doing it incorrectly relative to task</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of standards of self-improvement, progress, deep understanding of task</td>
<td>Use of standards of not being wrong, not doing it incorrectly relative to task</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

‘Mastery-approach’ can be seen as broadly aligning with the identification/integration/intrinsic elements of the SDT continuum, whereas ‘performance-approach goals/performance-avoidance’ might be said to align with external regulation/introjection (though not respectively, but rather as dual aspects within each SDT element). ‘Mastery-avoidance’ sits much less easily within the SDT framework, (Ciani et al., 2011) . However, this less compatible element does not negate other more viable correlations. In support of the above, it is worth noting that Elliot and Church (1997) observed an inverse correlation between performance-avoidance and intrinsic motivation. Similarly, Duda et al. (1995) discerned the positive association of mastery-approach and intrinsic motivation. Barkoukis et al. (2007) observed the
same phenomenon, but on a wider scale, with mastery-approach also correlating with identified motivation, whilst exhibiting a negative relationship with external regulation. Likewise, given the potentially opposing nature of mastery and performance, it may be the case that goal conflict (Carr, 2015a; Bordreaux and Ozer, 2014) is apparent in the data, with this associating with the tensions present in the SDT continuum. Taken together, such linkages suggest that the achievement goal framework may prove illuminating when considering how teachers are motivate to ‘improve’, contingent on the findings.

Similarly, the two-factor motivation-hygiene approach of Herzberg et al. (1959) may be of relevance, with there being a linkage of the SDT notion of ‘external regulation’ and its emphasis on reward and punishments with Herzberg et al.’s (1959) notion of basic ‘hygiene’ needs relating to factors such as working conditions and pay. The partner-concept of ‘hygiene’, namely ‘motivation’, concerns the satisfaction of higher order needs such as the desire for responsibility and the pleasure of the work itself. This might therefore link to the ‘identification/integration/intrinsic’ aspects of the SDT continuum. The SDT concept of ‘introjection’ sits less easily, with this being associated with Herzberg’s notion of ‘motivation’ in the sense that it pertains to the recognition of others, but also to ‘hygiene’ in that negative esteem is a factor in poor employer-employee relations. Stello (2011) notes another potential problem in that Herzberg et al.’s theory can be interpreted as two distinct aspects that are not of necessity mutually contingent. In other words, ‘motivation-hygiene’ is not a continuum in the sense that the SDT concepts might be thought of. Nonetheless, this theory may prove relevant to the consideration of what motivates teachers to develop professionally or ‘improve’.

In sum, there are other established theories which have potentially valid linkages with SDT. If Kaplan’s (2013) view of the complex theorisation of motivation is correct, it may prove that these theories can be interwoven with SDT to illuminate the data further.

2.6 Other relevant studies of teacher motivation.

Individual studies outside of a specific theoretical framework may also prove pertinent to a consideration of teachers’ developmental motivations. One question of interest is the potential counter-productivity of performance management, with Finnigan and Gross (2007), in the US, offering a large mixed-methods study which examines the impact of performance management reforms (which bear considerable similarities with the teacher performativity agenda in England). They conclude that any initial gains are counteracted by a rapid deterioration in teacher motivation, thereby suggesting the
pyrrhic nature of the performativity agenda. They note that the lack of achievability of the goals to which teachers are held accountable creates a negative cycle of evaluation and subsequently negative teacher behaviours.

Other studies seek to similarly underplay the utility of extrinsic motivators. For example, Roness (2011), in the Norwegian context, concludes that teachers are driven primarily by subject discipline, the intrinsic value of teaching and altruism as three distinct motivators. However, it may be possible to question this to an extent, with altruism and the intrinsic value of teaching ‘collapsing’ particularly easily into the same category.

Students’ perceptions of their teacher’s motivations may also have relevance to the ‘extrinsic vs intrinsic’ debate. Wild et al. (1992) conducted an experiment to determine whether undergraduate students behaved differently if they were made to perceive that their teachers were either intrinsically or extrinsically motivated. They were informed that their teacher was either paid or a volunteer, though the teacher in question was unaware of their designation. Following this, ‘identical’ lessons were then taught to multiple students. Students were found to be considerably more responsive to teachers whom they believed were intrinsically motivated. It perhaps serves as another warning as to the wisdom of encouraging a greater tendency towards extrinsic motivation on the part of teachers.

Yet perspectives on the value of extrinsic motivation may not be unanimously negative, with some making the case for their utility as an incentive for professional learning or ‘improvement’. Firestone (2014), for example, argues that much of the challenge related to extrinsic motivation comes down to the nature of teacher evaluation. He suggests that if this were to be satisfactorily resolved, then extrinsic motivators would have greater traction. In other words, if a reward were to be offered based upon a more meaningful and accurate evaluation of teacher performance, it would be that much more incentivising. However, Firestone does not propose a solution to the problem of teacher evaluation, instead acknowledging that the measurability of a complex and layered activity such as teaching is by its very nature challenging. He does, however, suggest that progress can be made in this respect with further research, which would perhaps differentiate him from the likes of Ryan and Weinstein (2009) who argue ‘that attaching serious consequences to any indicator increases the probability that its meaning and utility will be corrupted’ (p230). Firestone’s (2014) conclusion is that a composite model ought to be arrived at, fusing extrinsic and intrinsic motivators. However, it is worth noting that Firestone’s (2014) conception of ‘intrinsic motivation’ would be far more akin to what the SDT framework would describe as identified/integrated regulation, rather than fit the SDT definition of
intrinsic motivation. Likewise, in the Chinese context, Liu and Onwuegbuzie (2012), make observations that resonate with the English system of teacher management, including the need to ‘establish a fair teacher evaluation system, and reduce unnecessary centralised inspections of teachers’ (p92), noting the negative impact that such systems can have upon teachers’ intrinsic motivations (and by extension, their effectiveness). Interestingly, however the authors do not discount the value of extrinsic motivations, noting that in their survey of Jilin Province, teachers reported lower remuneration negatively impacting on job satisfaction.

The difference between ‘accountability’ and ‘responsibility’ may also prove pertinent to the consideration of extrinsic motivations to develop professionally. Lauermann and Karabenick (2011) note the reductive nature of teacher accountability systems and their failure to take into account the fluid and multidimensional nature of teacher responsibility. Given the complex and shifting factors influencing teacher responsibility, it is perhaps unsurprising that a rigid and simplistic accountability system would fail to deliver as intended. Similarly though, Lauermann and Karabenick (2011) note that an instantaneous divesting of all accountability systems would not result in an immediate reassertion of teacher responsibility, but rather argue for a phased reintroduction in the form of supported autonomy (though there would be a clear danger of this being corrupted by the existing culture of managerialism). This has relevance given the potential correlation between accountability/responsibility and the degree of motivation to develop as teacher.

As noted in relation to SDT studies earlier in the chapter, group variations may prove of interest. Yet individual non-SDT studies may have observations of value here too. One such possible variable may be that of the age-phase specialism of teacher-participants. For example, Klassen and Ming-Ming (2010) conducted a study where elementary teachers were noted to be a little more autonomous, and, by extension, a little more motivated to be effective. Similarly, the inverse of this may be true, with Pearson and Moomaw’s (2005) large cross-age phase study in the Florida region showing a correlation between a lesser degree of autonomy and teacher burnout. Interestingly, Pearson and Moomaw (2005) observed that this correlation was consistent across all school age-phases, suggesting a more general malaise and less group variation in this respect than Klassen and Ming-Ming (2010).

The nature of a teacher’s role or remit may also be an important point of variation. Remijan (2014) perceives there to be higher levels of motivation amongst those described as hybrid teachers, who combine their classroom role with non-teaching responsibility. She attributes higher motivation to such figures because of the assertion that they are more likely to be able to exercise autonomy and
independence. The association between autonomy and motivation may be a valid one; however, Remijan’s (2014) view may bear more critical analysis. Firstly, the notion that administrative/managerial tasks can be empowering is open to considerable question, particularly in the English context, where instrumental managerialism appears to draw energies away from the work of developing as an effective teacher, with the negative impact on motivation that this implies. Secondarily, it can be argued that those in promoted ‘hybrid’ posts often tend to have been successful in the classroom. Therefore, a correlation between a person’s ‘hybrid’ status and their classroom motivation may be a case of retrofitting an already existing motivation.

Another possible point of interest in terms of group variation might be gender. Robert (2013), in the Mexican context, concludes that male teachers are more disposed to extrinsic rewards than female teachers and that motivation is by extension a gendered issue. If true, this may prove to be an interesting variable, not least because of the larger numbers of female teachers in the English context. However, such a study is open to question, not least because, as Ryan and Deci (2000) argue, motivation can be specific to the individual rather than the gendered group. Secondly, as Wilkesmann and Schmid (2014) suggest, the public sector in general may be inhabited by individuals who are more likely to be intrinsically motivated; Robert (2013) concedes this to an extent, arguing that ‘teachers also desire the non-monetary incentive of being part of a larger project’ (2013, p18), and that this is true irrespective of gender.

The importance of collective rather than simply individual motivation may have bearing too, with Klassen et al. (2008) describing the value of ‘deliberately building a collaborative school culture’ (p1932). This is perhaps particularly noteworthy given the emphasis that neoliberalism places on the individual (albeit an individual submissively responsive to external stimuli). Klassen et al. (2008) argue that collective efficacy (and by extension greater motivation) can be achieved through means such as the observation of effective colleagues, collaborative improvement of student outcomes and the development of a shared sense of purpose (through mission statements and enacted ethos). The notion of collective motivation through collaboration can be differentiated from the idea of financial incentives for groups. Fryer (2011) indicates that group incentives in schools could be valid given the right conditions, yet when poorly implemented allowed for the ‘potential for free-riding’ (p22). Pouliakas and Theodossiou describe an ‘important asymmetry in the manner in which individual and gain-sharing incentives affect job satisfaction...as only the latter exert a positive effect on employee well-being’
(2009, p681). This is of interest as it suggests a point of nexus between ‘higher’ psychological needs and more basic impulses, and also between collaborative and self-interested behaviours.

In sum, these varied perspectives on teacher motivation outside of the scope of self-determination theory may have relevance to the present study. This will be contingent on the data generated, with these ideas being drawn upon as they prove pertinent.

2.7 Literature review conclusion

This literature review has delineated, firstly, the neoliberal context of teacher performance management. Second, a range of literature in respect to performance pay has been considered, as a particularly timely aspect of performance management. Thirdly, the significance of SDT to the question of teacher motivation within the context of neoliberal performativity has been explored. Fourth, the interplay between other major theories and SDT has been outlined, in case these should prove additionally relevant to the data. Lastly, other valuable studies have been described, as these may be of pertinence to the findings.

In summary, given the pervasive neoliberal educational context and the relevance of a motivational lens to this phenomenon, a clear opportunity can be identified. Though performativity is much prevalent in the English context, current studies which quantitatively examine the motivational efficacy of this neoliberal approach on working teachers are less common, with a self-determination theory-informed study of this type yet to be undertaken. Similarly, with the introduction of performance pay in the English context, it can be argued that external regulation is reaching its apex as a motivational approach; this therefore makes the study particularly timely. It is proposed that the synthesis of these quantitative findings with rich qualitative data from semi-structured interviews will provide an insight into the perspectives of working teachers at an important time for the profession. Similarly, it may prove that other perspectives on teacher motivation are of relevance, depending on the data generated. This may take the form of more established theories of motivation such as achievement goal theory or motivation-hygiene theory, but the insights of more individual studies may also be important. Ultimately, there is a ripe opportunity to explore how participants’ perceptions of their motivations to ‘improve’ or develop as teachers are influenced by the current neoliberal educational context.
3. Methodology

3.1 A mixed-methods approach: a ‘complementary analysis’

With mixed methods research, important questions can be asked as to which element precedes or informs the other and how they will converge at the point of analysis, including which, if either, should carry the greater weighting. Bazeley (2018) recommends ‘complementary analysis’ whereby ‘information and ideas are pieced or merged together such that each reinforces another to create a more...comprehensive whole’ (p93). An approach entailing the ‘strategic integration of complementary sources’ is described by Bazeley (2018, p99), where the study is designed so that ‘sources contribute data relating to complementary parts of an overall puzzle’ (ie. X + Y) and/or ‘each source contributes information in parallel on each [of the same] major issues’ (ie. X¹ + X²) (Bazeley, 2018, p100). This study will use just such a strategy, leaning more towards the latter approach of parallel contributions on the same issues, though acknowledging the ‘extra’ that can be added by a particular strand where appropriate. For the juxtaposition of these strands, the present study proposes an approach of triangulation, as this can allow both methods to illuminate one another in a rich, equitable and flexible way, as both are considered equally relevant to the phenomenon under consideration. Bazeley (2018) also makes the valuable point that triangulation, when complementary, can be about identifying interesting dissonance between the strands, rather than being solely concerned with consonance for the purposes of cross-validation. At which point, choices arise as to the specific nature of the triangulation approach, with Creswell (2003), for example, offering a further four choices. Of these, the data transformation model would be eliminated because of an arguable loss of some of the richness of the qualitative data at the interpretative phase. Similarly, a validating quantitative data model would be discounted on the basis of an implied subordination of one strand to another and because it is therefore insufficiently ‘complementary’ (Bazeley, 2018). The last form of triangulation to be disregarded would be the multi-level model, whereby differing data strands are used for different levels of focus (eg. quantitative for macro-level, qualitative at the micro-level). However, as both strands focus on the same ‘unit of analysis’ (namely the perspectives of working teachers) this would not be appropriate. Therefore, the convergent triangulation design illustrated below has been chosen, as this arguably allows for the richest ‘well substantiated conclusion about a single phenomenon’ (Creswell, 2002, p65). The model follows this pattern:
However, it is important to draw on another relevant point made by Bazeley (2018), that ‘flexibility in the design and conduct of mixed methods research is required…a reflexive, interactive process evolving through the project’ (p23-4). The clean, parallel linearity offered by Creswell (2003) in the above diagram is valuable as it offers clarity and organisational structure to both the analytical process and the presentation of findings. Yet following Bazeley (2018), it is apt to acknowledge that the reality of mixed-methods research is somewhat ‘messier’ and more complex in practice.

3.2 A critical realist perspective

Such an articulation of a mixed-methods approach requires a simultaneous expression of the meta-theoretical underpinnings which inform it. As Maxwell and Mittapalli (2010) note, there is a ‘widespread view…that the appropriate philosophical “partner” for qualitative research is constructivism, and that for quantitative…post-positivist empiricism’ (p146). However, as Scott (2007) contends, drawing upon Pring (2000), this represents a ‘false duality argument’ (p5), which has come to represent an outmoded and restrictive dogmatism, resulting in the exclusion of methodological practices which may be of real value to a particular research question. Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004) argue that ‘this linkage between research paradigm and research methods is neither sacrosanct nor necessary’ (p15), articulating instead a vision of ‘a non-purist or compatibilist…position [which] allows researchers to mix and match design components that offer the best chance of answering…question[s] (Ibid). However, it is worth noting that their perspective is one which is strongly informed by the pragmatist perspective, drawing on the tradition of Peirce (1878) amongst others. Yet it could be argued strongly that pragmatism seeks to elide questions about the ontic and epistemic, rather than engage with them.
By contrast, critical realism offers a fully engaged ontological and epistemological stance, but with many of the methodological virtues of pragmatism. It is for this reason that Scott (2005) argues, ‘any reconciliation between qualitative and quantitative…methodologies…has to take account of the principles…[of] critical realist meta-theory’ (p633). It is therefore important that critical realism is defined. Bhaskar (1975) delineates basic realism as the idea that ‘perception gives us access to things and experimental activity access to structures that exist independently [my italics] of us’ (p30). However, as McGrath (2004) puts it, crucially, for critical realists: ‘ontology (the way things are) determines epistemology (the way things are known)’ (p107). This departs from Kantian transcendental idealism, whereby knowledge comes from experience, but where our minds impose what that experience is (ie. the real does not exist independently of the mind, or, in some of Kant’s (1781) more ambiguous moments in respect to realism, that it doesn’t matter if they do, to our perception of them. Rather, for critical realism, the real nature of things (though ultimately unknowable) exerts an influence how we perceive them.

A key concept that then arises here is that of stratification or ‘ontic depth’ (Olsen, 2009). Lipscomb (2008) defines this well as a researchers having an awareness of the ‘stratified and complex nature of the reality they are investigating’ (p42), that there are many and layered ways of attempting to know a thing: in other words, this leads inevitably to epistemic relativism. From this, a logical consequence is methodological pluralism; if there are many and sometimes changing ways in which an object (including social objects) manifests itself, this implies that it must be viewed in multiple ways methodologically. In essence, as Scott (2007) argues: ‘critical realism is realist and critical for two reasons: objects in the world, and in particular social objects, exist whether the observer or researcher is able to know them or not [hence realist]; and secondly, knowledge of these objects is always fallible [hence critical]’ (p14). It is perhaps therefore unsurprising that the likes of McEvoy and Richards ‘emphasize critical realism’s theoretical ability to ‘circumvent many of the problems associated with paradigm “switching”’ (2006, p76), a view shared not least by Lipscomb (2008).

Yet in order to explore the implications of this fully, it is worth noting that early critical realists such as Bhaskar (1979) have argued (based on what is arguably a qualitative bias) that quantitative work is innately incompatible with the critical realism perspective. This has perhaps best been taken to task by Pratschke (2003) who argues that modern statistical models in the social sciences do not assume the positivist rigidity which early critical realists have perhaps naively accorded to them. For example,
Pratschke (2003) notes that an ‘objection that critical realists have made to statistical models concerns the validity of the assumptions implied by these models [like] homoscedasticity and multivariate normality’, but goes on to argue that this is less relevant due to ‘recent developments in statistical theory and…robustness [in response to] deviations from normality’ (p22). This argument is perhaps even more true as a consequence of innovations subsequent to Pratschke’s (2003) time of writing, with the emergence of work by the likes of Basto and Pereira (2012) and Lorenzo-Seva and Ferrando (2013) in respect to ordinal factor analysis being an example of this. Secondly, Pratschke also notes the tendency of early critical realists to regard quantitative work as occurring within a reductively ‘closed system’ whereby analytical closure can be achieved (ie. that a ‘question’ can be definitively and conclusively answered). By contrast, Bhaskar (1975) would contend that social enquiry operates within an ‘open system’, one which is fluid, irreducible and inconclusive. However, there is no such assumption with quantitative work that such enquiries are conclusive. Similarly, they (‘classic’ critical realists) also believe that in an open system it is possible for ‘demi regularities’ to occur, which are defined as ‘partial event regularities which prima facie indicates the occasional, but less than universal, actualisation of a mechanism or tendency, over a definite region of space-time’ (Lawson, 1998, p149). Pratsche (2003) argues persuasively ‘that associations between events, attributes, actions and beliefs that are recorded by the covariances between variables can be interpreted as equivalent to ‘demi -regularities’” (p25); in other words, that statistical analyses such as factor analyses readily align with critical realist thinking when properly understood. Further critical realist concepts of relevance here in respect to quantitative work are abduction and retroduction, which are natural companions of ontic depth and epistemic relativism. Meyer and Lunnay (2012, online), drawing on the ideas of Danermark et al. (2002), define these succinctly: ‘abduction involves analysing data that fall outside of an initial theoretical frame…retroduction is a method of [re]conceptualising which...identif[ies] the circumstances without which something (the concept) cannot exist...in conjunction, these forms of inference can lead to the formation of a new...theory’. Importantly here, this implies that a theoretical framework being used in quantitative research is not simply proved or disproved in the sense of deductive logic, but rather is evaluated, revised and reconceptualised on the basis of the findings, as is the case in the present study.

Drawing on the important work of Margaret Archer (1990, 1995), Scott (2005) identifies a key tenet: ‘For critical realists...the central relation of social reality is between agency and structure’ arguing that ‘social structures pre-exist agential operations, and in turn human beings reflexively monitor the social world...changing relatively enduring but [also] emergent structures’ (p6). Social structures may have
been (and are being) ‘created’ in the broadest sense of the term, but these then assume an independent
reality (hence critical realist) which precedes and impacts upon the agency of their original human
progenitors. This leads to the conclusion, as Scott (2007) argues in a later work, that
‘methodologically...investigation can only take place at the intersection or vertex of agential and
structural objects, and thus indicators that researchers use have to reflect this close relationship
between the two’ (p14-15). In other words, the criterion for choosing methods must be their pragmatic
ability to ‘get at’ the interplay between structure and agency, rather than any outmoded notion as a
paradigmatic bias towards quantitative or qualitative. As the present study looks at the impact of social
structures upon motivation (and by extension agency), this therefore necessitates a mixed methodology
that can explore such.

3.3 Reflexivity

It is important to acknowledge the complexities that arise in relation to the question of reflexivity.
Bourdieu et al. (1999) argue that it is a mistake to claim it is possible to achieve ‘an epistemological state
of perfect innocence’ (p608). Instead, Bourdieu (2004) makes the case for reflexivity, whereby ‘casting
an ironic gaze on the social world...[implies that]....it cannot avoid casting this gaze on itself’ (p4). In
other words, it is essential for a researcher be aware of their ‘habitus’ (Bourdieu, 1986), and, in
particular, in this instance, the ‘cultural capital’ (Bourdieu, 1986) that the present researcher possesses
as a former teacher, still working in education, who is researching the perspectives of working teachers.
In practice, this means that the present researcher needs to possess an awareness of their position in
the ‘field’ (in this case, the modern school context) and a consciousness that there is a shared ‘doxa’
(Bourdieu, 1973), or set of rules, that both the researcher and participants understand and share. This
may manifest itself in a number of ways. For example, it may be, with a tacit sense of shared language
and perspective, that it may advantageously result in disclosure of sensitive details (ie. a teacher may
feel comfortable disclosing to someone they perceive to be a teacher). From the researcher’s
perspective, there may be a temptation to be sympathetic to or magnify such ‘disclosures’ and not view
them critically. For example, the participant who criticises their school leader might find an audience in
the researcher whom they feel incites them to this. Indeed, it could be that the researcher and teacher
actively construct this perspective together. In contrast, another consequence may be that a participant
presents views that they do not truly hold because of a sense that what they truly think does not
conform to the ‘doxa’. For example, the participant may not wish to disclose a sense that they are
motivated by pay because of a doxa which says that teaching is a vocational pursuit driven by moral purpose. Indeed, the researcher might inadvertently take this at face value as it accords with the ‘doxa’ that they anticipate. Likewise, at the point of analysis, the researcher should be conscious of the danger of ‘finding’ or prioritising data which corresponds to the ‘doxa’ and (consciously or otherwise) suppressing data which does not conform to this. The present research therefore needs to make the caveat that this work is influenced and coloured by the habitus of the researcher. The importance of ‘teacher voice’, delineated below, is therefore paramount.

3.4 The Teacher’s Voice

One key principle in the present study is the importance of teacher voice. This study is conducted in a neoliberal context in which the voices of teachers are often silenced or marginalised (Courtney and Gunter, 2015; Stevenson and Gilliland, 2015). As such, whilst acknowledging the inevitable complications associated with reflexivity, this study seeks to prioritise the opinions of working teachers, engaging with these and communicating them in as direct a fashion as possible. This is not least on the basis that it may be possible to obtain a greater insight into performance management strategies in schools by asking those whose performance is under question, as opposed to asking managers how well they are managing others (with the complications this implies). In the data-gathering and analytical processes, therefore, an emphasis will be placed on exploring the views of teachers in as transparent a way as pragmatically viable (acknowledging reflexivity). For example, the use of semi-structured interviews (see section 3.12 for greater detail) is designed to allow for teachers to take conversations in range of directions. Similarly, the survey distribution method (see section 3.5, relating to use of an alumni email database) is intended to bypass school hierarchies, engaging with teacher-participants directly. In the analytical process, this will include the identification of divergent views on the part of teacher participants, expressing these alongside the most salient or prominent viewpoints (see section 5.1 for more detail). Similarly, the use of an inductive thematic analysis is important (see section 3.11), as this entails the generation of codes from the data itself. In sum, therefore, the study tries to integrate the principle of the importance of teacher voice as fully as possible (always with the caveat of reflexivity).
3.5 Survey design

Oppenheim (1998), stresses the meticulous care needed for the wording of specific questions to avoid inadvertently influencing respondents. De Vaus (2002) also emphasises the need for intelligibility of question language. Inevitably, therefore, care was taken to ensure precision of the language used for each item. Firstly, a key principle was to integrate the word ‘motivation’, or a root variation upon it, in each item to ensure specificity of focus throughout. Secondly, drawing on language developed by Gagne and Deci (2005) and Leal et al. (2012) for self-determination theory surveys, key words were used in relation to each factor, whilst not using esoteric academic terminology. For example, in relation to integrated extrinsic motivation, the key language of ‘shared values’ was used; for introjected extrinsic motivation, terms such as ‘self-worth’ and ‘esteem’ were selected. In relation to intrinsic motivation, examples of key language would include ‘enjoy’ and ‘inherent interest’. Such language allowed for a coherent expression of each factor, without being impenetrable and arcane. A particular consideration had to be given to the phrasing of external regulation factors because of the danger associated with skewing a response because of negative language. Of particular importance here was the phrase ‘greater pay reward’ as opposed to more emotive variants that might be inferred as being expressive of greed or similar. However, throughout, an emphasis was placed upon a view of teachers as intelligent professionals. Therefore, the survey included more complex vocabulary as this would be intelligible to the intended audience. This would therefore differ from the more simplistic language of a scale such as the Work Tasks Motivation Scale for Teachers developed by Fernet et al. (2008). This did not, however, go so far as to include esoteric self-determination theory-specific terminology such as ‘introjected regulation’ as this would require a detailed knowledge of the framework itself.

Prior to the formal pilot, the questionnaire was trialled then discussed with individual teachers. This consisted of using individuals working at different primary and secondary schools so as to avoid the survey being shaped by a particular contextual bias (2 in each context). Similarly, to avoid a shaping of the items as a consequence of the survey being trialled on a particular type of teacher, different subjects and progression points were chosen. Initial responses suggested that the factors were being correctly tested for, with strong attitudinal clustering in respect to external regulation and intrinsic motivation and amotivation in particular. Testing demonstrated somewhat weaker clustering of responses in regard to more subtle forms of external motivation, namely identification and integration. Upon discussion with the teachers concerned, this was not as a consequence of the intelligibility of the items and may
have been more expressive of the ambiguities that exist within the theoretical framework itself. Where ‘identification’ ends and ‘integration’ begins could be a matter for considerable debate and some theorists, such as Gagne et al. (2015), go so far as to collapse these categories. It was therefore decided to fully pilot the survey with these factors in play, subject to possible further revision. Some individual items were rephrased to give a greater level of intelligibility for respondents. An example would be:

‘My motivation to be an effective teacher is partly the endorsement of a positive Ofsted grading.’

(Original)

‘My motivation to be a better teacher is partly the prospect of a positive Ofsted grading.’  (New)

This was changed as a consequence of some ambiguity and confusion as to the word ‘endorsement’ on the part of those teachers initially trialled. Similarly, another interesting element relates to teachers’ initial interpretation of certain items in respect to ambiguity over items which could be taken as either involving something already being the case in the schools, or, alternatively, could be viewed as that which teachers would want to be the case in schools (but which does not occur). For example, if a teacher is asked:

‘I am motivated to be a better teacher by being offered a degree of professional autonomy’

This might be interpreted by a particular teacher as ‘Strongly Disagree’ because they have not been offered any such autonomy in their school, or, alternatively, ‘Agree’ in anticipation of this potentially occurring, though it has not as yet. As such, items of this type were rephrased to include the opening words ‘I would be…’ as this would garner the same response from teachers who both have and have not experienced such conditions. Other items were rephrased on the grounds of being overly complex in their grammatical construction such as Q7 which was altered to be more direct and less ambiguous in its language. Similarly, ‘flip’ questions were avoided on the recommendation of Colosi (2005) and Sonderen et al. (2013), who have documented the negative effects of reverse wording in terms of discrepant responses and respondent confusion. The full instrument can be found in Appendix 1.

In specific respect to a self-determination theory analysis applied to the educational context, several studies have demonstrated the value of a seven-choice response range, notably Fernet (2011), Gorozidis and Papaioannou (2014), Guay et al. (2000), Vallerrand et al. (1989) and Leal et al. (2012) and this has therefore been adopted. In terms of the language used in respect to the choices available to respondents, the ‘Strongly Agree-Strongly Disagree’ continuum suggested by Muijs (2004) and Fink (2009) was adopted, this having the virtue of clarity for respondents and being (in an area where there
are various scale options and contested empirical evidence in respect to the advisability of these) recognisable and straightforward.

The survey also needs to be contextualised within the neoliberal environment detailed earlier in relation to Ball (2003) and Leaton Grey (2006), amongst others. With a target audience of working teachers, this had two implications. Firstly, in regard to the number of questions, this was felt important in respect to respondent rate; a working teacher exists in a high intensity environment with multiple competing demands; this necessitates a questionnaire which is as purposeful and succinct as possible.

In turn, this raises the question of the extent to which a survey on motivation should be domain-specific or orientate itself in respect to particular types of tasks. Fernet et al. (2008) have contended that ‘Most studies examining teachers’ self-determined motivation have...a global motivational orientation at work’ but that ‘this kind of assessment may be too broad to get a clear picture of motivation’ (p258). Fernet et al. (2008) therefore propose a survey model which asks teachers for specific motivations in relation to particular activities, such as administrative tasks or planning. However, in order to encompass this in their study, whilst factoring in the different self-determination theory motivations, this results in ‘a scale is made up of 90 items’ (p276). The negative implications of such an elaborate survey, sent unsolicited to working teachers are clear. Indeed, Fernet et al. (2008) acknowledge the unwieldiness of such a measurement instrument, particularly when directed at members of a high-intensity profession such as teaching, acknowledging that ‘circumstances are often not ideal’ (p276) and suggesting a reduction to, for example, motivation relative to two tasks, so that practical issues can be surmounted and yet ‘simultaneously respecting the content specificity of the scale’ (Ibid.). Others, such as Pelletier et al. (2002) and Tremblay et al. (2009) opt for the more ‘global’ measurement of SDT motivation within a particular context. Of particular note is that they opt for a measurement of ‘six separate latent constructs (i.e., three items per factor)’ (2009, p216), reporting a response rate of 77.5%, with positive and acceptable construct and internal validity. Nonetheless, they acknowledge that ‘arguments cannot be made that a particular form (or type) of motivation was causal with respect to specific work-related criteria’ (p223). The present study seeks to find a compromise between the content specificity of Fernet et al. (2008) and the efficiency and pragmatism of Tremblay et al. (2009). As such, the study comprises a three-item per factor/six latent constructs model, but with the content specificity of questions being focused on the motivational implications of performance management (or its absence). However, because performativity is a pervasive phenomenon and therefore not by necessity always explicitly subject or task specific, the study simultaneously possesses the more global quality of Pelletier et al.
(2002) and Tremblay et al. (2009). Also, because Tremblay et al. (2009) also recommend that ‘researchers ought to use multiple methods’ (Ibid.) when making more singular measurements of motivation, the present study will utilise open responses. This open response section was phrased to allow as wide a range of comments as possible: ‘Please use the box below to add any other thoughts that you wish.’

The second implication of the neoliberal environment relates to anonymity. Whilst identifiers are asked for at the end of the survey, these are in relation to ‘types’ of teacher rather than specific identities. Existing in a pressurised environment, teachers need due anonymity when expressing their views about performativity.

3.6 Ordinal factor analysis: the implications for Likert scale data

There is considerable debate as to the proper classification of Likert data and the implications that this has for its analysis. Indeed, in much SDT theory literature, Likert-scales are analysed as interval data seemingly without question. What it perhaps indisputable is that a Likert-type item can only ever be regarded as ordinal. This is because of the natural differences in each individual’s response to the answer options. For example, one person’s ‘Agree’, may be another’s ‘Agree Somewhat’ (Shearman and Petocz, 2013). Similarly, it is not logically possible to argue that ‘Disagree’ is at an exact distance apart from ‘Agree’ in terms of its inherent value. This absence of equality of variance has obvious negative implications for any multivariate statistical analysis, leading some to the conclusion that Likert data can never be appropriate for analysis parametrically, because parametric analyses are predicated on mathematical assumptions such as equal variance (Shearman and Petocz, 2013; Basto and Pereira, 2012; Reise, Moore and Haviland, 2010; Kuzon et al., 1996; Stevens 1951). Similarly, in respect to normal distribution, as Jamieson (2004) also notes, many Likert scales naturally tend towards a skewed/polarised distribution, with for example, a high concentration of ‘Agree’ and ‘Strongly Agree’ on a more emotive or controversial topic (see Table 1).

