THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CULTURAL DIPLOMACY IN STATE TRUST BUILDING BETWEEN CHINA AND THE UK

A thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations

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**Abstract**

In this thesis, the most important argument is that cultural diplomacy can maintain, enhance and even create state trust, at the same time, the effectiveness of cultural diplomacy can influence state trust building. This research is an in-depth, empirical study of the linkage between cultural diplomacy and state trust, and this thesis aims to explore whether the effectiveness of cultural diplomacy could influence state trust building or not, particularly in the relationship between China and the UK. More generally, this research has three key themes: first, it establishes the conceptualisation of cultural diplomacy and state trust by discussing the thoughts from different schools and proposing new perspectives rather than simply looking at the arguments from scholars; second, it puts forward five indicators of existing state trust and five factors that influence the effectiveness of cultural diplomacy in state trust building; third, it explicitly explores the situation of state trust building by looking at the development and effectiveness of cultural diplomacy in both China and the UK.

With the re-emergence of approaches towards soft power in global politics, there comes a growing interest in the potential power of cultural diplomacy. As it is being regarded as the emerging state with great power, China is trying to seek a "soft" path of facilitating harmonious development to thereafter shoulder the responsibility and reshape its national image. In addition, the United Kingdom was one of the earliest states to carry out programs of cultural diplomacy and has already achieved outstanding progress. Therefore, under the grand background of "Golden Era" (Xi, 2015) between China and the UK, improvements of their relationship could be witnessed from many areas. Also, it is a good opportunity to examine whether the state trust level between them might increase or otherwise by taking cultural diplomacy as the main contributor.

**Key Words:** cultural diplomacy, state trust, China, the United Kingdom
Declaration

I hereby declare that no portion of the work referred to in the thesis has been submitted in support of an application for another degree or qualification of this or any other university or institute of learning.
Acknowledgement

I would like initially to express my sincere gratitude to those members of the staff of the Department of Politics Philosophy and Religion at Lancaster University who have supported me during the four years of my PhD career; in particular my two supervisors: Dr. Martin Steven and Dr. Astrid Nordin. Their academic guidance, constant support and encouragement, inspirational advice and rich expertise are invaluable throughout the course of my PhD research. Special thanks to the Albert Sloman Library of Essex University; I spent a lot of time in this library writing up my PhD thesis. Thanks for help from librarians and I really precious the period so much in this library.

This research would not be possible without the support of those people I interviewed or talked to, formally and informally, both in China and the UK. They were busy and enjoyed high reputation in the academic and political fields but were still so generous to support my research. Their advice was invaluable at the time when I was struggling to give some shape to my works.

Definitely, I should owe the greatest debt of thanks to both of my parents and my husband Mr. Yunong Han and whom this thesis is for. Thanks to my parents for funding, encouraging and supporting me all the time unconditionally. Without them, I would never have been able to live in a foreign country and finish my doctoral research here. Thanks to my lovely husband, he keeps on encouraging me in my life.

At last, thanks all of the people for loving me so much, here, I would like to give my special thanks to all of my dearest friends. I am so honoured to meet you in my life. Thanks again for sharing happiness and sorrows with me, and thanks for helping me to be better.

Liang Xu
Lancaster, 2018
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AIIB</td>
<td>Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRICS</td>
<td>Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBI</td>
<td>Confederation of British Industry</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPC</td>
<td>Communist Party of China</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCTV</td>
<td>China Central Television (the state broadcaster in China)</td>
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<td>CNKI</td>
<td>China National Knowledge Infrastructure</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRD</td>
<td>Cultural Relations Department.</td>
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<td>CRI</td>
<td>China Radio International</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUNIC</td>
<td>European Union National Institutes for Culture</td>
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<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Government Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>People's Republic of China</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
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<tr>
<td>SARFT</td>
<td>State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Television</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nationals Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation</td>
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<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Research Background

The main argument of this thesis is to examine whether cultural diplomacy could maintain, enhance and even create state trust or not. Based upon this argument, it is quite necessary to understand the general background in today's international society. In recent decades, almost every state attempts to devote a significant amount of efforts to improving soft power. Joseph Nye emphasises that soft power of a state rests primarily on three resources: its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority) (Nye, 2005, p.12).

The concept of cultural diplomacy lies at the heart of soft power. From the reciprocal gifts of ancient rulers to today's Expos, various forms of culture have been used by state actors to exhibit who they are, assert their claim in the global governance, shape national image and build long-lasting relationships with others. Nye also argues that cultural diplomacy is considered as the ‘ability to persuade [others] through culture, values and ideas’ (Nye, 2004, p. 22). Therefore, along with the economic globalisation and closer interdependence regarding the national interest of each state, more and more states have gradually realised the importance of cultural diplomacy, especially its role in solving international conflicts and frictions to thereafter enhance international mutual understanding and trust building with other states. Besides that, cultural diplomacy seems to be diversified, which means that the practice of cultural diplomacy is not merely confined to the developed countries; developing countries can also take advantage of this concept to have practical applications in order to exhibit their unique culture. Just as the previous chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee of the USA, J. William Fulbright argues ‘in the long course of history, having people understand your thought is much greater security than another submarine’ (quoted by Simpson, 1988). Fulbright’s quote
reminds us that cultural diplomacy is not only about the quest for image building but also is a matter of winning hearts and minds. In an increasingly interconnected global society, state actors attempt to communicate not only through traditional diplomacy but also beyond national borders under the name of cultural diplomacy. Culture is no longer as subordinate to politics, and it is the time to unlock the full potential of cultural diplomacy as offering the operational context in international relations.

Trust is a widely studied and acknowledged concept including diversified forms of operationalisation. In the academic area, Carsten Schultz argues that ‘researchers operationalise trust differently depending upon the focus and phases of trust studies’ (Schultz, 2006, p.1). To Wheeler, ‘the challenge of building trust between states that have a history of conflict and acrimony has attracted the attention of scholars in the field of International Relations for several decades’ (Wheeler, 2012, p.1). It can be seen that the term ‘state trust’ is not easily defined. The inspiration for conceptualising the notion of state trust comes from the concept of social capital, which was evoked in a book Bowling Alone written by Robert D. Putnam (2000). As an important category of social capital, social trust is applied as an analytical tool in the research of international relations. Therefore, when thinking about the term trust at the state level, I draw on the essence of social trust as well as take other scholars’ findings. For example, Aaron M. Hoffman did some studies in the area with regard to “trust in international relations” (Hoffman, 2002), and then coin the concept of state trust.

Additionally, since a lot of scholars and politicians have placed much emphasis on the role of cultural diplomacy in building trust among individuals and states, for example, Philip Seib argues that ‘nearly everyone likes cultural diplomacy in principle, but some remain sceptical about its value. Trust may seem to be an ephemeral quality, but it is at the heart of relations between states and is a principal goal of public diplomacy. Cultural diplomacy can remove the mystery and debunk mythology about a country and its people, and by doing so, and it can allow that country’s policies to receive attention without distractions’(Seib, 2012). Scholars have documented differences and similarities in cultural
diplomacy behaviour and management across different states and elaborated why they occur. However, they have not developed theoretical frameworks for the comparative study concerning the relationship of cultural diplomacy and state trust between different states.

As Frédérique Six mentions in his book that ‘trust requires dependence, vulnerability and optimism about a positive income, conditions that give some indications of why so many people may be hesitant to actually engage in it’ (Six, 2005, p.2). This could also be quoted to further explain the situation why states might be hesitant when they need to make a choice whether to trust another state or not. Moreover, culture, as the essence of ideology, does tend to lead many states to become afraid on the notion that once they let the culture of another state steps onto the civil society of their own state, the ideology of their people might be influenced in a dramatic fashion with associated unintended consequences. Therefore, in accordance with the key argument of this thesis, then several relevant questions that need to be answered: can cultural diplomacy be actually applied in state trust building? If the answer is yes; then how to explore the effectiveness of cultural diplomacy in state trust building? These questions and academic perspectives concerning the importance of cultural diplomacy and state trust present a significant challenge to further research, particularly for the relationship of these two concepts in the academic field as well as its practical application and implementation issues in the political arena.

The relation between China and the United Kingdom is a good case study. Firstly, these two states have different political rationales and approaches to their cultural diplomacy. This reasoning is agreed upon by scholar Da Kong, who has conducted extensive research studies on the cultural diplomacy between China and the UK. He states that ‘the UK is a democratic country with an arm’s length attitude to its cultural institutions, while China is a one-party state with a more authoritarian approach to its cultural institutions’ (Kong, 2015, p.28).

Secondly, the UK is one of the pioneers in promoting cultural diplomacy across the world. It has a number of historical and contemporary cultural advantages:
its collections and performing companies rank at the top level in the global cultural area. It has already achieved outstanding successes. As other scholars agree, the UK boasts a strong tradition of international cultural exchanges through the British Council’s presence around the world, and also via the dense global networks of its national cultural institutions and diaspora communities (Bound et al., 2007). China has a large amount of significant cultural heritage as well. In recent decades, the desire and efforts of the Chinese government to strengthen its cultural soft power and polish its national image on the global stage, using various methods in order to implement its cultural diplomatic programs, has attracted increasing attention.

Thirdly, determined joint efforts of cultural interaction between China and the UK that has shown an upward trend clearly in recent years. Such as the project of Cultural Year, Connections through Culture, programs of the British Council in China and programs of the Confucius Institute in the UK, those of which are beneficial for scholars as well as the governmental bodies to explore for more advantages and avoid the weaknesses of their cultural diplomatic programs. Hence, due to the amount of data, events as well as available evidence already in existence over a relatively long period of time, the thesis uses China and the UK as the subjects of this research and endeavours to explore the effectiveness or otherwise of cultural diplomacy in state trust building between them.

1.2 Objectives and Aim of This Research
The academic contribution of this thesis is the discussion and analysis of cultural diplomacy and state trust within the social and political background. In essence, this research is a study of the relationship between cultural diplomacy and state trust. More specifically, the primary aim of this research is to examine the effectiveness of cultural diplomacy in improving state trust building between China and the UK or otherwise. To somewhat degree, in accordance with the recent surge in the studies of cultural diplomacy and trust in social science, both concepts have been discussed respectively while the linkage of cultural diplomacy and state trust has not been explored comprehensively yet.
The following objectives have been designed in pursuing this aim:

1. To conceptualise the notion of cultural diplomacy. In order to clarify the main body of cultural diplomacy, this research attempts to differentiate similar semantic concepts, such as public diplomacy, cultural soft power, international cultural communication and intercultural relations.

2. To conceptualise the notion of state trust. The concept of state trust is the original creation in this thesis. Therefore, in order to elaborate the new concept logically, it is necessary to discuss the related concepts, such as social capital and social trust.

3. To explore the relationship of cultural diplomacy and state trust. It could help to understand the potential influences on state trust building during the implementation process of cultural diplomacy.

4. To set up methods to evaluate the immeasurable through developing identifiable indicators of state trust. Both cultural diplomacy and state trust are concepts that cannot be easily measured. Hence, in accordance with the detailed elaboration regarding the two concepts in the previous chapters, it is necessary to come up with some measurable ways to examine the effectiveness of cultural diplomacy in state trust building.

5. To evaluate the application of cultural diplomacy in both China and the UK, then this thesis adopts a case study in an attempt to verify the effectiveness of cultural diplomacy in state trust building between China and the UK.

1.3 Methods of This Research

The research has involved an in-depth, empirical study of the cultural diplomatic efforts of both China and the UK, and the methodological approach would have been significantly different. This thesis will describe in what way the main problem will be approached— including the core concepts, theories, data and the analytical approach. A cross-state comparative study in any discipline is not an easy task because of the overwhelming logistical barriers, among other things. The effectiveness of cultural diplomacy and its relationship with state trust is an umbrella topic covering a wide range of disciplines with the integration of other subjects, such as international politics, history, cultural studies, philosophy, etc.
Additionally, both concepts matter a lot with the practices of state actors; therefore, they cannot be discussed alone in the academic field but need to be combined with the real political environment. Furthermore, in order to explore the supportive evidence in both academic and practical areas, this thesis will use both quantitative methods and qualitative methods, which contain some additional branch methods and will be applied to the study of complex phenomena within the research contexts to thereafter develop theory, evaluate programs and expound on analysis. Any endeavours at comparative theory building suffer more from limitations with methodological frameworks than from problems with theoretical frameworks. To overcome the barriers, the research methods used in this thesis could be primarily divided into five parts as follows:

Firstly, there has been a review of the literature, with an analysis of key concepts: cultural diplomacy and state trust. Academic literature review and policy review of states have been undertaken in order to discover the issues of cultural diplomacy and state trust from the academic perspectives and practices in the political arena. Most examples of this thesis are sourced from government report or information from official websites, statement of state leaders, related books, journals and other analytical reports such as official statistics. All of these are of help to examine the scope of different attitudes towards cultural diplomacy and state trust. These reviews are useful in order to establish the necessary theoretical foundation for the conceptualisation of these two notions. In addition, all these efforts are considered to be of benefit so as to have a better understanding of the current achievements and weaknesses concerning the effectiveness of cultural diplomacy in state trust building between China and the UK. In addition, in order to ensure the reliability and maintain the fidelity of this research, some figures and data are mainly obtained from questionnaires of this research, official bodies as well as renowned scholars with respect to the reviews.

Secondly, in order to have a better understanding of the real practices of cultural diplomacy, fieldwork is indeed required. It can help to develop an understanding
of the composition of a particular setting or any relevant issues of the society by taking part in the everyday routines. With respect to the research topic that fieldwork has been conducted mainly in two countries:

1. China: scholarly communication, interviews of both scholars and government officers, related conferences and cultural activities. As China is one of the research subjects in this thesis, it is, of course, necessary to collect relevant information there. Several outstanding scholars who are doing research on the topic of China's cultural diplomacy have been interviewed, such as Professor Fan Wang from China Foreign Affairs University, Professor Bo Qu from China Foreign Affairs University, Professor Lihua Zhang from Tsinghua University and Professor Qingmin Zhang from Peking University. Most of them have kindly shared their opinions and offered suggestions for the research of this thesis. Additionally, this research has been inspired a lot from the academic communication with the PhD students from Peking University and Tsinghua University. Furthermore, several cultural activities provide good opportunities to explore in depth on the practical activities of government and non-government organisations. The trackable records are listed as follows:

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<td>“2015 NE-TIGER Intangible Cultural Exhibition in Beijing” (29th July 2015)</td>
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<td>2.</td>
<td>“2016 Overseas Chinese Youth Root-Seeking Cultural Tour” in Jiangxi Provinces organised by the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council (20th July 2016)</td>
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*Figure 1. Attended cultural activities of fieldwork in China*

2. United Kingdom: academic conferences, seminars, and workshops; political conferences and activities; activities of non-government institutions; individual cultural enterprises. The United Kingdom is another main subject of this research; moreover, its excellent track records in cultural diplomacy could offer a vast amount of inspiration and sources while evaluating the efforts of cultural diplomacy in this thesis. In the past three years, this research has been inspired by a lot of academic and cultural events in the UK. I also took an active part in
organising some of these events, which offered me a platform to examine the practices of cultural diplomacy in both academic area and political field. The trackable records are listed as follows:

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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>“Global China Workshops: China’s Role in the World Culture Pattern and Reconstruction of Contemporary Culture” in the Oxford University (23rd October 2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>“China-UK Film Festival” in London (26th June 2016)</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>“Jiangsu Province Cultural Industry Overseas Project Conference” in London (12th September 2016)</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>“Belt and Road and Sino-EU Relations” workshops in the University of London (6th September 2016)</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>“Grand Chinese Paintings and its Development” organised by Shanghai Intercultural Association in the SOAS of University of London (7th September 2016)</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>“Global China Dialogue” in the British Academy (2nd December 2016)</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>“After Brexit- China’s Culture and Economic Development in the UK” organised by the Sino-Europe Economy and Culture Centre (20th February 2017)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>“Reimaging Xiabu Exhibition in London” organised by China Design Centre and Chelsea Art College (17th March)</td>
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**Figure 2. Attended activities of fieldwork in the UK.**

Thirdly, questionnaire (see Appendix 3) has been designed to collect the opinions from the public on the discussion of these two concepts: cultural diplomacy and state trust. It helps to foster a better understanding and generation of assumptions on the key argument of this thesis. This questionnaire
started in July 2014, ended in January 2015 and collected 2,215 valid samples in total. This questionnaire has three channels to collect data: 1) postal questionnaire (285 samples), which had been sent to some interviewees by post; 2) online questionnaire (1624 samples), which had been published on the website; 3) street questionnaire (306 samples), which had been distributed randomly to the passengers. Further, questionnaires of this research are divided into two editions: English language edition (984 samples) and Chinese language edition (1231 samples), which could help to collect responses from both Chinese-speaking and English-speaking people. Additionally, these respondents were also from different countries, different occupations, and different ages.

Fourthly, semi-structured interviews have been undertaken. It is beneficial to test the level of knowledge of the general public on cultural diplomacy, state trust and to evaluate the benefits of cultural diplomacy in state trust building between China and the UK. Furthermore, these interviews are also used to identify the problems and difficulties that exist in both academic and political areas. The interviewers can be divided into several groups:

1. Political area: government officials, politicians, diplomats and advisors of foreign policy (see Appendix 1).
2. Academic field: academic scholars (See Appendix 1), student majored in the related subjects (see Appendix 2).
3. Relevant non-governmental Institutions: director and staff (see Appendix 2).
4. Individuals who have interest in the concept of cultural diplomacy (see Appendix 2).

Due to the various situations of interviewers, there is a range of ways to collect and record data from the structured interview, which could ensure the efficiency of the interview. This thesis has adopted the following manner: 1. Paper-based interview, for example, questionnaire and post mails; 2. Face-to-face interview; 3. Telephone interview; 4. Internet-based interview, for example, emails and communication on the social software of mobile phones.
Lastly, one case study has been employed as useful as an exploratory tool in this thesis, which will provide an understanding of a complicated progress to examine the effectiveness of cultural diplomacy in state trust building between China and the UK. Therefore, I choose the 2015 China-UK Cultural Year as the case study of this thesis.

1.4 Limitations of Research Methods

It is also important to note the methodological limitations of this thesis. For example, insufficiency of questionnaires. The participants of the questionnaire presented in this thesis are mostly affiliated with different universities, which could not ensure the variety of the sample. This means, strictly speaking, the conclusion of the obtained samples could not represent the reality well due to a lot of factors, such as sample size, sample varieties and questionnaire’s content.

Additionally, during a host of interviews, a researcher may give out indirect signals or clues that guide the respondents to provide the answers he/she expects (Miles, Huberman, and Saldaña, 2013, p.193). It can be avoided as much as possible by the researcher retaining himself neutral and giving the interviewees the confidence to answer the questions truthfully. While interviewing respondents, researchers may find it far from straightforward to determine whether they are truthful or not. Respondents may not consciously conceal information but may have an imperfect recall. It could be one of the limitations of this research as the interviewees were asked questions about experiences that had occurred.

1.5 Overview of Thesis Structure

In order to achieve the objectives and aim of this research, this thesis is laid out in seven chapters in total:

This introductory chapter presents a general introduction to this thesis, which includes research background, aims and objectives, methods and overview of thesis structure. To be able to provide a thorough answer to each of the main research questions, it is foremost necessary to provide more background
information in this chapter. Following on from this, the detailed conceptualisation of these two concepts that upcoming chapters will be provided.

Chapter 2 conceptualises the notion of cultural diplomacy based upon its multiple definitions across a range of social science disciplines. This chapter argues that the main subject of cultural diplomacy is the state actor, such as government institutions or non-governmental institutions authorised by the government to join programs of cultural diplomacy. Additionally, this chapter attempts to differentiate several semantic concepts so as to ensure the essence of cultural diplomacy, such as public diplomacy, cultural soft power, intercultural communication and international cultural relations. Furthermore, it outlines the general development of cultural diplomacy. It also arguably discusses the limits and merits of cultural diplomacy.

Chapter 3, the concept of state trust is elaborated at length. The beginning of this chapter clarifies and highlights the important theoretical and empirical misconceptions regarding the key terms as follows: trust, confidence, social capital and social trust. The next section combines the essence of both trust and social capital to conceptualise a new concept—state trust. The next section outlines the relationship of state trust and cultural diplomacy. Three propositions are put forward in this part to discuss the key argument of this thesis, assuming that when everything else being equal, if cultural relations can be strengthened and improved, the challenges of cultural identity can be solved well, and reciprocal behaviour can be increased or maintained, then cultural diplomacy can maintain, enhance and even create state trust. Besides, in order to explore how cooperation, state trust and cultural diplomacy can reinforce with each other, the last section introduces and discusses the Game of State Trust, explicitly and arguably. The concept of state trust tailored for this thesis that later will be empirically tested across the comparative case studies.

Chapter 4 concurred with the establishes view by other scholars that measuring the effectiveness of cultural diplomacy is far from straightforward, and that
attempting to gauge precise level of state trust is particularly difficult. This chapter thus puts forward five indicators to examine different levels of the existing state trust: a) high level of state trust--discretionary power in the policy-making; b) upper medium level of state trust -- types of rules that state actor employ in the written forms and with leeway; c) medium level of state trust--carrying out benevolent policies between states; d) lower medium level of state trust--advantageous orientation of states’ policies; e) minimal level of state trust--cooperation among states. This chapter discusses five obstacles of cultural diplomacy in state trust building. Additionally, nine factors that may influence the effectiveness of cultural diplomacy are proposed as well: a) some content of cultural policies and foreign policies; b) clearly defined social roles, formal contract and well-established obligations between states; c) the quality of cultural diplomatic programs; d) coordination among different governmental departments and other institutions within and across states; e) existing mistrust and conflictual issues between states; f) misuse of funding for cultural diplomatic programs; g) the operation of overseas cultural institutions; h) publicity concerning the programs of cultural diplomacy; i) monitoring the impact after cultural diplomatic activities. These indicators and factors will thus serve, over the course of the empirical case studies, as the measurement tool to examine the effectiveness of cultural diplomacy in state trust building.

Chapter 5 looks at how cultural diplomacy has developed in China over the past eight decades and what the aims of the Chinese government are. It predominantly discusses the application of China’s cultural diplomacy from the following aspects: the historical origin of China's cultural diplomacy; the Chinese government official’s promotion of cultural diplomacy; the practice of China's cultural diplomacy in state trust building. It helps to locate my research, related questions and concerns in the practical situations and academic fields in China. Additionally, this chapter takes the 2014 APEC Beijing CEO Summit as an example, in order to examine the improvements, weaknesses and outcomes of state trust building.
Chapter 6 analyses the general developmental situation of UK’s cultural diplomacy and in particular, the role of the British Council in UK’s cultural diplomacy. Furthermore, the case study of “2015 China-UK Cultural Year” is adopted to assess the effectiveness of UK’s cultural diplomacy with regard to state trust building. The last part of this chapter combines five indicators of existing state trust and five factors that influence the effectiveness of cultural diplomacy with the foreign affairs to examine the state trust level between China and the UK.

The last chapter offers recommendation and conclusion. To bring the key discussion to an end, the concluding chapter serves two purposes. Firstly, it summarises what has been discussed in the previous chapters, which amplifies the central argument of this thesis— cultural diplomacy can maintain, enhance and even create state trust while the effectiveness of cultural diplomacy can influence state trust building. Additionally, this chapter also puts forward the prospects for the future research and its contribution to the scholarship.
Chapter 2

Cultural Diplomacy as a Concept

2.1 Introduction
Since human civilisation evolves and develops, cultural elements start to be utilised in the global diplomatic arena. Cultural diplomacy, as the name implies, is the combination of culture and diplomacy: culture + diplomacy = cultural diplomacy. Culture is not a simple concept, and diplomacy is a rather tricky word in politics. Both of them are vague terms that can have different meanings with variable usages, which could spawn a string of contrasting associations with mixed fortunes as a result. The mix of culture and diplomacy generates the term “cultural diplomacy”, with an increasingly sophisticated but distinctive meaning. As the main component of soft power, culture is also regarded as one of the most important elements in diplomacy; this is particularly so in terms of the significance of cultural communications among international relations. When the word diplomacy is used, the first impression that springs to mind will likely be diplomatic representatives, heads of state visiting, foreign affairs or negotiations. Cultural diplomacy, which seems to be more of an abstract concept and will produce factors of an intangible nature, for instance, the statecraft of a country.

Firstly, in order to offer context, this chapter defines the two components of cultural diplomacy: culture and diplomacy. Secondly, based on a range of perspectives, this chapter defines and updates the conceptualisation of cultural diplomacy, and explores the possible roles it may play domestically and internationally; Thirdly, it distinguishes this term among other related concepts, including cultural soft power, public diplomacy, international cultural relations and intercultural communication. Finally, this chapter offers the general background about the practices of cultural diplomacy in the global society.

2.2 What is Culture?
Culture is clearly important to human beings; however, using it as an analytical tool can be rather problematic. Culture is such a multifaceted concept embracing
a range of topics, processes, differences and even paradoxes, and that it may only be possible to apply it in a vague and intuitive way. A large number of anthropologists and scholars from various disciplines have attempted to define it in different ways and emphasised the countless aspects of culture. Therefore, it is noted that the term culture varies with numerous changes, and can never actually be described as a single entity. Furthermore, it is also considered to be a complicated matter with dynamic as well as evolving features.

Looking back to the origin of culture, from the aspect of etymology, both English and French use the same word “culture” deriving from the Latin expression “cultura”, which means to cultivate and tend to the earth and grow, or cultivation and nurture (Rossi, 2015). Sir Edward Burnett Tylor, the founder of cultural anthropology, once argued that ‘culture is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, law, morals, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society’ (Tylor, 1871, p.1). Since the era of Tylor, the concept of culture has become the central focus of anthropology. Moreover, it is also one of the reasons why political scientists of the period became interested in exploring cultural questions in the late 1950s, because they felt it necessary to limit their relevant cultural domain to “political culture” (Spencer-oatey, 2012). Additionally, to George Simmel, ‘culture, as it were, formed intentional subjectivity that emerges out of human life and its intentions and is created by human beings as objectified contents or entities in language, religion, normative orders, legal systems, traditions, artistic artefacts, and so on’ (Simmel, 1997, p.103). To Bound and Briggs, ‘culture stems from the wider, connective and human values. Culture is both the means by which we come to understand others, and an aspect of life with innate worth that we enjoy and seek out’ (Bound and Brigg, 2007, p.13). Furthermore, Franz Boas argued that ‘culture embraces all the manifestations of social habits of a community, the reactions of the individual as affected by the habits of the group in which he lives, and the product of human activities as determined by these habits’ (Boas, 1911, p.159). To Kroeber and Kluckhohn, ‘culture consists of patterns, explicit and implicit, of and for behaviour acquired and transmitted by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievements of human groups, including their embodiment in artefacts; the
essential core of culture consists of traditional (i.e., historically derived and selected) ideas and especially their attached values; culture systems may, on the one hand, be considered as products of action, on the other, as conditional elements of future action’ (Kroeber and Kluckhohn, 1952, p.45).

It is plenty of different views toward the concept of culture that provides a solid foundation for cultural studies now and in the future. Moreover, the presence of these perspectives on culture could be beneficial to creating an open and broad horizon for people who wish to understand and recognise other cultures. In this thesis, in accordance with the definitions of culture discussed above, I understand the concept of culture as follows:

1. Cultures are an integrated and not an isolated concept. Integration means that a certain part of a specific culture is related to another culture in some way, which could be regarded as a set of mutually influential relationships among the different cultures.

2. Cultures are products of history. Culture often takes a long time to develop and is generally transmitted across generations.

3. Cultures can be changed and influenced, and they can cause changes and influences as well. On the one hand, with respect to the human beings, culture has the power to influence and change human beings; human behaviour would change and shape the culture as well. On the other hand, for consideration of culture itself, different cultures could have interactive effects with changes and influences on each other.

4. Cultures are strengthened by the various social and cultural values. Cultural values play a major role in the development of human beings, and cultural values are a powerful determinant of human behaviour.

Therefore, in general terms, culture is considered as an integral part of human society. Although the above definitions of culture come from a number of disciplines, the characteristics of culture are stated in a similar fashion. This thesis has a firmly held assumption on the argument that culture is the important part of diplomacy. Based on the analysis of cultural components with
many different categories, this research combines the definition of Tylor towards culture with the summarised characteristics from other scholars as the primary definition.

Culture itself contains many abstract and unaccountable norms and international society is full of numerous kinds of culture, and cultural conflicts will inevitably emerge now and again, in a light-hearted fashion or in a much more serious way. In the questionnaire, the first question is “do you think different cultures will cause conflicts”, the proportion of their responses can be seen clearly in the columns as follows:

![Diagram](image)

**Figure 1. Data result of questionnaire “Do you think different cultures will cause conflicts?”**

As for the responses to this question, there are no distinct differences between English edition and Chinese edition. When the data of these two columns are combined, 47.3% gave the answer that different cultures would cause conflicts; 45.98% agreed that it depends on the situation when different cultures meet each other. When asking for the reason from those people who gave the answer
“Yes” or “It depends” that most of them argue that cultural differences and value clashes do exist, and they must be taken into account in dealing with political issues so as to promote international understanding. Less than 7% of respondents gave the ‘positive’ answer that different cultures would not generate conflicts.