It is therefore more prudent to employ an ordinal factor analysis (Lorenzo-Seva and Ferrando, 2013; Basto and Pereira, 2012), alongside a non-parametric equivalent of ANOVA for the examination of variance between groups, namely Kruskal-Wallis tests (Kuzon et al., 1996). These will naturally be accompanied by an analysis of descriptive statistics, though in this instance, led by median rather than mean because of the ordinal nature of the data. Importantly, this does not make the data less rich or interesting, for ordinal data can yield valuable results. Rather, it negates the claim of statistical
generalisability across the wider population beyond the sample. Yet given the number of studies which appear to routinely disregard the basic assumptions regarding interval data, it may prove more valid to produce a secure ordinal analysis. Respondent rate may also prove to be low, given the use of an alumni database – as anticipated by Lambert and Miller (2014) and Smith and Bers (1987), however, the ordinal nature of the analysis will be less inhibited by this, not requiring the numbers usually stipulated for a parametric test. The use of a sample from the alumni database is regarded as the most ethical and practical approach, given the performance management-related nature of the survey; a survey distribution involving school permissions (and by extension the school hierarchy) would entail obvious difficulties. Similarly, should respondent range prove positive (Cook et al., 2000), alongside legitimate indicators offered by the KMO test/Bartlett’s test of sphericity, this will further justify the factorisation in spite of a lower response rate.

3.7 Potential variance between groups

Groups may yield different motivational patterns. Kunter and Holzberger (2014) stress the importance of career stage as an influence on teacher motivation, hence this has been included as an indicator. Another potentially fruitful avenue might arise in respect to gender. Both Spittle et al. (2009) and Keng et al. (2008) noted gender variance in relation to aspects of the SDT framework. In the case of Spittle et al. (2009), this was in relation to female student teachers being more intrinsically motivated than males. In respect to Keng et al. (2008), this study found more males being in an ‘amotivated’ cluster and more females being ‘external regulated’. Such findings have meant the inclusion of a gender identifier in the survey and may be relevant given the gender imbalance in the profession towards females. However, the attribution of broad cognitive states to specific genders is obviously fraught with danger and carries the risk of stereotyping. Other groupings may also prove relevant, such as years’ service (not the same as career progression), school type and level of awareness of performance pay. As such, these indicators have been duly included and may yield valuable analyses.

3.8 An evaluation of a pilot survey using ordinal factor analysis and Kruskal-Wallis tests

3.8.1 Response analysis
As anticipated by Lambert and Miller (2014) and Smith and Bers (1987), the use of an alumni database yielded a lower response rate. Of the University of Cumbria teacher training alumni who opened the invitation email (1094), 84 or 7.67% chose to complete the survey. However, the ordinal nature of the analysis is less inhibited by this, not requiring the numbers usually stipulated for a parametric test. Similarly, as respondent range proved positive (Cook et al., 2000), this indicated further sense of viability. However, one important caveat here is a need to acknowledge the self-selecting nature of the participants and the impact this will have on the conclusions; there may be a tendency amongst those who participated to either be particularly demotivated or especially motivated and use the survey as an outlet for this. The data were screened and adjusted based on three cases with missing values, resulting in a final sample of 80.

3.8.2 Descriptive statistics based on median responses evident in ordinal data

Medians indicated consistently higher perceived motivation in relation the more autonomous elements of the SDT framework, though this was evident across the range from identified/integrated/intrinsic motivations, rather than an increasing trend. This could, for example, have potentially positive implications for school leaders, given that the identified/integrated motivational constructs are in fact forms of extrinsic motivation, being an ‘autonomy supportive’ model of management.

Conversely, medians indicated overall lower perceived motivation on the part of participant teachers towards external regulation, a high-control form of motivation, though with a slightly more positive orientation to V3 (which explicitly referenced the prospect of pay reward).

A mildly higher perceived motivation in relation to introjection was noted, suggestive of teachers’ need for the approval and esteem of their managers, though this may at least to some extent be contingent on the sample being more representative of teachers with fewer years’ service (who could be thought more susceptible to it). The medians for variables measuring for amotivation are perhaps expressive of a range of attitudes. It is possible that some are resilient towards performativity, whereas others are demotivated by it.
### Table 1: Medians, Skewness, Kurtosis and Range for Individual Variables in Pilot Study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Amotivation V1</th>
<th>Amotivation V2</th>
<th>Amotivation V3</th>
<th>External Regulation V1</th>
<th>External Regulation V2</th>
<th>External Regulation V3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Median</strong></td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>4.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Skewness</strong></td>
<td>.344</td>
<td>.108</td>
<td>-.152</td>
<td>.241</td>
<td>.906</td>
<td>-.209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kurtosis</strong></td>
<td>-.1069</td>
<td>-.728</td>
<td>-.1270</td>
<td>-.1173</td>
<td>-.290</td>
<td>-1.166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Range</strong></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Introjection V1</th>
<th>Introjection V2</th>
<th>Introjection V3</th>
<th>Identification V1</th>
<th>Identification V2</th>
<th>Identification V3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Median</strong></td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>6.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Skewness</strong></td>
<td>-.1001</td>
<td>-.060</td>
<td>-.654</td>
<td>-.1924</td>
<td>-.923</td>
<td>-2.043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kurtosis</strong></td>
<td>-.057</td>
<td>-.1055</td>
<td>-.112</td>
<td>4.391</td>
<td>.886</td>
<td>7.063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Range</strong></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Integration V1</th>
<th>Integration V2</th>
<th>Integration V3</th>
<th>Intrinsic Motivation V1</th>
<th>Intrinsic Motivation V2</th>
<th>Intrinsic Motivation V3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Median</strong></td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>6.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Skewness</strong></td>
<td>-.1104</td>
<td>-.791</td>
<td>-.1072</td>
<td>-.1597</td>
<td>-.385</td>
<td>-1.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kurtosis</strong></td>
<td>.924</td>
<td>.308</td>
<td>.982</td>
<td>4.000</td>
<td>-.441</td>
<td>1.127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Range</strong></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 3.8.3 Pilot ordinal factor analysis

Two initial indicators further reinforced the need for ordinal factorisation. Baglin (2014) notes that excessive kurtosis and skewness can be a still further justification for the treatment of ordinal data as non-parametric, which proved evident in this case (see Table 1, above). Similarly, both the Bartlett’s and KMO tests were expressive of the viability of a factor analysis, with Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity = 626.7 (df = 153; p<.001) and the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) test = 0.79481.

Gadermann et al. (2012) ‘recommend considering ordinal, polychoric correlation-based versions of reliability coefficients, such as alpha...when one’s data are...ordinal—that is, from Likert-type or mixed items’ (p7). This is because, when Pearson correlations are used to calculate alpha, the assumption is made ‘that data are continuous, and if this assumption is violated, the Pearson covariance matrix can be substantively distorted’ (p2). It is similarly important to note, for reasons of clarity, that ‘ordinal alpha is conceptually equivalent to Cronbach’s alpha. The critical difference between the two is that ordinal alpha is based on the polychoric correlation matrix’ (Gadermann et al., 2012, p2). As such, using the Factor program (Lorenzo-Seva and Ferrando, 2015), ordinal coefficient alpha was calculated to assess the internal reliability of the scale, producing the strong result that ordinal alpha = 0.803745.
Gadermann et al. (2012) recommend that for ordinal alpha, because of the conceptual equivalence, the same widely accepted thresholds endorsed by Nunnally (1978) for Cronbach’s alpha be used. This results in an alpha in this case which can be considered more than acceptable in terms of internal reliability, not least when the number of items in the survey is considered (which would typically result in a lower alpha than a survey with a large number of items).

As to extraction, there is debate in the literature as to which method for determining the number of factors to extract is most viable when using ordinal data, as summarised by Basto and Pereira (2010). Parallel Analysis (Timmerman and Lorenzo-Seva, 2011) is regarded as having much greater credibility than an approach which fails to recognise the ordinal nature of the data. In this particular case, the PA (parallel analysis) recommended a two factor extraction initially, however a trial of this model produced an ambiguity in respect to the variables measuring for amotivation. The result was essentially that of a ‘controlled motivation’ cluster (of variables measuring for amotivation, external regulation and introjection) and a ‘autonomous motivation’ cluster (of variables measuring for identification, integration and intrinsic motivation). The Root Mean Square of Residuals for this factor solution proved problematic, exceeding the 0.8 set by Hu and Bentler (1999) as acceptable (in other words, too much of the data was left outside the factor solution). Likewise, the variables measuring for amotivation suggested a greater complexity, loading negatively on the second factor, as did the relatively close outcome of the parallel analysis, which only narrowly eliminated a third factor (accounting for 9% of the data’s variance):

Table 2: Parallel Analysis: Recommended Number of Factors for Pilot Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Variable real-data</th>
<th>Mean of random</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of variance</td>
<td>% of variance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>23.6*</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Advised number of dimensions: 2
Therefore, a three-factor solution was trialled, as analysed below:

*Table 3: Ordinal Factorisation of Pilot Survey*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Factor 1</th>
<th>Factor 2</th>
<th>Factor 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amotivation V1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.676</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amotivation V2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.801</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amotivation V3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.751</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extrinsic Regulation V1</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.585</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extrinsic Regulation V2</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.515</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extrinsic Regulation V3</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.802</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introjection V1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introjection V2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introjection V3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.492</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification V1</td>
<td>0.324</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification V2</td>
<td>0.634</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification V3</td>
<td>0.658</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration V1</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.517</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration V2</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.695</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration V3</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.540</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intrinsic Motivation V1</td>
<td>0.498</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intrinsic Motivation V2</td>
<td>0.846</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intrinsic Motivation V3</td>
<td>0.549</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Using FACTOR version 10.3.01 (Lorenzo-Seva and Ferrando, 2015)

This model’s various fit indices were indicative of a highly plausible factorisation:

- Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) = <.001
- Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI) = 1.005
- Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = 1.003
- Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) = 0.970
• Root Mean Square of Residuals (RMSR) = 0.0658

NB. Thresholds for acceptable goodness of fit indices are taken from Hu and Bentler (1999), with the exception of GFI, taken from Hooper et al. (2008), as Hu and Bentler (1999) do not offer a threshold for GFI. Additionally, due to cross-loading on Integration V1, the higher loading was retained. This variable was identified for further review with the larger study.

The chosen extraction was Unweighted Least Squares (Crowson, 2015) with Promin rotation (Lorenzo-Seva, 2013). Both the extraction and rotation methods are consistent with an ordinal factor analysis and recommended by the FACTOR program authors (Lorenzo-Seva and Ferrando, 2015). The reason for this is that both methods are less susceptible to assumptions about the nature of the data (in other words, some of the assumptions that would accompany the data being considered interval in nature).

The trial factor analysis is supportive of the SDT construct in that there is a clear and observable division between what might be called a ‘controlled motivation’ cluster and an ‘autonomous motivation’ cluster. The absence of a 6 factor solution that would be expressive of the theorised SDT model is intriguing and reflective of the findings evident in previous studies. Fernet et al. (2008) found that ‘external and introjected regulations and amotivation are not very specific and could tend to collapse’ (p274), a finding shared by Guay et al. (2000). Similarly, at the other end of the spectrum, Wilkesmann and Schmid (2014) found an ‘empirical merger between intrinsic and identified motivation’ (p14). It should be noted here that some SDT studies pre-merge identified and integrated motivations because of the finer distinction between these (Gagne et al. (2015), for example), and this was the case for the Wilkesmann and Schmid (2014) study. Likewise, the emergence of an ‘amotivation’ factor is consistent with self-determination theory, which posits this to be a state outwith extrinsic motivation, being conceptually distinct as can be seen below:
However, of chief interest is the dichotomy which emerges between the first two extracted factors. This merger effect offers valuable opportunities for trial discussion. Kaplan (2013) argues for an ‘integrative’ and ‘dynamic’ (p61) theorisation of teacher motivation, combining sympathetic frameworks. On this basis, the basic performance/mastery dichotomy from Achievement Goal theory may be useful. For example, Ciani et al. (2011) argue that ‘mastery’ aligns with the identification/integration/intrinsic elements of the SDT continuum and ‘performance’ with the external regulation/introjection elements. This has particular relevance not least because of Boyd, Hymer and Lockney’s (2015) articulation of performance as ‘proving’ and mastery as ‘improving’ (p35), which is again expressive of the irony that a performance-orientated context may result in lesser performance gains.

Similarly, another way of viewing the two factor solution may be through the lens of Herzberg’s motivational hygiene theory. Herzberg et al. (1959) posited the notion of ‘motivation-hygiene theory’, sometimes referred to as the ‘two factor’ theory of motivation. This can briefly be summarised as (1) ‘motivators’ (typified by challenge, responsibility, involvement, autonomy: the intrinsic conditions of the work undertaken) and (2) hygiene factors (including remuneration, job security, workload, supervisory practices: extrinsic to the work undertaken).

Whilst the methodology of Herzberg et al.’s (1959) study has been criticised by many (as summarised by Stello, 2011), the possible association between this construct and a two-factor distillation of the SDT
framework is clear. Where a difference would arise would be in Herzberg’s notion of these two factors as being independent and coexisting, rather than being impactful on each other and part of single continuum. Many studies appear to demonstrate that this is not the case, with extrinsic factors actively inhibiting intrinsic motivation, for example. Indeed, it might also be said, given the context of Herzberg et al.’s (1959) work, undertaken with relatively autonomous and affluent professionals in an era of less pronounced performativity, it may have been easier for Herzberg et al. to consider their two factors more independently of each other.

A third way of considering the dichotomy presented by the pilot factor analysis can also be proposed, which perhaps has greater relevance within the modern context of performativity. It may, tentatively, be possible to think in terms of instrumental/constitutive forms of motivation, drawing on the distinction that Aristotle (Trans. Ross, 1994) makes between constitutive and instrumental forms of action in the field of ethics. In the present study, this might be articulated as motivations external to the work (instrumental) and motivations intrinsic to the work (constitutive). This has particular relevance in an era of performativity, because of what might be called the process of encroachment, whereby instrumental performativity crowds out constitutive professional development and becomes central to the teacher’s role in its stead.

In sum, the survey instrument appears to offer some valid opportunities for theoretical interpretation that would be worthy of fuller examination with a larger study.

3.8.4 Descriptive statistics from combined variables and extracted factors for pilot.

Variables were combined on the basis of both the SDT categories of motivation and also the larger clusters of variables extracted by the factor analysis. As with the individual variables, higher medians were in evidence for the combined variables measuring for more autonomous forms of motivation, with, again, lower medians in relation to more controlled forms of motivation, particularly external regulation. Greater ambiguities in respect to combined variables measuring for amotivation and introjection were evident, as discussed in section 3.8.2 previously.
Table 4: Medians and Range for Combined Variables in the Pilot Study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Combined Variable:</th>
<th>Amotivation/External Regulation/Introjection Variables Combined</th>
<th>External Regulation/Introjection Variables Combined</th>
<th>External Regulation Variables Combined</th>
<th>Introjection Variables Combined</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Median:</td>
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<td>4.00</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>4.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>3.11</td>
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<table>
<thead>
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<th>Combined Variable:</th>
<th>Identification/Integration/Intrinsic Variables Combined</th>
<th>Identification/Integration Variables Combined</th>
<th>Identification Variables Combined</th>
<th>Integration Variables Combined</th>
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<td>2.67</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

3.8.5 Kruskal-Wallis tests: variance between groups in the pilot data

A summary follows of the variance evident between groups based on the survey identifiers. No variations between groups (either by each factor or at a more granular level) were noted due to:

- School Sector
- School Type
- School Role
- Gender
- Years’ service

It may be suggested that this represents a salient finding worthy of further corroboration or questioning in the light of a larger study, because it appears to demonstrate an antipathy towards control-orientated motivation and an inclination towards more autonomous motivation *irrespective of context*. In other words, it may be expressive of the pervasiveness of performativity and the widespread appetite for an alternative. However, it may be a consequence of a lower number of participants influencing the groups based analysis. All significant and non-significant findings are presented for transparency in Appendix 1 (H (the Kruskal Wallis test statistic), degrees of freedom and P for each variable).
However, one finding in respect to the groups-based analysis was evident, with the Kruskal-Wallis indicating that further enquiry was warranted in respect to those who identified as ‘No’ and ‘Yes’ in response to ‘Has your school implemented a performance pay system?’. The subsequent pairwise Dunn-Bonferroni test confirmed variation in respect to the third variable measuring for the amotivation Variable 3: $H = 6.621$, $P = 0.35$.

In other words, amotivation was actually higher in the contexts where performance pay was in explicit use. There is a suggestion that performance pay appears to inhibit teacher motivation rather than enhance it and this is clearly a finding worthy of further testing and investigation in a larger study. Likewise, the first variable measuring for introjection proved significant: $H = 7.622$, $P = 0.22$. In this instance, introjection appeared to be a little more potent as a developmental motivator for contexts where performance pay had not been introduced. In other words, those who answered ‘No’ had more motivation from self-esteem and the regard of others, perhaps suggesting that performance pay deprioritises such social dynamics. In both cases, these interpretations are tentative and warrant examination with a larger study.

3.9 Implications for the quantitative element of the full survey.

On the basis of the pilot data findings and the existing literature, it was concluded that this study design represented a viable approach for a more extensive trial with a wider population. The carefully developed data collection instrument and procedures for its analysis appeared to demonstrate a valid approach going forwards given the results in evidence in the factor analysis. Of further ongoing interest from a quantitative perspective was the extent to which there would be a replicability of the findings across a wider population of teachers. If differences did emerge, perhaps given the smaller sample size in this first instance, it would be interesting to note whether the three-factor solution proved sustainable. It was tentatively hypothesised, given the alignment that appeared to be in evidence in relation to existing theory, that this three-factor solution might be sustained, but that there would be greater nuance in relation to the Kruskal-Wallis tests which consider variance between groups.

3.10 Evaluation of pilot survey qualitative open responses analysis

From the pilot study, the open response section of the survey represented a valid source of qualitative data upon which to trial the approach offered by Gorozidis and Papaioannou (2014). This approach entailed using etic coding based on the SDT construct. Boyatzis (1998) has identified the use of
theoretical thematic analysis as a valid framework for qualitative analysis. Braun and Clarke (2006) have elaborated on this as entailing a deductive approach which seeks to identify the latent variables suggested by a theoretical construct.). Other studies have demonstrated the suitability of qualitative data in a SDT-related analysis (e.g. Hassandra et al., 2003), and the value of mixed-methods analysis with reference to the SDT framework has also been demonstrated (Tadic et al., 2013; Kunter and Holzberger, 2014). Data were etic-coded against the SDT framework categories, using a theoretical thematic analysis approach (Boyatzis, 1997) similar to that implemented by Gorozidis and Papaioannou (2014). This was so that the theoretical thematic analysis could be evaluated as to its utility in the larger study. Responses to this section of the survey were limited, with only 16.4% of respondents taking this option, however the responses offered proved rich for analysis.

The codes of external regulation and amotivation appeared strongly applicable to the data, with frequent references to feelings such as external pressure, control and depersonalisation. The theme of introjection was also generated, with references to the absence of managers’ esteem and not feeling valued. As with the quantitative findings, these themes co-occurred, suggesting a similar collapsing of these categories into a more general theme of a negative orientation toward performativity.

Teachers in their third year of service were proportionally the largest number of respondents to the qualitative option (61.5%). This is particularly intriguing when related to the question of early career teacher retention (NAO, 2016). The responses overall were characterised by very low motivation and an oppressive sense of performativity, as indicated by the examples below:

Female, 1yr, Secondary:

…it’s the fear and pressure of SMT that makes me do what I do. I feel as though I have no choice in what I’m teaching - I can’t even choose a class novel… I just feel immense stress and pressure to do well so they don’t criticise anything

Male 3yrs Primary:

The increased level of observation by senior management has had a hugely detrimental effect on me and my colleagues. To link these observations to the teachers’ wage increases, regardless of how small a role they play, is unfair and has created ill will, bad feeling and mistrust
Male 5yrs Primary:

Joyless. Stressful. Love kids. Love teaching. Totally disillusioned with the system we have. So many important elements of the job fall by the wayside out of fear of not passing the grade in the elements which I’m judged by.

In regard to the etic codes of the intrinsic, integrated, and identified forms of motivation, these again co-occurred in the qualitative data, but in the form of inverse responses – that is to say, they were expressed not as forms of motivation presently experienced in their context, but rather in the form an appeal or as an expression of their felt absence, as illustrated by the examples such as: ‘let us do what we were trained for’, ‘loosen their grip’, ‘I have no choice in what I’m teaching’.

This theoretical thematic analysis approach (Boyatzis, 1997) seemed to offer a viable option for a more extensive study, particularly when used with more extensive interview data alongside a greater number of open responses for the full survey, rather than being confined to a limited number of qualitative pilot survey responses, as in this instance. However, at the same time, it was considered that whilst the theoretical thematic analysis yielded valuable findings, that there may be an extent to which, in isolation, it can suppress data which does not conform to the theoretical framework. As such, for the full qualitative analysis, the study employs a hybrid inductive/deductive thematic analysis (Fereday and Muir-Cochrane, 2006) and this is elaborated upon below.

3.11 A revised approach to qualitative analysis for the full study: a hybrid inductive/deductive approach

Braun and Clarke (2006) note that, in essence, ‘thematic analysis is a method for identifying, analysing, and reporting patterns (themes) within data’ (p6) and differentiate between inductive and theoretical thematic analysis, with these being the ‘inductive or ‘bottom up’ way...or...a theoretical...‘top down’ way’ (p12). Fereday and Muir-Cochrane (2006) demonstrate the greater rigour that can be achieved in thematic analysis when a ‘hybrid approach’ (p80) is taken. In practice, this constitutes a combination of inductive and deductive thematic analysis, with the aim of harnessing the advantages of each. In effect, this constitutes the use of both pre-ordinate and responsive codes and categories (Cohen, et al., 2007). The pre-ordinate categories involve application of the explicit theoretical framework developed through engagement with the literature and in this sense the analysis includes a deductive element. However, the approach also entails a thematic analysis, involving the generation of themes from the data, and so
includes an inductive element (Braun & Clarke, 2006). This combined approach helps to ensure that the voice of the participants is valued, whilst simultaneously allowing for a more theory-led analysis. In respect to the sequencing of the analytical process, this follows the approach set forward by Fereday and Muir-Cochrane (2006), which, for the purposes of written clarity is ‘presented as a linear, step-by-step procedure’ though in fact ‘an iterative and reflexive process’ (p83). However, to avoid suppression of variation and theoretical bias, the inductive analysis is to be entered into first, with the integration of the theoretical framework at a more secondary stage of analysis (Clarke & Braun, 2013, p. 257).

In specific respect to the theoretical thematic analysis, this can be seen to possess real value, because Hayes (1997) notes, this ‘offers a...theory-driven approach...with the flexibility and richness of qualitative analysis’ (p113). However, it is important that such a process carries rigour to avoid theoretical bias. For the theory-led element of the thematic analysis, therefore, Boyatis (1998, p36) describes three stages: (1) to establish the themes ‘through reading and contemplation [of] the theory’, (2) to check the ‘compatibility with the raw information’ through pilot coding and (3) ‘to determine the reliability of the coder’ through inter-rater reliability testing. Each of these stages has been adhered to, with pilot coding indicating an applicable theory and inter-rater reliability proving very encouraging. Using the approach outlined by Boyatis (1998), when applied to an interview transcript, this resulted in a percentage agreement of 93%, with PhD main supervisor as second rater. However, many, beginning with Cohen (1960), have noted that percentage agreement does not allow for chance agreements to be accounted for statistically. Therefore, a widely accepted approach for more robust estimation of inter-rater reliability can be attained with Cohen’s Kappa (again, with PhD main supervisor as second rater), as noted by the likes of McHugh (2012). Very encouragingly, this emerged as:

Table 4: Measure of Kappa Agreement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure of Kappa Agreement</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Asymp. Std. Error</th>
<th>Approx. T</th>
<th>Approx. Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.874</td>
<td>.060</td>
<td>10.548</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Such a figure of .874 would be regarded as representing strong and robust inter-rater reliability (e.g. McHugh, 2012; Landis and Koch, 1977).
Other virtues of such an approach are noted by Hayes (1997), including an answer to the ‘question of reflexivity’ (p112) which can arise in relation to qualitative work, namely that the research will be unduly influenced (inadvertently or otherwise) by the perspective and actions of the researcher. If the researcher is using an existing theory (in a critically-minded way), then this can work to provide a check to the subjectivity of said researcher. This said, Boyatis (1998) nonetheless contends that there is still a risk of ‘projection’ (p35) when using a theory-driven code. Therefore, as Hayes (1997) also acknowledges, there is still a need for a second perspective in the form of a critical friend who independently analyses the transcript data and in the present research, this process is undertaken as part of the PhD supervision process and using the three stage approach of Boyatzis (1998) above. Hayes (1997) also noted the value of ‘pre-determined themes to structure the analysis [of]…large amounts of data’ (p112) derived from qualitative interviews. Hayes (1997) also contends that: ‘the method...requires a dynamic, broad-ranging theory with real-world applicability’ (p113). Given the wide practical application of SDT delineated in the literature review section, this would seem an appropriately flexible and inclusive framework for such an approach.

However, a departure from Hayes (1997) perspective occurs in relation to the view that ‘novel material, inappropriate to the theoretical themes, will not be included in the analysis – unlike grounded theory approaches’ (p113). This is as a consequence of the critical realist approach to the study. The principles of abduction and retroduction are brought to bear when considering the applicability of theory, as noted in relation to critical realism in Section 3.2. This is because, as Meyer and Lunnay (2013, online) argue, when ‘used in conjunction [abduction and retroduction]...lead to the formation of a new conceptual framework or theory’. Therefore, such an approach should be theory-generative, rather than simply theory-confirmatory, negating the charge of unquestioning and biased acceptance of existing constructs that might be levelled against a theoretical-thematic approach by a grounded theorist. Indeed, it could be argued that a theory-led approach has a greater degree of openness and transparency as to its influences. It would be a widely acknowledged argument to say that grounded theory must always struggle to ‘bracket-out’ prior awareness of theory. Therefore, to acknowledge such theoretical influences explicitly, whilst also being critically minded as to their utility, offers an arguably more valid and open approach.

In summary, in each instance of qualitative analysis (the open survey responses and the qualitative interviews respectively), the first section of the findings presents the bottom-up inductive thematic analysis that foregrounds teachers’ voices and uses selected quotes to illustrate the themes generated
in order to provide some transparency to the interpretation of the data. The second section presents
the application of the self-determination theory framework as a deductive top-down tool for analysis
that foregrounds theory and again presents illustrative quotes to make explicit the interpretation of the
data.

3.12 Design of semi-structured interviews

The use of interviews (and open responses) is designed to enable the acquisition of richer, more
balanced data than can be garnered through solely quantitative means. As to the choice of specifically
semi-structured interviews, Gill et al. (2008) assert that these facilitate ‘discovery or elaboration of
information that is important to the participant’ (Gill et al., 2008, p291), whilst simultaneously affording
thematic focus. Cohen et al. define the semi-structured interview as ‘where a schedule is
prepared...sufficiently open-ended to enable the contents to be reordered, digressions and expansions
made, new avenues to be included’ (2007, p182).

Brenner (2006) describes a funnel shape that can be used in effective interviews in educational research,
allowing for a broad initial focus which then tapers into the consideration of more specific areas. In
addition to perhaps simply being good general practice, this approach also aligns well with the study as
it enables a focus first on broad developmental motivations, followed by more specific contextual
influences upon teachers’ motivations to develop professionally. Another virtue of this approach is that
it can allow for themes to emerge prior to these being explicitly raised with a participant, therefore
suggesting that such themes have a particular salience. For example, if, in relation to the diagram below,
a participant raises performativity prior to this funnel point being reached, then this may be telling. In
essence, the interview schedule operates as follows:
Stage 1: Broad motivational stance in relation to their development as teacher, allowing for a multiplicity of responses: ‘What makes you want to develop further as a teacher?’. Contingent on the response, further questions may be explored.

Stage 2: ‘To what extent are your motivations to develop shaped by the school you work in?’ This question seeks to identify contextual influences on teacher motivation. If the teacher has worked in multiple contexts, they will be encouraged to reflect on any possible differences that may occur. If not arising organically, this section will also seek to probe three important SDT concepts in relation to contextual influences on motivation, namely autonomy, relatedness and competence. These will take the form of:

1. ‘How autonomous do you feel in your school? Does this affect your motivation to develop?’

2. ‘How valued for your competence do you feel in your school? Does this affect your motivation to develop?’

Interview Conclusion
3. ‘To what extent do you feel you have an effective relationship with your school? Does this affect your motivation to develop?’

Stage 3: ‘Does performance management motivate you to be a better teacher?’ This question will be initially broad to see if the response is expressive of a pervasive sense of performativity. In regard to more specific questioning on this theme, however, it was decided that an ‘artefact-based’ approach would not be viable because of the professionally sensitive nature of the subject. For example, asking participants to bring an artefact associated with performance management such as a recent appraisal or lesson observation would have considerable ethical complications. It would also be for this reason that a very explicitly-contextualised approach would prove difficult (e.g., asking them to reflect on a particular episode), though if a participant wishes to alight on the most salient manifestations of their own performance management, then this may be discussed. Yet, as noted earlier above, this second tack may be challenging because of the pervasiveness of performativity in the context under consideration. Therefore, selecting an emblematic or characteristic scenario might prove artificial and limiting for participants. Lastly, the participant may be prompted on their awareness of performance pay if this does not arise organically, as this is a particularly timely area in relation to government policy (DoE, 2015).

In each instance follow-up questions were possible due to the semi-structured design.

3.13 Rationale for selection of participants

Teachers rather than school managers were interviewed, as the purpose of the study was to explore the impact of performativity on teacher motivation from working practitioners themselves, rather than the intent of it by those responsible for its implementation. In respect to the specific teachers selected for this study, a range was chosen which allowed for comparison of variances based on contextual factors. Therefore, teachers from both primary and secondary sectors were selected. Similarly, teachers were chosen who had worked in multiple contexts or who had worked in a single environment, to consider if this resulted in any differences in perspective. Equally, teachers of differing years’ experience were selected to explore the extent to which this was a variable (and, by extension, the extent to which pre-threshold and post-threshold teachers offer different views). Another variable is that of school type (for instance, academy, comprehensive, local authority primary). Lastly, gender will be allowed for as a variable, should this prove of relevance. These individuals were to be identified through the present researcher’s informal networks and were conditional on there being no managerial relationship with the
researcher, no personal relationship with the researcher and on the basis of a direct approach (no consultation with the individual’s school leadership). Balancing these possibilities, the resultant approaches to possible teachers resulted in 7 participants offering their consent to be interviewed. The principle in terms of the weighting of these variables was to have sufficient characteristics across participants to allow for meaningful comparisons should variances of perspective arise. However, a sample ‘broadly representative’ of the teacher population at large would not be viable, not least because of the (arguably intentionally) opaque teacher workforce statistics held by the Department for Education. An example of this would be a grouping together of pre-school and primary colleagues, which results in a blurring of professional characteristics. Similarly, a failure to distinguish between proportions of teachers who are pre- and post-threshold occurs in teacher workforce statistics due to a simplistic presentation of salary figures, when the inner and outer London pay ranges mean that a teacher in London could be pre-threshold and earn as much or more than a post-threshold elsewhere.

Whilst, since the introduction of performance pay in 2013, it could be argued that the pre-/post-threshold distinction is less relevant, in practice, the de facto continuation of this distinction in many schools makes it an important variable still.

As ever, in respect to interviews, other caveats applied in that they took place on a single occasion to minimise the impact on the participant and in a private setting (due to the sensitivity of some aspects, such as performance pay). Each participant’s anonymity was preserved and the data remained confidential, with each interviewee made fully aware of the nature of the research and use of the data. Ethical issues described by Cohen et al. (2007, p382), have been addressed, with informed consent sought (see Ethics submission, Appendix 3).
4. Quantitative Data Analysis of Full Survey

4.1 Respondent rate and respondent range

As with the pilot survey, respondent rate again proved low due to the use of an alumni database (9.8%), as anticipated when employing such a population (Lambert and Miller, 2014; Smith and Bers, 1987). However, as also indicated elsewhere, this was off-set by the advantage of this approach being to bypass school managerial structures. Similarly, the number of respondents (n.323) offered data of a sufficient size appropriate for factorisation. Additionally, the respondent range proved positive, with a variety of school characteristics (Figure 6) and teacher characteristics (Figure 7) in evidence. Cook et al. (2000) emphasise the value of this with lower-response rate populations such as alumni.