These figures could not provide the affirmative and authoritative level of certainty to any extent, but the answers to this questionnaire highlight the argument regarding the relationship between culture and conflict. It can be seen from the responses that almost 50% realised and agreed on the connection between culture and conflict and this kind of connection could not be just ignored. Since the September 11 attacks in New York, state actors have gradually realised, perhaps more thoroughly than previously, that due the shortage of cultural understanding, which largely inspire global conflict to an extent far less controllable than the superpower conflict during the Cold War (Gienow-Hecht and Donfried, 2010, p.13). Even with the best security check in the airport and bordering areas or any sorts of harsh visa policies, one can never replace the power that derives from a sustainable cultural dialogue and cultural understanding between various cultures and civilisations across the global villages. Human society is not able to fulfil the civilised evolvement or development if there is no culture. However, how to understand different cultures and avoid conflicts caused by cultural clashes is quite crucial, especially in the aspect of trust building among states. It is also one of the main purposes of this thesis, which endeavours to come up with useful methods so as to help to resolve or avoid conflicts caused by different cultures among states.

2.3 What is Diplomacy?

The term diplomacy has been used for a long period in history, and the concept of diplomacy is an agreed standard term without any further contentious debates. This part provides a clear concept of diplomacy to lay the foundation for the conceptual analysis of the parts that followed later on. One of the standard measurement methods to judge the legitimacy of a state is the capacity for diplomacy by this state in question, whether it can conduct foreign affairs in a
proper and generally accepted way or not. For thousands of years, people of the states had already begun to engage in diplomacy to deal with foreign affairs. In a quite long period of human history, whenever it was needed, a diplomat would have been sent to another country so as to negotiate with the leader of that country on a particular issue. He then immediately returned to the country after the relevant talks. Diplomats were typically members of the general household of the ruler of that country or one of the senior officials appointed by the ruler, in order to be in an authoritative position to discuss and convey the essential elements in the actual negotiations, and be able to agree on the results of these negotiations with other countries. Hence the personal link of this diplomat with the ruler, and the high-ranking official post of this diplomat gave the impression of authority and legitimacy as well.

In the current era, the subject of diplomacy is the sovereign state. International organisations, authorised by sovereign states, have increasingly played an active role on the world stage and have gradually become important participants. For example, the United Nations’ activities have close relations with other sovereign states and have a very significant functional effect upon a number of diplomatic coordination. The purposes of diplomacy include many issues, but the main theme is the use of peaceful means in order to achieve the goals of its foreign policy, to safeguard the interests of the country, to expand its sphere of influence internationally and develop an acceptable relationship with other countries. Accordingly, “diplomacy concerns as much the promotion of political, economic, cultural or scientific relations as it does international commitment to defend human rights or the peaceful settlement of disputes, the aim of such international diplomacy is primarily to strike a balance between state interests” (Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 2008). Thus, diplomacy as a critical process of communication and negotiation in world politics and as an important foreign policy instrument used by global actors (White and Baylis, 2005, p.388).

There are internationally accepted guidelines for diplomats’ interaction. Among the guidelines, the best example is the United Nations Charter, which illustrates
the main purposes and principles of the diplomatic behaviours of sovereign states. It mentions 'the mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. Settle all disputes by peaceful means, without resorting to force and threats of force. The diplomacy on this basis is with equality and justice, otherwise will become inequality and injustice. Equitable new international political order and a new international economic order would be possible to build if the premise is keeping peace and development as the main objective' (United Nations, 1945).

In order to ensure the main subject of cultural diplomacy, it is entirely necessary to clarify the characteristics of contemporary diplomacy in the international society. Besides the guidelines of the UN Charter, in accordance with Lu Yi’s analysis regarding the features of diplomacy (Lu, 2004, p.35), contemporary diplomacy has the following characteristics:

1. Independent diplomatic power is one of the hallmarks of sovereign states, and it is also the guiding principle of the equality of diplomacy with respect to each sovereign state.

2. "Limited diplomatic authorisation", diplomacy involves the highest national interest, diplomatic decision-making is at the highest national organs for policy-making, diplomatic executive authority is the decision-making organ, which can have flexibility in operation but only within certain limits and it must consult the organs of policy-making in case of major problems.

3. Heads of State and government have gradually and directly been involved in a variety of diplomatic situations; the roles they play tend to become a lot more active as well as having been placed in a significant and prominent position.

4. Comprehensive and diversified participation in diplomatic activities is the developmental trend of modern diplomacy. Foreign Affairs are subjected to their own political and economic systems as well as the relevant domestic policy and the national necessity/requirements.
For those people who are not quite familiar with the concept and characteristics of diplomacy, they usually use the term ‘diplomacy’ without thinking about the meanings in a logical way and sometimes, even to the degree of being a little bit too farfetched. It is quite often to find some references which are examples of the incorrect application of the term diplomacy, such as Celebrity Diplomacy, Electronic Games Diplomacy, Media Diplomacy, Digital Diplomacy and other similar terms are being linked with the wording of diplomacy. Additionally, the public also appears to have confusion on the meaning of diplomacy and foreign policy.

The term diplomacy is not necessarily synonymous with foreign policy. Whereas foreign policy can be described as the substance, aims, and attitudes of a state’s relations with others, diplomacy is one of the instruments employed to put these into effect. Diplomacy is concerned with dialogue and negotiations, and in this sense, it is not merely an instrument of the state, it is also an instrument of the state-system itself (Evans, 1998). This study takes as a point of departure that states or departments, organisations, and institutions authorised by states are the main subjects of diplomacy. The case studies in the following chapters should be considered with this position in mind.

2.4 What is Cultural Diplomacy?
Cultural diplomacy is the combination of cultural issues and diplomatic behaviours, which seems to be more of an abstract idea or concept. Culture is either the essence or the method of diplomacy, and cultural diplomacy is the manifestation, which can be defined as ‘the deployment of a state’s culture in support of its foreign policy goals or diplomacy’ (Mark, 2009, p.5).

The significance of culture in diplomacy is not in doubt; as the former Secretary of State of the USA, Ms. Madeline Albright once said in an interview: “it is the time to show how the values we preach in the political arena are embodied in our culture—and time to listen to what the cultures of the rest of world are saying about us’ (The Aspen Institute, 2010). Considering the current international situation, the world today is undergoing major changes with major
adjustments, the emergence of a new international balance of power and that the evolving situation will either gradually or sometimes very quickly have an effect on shaping the international order and system. The international community has increased recognition of cultural diversity with a variety of developmental models and become much more concerned about cultural connections with other states. At the same time, against the background of economic globalisation, the rapid development of information technology and its widespread usage have contributed a lot to promote intercultural learning.

Before 2000, the concept of cultural diplomacy attracted very little attention in both academic and political areas. In particular, the discipline of International Relations almost completely ignored this concept. However, after 2000, increasing attention has been, slowly but clearly, paid to the concept of cultural diplomacy. Three reasons could explain the increasing usage of this term with a substantial amount of scholarly and political attention being attached to this particular phrase: cultural diplomacy.

Firstly, Joseph Nye came up with the concept of soft power, which is a controversial and frequently discussed concept in contemporary debates about the nature of power. More and more attention is paid to soft power, and cultural exchange is not an exception. “Soft power” can be regarded as a substitute for traditional forms of power (military measures and economic sanctions). Furthermore, it emphasises peaceful means in obtaining or attaining one’s goals and establishing trust. As Nye notes, both are inextricably linked. Nye also identifies culture as one of three sources of a nation’s soft power, the other two sources being political values and foreign policies; these three sources of soft power are considered to be fully in line with internationally consented credibility and moral authority (Nye, 2004, p.36). In most visible manifestation can be seen in the popular culture including food, fashion, tourism, and entertainment.

Barghoorn defined cultural diplomacy as 'the manipulation of cultural materials and personnel for propaganda purposes, and a branch of intergovernmental
propaganda' (Barghoorn, 1976, p.48). As the time goes by, in the contemporary era, American political scientist Milton Cummings defines it as ‘the exchange of ideas, information, art, and other aspects of culture among nations and their peoples in order to foster mutual understanding, which can also be more of a one-way street than a two-way exchange, as when one nation concentrates its efforts on promoting the national language, explaining its policies and point of view, or “telling its story” to the rest of the world’ (Cummings, 2003, p.1). In current historiography, Jessica Gienow-Hecht and Mark Donfried agree that ‘cultural diplomacy often denotes a national policy designed to support the export of representative samples of that national culture in order to further the objectives of foreign policy’ (Gienow-Hecht and Donfried, 2010, p.15).

Secondly, the very speedy progress of globalisation has accelerated the rise of cultural diplomacy and other forms of cultural flows. As one school argues, ‘globalisation is not just an economic matter but is concerned with issues of cultural meaning. While the values and meanings attached to place remain significant, we are increasingly involved in networks that extend far beyond our immediate physical locations’ (Barker, 2012, p.6). Globalisation is also an ever-more important aspect of international relations because globalisation and advancements in communication technologies have reconfigured the power dynamics between different social actors. For example, the globalisation of electronic communications provides a convenient method for people to explore world cultures almost without limitation of space and time. Therefore, the diplomatic efforts of a state could be used efficiently and effectively by niche targeting.

Thirdly, with the extensive emergence of religious conflict, the importance of understanding and respecting different religious cultures is an issue that is fast becoming an increasingly urgent necessity. International society’s move from the bipolar situation of the Cold War to the uncertainties of the current multi-polar world has a profound influence on the ways in which states attempt to construct and project their national image and identity. Cultural, religious and ethnic
factors are now playing an increasingly significant role in defining the image and sense of identity of a state.

A recent argument in the academic and political fields has asked whether culture can be used for political or diplomatic purposes. As for the research interview, which was conducted during the period from 10th September 2014 to 30th April 2015, fifty-two individuals from various occupations (scholars, university students, government officers, news reporters, curators, etc.) were selected to provide their perspectives towards the role of culture in politics. Most of the interviewees had a certain degree of knowledge in the politics. Therefore, results of the interview could help to explore the general opinions towards this topic. In this interview, eighteen interviewees argue that culture is pure while politics is full of tricks. Hence, they could not possibly have the connection. Among the eighteen interviewees, five of them had interest in the politics, while the rest thirteen interviewees had less interest in politics.

Additionally, twelve interviewees argue that the linkage of culture with a diplomatic frame around it implies that culture is just another tool for the promotion of national interest overseas, thus “cultural relations”, or “cultural engagement” would be much more appropriate than the term cultural diplomacy. Other perspectives along the same lines include knowledge diplomacy, global cultural exchange, and cultural collaboration. Nonetheless, the term cultural diplomacy has been attracting a significant amount of support. In addition, in this research interview, some scholars, PhD students and government officers, for example, Professor Qingmin Zhang from Peking University and Mr. Rulei Dong from Beijing Government, argue that if the state takes culture as an effective tool to promote international cooperation and mutual understanding, the contribution of culture to politics should not be left unrecognised. As for the result of questionnaires, the question is “do you think ‘culture’ can be used as a means of diplomacy?”
Figure 2. Data result of the questionnaire “Do you think of “culture” can be used as a means of diplomacy?”

It can be seen clearly from the figures with the highlight that more than 80% of the respondents think that culture can be used for diplomatic purposes. Although these figures could not represent the opinions of all the people, or the published and stated perspectives of any authority, it does provide an indication of the general opinion or outlook of the public.

In addition, during the process of conducting the interviews and meeting the people who offered responses to the questionnaire, it finds that not so many people in China care about cultural diplomacy. Therefore, as there are very few people who are willing to pay any degree of attention towards the understanding of cultural diplomacy, the knowledge, the idea or concept of cultural diplomacy could not be obtained easily. For example, in China, there is a piece of news with the title that ‘XXX (a female actor) represents cultural diplomacy (Sina
Entertainment, 2015), it is highly likely that the editor has not grasped the
differences between the concept of cultural diplomacy and cultural activity. This
phenomenon, to some extent, illustrates the relatively low level of knowledge
regarding the concept of cultural diplomacy in China. Because a substantial
proportion of members of the public would tend to agree with the
notion--attending cultural activities in other foreign countries equals to the
perceived correct behaviours of cultural diplomacy. More specifically, this type
of misunderstanding is also a reflection on the fact that the public is not quite
familiar with other respective terms resulting in having confusion with their
meanings, such as cultural communication, individual cultural exchange, cultural
relations, etc.

In the academic field, cultural diplomacy is in need of a higher level of attention.
According to Simon Mark, 'cultural diplomacy has been almost entirely ignored
by the discipline of IR. General texts on diplomacy, which might be assumed to
include cultural diplomacy, barely mention, or discuss, the practice (Mark, 2009,
p.9). Additionally, in accordance with the research report published by EUNIC
(European Union National Institutes for Culture), 'on the whole, cultural
diplomacy at the academic level is still relatively uncharted territory, and there is
a lack of training specific to the subject. Programs that explicitly deal with
cultural diplomacy usually borrow content from more consolidated disciplines,
including political science, international relations, and public communication'
(EUNIC, 2016, p.2).

The questionnaire in this study identifies that only 9.97% of the 2,125 sample
respondents consider themselves quite familiar with the concept of cultural
diplomacy and 45.66% know a little bit about the concept, while 42.86% in total,
without any knowledge of this concept.
Figure 3. Data result of the questionnaire “Do you know the concept of cultural diplomacy?”

In the two figures shown above, due to the fact that the distribution of questionnaires in English language was mainly conducted in Europe and that the distribution of questionnaires in Chinese language was mostly carried out in China, a huge difference in the results appears to show that Europeans consider themselves to be much more familiar with the concept of cultural diplomacy than the Chinese. When the question is asked ‘can you describe the definition with your own words’, those people who thought they were familiar with the concept broadly answer that cultural diplomacy is the use of a country’s culture to reach foreign audiences, that it endeavours to project a positive image of a state in the international arena. Besides, they consider that cultural diplomacy is an increasingly important component of the diplomatic efforts of many countries.
Another question of this questionnaire is framed in an interesting fashion as well, “do you think ordinary citizens and non-governmental institutions rather than government or diplomats also could be a part of cultural diplomacy?” The reason why designs this question is mainly because of that in the current academic area, three schools holding different perspectives towards the main subject of cultural diplomacy. Answers given are shown in the following figures:

![English Edition](image1)

![Chinese Edition](image2)

**Figure 4. Data result of the questionnaire “do you think ordinary citizens and non-governmental institutions rather than government or diplomats also could be a part of cultural diplomacy?”**

More than 70% responds to the option of “yes”, which means that they consider that ordinary citizens and non-governmental institutions could join as a part of cultural diplomacy. Approximately, 20% chooses the answer “it depends”. However, this group of respondents has two different perspectives. Some of them consider that within some specific types of situation, ordinary citizens might be able to participate in the activities of cultural diplomacy, which is conducted by the government or non-governmental institutions authorised by the state. While the rest of them thinks that ordinary citizens can join the
activities of cultural diplomacy, which is conducted by other non-state actors. From the responses towards this question, it demonstrates that the dispute concerning the main subject of cultural diplomacy does exist and a substantial proportion of them considers that the main body of cultural diplomacy should not be merely limited to the political arena.

In the academic field, there are three schools grappling with the definitions and the main subject of cultural diplomacy. One of the supporters of the first school is Fayet, who insists that cultural diplomacy matters more with state control and propaganda. To Fayet, ‘cultural diplomacy in the Soviet Union from the 1920s onward took the dimension of cultural propaganda work, organising tours by Soviet artists, scholars, and exhibitions outside Russia while welcoming foreign journalists and representatives of international humanitarian organisations’ (Fayet, 2010, p.9). Another representative of this school is Prof. Lihua Zhang, the director of Sino-Europe Research Centre of International Department of Tsinghua University stated in an interview given. She considers that the concept of cultural diplomacy is a reference to the sum total of the foreign cultural relations engaged in by a government, including the official foreign cultural strategy and policy, foreign cultural exchange activities and projects, which are hosted, led, supported and financed by states and governments. She also claims that the principal subject of diplomacy can only be a matter for states and governments. In addition, she also argues that if any activities that could be given the title or term as diplomacy without any prerequisites, then perhaps the use of this term ‘diplomacy’ in this particular situation would not be an accurate reflection of the essence of diplomacy. Furthermore, based upon the research report by the EUNIC, which demonstrates a slightly different perspective from Prof. Zhang; it states that ‘cultural diplomacy does not necessarily entail the involvement of the government but implies its role in fostering a specific strategic interest; and the “cultural relations approach,” which looks at cultural diplomacy as a practice based on dialogue and collaboration, detached from a soft power framework’ (EUNIC, 2016). This school considers the use of cultural diplomacy as an instrument of state policy and with a certain kind of limited private participation.
Another school regards the use of cultural diplomacy as a tool to work at the exclusion of state policies. For instance, Aniko Macher considers that ‘while officials used the terms “cultural diplomacy” and “propaganda” interchangeably, the origins of cultural diplomacy were nonetheless neither propagandistic nor new: instead, it represented a means to establish ties with countries that were politically unpalatable’ (Macher, 2010, p.75).

The third school defines cultural diplomacy as beyond the realm of the state. For example, Maki Aoki-Okabe and other two Japanese scholars argue that ‘cultural diplomacy matters with the promotion abroad “national culture” and interactive cultural exchange. Additionally, the structure of cultural diplomacy agency can be extremely heterogeneous’ (Maki; Toich; Kawamura, 2010, p.212).

In accordance with the elaboration on the concept of diplomacy in the previous section, cultural diplomacy is a matter of emphasis on the role of sovereign state or government when these official bodies engage in foreign cultural exchanges. States are perceived as the main actors carrying out cultural diplomacy, even though they might lose some of their monopolies as other actors become more active. It should not and cannot disappear from cultural diplomatic programs, and the necessity of state activities cannot be dismissed. Instead, they could fill a significant role by ensuring that the private agendas or related groups from civil society could work in tandem with the priorities and challenges of national policy. Additionally, they utilise culture as a means to achieve the specific political purpose or strategic intent outside the usual or formal diplomatic activities; while other sectors could conduct the process of implementation towards cultural communication programs under the guidance of the national government. As Mark argues, ‘cultural diplomacy is managed both by diplomats working for a state’s foreign ministry and by those working for stand-alone entities with varying degrees of governance and funding links to foreign ministries. Activities are undertaken within cultural diplomacy’s scope manifest an aspect of the culture of the state which the government represents, and involve a wide range of participants such as artists, singers, and the exchange of people, such as academics. The practice incorporates a wide range of activities
and now more often includes cultural activity targeted at the wider population rather than elites, as well as sport’ (Mark, 2008, p.10). Mark’s perspective is mostly agreed in this thesis.

When discussing the purposes of cultural diplomacy, in accordance with the research by the EUNIC, ‘cultural diplomacy preferred by most scholars and diplomats that it should be based on dialogue, collaboration, and co-production, whose main purpose is not to influence decision makers but rather to change attitudes and behaviours’ (EUNIC, 2016, p.3). This perspective is partly agreed in this thesis. Cultural diplomacy is undertaken for a range of purposes. In this thesis, firstly, one of the purposes of cultural diplomacy is to influence the decision makers of other states, especially policy decision makers. Secondly, enriching and developing the culture to strengthen mutual understanding and cooperation is quite important, but not the fundamental purpose of cultural diplomacy; however, employing cultural diplomacy as an intermediary to safeguard and promote national cultural interests to thereafter achieve the external cultural strategy of a state is the main purpose of cultural diplomacy. Therefore, in order to achieve this aim, it cannot avoid the considerable attention from decision makers. Thirdly, this research agrees with another purpose of cultural diplomacy in changing attitudes and behaviours domestically and externally.Fourthly, utilising the efforts of cultural diplomacy might assist a state to establish friendly relationships with other states is a purpose of cultural diplomacy as well. Non-essential frictions or minor but irritating conflicts might be skirted around or even avoided due to the resultant effects of cultural diplomacy.

2.5 Differentiation of Similar Concepts
Jessica C.E. and Mark Donfried argue that ‘the concept of cultural diplomacy has become an increasingly perplexing and controversial term, one that is often used interchangeably with other similar terms’ (Gienow-Hecht and Donfried, 2010, p.13). The similar terms are listed as follows: cultural soft power, public diplomacy, foreign cultural relations and intercultural communication. Therefore, there is a certain kind of confusion when discussing those concepts. The
confusion arises from the reality that the concept of cultural diplomacy is quite distinct when compared with other diplomatic interactions among state actors. In order to have a better understanding of cultural diplomacy to thereafter avoid the semantic confusion with other similar terms, it is therefore essential to briefly distinguish it from these concepts. Through the comparison of these apparently similar but in actual fact, categorically and significantly different concepts, the meaning of cultural diplomacy will become much clearer.

What is Cultural Soft Power?

The concept of soft power was coined by Joseph Nye, who is the first person to divide national power into two parts: soft power and hard power. Nye stated that hard power has its limitations, while the real unlimited power is soft power (Nye, 1990, p.160). To Nye, hard power refers to ‘the ability to use the carrots and sticks of economic and military might to make others follow your will’ (Nye, 2003). As it is well known to the general public on the concept of hard power, it refers to coercive force, exercised through for acquiring natural resources, economy, military, science, and technology. Soft power derives from anything else and diametrically opposed to the use of hard power. It is a general concept with the emphasis on the ability of a country to persuade others to do what it wants without the use of force or other forms of coercion.

Nye further points out that if a country can set up the leading international norms and the international system, it can then affect the preferences of people and the understanding of national interests, leading the state to have soft power (Nye, 1990, p.160). In 2004, Nye expounded the concept of soft power in his book *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, in the preface of which he argued that soft power could only be used if others acknowledge this power, and those who wish to see it as a means to achieve their goals. Usually, soft power stems from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideas and policies (Nye, 2004, p.22). He attributed the state’s soft power to three primary sources: the first one is culture, which can have appeal to other countries; the second is political values, which can be practised in reality; the third is
considered to be the foreign affairs policy, which has legitimacy and moral authority.

Cultural soft power is thus a term derived from the concept of soft power. In fact, it serves as one of the significant components of soft power. It is also an important part of the overall strength of a nation and its international competitiveness. More specifically, cultural soft power means the attractiveness of a state and the influences produced by its culture, which is the consequence of ideology, such as cultural values, ideological norms, policies, etc. Among all these, cultural values are a reference to the mainstream culture recognised by most states and that it is the core element of cultural soft power.

Cultural soft power itself includes two parts, cultural attraction and cultural influence. Cultural attraction usually means the internal cohesion of the culture and the external appeal of the culture of a country; it generates a positive impression on foreign audiences and deepens their understanding of the culture of another state through spiritual or cultural values and cultural expressions (Zhang, 2013, p.12). For example, in the Tang Dynasty of China, especially in the period of “Zhenguan Zhi Zhi” (627-649), the neighbouring countries had been attracted progressively and successfully by Chinese culture; they respected Chinese cultural values. Therefore, they started to send envoys to Chang’an, the capital of China, during that period to thereafter learn the culture, etiquette as well as the laws and institutions of Tang Dynasty. After that, an increasing number of foreigners gradually chose to reside permanently in Chang’an and other cities in China. Zhang argues that ‘cultural attraction is with the process of cohesion from the outside of the state to the inside of the state (Zhang, 2013, p.13). Additionally, the concept of cultural influence refers to the cultural power of radiation among foreigners and foreign societies; the influential effect of which is mainly produced by the cultural values and spiritual cultural products of a state(Zhao, 2013, p.12). For example, since the period of Ming

\[1\] The Tang Dynasty (618—907) witnessed the first period of florescence in the reign (627—649) of Emperor Taizong, which was called the Prosperity of Zhenguan, an era of peace and prosperity.
Dynasty of China, more and more Christian preachers travelled to China to thereafter advocate the teachings of the Bible and other ideology of Christianity. Their sermons had a great influence on Chinese people and the whole society which appeared to form a focus from the church as the centre with the related religious influences radiating outward to the surrounding areas. Therefore, a lot of churches were built all over the cities and towns. With numerous and persistent efforts, the Christian ideology had been accepted by a considerable proportion of the Chinese people across a large part of China. It is the phenomenon regarding cultural radiation and cultural influential process--from inside to outside.

When comparing cultural diplomacy and cultural soft power, cultural soft power mainly refers to the power of delivering the cultural values and from a state to another state to thereafter gain the cultural attraction from foreign audiences, while cultural diplomacy always means the cultural activities and programs mainly undertaken by state actors. To put it in another way, cultural diplomacy is one of the several different parts of cultural soft power, which provides cultural values and other cultural norms for cultural diplomacy. Zhao also considers that cultural diplomacy is the practice of cultural soft power, it offers a path or a route to the dissemination of the cultural values of a state (Zhao, 2013, p.16).

**What is Public Diplomacy?**
There has been an increasing recognition in recent years of the importance influencing foreign citizens, as well as their state leaders. Public diplomacy is a kind of way to reach the masses. Public diplomacy, as a diplomatic practice, has been in existence since the ancient times. This concept has enjoyed a long history dating back to the middle of the 20th century. Most scholars date the first usage of “public diplomacy” to 1965 when Edmund Gullion, a career diplomat used the term in connection with the foundation of the Edward R. Murrow Centre at Tuft’s University Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy (Institution of Public Diplomacy, 2012). Then the first Murrow Centre pamphlet described the practice of public diplomacy as: “the influence of public attitudes on the formation and
execution of foreign policies. It encompasses dimensions of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy...[including] the cultivation by governments of public opinion in other countries; the interaction of private groups and interests in one country with those of another...(and) the transnational flow of information and ideas” (Institution of Public Diplomacy, 2012).

Public diplomacy primarily concentrates on those activities held in the field of external information dissemination and public relations. To Schneider, public diplomacy can be defined as a government’s communication with foreign audiences in order to provide the positive national image for them (Schneider, 2005, p.150). It should be noted that contacts between individuals from different foreign communities cannot, therefore, be regarded as a part of public diplomacy. For instance, trade links between cross-continental enterprises, recreational activities and friendly exchanges between universities, tourism, and activities of the public are classified as non-governmental exchanges and cannot be counted as the practice of public diplomacy. When public diplomacy is initiated, practised and implemented, it does not necessarily mean the direct contacts from one state government to the other state government. It can be from one state government to the citizens of another state. It is the same case with cultural diplomacy.

However, it should be of note that a significant amount of reliance has to be placed on the shoulders of other information providers to provide the platform as well as the stage in order to have an influence on the public opinion in an indirect way. The information providers might well be government institutions, state media and other organisations authorised by the government or civil communities. Additionally, public diplomacy focuses on a much wider field, while cultural diplomacy is a matter of the initiation, practices, and implementation of exchange activities and projects with a foreign country in the area of culture by sovereign state or other organisations authorised by the state. In this thesis, ‘cultural diplomacy’ is taken to be distinct from ‘public diplomacy’ in the following manners:
Firstly, cultural diplomacy mainly focuses on the cultural field of soft power, while public diplomacy has operations in a much wider area.

Secondly, both types of diplomacy aim to implement foreign policies of a state, protection of national interests, projection of the national “brand” with positive national image and enhancement on many aspects of national influence. However, public diplomacy has a definitive target aiming clearly and explicitly at influencing the ideology of the public among foreign countries. Cultural diplomacy is not considered, simply, as another name for public diplomacy; it is a practice in relation to the implementation of cultural strategies.

Thirdly, cultural diplomacy focuses on the reciprocity of cultural exchanges. In contrast, public diplomacy favours unilateral communication and is primarily addressed to the masses.

**What is International Cultural Relations?**

For the definition of international cultural relations, Robin Higham notes that ‘international cultural relations, as funded and encouraged by national governments at least, generally have a different objective, cultural development... that of building a country's competence and capacity for its own artistic expression through international exposure and collaborations abroad with other artistic or cultural professionals. The Alliance Française, the Goethe Institute, the British Council were founded in varying degrees on the cultural development/international cultural relations rationale and less as tools designed exclusively for cultural diplomacy’ (Higham, 2001, p.136).

The concept of international cultural relations is frequently used synonymously with cultural diplomacy. However, not all international cultural relations involve the participation of government, nor do they contribute to foreign policy goals and diplomacy. For example, every day, everywhere in the world, many groups or individuals providing a number of foreign cultural activities with or without government involvement could also be regarded as a manifestation of international cultural relations. Prof Kejin Zhao of Tsinghua University, argues
that ‘cultural diplomacy is different from international cultural relations while the latter has extensive contents. Despite the relations among different social values, international cultural relations also include human resources exchange, education exchange programs, science and technology, literature, arts, language teaching, books, information services, the relationship among the various social groups and institutes, different mutual communication and contact between enterprises and states, etc. International cultural relations can be conducted by either private organisation, such as foundations, academic groups, religious institutions, commercial agencies and government official organisations’ (Zhao, 2013, p.26). Additionally, Mitchell considers that ‘government carries out diplomacy, independent entities carry out international cultural relations, and the objectives for each differ’ (Mitchell, 1986, p.24). To Mitchell, the concept of cultural diplomacy has two significant levels: the cultural agreements between states and the execution of these agreements. The execution of these agreements is carried out by diplomats seeking to achieve political and economic goals, which are closely connected to national policy and national interest (Mitchell, 1986, p.28). Furthermore, Mitchell also argues that international cultural relations go beyond the actions of governments and their agencies, and can be conducted on the initiative of public and private institutions (Mitchell, 1986, p.29).

In this thesis, therefore, ‘cultural diplomacy’ is taken to be distinct from ‘international cultural relations’ in the following manners:

Firstly, international cultural relations are not necessarily subject to political goals. Thus, it can be conducted by both government and public sectors, while cultural diplomacy can only be carried out by the government or some particular organisations authorised by the government.

Secondly, cultural diplomacy acknowledges that the objectives of a state’s foreign policy and its programs were undertaken in support of these objectives, such as the achievement of understanding and cooperation between national societies for their mutual benefits. However, with respect to international
cultural relations, the actions and behaviour of the actors could be casual or informal and usually has no specific purposes.