*Figure 6: School types of respondents*
4.2 The data screening process

The data were screened for anomalies resulting from issues such as intentional mis-responding or entry error (leading to the removal of four cases from all analyses, resulting in N.319). For the performance pay Kruskal Wallis test, any individuals not presently working in schools in England were removed (supply teachers or the unemployed, for example), as they were not presently subject to performance pay. Likewise, those who self-identified as ‘senior leaders’, were considered not subject to performance pay as applied to classroom teachers and so were also removed from this analysis (N.275 for this Kruskal Wallis test). These individuals were, however, included in other analyses after a Kruskal Wallis test of medians by school role indicated no significant difference in response pattern (ie. they were answering from their experience as a classroom teacher, rather than being coloured by their leadership capacity).

4.3 Initial descriptive statistics: median, range, skewness and kurtosis

These proved to be broadly reflective of the pilot study findings, with a clearly higher perceived motivation in relation to those individual measured variables for the identification, integration and intrinsic aspects of the SDT continuum. Conversely (and, again, as previously the case in the pilot study), there was a lower perceived motivation towards the individual measured variables for external regulation and introjection, though some variables are worth slightly longer pause. There was a mildly higher perceived motivation towards a variable measuring for external regulation which specifically referenced the prospect of greater pay reward (V3), suggesting the possibility that this may carry more
motivational traction than previously envisaged and this will be given fuller consideration in relation to other qualitative findings in due course. Similarly, there was some higher perceived motivation towards some introjection variables, again suggesting that notions of ego and esteem may carry motivational potency. Considerable ambiguity also emerged in respect to the amotivation aspect, which can be interpreted as a consequence of considerable variation in response to performativity (with some, for example, being demotivated by it and others adopting a stance of resilience).

Table 5: Descriptive Statistics for Individual Measured Variables: Median, Skewness, Kurtosis and Range

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Amotivation V1</th>
<th>Amotivation V2</th>
<th>Amotivation V3</th>
<th>External Regulation V1</th>
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<td>-1.641</td>
<td>-1.830</td>
<td>-.934</td>
<td>-1.802</td>
<td>-1.171</td>
<td>-.874</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurtosis</td>
<td>4.091</td>
<td>5.356</td>
<td>1.109</td>
<td>4.259</td>
<td>1.666</td>
<td>1.277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.4 Ordinal Factor Analysis

As with the pilot study, the approach recommended by Gadermann et al. (2012) in respect the generation of ordinal alpha was pursued, with this again producing a highly encouraging outcome: 0.792125.

Similarly, indicators as to the adequacy of the correlation matrix proved positive (Bartlett's test of sphericity = 1636.5 (df = 153; P = 0.000010) and the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) test = 0.79263).
Zwick and Velicer (1986) describes Parallel Analysis (PA) as a reliable and ‘frequently accurate’ (p440) measurement, and others concur with this view (Baglin, 2014; Ledesma and Valero-Mora, 2007). Parallel analysis, briefly, can be described as where ‘the focus is on the number of components that account for more variance than...components derived from random data’ (O’Connor, 2000, p396). In the pilot study, PA produced a similar outcome to the larger analysis, but they are not identical. This may be a consequence of larger N (319), as this is argued to improve the subtlety of PA (Zwick and Velicer, 1986). The parallel analysis in this instance more unambiguously recommended the extraction of 3 factors.

Table 6: Parallel Analysis: Recommendation of Factor Extraction for Full Survey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Real-data % of variance</th>
<th>Mean of random % of variance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>31.1*</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>20.0*</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>13.1*</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Advised number of dimensions: 3

In respect to robustness of fit, the factorisation reported strong goodness of fit indices for a three factor model:

- Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) = 0.038
- Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI) = 0.977
- Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = 0.985
- Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) = 0.985 NB. Coincidental same value as CFI – not a typographical error.
- Root Mean Square of Residuals (RMSR) = 0.0433

NB. Thresholds for acceptable goodness of fit indices taken from Hu and Bentler (1999), with the exception of GFI, taken from Hooper et al. (2008), as Hu and Bentler (1999) do not offer a threshold for GFI.

Taken together, these would suggest a highly plausible factorisation, with this therefore being the reported factor model in the present study.
A first observation would be the presence of a clear cluster characterised by autonomy and internalised motivations, expressive of teachers’ motivational responsiveness to extrinsic motivation in the form of identification and integration, alongside a strong association with intrinsic motivation:

Table 7: First Extracted Factor

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Factor 1</th>
<th>Factor 2</th>
<th>Factor 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amotivation V1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amotivation V2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.702</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amotivation V3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.737</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extrinsic Regulation V1</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.529</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extrinsic Regulation V2</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.304</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extrinsic Regulation V3</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.739</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introjection V1</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.552</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introjection V2</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.564</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introjection V3</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.579</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification V1</td>
<td>0.337</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification V2</td>
<td>0.627</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification V3</td>
<td>0.568</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration V1</td>
<td>0.621</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration V2</td>
<td>0.714</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration V3</td>
<td>0.581</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intrinsic Motivation V1</td>
<td>0.649</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intrinsic Motivation V2</td>
<td>0.717</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intrinsic Motivation V3</td>
<td>0.505</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Using unweighted least squares extraction and promin rotation)

NB. The cross-loading issue with Integration V1 identified in the pilot study was resolved through the larger N. in the full study, meeting the acceptability threshold set by Beavers et al. (2013) and Schonrock-Adema et al. (2009).
Or, to express this differently:

*Figure 8: First extracted factor expressed in diagram form*

![Diagram](attachment:image.png)

(Gagne & Deci, 2005, p. 336)

This association of the three elements in the SDT continuum above might be a consequence of shared facets of each, such as the (relative) degrees of autonomy, internalisation and professional mastery which characterise each category. Equally, the sense of vocation which might be said to accompany a role such as teaching may be important (that there is a sense of inherent satisfaction and pleasure (intrinsic motivation) which compliments and goes alongside an alignment of values (identification/integration), for example). These findings agree with Wilkesmann and Schmid (2014) who found an ‘empirical merger between intrinsic and identified motivation’ (p14).
Conversely, the second extracted factor resulted in the emergence of a motivational cluster characterised by externality, performance and control:

Table 8: Second Extracted Factor

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Factor 1</th>
<th>Factor 2</th>
<th>Factor 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amotivation V1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amotivation V2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.702</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amotivation V3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.737</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extrinsic Regulation V1</td>
<td>0.529</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extrinsic Regulation V2</td>
<td>0.304</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extrinsic Regulation V3</td>
<td>0.739</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introjection V1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.552</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introjection V2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.564</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introjection V3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification V1</td>
<td>0.337</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification V2</td>
<td>0.627</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Identification V3</td>
<td>0.568</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration V1</td>
<td>0.621</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration V2</td>
<td>0.714</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration V3</td>
<td>0.581</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intrinsic Motivation V1</td>
<td>0.649</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intrinsic Motivation V2</td>
<td>0.717</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intrinsic Motivation V3</td>
<td>0.505</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Using unweighted least squares extraction and promin rotation)

What is first apparent here is the extent to which the pilot analysis factor structure is replicated, through an observable association of the introjection and external regulation as was previously the case. Both Guay et al. (2000) and Fernet et al. (2008) have noted a similar blurring of external regulation and
introjected motivation, which is perhaps natural, being characterised as they are by external control, instrumental activity and a sense of performance. In relation to the first extracted factor (the identification/integration/intrinsic cluster), it may then be possible to discern an important dichotomy, whether it be articulated variously as performance vs. mastery or autonomy vs. control, for example.

*Figure 9: Second extracted factor expressed in diagram form*

![Diagram of motivation factors]

(Gagne & Deci, 2005, p. 336)
As previously in the pilot, the third factor identified ‘amotivation’ as a distinct construct:

Table 9: Third Extracted Factor

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Factor 1</th>
<th>Factor 2</th>
<th>Factor 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amotivation V1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amotivation V2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.702</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amotivation V3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.737</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extrinsic Regulation V1</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.529</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extrinsic Regulation V2</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.304</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extrinsic Regulation V3</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.739</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introjection V1</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.552</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introjection V2</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.564</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introjection V3</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.579</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification V1</td>
<td>0.337</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification V2</td>
<td>0.627</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification V3</td>
<td>0.568</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration V1</td>
<td>0.621</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration V2</td>
<td>0.714</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration V3</td>
<td>0.581</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intrinsic Motivation V1</td>
<td>0.649</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intrinsic Motivation V2</td>
<td>0.717</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intrinsic Motivation V3</td>
<td>0.505</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NB. A loading lower than the 0.3 recommended by FACTOR for polychoric correlations is shown to better reflect factorial structure.

This can also be communicated in the fashion below:
The ultimate conclusion of the pilot analysis, that the variables measuring for amotivation represented a third factor, clearly aligns with this same finding from the full survey. The notion of amotivation as a distinct construct would be entirely consistent with self-determination theory, as amotivation is concerned with the absence of motivation and therefore conceptually different from extrinsic motivation in this sense, which supposes a degree of motivation to be present. Another reason for the distinction might pertain to a resilience towards amotivation. For example, a respondent may be strongly demotivated by external regulation, but perceive themselves to be resistant to becoming amotivated, creating variation here. It should be noted that the loading of V1 on the amotivation factor is 0.039 lower than would ideally be the case, suggesting the need for refinement of this item in the event of future use of the instrument. However, it is retained on the basis that it best reflects the factorial structure (and when this variable is removed and the data is re-analysed, the factor division remains the same). Similarly, Samuels (2016) notes the potential acceptability of loadings slightly beneath 0.300 when sample size exceeds 300.

4.5 Descriptive statistics from combined variables and extracted factors
Variables were then combined on the basis of both the SDT categories of motivation, but also the larger combinations of variables extracted by the factorial analysis (which are highlighted). As previously with the interpretation of the individual variables, there is an evidently higher perceived motivation towards those variables measuring for identification, integration and intrinsic aspects of the SDT continuum (and in combination, which might be articulated variously as mastery/autonomy/constitutive groupings, as discussed above).

Conversely, there was again a lower perceived motivation towards variables measuring for external regulation and introjection (which might be considered collectively as a grouping characterised by external control and performance). However, there was slightly higher perceived motivation towards the combined variables measuring for introjection alone. Again, there was also considerable ambiguity in respect to the amotivation aspect. See section 4.3 for fuller discussion of these medians.

Table 10: Medians and Range for Combined Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Combined Variable</th>
<th>Amotivation Variables Combined</th>
<th>Amotivation/External Regulation/Introjection Variables Combined</th>
<th>External Regulation/Introjection Variables Combined</th>
<th>External Regulation Variables Combined</th>
<th>Introjection Variables Combined</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Median:</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>4.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range:</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>4.56</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>5.67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Combined Variable</th>
<th>Identification/Integration/Intrinsic Variables Combined</th>
<th>Identification/Integration Variables Combined</th>
<th>Identification Variables Combined</th>
<th>Integration Variables Combined</th>
<th>Intrinsic Variables Combined</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Median:</td>
<td>5.77</td>
<td>5.83</td>
<td>5.66</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>6.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range:</td>
<td>5.33</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>5.33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.6 Kruskal-Wallis tests and post-hoc Dunn/Bonferroni tests

As with the pilot study, Kruskal-Wallis tests were employed to identify any meaningful variation between groups, which are explored in turn below. This, as noted in the Methodology, is the appropriate method for the treatment of ordinal data. These tests were performed on the basis of both the combined and individual variables. Post-hoc Dunn-Bonferroni tests were employed to identify specific statistically significant pairwise combinations, where the Kruskal-Wallis tests identified the possibility of differences. As previously, all significant and non-significant findings are presented for
transparency in Appendix 1 (given as H (the Kruskal-Wallis test statistic), degrees of freedom and P for each variable). In each case below, in the interests of rigour, the P value given is the adjusted significance of the Dunn-Bonferroni test, not the initial Kruskal-Wallis indicator).

**Variation by School Type.**

Initial Kruskal-Wallis tests indicated that there may be some possible variance by school type worthy of post-hoc testing. However, these subsequent Dunn/Bonferroni pairwise comparisons revealed no comparisons that could be deemed statistically significant when the relevant adjustments made by this test were taken into account. This is perhaps expressive of similar conditions in respect to performativity across school contexts (though this is open to question as some variation proved evident in the open responses, discussed later).

**Variation by Years’ Service.**

Kruskal-Wallis tests suggested post-hoc testing, but, again, the Dunn/Bonferroni pairwise comparisons proved to be of no statistical significance. Again, this may suggest similar attitudes to motivation and performativity irrespective of years’ service, but equally, there was some evidence of variation in this regard in the semi-structured interviews (discussed later).

**Variation by Gender.**

On the 3 combined ‘Introjection’ variables, the Kruskal-Wallis test indicated a significant degree of variance between two groups. The subsequent Dunn’s/Bonferroni test indicated \( H = 36.261, P= 0.004 \) that there was a difference between male and females, with this being that there appears to be a slightly greater degree of motivation to develop professionally through introjection on the part of the women. This observation, however, should be subject to all the caveats that would ordinarily be applied when making generalisations on the basis of gender, as noted at greater length in the literature review.

**Variation by Performance Pay Awareness**

Of most interest here is the absence in any variation between groups on the basis of awareness of performance pay in relation to external regulation. This is relevant because it might be hypothesised (by those who formulated the government policy, for example), that a context where performance pay was implemented would result in external regulation having a greater degree of traction. However, this has proved not to be the case in this instance, with the Kruskal-Wallis test showing no variation in this regard when the relevant variables were combined.
Another important variation here emerged in respect to the combined variables measuring for amotivation, whereby those who were overtly aware of performance pay operating in their context appeared *more likely* to be amotivated. The post hoc test suggests a statistically significant difference between those who identify as ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ (\(H = 31.558, P = 0.34\)), though it is worth noting that those who identify as ‘No’ are technically incorrect in legislative terms. It may be that the explicit use of performance pay results in a more punitive and controlling context, which in turn leads to a higher propensity towards amotivation.

**Variation by Teacher Characteristics**

Some interesting variations by teacher type emerged through post-hoc testing. The Kruskal-Wallis tests indicated that NQTs were less responsive to the second variable measuring for identified motivation than TLR (Teaching and Learning Responsibility) holders, with this confirmed by the Dunn-Bonferroni test (\(H = -58.570, P = 0.23\)). This is intriguing, as it perhaps suggests that engagement with a school’s wider agenda, or the ability to more assertively engage with a school’s approach is contingent on greater experience to a certain extent. It may also be that TLR holders ‘identify’ more because they are, in effect, part of the school leadership structure in effect. It might also be conjectured that an NQT is more inclined to a potential combination of passivity and/or insularity.

In regard to individual variables, an interesting facet emerged in regard to teacher characteristics. This included a particular negativity towards managerial scrutiny on the part of pre-threshold teachers compared to NQTs (\(H = 42.627, P = 0.37\)). While this was perceived negatively by many respondents, this proved to be *particularly* negative in relation to pre-threshold teachers compared to NQTs, perhaps suggesting that the experience of full performance cycles has a deleterious influence (which NQTs would not yet have experienced), with a consequent eroding of resilience towards performativity.

**Variation by Sector:**

Sector proved to draw out some interesting variation between groups. This appeared to exist between the attitudes of primary and secondary teachers in respect to their responses to the combined introjected motivation variables. The Dunn/Bonferroni test identified a statistically significant variation here, with primary counterparts more likely to be motivated by introjection (\(H = 39.939, P = 0.001\)). Possible reasons for this can be conjectured upon: it may be that a more smaller, more intimate environment emphasises the social elements of introjection in respect to esteem, for example. This could be countered by the argument that in modern secondary contexts, the atomisation of individual
subject departments in effect creates a similar scenario. However, it is certainly the case that a primary teacher is more likely to be directly line-managed by a senior leader, and this may intensify the introjection aspect.

4.7 Summary

In sum, there are a range of key quantitative findings. Firstly, there appears to be a dichotomy between more autonomous and internalised motivations (identified/integrated/intrinsic) and more controlling, external forms of motivation (external regulation/introjection). It would appear that in terms of the motivation to develop professionally, there is a clear higher perceived motivation in relation to the identified/integrated/intrinsic grouping. There is a lower perceived motivation towards external regulation/introjection, but ambiguities remain in terms of the motivation to ‘improve’ induced by financial reward (external regulation) and ego/esteem of others (introjection). Amotivation appears to sit apart from this dichotomy, with this being consistent with the SDT framework as noted earlier in this chapter. A range of responses are evident in relation to amotivation, which appears to be expressive of the varying extent to which teachers perceive themselves to be resilient to performativity. Some interesting variation by groups is in evidence as noted in the previous section, though perhaps the most compelling of these is an apparent greater tendency for teachers to perceive themselves to be amotivated in contexts where performance pay is formally and explicitly in use.
5. Qualitative Analysis

As noted in the Methodology, this qualitative analysis takes the form of a hybrid inductive/deductive thematic analysis (Fereday and Muir-Cochrane, 2006). An inductive analysis of survey open responses is followed by a deductive analysis of the same data. This process of an inductive then deductive analysis is subsequently applied to the interview data. The aim of the qualitative analysis is to provide a rich sense of teachers’ perspectives on how neoliberal performance management affects their motivation to develop professionally.

5.1 Survey open response inductive analysis: teachers’ voices

Two broad themes were generated from the inductive or ‘bottom-up’ thematic analysis of the survey open responses: those of ‘sense of professionalism’ and ‘experiences of managerialism’. This section presents these two themes with illustrative quotations to clarify each theme and some of the variation within it, including teacher responses that suggested alternative individualised perspectives. These two significant themes involve a number of aspects, making it useful to draw on the approach offered by Attride-Stirling (2001), who recommends the use of networks to illustrate the webs that constitutes broader themes:

*Figure 11: Thematic webs in the survey open response analysis*

**Sense of Professionalism**

This theme was characterised by notions of trust, autonomy and a sense of vocation, with each of these proving potent motivators to develop professionally. However, these aspects were more often
described as being undermined or inhibited, with this having a deleterious effect upon motivation. Each of these aspects is detailed in turn below.

**Professional Trust**

A major factor in regard to the theme of ‘sense of professionalism’ was that of the motivational importance of professional trust. This presented itself variably as an appreciation of being trusted (though rare), the absence of trust in their context and/or the desire for a greater sense of trust. This aspect was chiefly generated from the considerable number of comments from teachers who complained of a lack of trust and the demotivating impact of this:

N.B. PRP? Yes/No/Don’t Know denotes the participant’s awareness of performance-related pay in their context.

**TLR Holder, 8yrs, Independent Academy, PRP? Yes, Secondary, Female:**

> The system is flawed and based on mistrust, ridiculous targets and spying

**Pre-Threshold, 5yrs, Not Currently Teaching, PRP? Yes, Primary, Female:**

> One of the reasons I left [the profession] was the undue pressure and suspicious attitude of management team of my colleagues and no matter how hard we tried to impress them or hoops we jumped through.

These comments are expressive of a more general trend amongst respondents in respect to a lack of trust, with a desire for the level of trust to increase articulated by some:

**Pre-Threshold, 3yrs, Community School, PRP? No, Secondary, Male:**

> I believe that teachers need to be trusted more, rather than constantly being scrutinised

It is worth noting that there were rare instances of respondents noting a positive and motivating level of trust, though these individuals were in the minority:

**Pre-Threshold, 5yrs, Academy-Chain School, PRP? Yes, Primary, Female:**

> They also have a lot of trust that we do our jobs well so I am very keen to prove them right!

Whilst infrequent, such references to a positive sense of professional trust are perhaps expressive of contextual variation, with teachers experiencing a higher degree of trust in some environments, though this did not appear to follow a pattern in respect to sector or school type. An associated notion here in
respect to trust is that of a sense of professional status, or more specifically, evidence of some teachers’ perceptions of not being valued or trusted as the professionals they regard themselves to be:

NQT, 3yrs, Local Authority Primary (Before Leaving Profession), PRP? Don't Know, Primary, Female:

\[\text{I am no longer in the profession after feeling devalued as a professional.}\]

Post-Threshold, 10yrs, Multi Academy Trust, PRP? Yes, Primary, Female:

\[\text{Performance related pay makes us feel undervalued as a profession...the performance management system makes us feel constantly scrutinised and undervalued.}\]

What appears evident here is a sense that some teachers feel that their professional status is undermined or jeopardised by performance management. Taken overall, this aspect of the theme of a sense of professionalism is chiefly characterised by the demotivating effect of an absence of trust, with rarer evidence of some teachers perceiving themselves to work in contexts where they are motivated to develop professionally by the trust placed in them.

*Professional Autonomy*

This sense above of what might be articulated as a kind of perceived de-professionalisation also has links to a second constituent aspect: professional autonomy. There were a small number of respondents who perceived themselves to be in possession of a degree of professional choice:

Post-Threshold, 10yrs, Local Authority Primary, PRP? No, Primary, Female:

\[\text{Thank goodness I work in a school where motivation is linked to personal development and a degree of autonomy.}\]

A more prevalent aspect here, however, appeared to be the absence of professional autonomy and the demotivation that accompanied this, with many describing what they perceived to be the constraints in terms of exercising their creativity and professional judgement in the classroom:

TLR Holder, 12yrs, Comprehensive, PRP Yes, Secondary, Female:

\[\text{Teaching has dramatically changed since I started. Less allowance for creativity in the classroom}\]

Pre-Threshold, 6yrs, Academy-Chain School, PRP Yes, Secondary, Female:
We are now ordered to teach in one style across the board - it is not appropriate for MFL [Modern Foreign Languages]

A perhaps natural concomitant of this was that others made clear their desire for greater autonomy as being essential to their professional development. This was to a certain extent differentiated from ‘performance management’, but sometimes implying that effective performance management was inclusive of this and enabling of it:

NQT, 1yr, Local Authority Primary, PRP? No, Primary, Female:

I would indeed be more motivated to improve and extend my practice by having more individual authority over systematic methods of assessment and classroom procedure...

This clear linkage of motivation and autonomy is similarly helpful in summarising this aspect of a ‘sense of professionalism’: that these teachers (although with exceptions) feel the absence of professional choice and that this has a demotivating effect.

Sense of Vocation

The notions of professional autonomy and trust detailed above were also associated with a third aspect of a motivating ‘sense of professionalism’, that of perceiving teaching to be a vocation:

NQT, 1yr, Local Authority, PRP Don't Know, Special School, Male:

I do it because I enjoy being with the children and seeing the progress they make.

Pre-threshold, 3yrs, Supply Teacher, PRP No, Primary, Male:

I teach to the best of my ability because I care about the growth of the children I teach.

Post-Threshold, 7yrs, Local Authority School, PRP Yes, Primary, Female:

I am motivated to be a better teacher for the children - I love the job.

These comments are expressive of the salience of this aspect of a ‘sense of professionalism’ in the survey open response data as a whole. Respondent teachers appeared to be strongly influenced by this aspect, which can be summarised as the motivational importance of moral purpose, with this also being intertwined with the pleasure of working with young people. It proved to be a clear impetus for developing professionally for many. However, this aspect of the theme of a ‘sense of professionalism’ also leads us to the second theme of ‘experiences of managerialism’, as, often, such positive remarks in
regard to vocation were expressed in direct juxtaposition, contrasting with their perceptions of managerialism.

**Experiences of Managerialism**

This theme proved to be closely related to the theme of ‘sense of professionalism’ and was often present by way of juxtaposition to it. It was characterised as motivation being impacted upon by a sense of unfair judgement, the burden of ‘proof’, a separate managerial class, and the effect of financial constraints on professional development, each of which are explored in turn below.

**Judgement**

One clear aspect that emerged here related to the nature of the judgements to which they were subject, with the perception that these were unfair and unrealistic, with a consequent negative impact on their motivation to be more professionally effective:

**Post-Threshold, 12yrs, Faith School, PRP Yes, Secondary, Female:**

> Performance management, I believe, is a means to get even more work out of an individual to meet with school performance and league tables. We are given unrealistic targets that are nearly impossible to achieve. This leads to zero motivation.

**TLR Holder, 9yrs, Academy-Chain School, PRP Yes, Secondary, Female:**

> Performance related pay, based on students achieving unrealistic targets and data driven activities are certainly having a huge impact...

This sense of being subject to unfair judgements based on unachievable or inappropriate measures of effectiveness appeared to affect teachers’ motivations significantly. In other words, it seemed to result in disengagement, as opposed to the increased impetus for improvement that performance management would perhaps intend. This managerialist approach to unfair judgement was not only reported as being demotivating, but also capricious and possibly even corrupt:

**Pre-Threshold, 5yrs, Independent Academy, PRP Yes, Secondary, Female:**

> Sometimes it just seems to be whether the powers that be like you or not and what do they really base their opinions of your teaching on?
Similarly, from a number of teachers there was comment on the demotivating process of formal appraisal, often punitive, unrealistic and mutable, with this have an impact on motivation:

**TLR Holder, 11yrs, Comprehensive, PRP? Yes, Secondary, Female:**

...targets at the beginning of the year that become unsuitable by the end of the year as my role constantly changes...therefore, the targets set for them are now not correct.

**TLR Holder, 8yrs, Independent Academy, PRP? Yes, Secondary, Female:**

*Performance management based on the results students get and a target system is inherently unfair...aspirational target setting is also damaging to student and teacher.*

**Post-Threshold, 7yrs, Local Authority, PRP? Yes, Primary, Female:**

*Appraisal targets can somewhat be unrealistic and relies on the progress of pupils, regardless of their situation.*

This sense of being given unachievable targets, then being scrutinised intensively for these seems a shared experience in the data, possessing considerable salience. The impact of unattainable outcomes on teacher motivation is a potential cause for consideration, noted most explicitly by the second respondent in the section above. The ‘unfairness’ raises wider questions in respect to how teachers are measured and judged. To recapitulate, this aspect of the theme of ‘experiences of managerialism’ can be summarised as teachers experiencing judgement that is characterised by unfairness, with the consequent demotivation that accompanies this.

**The Burden of Proof**

The comments above are also related to a second aspect in respect to managerialism, a focus upon ‘proof’ or instrumental, data-driven activities. Of perhaps considerable concern here are those teachers who detail their perception of the demotivating effect of this ‘data-culture’, one which is characterised by dishonesty and manipulation:

**Pre-Threshold, 2yrs, Comprehensive, PRP? Yes, Secondary, Male:**

*Creativity is stifled as a consequence of ever-increasing bureaucratic demands placed upon us by statistic-orientated leaders.*
NQT, 1yr, Local Authority (Before Leaving Profession), PRP? Yes, Primary, Female:

It’s all about the data and manipulating the data in a dishonest manner.

NQT, 1yr, Faith School (Before Leaving Profession), PRP? Don’t Know, Primary, Female:

A system where I was not free to teach in the best way for the children in my class. Where I was forced to change my recorded levels for children to meet what the headteacher wanted on paper.

It appears that the performativity measures to which teachers are subject can result in the adoption of fraudulent practices that compromise teachers’ sense of integrity. Simultaneously, the pursuit of such data-led instrumentalism is also perceived to be a significant distraction from the core role of educating children. Both of these factors appear to have a deleterious impact on teachers’ developmental motivations, especially pronounced in the latter two cases above.

Related to this is the extent to which ‘proof’ can be perceived by teachers to not carry educational value. A number of respondents noted the instrumental nature of such an approach, with this proving to be seen as a distraction from the true nature of the teacher’s role:

Pre-Threshold, 3yrs, Local Authority, PRP? Yes, Primary, Female:

I would be more motivated to be a better teacher if I wasn’t...expected to devote my entire life to school...filling in endless data and box ticking projects.

Department Manager, 10yrs, Comprehensive, PRP? Yes, Secondary, Female:

It’s less about what CPD you’ve under taken and how you’ve developed as a teacher and more about data and getting a good observation

NQT, 1yrs, Local Authority, PRP? Don’t Know, Primary, Female:

Have witnessed the run up to PM, and all I saw was people quickly sorting out the numbers to meet arbitrary months old targets, not continuously interacting with them. Seemed incredibly inefficient and open to manipulation.

This similarly raises a question as to the absence of a valid link between professional development and performance management; if the nature of ‘proof’ is such that it potentially does not engender the motivation for meaningful improvements, then a vocalisation of this by teachers is worthy of attention. On a second note, the latter respondent also deserves attention because of what might be perceived as
a superficial compliance which is characterised by artifice, manipulation and deception. In such circumstances described by teachers, it is perhaps unsurprising that relationships between teachers and those who manage them might encounter difficulties. In summation, this aspect of the theme of ‘experiences of managerialism’ can be characterised as ‘proving’ their effectiveness in ways which are distracting at best and dishonest at worst, with a negative implication for motivation.

**Managerial Class**

This, in turn, leads to another aspect of ‘experiences of managerialism’, that of teachers’ perceptions of a separate managerial class, characterised by a sense of distance between classroom practitioners and school leaders, as well as a feeling of autocracy, with this impacting upon motivation:

**Pre-Threshold, 3yrs, Local Authority, PRP? Yes, Primary, Female:**

Too many politics in school and out of touch management often offloading their latest ideas onto already overworked, unhappy staff.

**NQT, 1yr, Faith School (Before Leaving Profession), PRP? Don’t Know, Primary, Female:**

Where my unusual approach to mathematics saw the highest ever growth in results but needed to change because it ‘wasn’t school policy’.

**Post-Threshold, 7yrs, Faith School, PRP? No, Secondary, Female:**

I don’t really feel valued by management as Art is a marginal subject. I don’t cause any ripples and don’t suck up to management so I feel invisible.

The final comment above is particularly expressive of what might be seen as a marginalisation of teachers’ priorities, in the interests of that which school managers deem to have priority. Alongside this, the sense of imposition and the absence of teacher voice seems relevant. In summary, the sense of a ‘gulf’ between managers and teachers appears to have its implications for teachers’ motivation to develop professionally.

**Financial Constraints**

Another area of relevance in respect to the theme of ‘experiences of managerialism’ relates to the economic environment in which schools presently find themselves. This proved to be a less prominent code than the others relating to the ‘experiences of managerialism’ theme, but appeared sufficiently distinctive and salient to warrant comment in its own right. This aspect was characterised by an absence
of adequate financial resources to engage meaningfully with performance management and/or professional development:

Department Manager, 10yrs, Comprehensive, PRP? Yes, Secondary, Female:

*There is no budget for CPD so this can't filter into performance management*

Pre-Threshold, 5yrs, Faith School, PRP? Yes, Primary, Male:

*Performance management is too often used as...a money saving device for schools*

NQT, 1yrs, Local Authority, PRP? No, Primary, Female:

*I would be motivated to advance my knowledge base by having the TIME and FUNDS to involve myself in professional development however these options are not really available to me...*

In summary, this notion of a managerialism which is driven by financial imperatives is of considerable interest. The effect of reduced investment in the education sector appears to be perceived by teachers as inhibiting the impetus for improvement. There may also be an extent to which the way school managers choose to direct their limited resources may affect teacher motivation.

5.2 Self-determination theory analysis of open responses

It is now appropriate to move to the deductive analysis of the open response data, making use of the SDT framework. The application of this lens will allow for a structured, theoretically-led examination of the data.

*Amotivation*

When coded against the self-determination theory framework, a prevalent feature was generated through the open responses: *amotivation*. This concept is characterised by absence of purpose, value or impetus. This study looks to determine the salience of themes beyond sheer frequency, instead adopting a broader, more subtle sense of thematic prevalence. However, it is worthwhile in this case to briefly consider numerical occurrence. In simple numerical terms, of the 68 respondents who elected to use the open section to comment on their motivations, over a third expressed feelings of an absence of motivation, with a number explicitly citing performativity for the reason they left the teaching profession. Interestingly, these participants were chiefly female. Several examples from different
individuals are given below in which performance management is cited as a specific reason for becoming amotivated:

**Pre-Threshold, 3yrs, Local Authority, PRP? Yes, Primary, Female (2\textsuperscript{nd} teacher with these characteristics):**

I am leaving the profession, partly because I disagree with performance related progression.

**Pre-Threshold, 3yrs, Local Authority, PRP? Don’t Know, Primary, Female:**

I am no longer in the profession after feeling devalued as a professional.

**TLR Holder, 5yrs, Local Authority, PRP? Yes, Primary, Female:**

I was strongly advised not to apply to go over the threshold, even though I achieved all my targets from my previous appraisal. My experience of appraisal and pay review has been negative and difficult to achieve. I am now no longer teaching.