Thirdly, it would be much easier to establish the international cultural relations with other states than to conduct the numerous measures of cultural diplomacy. Cultural diplomacy needs a relatively long-term to win the hearts and minds of the people in other states.

**What is Intercultural Communication?**

Intercultural communication is ‘a form of communication that aims to share information across different cultures and social groups. It is used to describe the broad range of communication processes and problems that naturally appear within an organisation or social context made up of individuals from different religious, social, ethnic, and educational backgrounds’ (Allwood, 1985, p.1).

Globalised culture itself is multicultural or intercultural, and intercultural communication in the sense of contracts between people and nations go back thousands of years, but are now taking on added importance because of revolutionary changes in human’s life (Fox, 2014, p.489). Due to the emergence of an unprecedented amount of new developments in science and technology, particularly with the extensive and widespread use of smartphones, the internet, and social media sites, these types of modern technology allow human beings to have greater and easier access to different cultures.

The World Bank has suggested that ‘intercultural communication takes place when individuals influenced by different cultural communities negotiate shared meanings in interaction. What counts as intercultural communication depends in part on what one considers a culture, and the definition of culture itself is quite contestable. Interactions are most highly intercultural when individuals’ group identities are most salient in determining the values, prejudices, language, nonverbal behaviours, and relational styles upon which those individuals draw’ (The World Bank, 2010, p.1).
As for the differences between cultural diplomacy and international relations, Dr. Marta Ryniejska-Kiełdanowicz has argued that cultural diplomacy probably can be conducted by the state within a specified country, abroad or utilising media. It is not only a case of promoting a country's image to foreigners but also to its own citizens (Kiełdanowicz, 2012, p.7). This highlights two important points: firstly, it shows that principal body of cultural diplomacy is the sovereign state; secondly, it illustrates the problem with current practices of cultural diplomacy, which has its primary focus on the national image while ignoring other relevant aspects.

Either intercultural communication or cultural diplomacy could be used to assist state actors in resolving certain kinds of misunderstandings and negative feelings, which are generated, mostly, by the lack of appropriate and timely cultural communication.

In this thesis, ‘cultural diplomacy’ is taken to be distinct from ‘intercultural communication’ in the following manner:

Firstly, intercultural communication could have involvement with the public sectors, while cultural diplomacy can only be conducted by the government, governmental agencies or other organisations authorised by the state.

Secondly, where both these concepts have a definitive link aims to strengthen cultural communication to thereafter reduce misunderstanding. Intercultural communication primarily seeks to understand how people from different countries and cultures act and communicate, while it is not the most important aspect of cultural diplomacy.

The major perspectives on the relationship among cultural soft power, public diplomacy, cultural diplomacy, international cultural relations and intercultural communication show that cultural soft power is a ‘macro’ notion while the other four concepts are labelled as ‘micro’. Public diplomacy, cultural diplomacy, international cultural relations and intercultural communications are the four components of cultural soft power. However, the agent of public diplomacy and
cultural diplomacy is the state or organisations authorised by the state, while intercultural communication and international foreign relations could be a matter for the states or other non-governmental sectors.

In general, in line with the consideration of Mark that cultural diplomacy is not defined simply as the foreign cultural policy of a state, cultural diplomacy is the practice of governments, rather than a statement of how they approach international relations. Additionally, cultural diplomacy has a wider focus than the simple objectives of foreign policy associated with culture. Moreover, cultural diplomacy is closely related to the international cultural relations of a government, but not all such relations are regarded as falling within the remits of cultural diplomacy. Because some governmental entities undertake international cultural relations of a type which are not intended as a contribution to foreign policy goals or diplomacy (Mark, 2008, p.14).

2.6 General Background of Cultural Diplomatic Practice

In the contemporary era, cultural diplomacy has attracted considerable attention from both academic and political fields. Jacques Barzun mentioned that ‘cultural diplomacy, it is not to see ourselves as others see us, but to see others as they see themselves’ (Barzun and Lewis, 2001). The former Secretary of the UK, the Hon. Charles Clark considered that ‘the core point about cultural diplomacy is the need for different groups of people, whether religions, faiths, political groups, or ethnic groups, to understand others and to understand what they are trying to achieve, and what they're preoccupied with. I think it is the way we should be looking at the world much more these days’ (Clark, 2012). Besides that, some scholars argue that cultural diplomacy is a latecomer in the relations of Western countries with China (Sandchneider, 2012, p.29). However, in China, the evidence of culture is used to extend the political influence of the state dates back to the second century B.C. or even earlier (Lin, 2003). Briefly speaking, prior to the Mao era (before 1949), China’s cultural diplomacy matters much more with showing the national strength of China so as to against the attacks from enemy states or demonstrate distinct attractions to the neighbouring states in various aspects. In the Mao era (1949-1976), culture was taken to be as a
political tool to influence the ideology of the public, while the activities of cultural diplomacy in other states had largely reduced. In this period, “Cultural Revolution” is the typical manifestation. In the post-Mao era (after 1976), the diplomatic efforts of Chinese government mainly focus on the national branding, particularly in the aspect of reshaping positive national image on the world stage. Currently, the practical application of China’s cultural diplomacy is more like a political tool to exert desirable behaviour of other countries to thereafter attain an expected result and strengthen the identity of the state.

During the period of the First World War and the Second World War, people had suffered a lot of mental and physical miseries. Therefore, “living in peace” tends to be a dream for almost everyone in the world. It can also be seen clearly in the period of the Cold War. Hellyer argued that ‘there are considerable amount of significant differences and conflicting issues between the USA and the USSR, cultural differences had, ostensibly, been taken to the back-stage having to vacate the frontline position to the greater issue of global geopolitical struggle; however, both states were still trying to avoid confrontation which could lead to massive worldwide outbreak of war’ (Hellyer, 1951, p.12). There is increased awareness of the significance of cultural identity after the end of the Cold War because, in the global arena, there are very few states that would show a preference to provoke a war unless there are serious political issues or major military movements having been shifted into place. When a situation filled with conflicts is encountered, the states at the centre of these conflicts need to explore a path to solve the disputes and conflicts peacefully to thereafter avoid wars if at all possible. Moreover, globalisation also fosters a harmonious multicultural landscape across the world. In this aspect, the application of cultural diplomacy into solving international conflicts has gradually become a relatively interesting and hotly debated subject; for instance, the possibility of communicating via the conduit or venue of culture, values, and ideas, which are in stark contrast to the traditional concept and application of hard power.

Furthermore, the European Union is one of the pioneers to discover the great power of cultural diplomacy. The European Union has always been proud of
being a place of cultural diversity characterised by the value of the community. The common cultural heritage of EU countries has gradually inspired many countries in the world to reconsider their cultural policy. In 2008, the Council of the European Union emphasised the importance of culture in the international society:

1. Intercultural dialogue can help to bring individuals and peoples closer together, and help towards conflict prevention and the process of reconciliation, especially in regions which are facing politically precarious situations;
2. Cultural exchanges and cultural cooperation, including in the audio-visual sphere, can help to establish relations based on partnership, strengthen the place and the role of civil society, foster processes of democratisation and good governance and promote human rights and fundamental freedoms;
3. Culture, an essential component of the knowledge-based economy, is also a sector with strong economic potential, in particular with respect to cultural and creative industries and sustainable cultural tourism;
4. Europe's place in the world, from an artistic, intellectual and scientific point of view, depends on a considerable extent on the dynamism of its cultural creative work and on its cultural exchanges with third countries;
5. Cultural ties between Europe and the other regions of the world can be important for the development of intercultural dialogue and the setting up of common cultural projects; moreover, the Union has to ensure the promotion of its cultural and linguistic diversity.

(The Council of the European Union, 2008, p.2)

Although the Council of European Union did not point out the concept of cultural diplomacy specifically in this document, however, five points listed above not only demonstrate the importance of cultural diplomacy but also provides the inspiration for other states to explore the way of cultural diplomacy. In the past years, as a member of the European Union, the United Kingdom is a classic example in promoting cultural diplomacy. In western countries, UK is a latecomer in the area of cultural diplomacy. However, its unique mode of cultural
diplomacy has made it a pioneer in advancing its strategy of cultural diplomacy. Additionally, the inventive combination of efforts by official and unofficial agencies of the UK working and acting for cultural diplomacy has fermented into a model mechanism for many countries. The typical example is the British Council, which keeps its day-to-day operational independence on a continuous basis but nevertheless supports the goals and objectives of the UK government.

In order to help the general public in foreign countries to have a better recognition of the UK within the international community, the government of the UK initiated a program called “New Britain” in 1997, which helped the Labour party led by Tony Blair to win the general election. In the autumn of the same year, the government introduced a new way to promote the UK through the promotional film "New Britain" and the rock version of the British national anthem “God Save the Queen”. Thus, a new campaign promoting a young and trendy image of Britain began to operate. In April 1998, "Power to the British", a major exhibition took place during the second ASEM summit in London, which showed a "creative and innovative" image of the United Kingdom. A few years later, at the beginning of 2004, the British launched several large-scale cultural activities in China, South Korea, Canada and other countries, the theme of which was called “Creative Britain”. It expressed the attitude that Britain was creative, diversified, free and open to the world. Besides the United Kingdom, other countries are also taking an active part to explore the power of cultural diplomacy as well, such as the USA, Germany, New Zealand, Japan, Canada, China, etc. Among these countries, the USA has realised the importance of cultural diplomacy earlier than others. In 2005, the Department of State of the USA placed emphasis on this concept in a report, ‘cultural diplomacy helps create “a foundation of trust” with other people; encourages other people to give the United States the benefit of the doubt on specific policy issues or requests for collaboration; demonstrates our values, and our interest in values, and combats the popular notion; affirms that we have such values as family, faith, and the desire for education in common with others; creates relationships with peoples; can reach influential members of foreign societies, who cannot be reached through traditional embassy functions; provides a positive agenda for
cooperation in spite of policy differences; creates a neutral platform for people-to-people contact; serves as a flexible, universally acceptable vehicle for rapprochement with countries where diplomatic relations have been strained or are absent; is uniquely able to reach out to young people, to non-elites, to broad audiences with a much-reduced language barrier; fosters the growth of civil society; educates Americans on the values and sensitivities of other societies; counterbalances misunderstanding, hatred, and terrorism; can leaven foreign internal cultural debates on the side of openness and tolerance’ (U.S. Department of State, 2005, p.4).

In accordance with these arguments and emphasis mentioned above, the importance of cultural diplomacy in trust building and image shaping has been confirmed by a lot of scholars and politicians. When states realise the importance of soft power, particularly after the Cold War, presentation of a good image of the state to international society became a popular trend, and many governments become aware of the significance of systematic image construction. Gradually, national image or national branding has become a significant part of public diplomacy and recently there has been a greater emphasis on using cultural diplomacy to exhibit the national image of a state, ‘not simply showing aspects of a state’s cultural face to the world, but a more managed, considered and strategic presentation of national image’ (Mark, 2009, p.7).

It is not difficult to understand why the building of a positive national image and establishing trust with others is considered as the leading practice of cultural diplomacy. In international society, there are various kinds of competition among states for overseas investment, funding, for attracting talents or skilled migrants, etc. A positive national image is at least partially helpful in doing so. States have gradually come to believe that their chances of competing successfully can be improved by exhibiting a positive national image to overseas audiences. The emphasis on the national image in cultural diplomacy typically concentrates on the cultural distinctiveness of a state, but also on its economic, technological and innovative achievements, particularly showing a country’s modern economic face, (Mark, 2009, p.9). For example, in the UK, recent cultural
diplomacy activities undertaken by the British Council have already managed to convey its modern image as an innovative leader in the area of culture, especially in the cultural industry. Another example is China that is now exploring a way to boost its cultural industry through cultural diplomacy and international cultural communication, so as to project a positive image of China as a state with *wen hua fan rong* (cultural prosperity). Those states consider that once their positive images established, trusting attitude from other states would be formed relatively easily. Therefore, it can be seen that most of them keep devoting cultural diplomatic efforts with various methods across the world.

### 2.7 Limits of Cultural Diplomacy

As discussed in previous parts, cultural diplomacy can be a lubricant in various areas in international society. However, considering the characteristics of this concept, just like Goff argues that ‘cultural diplomacy is neither unambiguously effective nor necessarily a force for good. It has limits’ (Goff, 2013, p.420).

Firstly, cultural diplomacy needs a relatively long period of time to display its effectiveness. This feature might push state actors to give up support for programs of cultural diplomacy. They would tend to see more tangible achievement in the economic area rather than wasting a lot of time in order to wait for the outcomes of cultural diplomacy when it can be measured. Arndt notes that ‘the dividends of cultural diplomacy may not be paid for a decade or two’ (Arndt, 2005, p.14). Goff also suggests that ‘cultural diplomacy plants a seed; as such, it may take root over time. It is possible that cultural diplomacy efforts will yield no fruit whatsoever’ (Goff, 2013, p.421). Unlike other simple and straightforward methods, some states care more about the proportional amount of effort put in on the side of inputs concerning the expectant harvesting on the side of outputs in economic and political terms. If the inputs and outputs are not directly proportional when foreign culture collides greatly with local culture, some states will reduce their input in cultural diplomatic programs or even abandon the cultural diplomatic programs.
Secondly, evaluating the effectiveness of cultural diplomacy is quite challenging. Many scholars are in agreement with this argument, for example, Goff considers that ‘it would encounter great difficulties when assessing whether cultural diplomacy has had any sort of effect or not’ (Goff, 2013, p.421). Milton Cummings notes that ‘a certain degree of faith is involved in cultural diplomacy’ (Cummings, 2003, p.3). It is certainly possible to track the number of programs of cultural diplomacy of a state and the number of participants involved; however, it is extremely hard to determine and evaluate the effects on those participants.

Thirdly, cultural diplomacy is not a panacea. Cultural diplomacy might not change the outcomes of policies. It needs a long period of time to foster mutual understanding. A state could not completely rely on the functions of cultural diplomacy in order to solve serious conflicts and frictions across nations. For example, territorial disputes, political intervention, and military friction make cultural diplomacy more challenging of certain moments in time.