**Pre-Threshold, 1yrs, Faith School, PRP? Don’t Know, Primary, Female:**

I could not continue working with my negative feelings towards our education system.

**Pre-Threshold, 5yrs, Other (Not Currently Teaching), PRP? Don’t Know, Primary, Female:**

One of the reasons I left was the undue pressure and suspicious attitude of management team

This may also be expressive of the possibility some teachers perceive that performativity can result in the inverse outcome to that which it intends: these are individuals who have ceased to be ‘productive’ in any sense. In terms of individual details here, the second comment above in relation to de-professionalisation is particularly compelling, linking with Ryan and Deci’s (2000) characterisation of amotivation as involving an absence of value in a task or role.

Perhaps of further and related concern is the sense communicated by some of being ‘on the edge’ of leaving the profession:

**Other (Lead Practitioner) 7yrs, Academy-Chain School, PRP? Yes, Secondary, Female:**

I have considered leaving teaching because of the PM process.

**Post-Threshold, 9yrs, Independent Academy, PRP? Yes, Secondary, Female:**


I'm far from incompetent but have raised major issues with the school and feel absolutely bullied to the point of leaving.

**Post-Threshold, 12yrs, Faith School, PRP Yes, Secondary, Female:**

I’m an outstanding teacher as rated by OFSTED and in this current climate of teaching - I am looking to leave the profession.

These evident expressions of amotivation from different teachers on the cusp of leaving the profession all identify performativity as a catalyst. Of particular interest here is that each of these teachers self-identify as successful in the classroom, with one referring to being graded ‘outstanding’, another ‘far from incompetent’ and the first a ‘lead practitioner’. If these remarks are taken at face-value, then it is of notable interest that amotivation is being perhaps being induced in capable individuals – rather than the easy assumption that performativity worst affects those with the poorest performance. In summary, amotivation appears to be of considerable salience in the survey open response data.

**Intrinsic Motivation**

This aspect of the SDT continuum can be characterised as motivation through the inherent satisfaction or enjoyment of a role or task. This aspect often presented itself in opposition to a sense of amotivation. This can be seen by the examples below (with intrinsic emboldened and amotivation italicised for convenience):

**Pre-Threshold, 3yrs, Academy-Chain School, PRP? No, Secondary, Male:**

I think most teachers are motivated by the pupils we serve...*so performance management is often a distraction from this. Indeed, the worst managers exploit this goodwill.*

**NQT, 1yr, Faith School, PRP? No, Secondary, Female:**

I am motivated to improve because of how I am...*not harsh scrutiny which leaves me feeling rubbish.*

**Post-Threshold, 10yrs, Multi Academy Trust, PRP? Yes, Primary, Female:**

Teachers always work as hard as they can and try to do the best job they can regardless of pay...*the performance management system makes us feel we can never do enough.*
This sense of motivation appears to align with the inductive aspect of a teacher’s sense of vocation. Similarly, that various teachers perceive a strong oppositionality between a teacher’s internal developmental impetuses on the one hand, and an amotivating performativity on the other, is perhaps of significance. It suggests that a perception of irreconcilability can arise in some, making the employment of extrinsic motivation strategies challenging for school leaders. This in turn now leads to those open responses which refer to elements of the ‘extrinsic motivation’ aspect of the SDT continuum (introjection, external regulation and identified/integrated motivation).

**Introjected Motivation**

Introjection, characterised by motivation through a sense of self-worth and the esteem of other, proved to be an aspect present in the open responses. In some cases, this was an open acknowledgement that the esteem in which they were held by their senior leaders was of consequence and motivating to them to ‘improve’ professionally. These individuals were open that, for example:

**NQT, 1yr, Local Authority, PRP? Yes, Primary, Female:**

*It is nice to be rewarded for hard work but a thank you from the boss or a parent works just as well.*

In the latter comment it is also interesting to note that parental approval can be a source of introjected motivation, which is something that sits outside of the gambit of formal performativity. Another respondent also offered an alternative source of introjected motivation, namely the esteem in which they were held by their teacher-peers:

**NQT, 1yr, Independent Academy, PRP? Yes, Secondary, Male:**

*I am motivated by the thought of being held in high-esteem by department colleagues.*

This perhaps suggests a potential avenue for the use of positive introjection by senior leaders, through the fostering of such relationships to drive improvement. Conversely though, it may be argued that such collegially-driven introjection lies outside the manipulation of a school hierarchy to some extent.

Not unrelated to this would be the extent to which teachers may be driven to develop professionally by their own sense of self-worth, as differentiated from the worth they derive from the esteem of others. It is valid to note here that under the SDT framework, introjection is inclusive of the approval of one’s self.
Whilst such easy differentiation of self-worth and the approval of others may be too simplistic, it is worth noting that one respondent did identify:

**Post-Threshold, 9yrs, Local Authority, PRP? Yes, Primary, Female:**

> No motivation other than own self-worth.

Contextually, this was in relation to an environment where the teacher felt there was no sense of reward for individual effort, so this may have been more reflective of the influence of a particular (though perhaps far from unique) situation. Nonetheless, it is interesting to note the emergence of this aspect of SDT’s conception of introjection in the data.

Another respondent noted that the esteem in which teachers are held by a school hierarchy possessed too strong an element of subjectivity, or an uncertainty to its judgement:

**Pre-Threshold, 5yrs, Independent Academy, PRP? Yes, Secondary, Female:**

> Sometimes it just seems to be whether the powers that be like you or not and what do they really base their opinions of your teaching on?

This is an intriguing strand, suggesting a negative form of introjection which could serve to actively demotivate. Such a sense of inconsistency might be worth noting in respect to its cross-over with the adjacent SDT construct of external regulation.

A final aspect of introjection evident amongst respondents was what might be seen as an occasional tendency to couch a sense of being motivated by the approval of school leaders alongside other, more intrinsic motivations:

**Post-Threshold, 7yrs, Faith School, PRP? No, Secondary, Female:**

> 'It doesn’t change my performance because I am ambitious for pupils to get good results but I would probably feel happier if I felt appreciated’

**TLR Holder, 3yrs, Independent Academy, PRP? Don’t Know, Secondary, Male:**

> It is nice to be told you are doing a good job but having a happy total life is more important.

Such remarks might on the one hand be seen as a reluctance to admit the influence of introjection without some form of caveat or protective qualification. However, taken at face value, they might also
be seen to align with the argument of SDT that whilst introjection is not without motivational force, that other more internalised aspects might have a greater traction or potency.

**External Regulation**

Another aspect of extrinsic motivation in the SDT framework is that of *external regulation*. Alongside amotivation, external regulation proved to be a most salient aspect in the open response data. This proved to generate itself in a number of ways, principally pertaining to the salience of reward and punishment (or the promise/threat of these). The first of these relates to the perception amongst some teachers that performance management was inherently negative, with external regulation taking the form of ‘stick’ rather than ‘carrot’:

**TLR Holder, 3yrs, Faith School, PRP? Yes, Primary, Female:**

*Extremely intrusive monitoring. Bullying management...Horrendous demotivating performance management system.*

**Pre-Threshold, 5yrs, Faith School, PRP? Yes, Primary, Male:**

*Performance management is too often used as a threat...rather than as a way to improve the education of the children.*

**Pre-Threshold, 3yrs, Faith School, PRP? Yes, Primary, Female:**

*The Head Teacher uses performance management more of a threat than an encouragement, eg 'If you don't do this, you won't get that'. I have become disillusioned with the whole process.*

This sense of performativity as a ‘stick’ used to intimidate teachers raises ethical questions, as well as queries related to the dubious efficacy of such an approach. They are suggestive of school environments where punitive use of consequences appears to be a matter of course, resulting in a coercive set of circumstances where notions such as fear and bullying become normalised. As such, it is perhaps inevitable that this can spill over into hostility and anger:

**Pre-Threshold, 2yrs, Local Authority, PRP? No, Primary, Male:**

*You get treated like an idiot by people who are actually idiots.*

The potential implications here are both ethical, in respect to wellbeing, and also in terms of the efficacy, given the negative performance outcomes that can be associated with such methods. The
notions of compliance and reactance, integral to the SDT understanding of external regulation appear prevalent.

A number of participants also wished to note what they perceived to be the lack of traction that pay has in respect to their motivation to improve as teachers:

**Post-Threshold, 9yrs, Local Authority, PRP? Yes, Primary, Female:**

*PRP (performance related pay) works in business when you are motivated to get more money....*

**Pre-threshold, 3yrs, Independent Academy, PRP? Yes, Primary, Female:**

*Performance management is disrespectful. I want to be better because I want to be better. I don’t need the financial aspect to be dangled in front of me.*

**Pre-threshold, 3yrs, Supply Teacher, PRP No, Primary, Male:**

*Though pay is a driving factor in attending work, it is not a driving factor in my work performance.*

External regulation encompasses the notion of monetary reward and it is notable that a number of teachers felt the need to articulate its perceived absence of influence upon their practice, irrespective of the effectiveness of its implementation or otherwise. The first two of these open responses appear to pertain more to the notion that such a system of reward might be seen as antithetical to a more vocational profession. The latter is particularly intriguing, articulating the idea that pay has traction in terms of *employment*, but not *improvement*. It may however be difficult to assess the effectiveness of pay, due to the implementation of PRP in an era of budgetary restraint. This situation was described well by one individual:

**Pre-Threshold, 6yrs, Local Authority, PRP? Don’t Know, Primary, Female:**

*School strapped for cash so told head I’m not looking to go up the pay ladder next year (continuing on mps4). Jobs in local schools all offering mps1 and 2, no higher, so I think I’ve got a good deal. Despite doing 70 hours last week. And being a so-called outstanding teacher.*

Perhaps most compellingly on this aspect, respondents offered descriptions of performance related pay being used to actively *preclude* pay progression:

**Post-Threshold, 10yrs, Independent Academy, PRP? Yes, Secondary, Female:**

*Performance Management Targets are used to PREVENT pay progression, not reward hard work*
Pre-Threshold, 3yrs, Independent Academy, PRP? Yes, Secondary, Female:

School with financial problems - they will find any reason not to give raise

This is perhaps principally due to perceived financial issues in schools, however, it is not impossible that some school hierarchies perceive punitive use of pay to be a motivating factor. Similarly, it is possible that a case may exist where the prevention of pay progression may have been the consequence of what was an objective, accurate assessment of teacher’s performance. However, it seems likely that the first reason identified (financial difficulties) is the most plausible. Another relevant factor here relates to the awareness of performance pay. There appears to be an issue with school hierarchies not articulating the existence of performance pay to staff, where more than a third of respondents were unaware of it. It is worth noting that the response ‘No’ and ‘Don’t Know’ are technically incorrect following the change to legislation in 2013 (in other words, all school must have implemented it in some way as a legal requirement).

Nonetheless, there were a small number of references to pay as having some sense of positivity though:

NQT, 1yr, Local Authority, PRP Don't Know, Special School, Male:

However, it would be nice if the pay reflected the amount of hours I put in (working over 12 hours most week days) but that would have little impact on my professional conduct.

Yet it is interesting to note that such references to pay invariably took the form of a desire for an encomium (a just reward for services already rendered) as opposed to pay as an incentive (as a motivation to improve).

Identified/Integrated Motivation

Identified/Integrated Motivation is the final aspect of the extrinsic motivation continuum, concerned with notions of aligned or shared values and goals. These elements of the SDT framework bear analysis at the same time, as they appear in effect to be weaker and stronger forms of the same type of motivation. It might be predicted in the light of the preceding analysis of widespread external regulation that identified/integrated motivation would be minimal in the open responses. Whilst it is certainly the case that references to this type of motivation proved less frequent, there were nonetheless some remarks expressive of it. This principally appeared evident in the sense that ‘alignment’ was obtained through autonomy and trust (two important inductive aspects in their own right).
One observation that would be made in relation to identified/integrated motivation is that of the influence of contextual variation. Whilst the quantitative work identified relatively small variations on the basis of sector and school type, what appears evident from the open responses is that one individual context can vary considerably from the next, with some respondents keen to directly juxtapose their contrast in experiences:

**TLR Holder, 3yrs, Faith School, PRP? Yes, Primary, Female:**

*Current school of 2 years - lot of trust in staff, small amount of monitoring, big whole school impact. Fantastic results. Outstanding school. Previous school 1 year - extremely intrusive monitoring. Bullying management. Low staff moral. Horrendous demotivating performance management system.*

**Other (Lead Practitioner) 7yrs, Academy-Chain School, PRP? Yes, Secondary, Female:**

*Within my first school, PM was a positive process which went alongside my intrinsic desire to improve. In my current school, it is part of my reason for leaving at the end of this year. I have considered leaving teaching because of the PM process.*

While it might be hypothesised that national conditions in respect to performativity would suppress contextual variation, it would appear from the above that there is a greater degree of managerial freedom than might be supposed. This is not to minimise the influence of macro-level performativity factors, but it may suggest that there is more scope for mediation by headteachers than suspected, with such contexts motivating teachers to develop professionally.

Similarly, in contexts where conditions facilitating identification and integration do not seem to prevail, it is apparent from some respondents that there would be an appetite for more autonomy:

**TLR Holder, 3yrs, Independent Academy, PRP? Don't Know, Secondary, Male:**

*What is needed is more ability to innovate, adapt, and work outside the confines of curriculum and exam based requirements.*

This desire for a greater degree of freedom of action would appear to be something that school leaders might be able to harness in order to motivate teachers to develop professionally. It is worth noting here though that this represents a particular aspect of the SDT continuum: greater internalisation as autonomy increases. It does not explicitly refer to the alignment and of values (and internalisation of
these) that also characterises identification/integration. However, it might be argued by SDT adherents that this would be a natural concomitant of greater autonomy.

Another small element of the data that might be worth attention is the potential ‘bleed’ between introjection and identification. This possibility was initially highlighted by the pilot data and the MAP analysis of the larger sample and might be further illuminated here:

**Pre-threshold, 3yrs, Supply Teacher, PRP No, Primary, Male:**

> I often find the greatest impacting factor on my performance to be the support and belief of senior staff.

The references to ‘support’ and ‘belief’ could be seen as expressive of the conscious valuing and congruence of beliefs evident in the identification/integration construct, but, at the same time, the reference to ‘belief’ could equally be seen as related to esteem and hence introjection.

However, perhaps some of the most compelling responses in relation to identification/integration relate to those rare contexts where a strong congruence of values is fostered and where the motivational benefits of this are harnessed, for example:

**Pre-Threshold, 5yrs, Academy-Chain School, PRP? Yes, Primary, Female:**

> They also have a lot of trust that we do our jobs well so I am very keen to prove them right!

It would appear that in such contexts, teachers can be motivated to develop professionally through greater degrees of trust, autonomy and shared principles. It is, however, worth noting that remarks such as these represented a fraction of the open responses.

In summary, identification/integration is at times expressive of the motivational potency of shared goals and values, though more frequently appears conspicuous by teachers’ perception of its absence, with the demotivating impact this implies.

5.3 Inductive thematic analysis of semi-structured interviews

*Generation of inductive codes for semi-structured interviews.*

Before considering the inductive codes for the semi-structured interviews, it is worth examining the extent to which these have been influenced by the survey open response inductive codes. A number of point are relevant here. Firstly, when asking members of the same group about the same subject
(through different means), it is not unlikely that the same or similar themes will emerge. Yet while this may be the case, this needs to considered critically, rather than taken as a given, hence the revision of the inductive codes given in the diagrams below. This criticality is important not least because the researcher should acknowledge the difficulty in objectively ‘bracketing out’ an existing analysis which is part of the same study.

Semi-structured interviews appeared to exhibit many of the notions evident in the inductive coding of the survey open responses, with ‘sense of professionalism’ and ‘experiences of managerialism’ again present as the two key themes. However, the extended nature of the interviews resulted in more subtle details, particularly in respect to greater reference to contextual variation. In relation to managerialism, an aspect of this, ‘financial constraints’ proved to be largely absent from the semi-structured interviews. This is curious given its presence in the open responses, expressive as they were of a period of budgetary constraint prevailing. However, in the interests of thoroughness, this was again referred to in one single interview:

N.B. The descriptors for interviewees are years’ service, gender and primary/secondary. They are given fewer characteristics because they are more easily identifiable due to the smaller pool from which these participants are drawn.

12yrs M Prim:

I think there’s pressures of working on a low budget, increase in numbers, reduced staff numbers, they’re pressures. I’ve a very large class myself with a massive mixture of abilities and that’s a pressure...

It is worth noting that, while is this is similar to the survey open responses in the sense of general budgetary constraint, it is different in that it does not specifically refer to the budget available for pay rises following performance management.

Two further aspects emerged as salient in respect to the broader theme of ‘sense of professionalism’. The first of these was the notion of collegiality, or being motivated to develop professionally by a sense of collective endeavour with teacher-peers (distinct from the school hierarchy). The second aspect was that of professional wellbeing, or the effect on motivation of professional working conditions being met (in respect to a safe school environment and contractual status).
The most prominent aspects were present across both the open responses and the interviews (‘vocation’, ‘trust’, ‘autonomy’ for professionalism; ‘judgement’ and ‘the burden of proof’ for managerialism). In summary, the similarities and contrasts can be seen below.

*Figure 12: Comparison of inductive themes from the survey open responses and semi-structured interviews*

*Inductive themes from open responses:*

*Inductive themes from semi-structured interviews:*

*The first inductive theme: ‘Sense of Professionalism’*

*Trust*

As with the analysis of the open responses, the aspect of trust proved to be salient. Once again, this was expressed in negative terms by some, with one individual keen to enumerate the ways in which this
absence of trust manifested itself and the impact this had upon her levels of motivation to develop professionally:

2yrs F Prim:

For example...you’ve got to put in whether they got a full mark, a half mark or no mark and it’s checked, and it’s checked against your papers. I don’t feel like that’s trusting me as a teacher to be truthful and be honest about the progress that the children are making... That makes you question do they trust us to be doing what we should be doing? Probably not. Quite de-motivating I would say...

It is striking to note the intensity of the scrutiny to which this teacher finds herself subject, and the feelings of mistrust it engenders, but important also to observe that the interviewee appears to be describing something to which the staff body is subject, rather than the intensive management of a ‘failing’ teacher. In other words, that this absence of trust was considered appropriate for competent and able teachers. Indeed, this same individual noted that for some of her colleagues, the processes detailed above were heightened to a yet greater pitch, suggesting a baseline level of distrust, with the suspicion increased for given individuals:

2yrs F Prim:

I think I would be de-motivated if somebody was to pop into my classroom and question me, ‘well why are they doing that’ and ‘what is the point or what’s the reasoning behind that’, that would be de-motivating and I know that’s happened in school to other members of staff but not to me.

This sense of variable scrutiny was similarly reported by an individual in the secondary context:

3yrs M Sec:

With the marking of my books in class, drop-ins, I don’t tend to get many of them because I assume...they have faith in me. Whereas other teachers I know get ‘random’ drop-ins more often than others. I think it’s because they don’t have that faith in them. So to answer your question,
yeah, I think they’ve got trust [in me].

On the one hand, such variability in degrees of trust might seem an inevitable consequence of the natural differences in ability that might occur in any group of differently developing professionals. Yet on the other hand, it could be expressive of inconsistency on the part of school managers, or a lack of transparency as to managerial processes (see the reference to ‘more ‘random’ drop-ins’, for example).

Feelings of mistrust did not appear to be confined to a single context, or solely a consequence of years’ service or gender. Similarly, a post-threshold teacher, this time in the secondary context, noted the importance of trust in being able to develop professionally, making a particularly explicit reference to the notion of *professional* trust. This individual described a sense of frustration and demotivation when this appeared to be in absence, whilst also referring to the notion of trust as being interlinked with the idea of professional status (an idea present in the open response analysis too):

9yrs F Sec:

...there’s times when you do want to say, ‘look I am a professional, you’ve got to trust my *professionalism*’ and so to then be told that we need to be seen to be doing this and this...if you don’t trust me as a teacher, I’m not entirely sure I then want to try and deliver your initiatives. I’ve got to be trusted with that in order to develop it and progress it myself, yeah.

It might be argued that, with the perceived pervasiveness of national conditions, a given individual would experience similar feelings of mistrust from one school to another, but this proved not to be the case for this interviewee. This same individual described her current context as one which contrasted considerably with her previous one (despite the same Ofsted rating in both contexts at her time of employment), which is suggestive of more latitude on the part of leadership teams than might be supposed. It is similarly interesting to note the sense of motivation to develop professionally that this greater trust engenders:

9yrs F Sec:

*I think it’s a lot more balanced here cos there is that trust in the teachers.  Yeah, I do feel there’s that element of trust and there isn’t that constant overlooking eye to see whether you are*
delivering particular, they just trust and believe in that, and so that definitely drives me...yes definitely, it drives me, because you then want to almost repay something back if you’re being trusted.

Indeed, this positive sense of trust proved to be prevalent elsewhere in the semi-structured interviews, with another individual keen to note what she perceived to be an environment in which there was a high level of confidence in the staff body as a whole and the implications this had for professional growth. This individual was keen to note the positive influence of the headteacher as a variable in this regard:

**6yrs F Prim:**

*We’re very much so trusted as professionals to just get on and do the job and we are very frequently reminded on that which definitely impacts on how you feel in your career and your profession. That kind of keeps me grounded and makes me realise that I am good at my job, I am trusted, I am professional and I am making the right choices. And that affects your motivation.*

*Absolutely, yes and we’re quite lucky in that sense, our head teacher is very aware of making sure that he does remind us of what a good job we’re doing. I think everybody needs to hear that and we’re certainly lucky that our head teacher says it quite frequently.*

Again, such a positive context in respect to trust proved present in another interviewee’s remarks, which reiterated the sense of the headteacher as a variable in the comments made by **6yrs F Prim**, while also emphasising the sense of wanting to repay that trust referred to by **9yrs F Sec**:

**12yrs M Prim**

*But that’s no pressure, like I said before, in my school there is no pressure from the top and I think I’m very lucky in that school. I’m not just saying that for the interview. I think in my school you are encouraged to take risks, you’re patted on the back, you’re rewarded with praise and thanks. For me, I want to do it for them as well.*
However, it is of value to note that these are not the remarks of what might be perceived as a naturally ‘on-side’ individual. It is interesting that both this figure and 6yrs F Prim refer to being ‘lucky’ in their contexts, with the implication perhaps that colleagues in other schools are not similarly fortunate. As with 9yrs F Sec, this figure was also keen to emphasise the variation by context he had experienced over his years’ service:

12yrs M Prim:

P: *It was very intensive and lots of local authority coming in, lots of consultants coming in, going through your files, going through your books and I didn’t like that.*

R: *It was demotivating.*

P: *Yeah, massive; you just feel actually I can’t do right and you feel you’re walking on egg shells. So I didn’t like that but then now I’m very fortunate it’s not like that.*

Taken overall, it might be possible to briefly summarise this particular aspect of a ‘sense of professionalism’ as being that the degree of trust a teacher experiences appears to have a clear influence on their degree of motivation to develop professionally.

**Autonomy**

Although ‘autonomy’ is regarded as concept within the SDT continuum, the salience of a sense of professional choice (or its absence) within the data suggests its value as an inductive code in its own right. This is not least because the notion of professional autonomy appeared to be an aspect which occupied a broader ground than that offered by an individual SDT categorisation. Some interesting variation occurred across the interviews, with no fixed pattern emerging. For example, one participant felt that this was contingent on years’ service, feeling that her ability to exercise autonomy to develop professionally was constrained by a perception of being subordinate to longer serving members of staff:

2yrs F Prim

*You feel that they can over-shadow that and for me the other two teachers are a lot more experienced... so I don’t feel like I’ve got freedom in that way...probably my experience as how long*
I’ve been a teacher for but maybe that’s my confidence, maybe that’s me thinking that I don’t have the freedom, don’t have the knowledge, don’t have the pedagogy to back up what I want to do...

However, this perspective was not shared by another individual with similar years’ service, who reported a feeling of being able to exercise professional autonomy at the departmental level and was emphatic in his sense that this carried real motivational potency in terms of professional development:

3yrs M Sec

I feel as though I’ve got autonomy in the school. At departmental level I’ve got a lot of autonomy because I’m encouraged, and because I’m a young teacher and it’s expected, ‘you’re a young teacher with good ideas’.

Is that motivating to you?

Yeah I love it. It means I’m not restricted...teachers should have autonomy...don’t think I would feel comfortable working in a department or a school that didn’t allow some sort of autonomy for teachers because it would take away the fun, I think.

Yet in relation to other interview participants working in the secondary sector, this perspective proved to be quite isolated. Others in this sector reported what they felt to be a high level of control, resulting in a sense of uniformity of approach or an imposed structure, with this having restrictive consequences in respect to exercising professional autonomy and on their capacity for growth:

9yrs F Sec

I think in schools and there’s an element of everyone’s got to do it [the same way], and I think there’s some classrooms where actually it’s successful [doing it differently]... So I don’t know, I think that’s maybe what I feel there’s a problem with.
4yrs F Sec

R: How autonomous you feel?

P: When I first arrived there two years ago, I felt really autonomous. I felt like I was being left to my own devices, I was being allowed to teach and now suddenly I feel like there is almost like a [Ofsted] panic setting in so we’re being...much more structured

R: How has that affected your motivation?

P: Honestly I find it really demotivating.

The second participant here (4yrs F Sec) is particularly explicit in identifying this as a cause of demotivation. However, this sense of restriction proved to be less prevalent for a primary participant, who reported a sense of freedom to plan lessons in such a way that exercised her professional autonomy:

6yrs F Prim

But no it doesn’t restrict me, I can put whatever I want on that lesson plan that’s going to actually ensure those children have a really good go and a really good chance of achieving the learning objective

Yet this may be very context dependent, rather than sector-specific, as another primary participant reported what he perceived a steady reduction in his ability to exercise professional autonomy. He (10yrs M Prim) did in part attribute this to what he saw as a shift nationally, however, when juxtaposed with 6yrs F Prim above, the relative lack of professional autonomy experienced by 10yrs M Prim may be more contingent on context than he perceived. This individual also made an explicit link between his feeling of being controlled and a consequent demotivation in terms of professional development:
This is ominous isn’t it? As the years have gone on I would have said less and less so [autonomous]. I know it’s only 10 years and it’s not a massive amount of time for a teacher but actually from where I started to where I am now, the changes that have occurred through education, it’s just a whole shift…it’s not very good to be honest. Yeah, you’re not bothered if you’re not autonomous.

Interestingly, however, this individual (and other primary teacher participants) did report a sense of being able to exercise professional autonomy in respect to a personal target set through the appraisal process. This was a commonality amongst primary-sector interviewees, who less readily differentiated between performance management and professional development for this reason, whilst also reporting higher motivation in respect to their chosen personal target. This contrasted somewhat with some secondary teacher interviews, who reported a greater sense of control in terms of their performance management processes and a psychological disassociation of it from professional development as a consequence. This juxtaposition between primary and secondary can be seen below:

10yrs M Prim

The personal target is a bit more meaningful, you’ve set it you’ve discussed it, it’s something you’ve thought about and talked through with your appraisal manager, so it’s probably a little bit more developed and it’s obviously personal.

4yrs F Sec

I feel like performance management is much more about - SMT have a development plan for the school, they just want to see evidence of that, often it’s about you climbing up the ladder, whether that’s pay scale or progressing in your career, whereas personal development and professional development, it’s about being a better teacher, and often that’s about how you perform in the classroom.
9yrs F Sec

But I think you’ve got more control over the professional development side to some extent because you can choose to go to particular things that are on offer and yeah, it’s your choice. But performance management I don’t think there’s an element of choice there.

It is further worth noting that with this last participant, the notion of autonomy was a source of real equivocation, feeling herself to be ambivalent in respect to how controlled by others she felt, and the potentially demotivating impact of this:

9yrs F Sec

R: How autonomous do you feel as a classroom teacher?

P: I feel completely [long pause] I feel fully yeah. I’m not sure. [Long pause] I’m not entirely sure and I don’t know what’s throwing me on that one. [Long pause] I’m not sure, can I come back to that one?

R: Yes of course.

P: It’s a stickler for me a little bit.

R: Yeah, interesting. Any particular reason why you think it might be giving you pause for thought?

P: Because it’s that whole thing of, I don’t know… I can see that there’s an element of external again...

This sense of ‘external’ control impinging on autonomy with a consequent implication for the motivation to develop professionally appears apparent here.

Taken in sum, this aspect of a ‘sense of professionalism’ seems to be characterised by the freedom to make professional choices having a positive correlation with the motivation for professional development. However, professional autonomy appears to be often felt by its absence, with the consequent effect that this has upon motivation.

Sense of Vocation
Sense of vocation as a motivating factor proved to be a prevalent aspect with participants. It might be said to include SDT aspects, given its mix of conscious values (identification/integration) and inherent satisfaction (intrinsic). Yet, at the same time, it appears to inhabit a coherent place that is internally consistent rather than ‘jumping’ between these SDT categories, and therefore can be seen as an aspect in its own right. It appears that in a profession perceived as a vocation, participants found it natural to associate (or difficult to disaggregate) their educational values from the pleasure derived from the role. It might be anticipated, when considered sceptically, that in any perceived-to-be ‘vocational profession’, there would be an extent to which interviewees would offer their interviewer the ‘expected’ response. This might be termed ‘The Answer’, something which it might be expected to hear from every participant, but with varying degrees of authenticity. It was striking, therefore, the extent to which this was prominent amongst participants, rather than simply present. This motivating sense of vocation was often seen to be expressed in opposition to a performativity:

**2yrs F Prim**

> Real progression is when ‘Poppy’ has struggled to come to school...for me to see progression like that in a child, emotionally, will always impact on her learning because she’s feeling happier and safer and I think the progression of that rounded child rather than a score on a piece of paper is the real motivator for me as a teacher.

**3yrs M Sec**

> ...over the past three years I genuinely think I’m making some sort of impact; not on every child, not every day, but mostly that we are generally making a difference in someone’s life...above all else that is probably what keeps me going, even those dark days near Christmas or exam season like right now when everything can seem so stressful.

**12yrs M Prim**

> My motivation for getting into teaching was to work with children it was not to do paperwork.

Principally, however, this aspect appeared to be generated as the satisfaction derived from helping
children to attain educational goals, with a number of participants referring to the ‘light-bulb moments’ or a similar notion of having achieved a pedagogical objective. This identification of vocation as key motivator to develop professionally occurred across genders, sectors and years’ service:

**9yrs F Sec**

*Probably seeing the students develop and faster progression for me, and seeing them have a light bulb moment, I suppose, that drives me...It ultimately is what happens in your classroom and when you see something work that you've brought in, I think that really drives me a lot,*

**10yrs M Prim**

*I would say when I went into teaching my idea was that I wanted to give pupils the education that I received so I want children to be enthused, I want them to feel happy in the learning that they're doing and that's kind of the motivation behind it, that I'm helping them have a good start in life.*

**6yrs F Prim**

*For me it's probably those light bulb moments that we have with the children, sometimes on a daily basis, sometimes on a weekly basis. Yeah, it's not an easy job, teaching and you really have to want to do it.*

**4yrs F Sec**

*That's why I got into it in the first place and it is still, not all the time what I enjoy, but the majority of the time, interacting with the kids...and hopefully making life easier/better for them really.*

This aspect was often characterised as a sustaining motivator in response to the challenges of the profession (see **6yrs F Prim** for example). It also proved to be a recurring aspect in that individual participants referred to it repeatedly, often with a kind of ‘bookending effect’, which is to say that teachers would often open with vocation as a motivator to develop professionally and close the interview with it too. This may be because it is the perceived ‘answer’ that teachers feel they are expected to give, but could also be consequence of the salience of it as a true impetus for professional
growth for many teachers.

Taken overall, this aspect of a ‘sense of professionalism’ can be seen as the perceived motivating effect of a teacher’s educational values on their professional development and the notion of teaching as a vocation that they find inherently satisfying.

**Collegiality**

Motivation through professional collegiality was a new aspect in the semi-structured interviews that was not generated in the open response analysis. Alongside facets which define it as distinct in itself, this aspect could also be argued to incorporate some of the SDT elements of introjection/identification/integration. Therefore, its boundary-crossing nature, particularly in the sense of inhabiting a liminal area between introjection (mutual esteem) on the one hand and identification/integration (shared purpose) on the other, suggests that its treatment as a separate inductive aspect is all the more justifiable.

This aspect proved most evident amongst primary colleagues, with this taking the form of a culture of mutual self-improvement. This was acknowledged to be a process not without difficulties, but one which was felt to be an authentic driver of real improvement. There appeared to be a reciprocal sense of appreciating the worth of other teacher-peers in the form of shared respect, alongside a notion of alignment in terms of the purpose of the undertaking:

**12yrs M Prim**

...it’s difficult because we’re all friends and I think we’ve all agreed...the hardest thing is telling a friend where they need to improve. But I think we’re getting round that now cos we are being professional coaches and saying ‘at the end of the day we want everyone to improve’...and I think it’s having that mutual respect again.

In a context described by one interviewee as being particularly positive in this regard, this notion of collegiality appeared to be possible not just in the *horizontal* sense (ie. between classroom practitioners), but also *vertically* in the sense of involvement of the school hierarchy too. This individual reported being motivated by a feeling of support and a sense of collective effort. This was solely in
respect to an alignment of values though, but also in a sense of a shared burden in respect to workload:

6yrs F Prim

I don’t know if you noticed, you’ve used the word ‘we’ a lot. Is there a reason for that?

Possibly because we’re a team and when I have conversations with other staff, the head teacher, deputy head, management team, just people that I work with, it’s very much so ‘we’. Yes we’re a team and I feel really supported in this school...

Such notions of collegiality were not confined to primary teacher colleagues, however, with a final interviewee in the secondary context expressing a sense of working with other classroom practitioners in a spirit of positive competition (though managerial colleagues were not mentioned, which may be a conspicuous absence). This sense of relative esteem has obvious parallels with the introjection aspect of the SDT framework.

4yrs F Sec

...there’s people that you are competitive with and you want to be better than or at least as good as are them, figures that you put up there that you want to be like and emulate...That’s sort of healthy competition that you want to be the same or better than other people.

This same individual also raised a sense of collegiality as being a wider network than that of immediate colleagues in a particular school:

4yrs F Sec

Not necessarily even that you’re working with, with friends or old colleagues that you’re still in touch with and you think, ‘oh I want to steal that’ that you’ve observed and things.

This second point perhaps offers a less contextually introspective view of collegial motivation and suggests a broader notion of professional interaction.
Taken overall, this aspect of a ‘sense of professionalism’ suggests that notions of collective endeavour and the esteem of teacher-peers appears to possess considerable motivational traction.

**Professional Wellbeing**

Professional well-being was an aspect not prominent in the survey open responses (though perhaps implicit in some remarks describing low motivation), but which proved to be more evident in the semi-structured interviews. This aspect can be described as the motivational impact of working conditions which impinge on professional wellbeing. These comments were not confined to a particular sector or gender (though seemed a little more prominent with female teachers of fewer years’ service). At the same time, however, such remarks were by no means especially salient across all the interviews. Some individuals made no reference to issues of professional wellbeing impacting on their motivation to develop professionally (presumably because this was not an issue in their context). Where this aspect did occur, it appeared to be concerned, firstly, with the demotivating aspects of feeling their personal welfare was affected as a consequence of pupil behaviour, with this sometimes taking the form of physical threat:

**2yrs F Prim**

Some of the children in my class would swear at me...fight, pick on other children, things that were completely unacceptable that really they shouldn’t have been in school any more, to the point where some of them should have been permanently excluded

**4yrs F Sec**

At that point I was teaching in a portakabin and you’d have kids kick off, assault each other, throw chairs around. I’m not exactly very big. I can be quite scary and loud but I didn’t feel safe and a lot of the other children didn’t feel safe, and if there’s nobody around to send those kids to or to ring for help...

Similar reports of issues with the management of behaviour affecting motivation also proved evident in discussions of less extreme behaviour, particularly in relation to the disruptive effect on learning. This is of relevance as it suggests that motivation cannot be confined to aspect of performativity, with other
factors such as pastoral management at play:

9yrs F Sec

I felt I didn’t have that relationship with the students and that kind of control in my own classroom and so I wasn’t interested in delivering it for them to be perfectly honest.

3yrs M Sec

Sometimes tensions and emotions can be really high in a classroom and that can be extremely stressful for staff because that shows and manifests itself in bad and disruptive behaviour...

The second aspect of professional wellbeing was that related to employability and contractual status, with individuals reporting that they were motivated to ‘improve’ through the prospect of greater job security. This element has clear alignment with the ‘hygiene’ aspect of Herzberg et al.’s (1959) theory:

2yrs F Prim

Last year, I was wanting another year’s contact, this year wanting to be, so say my first appraisal in Autumn term I didn’t know I would have a permanent contract...

10yrs M Prim

So one point was kind of looking well anybody coming to apply for a job who doesn’t have a Masters level and you have got one, maybe you’ve got the edge on it if you were looking for other employment.

Each of these teachers reported on their motivation to satisfy these needs, though the extent to which this is a productive or positive sense of motivation is open to question.

In sum, this aspect of a ‘sense of professionalism’ can be characterised by wellbeing influencing the
motivation to develop professionally, either negatively in respect to challenging behavioural conditions or ambiguously in regard to employment status.

**The second inductive theme: ‘Experiences of Managerialism’**

**Judgement**

As with the survey open responses, a prevalent aspect in the semi-structured interviews proved to be that of unfairness in respect to target-setting and managerial judgement, and the impact this had upon teachers’ motivation to develop professionally. This expressed itself in a number of ways. Firstly, it pertained to a sense of being judged against ever more unachievable targets, with this engendering feelings of futility and demotivation:

**2yrs F Prim**

*Sometimes you feel like your best isn’t good enough because you’re not going to get there...then next year the bar is going to be raised even more because you reached that bar that you thought was unachievable.*

**3yrs M Sec**

*I think the main element of teaching that can be stressful is the expectations that are put on teachers from policies...to make sure that students are meeting their target grades...the pressures for teachers to hit these targets is insane, it’s phenomenal...*

The sense above of the impact of unachievable targets seems clear. Similarly, at times, this sense of ‘unattainability’ also appeared to entail a perception of there being an opacity to the judgements to which teachers were subject. This led one teacher to describe what he perceived to be the demotivating nature of judgements which appeared unfairly capricious or arbitrary:
10yrs M Prim

You would want to think, ‘well what’s he marking us on, where is he pulling these numbers from?’ I don’t think there was an awful lot of thought went into it...So yeah, I think it has demotivated the staff across the board quite heavily

Related to this was a perception of inconsistency in the judgements to which some teachers felt they were subject. This took the form of a sense of shifting ‘goalposts’, with managers repeatedly and unfairly introducing new initiatives in response to perceived external pressures. The demotivating nature of this is evident below:

9yrs F Sec

That knocked my motivation, and at times it actually knocked my confidence as well. But again, it’s just their thing of panic stations and everything had to change and it had to be adapted... we never ever got the chance just to simply focus on one initiative and embed it. It was this constantly moving of goal posts, and that was obviously driven by Ofsted.

This sense of external pressure leads to another key aspect in respect to unfair judgement, that of Ofsted, with the motivational impact of the inspectorate proving ambiguous. One teacher reported a clear sense of feeling motivated by the prospect of external inspection and the judgement that this entailed:

2yrs F Prim

... I want my class and my teaching to be good because then you can always strive to be outstanding in terms of Ofsted ratings...That is motivating because you want to show Mr or Mrs Ofsted that I am a good teacher...so I do find that quite motivating.

However, another teacher with similar years’ service, this time in the secondary sector, offered a more negative perspective on the prospect of external judgement by the inspectorate:

3yrs M Sec
...I can’t remember the last day that I was in school where someone didn’t mention the word Ofsted. I’ve never met Ofsted. It’s like some Dickensian villain almost. I don’t know what he’s like. He doesn’t seem a nice guy. I’ve heard mixed things about Mr Ofsted that he’s out to close down the school...

These contrasting views on the motivational impact of this external body may be a consequence of individual perspectives on Ofsted, but are also perhaps a result of inconsistencies in the fairness of the approach of the inspectorate. Equally, there was also a perception of feeling demotivated by the sense of ‘hovering’ surveillance that they engender:

6yrs F Prim

I think it can be a lot to do with the team that you get with Ofsted...we had a very fair team. But I do know of schools that have had an Ofsted and have had an unfair team...But they probably de-motivate me in the sense that it’s just something that sometimes hovers over you...

Another post-threshold primary teacher did note a motivational aspect to Ofsted, but in the sense of being motivated by a sense of loyalty to their headteacher, who they perceived to be the most subject to consequences of the unfair judgements of an inspection:

12yrs M Prim

I would say yes because I classify my head teacher as a friend. I know, and I know all staff know this...the person who unfortunately is going to get the blame in terms of results is the head teacher. It’s always the head teacher, if Ofsted comes in or local authority, so as a staff we want to do it for her...

This leads to a related point, which is that of how the culture of unfair judgement can permeate into individual schools. Some teachers reported a sense of managers engaging in demotivating intensive ‘teacher surveillance’ exercises which were designed to replicate perceived Ofsted inspection processes, or to generate evidence for use with inspectors:
2yrs F Prim

Yeah book scrutiny; I understand scrutinising my marking for next steps, maybe it could be in more depth...fair enough. But scrutinising that a child has not underlined their date or scrutinising that ‘Tom’ has coloured in his sticker on the front of his book...what effect does that have on ‘Joe’s learning’? That baffles me. That de-motivates me.

This notion of ‘book scrutiny’ as a form of demotivating and unfair judgement occurred across sectors, genders and years’ service. It also links to a second way in which teachers are subject to surveillance in schools, described by different interviewees as ‘learning walks’ or ‘drop-ins’, and perceived in practice to be a form of ‘no-notice’ lesson observation:

3yrs M Sec

What’s the purpose of a drop-in? ...I mean, someone enters my classroom, a member of SLT, I automatically assume they’re watching and judging me... I think if they were constant...it would make me feel really anxious and untrusted and therefore it would demotivate me.

Again, this form of surveillance was reported by teachers of varying genders, sectors and years’ service. This same individual reported a demotivating feeling that these judgements were for Ofsted-purposes rather than for educational or developmental purposes, even though they appeared in his opinion to contradict some of Ofsted’s stated views, leading to an additional layer of unfair futility:

3yrs M Sec

They are doffing the hat to Ofsted. Even though they tend to sometimes contradict what the official Ofsted say, for example about deep marking...I would say that most of the changes with regards to teaching and learning are directly driven by Ofsted and that for me is disheartening, because you stop being a teacher at that point and you start to become an Ofsted-pleaser, and that’s not why Ofsted are there.
When asked to identify why managers were engaged in this behaviour, this individual reported the sense of fear that he perceived to exist in the hierarchy, with a perception of a demotivating ‘chain’ of unfair judgement running through the school:

**3yrs M Sec**

...obviously you’ve got the big threat of Ofsted and management and leadership go into some sort of weird melt-down when Ofsted are coming and you see more and more of that. I’m not going to lie because it does make me feel uneasy because it feels as if you’re being judged.

The same sense of managerial fear resulting in a ‘judgement culture’ was again reported by another individual (this time at a school graded ‘Outstanding’, suggesting such institutions are not impervious). This individual very explicitly associated Ofsted, judgement and demotivation:

**4yrs F Sec**

*P:* Currently there is the Ofsted fear and suddenly it feels like any autonomy is being taken away...now suddenly I feel like there is almost like a panic setting in...when people are popping into lessons it doesn’t feel like they’re visiting just to see what’s going on in school to evaluate teaching and learning, it just feels much more like it’s there for the judgement

*R:* How has that affected your motivation?

*P:* Honestly I find it really demotivating. Other people rise to that. I am hoping it is just a case of the current Ofsted fear.

In contrast, another more positive comment reported the sense that a degree of ‘Ofsted-compliance’ was both a practical necessity and, in some respects, in alignment with real educational goals and therefore not demotivating as such:

**6yrs F Prim**

Ofsted absolutely still influences certain things that we do and certain things that we have in place
because I think it would be silly if it didn’t because at the end of the day we want to get a good inspection so there are certain things that we have to do, but yes most of them I would say that actually they are not a bad thing.

However, this sense of acquiescence to aspects of judgement was not a shared perspective across participants. On the contrary, some raised significantly demotivating aspects, with this being particularly evident in relation to the grading of observed lessons. One individual reported a new headteacher as a contextual variable here - and the demotivating effect of the unfair introduction of lesson grading by this new figure:

10yrs M Prim

He came and observed a lesson with myself. I got good feedback for the lesson so obviously he was impressed within reason. Then he graded us out of a score of 1 to 4.

How did you feel about that?

Well it wasn’t particularly - I don’t think they’re supposed to grade you, which of course ruffled feathers.

Indeed, the impact of this ‘labelling’ of lessons with performance grades was mentioned at length by another participant, one who despite a personal preference for being graded as a teacher, noted what he perceived to be the negative motivational implications of such potentially unfair judgements on a school’s staff body:

12yrs M Prim

Actually I’m weird, I’d like to get graded. I like the 1s, and the 2s or outstanding...but if you’re graded 4 you feel that is you and it’s not fair and I can totally understand that because people can then walk around with that badge on their chest saying, ‘I require improvement’, or ‘I’m an unsatisfactory teacher’...If it’s positive it’s great; if it’s not a positive experience, it can stick to you like muck, and that’s not fair.
Another final detail emerged here in respect to the effect of judgemental observation on teachers’ motivations, that of a sense of misdirected motivation:

2yrs F Prim

*Often an observation can be very thought out by a class teacher and it can be very structured so the observer sees what the class teacher wants them to see. For example, if they don’t want them to look in their books they won’t do an activity in their books...*

4yrs F Sec

*Do you feel it [lesson grading] improves you at all as a teacher, or helps you as a teacher?*

*No. I got an outstanding off my Head teacher but I’ve taught lessons to that class and to other classes that are being seen by other people who didn’t think it was outstanding or I’ve taught lessons that no one has seen that I know are far better...If you know that person and know what they want then it’s like OK, you can tick an exam box in the right place.*

This appears to describe managers incentivising teachers to present their observer with misrepresentative practice which reflects what the teacher perceives the observer wants to see, due to the inherent unfairness of the grading process.

Taken overall, this aspect can be summarised as teachers experiencing unfair judgement, with a consequent negative impact on motivation. This appears to be somewhat influenced by context, but also a shared perspective amongst participants.

*The Burden of Proof*

This aspect, characterised by the evidencing of practice through data, bureaucracy and other forms of scrutiny was salient for a range of interviewees, who described their perceptions of its influence on their developmental motivations. One of the most prominent elements in this regard alluded to ‘box ticking’, with it being worthwhile to document these references together:
2yrs F Prim

...not in terms of data, not wanting to see the progression in black and white data for the school and to tick boxes for SLT

9yrs F Sec

I feel it’s just a tick box process actually

10yrs M Prim

I think just because I can tick a box.

3yrs M Sec

There’s more of the box ticking bureaucratic side

4yrs F Sec

...you tick the right boxes

Such shared descriptions of a bureaucratic evidentiary process suggest a pervasiveness across the age-phases and contexts in which these teachers are located. The attitudes of the teachers interviewed as to the demotivating effect of this prevalent culture were striking. Indeed, one such illustrative interviewee felt keen to differentiate between what she perceived to be ‘real’ progression and ‘data’ progression:

2yrs F Prim:

...that goes back to seeing the children as progressing as little people and not just as green to red or red to green or whatever it is on your spreadsheet. I don’t like spreadsheets [laughs]...Because I feel like all I ever do is colour in spreadsheets and put numbers in spreadsheets, and who is it for? Cos it’s not for the children, isn’t not, and I don’t really think it’s for me either, it’s for the powers
above, and what do they do with it?...That baffles me completely...I feel like I do is test children, fill in spreadsheets, test them again to fill in the spreadsheet, and that’s sad.

Of particular interest here is the sense of an absence of utility or educational purpose to the process and the consequent impact on teachers’ motivation that it entails. This perception appeared to extend not only to the evidencing of pupils’ development, but also that of another teacher’s (9yrs F Sec) own ‘development’ in the form of performance management:

9yrs F Sec

I haven’t experienced an element of performance management that I’ve felt does drive me. Maybe that’s a bit too honest, I don’t know...I feel it’s just a tick box process actually and it’s not bespoke...It’s just my thing of I want to deliver an education which they enjoy and shows progression, that’s what drives me and not this whole ticking box routine. I find it pointless.

Again, this perception of the futility of ‘proof’ can be said to bring into question the efficacy of such an approach in itself. However, it also raises the second related point of to what extent such ‘box-ticking’ processes obfuscate or impede more purposeful activities which might better foster truly motivated professional development.

Yet such an attitude in respect to ‘evidence’ was not universal, with one individual expressing a more ambiguous view, describing a process he was involved in whereby:

10yrs M Prim

...basically it was just me commenting on what I would be doing in my day-to-day job anyway but proving it via evidence. I basically just submitted what I had done anyway. It never drove me to do anything more than what I wasn’t doing.

However, later in the interview, this same individual referred back to this appraisal process to say that it perhaps did have some utility in terms of motivating him to improve the quality of the work produced:

10yrs M Prim

But I wouldn’t have done it as well I don’t think because I hadn’t got that evidence, so I was making sure that I could prove I’ve done this with that piece of evidence.
While not a prominent feature in the interview data as a whole, such remarks are perhaps suggestive of a fine balance between purposeful evidencing of activity and a more demotivating approach which duplicates workload or describes existing activity without improving it. This shared notion amongst interviews was raised articulately by 3yrs M Sec, who described his energies being directed by the process of evidence gathering:

3yrs M Sec

...a lot of what I do is dictated and led by that appraisal. For example, when you've got an exam class, any class, I keep a spreadsheet for my exam classes with all the students that I'm teaching and next to them I put a little note and I put down every intervention strategy that I'm doing...there's a little part of me that does that because when it comes to appraisal and someone says, 'this child's target was a C but she got a G, why?' I can say, 'well this is everything I've done'...It's bureaucracy, the only reason I do it is so when it comes to the final, 'right let's find out if you can progress', I can say, 'well this is everything'...there's more of the box ticking bureaucratic side that I would probably not do if there was no appraisal.

Two observations are valid here. The first pertains to the implications for workload that arise because of the need for 'proof'. The second is what appears to be the sense of demotivating performativity-influenced activities which the teacher perceives have to be undertaken for the benefit of other adults, rather than the children/students that are being taught. A similar aspect was noted by 12yrs M Prim who appeared to make the same distinction between teaching and bureaucracy. When asked about this in more detail, this same figure was keen to emphasise that in his own context, bureaucracy proved less prevalent, again suggestive of some contextual variation or latitude on the part of headteachers. However, he wished to note his sense that there was a demotivating level of bureaucracy in other contexts that he was aware of:

12yrs M Prim

Paperwork, once again I'm very fortunate, we're not expected to produce reams and reams of paperwork but I know lots of schools out there locally and nationally where the expectation of paperwork is beyond the need. So that adds pressure.
Indeed, this notion of ‘proving’ rather than a motivation to *improve* was a factor even in a context which the interviewee elsewhere went to considerable effort to describe a positive and moderate environment. This teacher did note that there was ‘a place’ for assessment and reportage, but was critical of the need for the current extent of it:

**6yrs F Prim**

...every day in single lessons we’re constantly assessing the children...then on a weekly basis we’re assessing them to see whether we need to re-visit any concepts...on a half-termly basis we’re again assessing them. At the end of the term we’re again assessing them and again at the end of the year...it does sometimes feel like we’re constantly reporting all the time...now whether there’s a place for as much as we do is definitely questionable.

When asked to identify the reasons for this, the teacher in question noted the headteacher’s belief in assessment as a factor, so there may be an element of contextual variation, but she was also keen to refer to the need to have evidentiary ‘fortifications’ in place for Ofsted purposes:

**6yrs F Prim**

Yeah absolutely, we are due our next inspection, so yeah, that does play on your mind and you think about it every day in your job. I suppose in terms of when we do get our next inspection I feel like we’ve got all the paperwork where it needs to be to show where these children are at and we know our children quite well.

This sense here of the need to generate ‘proof’ because of external scrutiny can perhaps be viewed as something which is either demotivating and/or motivating teachers in a purely instrumental fashion (ie. in the wrong direction, away from the needs of those they teach or their own professional learning).

Taken overall, this aspect of the theme of ‘experiences of managerialism’ can be summarised as a pervasive, cross-context (with exceptions) culture of ‘proof’, characterised by bureaucracy and instrumental activity. The consequence of this culture appears to be considerable demotivation on the part of teachers.
Managerial Class

The notion of a distinct and distant managerial class as being a factor which affected motivation was again present in the data, with some semi-structured interviews describing a culture of diktat:

2yrs F Prim.

*I know that other staff members felt the same but whenever anybody spoke up about it and I didn’t feel that I could for being new, they were shot down completely.*

It is particularly interesting to note the sense in which this teacher with fewer years’ service felt silenced by this managerial culture, with the implications for the motivation to develop professionally that would accompany this. However, such feelings of separation, or what might be termed an absence of collegiality between leaders and those led was not confined to teachers with lesser degrees of experience. In both the primary and secondary contexts, post-threshold teachers of both genders noted similar feelings:

9yrs F Sec

*They weren’t interested in offering me support or seeing how they could possibly move me on or help in particular ways and so then I lost interest.*

10yrs M Prim

*It’s not very good, it’s kind of like being kept out of the loop. A perfect example...there was an incident that happened at school, I wasn’t told about it, I wasn’t even consulted about it but at the next staff briefing we had everyone was told about it including myself, I had no idea. It took away my - I didn’t know how to react to it because I didn’t know anything about it.*
This notion of ‘separation’ or a distinct managerial class was also evident in the comments that one interviewee made in respect to middle managers, perceiving them to be in an invidious position as the intermediary between two factions, rather than figures that could promote a motivating cohesion in a school:

**4yrs F Sec**

*I just think sometimes they’re in a difficult position. They’re stuck between a rock and a hard place… they’re in a ridiculous position between SMT and your average teachers cos they’re getting it from both directions, generally contrasting views as well and contrasting aims.*

Such feelings were not uniformly the case across the interviews, however, with one individual keen to note that he did not feel this sense of separation in his current context, contrasting it with other experiences:

**3yrs M Sec**

*Within any work place, managers or whatever, they always try and create a team, a community. I never, ever felt part of it and as a result I didn’t really care as much… It’s because you don’t buy in to their vision cos you don’t feel part of their community. So I think that if you didn’t buy in to their visions and values of your school then you’d hate it.*

At this point, as the notions of ‘buy-in’ and alignment arise, it is apparent that this becomes a liminal area between the inductive code of ‘managerial class’ and the theoretical code of ‘identification/integration’. As such, this discussion will be pursued in the second thematic analysis below. Taken in sum, however, this aspect of ‘experiences of managerialism’ can be summarised as a sense of detachment between teachers and those who manage them (with some exceptions). Overall, this ‘separation’ seems to have negative implications for teachers’ developmental motivations.
5.4 Theoretical thematic analysis of semi-structured interviews

As with the survey open responses, the interview data was subject to ‘top-down’ thematic analysis against the self-determination theory framework. Each of the SDT categories is now examined in turn below.

*Amotivation*

Amotivation, in SDT terms, can be conceived of as the absence of motivation, characterised by a dearth of purpose and value. The state of amotivation proved to be salient in the transcripts, but perhaps not with the degree of prominence that might be expected, given the national issues with teacher performativity. This, however, warrants an important caveat – the interview element of the study involves working teachers. As such, those with the potentially very highest degrees of amotivation would perhaps inevitably be less accessible (and who, to a certain extent, were reached through the survey open responses instead). Yet this is not to say that someone cannot be both amotivated and still in post. There was, for example, evidence of individuals having reached the cusp of departure at certain points of their career. The extent to which this was as a consequence of contextual variation is striking: a teacher with a reasonable degree of motivation in her current context reported a high level of amotivation in the preceding school in which she worked. She attributed this chiefly to the instability and perpetual change induced by performativity:

4yrs F Sec

...staff absence, staff resignation, constant changes to policy, constant changes to staffing structure that destabilise you, they destabilise the department and eventually they destabilise the classes.....it just got to the stage where it was: this isn’t healthy, this isn’t motivating, I’m not wanting to go to work in the morning, and to do something else or find somewhere else. Luckily I did find somewhere else cos I was very close to doing something else

It is worth noting that the school in question was not subject to special measures (which might be supposed to engender the flux described above), but in fact graded ‘Good’ by Ofsted, suggestive of more widespread experience of such conditions.
Yet the experience of feeling amotivated was not restricted to teachers with fewer years’ service, who might be imagined more susceptible to contextual variations. Instead, this also proved true for a post-threshold secondary teacher who attributed amotivation both to a culture of distrust and a lack of support, resulting in the absence of any desire to develop professionally:

**9yrs F Sec**

I didn’t want to be there and I completely switched off. Yeah, I completely switched off. I actually got to the point, obviously there’s other circumstances within the second context that I’m talking about, but I got to the point where I was going to leave the profession completely and I never thought I would ever become that way. I always thought I’d just continue to progress and develop but no. Yeah, I got to a very low point and I didn’t want to be a teacher. I wasn’t interested.

This notion of being ‘completely switched off’ is perhaps strongly expressive of amotivation. This same individual reported that her feelings of amotivation diminished when she left the context described above. However, school context in the most general sense might not prove to be the sole variable in this regard. Another participant who experienced a change in headteacher noted a shift in motivational stance, towards amotivation, yet with effectively the same school demographic:

**10yrs M Prim**

R: In terms of the heads you’ve worked under, has that been at different schools or at the same school?

P: The same school, but when I trained I worked with other heads as well, but yeah different heads have their own visions or their own ideas and usually we work well with them. I’m not saying that I don’t work well with this one.

R: No it doesn’t come across that way. I was just trying to determine the extent to which your context affects your motivation.

P: Yeah it does. I’ll be frank, literally I’ve come to school for 10 years. I’ve always wanted to come to work, I’ve never had a day off sick in 10 years, never once. Obviously I’ve been late but literally
the last term I’ve considered looking for other jobs.

R: Interesting, so what’s been driving that?

P: I think the fact that I don’t feel like there’s a sense of worth there.

This individual raises an interesting question in relation to the autonomy, relatedness and competence elements of SDT. It suggests the notion that there can be different directions for travel for the autonomy and relatedness elements on the one hand, and the competence aspect on the other. This participant, who elsewhere said he felt that he was perceived to be competent, nonetheless reported feelings of amotivation in relation to his professional development as a consequence of a lack of relatedness and autonomy.

In sum, it would appear that amotivation can and does occur amongst teachers, for a variety of reasons and subject to contextual factors. Interestingly, amotivation proved to be more characteristic of secondary rather than primary participants, though the reasons for this are difficult to adduce. Very tentatively, it could be argued that a culture of performativity is more explicit at secondary level, but this seems tenuous and subject to contextual variation.

Intrinsic motivation

It is important to note the nature of the language being used in this analysis. The SDT framework considers intrinsic motivation to be that which gives inherent interest/satisfaction and enjoyment. This can therefore perhaps be disaggregated from a sense of moral purpose, which may prove to be intrinsically satisfying for some, but may be a more externalised goal for others (in other words, fulfilled out of sense of obligation rather than pleasure). At this juncture, the notions of integration and identification come to bear. This has also been examined through the inductive code of a sense of ‘vocation’.

This sense of motivation through pleasure or satisfaction generated itself in a number of ways. For some teachers, most prominently in the secondary sector, this came through as being motivated to develop professionally by a love of subject, with the inherent pleasure of being able to focus on and communicate an area of personal interest:
3yrs M Sec

I like it. Is that a taboo to say? I like being a teacher. I mean, one of the reasons why I’m a history teacher is cos I love history. Every day I get to speak about history...yeah, I actually just love it, hence why I’m a history teacher. I love speaking about history and talking about it for six or seven hours a day, five days a week that’s what I get to do and I love it.

4yrs F Sec

But yeah, I think it is for the majority of people anyway, it’s about pupils, our love of subject.

9yrs F Sec

What I really like is the idea of the creativity and what you can do inside the classroom to make it engaging especially in [subject deleted] because it’s kind of subject that they have to do so I think it’s that idea of making it engaging through interactive resources, I think that’s what I like about it.

Another key way in which a sense of intrinsic motivation appeared to be generated in the data was in terms of the pleasure teachers appeared to derive from their interactions with young people. This proved true for both primary and secondary colleagues, both men and women, and with different years’ service. There was a clear sense of enjoyment derived from the interpersonal nature of the role:

4yrs F Sec

I suppose it’s that no day is the same, and it’s the interaction with people. That’s why I got into it in the first place and it is still, not all the time what I enjoy, but the majority of the time, interacting with the kids, with the other students

12yrs M Prim

I love going working with kids. My motivation for getting into teaching was to work with children it was not to do paperwork. Even when I have trainee teachers in my class I hate being out of class because I’m a showman. I like going in, putting a show on, teaching children, having a laugh.
2yrs F Prim

Last Friday it was lovely and sunny and for our golden time... they chose to go outside and read and it was lovely. I sat there in the sunshine reading to them thinking, ‘this is why I became a teacher because this is a lovely experience for them’.

Not unrelated to this is the sense of teaching as a dynamic and creative role. This appeared to be an aspect which a number of teachers appeared to derive intrinsic motivation from, with there being a sense of inherent satisfaction that the role does not possess the perceived “monotony” of other kinds of employment, but rather that it was enjoyable as a consequence of its variety and the pleasurable opportunities it offered in terms of inventiveness and therefore, inherently, for professional development:

3yrs M Sec

I used to work in retail and it can get quite monotonous. There are some monotonous areas of teaching but every day is different, you don’t know what’s going to happen, anything could happen. Time flies so quickly when you’re a teacher.

9yrs F Sec

But yeah, I think it’s the creativity side. I can’t stress that enough I don’t think, yeah. I love being creative and thinking of different ways to approach it and make it slightly easier for them in a sense as well in getting their understanding... I become bored very easily as well, so once I think I’ve got the hang of something I then want to change it and address it and challenge myself that way.

As with the inductive aspect of vocation, it is notable that, in response to the most open questions, namely those which ‘bookend’ each interview (in the form of a question about general motivation at the outset and a final opportunity to voice anything else they wish to raise), that these intrinsic motivations came to the fore, perhaps suggesting a kind of “psychological parenthesis” by which the question of
motivation is framed: it is what they begin with and what they return to, the intrinsic satisfaction of working with children:

12yrs M Prim

*I’d say first of all its enjoyment of the job. I love teaching...I think for me it’s just the children, worker and children, colleagues and loving teaching really.*

6yrs F Prim

*Is there anything else you would like to add?*

*Just that it’s a job that I love and I don’t know what I’d do if I didn’t teach*

Taken in entirety, the various comments above might lead to the suggestion that teachers possess a high level of intrinsic motivation to be professionally effective and improve their practice. Therefore, rather than question how to motivate teachers to develop professionally, it might in one sense be better to consider what demotivates teachers (who appear to already have a high level of personal and internal motivation).

**Introjection**

One aspect clearly generated in the data was that introjection represents a considerable motivator to develop professionally, perhaps a more internalised and potent motivator than SDT might posit. Introjection is characterised by notions of the ego, self-worth and the esteem of others. This aspect of SDT was often expressed through prominent references to the importance of the esteem in which a teacher is held by both his/her colleagues, but also his/her managers.

Interestingly, particularly in the secondary context, in regard to what might be termed *hierarchical* introjection, details emerge as to teachers valuing the esteem of senior leaders more than that of their immediate line managers (departmental heads). There is an extent to which middle managers are seen as mediating or impeding the esteem in which teachers are held by more senior figures:
They’re [middle managers] stuck between a rock and a hard place and sometimes they do just want a bit of credit and they take it sometimes, even when it’s not their work.

However, there is also an extent to which this is bypassed, with a kind of ‘leapfrogging’ taking place, with teachers seeking the direct esteem of their senior leaders. It is apparent that hierarchical introjection is a considerable driver for some teachers. For example, some participants noted a significant upturn in motivation when praised by their headteacher. This is also interesting in relation to the SDT notion of the desire to be esteemed as competent:

I think that’s been brilliant. Now that I know that he [the head] is aware that I am more than capable and that actually some of the things that he wasn’t aware of that I’d been doing.

I think in my school...you’re patted on the back, you’re rewarded with praise and thanks. For me, I want to do it for them as well. I think for me, I work hard for my head teacher... at the staff meeting it [an achievement] got brought up as thanks to myself for representing the school so superbly. So you get praise, I get a lot of praise, and I work on praise.

I think it’s really important because if they don’t hold us in esteem, it’s not that you’re trying to do a good job for them cos you’re doing a good job for yourself and the children, but you want them to also be confident...then that motivates you to do a better job.