2.8 Merits of Cultural Diplomacy

As an old proverb going ‘every coin has two sides’, the emergent power of cultural diplomacy cannot exist if without any merits. As elaborated previously, the European Union has placed much emphasis on the role of culture in international relations, and the USA has also confirmed the importance of cultural diplomacy. Therefore, this section outlines four advantageous points concerning the effective efforts of cultural diplomacy as followed:

Firstly, effective cultural diplomacy can generate more cooperative opportunities, and enhance the inter-state cooperation in various fields. Cultural diplomacy cannot solely exist if without any other cooperation, which is not merely limited in the area of cultural diplomacy but may be extended to other sectors. For instance, various forms of culture might be able to develop and promote a series of related development in the cultural industries, which could be regarded as the supplement during the implementation of cultural diplomacy, such as customised cultural products and other necessary consumables particularly designed for the programs of cultural diplomacy. In addition,
programs of cultural diplomacy not only serve to increase the cooperative interaction among states but can also contribute to the intensification of international civic cooperation. This is similar to what Johnsons argue, ‘cooperation creates conflict, cooperation ends conflict and cooperation provide the context in which conflicts can be resolved constructively’ (Johnson and Johnson, 2008)

Secondly, effective cultural diplomacy can reduce conflicts and collision among states. It is widely agreed by the majority of scholars who conduct research in the area of cultural diplomacy that culture has the power to solve conflicts and mistrust. However, how these conflicts and mistrust could be resolved by means of cultural diplomacy, they seldom provide the specific explanation about it. In order to gain a clearer insight into this question, it might be useful to explore the nature of the conflict. As a specific saying in the book The Art of War by Sun Tzu stated ‘knowing yourself as well as the enemy, you’ll never lose a battle’ (Sun, 2002). For example, Martin Davidson, the chief executive of the British Council, argues that ‘in a nutshell, the people who know us like us--and the people who like us, trust us. Nothing about this is complicated. Cultural diplomacy can remove [the] mystery and debunk mythology about a country and its people, and by doing so, it can allow that country’s policies to receive attention without distractions’ (British Concil, 2012).

Cultural diplomacy could be reflected in a variety of forms (such as cuisine, entertainment, arts, etc.), which can be used to promote the culture of a state. Cultural diplomacy is not the way to force one state to accept the culture of another state; it places a lot of emphasis on the mutual exchange rather than just a single transaction. Without bilateral or multilateral support from states, the misunderstanding issues and other side effects might continue to exist in among individuals, groups, communities, etc. Furthermore, sometimes even a tiny issue of misunderstanding might lead to a serious conflict. However, with the assistance regarding the continuous and persistent efforts of cultural diplomacy, which could shape the fixed lifestyle of people and the way of their understanding towards various cultures of other states. If things go on as
smoothly as expected, states might be able to communicate in a much more favourable way and find a short path to overcome existing conflicts and potential collisions with the result that the soft power of their state might be significantly enhanced as well.

Thirdly, effective cultural diplomacy can promote the development of global cultural diversity to thereafter improve awareness concerning the protection of cultural heritage and the accelerating pace of human civilisation. Civilisation means wearing shoes while culture means wearing different kinds of shoes. The role of cultural diplomacy plays in the cultural communication and transmission is clear without any doubt. Programs of cultural diplomacy might have the effect of the stimulation of people’s interests in various cultures of other states, especially in the aspect of improvement on the awareness of protecting cultural heritage and the issue of respecting cultural diversity. When there is an increase in the effectiveness of the cultural program, then this public awareness would almost certainly be on the ascending path as well. Such awareness might lead to a virtues circle for further development of cultural diplomacy, and will inspire states to share knowledge, information and to make special efforts to improve or perfect the means of cultural protection. Otherwise, if the public awareness towards cultural protection might not be formed as solidly as expected through cultural diplomacy, a significant amount of cultural heritage will be threatened with extinction.

Lastly but significantly, effective cultural diplomacy can maintain, enhance and even create state trust. Grincheva considers that interactions among states are usually implemented through the organisation of various cultural events, which employ the instrument of culture in promoting a country’s interests in economic, political, and strategic fields (Grincheva, 2013, p.40). However, as for the cultural diplomatic practices between two or among multiple state actors, if the states merely rely on the programs of cultural diplomacy while ignoring placing emphasis on the essential elements concerning trust building, then this effort of cultural diplomacy cannot be considered as effective. As for its role in state trust building, it will be further discussed in Chapter Three.
2.9 Conclusion

As the heated debate regarding cultural diplomacy has reached a feverish level in the international society, this chapter has defined cultural diplomacy as: cultural diplomacy is principally conducted by state actors and supported by other non-governmental organisations and individuals as well; cultural diplomacy not only aims to influence the decision makers, to enrich and develop culture to other states so as to strengthen mutual understanding and cooperation, but also to safeguard and promote national cultural interests so as to achieve the external cultural strategy of a state.

Additionally, this chapter has also differentiated it from another four relevant concepts: cultural soft power, public diplomacy, international cultural communication and intercultural relations. Cultural soft power and public diplomacy have a wider focus in various areas, while culture diplomacy pays more attention in the cultural area and can be perceived as a part of the cultural soft power and public diplomacy. International cultural communication and intercultural relations do not necessarily have the government involvement, while the implementation of cultural diplomacy should be an issue for the state or those non-state sectors with the authorisation of the state.

In order to provide a clear framework of cultural diplomacy in the following chapters, it is quite necessary to clarify the main body of cultural diplomacy at this stage. For example, in Chapter Three, the concept of cultural diplomacy is applied to analyse the relationship with state trust; if without precise definition, it cannot prove the key argument of this thesis that cultural diplomacy can maintain, enhance and even create state trust. In Chapter Five, Chapter Six and Chapter Seven, the application of cultural diplomacy in both China and the UK is analysed with practical examples and case study; in accordance with the defined concept in this chapter, it is beneficial to examining the effectiveness of cultural diplomacy in state trust building between China and the UK. This chapter has also taken the EU, the UK, China and the USA as examples to summarise the development of cultural diplomacy, particularly in the contemporary era. Moreover, this chapter has listed some limits of cultural diplomacy, which can be
mainly reflected in three aspects: time-consuming, difficult evaluation and not an almighty tool.

Furthermore, this chapter has discussed the limits and merits of cultural diplomacy respectively. Every cloud has a silver lining, and cultural diplomacy is not exceptional. The limits of cultural diplomacy are mainly reflected in the following three aspects: 1. Cultural diplomacy needs a relatively long period to display its effectiveness; 2. Evaluating the effectiveness of cultural diplomacy is quite challenging; 3. Cultural diplomacy is not a panacea, and it is impossible to resolve all the problems by its efforts. The merits of cultural diplomacy are primarily reflected in the following four aspects: 1. Cultural diplomacy can generate cooperative opportunities; 2. Cultural diplomacy can reduce conflicts and collusion; 3. Cultural diplomacy can promote the development of global cultural diversity; 4. Cultural diplomacy can maintain, enhance and even create state trust.

Generally speaking, the process of conducting cultural diplomacy is more like a way of gardening, you plant the seeds and get the weeds out when they are small, then you need to keep putting your efforts to look after them, and you may have a good harvest in return.
Chapter 3

State Trust as a Concept

3.1 Introduction

Trust is said to be at the centre of a cluster of other concepts that are as important in theory of social science as in practical daily life. Trust is an invisible, abstract concept and is quite difficult to measure. However, the features of trust might be reflected through other ways under certain circumstances. An enduring and controversial debate centres on whether the trust is in existence among states has attracted the attention in the academic as well as the political fields. For example, the Rt. Hon. Jack Straw argued that ‘the balance of trust has to be an element of global order’ (Straw, 2001). As a significant part of trust studies, the concept of ‘social trust’ has been discussed widely. It is frequently used as an index of satisfaction or happiness in life, and it is also regarded as the central focus of a cluster of other concepts or arguments in social science and political theory, for example, in social or civic participation, and in international relations. This chapter comes up with the proposal of a new concept, ‘state trust’, which could be used as an index for the political behaviours of a state actor.

The intensity of ethnic and religious conflicts among states has generated growing concern about what fuels and maintains distrust. Trust and its breakdown are important considerations for any state actors. Therefore, how to rebuild or establish the trusting relationship among states so as to hedge against conflicts is a crucial question. Yet, in spite of the essential role of this concept, little scholarly attention is paid to the conceptualisation of state trust. Therefore, this chapter aims to clarify some misconceptions regarding trust, confidence, social capital, and social trust. It then combines the essence of both trust and social trust to conceptualise the new concept of ‘state trust’.

3.2 What is Trust?
Each term can sometimes carry a plethora of meanings and that the concept of trust is not an exception. Trust is a term, which has the connotation as to be variable, vague and ambiguous in most of the definitions. It is due to the fact that the word trust is complicated by its association to economic, political, legal and moral contexts; it even enters into everyday life within social and interpersonal relationships.

To Fu, ‘trust involves risk taking; that is, both parties know that the actions of one party can materially affect the other, but both share ideas, concerns or issues candidly notwithstanding’ (Fu, 2004, p.16). In simple terms, trust is a major component in the foundation of interpersonal relations. When a married couple is being asked, they might say trust is the basic foundation of marriage; when friends are being asked, they might say trust is the nutrition of friendship; when businessmen are being asked, they might say trust is the premise of cooperation; when diplomats or government officers are being asked, they might say that a relationship of trust is what they seek. Whether it exists between parents and children, husbands and wives, lovers and foes, creditors and debtors, in a general sense, the important issue of trust is an essential element of the foundation upon which further relations are built. Trust can sometimes be perceived as a kind of feeling of trustworthiness that is in existence among interpersonal relationships. In this thesis, trust is a major factor that could be reflected in the relationship among states during the process of interaction.

Studies regarding trust did not achieve outstanding progress until the 1950s when a group of psychologists began to re-examine the issue of trust. Their research mainly focused on the aspect of interpersonal trust. In 1958, Morton Deutsch, an American psychologist, conducted a famous experiment called ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’. In this experiment, Deutsch discusses how to resolve conflict from the point of view concerning interpersonal trust. In interpersonal relationships, trust is reflected in reactions to situations and is determined by that situation. Trust may change as situations change. Deutsch argues that in this experiment, trust is deemed to be a dependent variable decided by external stimuli (Deutsch, 1977, p.38). Therefore, it can be understood in a simplistic
manner that A trusts B due to the reason that A presumes it is in the interest of B to act in a way, which would be largely consistent with the interest of A. Additionally, the existential form of trust is relational; the initial grant of trust relies on the evaluation of A that B would be trustworthy. The maintenance of this trusting relationship between A and B requires the reciprocal confirmation of trustworthiness; otherwise, trust would be withdrawn (Levi, 1998, p.77). To the experiment of Prisoner’s Dilemma, this experimental model will be adopted and further explained in Chapter Four to exhibit a fundamental model of trust in the aspect of cooperation between states.

After the 1970s, a growing number of studies began to focus on trust, mostly in the areas of sociology and psychology. Besides that, the focus was also shifted into the following fields, such as economics, management, public relations, organisational behaviour, culture and political science. However, most studies pay little attention towards the nature and limits of trust itself. Therefore, it is not easy to judge which definition is correct or tentatively agreed upon and authorised by researchers. However, two important points need full attention in this chapter. One is the differentiation of trust and confidence. These two concepts are similar but different. Another point is the function and effectiveness of trust. On this respect, this chapter elaborates how trust works and what the criterion or standard of state trust is.

Firstly, the semantic analysis of trust and confidence should be illustrated clearly. The concept of confidence and the concept of trust are similar but different. For Levi, ‘trust implies a risk to the truster. In some instances, the risk may be so low that we tend to use the label confidence instead of trust. In other instances, the risk is so high that we consider the truster gullible’ (Levi, 1998, p.78). Additionally, sociologists tend to portray trust as a pervasive concept, ‘trust is inherent in and formative of many social situations, including face-to-face encounters and the relationships between individuals and organisations, institutions, and the state’ (Jackson and Bradford, 2010, p.242). Moreover, according to Hoffman’s definition of trust, he argues that ‘trust implies a willingness to take risks on the behaviour of others based on the belief that
potential trustees will do what is right’ (Hoffman, 2002, p.380). Moreover, Barbalet argues that ‘trust is a means of overcoming the absence of evidence, without the benefit of the standard of rational proof, which is required to sustain relationships between persons or between a person and a social artefact’ (Barbalet, 2006, p.3). As for the perspective of Fukuyama, he considers that ‘trust is defined as, the expectation that arises within a community of regular, honest and cooperative behaviour, based on commonly shared norms’ (Fukuyama, 1995, p.3). Luhmann also argues that ‘trust is a means of mediating the risks of social interactions’ (Luhmann, 1979, p.208).

In general terms, trust can be emotional as well as logical. On the emotional side, trust means that you can expose your vulnerabilities and weakness to your counterpart and hold the belief that they might not take advantage of your openness so as to hurt you. On the logical side, this means you have already assessed or predicted the probabilities of gain and loss, calculated expected usefulness or otherwise based on hard performance data and concluded that the person in question would, more than likely, behave in a predictable and reasonable manner.

The concept of confidence has a certain inclination to be a kind of feeling established on privacy issues. Tonkiss argues that it ‘tends to be based on clearly defined social roles, formal contract or well-established obligations’ (Tonkiss, 2014b). Furthermore, in the majority of cases, the term confidence in the international political field is primarily linked with ‘confidence building’, which could be broadly defined as mentioned by Higgins that ‘any set of unilateral, bilateral, or multilateral actions or procedures that act to reduce military tensions between a set or sets of states, before, during or after actual conflict’ (Higgins and Security, 1991, p.110).

As George Simmel says, ‘without the general trust that people have in each other, society itself would disintegrate, for very few relationships are based entirely upon what is known with certainty about another person, and very few relationships would endure if trust were not as strong as, or stronger than,
rational proof or personal observation' (Simmel, 1978, p.23). Overall, confidence can be considered as the foundation upon which trust can be built, but it cannot take the position of trust. The essence of this chapter is to apply the term trust into further studies. It adopts the theory of Fukuyama with respect to the concept of trust, rather than using the concept of confidence, as the analytical concept.

Many scholars argue that trust is rather difficult to generate on purpose. For example, Coleman argues that as a rational account of human behaviour, trust could only be generated in informal, small, closed and homogeneous communities, which are in a position to be able to enforce normative sanctions (Coleman, 1988, p.95). However, he does not offer a further explanation of how to generate trust within communities, especially in diverse or heterogeneous societies. Moreover, Coleman suggests that the environment for generating trust is limited. In most cases, this argument is correct; however, this perspective is not always right in absolute terms. Trust might also be generated among large communities, for example, between states. Currently, a number of scholars are trying to identify conditions that might be beneficial to cultivating trust among states.

Trust is a social mechanism that is embodied in structures of social relations. An American sociologist, Mark Granovetter stresses that ‘social relations are mainly responsible for the production of trust in economic life’ (Granovetter, 1985, p.483). He believes that trust is generated when agreements are “embedded” within a larger structure of personal relations and social networks (Granovetter, 1985, p.484). Social structure is significant in the sense that it is not only a matter of the formation of social capital, but also for the production of trust itself. Coleman considers that it allows for the increasingly expeditious proliferation of obligations and expectations, imposes sanctions on defection from an obligation and helps to generate reputation (Coleman, 1988, p.99). Fu also puts forward the argument that familiar and stable relationships with friends, relatives, and workmates can relieve the mood of participants, particularly when they are trapped in a social structure of the uncertainty about motivations of other people and concern that of others’ actions may not meeting their expectations (Fu, 2004,
Without certain social relations, there would be a shortage of fertile grounds for the existence of trust in the human society.