There seems to be a clear sense here of teachers being strongly influenced to ‘improve’ by introjected motivation in the form of the praise and esteem of their leaders. By the same token, however, another participant noted the demotivating nature of not being the recipient of praise from their headteacher, suggesting that introjected motivation can also be felt by its absence:
**2 yrs F Prim**

*I was thrown into Year 6: a very difficult year group of primarily boys from varied difficult backgrounds...the head teacher at the time was, unknown to us, ready to move on, didn’t really motivate us as staff, I felt like he was really out for himself and didn’t feel like there was any praise where praise was due.*

At the same time, a kind of *collegial* introjection also proves evident, with teachers measuring their sense of worth against their peers and competing with one another for esteem. It is also interesting that this competition to ‘be better’ professionally seems much more centred on introjection than external regulation (competition for salary or the avoidance of performativity-type punishments):

**4 yrs F Sec**

*sort of healthy competition that you want to be the same or better than other people...there’s people that you are competitive with and you want to be better than or at least as good as are those figures that you put up there that you want to be like and emulate...*

**3 yrs M Sec**

*I don’t know if it’s selfish but I want to be the best. I do want to be. It’s like anyone, Andy Murray or whoever they want to be the best in their fields.*

**12 yrs M Prim**

*I’m a very competitive person as an individual. I think it’s my sport background, my university background and for me to improve as a teacher I want to be the best I can so no one can turn round to me and say ‘you’re not doing this and you’re not doing that*'

However, one of these teachers also noted the possible flip-side of such an outlook, with competition for status/esteem having negative consequences in terms of wellbeing:

**4 yrs F Sec**

*some of my colleagues, yeah probably it makes them ill or anxious, shall we say; they can’t cope with not being the one that everyone else is looking to or the one at the top of their game*
And yet, at the same time, this participant was keen to note a perception that this feeling of esteem was very much something to be garnered from other classroom practitioners:

...what my close colleagues when they pop into my classroom think or if at the moment I've got a few NQTs and trainees observing, what do they think...

Additionally, introjection was also not confined to the views of teacher-colleagues, but, for some, rather a broader composite of esteem from a variety of quarters:

3yrs M Sec

Another reason I want to be recognised, not just from students but from staff and parents as well. I like it on parents’ nights when parents will say, ‘oh he never stops talking about you’ or ‘she never stops talking about you’.

2yrs F Prim

The feeling of pride is a motivator, when the children that you teach are...representing the school that you work for, you feel proud to work for that school, you feel proud to be representing them in a public place

This notion of the motivating effect of the esteem of others is perhaps not even confined to school colleagues, parents or students. One participant shared his perception of pursuing professional development in the form of a Master’s degree as being motivated by the sense of professional esteem that it endowed, not simply in terms of within his school, but in the broader social sense of the esteem it carried. This appeared to be a potent motivator for this individual:

10yrs M Prim

What did motivate you to do it?

I think the idea of having a qualification of a Masters to be honest because it is held in high
esteem...I wanted to be a doctor, and I think the idea that actually you could be a doctor or a
doctor through doing a Master’s degree and then doing PhD.

This aspect emerged with another post-threshold male teacher, who expressed similar sentiments in respect to a wider social esteem. This was a little more ambiguous, with some evidence of a perceived waning of the status of teachers in society, but nonetheless, still being a motivating factor:

12yrs M Prim

Someone says, ‘what do you do for a living?’ you say, ‘I’m a teacher’, they say, ‘oh wow!’ and I think that’s great, society still values teachers on the whole...[though] definitely less. I don’t think we’re admired anymore or revered. People respect us but I think sometimes people think the job is easy...but I think we are held in high esteem and respected for it so that’s another reason as well.

A final notion in respect to introjection comes in respect to being motivated by feelings of self-approval or self-worth. For two teachers this manifested itself as a sense of self-worth being contingent on not being seen to fail, or more specifically, the sense of shame that he felt would accompany such ‘failure’:

3yrs M Sec

The very idea of failing in appraisal, like I said earlier, it’s the idea that I want to be the best; it’s a failure and I don’t like to fail. I don’t want to feel embarrassed that I didn’t meet that target

12yrs M Prim

I don’t want anyone to turn round to me and say ‘you’re not doing your job properly’.

For others this sense of self-esteem as a motivator came through as a sense of competing with oneself, with this ‘improvement’ being contingent on factors such as a pride in perfectionism or expectations of oneself:

9yrs F Sec
I think that’s really difficult because me personally I’m a perfectionist and that’s the worst thing I think you can possibly be in this job. I think that I drive the pressure at times so I think I put undue pressures on myself.

12yrs M Prim

Myself. I’m competitive with myself.

2yrs F Prim

Because I always want to get better as a person, I suppose... If I didn’t have the expectation in myself to improve and to better myself in lots of different aspects of teaching then how could I expect the children that I teach to want to improve

Taken overall, it does appear that introjection in its various forms possesses considerable traction for the teachers interviewed. Nonetheless, the extent to which introjection motivates and the extent to which it motivates effectively are arguably different questions. Indeed, Deci and Ryan (2000) do not contend that introjection fails to motivate, but rather that it does not motivate as powerfully as more internalised forms of motivation. This might also be evident in the data, with some teachers expressing a degree of inner conflict on this score. Another consideration here might be whether, if introjection is to be considered to some extent a positive motivator, then positive in what sense? This might mean positive in the sense of it engendering some improvement in practice, but not necessarily positive in the sense of wellbeing (and the negative longer-term implications that this might have in respect to longer-term productivity). Similarly, it may be a weaker form of positive motivation than other dynamics, such as identified or integrated motivation as the SDT framework would contend, but given the strength and prominence of feeling in respect to introjection in the data, this may be doubtful.

Before moving to the next SDT category, it is worth noting that there also appears to be a potential ‘tipping point’ in the perception of some, whereby introjection bleeds over into identification:
I think it’s a lot more balanced here cos there is that trust in the teachers. Yeah, I do feel there’s that element of trust and there isn’t that constant overlooking eye to see whether

Here, it appears that the esteem of leaders blurs in this teacher’s perceptions with notions of trust and greater autonomy, which in turn seems to foster a sense of alignment. This is therefore not without relevance to the section that follows.

_Identified/Integrated Motivation_

This area would, again, appear on the basis of the interview data to be one that bears analysis as a single category, rather than two distinct areas. _Identification _and _integration _seem to be in effect ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ forms of the same motivational phenomenon, namely the extent to which organisational goals and values can/should be internalised by individuals. This should be of considerable interest to school leaders, not least because of the degree of contextual variation that appears to occur across the data.

Two participants spoke very positively as the extent to which goals were aligned (or rather, were in a process of alignment) and that this influenced their motivation to develop professionally:

_3yrs M Sec_

_R: To what extent do you share the values of your school?_

_P: It’s really interesting you should say that because we’re in the process of changing those values and I’m part of the working group cos it went through School Council...yeah, it does, it resonates with me and I don’t feel out of place in my school, I feel part of it._

_R: Does that affect your levels of motivation at all?_

_P: Definitely, because if you didn’t feel part of the community that you’re in and if the values whatever they are, if they didn’t resonate with you, you wouldn’t feel part of it._

_2yrs F Prim_

_I’m enjoying the school that I’m working in, I like the vision that the school has, yeah I’d say that’s what gets me out of bed in a morning...yeah, I do think the head can shape the motivation in_
It is interesting to note that both the preceding participants are pre-threshold, which may be indicative of a greater degree of malleability on the part of teachers with fewer years’ service. However, this inclination towards achieving a sense of shared values was not exclusive to such teachers.

**12yrs M Prim**

*R: Is there a sense of relatedness at the school?*

*P: Yeah, to me it does cos we have Christian values. Our whole curriculum, our whole behaviour, our whole reward for both children and staff is based on Christian values: about togetherness, justice, trust, fairness and I buy into it because I think the head teacher buys into it, the governors buy into it, parents buy into it, so for me, yeah I do...and to be honest I’m not going anywhere soon because I enjoy where I work.*

This sense of identification/integration appears to be predicated on there being alignment in the sense of cultural beliefs, but this same individual also reported another reason for a sense of shared values: a headteacher who *led* rather than *managed*, participating in the same tasks as her teachers in an egalitarian way. This view was also shared by another interviewee (**3yrs M Sec**):

**12yrs M Prim**

*I do share the school outlook and it’s very rare for a teacher to say that but I can actually make it work because the teachers are trusted to guide the curriculum. Our head teacher is a leader not a manager and she’ll do lunch time duties, she’ll serve dinners, others have to do the same thing. It is one-for-all-all-for-one so for me the way the school is run...I buy into it.*

**3yrs M Sec**

*They need to see more of a leader than a manager so rather than at the back with the whip be down the front with them and, again a cliché, practice what you preach. I think you need to be more of a leader than a manager to get people to believe in your visions and values for a school.*
Interestingly, this proved to be the case for a post-threshold secondary participant too, though in a slightly more ambivalent fashion, suggesting some sense of alignment, but not feeling entirely secure in this. She also perceived that to a certain extent it was for school leadership to determine if this ‘alignment’ were the case:

9yrs F Sec

P: I think there is [alignment] but I’m not entirely sure. I hope there is. I suppose the only thing I can think of is this idea of in my classroom there’s not a particular set way how we get to that particular objective but we get there and it’s as engaging as possible and I think that’s also outlined here in this school...So I think in that way definitely I think we are aligned in that way, I would hope. I keep saying hope [laughs].

R: OK, why hope then?

P: Because it’s my perception of it, isn’t it? It’s that thing of I think I’m that way, I hope I do meet their expectations and what they are hoping to achieve in terms of education etc, but it’s whether they then agree, they might have a different view...

If this teacher is not entirely secure in her sense of alignment, this may a consequence of it not being authentic ‘relatedness’, or in need of greater consolidation. However, this individual was more motivated to develop professionally by identification/integration in the context she describes above. This particular individual, who had worked in 3 schools, was not simply inclined by disposition towards sharing the values of her school. Indeed, this individual had experienced a perceived disenfranchisement in another context:

9yrs F Sec

R: So in other contexts where you might not have shared the values of the school so much, was
that affecting your motivation in any way?

P: It’s the two way-thing again. In some ways it was but then in others...I didn’t want the students to be left behind and in that environment they were getting left behind...there was a number of times where I did not agree with what was being asked of us and that knocked my motivation

However, to return to teachers perceiving a positive sense of shared values, this was also expressed by another interviewee in the primary context (indeed, this notion seemed more prevalent amongst primary colleagues than secondary):

6yrs F Prim

R: To what extent do you feel you agree with the school’s ethos in relation to professional development or generally?

P: Yes I feel very lucky to work in this school and I would be reluctant to leave because I do feel like I work in a school where everybody gets on, if you’re struggling there’s always somebody you can go and speak to. I work alongside a teacher who has got a lot of experience, who is very helpful, we do everything together so we’re not doubling up on anything.

However, having noted that this sense of shared values appeared more evident amongst primary participants (which may be a consequence of a general cultural difference, or perhaps smaller (primary) contexts engendering greater closeness and communication), this was not the case across the board. Indeed, one of the most negative comments in respect to identification/integration came from a post-threshold primary participant:

10yrs M Prim

R: In terms of sharing the vision of the head teacher or sharing the ethos of the school...

P: We are told about [it] and respond to [it], yeah.
R: Would there be a sense of relatedness there at all?

P: We weren’t consulted over it. We were told.

R: How does that affect your motivation?

P: It’s not very good, it’s kind of like being kept out of the loop.

Indeed, later, this same individual returned to this aspect to express his desire for such an alignment of values to take place, expressing the demotivating nature of its absence:

10yrs M Prim

At the moment I think we’re all very much just teachers in the classrooms and that’s all we are. I think if we’re given a sense of worth and we’re included in discussions about your position and about what you should be doing rather than someone just doing it over you, then that would certainly be motivating for me at the moment.

Taken overall, these various comments might also challenge the perception that ‘the system’ would inhibit school leaders to the extent that minimal contextual variation would occur. In other words, that the confines would be such that the behaviours would be very similar. In a high-control macro-culture, it might be suggested that wider influences would restrict school leadership’s capacity to set a vision or ethos of their own. However, it appeared that some teachers’ perceptions were that their school leaders had more control than might initially be thought. This observation may also be relevant to working teachers who can perhaps be led to believe that their school leaders’ ‘hands are tied’ in respect to the way that they manage a school as a consequence of external performativity factors such as OFSTED. Instead, these teachers might find that their school leaders possess more latitude than they (their managers) claim.

However, on closer inspection, the extent to which the school leader’s ‘vision’ is in fact the system’s agenda can be given consideration. In other words, there may be an extent to which headteachers either co-opt, pass-off or (more generously) humanise a system-wide initiative. For example, another interviewee noted a mismatch between a school’s stated ethos and its actual goals:
4yrs F Sec

P: No. I feel quite separate but I think it’s just I have very different aims and a different ethos. Not necessarily to the school’s ethos, I think I’m in agreement there but perhaps other people at the top of the tree in the school have a different ethos...I think that’s where I find it difficult in the sense of belonging; I belong to one set of thinking and often, not just in the school I currently work at, what they state is their ethos and what actually becomes their core values, generally are very separate.

R: Interesting, and how does that affect your motivation?

P: I tend to ignore the bits I want to ignore and pick the bits I want to but I know that not everyone is that way inclined, but I tend to. It keeps me sane.

This raises two important questions. First, the extent to which teachers can be motivated through identification/integration if they perceive there to be a hypocrisy or hollowness to the ethos/aims/values of the school, with leaders stated aims being subordinate to an underlying instrumentalism. Secondly, it also raises the interesting idea that there can be a kind of elective relatedness, whereby a teacher ‘cherry-picks’ (perhaps identifies, rather than integrates) those aims which they perceive to be authentic and with which they are in accord, being motivated by these. However, this may prove to be fraught, given the lack of alignment that this individual reported:

4yrs F Sec

...an obvious tension maybe between what I want, what they want, what I see as development

Other teachers also noted some perceived inconsistencies here. This occurred while expressing some superficially positive sentiments about their school’s ‘vision’ which also carried a doubtful undercurrent about the authenticity of this ethos (in bold):
3yrs M Sec

You said you were involved in the process of the school’s vision changing. What does that entail?

...the school’s changing, it is because we’ve got a new head teacher and new leadership and because of that new vision, that end goal...it was more of a collaborative effort. So yeah, that’s why I got part of that and it was quite interesting. I don’t know where it’s going, there hasn’t been a meeting for a long time so I don’t know what’s happening with that but I assume something’s going on behind the scenes.

2yrs F Prim

To what extent do you feel you share your school’s ethos?

We’ve just changed it. We are a community of lifelong learners, champions of our own success.

That’s what we are at the minute. I can only remember it because it’s everywhere...[but] I think there’s something in it.

Therefore, a valuable area of interest might be in regard to how a leader goes about achieving this internalisation of values authentically, in practical terms. There would appear to be an extent to which the ‘buy-in’ may be in part an expression of the extent to which teachers are involved in the evolution of a school’s ethos, with this being a genuinely participatory process:

3yrs M Sec

How do you get people to buy into your visions of the school?...They need to respect you, they need to want to do it and if you have a more autocratic way of managing people then I think it’s going to be much harder to build that relationship and that atmosphere in a school.
6yrs F Prim

**R:** What motivates you to be a better teacher?

**P:** So yeah, we’re very heavily involved in our school with the design of the school improvement plan, which is great really because that’s what it’s all about, the staff need to be aware of and have definitely played a part in writing that school improvement plan because it’s for all of us really...we all need to be on board with it.

These perceptions may be of value to school leaders, suggesting that teachers can and do buy into a school’s mission or ethos, if they believe to be of real value. An intriguing factor here too is the extent to which relatedness and autonomy appear to possess a similar direction of travel, in the sense that participants seem to articulate that a degree of autonomy is integral to a degree of relatedness.

In sum, identification/integration appears to be perceived by a range of teachers as a potent and important source of motivation to develop professionally, but that it is fraught with various issues that can inhibit real alignment of values.

**External Regulation**

Whilst external regulation (characterised by reward and punishment) proved to be a pervasive phenomenon, the extent to which different interviewees perceived themselves to be (a) subject to and (b) motivated by external regulation appeared to vary to some extent according to the individual, and to the contextual factors which they experienced (though there were fewer variations by age-phase as a whole and minimal evidence of variation by gender). It is worth noting that, for analytical purposes here, the notions of reward and punishment will be explored principally in the form of pay. It could, however, be argued that in respect to external regulation, whilst pay is central, the ‘punishment’ or ‘control’ element is larger than pay. The SDT notions of compliance and reactance (Ryan and Deci, 2000) are important here: it could for example take the form of excessive imposed workload, a sense of bullying scrutiny or confinement of autonomy. Yet these notions are larger than external regulation and have hence been explored as inductive aspects in their own right (‘Judgement’, ‘Autonomy’ (its absence) and ‘The Burden of Proof’).
External regulation certainly constitutes the point of greatest divergence from the survey quantitative findings and open responses, with the interviews indicating that it may possess more motivational potency. Before moving to these areas of difference, it is worth noting that there were some similarities with the survey, with some teachers expressing the same sense of not being motivated by financial reward, for example:

4yrs F Sec

At the end of the day if I went to work for the money I definitely wouldn’t be in teaching because it’s not great money

However, the interviews also offered perspectives which contrasted with the above. This is perhaps suggestive of the semi-structured interview as a research method which allows participants to confide their views more fully, as well as be probed on these to a greater extent.

One participant perceived himself to be unmoved by punitive external regulation in the form of his pay progression being withheld, with the prospect of this (improbable in his view) not resulting in any increased motivation to improve. However, he simultaneously argued that he would be motivated by the prospect of positively orientated performance pay. This might perhaps best be articulated in the sense of performance-enhanced pay, as opposed to performance-related pay:

10yrs M Prim

R: And you would find that motivating?

P: Yeah. I think money is a great motivator.

Indeed, of the primary participants, both post threshold participants spoke positively of performance enhanced pay (my italics). Again, this term is an interesting one, because it allows for differentiation from the use of performance pay in a punitive sense. This individual professed that they would be
motivated by performance enhanced pay, but with a considerable caveat, namely that it would need to be based upon a holistic judgement:

12yrs M Prim

I think that’s a sticky point again, it’s all based on what it’s being judged on. If someone said to me, ‘I’m going to give you £10,000 extra because you’ve been an outstanding teacher and because you guide others, you coach others, you do this, great’, but if they turned round and said, ‘I’m going to give you a £10,000 pay rise because of your results’, I think that’s wrong because every cohort is different.

This was a view shared by another primary participant on the cusp of the ‘pay threshold’ who again noted the value of performance-enhanced pay if it were enacted as a form of reward for greater achievement:

6yrs F Prim

That’s different I think. Again I think that’s actually probably more of a positive thing because people would be getting rewarded for really going above and beyond or doing extra or being able to prove that they’ve had an impact on a certain area of the school or their class of children. So yeah, I think by taking more of a positive stance we’re getting paid more for doing more.

Another post-threshold teacher, this time in the secondary context, noted similar misgivings about performance pay being based upon unfair or unachievable criteria, citing an example of this in a previous context. However, unlike the previous interviewees, these issues with consistent and fair judgement led her to the conclusion that she could not be motivated by performance pay:

9yrs F Sec

R: If performance pay existed in your current context, would it motivate you?

P: No, it actually wouldn’t. No. It’s hard that. I completely don’t agree with it because there’s so many different set ups and context to classrooms and those stories aren’t always considered...
so for us to then have a performance pay related kind of conversation around that, I think that would be really unfair.

In each of the instances above, these comments were made on prompting from the interviewer, rather than unbidden. Yet, in the case of a pre-threshold primary teacher, pay was raised as an incentivising factor without being asked and close to the outset of the interview. This may be expressive of a kind of ‘mercenary syndrome’, whereby performance pay induces such behaviours amongst staff – it is intriguing that a person who has qualified subsequent to the introduction to performance pay, finds it to be so salient:

2yrs F Prim

I would say pay maybe but then that’s also something that kind of doesn’t motivate me as well.

The note of ambivalence at the end of the remark is worth pause, and on probing, this again appeared to be as a consequence of a perceived lack of achievability in terms of the requirements set in order to progress (though not the principle itself) alongside a sense of unfairness in relation to the pay progression of teachers with greater years’ service:

2yrs F Prim

Because there are lots of hoops that you’ve got to jump through to be able to get to that next pay increment...it just feels like you’ve got to do more and more and more and more to be able to actually get something out of it at the end for yourself...So that’s quite de-motivating.

Another pre-threshold teacher, was more explicit in respect to the motivating power of financial reward:

3yrs M Sec

A lot of what I do is dictated by appraisal and this is when I’m gonna sound slightly selfish because
I want to progress financially. I want to move up and I want more money

This frank admission of the importance of pay as an incentivising motivator contrasts somewhat with the survey data (both qualitative and quantitative) which appeared to indicate a relative lack of traction. This figure also sought to emphasise the idea of enhanced, rather than punitive performance pay, explicitly endorsing the ‘carrot’, rather than the stick:

3yrs M Sec

That’s the carrot. I want that carrot. That’s a nice carrot. That carrot would make me a little bit happier, assuming of course that money makes you happy. Yeah, I’d say for me it’s the carrot and that’s what drives me towards my appraisal.

This same figure noted ambivalence on this, however, saying he felt there was a tension between pay progression for those who ‘go over and above’ and at the same time feeling that the profession as a whole had an entitlement to pay increments:

3yrs M Sec

But then I’ve always said that I disagree with performance related pay. I don’t know, I’m conflicted, I really don’t know on that one. Because on the one hand good teachers should be rewarded for what they’re doing if they go and over and above, they should be paid, but on the other hand should teachers who just do their job and nothing more, should they not progress because technically they are doing what they - I don’t know on that one, sorry.

However, this positive attitude towards the principle of performance enhanced pay was not consistent amongst pre-threshold teachers, with another participant stating that it would not be motivating (though adding the ambiguous detail that there was a sense of injustice that she was paid less than those did not do as much):
I don’t think I’d be motivated by it. I know earlier last year I did have a bit of a conversation with someone who said I should be earning more than I did cos I earn the least in the entire department, yet I do essentially at one point the most.

In contrast with performance-enhanced pay, the demotivating nature of the punitive use of performance pay was emphasised by interviewees (and this accords with the survey findings). Indeed, one individual described what she perceived to be a particularly damaging instance of this, namely collective pay punishment, which warrants a fuller quotation:

They put a ban on anybody moving up despite the fact that we could actually prove that we’d met the certain criteria of the UPS threshold, we weren’t allowed to move up. How come?

Because the school as a whole wasn’t delivering the correct grades and the correct grades A-C in terms of English and Maths. No one was allowed to move up. So even in the subjects such as Science and Drama, PE, they weren’t allowed to move up, there was a complete ban until the school kind of picked up its pace, I guess, but that sent people away. Yeah, that’s probably the worst decision that they made. They lost their experienced teachers that were probably holding the school together to a certain extent...

Another figure reported a similar sense of punitive pay being negatively demotivating, and, even whilst noting the perceived injustice of over-payment of some colleagues, the notions of unfairness and judgement came through with this:

...we don’t go the other way. If you’re not doing your job or you have not met your targets you will stay where you are, you won’t go up but you won’t go down...well I don’t know anybody go down;
hopefully you don’t… I worked with several teachers in the past within my career which I think, ‘why are you getting UPS 2 or UPS 3 when you’re not doing the role of that’ but it’s very hard to prove. I wouldn’t like it.

This was not confined to post-threshold teachers, however, with two other pre-threshold participants describing a downward spiral that would result as the consequence of pay being used as a punishment, with a consequent impact on productivity, collegiality and motivation:

**2yrs F Prim**

*Sometimes the pressure can become too much and I think if pay were to be dangled in front of you in that way you don’t meet this target then you lose X, Y, Z of your pay or whatever, that would be really de-motivating. I think it would make me think in a negative downward spiral, that’s how I would feel towards that…*

**6yrs F Prim**

*Motivating maybe not in a positive way, motivating maybe in a negative way in the sense that you would think, ‘oh goodness’. I think it would probably put a little bit more pressure on you but maybe negative pressures in, ‘oh I need to get this done just because I need to get to the next point in the pay scale’….I think that would probably in turn have a negative impact on your staff*

So, the interview data appeared to be expressive of some differentiation between positive external regulation and negative external regulation. Pay as an incentive was recognised as a motivator by some, but pay as a punitive measure not only often lacked motivational traction, but proved to be actively demotivating. In respect to pay as an incentivising force, interestingly, there was a greater bias towards this in two main ways, namely by age-phase and by gender. Firstly, there appeared to be a greater sense of pay as a motivator amongst primary interviewees (though not exclusively). This may be expressive of contextual variation – it appeared that those interviewees who were working in the primary sector had a greater awareness of the introduction of performance pay. It might be speculated that in closer-knit environments this could prove to be the case, though this is tentative. Likewise, male participants seemed more influenced by pay, taken as a whole.
However, for some participants from both age phases, a particularly interesting factor arose in respect to a lack of awareness as to the introduction of performance pay, with both pre- and post-threshold teachers proving to be without knowledge of this change in legislation, for example:

12yrs M Prim

*No, we’re just doing the old traditional going through the pay scales and as long as you do your pay scales you can work up but we’re still working on the accepted way the County recommends.*

Another participant described a situation where he was the recipient of performance pay:

3yrs M Sec

*And if there was a prospect of performance enhanced pay whereby you were to move through the pay scale quicker.*

*That did happen, yeah. I jumped up two pay scales last year, which I didn’t think could happen, but yeah. If they introduced accelerated pay, I quite like the idea of that. If a teacher has excelled and done more and really exceeded, yeah you should be accelerated. Yeah, personally I would quite enjoy that but it’s because it happened to me last year and it was great, it was a good feeling. It felt that you were being rewarded.*

What is most intriguing here is that this same individual, when asked directly if his school operated performance pay said this was *not the case*, despite his being the beneficiary of accelerated financial advancement. This is perhaps expressive of the lack of a clear and explicit articulation of performance pay on the part of some school management teams, though an additional detail from this individual is worthy of attention, which returns to the idea of performance pay working if there is flexibility and a holistic approach to the judgement made:
3yrs M Sec

Yeah, you’re right, I suppose that is performance related pay. Yeah it is, it is...That still happened to me even though I didn’t meet one of my targets so I suppose if there was performance related pay but there was some flexibility and if you could genuinely justify why

Another key point in relation to external regulation was the extent to which those who did perceive themselves to be influenced by pay found it difficult to disaggregate this from other forms of motivation, even to a certain degree noting a connectivity between them. This perhaps makes it particularly difficult to analyse pay as a motivating reward in isolation from other factors:

3yrs M Sec

It’s money isn’t it? Teaching is a vocation, it is, and you certainly don’t do it for the money, but the money helps...again that is a very difficult question although I’m going to have to go for the pay, although the esteem and the respect, honestly it makes you feel electric, it’s brilliant, but at the end of the day you need to survive and that money, yeah...[but]...the minute I say that I feel like I’m devaluing the other stuff, as if I’m just saying, ‘oh you know what I said about motivation about esteem, it doesn’t matter; I’m just in it for the money’ cos I’m not, I really do love the visions and the values...I think pay connects them, it’s the common factor or denominator....Yes, pay is in there.

6yrs F Prim

Definitely freedom to take hold of what you teach, freedom with the direction that you take in your professional development, the people I work with and the working relationships I have with those, the management team and how they value me, and yeah the pay would come in there as well, and I suppose the fact there is scope for moving and increasing on the pay scale...if there was something that I think would benefit teachers all over the country is that the pay reflected the work that we put in every day and the extra hours and the stresses that it can bring to your life.
This last remark is especially interesting as it also brings into play once again the idea of an ‘encomium’, that is to say a *reward* for services already rendered, as opposed to an *incentive* to perform better in the future. This is important, as it suggests the idea that pay in this sense can be about *maintaining* motivation or encouraging retention, rather than a ‘carrot’ as such.

In sum, external regulation represents a complex motivator for teachers, with reward proving very ambiguous (though salient) and punishment proving demotivating in the extreme. Similarly, the question of the extent to which it motivates teachers to ‘improve’ in the sense of conforming to the culture of performativity, or ‘improve’ in the sense of genuine professional development is open to question.
6. Synthesis and Discussion

6.1 Introduction

This chapter seeks to bring together and interpret key findings from the analysis of the two distinct data types. As noted in the methodology (Chapter 3, Section 1), this approach will be one of complementary analysis involving the ‘strategic integration of complementary sources’ (Bazeley, 2018, p99) which allows quantitative and qualitative data to converge and diverge in a flexible and equitable way. To this end, there will be a synthesis of the quantitative findings from the survey with the combined qualitative findings from the open responses and interviews (though points of divergence between the open responses and interviews will be noted). This synthesis will centre on identifying and clarifying the key findings. After each section of synthesis below, a separate discussion will follow, relating each key finding to the relevant literature. The main areas of synthesis will be the notions of constitutive and instrumental motivations (with a separate consideration of performance pay as an important sub-element of instrumental motivation). Another valuable, but perhaps less significant, area of synthesis will then be considered, with this being the complexity of ‘introjection’. Following this, an overall summary of the key points will be made.

As said, two key concepts for the synthesis are those of constitutive and instrumental motivations. Aristotle (Trans. Ross, 1994) makes a distinction between constitutive and instrumental actions. Constitutive are those activities performed for their own sake, whereas instrumental are those where the ends and the means are not the same. Modifying this distinction for the purposes of the present study, it might be possible to posit the notions of constitutive motivation and instrumental motivation as the key hypernyms (umbrella terms) which allow for the most effective synthesis of the findings. In relation to previous literature drawing on this Aristotelian concept, Gardner and Lambert (1959) have applied the notions of ‘integrative’ (constitutive) and instrumental motivation to second language acquisition. Likewise, Fowers et al. (2010) have applied Aristotle’s distinction between constitutive and instrumental goals to their impact on a person’s happiness and wellbeing. However, the notions of constitutive and instrumental motivations in the context of teacher professional development and as hypernyms in relation to different established theories of work motivation which also allow for inductive analysis is as yet new.
6.2 Constitutive Motivation: Synthesis

One important point of synthesis between the quantitative and qualitative elements occurs in relation to the motivational significance of what might be characterised as the ‘constitutive motivation’ to develop professionally. In the qualitative data, it proved difficult at times to disaggregate a sense of moral purpose or a sense of educational goals from feelings of the inherent satisfaction or pleasure derived from the role. As noted in the preceding qualitative analysis, this warranted an inductive code of ‘vocation’ to capture this blurring effect. This same blur was reflected in the quantitative data through the first factor extracted by the analysis, which merged the self-determination theory categories of Identified/Integrated and Intrinsic motivation. This shared finding across the two data strands is suggestive of the difficulty in disaggregating the motivations of those who work in the public sector or otherwise ‘moral’ areas of endeavour, where there is perhaps a strong likelihood of such impetuses being blurred. These impetuses for professional development in respect to ‘vocation’ are also closely linked to the notion of autonomous mastery, hence the need for a new term expressive of this: constitutive motivation. This overarching concept can be defined as ‘the motivation of the thing in itself’. In other words, what these notions of vocation, pleasure and autonomy have in common is that the individual is motivated by them in themselves, with ‘constitutive’ motivation being the more potent and purposeful as a consequence. However, whilst this term perhaps best helps to capture this aspect of the synthesis, it may also be useful to consider the SDT category of ‘identification/integration’ alone. While, as noted above, it is perhaps more valid when considering teachers to regard this as part of a composite along with ‘Intrinsic’ motivation, the separate distinction may still be helpful. This is because, across the qualitative analyses, teachers did note being more motivated to develop professionally by a sense of alignment and greater autonomy (which characterise ‘identification/integration’), even where there was no clear or obvious reference to Intrinsic motivation in the form of enjoyment or inherent satisfaction. Similarly, in the quantitative analysis, the medians for identification/integration proved high even when isolated from the variables measuring for intrinsic motivation. Therefore, a lesser form of the composite ‘constitutive’ motivational construct (identification/integration minus intrinsic) may also be possible. Taken overall, however, it is apparent across the analysis of both data sources that constitutive motivation is highly potent for those teachers who participated in the study, raising the interesting question of the gains that might be had by those school leaders who can access or influence or empower this source of impetus. To give an example, constitutive motivation would be used to describe a teacher’s motivations to develop professionally being related to the value of education and being able
to contribute to that, but is also inclusive of the pleasure and enjoyment derived from the role. However, if this example seems broad, it is because constitutive motivation as a concept is difficult to disaggregate.

Yet what is perhaps most compelling in respect to the importance of constitutive motivation is the extent to which it is undermined in practice. The quantitative variables allowed as much for the potential that teachers could be motivated by such drivers, rather than simply that they were presently motivated by them in their current school context. When this is then linked to the qualitative findings (both interviews and open responses), it is striking the extent to which teachers feel this is not achieved in practice, noting a lack of alignment/relatedness, an absence of autonomy, an inhibiting of the inherent satisfactions of the role. Likewise, the data identified inauthentic ‘mastery’ offered to teachers by school leaders in a manipulative fashion, where, for example, ‘consultation’ of staff proved to be superficial. Nonetheless, there were less frequent instances within the qualitative data where, contextually, teachers did perceive that their ‘constitutive motivations’ were fostered or at least uninhibited by school leaders, even in the present neoliberal environment, resulting in the impetus for professional development.

6.3 Constitutive Motivation: Discussion

The pervasive interplay of the notions of autonomy, mastery, identification, integration and intrinsic motivation within a broader notion of ‘constitutive motivation’ seems to emphasise the importance of professional empowerment. The case for trusting and empowering teachers has been persuasively made in the past by the likes of Sahlberg (2011) and Popkewitz (1994). This seems to align well with the findings in relation to the importance of ‘constitutive motivation’. Wilkesmann and Schmid (2014) would support this view, noting the potency of motivations derived through the ‘merger between intrinsic and identified motivation’ (p14).

The argument in favour of more democratic school leadership also seems to be supported by the findings in relation to alignment and autonomy, though the warnings of both Woods (2005) and Massy et al. (1994) that movement in this direction can be superficial and inauthentic, rather than genuinely collaborative and empowering is relevant here. This relates to a theme identified by Allen (2012) and Carr (2015a), who note a shift towards mastery in some educational contexts, but with this being, in
Carr’s words, a ‘faux-mastery’ which is in fact a ‘vehicle...[in the service]...of ‘super-ordinate performance goals’ (Carr, 2015a, p74-5). The present study’s synthesis supports this articulation of performance in ‘a more ‘motivationally-acceptable’ guise’ (Carr, 2015a, p70). In this regard, the absence of teacher voice appears to be a significant obstacle to ‘constitutive motivations’; the description by Courtney and Gunter (2015) of a culture of conformity and the elimination of any dissent appears to be of real relevance to the combined analysis in the present study. Likewise, the silencing of teachers’ voices powerfully articulated by Stevenson and Gilliland (2015) and the undermining of teachers’ professionalism described by Plowright and Barr (2012) seem to align with the combined analysis. These depictions of marginalisation and obedience are of pertinence, because, in such a culture, the likelihood of these constitutive motivations to develop professionally being actually enabled seems remote.

An alternative view, however, would be that a teacher’s sense of ‘constitutive motivations’ may in fact be a façade, disguising their underlying financial self-interest (Freidson, 2004). It is not impossible that this may be the case for some teachers; for example, it may be that notions such as vocation and mastery are those which teachers feel they ought to present because of social expectations of their profession. However, the salience of the motivational power of ‘constitutive’ activity in the data seems to contradict this. Similarly, teachers were able to express their ‘constitutive motivations’ alongside other forms of motivation. This would at least to some extent undermine the notion of vocation as a smokescreen, if teachers are actually willing to articulate other impetuses. This would also accord with Freidson’s (2004) view that a teacher’s integrity and an employee’s desire for material gain are not mutually exclusive, and nor does the latter undermine professionalism.

At this juncture, it is important to bring existing motivational theory to bear. The overall synthesis supports Ryan and Deci’s (2000) basic contention that there is a continuum of negative-to-positive forms of motivation, with more productive and constructive forms of motivation being characterised by increasing autonomy, relatedness and internalisation. The notion of ‘competence’, however, proves a little more challenging, with the data indicating this at least to some extent falls within the purview of performativity, in the sense of proving the degree to which one is satisfactorily competent. This would not align with the likes of Ciani et al. (2011), who find a positive directionality for autonomy, relatedness and competence. However, the basic principle of increasing internalisation through increasing autonomy and relatedness does support studies such as Ciani et al. (2011). Similar findings are evident in other studies (e.g. Gorozidis and Papaionnou, 2014; Fernet et al., 2012a) where a correlation between autonomy and intrinsic motivation has been found. Likewise, in a Norwegian non-SDT study, Roness
(2011), conclude that teachers’ motivations stem from the intrinsic worth of teaching, while also identifying, for secondary-level teachers, the importance of subject discipline (evident to some degree in the present study’s qualitative data). Roness’ (2011) combination of these two factors with what was found to be a motivating sense of altruism would also align with the blended idea of ‘constitutive motivation’.

However, whilst the importance of intrinsic motivation should not be understated, the value of ‘lesser’ forms of internalisation need to be recognised as potent motivators to develop professionally. In this sense, the present study aligns with Koludrović and Ercegovac (2014) and Fernet et al. (2008) which both emphasise the motivational traction of identified regulation (these studies did not disaggregate identified regulation and integration, using only the former term, whereas the present study regards identified and integrated regulation as weaker and stronger forms of the same motivation). Fernet et al.’s (2008) observation of greater identified regulation by gender (greater for females) seems to align to a certain extent too, but the present study also noted the same trend for introjection, commented on more fully in the relevant section below. Likewise, the motivational potency of that which Skaalvik and Skaalvik (2011, p1036) describe as ‘value consonance’ would clearly align with the observed worth of identification/integration in the present study. Similarly, Dorman (2003) describes an intervention in the Australian context where a genuinely shared school ethos had a palpable impact on the motivation of teachers. The present study would also reinforce the view of Fortier et al. (1995) that greater autonomy produces better results; teacher-participants in the present data appeared to be largely in consensus on this. Similarly, McLachlan and Hagger (2010) also note the value of ‘supportive’ autonomy, which resembles identification/integration, though some have used the term ‘supportive autonomy’ ironically (‘supportive’ as synonymous with ‘controlling’). On the note of ‘supportive autonomy’, Roth and Weinstock (2013) ask whether a teacher’s epistemological beliefs influences their likelihood of being autonomy-supportive (for example, if they have a ‘transmission’ view of knowledge, they are more likely to teach students in a didactically controlling way). The present study notes a prevailing tendency amongst participants to be inclined towards creative and explorative teaching and learning (if they are permitted). In a non-SDT study, Remijan (2014) also found higher motivation amongst those who combined a non-teaching responsibility with a classroom role, attributing this to their being more likely to be autonomous and independent. The present study seems to indicate that this appetite for autonomy exists just as fully for those who work solely in the classroom, though it may indeed be true that they have less opportunity to exercise it.
6.4 Instrumental Motivation: Synthesis

This element of the synthesis is concerned with a highly salient aspect of the data: the motivational significance of ‘instrumentalism’. This can be defined in opposition to constitutive motivation (which is the motivation of the thing in itself), with instrumental motivation being the motivation of ‘something else’ (eg., reward, avoidance of punishment, esteem). A number of the inductive themes in the qualitative analysis of open responses and interviews can be aligned with the second factor extracted by the quantitative analysis. For example, given the instrumentalism-focused nature of the quantitative external regulation-introjection factor, there is clear scope for alignment with the qualitative inductive theme of managerialism. The notions of unfair judgement, the burden of ‘proof’ and a distinct managerial class within the theme of managerialism are all perhaps expressive of this same sense of negative and demotivating control. Similarly, the perceptions of teachers in relation to the inductive theme of professionalism (the extent to which they feel they are not treated as professionals) can be seen as expressive of the same negatively motivating sense of controlling performativity. This would be chiefly in the form of the absence of trust and autonomy. Similarly, the qualitative deductive themes generated through the open responses and interviews can be aligned with the quantitative ‘external regulation-introjection’ cluster. This would be through qualitative data coded as external regulation, where the impact of punitive measures (‘the stick’) on teacher motivation seems clear. This can be linked with the lower medians for the variables measuring for external regulation in the survey, indeed amplifying these and offering richer detail as to how external regulation manifests itself in the form of aggressive managerialism. Taken together, the analysis of these qualitative and quantitative strands is arguably expressive of a pervasive neoliberal ‘turbo-accountability’, damaging to teacher motivation in itself, whilst also inhibiting more positive forms of professional motivation. Responses to this on the part of teacher-participants included demotivation, superficial compliance, duplicity (in the form of assessment fraud) and the neglect of constitutive (educationally purposeful), child-orientated work in favour of adult-orientated, instrumental activities. The commonality here is that these reward, punishment and esteem-based motivations are all the motivation of ‘something else’, rather than the pursuit in itself. However, in respect to the ‘carrot’ or reward element of external regulation, this can best be considered separately in the section on ‘pay’ below.
6.5 Instrumental Motivation: Discussion

This notion of instrumentalism as a motivator (or-demotivator) does not go so far as Rogers (2012) who seeks to differentiate ‘performativity goals’ from ‘performance goals’ (in the achievement goal theory sense), on the grounds that the former of these is not concerned with normative comparison with others. The present analysis contradicts this, with performativity and performance goals appearing closely wedded. For example, participants’ perception of the pursuit of high grades for their students (performativity) seems closely linked with wanting to perform well in relation to other teachers (normative achievement goal ‘performance’). It is not that Rogers’ (2012) distinction is entirely invalid, but rather that the two notions are so interwoven as to be difficult to disaggregate. Rather, the term ‘instrumentalism’ in this analysis would appear to encompass conceptually and locate contextually the notions of ‘external regulation’, ‘performance goals’ and ‘performativity goals’ within a broader framework of ‘instrumental motivation’.

Findings in respect to the strong prevalence of instrumental motivation in schools seem to closely accord with other literature. Verger and Curran (2014) and Tolofari (2005) describe the widespread practice of New Public Management in schools, detailing the incentivising of outcomes through punitive ‘measurement’ and accountability. Such perceptions would appear to be similarly prevalent for teachers in the present research, with notions of ‘proof’ and ‘judgement’ being salient. Similarly, an agenda of marketising neoliberalism preoccupied with competitive outcomes (Apple, 2004) seems to accord with the ‘turbo-accountability’ present in the synthesis. The analysis also seems to point towards the need to differentiate between a negative sense of teacher accountability and a positive sense of teacher responsibility. Lauermann and Karabenick (2011) and Sahlberg (2011) are in alignment with the present study in this respect, observing the same accountability/responsibility distinction. In terms of high-stakes accountability, Dworkin (2001) details the effect of intensive testing on teacher burnout in the American context and this trend seems evident in the present study in relation to those teachers who reported themselves to be amotivated. This may be of considerable relevance in the context of recruitment and retention of teachers in England (NAO, 2016). Likewise, Finnigan and Gross’s (2007) findings in the American context, that unachievable targets resulted in negative iterations of punitive appraisal and less productive teacher behaviours seems to reflect the present study’s findings.

Perhaps most compelling is the extent to which the impact of ‘instrumental motivation’ accords with Ball’s (2003) description of ‘the terrors of performativity’ (p215). Ball notes the ‘field of judgement’
(2003, p216) to which teachers are subject and this would seem to align strongly with the inductive analysis of the teacher interviews. He further delineates a target-culture, which entails the ‘set[ting] aside of personal beliefs and commitments [to] live an existence of calculation’ (Ball, 2003, p215), which would link closely with the notion of instrumental motivation evident in combined analysis. The notion of performativity as a counter-productive enterprise which ‘produces opacity rather than transparency as individuals and organizations take ever greater care in the construction and maintenance of fabrications’ (Ball, 2003, p215) aptly summarises the inauthenticity and duplicity that participant teachers experience as prevailing in their schools.

In connection with Ball’s (2003) Foucauldian perspective on schools, Perryman’s (2006) notion of panoptic performativity appears to ring true, as the present study also identifies similar ways in which teachers are subject to surveillance, with this having a clearly negative effect on teachers’ developmental motivations. The oligopticon of Latour (2005) is not without relevance either, in the sense that ‘data’ was identified as perpetual form of ‘keyhole’ surveillance. However, similarly, the descriptions from some participants of data being fabricated or manipulated suggests that ‘keyhole’ surveillance does always ‘see’ in as unimpeded and clear a way as Latour contends. Likewise, the suggestion of a metaphor of ‘glass’ by Page (2015) proves a valid one, in that there does appear to be a very overt sense in which managers conduct the surveillance of teachers, with this again having a negative motivational impact on teachers. However, again, the notion of glass perhaps suggests too much transparency, given the descriptions of furtive or inauthentic activity from some participants. It is true that Page (2015) does allow for the possibility that the ‘glass’ can be obscured, but this is in the sense that managers make this happen in order to engage in punitive measures against individual teachers secretly. It does not capture the possibility of managers’ complicity in, or active direction of, activities such as assessment fraud in the name of instrumentalism. Nor does it fully reflect some of the variability of scrutiny that appears to be in evidence; for some participants, there was a sense of occasional, rather than permanent visibility.

Arguably, the post-panopticism of Courtney (2016) offers the most up-to-date depiction of neoliberal performativity as it manifests itself in the form of school surveillance. It captures the same sense of intensive scrutiny (or ‘external regulation’ in SDT terms) that Perryman (2006) and Page (2015) also articulate. However, its differentiating factor, which better expresses the contemporary environment, is the insight that intentionally fuzzy and mutable performance goals mean that failure to ‘comply’ is
unavoidable – and that this is the desired outcome. This seems to align closely with the data in that some participants described unachievable and ever-changing targets and being subject to a capricious sense of judgement. The deleterious effect of this on teachers’ developmental motivations appeared powerful; not only were they subject to instrumentalism, but an intentionally punitive instrumentalism at that.

However, where the present study would depart slightly would be the sense that this chimerical performativity ‘disrupt(s) subjects’ fabrications that had been predicated on stability’ (Courtney, 2016, p629). It would be agreed that this appears to be the intention and is to some extent partially true, however, the present study’s data would seem to align with Gad and Lauritsen (2009), in the sense of participants being instrumentally motivated to participate in successfully duplicitous activities, rather than engaging authentically with professional development. Courtney (2016) does not exclude the possibility of successful fabrication, but the present findings would suggest that ‘effective’ duplicity is more widespread. Therefore, the present findings suggests that a useful additional metaphor may be that of a ‘searchlight’, as an idea that might complement the ‘panopticon’. It is linked in the sense that both entail notions of captivity and surveillance. However, the difference is that a ‘panopticon’ assumes permanent visibility. The searchlight metaphor is therefore useful as it allows for a fuller expression of invisibility as well as visibility. This metaphor therefore describes the furtive activities which occur as the searchlight (Ofsted, for example) sweeps elsewhere. Indeed, the application of such a metaphor might not only be confined to the English context. For example, Liu and Onwuegbuzie (2011), in the Chinese context, describe the negative impact of a centralised, ‘surveillance-based’ inspection system on teacher motivation and effectiveness, which closely resembles the sweeping ‘searchlight’ metaphor.

Returning to Ball (2003), the present study’s findings suggests that his observations seem as relevant as ever, despite the lapse in time since this significant paper. This is perhaps unsurprising as it accords with the view outlined by Bartlett (2000) and Leaton-Gray and Whitty (2010) who perceive there to have been a concerted by-partisan effort over almost three decades to progressively ‘performatise’ the teaching profession. Similarly relevant are successive changes to terms and conditions, making these ever more precarious and punitive over time (Courtney and Gunter, 2015; Gunter, 2012; Gunter, 2008). In the present data, this can be observed in participant-teachers’ perceptions of the pervasive and deep-rooted instrumentalism that predominates in schools. What matters most here is the extent to which the instrumental motivations associated with teacher performativity engender improvements in actual
performance. Given the pervasiveness of instrumental motivation evident in the data, therefore, the findings of Peterson (2000) and Weisberg et al (2009) are troubling: both studies note a poor correlation between teacher performativity and improvements in children’s learning.

Relevant here is Carr’s (2015b) suggestion that neoliberal performativity needs to be analysed as the ‘instrumental’ motivational phenomenon that it is. For instance, the present analysis aligns strongly to other studies using the SDT lens: Ryan and Brown’s (2005) observation on the effect of performativity on the motivation to be creative in the classroom shows a close parallel. The negative impact on student learning of controlling performativity identified empirically by Deci et al. (1999) accords with the perceptions of teachers in the present study. Rogers and Tannock’s (2013) description of children with particular educational needs being particularly affected by this was not explicitly present in the data, but could be seen as implicitly so (if teachers perceive that performativity harms children, then the most vulnerable are perhaps the most at risk). Likewise, when Sheldon and Biddle (1998) use SDT to enumerate the consequences of neoliberal performativity, the list they produce is replicated in the present study’s data: the transfer of pressures from teachers to children; accountability as a distraction from true learning; a curriculum narrowed and experimentation disincentivised. Indeed, the collective view of Sheldon and Biddle (1998), Ryan and Weinstein (2009) and Gagne and Forest (2008) of teachers being deprofessionalised by external regulation into production-line apparatchiks would concur with much of the negative aspects of the present study.

Another important aspect of instrumental motivation is that present study points towards a distinct managerial class which tends to operate in a controlling and punitive way, resulting in negative outcomes. Fernet et al. (2012b) have also noted, using SDT as a lens, that teacher burnout can be linked to external regulation-type school leader behaviours, not least due to the imposed workload. Similarly, in another SDT study, Eyal and Roth (2011) noted that ‘transactional leadership’ was linked to teacher burnout, whereas ‘transformational leadership’ was not. This would corroborate the view of Fernet et al. (2012b) as well as the present study, whereby ‘transactional leadership’ is controlling and counterproductive and ‘transformational leadership’ is empowering. This links to non-SDT studies by Leaton-Gray (2006) and Mualuko et al. (2009), who both identify the potentially negative impact of a controlling school hierarchy and the segregation of teachers and school leaders. Similarly, the autocratic imposition of a school leaders’ ‘vision’, as described by Courtney and Gunter (2015) is pertinent here. Likewise, Pearson and Moomaw (2005) note the absence of autonomy to be linked with teacher burnout, with this proving the case across age phases. This would align with the present study, though
the data from primary-level teacher-participants would also match that of Klassen and Ming-Ming (2010) in the American context, who found teachers to be a little more autonomous and so a touch more motivated.

Perhaps most important of all (without diminishing the impact of instrumental motivation on teachers) is the associated or consequent effect on children. It is clear that teachers in the present study perceive there to be a negative correlation between instrumental motivation and children’s learning, wellbeing and personal development. This accords with a number of other SDT studies which note contagious motivational dynamics between teachers and children (Assor et al., 2005; Sheldon and Biddle, 1998). This might also be particularly worrying in the more holistic sense of child development, given Guay et al.’s (2003) suggestion that controlling behaviours learnt in the school context can influence their wider lives. From the perspective of learning, however, Grolnick and Ryan (1987) make a clear assertion, aligning with the present study, that performativity results in shallower learning. Similarly, a number of studies have observed the irony that teaching to the test because of high stakes accountability actually produces poorer test results (Ryan and Brown, 2004; Ryan and LaGuardia, 1999, Flink et al., 1990) and the present study would seem to correspond with the view that such an approach is counterproductive.

6.6 Instrumental Motivation Synthesis Part 2: Performance Pay

A key and distinctive point of synthesis between the data strands in terms of instrumental motivation relates to pay, to the extent that it warrants consideration in a separate section. This was expressed both as convergence and divergence between the data strands. External regulation in the form of performance pay constituted a point of some divergence. The quantitative findings and open responses from the survey, ranged from negative to mildly positive on performance pay, while the interviews indicated that it may possess more considerable motivational potency. There was a clear and open admission of pay as a strong motivator in some of the qualitative interviews. These remarks were often accompanied by other comments on the challenging nature of this though, with these pertaining to the difficulties associated with obtaining a fair and holistic judgement on pay progression. It may also be that the relatively small number of teachers interviewed possessed a disproportionate number of individuals motivated by pay, though this is conjectural. It could equally be that the format of qualitative interviews might allow both for more openness and probing on the subject of pay, (a contentious and sensitive issue). At the same time, however, there were areas of alignment between the survey and the
interviews, with some teachers interviewed expressing the same sense (also present in the survey responses) of not being so strongly motivated by financial reward.

Similarly, the notion of a positive sense of pay as an *encomium* (as opposed to an incentive) was relevant to all strands of the analysis. This included the survey (where a variable measuring for external regulation which explicitly referred to ‘reward’ received a more slightly more positive response), as well as the open responses and the interviews. The distinction between an encomium (a just reward for services already rendered) and an incentive (a future-orientated inducement) is important, as some teachers appeared to be more in favour of an encomium than an incentive. Another relevant factor here relates to the awareness of performance pay. There appears to be an issue in relation to school hierarchies not articulating the existence of performance pay to staff. This again seemed evident across both the qualitative and quantitative data strands. In one final important sense, however, the different analyses were in accord in respect to pay. A clearly negative view of *punitive* performance pay was reported by interviewees and in the open responses, with this according with the survey results. There was clear sense of pay being *reduced* on the basis of performance as something that would result in very considerable demotivation.

6.7 Instrumental Motivation Discussion Part 2: Performance Pay

This discussion in effect relates to two main bodies of opinion in the literature: those who assert the efficacy of performance pay and those who regard it as more problematic. In relation to those who do regard performance pay as valid, for the present study, this proved more complex. Whilst the findings suggest that pay proved a motivator for some, this did not appear to fit a pattern. For example, one interesting point pertains to the PISA study (2012) which suggests a pattern whereby the lower a teacher’s overall salary is, the more likely they are to respond to financial incentives. This argument is made in terms of a teacher’s salary in relation to GDP per capita. However, if this were to be true, it might be suggested that teachers with fewer years’ service (and by extension, typically paid less) would be more responsive to incentivisation, but this was not apparent in the present findings.

Similarly, Woessmann’s (2010) assertion of an empirical link between the financial reward of excellent teaching and better student outcomes would be questioned by the present study. Firstly, it seems difficult to attribute a pattern of behaviour because of considerable variation in perceptions of pay
across all participants. It may have traction for some, but not for others. Likewise, the reports of inconsistency of implementation of performance pay in school (including a lack of awareness of its existence) mean that discerning a pattern is doubly compounded in difficulty. However, the most tentative way of articulating Woessmann’s (2010) view, that there can be positive use of performance enhanced pay (as opposed to punitively), appears to be not unsympathetically perceived by some of the participants in the present study. Robert’s (2011) view, using data from the Mexican context, that male teachers are more likely to be motivated by extrinsic motivation in the form of pay, does not accord fully with the present study, which appeared to find performance-enhanced pay appealing to both genders (reflected in the admittedly small sample of interviewed teachers). However, the qualitative interview data did seem to indicate a slightly more pronounced tendency amongst male participants. Other studies which assert a link between pay and performance, such as Atkinson et al. (2009) and Kingdon and Teal (2006) would be less closely aligned with the present study, as they articulate a view which is more akin to a belief in performance related pay, rather than performance enhanced pay. The present study finds less evidence to support such a view, not least given the findings in relation to the punitive use of performance pay.

The current policy agenda in England is of real relevance too, and as such the present study bears comparison with the Department for Education’s (2015) stated guidance in relation to the introduction of performance pay. On the basis of the present study’s findings, the DfE’s aims that performance pay should be transparent in implementation and objective in judgement appear to be somewhat distant indeed. Similarly, the DfE’s emphasis on proportionality, in the sense of the measurement and evidencing of performance pay not increasing teachers’ workloads seems at odds with the perceptions of a substantial body of participants in this study. In one respect, however, they do appear to have met their stated intentions. This is that they anticipated that schools would adopt different approaches, which appears to be the case based on the present findings. However, the extent to which this is down to inconsistency of implementation (such as not telling staff about the existence of performance pay), rather than a school’s thoughtful tailoring of the policy to their context is a not insubstantial question. Taken overall, there appear to be considerable difficulties associated with performance pay implementation, not least during a period of budget constraints. Indeed, on the note of reduced financial circumstances for schools, a minor point not entirely specific to pay is worth raising. Frase (1989) noted that teachers who could choose between personal reward and professional development funding were capable of choosing the latter and being more motivated by it. But if the budget does not
exist for such a funding, it is another avenue closed for teacher development. This is relevant as the present study’s findings proved expressive of such financial constraints.

Other studies argue that performance pay is inefficacious and the present research would align more closely with this perspective. There are perhaps two ways in which performance pay can be thought of as inefficacious: in principle and in practice. In terms of the practical implementation of performance pay, Firestone (2014) argues that much of the issue with extrinsic motivation through pay is a consequence of the difficulty in obtaining a judgement of a teacher that is meaningful and fair, due to the complexity of the role. He argues for a pragmatic compromise that fuses extrinsic and intrinsic motivators through accurate evaluation of teachers (though does not indicate how this might be done).

In the practical context, this appears to be extremely fraught in different ways. Firstly, in the present study, as noted previously, there was a clearly negative perception of punitive performance pay amongst participants. Secondly, in the qualitative analysis, those teachers who reported the attraction of performance enhanced pay (not a universal view), were consistent in arguing that the judgement should be holistic, rather than on end numeric targets and that this was very difficult to achieve in practice. Hulleman and Barron (2010) describe similarly negative outcomes from the association of pay with purely quantitative targets. There is also an extent to which the present study accords with the findings of Lundstrom (2012), whose Swedish study delineates teachers’ perceptions of the difficulties associated with the practical implementation of performance pay. Corollaries with this work would include the considerable reservations over consistency, transparency and fair judgement expressed by participant teachers in the present research. Fryer’s (2011) study of the impact of performance pay also seems to align with the present study’s findings, with manipulation of school data, assessment fraud and teaching to the test all proving evident (as it also did in the work of Croxson and Atkinson (2001) in this regard). Likewise, the extent to which teachers perceived themselves to be motivated by pay because they have been inculcated into such a disposition (Carr and Batlle, 2015; Sugarman, 2015) is worth consideration. The relevance of perceiving performance pay as a form of instrumental motivation is clear: the motivational impact of performance pay for teachers can be either outright demotivation or the misdirection of their motivations.

The underlying principle of performance pay is also open to considerable question. As Ryan and Weinstein (2009) argue, such ‘reforms represent ‘a motivational approach’ (p225), because of their employment of rewards and punishments. Yet Ryan and Brown’s (2005) point is relevant here, that this is not classical operant theory at work (though its architects at the DfE may believe it so), because
Skinner’s (1953) position is one which suggests the value of the reward and punishment of ongoing actions, not end results. This raises considerable questions about the association of linear high stakes testing with performance pay in itself. Yet even this is assuming that operant conditioning is healthy or efficacious in itself, with there being a strong argument to the contrary in terms of its failure to access more potent and internalised forms of motivation, its negative impact on wellbeing and its failure to properly recognise the complexity of human activity (Carr, 2015a). Indeed, this emphasis on the reward and punishment of outcomes may result in counter-productive demotivation, because, as Ryan and Weinstein (2009) argue, linking any serious consequence to any performance indicator will have a corrupting effect. This sense of instrumentalism corrupting motivation seems to link closely with the present study’s findings.

6.8 Complex Introjection: Synthesis

Across both the qualitative and quantitative analyses, the SDT notion of introjection also constitutes an interesting point of convergence. For those who participated, this appears to have more positive motivational traction for professional development than SDT might suggest. The qualitative analysis, primarily in the interviews, offered a rich hybrid of hierarchical, collegial and social forms of esteem, with each appearing to be a considerable motivator. Of these, collegial introjection (the esteem of teacher-colleagues) proved to be the most positively described and potent. However, the notion of hierarchical introjection (the esteem in which teachers are held by their managers) was the most prominent form of introjection in open responses and interviews. This was not uniformly positive, with some ambivalent views in evidence, especially in the open responses, yet it did appear to be a source of some positive motivational traction taken overall. The broader sense of social esteem (that of parents, friends and relations or society at large) was not generated from the open response analysis, with this being confined to the interviews, which may be a consequence of the greater scope for detail afforded by the latter method. The quantitative survey findings are perhaps more ambiguous here (with introjection forming a part of the second cluster extracted by the factor analysis). The position of introjection within this cluster would accord with SDT’s conception of it as a more controlling (and, by extension, less efficacious) form of motivation. However, the overall medians for introjection were not entirely negative, again suggestive of greater complexity here than SDT might suggest. In this sense there is a degree of alignment between qualitative and quantitative strands.
6.9 Complex Introjection: Discussion

In the present study, introjection did appear to have traction for teachers’ with both fewer and greater years’ service. Hildebrandt and Eom (2011) found a link between a teacher’s age and their being motivated by external validation (introjection), with younger American teachers more influenced by this. However, the present study’s finding is for a more general tendency in this regard. Where variation appeared more evident was in relation to gender and ‘age-phase’ with female primary teachers in the present analysis reporting a greater sense of motivation by way of introjection, though these findings are necessarily tentative.

Perhaps of greater debate is the extent to which introjection ought to motivate, in the sense of whether it is a truly productive motivator. Ryan and Brown (2003) argue that a key element of introjection, the desire for the fulfilment of self-esteem, is in fact an unhealthy thing, ultimately resulting in misdirected motivation and more fragile individuals. This would appear to be a view shared by some teacher-participants, who describe perceptions of the negative consequences of competing for the capricious esteem of managers and colleagues, or the dangers of self-worth being contingent on success in a role where ‘nothing is ever good enough’. However, other teachers did seem to perceive introjection as a positive motivator for professional development, describing mutual collegial esteem as an important factor, for example. Some also described a kind of healthy competition and a desire to emulate those they admire professionally, with these being articulated as pleasurable and to some extent internalised motivations. Perhaps a more ambiguous view of the value of introjection is worth arguing for; this would accord to some extent with the work of Ryan and Connell (1989), who found that introjection related in a positive sense to levels of effort, but was also resultant in a lesser sense of emotional resilience.

The current study contributes to the debate as to the extent to which introjection is a form of internalised motivation or external in nature. Both Guay et al. (2000) and Fernet et al. (2008) have found that ‘external and introjected regulations…are not very specific…and could tend to collapse’ (Fernet et al., 2008, p278). This would accord with the factorial analysis and some of the qualitative data. The implication here is that introjection forms part of an external, controlling construct of instrumental motivation. Ryan and Deci (2000) describe introjection as something of a hybrid, noting that it is a ‘type of internal regulation that is still quite controlling because people perform such actions in order to avoid guilt or anxiety or to attain ego-enhancements or pride’ and that this in turn means ‘although the regulation is internal to the person, introjected behaviors are not experienced as fully part of the self’
This would seem to accord with the ambiguity evident in respect to introjection in the present study in terms of both its potency as a motivator and the ambivalence with which it is perceived by teacher-participants. In terms of the extent to which introjection can be a positive force, Ryan and Deci (2000) note the value of supporting individuals to be satisfied in their need for feelings of competence and relatedness. They do, however, add the caveat that ‘to only introject a regulation and thus...be controlled by it will not leave people feeling self-determined...autonomy support is the critical element for a regulation being integrated rather than just introjected’ (p64). The strong desire for autonomy and the clear preference for more constitutive forms of motivation in the present study’s analysis would seem to accord with this view. Nonetheless, introjection perhaps possesses more positivity and potency than SDT might allow, taken overall.

6.10 Summary

Whilst the previous section on the complexity of introjection is worthy of synthesis and discussion, this summary focuses on what are perhaps the most salient elements: notions of constitutive and instrumental motivation as impetuses for ‘improvement’ or professional development. Given the respective nature of these constitutive and instrumental impetuses, the present neoliberal educational context is fraught with motivational ambiguity and conflict (Carr, 2015a; Bordreaux and Ozer, 2014), where the pursuit of ‘performance’ obstructs the fulfilment of more meaningful motivations to develop professionally. It seems clear that constitutive motivations are more potent and authentic impetuses for teachers to develop professionally, whereas instrumental motivations are ambivalent at best and actually disincentivising at worst. Indeed, even where instrumental motivations appear to be perceived by some teachers as an impetus to ‘improve’, the nature of that ‘improvement’ is open to question. Arguably, what ‘improves’ is a teacher’s engagement with performativity, rather than professional development in a more genuine sense.

The concepts of constitutive and instrumental motivation presented in this study also have close parallels with the notions of mastery and performance offered by achievement goal theory (Carr, 2015a; Ciani et al. 2011, Elliott and Dweck, 1988; Dweck and Elliott, 1983). Likewise, the contrast between performance goals and mastery goals offers a powerful way of understanding the dynamics at play within SDT. Indeed, Barkoukis et al. (2007) have noted a correlation between mastery and identified motivation; Duda et al. (1995) have found a similar connection between mastery and intrinsic
motivation; Elliot and Church (1997) note an inverted relationship between performance and intrinsic motivation. In the preceding sentence, the use of mastery and performance ‘sub-terminology’ (see Figure 2) was intentionally avoided: it should read ‘mastery-approach’ in the case of Barkoukis et al. (2007) and Duda et al. (1995) and for Elliot and Church (1997) ‘performance-avoidance’. This was because of a desire for initial clean lines of division, but the truth is probably much more complex; more elaborate correlations may be possible between the fine details of each theory. Of the variants associated with achievement goal theory, Elliott’s (1997) trichotomous model perhaps aligns best with SDT. This is because the later ‘2x2’ model (Elliott and McGregor, 2001) entails the somewhat more elusive idea of ‘mastery-avoidance’ (see Figure 2), which as Ciani et al. (2011) note, sits much less easily with SDT.