In addition to social relations, shared norms are one of the originators of trust as well. Misztal thinks that individuals create their moral rules; that is, mutual obligations, through the social interactions they experience with exchange (Misztal, 1996, p.36). To Putnam, social trust can arise from norms of reciprocity, which is similar to the creation of social capital (Putnam, 2000, p.101). Commensurate with the perspective of Putnam, Misztal thinks that reciprocity is a compelling obligation that reflects the normative standards that sustain exchange (Misztal, 2013, p.38). Fukuyama also emphasises the importance of shared norms to generate trust and agrees that ‘trust could be the expectation that arises within a community of regular, honest, and cooperative behaviour, based on commonly shared norms, on the part of other members of the community’ (Fukuyama, 1995, p.55).

Fu states that ‘trust needs to be embodied in social institutions and cannot be fully understood and studied without examining how institutions influence duties and obligations of human beings’ (Fu, 2004, p.19). Other scholars also address the importance of institutions and organisations to trust. Misztal claims that trust is necessary for social order and human action to continue with the rules and guidelines of institutions (Misztal, 2013, p.37). Moreover, Farrell argues that ‘institutions or organisations make rules, laws, incentives and sanctions for individuals to behave in a trustworthy manner, thereby fostering trust. In addition, institutions can disseminate information about expected behaviour to affect social beliefs about trust’ (Farrell, 2009, p.56). In this regard, the school is a typical institution which can be considered as the best example for a demonstration of the concept of trust. As an educational institution, the school shoulders great responsibility for guiding and producing cultivated human beings and passes on knowledge and good manners to the students. Colville argues that is why the school is the place with high level of trust (Colville, 2007).
In summary, there are four main sources for the creation of trust: 1) social relations, 2) shared norms, 3) social obligations and 4) organisations. Trust cannot exist alone without these social factors. In order to form the conceptualisation of state trust, another concept of social trust will need further exploration and elaboration.

### 3.3 Social Capital and Social Trust

As for the concept of trust mentioned previously, the question of trust tends to centre on relations among individuals, which can be understood easily and clearly. However, perhaps it is not always as obvious as it can possibly be on how these particular interactions could be related to the general statements in the contexts of social trust. In theory, the concept of social trust refers to Barbalet’s assumptions and argument that ‘the strength of the theoretical formulation concerning the emotional basis of trust is demonstrated by applying it to consideration of the relationship between trust and social capital’ (Barbalet, 2006). In order to have a better understanding of the term social trust, the concept of social capital cannot be neglected without further discussion and debates.

#### Table 1. Outlines of the various sources of trust

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sources of Trust</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social relations:</td>
<td>Family, friends, relatives, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shared norms:</td>
<td>Reciprocity, belief, performance, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social obligations:</td>
<td>Rules, laws, common sense, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisations:</td>
<td>Rules, roles, incentives, etc.</td>
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</tbody>
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Further contributing to this preoccupation with trust is the attractiveness of the idea of social capital. When compared the concept of social capital with other concepts within the political and social theories, scholars and the general public rarely notice the notion of social capital until Robert Putnam’s significant research is published, which puts the concept of social capital forward and allows it to be back to the area of research. In general, the concept of social capital has been a subject of studies for decades primarily from the perspectives of sociology and political science. Since it has been regarded as an important and constructive element so as to maintain the economic prosperity, regional development, and national governance. It has achieved considerable recognition, even worldwide prominence. However, different standpoints still exist among related scholars, such as Pierre Bourdieu (Bourdieu, 1986), Coleman (Coleman, 1988, p.25), Francis Fukuyama (Fukuyama, 1995, p.3), Robert Putnam (Putnam, 1995) and Nan Lin (Lin, 1999), the conceptualisation of social capital has already evolved rapidly into a sophisticated account of various relationships among people and their values. Despite these differences, most scholars hold the argument that social capital is inherent in personal connections and interpersonal interactions, together with the shared set of values that are associated with these contacts and relationships. They also consider social capital to be ‘a feature of the internal linkages that characterise the structures of collective actors and give them cohesiveness and its associated benefits (Adler and Kwon, 2002, p.18).

Many scholars are of the opinion that networks can be regarded as an important source of social capital. As Eric Lesser argues that ‘an individual’s social capital is characterised by her direct relationships with others and by the other people and relationships that she can reach through those to whom she is directly tied’ (Lesser, 2000, p.30). Bourdieu and Coleman argue that a network tends to reproduce an inherited pattern of relationships via individual’s efforts to preserve social capital. Coleman, in particular, argues that a closed social network—the existence of strongly interconnected and mutually reinforcing relations between different actors and institutions—maintains the existence of effective norms and the trustworthiness of others, hence strengthening social capital (Coleman, 1988, p.30). These arguments demonstrate that social capital is
created by a network to a certain extent in which people can bring connections between otherwise disconnected segments (Burt, 1992, p.78). That structure is permanent but might be mediated by human activities.

Another source of social capital is social trust, which is quite significant for the generation of state trust. Fukuyama comes up with a conclusion that social trust plays a critical but variable role. Fukuyama argues that ‘trust is both the condition for, and the effect of, the norms of social capital-collective values, social networks and cultural mores-that underpin social cohesion and shape economic growth’ (Fukuyama, 1995, p.26). Among current trends in the study of social capital with associated circular arguments, which have been further divided into two main schools, one follows that ‘social capital is a capability that arises from the prevalence of trust in a society or in a certain part of it’, and whether social trust is an integral category of social capital as represented by scholars like Fukuyama (Fukuyama, 1995) Coleman (Coleman, 1988) and Putnam (Putnam, 2001). Another school is trying to prove that, alternatively, social trust is one of social capital’s products and consequences as represented by scholars like Woolcock (Woolcock, 1998) and Field (Field, 2003).

In the earlier research stage, Putnam regards social trust as an element of the norms that arise from social networks. For him, social capital has two primary sources: networks and norms; rather than three sources: networks, norms, and trust. However, after studying American civil society, he modifies his definition of social capital to ‘features of social life—networks, norms, and trust—that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives’ (Putnam, 2001, p.31). He also confirmed the non-negligible importance of trust to social capital. Coleman contends that a system of mutual trust is an important form of social capital on which future obligations and expectations may be based. Putnam regards trust as a source of social capital that sustains economic dynamism and governmental performance. According to the research of Fu, she finds that Nahapiet and Ghoshal also treat the concept of social trust as a focal facet in the relational dimension of social capital (Fu, 2004).
The thoughts of both schools concerning the relationship between trust and social capital essentially focus on the coherence of trust and social capital. Based upon these arguments, it does appear that in each definition of social trust that an academic or non-academic interest has become a part of the current engagement with the collective or cooperative problems, which has confused scholars in politics and sociology for a long time. Tonkiss considers that ‘the concept of social trust also offers somewhat answers to the question of how individuals manage to get their collective acts together for common or at least mutual ends’ (Tonkiss, 2014). However, the relationship of trust and social capital is still trapped in a situation like the chicken or the egg dilemma, which is a commonly asked question “which came first, the chicken or the egg?” Whether trust is a precondition of social capital or trust is a resultant product or a beneficiary of social capital? This chapter keeps the notion of the argument that social trust is both the cause and the result of social capital.

The third source of social capital is social norms, and its major manifestation of is generalised reciprocity. Tudor Rickards considers that ‘trust is studied as a social exchange process, social exchanges deal with individual willingness to reciprocate care and consideration expressed within a relationship’ (Rickards, 2012, p.123). Generalised reciprocity is, in line with the argument put forward by Fu, ‘based on the assumption that today’s good turns will be repaid sometime in the future and is directly contrary to rational-choice theory’ (Fu, 2004, p.20). For example, Putnam argues that each individual act in a system of reciprocity is usually characterised by a combination of “short-term altruism (benefiting others at a cost to the altruist)” and “long-term self-interest (making every participant better off)” (Putnam, 1995, p.667). He believes that reciprocity can resolve problems of collective action and reconcile self-interest and solidarity. Portes also considers social capital as ‘primarily the accumulation of obligations from others according to the norms of reciprocity’ (Portes, 1998). He divides reciprocity into consummatory motivation that is bounded by the limits of specific community and instrumental motivations that emphasise reciprocal exchanges. Newton considers that reciprocity can bind the community via shared interests, create the environment that encourages voluntary collective behaviour
and generate the goodwill necessary for peaceful resolution of conflict (Newton, 1997). As it has been discussed above, the importance of reciprocity in both trust and social capital is without any doubts. In this thesis, reciprocity is a quite necessary category of state trust, and it will be analysed in detail in the following sections.

Finally, the fourth source of social capital is the institution. Adler and Kwon state that formal institutions and rules could be beneficial to shape the structure of network and influence norms and beliefs as well as having a strong effect on social capital. Transparent governments that are responsive to people's needs are a key factor in establishing formal community rules and institutions in government (Paul S. Adler, 2000). Fu also mentions that governments provide more than the backdrop for facilitating trust among citizens; governments also influence civic behaviour to the extent they elicit trust or distrust towards themselves (Fu, 2004).

In summary, in the commonly recognised definition of social capital, which contains four main sources: social network, social trust, social norms, and institutions. Among these four categories, scholars are increasingly paying a lot more attention to one particular category—social trust. They prefer using the notion of trust to explain different levels of cooperation evidenced in various social situations and political environments. The inspiration of state trust in this thesis comes from this concept.

![Diagram of social capital categories](image)

**Table 2. Categories of social capital**
Briefly, if you have the will to cooperate with others to achieve some purposes or goals, just merely knowing or having been a friend or acquaintance with them is not enough, having a trusting attitude in your cooperative partner seems to be a much more important issue than any other condition to obtain the benefit. Therefore, trust is becoming a particularly important issue as a result. Newton considers that ‘social life without trust would be intolerable and, most likely, quite impossible’ (Newton, 2001, p.201). As a member of the human society, it is impossible to get rid of the trusting network and live without trusting others. That is why the concept of trust cannot be neglected in the context of interactions among states. Trust plays a significant role interlinked and connected with the life of human beings as well as the smooth operation and persistent stability of a state. As one of the pioneers in doing research towards trust in social science, Fukuyama argues that “trust” and “social capital” are not mutually exclusive (Fukuyama, 1995). Additionally, trust and social capital are in effect, the mutually reinforcing twin concepts acting in tune with each other—social capital generates trusting relationships that in turn produces more social capital. Meanwhile, trust provides a great lubricant for social interactions and associations; as a result, trust is a natural byproduct of these social interactions and associations in any event. This paper will focus on adopting the core concept of social trust so as to introduce a relatively new concept of state trust in the parts that followed.

When the comparison is made on the four aspects of trust with the main sources of social capital, it can be seen that these two concepts have some essential elements in common, and both concepts cannot be in existence alone without a certain type of social community. Besides that, another four findings are as followed: 1) these four primary sources of social capital also have influence on trust; 2) social networks and norms appear to be the determinants of both concepts; 3) calculative trust depends on shared common beliefs; 4) reciprocity is of great significance in both concepts.

**3.4 What is State Trust?**
When the important issue of trust becomes an outstanding theoretical consideration as well as a practical matter on every sphere of human society, each state has to choose its own divergent paths to maintain and promote its economic growth and political stability. Vladimir Putin once addressed, ‘trust between nations is the key to tackling global problems’ (Vladimir Putin, 2009). In relation to the studies of trust among states, research concerning trust has its primary focus on the areas of sociology, psychology, economics and organisational behaviours. Fewer studies are conducted on the subject of trust in politics, and the concept of state trust advanced here has seldom been mentioned in previous studies. There are numerous reasons for this seeming lack of interest in this concept. For one, the immaterial and intangible nature of trust, particularly the trust between states or nations, makes it extremely difficult to measure for scholars wary of not having enough empirical evidence to support their argumentation. In the academic area, there are two distinguished scholars in the subject matter of social trust, one of them is Fukuyama, and the other is Putnam. Although there are some divergent views in their arguments about social trust, Fukuyama seems to consider the state in a deeper and more serious way within his analysis and tends to explore the relationship between state and economy (Fukuyama, 1995); while Putnam is good at tracing a national malaise in trust and civic participation (Putnam, 2001). However, none of them continues to further the concept of social trust up to the state level.

When looking at the developing process of state trust, the first person who did research about trust among states could be Immanuel Kant, who addressed the importance of trust among states in his famous work *Toward Perpetual Peace* (1795) and he agreed that trust would be an essential prerequisite to achieve peace among states (Kant, 2016, p.88). However, Kant did not continue his research to explore a deeper analysis about this relationship. After the research effort of Kant, there were almost no further in-depth analyses regarding trust among states until the beginning of the 20th century. Mansur mentions the similar concept in his thesis, Mansur considers that ‘trust at the national level means the relationship of integrity, commitment and confidence between two countries or more starts doing business and keeping each other in a good
relationship with the mutual benefits between each other. Alternatively, if their interests are conflicting, then they will not want to develop any kind of cooperation’ (Mansur, 2015). Mansur’s argument provides a kind of inspiration for developing the concept of state trust in this thesis. Benjamin Barton also discusses the concept ‘political trust’. Barton argues that trust can also be studied across other scholarly field such as law and finance, where trust pertains to its own applicable definition that does not relate to the concept that is being discussed throughout his thesis so as to examine the bilateral relations between China and the EU and their engagement in the Africa (Barton, 2016, p.13).

Therefore, it can be seen that the literature resources and theoretical analysis with respect to trust among states are relatively insufficient. Although some scholars are still continuing to explore the trusting relationships among states, such as Hoffman and Andrew Kydd, there is still no mature theory with a focus on the trust issues among states. Therefore, one of the purposes of this research is a clear attempt to set up a conceptualised framework for state trust.

Unlike individuals with a substantial amount of mixed emotions, the state is an organisation that it could not be operational relying solely on subjective judgments. Trust among states also has significantly more issues with uncertain and uncontrolled factors. Therefore, in the academic field, scholars would face more challenges and difficulties for analysis or set up a model to explore the trusting relationships among states. However, as mentioned previously that trust is treated as a kind of social fact, a feature of effective and collective acts of individuals and institutions. Therefore, the remainder of this chapter suggests that there are five key sources of state trust: 1) people, 2) cooperation, 3) shared norms, 4) shared obligations, and 5) interstate network.

**People and Institutions**

In international society now, trust is one of the important variables not only for interactions among individuals but also for interaction among states. Since individuals and institutions constitute the main body of a state, figuratively speaking, the trust issues of a state are similar to the issue of trusting
relationship among persons. Without the twin effects of individuals and institutions in a state, there would be no trust issue in a practical way with the interaction among states. If a state could participate actively in prominent international institutions, this state would have a greater possibility to establish reasonable and acceptable connections with other states. Additionally, and importantly, although individuals can be regarded as one of the crucial constituents of states, they could be considered as an indispensable supplement with respect to state trust. Among them, heads of state, diplomats and policymakers should be regarded as the main agents of state trust. In the real political environment, this group represents the position and policy of their state whenever they proceed to conduct any forms of diplomatic negotiations. Therefore, individuals and institutions play an important role in building or maintaining trust among states.