Similarly, just as ambiguity, multiple motivations and conceptual murkiness can exist within the SDT framework (the positioning of introjection, for example), the same is true with achievement goal theory. As Pintrich argues, ‘it may not be productive to view all performance goals as maladaptive or in opposition to mastery goals’ (2000, p99). However, the basic dichotomy of more positive forms of motivation/goal orientation (‘mastery’/‘intrinsic/integrated/identified’) and more negative forms of motivation/goal-orientation (‘performance’/‘introjection/external regulation’) may still have an essential validity. This may be more pronouncedly the case in professional and vocational roles such as teaching, offering useful insights into how goals are associated with motivational states and vice versa. At which point, some, such as Ciani et al., ask ‘which causal order is preferable – SDT motivations predicting subsequent achievement goal adoption, or achievement goal adoption predicting subsequent SDT motivations’ (2011, p228). Some might argue, such as Dweck and Leggett (1988), that beliefs (implicit theories) lead to the adoption of performance or mastery goals (though these beliefs might change). However, a definite answer here is problematic and this debate may enter into a ‘causal loop’, with the unhelpful circularity this implies. Indeed, within SDT work, there is an arguably similar cyclical tendency in respect to ‘goal contents’ sub-theory (Vansteenkiste et al. 2006), with this being perhaps pronouncedly the case when viewed in relation to professional development/‘improvement’. A more advantageous conceptualisation might be that of a rich, reflexive interplay between achievement goal and self-determination theories, offering a better depiction of how teacher motivation manifests itself in practice in the context of ‘performance’ and professional development. Indeed, other theories can be brought into this basic two-factor dynamic, such as self-efficacy theory. Sweet et al. (2010) try to align increasing self-efficacy with increasing autonomy and relatedness in SDT and, by extension, decreasing self-efficacy with externalisation (natural, perhaps, given the agentic qualities in both theories). This
approach by Sweet et al. (2010) could be made to encompass the idea of mastery/performance too. Others might argue that the two-factor motivation-hygiene approach of Herzberg et al. (1959) might align, linking with mastery/internalised SDT (motivation) and performance/externalised SDT (hygiene) respectively.

On this basis, it is perhaps not without irony and validity that Kaplan (2013) argues the theorisation of motivation needs to be ‘integrative’ (p61). Such an approach is arguably preferable if conducted in an equitable and flexible manner, avoiding what are perhaps unnecessary attempts by one theory to subsume or subordinate another, such as the achievement goal complex work of Elliot and Thrash (2001), or, vice versa, the SDT-dominant work of Vansteenkiste et al. (2014). Sommet and Elliot (2017) move closer to this sense of equitable interplay, but are focused upon the SDT/Achievement Goal dynamic only (to the exclusion of other perspectives), with an arguable bias towards the latter theory. The concepts of constitutive motivation and instrumental motivation are therefore intended to offer flexible and overarching hypernyms (umbrella terms) which facilitate this integrative approach, inclusive of rich inductive analysis alongside a range of theoretical possibilities for the investigation of teacher motivation. What seems clear, however, is that teachers’ constitutive motivations, however articulated, represent more efficacious impetuses than instrumental motivations, which are fraught with ambiguity and counter-productivity.
7. Conclusions

7.1 Limitations

One limitation relates to the quantitative analysis. The case for choosing to treat the data as ordinal in nature has been made at length in the Methodology, with this still being considered a valid approach at the study’s conclusion. However, an important caveat for any non-parametric analysis is that it cannot make a claim as the generalisability of the findings. It does not claim to have captured a representative distribution of the population at large and therefore the quantitative findings in this study relate to the opinions of 319 teachers, not the teaching workforce at large. This study is willing to accept this limitation in the name of analytical rigour. Similarly, this is the first use of a new instrument and the results from it should be interpreted with caution. It is no doubt the case, as with any survey perhaps, that the items can be further refined and developed, with this being of note in respect to the first variable measuring for amotivation. It does not claim to be a definitive instrument for the measurement of teachers’ motivations to develop professionally, but rather a useful contribution to the study of this educationally important field.

In relation to the qualitative work, whilst a sample of teachers was interviewed which allowed for a range in respect to gender, sector, school type and years’ service, it was not possible to secure an interview with a teacher at a school presently in ‘special measures’ (judged to be failing). This was offset by some interviewees having worked in special measures schools and some open response respondents referencing their school being in special measures. However, it would have been desirable to conduct an in-depth interview with a teacher whose school was presently experiencing such intensive scrutiny of performance. In respect to the mixed methods approach, it is also worth noting, whilst the present study does not agree with this view, that some regard qualitative and quantitative methods as paradigmatically incompatible and therefore would disagree with the mixed methods approach taken.

7.2 Contributions

It is now appropriate to outline the methodological and theoretical contributions that this thesis offers, considering each in turn.
7.2.1 Methodological contributions

The use of an ordinal factor analysis in a study of this type is still a relatively new approach. This study strongly supports the validity of this way of treating the data; it offers an effective way of engaging with such data whilst acknowledging that it does not possess the characteristics (such as equality of variance) that would render it suitable for parametric analysis. The use of Kruskal-Wallis tests is more well-established, but this research supports the view that it offers a valid non-parametric alternative to an ANOVA.

Likewise, the use of an inductive/deductive thematic analysis (Carr and Rockett, 2017; Fereday and Muir-Cochrane, 2006) is not a commonly employed strategy and this study argues for its effectiveness and the need for its greater use. This is most pronouncedly the case with mixed-methods studies, with the combination of a qualitative inductive/deductive thematic analysis partnered with a quantitative analysis that uses the same theoretical constructs leading to a more complementary analysis (Bazeley, 2018). At the same time, this has the advantage of being tempered by the inductive element as a counter-balance to the imposition of theory. In terms of the association between the methodology and the study’s meta-theoretical underpinnings, this study argues that mixed-methods research and critical realism are entirely compatible, if positivist assumptions are not made about quantitative work. In other words, if quantitative work is not considered to be in pursuit of the objective and absolute ‘truths’ of ‘hard science’, it might be wholly sympathetic to the critical realist perspective.

7.2.2 Theoretical contributions

This study argues for a composite theory of teachers’ developmental motivations which allows for the equitable hybridisation of frameworks such as the achievement goal and self-determination theories alongside rich inductive analysis. This is through their shared underlying emphasis on what this study would articulate as constitutive and instrumental forms of teacher developmental motivation. The first can be defined as the constitutive motivation of the thing itself (which is inclusive of, but broader than, purely intrinsic motivation, e.g., the educational best interests of children, as well as the pleasure of teaching). The second relates to the instrumental motivation of ‘something else’ (which is inclusive of reward, avoidance of punishment and esteem, but allows for the inclusion of other perspectives, such as the achievement goal notions of performance-approach and performance-avoidance). It is implicit
within this that an individual might at once hold constitutive and instrumental motivations at the same time, though the latter are likely to be at the detriment of the former (constitutive). Similarly, it is held that constitutive motivations are more productive, resulting in more meaningful professional development. The language used here also intentionally avoids reference to pre-dispositions or goals, because of the inevitability of this leading to a distracting ‘causal loop’ debate of the type referred to in relation to the work of Ciani et al. (2011) in the earlier Synthesis and Discussion chapter. The ‘causal loop’ is less important than the actual manifestation of motivations as constitutive or instrumental, with theories such as SDT and achievement goal theory offering real and complimentary insights into their more detailed nature, alongside inductive analysis. Therefore, this thesis asserts the value of constitutive and instrumental motivation as hypernyms which allow for integrative, rich and flexible analysis.

On the note of a contribution to the literature on motivational theory, it is also worth reiterating the ‘gap’ in existing research in relation to a self-determination theory study of the perspectives of working teachers in England in the present neoliberal context. This will be discussed more fully in section 7.3 on the research question (below).

In respect to Foucauldian theory, this study recommends the use of an additional metaphor to accompany that of the ‘panopticon’ and its variant concepts. The notion of a ‘searchlight’ adds the ability to articulate the furtiveness and duplicity which performativity engenders. This is a useful addition to the notion of a panopticon and its suggested variants, rather than a replacement for them. The essential argument would be that concept of the panopticon should not be conflated with the idea of all-seeing omniscience. Instead, the ‘searchlight’ metaphor allows for the inclusion and consideration of the hidden and the dissimulating, such as assessment fraud.

7.3 The research question

In terms of the original research question, as to whether teachers perceive neoliberal performance management actually motivates them to ‘improve’, findings suggest a more complex answer. It was hypothesised that it would be unequivocally negative, though this has not proven to be entirely the case, with the notion of performance pay proving better received by teachers than expected. However, having said this, crucially, it is performance enhanced pay that appears to have more traction than suspected, and this needs to be differentiated from punitive use of performance related pay, which seems to be counter-productive in the perception of participants. Yet in regard to the notion of
performance enhanced pay, questions remain unresolved. The evidence here was characterised in general by the potential for performance enhanced pay to be effective, rather than it being presently so. Major questions remain about how teachers are judged, the implications of performativity in terms of instrumental activity and workload, the question of the extent to which the process of measurement inevitably corrupts that which it measures and, finally, whether the resources actually exist to reward better teachers. Even with positive answers to these questions and accepting the argument that it is a valid motivator, the larger question remains as whether it is the most effective (or indeed healthiest motivator). Likewise, a ‘mercenary effect’ might be worth consideration, whereby teachers feel motivated by performance pay because they have been inculcated into this by the policy agenda (Carr and Batlle, 2015; Sugarman, 2015). It does not follow that because teachers can be motivated by pay that they should be encouraged to be so.

However, what also seems clear is that neoliberal performativity can be very counter-productive in the view of the present study’s participants, instrumentalising teacher development with the result that few meaningful improvements are achieved in practice. This is perhaps the most significant point from a policy perspective: by logical definition there should be consensus that performance ‘management’ should mean performance ‘improvement’. If the ‘improvements’ do not occur, or are superficial or fraudulent, then the present system of neoliberal performativity is not fit for purpose. It seems apparent that teachers can possess high levels of motivation and that this can be ‘tapped-into’ by school leaders. The notion of constitutive motivation is key here: if teachers are empowered as responsible, autonomous professionals, this will resulted in more motivated professional development and therefore better student learning (Niemiec and Ryan, 2009; Ryan and Brown, 2004; Ryan and LaGuardia, 1999; Flink et al., 1990). In this regard, another finding is relevant, namely that more contextual variation existed than anticipated, despite pervasive national conditions. There are school leaders who have, according to the teachers in this study, nurtured constitutive motivations to the benefit of school standards, rather than to their detriment. These contexts can be learnt from, assuming this does not constitute compliance. By ‘compliance’ it is meant that, while school leaders and teachers do seem able to mediate or modify that which they are subjected to in terms of performativity, this should not negate or deny the need for deeper systemic change.

7.4 Implications for practice
This study might offer the metaphor of the ‘silent staffroom’ to describe the absence of teacher voice that seems to exist at present in schools. For teachers, the implication of this study is for a louder collective voice which advocates for what actually works. This is true both within their individual context and at a broader national policy level. What teachers need to emphasise, perhaps, are not just the implications of performativity in terms of wellbeing or workload. This is perhaps occurring to some extent already and falling on unsympathetic or indifferent ears. What is perhaps needed is a greater articulation of the counter-productivity of much that occurs in the name of ‘performance’: how instrumentalism can wrench the focus from the learner; how performativity crowds out meaningful professional development. Teachers perhaps also need to be more conscious of unwitting or passive complicity with neoliberalism (Leaton-Gray, 2006), whilst gaining a keener sense of their psychological incultation into this culture (Read, 2009; Sugarman, 2015). The notion of teacher agency could be important here and Carr (2015a), drawing on the work of Patrick (2013), articulates this as something not which for which ‘permission’ is sought, but rather that ‘it is heavily linked to creating and fighting for the circumstantial autonomy from which personal forms of autonomy might arise’ (Carr, 2015a, p112). This view of the teacher as an agitator for their own autonomy is a valuable one.

For school leaders, there is a clear need to engage with the good practice of their peers. By this it is meant that there are instances of school leaders who have proven able to foster and harness the benefits of constitutive motivation, despite the dominant national culture of performativity. This good practice needs to be shared, and embraced (how this might be achieved is described in section 7.5), emphasising the efficacy of such practices as much as their humanity. School leaders who have adopted these effective practices can also be encouraged to communicate their strategies to colleagues in other contexts. This empowerment of teachers needs to occur in an authentic fashion, rather than in a superficial or manipulative way. There is an argument that the true need is for a wholesale political retrenching away from neoliberalism, however, in respect to what schools can do now, Dorman (2003) describes the positive motivational effects on teachers of a shared school mission, arguing that the more teachers understood/agreed with a collective ethos, the more resilient and driven they were likely to be. This would perhaps allow school leaders to access the more potent motivational states that are presently undermined as a consequence of external regulation. What is meant by a ‘shared mission’ here is not that teachers should better understand why Ofsted, league tables, and exam results are so important to school leaders, or that school leaders pretend to share the goals of their teachers. This results in the ‘hollowed collegiality’ of Massy et al. (1994) or the yet more oppressive ‘vision work’ described by Courtney and Gunter (2015), where the façade of collaboration can be cast aside entirely.
by an autocratic leadership. Instead, this articulation of a shared mission needs to be an authentic and truly consultative process. Deci et al. (1991) suggest that people naturally want to internalise motivational processes unless prohibited from doing so, so this should be encouraging for school leaders.

For policymakers, an implication can be identified in relation to England’s school inspectorate. Given what appears to be the high prevalence of performativity workload, and given Ofsted’s (2017) apparent objections to this, it is now arguably necessary to conduct Section 5 inspections which actively look for and explicitly comment on evidence of school leaders increasing teacher workload for performativity reasons. There is a possible contradiction here (greater school leader performativity to reduce teacher performativity), but perhaps a useful and practical one, which may serve as at least a partial deterrent against instrumentalism. Likewise, in another consideration of how policy-level reform might work, Deci (2009) cites Feinberg et al. (2007) in the Israeli context and Connell and Broom (2004) in the United States as examples of more systematic attempts to integrate SDT principles into wider school reform (in the American instance this was at the level of various districts, rather than system-wide). These interventions, in ordinarily highly neoliberal contexts, appear to demonstrate the value of school reform driven by the underlying principle of constitutive motivation. From a teacher’s perspective, the American initiative included the conscious division of larger school organisations into smaller learning communities for professional development; it entailed affording teachers ‘some latitude to make decisions about issues relevant to them’ (Deci, 2009, p247); it advocated three hours formal common planning time on a weekly basis for collaboration; it recommended teachers choosing their own professional development modules.

These appear to be pragmatic measures rather than idealistic ones and, further, the emphasis on ‘some latitude’ as opposed to complete autonomy might prove more attractive to those nervous of fuller independence for teaching staff. Deci (2009) also emphasises the ideas of ‘alignment’ and ‘rigour’. While rigour is more self-evident, alignment in this sense is defined as being ‘consistent with state standards...[but]...alignment is not an endorsement of the high-stakes assessments’ (Deci, 2009, p249). What this essentially seems to represent is a compromise between responsibility and accountability. Some might regard this as unsustainable because of a lack of logical consonance, whereas others might find the pragmatism of such an accommodation attractive. These processes are supported by ‘technical assistance’ (in effect an external adviser(s)) who, rather than impose reform ‘offer choice, provide a rationale for requested change, minimize pressure and control’ (Deci, 2009, p250). The success of this
American initiative is supported by other studies such as Levin et al. (2006) and Quint et al. (2005). Deci (2009) notes the particularly rapid improvements in Kansas City as a consequence of such initiatives, but also argues that the processes involved can be undermined where there is insufficient true commitment on the part of school leaders/administrators.

7.5 Recommendations for further research

It is clear, especially in the English context, that greater application of motivational theory is needed to further expose the negative influences of neoliberal policy. This should focus on the key stakeholders: the children and students who are being educated. To this end, similar tools and frameworks could be applied to garner the perspectives of children and adolescents (particularly the latter) as to the extent to which, for example, they are motivated by an exam-led environment, or whether they are conscious of the transfer for performance pressures from their teachers. Similar studies do exist, but fewer pertaining to those of school age (more focus is on the experiences of university students). A study in the English context would therefore be timely.

Another avenue in relation to students themselves pertains to their measured educational achievement. Neoliberalism is a policy agenda focused on the reward and punishment of outcomes. However, this largely counter-productive approach may not be exposed as such to its adherents without demonstrable evidence that it actually impedes better test results. Such research is fraught with difficulty, yet if it were possible to cross-reference educational outcomes in relation to prevalence of performativity, this would be powerful and relevant data. Inevitably, this would hold methodological implications at a larger scale, but at a smaller scale, comparative case studies may yield valuable data. Studies correlating student motivations and outcomes have been made in other contexts (Ryan and Brown, 2004; Ryan and LaGuardia, 1999, Flink et al., 1990), so the English context could benefit from one.

A further recommendation might be the trialling of the constitutive and instrumental motivation construct, to better establish its validity empirically. This would entail using pre-identified goal theory and SDT theory survey statements, then assessing the extent to which they correlate. A point of related interest here in relation to instrumental/constitutive activities is proportionality. This is to say, to what extent do teachers find themselves engaged in instrumental activities rather than constitutive. It may prove valuable to evidence the extent to which teachers’ time is misdirected.
In respect to teachers’ developmental motivation, there are clearly national policy factors at work which have significant implications for those who work in the classroom. However, the present study noted more contextual variation than suspected and therefore it may be worthwhile to conduct case studies of what might be described as motivationally productive contexts, in order that potentially replicable strategies might be identified.

However, the extent to which national policy factors influence teachers’ developmental motivation is still of considerable interest. Therefore, cross-context comparisons of teacher motivation would be worthwhile, examining the extent to which there is variation depending on the relative prevalence of performativity. One such valid enquiry might be a survey instrument across not unrelated but distinct educational contexts (for example, the 4 nations of the United Kingdom).

7.6 Final concluding thoughts

In sum, this study sought to examine whether neoliberal performance management affects teachers’ perceived motivations to ‘improve’. Whilst some complexities are in evidence in respect to instrumental motivations such as pay and the esteem of others, it seems apparent overall that neoliberal performance management represents a counter-productive approach to teacher motivation, resulting in number of highly negative consequences. It seems possible to differentiate quite sharply between negative neoliberal performance management impetuses to ‘improve’ and positive constitutive motivations to develop professionally as a teacher.

As such, it could be argued that the implications outlined in Section 7.4 are only pragmatic and partial responses in the midst of a neoliberal context unlikely to change in the near future. What is really required is a wholesale rejection of a demonstrably inefficacious and often damagingly counter-productive political paradigm (neoliberalism). Those who purport to be pragmatic and non-ideological conservatives or ‘centrists’ who are in favour of ‘what works’ (in their view, competition, marketisation, reward and punishment) are in fact dogmatic radicals perpetuating systemic harm and impeding improvements in educational performance. Instead, a more humane and productive policy agenda is required, one which prioritises autonomy over control, mastery over ‘performance’ and as Sahlberg (2011) argues, responsibility over accountability. The unlikeliness of this policy shift does not diminish the need for its advocacy.
8. Bibliography


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9. Appendices

Appendix 1: Survey
In the interests of transparency, the survey is presented in the manner experienced by participants. Self-determination theory question groupings are given below.

- Intrinsic Motivation: Q4, Q12, Q18
- Integration: Q5, Q10, Q15
- Identification: Q2, Q9, Q16
- Introjection: Q3, Q6, Q11
- External Regulation: Q1, Q7, Q14
- Amotivation: Q8, Q13, Q17
Please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements.

1. I am motivated to be a better teacher by my school’s system of financial reward.

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2. I would be motivated to be a better teacher by performance management processes that have a clear benefit to children.

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3. Being successful in formal appraisals motivates me to be a better teacher by increasing my sense of self-worth.

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4. I am motivated to become a better teacher due to the nature of the role itself.

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5. I would be motivated by school managers to be a better teacher if allowed to exercise real choice as a professional.  *Required

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6. My motivation to be a better teacher is partly the prospect of a positive Ofsted grading.

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7. Intensive managerial scrutiny motivates me to be a better teacher.

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8. Performance management processes do not have any relevance to my motivation to be a better teacher.

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9. I would be motivated by being offered a degree of self-direction in determining how to be a better teacher.

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10. I would be motivated to become a better teacher by knowing my educational values are shared by my school's managers.

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11. My motivation to be a better teacher is influenced by the esteem in which I am held by my line managers.

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Options: [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

12. I am motivated to engage in self-initiated professional development to be a better teacher due to its inherent interest and value.

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Options: [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

13. Performance management systems have taken away my previous motivation to...
be a better teacher.

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14. My motivation to be a better teacher is increased by the prospect of greater pay rewards.

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15. More professional autonomy would motivate me to be a better teacher.

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16. I would be motivated to be a better teacher by performance management systems which align with my personal goals.

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17. I am not motivated to be a better teacher because I am not trusted to self-manage.
18. I am motivated to be a better teacher when enabled to enjoy developing for its own sake.
19. Please identify the teacher characteristics which best describe you:

   

19.a. If you selected Other, please specify:

   

20. Please state your number of years in the profession:

   

21. Please indicate your school’s characteristics:

   

21.a. If you selected Other, please specify:

   

22. Has your school implemented a performance pay system?

   

   

7 / 10
23. Please state your sector:

24. Please indicate your gender:

25. Please use the box below to add any other thoughts that you wish.
Appendix 2: Kruskal Wallis Tests

The results of all Kruskal Wallis tests are given below, inclusive of all statistically non-significant findings.


**Kruskal Wallis Test: Teacher Characteristics**

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### Kruskal-Wallis Test: School Type

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**Kruskal Wallis Tests: Performance Pay Awareness**

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Df. 2
### Kruskal Wallis Test: Gender

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Appendix 3: Ethical Clearance
N.B. The thesis title was altered slightly in the name of precision during the development of the PhD, but deemed to be covered by the original project title by the supervision team.

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Research Ethics Application
for University Staff and Post Graduate Research (PgR) students

Application for study involving Human Participants

All fields will expand as required.

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<td>It is expected that all research is peer reviewed before applying for ethical consideration. Please indicate who your proposal has been discussed with (Mentor, Supervisor (s), Expert in field).</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Prof. Pete Boyd</td>
<td></td>
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Applicant information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5.</th>
<th>Name of applicant/researcher:</th>
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<tr>
<td>Kevin Proudfoot</td>
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<th>6.</th>
<th>Appointment/position held by applicant</th>
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<tr>
<td>PHD Student</td>
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<th>7.</th>
<th>Contact information for applicant:</th>
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<tr>
<td>E-mail: _____<strong><a href="mailto:kpr@trinity.cumbria.sch.uk">kpr@trinity.cumbria.sch.uk</a></strong> Telephone:_________Fusehill Campus, Ext 6215</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Address: <em><strong>Calva BG29, Fusehill Campus</strong></em>________________________________________</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
8. Project supervisor(s)/mentor, if different (or applicable) from applicant:

Name(s): ___Prof. Pete Boyd____________________________________________________

E-mail(s): _____pete.boyd@cumbria.ac.uk___________________________________

9. Appointment held by supervisor(s) and institution(s) where based (if applicable):

Professor of Professional Learning

10. Names and appointments of all members of the research team (including degree where applicable)

Dr. Sally Elton-Chalcraft, Dr. Liz Bates

The Project

NOTE: In addition to completing this form you must submit all supporting materials such as participant information sheet (PIS) and consent form.

11. Summary of research project in lay terms (maximum length 150 words).

This study examines teachers’ perceptions of the factors which motivate them to ‘improve’. Drawing on self-determination theory (Deci and Ryan, 2000) as a theoretical framework, an evaluation is made of the intrinsic and extrinsic motivations which might incentivise (or dis-incentivise) teachers. Recent international studies have demonstrated (Gorozidis and Papaioannou, 2014; Wilkesmann and Schmid, 2014; Vansteenkiste et al, 2012; Roth and Weinstock, 2013) the relevance of self-determination theory in understanding how to effectively motivate teachers in the modern context. This neoliberal context of teacher performativity (Ball, 2010, Leaton Gray, 2006) is considered, exploring the extent to which teachers perceive that they are motivated by factors such as the school inspection system, performance-related pay, lesson grading and numeric targets. Deci and Ryan’s (2000) concepts of external, introjected and identified regulation are of particular relevance here, exploring the extent to which teachers can or should internalise the extrinsic motivators employed by their managers and the wider educational system.

12. Anticipated project dates

Start date: ___Sept 2015_____________     End date: ____Jun 2018__________

13. Please describe the sample of participants to be studied (including number, age, gender):

• Survey of qualified state sector teachers. Characteristics dependent on respondents.

• Semi-structured interviews in a local schools. See below also.

14. How will participants be recruited and from where? Be as specific as possible.

• National/regional email lists held by teaching unions (subject to negotiation)
- Alumni student teachers of the University of Cumbria (survey)
- Local schools (interviews). Volunteers will be asked to participate from across the structure of the school hierarchy.

15. What procedure is proposed for obtaining consent?

Informed consent is obtained for the online survey in two ways. Firstly, the email invitation and the first page preamble to the survey informs participants of the nature of the research, the arrangements for anonymity and that their participation is entirely voluntary. They are informed that their subsequent participation by clicking to continue the online survey therefore gives informed consent.

Interviewees will be provided with an information sheet and consent form explaining their right to anonymity and ownership of the data and will give consent by signing the consent form.

16. What discomfort (including psychological), inconvenience or danger could be caused by participation in the project? Please indicate plans to address these potential risks.

Given the performance management-related nature of the enquiry, it is imperative that staff participate on an entirely voluntary basis and with full and entire anonymity. No raw data of any kind will be communicated, either verbally or in writing, to any participant’s colleagues or superiors. Both questionnaire respondents and interviewees will remain anonymous, but professional characteristics (such as managerial position, pre/post threshold status) of participants will be recorded and analysed if participant opt to give these. The interviewees, as key informants, are to be given the opportunity to revise their remarks as they see fit. The transcribed interview data will also be checked and redacted if required by the researcher to ensure that it does not inadvertently breach anonymity, for example by giving detailed and specific personal or contextual information. The reporting of the interview data will use selected, illustrative quotes but it will not be possible to link these to a particular respondent or school.

17. What potential risks may exist for the researcher(s)? Please indicate plans to address such risks (for example, details of a lone worker plan).

None.

18. Whilst we do not generally expect direct benefits to participants as a result of this research, please state here any that result from completion of the study.

Beneficial in the sense of exploring the deficiencies of the present national school performance management systems. Additionally, effective forms of professional development to be identified.

19. Details of any incentives/payments (including out-of-pocket expenses) made to participants:

None.

20. Briefly describe your data collection and analysis methods, and the rationale for their use

1. Use of online survey as indicated above. Analysis to include a confirmatory factor
analysis and subsequent analysis of variances between groups of participants (statistical processes to be decided depending on the underlying mathematical features of the data which we garnered).

2. Semi-structured interviews (Arksey and Knight, 2009) with key participants across an alliance of local secondary schools.

21. Describe the involvement of users/service users in the design and conduct of your research (where applicable). If you have not involved users/service users in developing your research protocol, please indicate this and provide a brief rationale/explanation.

N/A

22. What plan is in place for the storage of data (electronic, digital, paper, etc.)? Please ensure that your plans comply with the Data Protection Act 1998 and University of Cumbria Data Storage Guidelines such as consideration of data archiving, password protection and data encryption.

Data to be stored on UoC office PC only in a password protected network area. No school equipment to be used.

23. Will audio or video recording take place?  □ no  □ audio  □ video

If yes, what arrangements have been made for audio/video data storage? At what point in the research will tapes/digital recordings/files be destroyed?

Audio to be held on UoC office PC. Deletion on completion of PhD.

24. What are the plans for dissemination of findings from the research (reports, transcripts, summaries, publication, conferences)? Please give detail of how you plan to provide a summary of research findings in lay terms to participants.

Thesis, journal articles, conferences. Summary to participants of study available in the form of academic output in public domain - teachers do not need ‘lay terms’.

25. What particular ethical problems, not previously noted on this application, do you think there are in the proposed study?

The nature of the study focus means that it is high stakes for school leadership teams and for teachers. It will be important to gather interview data across a number of secondary schools in order to establish anonymity. Respondents will not be aware of which other schools are involved. The reporting of the qualitative analysis will simply give the number of schools involved and not locate them geographically.

Signatures:  
Applicant: Kevin Proudfoot

Date: 20th June 2016
Consent and Participant Information

As the survey is online, participation information and the giving of consent are integrated. The participant will receive an email which covers the various elements of the university’s participant information good practice document.

The text is as follows:

Teacher Pay and Performance Survey

This cross-school survey seeks to learn the opinions of working teachers in the light of recent performance management reforms.

The survey will take approximately 5 minutes to complete.

Given recent changes to the performance management of the profession, your voice as a teacher is important.

LINK GIVEN HERE

Your responses will be treated in confidence and you have full anonymity.

Please be sure to scroll down the page and click ‘Continue’ to submit your responses.

Thank you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire.

The research ethics for this survey have been approved by the formal University of Cumbria clearance process.

By selecting the link given above, you are agreeing to participate in this survey.

To contact us directly, please use: kevin.proudfoot@uni.cumbria.ac.uk (PhD Researcher)

What if I want to complain about the research

Initially you should contact the researcher directly. However, if you are not satisfied or wish to make a more formal complaint you should contact Diane Cox, Director of Research Office, University of Cumbria, Bowerham Road, Lancaster, LA1 3JD. diane.cox@cumbria.ac.uk, or my supervisor, Professor Pete Boyd: pete.boyd@cumbria.ac.uk

The similar information will be given to interviewees in the format below:
Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation in Teacher Development

Participant Information Sheet: For Interviewees

About the study

This study examines teachers’ perceptions of the factors which motivate them to ‘improve’. As such, this study seeks to learn the opinions of working teachers and their managers regarding what motivates them. Given recent changes to the performance management of the profession, your voice as a teacher/manager is important.

Some questions you may have about the research project:

Why have you asked me to take part and what will I be required to do?

Recorded interviews will be 10-15 minutes in duration and semi-structured in nature (ie, there will be a schedule of questions but these can be departed from depending on the flow of the conversation). These questions can be requested in advance from the researcher.

What if I do not wish to take part or change my mind during the study?

Your participation in the study is entirely voluntary. You are free to withdraw from the study at any time without having to provide a reason for doing so. You can ask for the revision or deletion of your interview responses at any point if on reflection your responses do not accurately communicate your views.

What happens to the research data?

The interview data will be transcribed and then qualitatively analysed against the self–determination theory framework. Audio data is to be held securely on a University of Cumbria office PC only. Deletion of audio data will occur on completion of PhD or at the participant’s request prior to this.

How will the research be reported?

The research will be reported in the form of a PhD thesis and associated journal articles/presentations to academic conferences. At no point will your anonymity be compromised.

How can I find out more information?

Please contact the researcher directly: kevin.proudfoot@uni.cumbria.ac.uk

What if I want to complain about the research

Initially you should contact the researcher directly. However, if you are not satisfied or wish to make a more formal complaint you should contact Diane Cox, Director of Research Office, University of Cumbria, Bowerham Road, Lancaster, LA1 3JD. diane.cox@cumbria.ac.uk or my supervisor, Professor Pete Boyd: pete.boyd@cumbria.ac.uk
Associated consent form for interviewees:

Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation in Teacher Development

Participant Consent Form

Having read the associated participant information sheet for the study named above, please answer the following questions by circling your responses:

Have you read and understood the information sheet about this study?  YES  NO

Have you been able to ask questions and had enough information?  YES  NO

Do you understand that you are free to withdraw from this study at any time, and without having to give a reason for withdrawal?  YES  NO

Your responses will be anonymised. Do you give permission for the researcher to analyse and quote your anonymous responses?  YES  NO

Please sign here if you wish to take part in the research and feel you have had enough information about what is involved:

Signature of participant:........................................ Date:..................

Name (block letters):..................................................................................