**Cooperation**

To Feger, cooperation, in this context, is defined as ‘interactional behaviour or a relationship between at least two parties, be they persons, groups or institutions. Their behaviour is coordinated in such a way that some actions of one side facilitate the goal attainment of the other side. Usually, this behaviour is conceived to be voluntary and not the result of yielding to power. It is the rule that both sides support each other in a balanced or symmetrical fashion, at least in the long run. The cooperative partners work towards the same or towards different but mutually compatible goals’ (Feger, 1991, p.284). Levi considers that trust, by its definition, is not a concept with equivalent meaning towards cooperation, although it might facilitate cooperation (Levi, 1998, p.79). Without the essential elements of trust, cooperation to address international problems will become impossible. Founder and executive chairman of Davos World Economic Forum, Klaus Schwab suggests a problem that ‘the world is lack of trust, although cooperation could avoid confusion and conflicts. Rebuilding trust and improving effective global leadership should be put on the agenda’ (2011). Peng Chen also argues that ‘trust is the prerequisite for cooperation, without trust the cooperation will not be going well. Cooperation between people is not
merely tools and instruments, but also the nutrient for stable social relations and international relations’ (Chen, 2014, p.27).

In the international arena, the world community is an anarchic society. Under anarchy, states can do anything they are physically capable of doing, in this kind of situation, trust is one of the important variables interaction between countries. National interest, as the centre of modern international relations, is still fraught with suspicion, conflict, and lack of cooperation. This could ‘not only lead to a fragile trust between countries but also demonstrate the lack of trust’ (Zhu, 2013, p.34). Zhu also argues that ‘when the state faces confrontation or cooperation, trust is a necessary condition for the construction of international relations’ (Zhu, 2003, p.35).

Another example from the perspective of psychology, Deborah Welch Larson compares the three explanations of trust among states: rational choice, domestic structure and social psychology. Larson believes that a prudent policy maker would not assess his country's interests and reputation only by agreement, the domestic political structures often encourage leaders not to take a trusting attitude toward any external enemy so as to legitimise the domestic governance with its associated foreign policy (Larson, 1997, p.710). Even if the preferences of two countries is fully in line with the wish to cooperate with each other, they often face many difficulties in reaching an acceptable result cooperatively. Mistrust between states may, therefore, misled the leaders to ignore each other's cooperation signals (Larson, 1997, p.713). Cooperation could potentially generate trust while maintaining any trust already in existence. Almost instantaneously, trust could facilitate cooperation. Therefore, there is a mutually influential relationship between cooperation and trust, and cooperation can be considered as one of the key elements of state trust.

**Shared Norms**

In the international community, shared social norms can be considered as an essential element for the stability of the global environment. Without a general, shared understanding of the rules and expectations of international society, the
chaos that may inevitably follow can erupt with great destructive power. However, a diverse world makes consensus that shared norms are difficult to achieve. As the main element of shared norms, reciprocity, and its relationship with trust has already been discussed. Elinor Ostrom argues with regard to the trusting relationship that ‘the more benefits they have received in the past from other reciprocators, the higher their own initial inclinations. The more often they have faced retribution, the less likely will they be to see free riding as an attractive option’ (Ostrom, 2003, p.23). In the aspect of interaction among states, reciprocal behaviours could be regarded as a signal of trust; Moreover, reciprocity, cooperation, and trust are mutually reinforcing norms.

![Diagram showing the relationship between Reciprocity, Cooperation, and Trust]

**Table 3. The relationship among reciprocity, cooperation and trust.**

This table demonstrates a complete circle of their mutually reinforcing interaction. If a state acts in reciprocal and mutually beneficial ways towards another state, then it is likely that more cooperative opportunities will emerge. If a state has a large number of cooperative opportunities with other states, then trust between them will likely be established. If a state has a trusting relationship towards another state, then the reciprocal behaviour might be repeated on a continuous basis. As for the interaction among states, ideally, this type of mutually beneficial cycle is considered to be a virtuous event. Almost all reciprocal behaviours share the common ingredients that a state attempts to offer positive reactions towards the positive actions of others and vice versa.

**Shared Obligations**

Trust has a multiplicity of forms as well as a variety of mechanisms that evoke and secure it. Shared obligations refer to laws, rules, and agreements.
Additionally, under the framework of shared obligations, the behaviours of state actors would be fundamentally influenced by transferring trust and ensuring that it is widespread throughout the process of interactions among states. In a sense, any forms of shared obligations would be able to solve the collective problems and provide credible assurances that each state could follow through the obligations. Due to that trusting relationship among states requires continuous efforts within a relatively long period, shared obligation could help state actors need to ensure that concrete steps are in place so as to obtain an agreed procedure for making and implementing the policy which could meet prevailing standards of fairness on a continuous basis.

**Interstate Network**

Among the different factors that might have an influence on the communication and interaction among states, the notion of network tends to play a pivotal role to help state build trust with others. State trust could be considered as the consequences of tightly knitted networks among sovereign states, which are independent of internal politics but dependent on each other when they engage in the repeated interactions. This kind of inter-state network can have an effect on promoting trust building even though there might be other alternative options. The network among states could be both visible and invisible. On the visible side, the border of each state makes up a vast area of the net to connect states together in the international community. While on the invisible side, the network among states is similar to the way of connecting through the use of routers of the internet. To states, the power of invisible network would be greater than the visible one. This invisible inter-state network could be reflected in various aspects, such as political issues, economic cooperation and shared cultural norms. Trust among states could not exist in isolation without the network among any sovereign states. The networks of states that share substantial interests in common. Therefore, the strong inter-state network is clearly critical to the smooth functioning of interactions among states, and it constitutes a base of trust that can reduce resistance and provide better solutions in the face of uncertainty. In particular, the formation of a strong
inter-state network could become the pillar for the perfect development that can produce significant benefit for the state actors.

In accordance with those arguments and analysis mentioned above, the sources of state trust could thus be summarised as follows: 1) people/institution, 2) cooperation, 3) shared norms, 4) shared obligation, and 5) inter-state network. Generally speaking, the concept of state trust as stated and promoted within this chapter primarily refers to a variety of phenomena that enable the actors of states to take risks in dealing with other states, solving problems with collective actions, or acting in other ways which might appear to be contrary to standard definitions of national interest.

3.5 The Relationship of State Trust and Cultural Diplomacy

As two burgeoning concepts in political research, increasing and persistent attention is now directed towards the notions of state trust and cultural diplomacy. The connection between them is now in need of exploration with logic. As discussed in Chapter Two, due to the shortage of both theoretical support and practical experience, even though in the academic field, it is still a small niche area with just a handful of scholars who argue that cultural diplomacy could improve a certain level of trust, it is still not persuasive enough if without clear and detailed elaboration. Therefore, it is necessary to explore how these two concepts connect with each other and how they can have mutual influence with reinforcement upon each other. However, there are a certain amount of debates against the backdrop of these concepts due to some interdependent factors, which are difficult to disentangle, can also play a role here. For example, the fierce competition concerning national strength among states, the integration of different cultures, the availability of advanced technologies and systems, and the emergence of a variety of organisations. All these factors could, directly or indirectly, have an influence on the relationship between state trust and cultural diplomacy. Moreover, the advent of these factors has transformed the international community in the world today into a rather different form from what it used to be decades ago.
When exploring the relationship of state trust and cultural diplomacy, it would then discover obviously that both notions involve a lot more subjective factors than objective ones. As the concept of state trust allows states to expose their vulnerabilities in front of other states, which could be quite difficult to be certain if they belong to the friendly group or the hostile group. Furthermore, trust will also need regular nurturing, and it might become depleted otherwise. Additionally, as the important role of culture in society today has been noted, as Lane and Wagschal argue that ‘culture, it must be remembered, is one of the several factors that explain society and politics’ (Lane and Wagschal, 2005, p.4). However, due to the fact that there are a variety of different forms of cultures in the society, visible forms, intangible forms, implicit types, at a subconscious level as well as a more explicit type of culture some of these include obvious elements of mental representations. All these subjective factors on the two concepts make an interesting yet challenging research study. Therefore, this section aims to show a clear understanding towards the relationship of state trust and cultural diplomacy.

This chapter sets up three propositions to examine the argument of this thesis that cultural diplomacy can maintain, enhance and even create state trust. As two necessary linked concepts with cultural diplomacy, cultural relations, cultural identity and reciprocal behaviour in the cultural diplomacy cannot be ignored. Additionally, for these propositions, the term state trust is defined as a variable concept, which may change as other factors change.

**Proposition 1:** Assuming that everything else being equal, when there are gradual improvement and enhancement of cultural relations between states, then cultural diplomacy is considered to have the capacity to create or maintain state trust.

The definition of cultural relations has been highlightly discussed in Chapter Two. It can be found that cultural diplomacy is able to improve and strengthen the cultural relations between states. Additionally, it is visible that in the modern society, strengthening and maintaining of cultural relations with other states
have become the central issue of state policy. Bennett considers that ‘the relations of state governance and culture are currently undergoing significant change’ (Bennett, 1998). This perspective of Bennett also suggests the significance concerning the position of culture on the state agenda. For example, in Hu Jingtao’s period, the project of Confucius Institute had been launched. Hu also put emphasis on the aspect of China’s soft power and he introduced the concept of “Harmonious Society”, which indicated a relatively strong focus on Chinese cultural elements. It can be considered as a way to impress foreign audiences and develop the philosophy Chinese culture. Another example is, in order to strengthen the cultural and economic relations with the states along with the Belt and Road Initiative, the Chinese government had proposed an Action plan on the One Belt One Road (OBOR) in March 2015. Under this framework, the Chinese government claims that ‘the initiative is proposed to build the Belt and Road jointly; to embrace the trend toward a multipolar world, economic globalisation, and cultural diversity in the spirit of open regional cooperation’ (State Council of China, 2015). In consideration of this, if one might say so, a new or even a pioneering initiative, these actions of the Chinese government are rather different from what it had done previously. Before the period of Hu Jingtao’s governance, the Chinese government usually waded in with the emphasis on the economic relations with other states while paid nothing more than lip service on the cultural issues. However, at this time, it is a clear signal that the Chinese government has started to realise the importance of strengthening cultural relations with neighbouring states even though the primary purpose of such initiative is still in line with the promotion and the development of economic benefits.

Culture has its own magical attraction with just the right amount of chemistry to allow states to relax their watchful vigilance to some extent. With this type of breakthrough on the “defensive shield” of any neighbouring states, the magic wand of culture, as a tool of regional cooperation, will forge an opportunity to plant a short-cut to thereafter gain a definitive kind of trust from the neighbouring states. This strategic plan of the Chinese government will improve the cultural and economic relations among those states that have participated in
this Initiative. While at the same time, its cultural diplomatic efforts that may be well developed to create or maintain state trust with others.

In this proposition, cultural relation includes two aspects: a favourable relation and an unfavourable relation, both of which might have an influence on the formation of state trust. As for the aspect of unfavourable cultural relations, the formation of state trust might encounter numerous barriers. The evidence of unfavourable cultural relations can be seen in a lot of states across the world. The primary cause is attributable to cultural differences, the forms of which could be reflected as the differences among cultural norms, cultural values, and cultural system. In addition, unfavourable cultural relations often result in those potential thistles and thorns, such as communicative difficulties, misunderstandings, conflicts of interests, historical reasons, cultural differences and even hatred emotions. These obstacles might lower the quality of cultural relations among states. Therefore, state trust might not be formed as smoothly as expected.

The current practical example is the deterioration of cultural relations between China and the ROK principally due to the conflict of interests, which will be discussed in Chapter Five. Another example is the cultural relations between China and Japan. Both states have a lot in common with similarities in terms of the oriental cultures. However, due to the reasons of historical armed conflict and the current social, political and territorial disputes between them, the relationship between China and Japan could be considered as a hard nut to crack. Under this circumstance, the situation of state trust between China and Japan cannot be more pessimistic than any other time and place. As the important states of Asia, China, Japan and South Korea have many things in common regarding the origins of oriental cultures for many centuries. Their cultural relations should have been considered as solid as rocks. However, the negative cultural factors mentioned above play a very influential role in state trust building among them.
As for improving the favourable cultural relations, states may refer to the following six methods: 1. Seek to understand; 2. Get involved and respect; 3. Keep an open attitude; 4. Keep promises; 5. Establish cultural network; 6. Assume positive intent. These methods can promote the cultural relations, overcome the obstacles mentioned previously, and then proceed further to help cultural diplomacy to create and maintain state trust. It is because that the continued effective and efficient cultural dialogue among states might eliminate the negative image of certain states due to historical reasons. Cultural relations might stimulate the international community to give a certain amount of impetus so as to resolve international conflicts as well. Moreover, according to the argument of Zheng that ‘states with strengthened cultural relations will also improve political recognition and state trust among states’ (Zheng, 2001, p.60).

According to the survey Trust Pays, which was conducted by Ipsos MORI and YouGov for the British Council, and specifically designed for evaluating the cultural programs of British Council in the aspect of trust building. This survey particularly aims to provide ample pieces of evidence regarding the influence of cultural relations on trust building, interpersonally as well as between states. It offers adequate examples and real case studies concerning how international cultural relationships and efforts of cultural diplomacy that could build trust between the UK and other states of the world, with specific emphasis on the success of the UK economy. Additionally, this survey involves more than 10,000 respondents aged 18-34 from ten countries--Brazil, China, India, Pakistan, Poland, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Thailand, and Turkey (British Council, 2012, p.7). It demonstrates that those who have had involvement in the programs aiming to improve cultural relations, especially in the following areas: arts, education and English language activities, etc., might effectively hold a relatively high level of trust towards the UK.

**Proposition 2:** Assuming that when everything else being equal, when cultural identity issues could be understood and well-recognised between the states, then cultural diplomacy is considered to have the capacity to create or maintain state trust.
Cultural identity is a kind of identity or feeling of belonging to a group. It is part of a person’s self-concept and self-perception. Additionally, it is also closely related to nationality, ethnicity, religion, tradition, social class, the generational issue, locality and any types of social grouping that have their own distinct culture. These factors can largely influence the effectiveness of cultural diplomatic efforts in state trust building.

With respect to this issue of cultural identity, Lane and Wagschal argue that ‘culture offers people cultural identities appear around the world in the form of ethnicity, religion or universal values. Nations or ethnic groups, as well as civilisations or religions, make up two types of culture, characteristic of specific areas’ (Lane and Wagschal, 2005). Furthermore, Ennaji considers that ‘cultural identity is both characteristics of the individual but also to the culturally identical group of members sharing the same cultural identity, it can foster better understanding between them’ (Ennaji, 2005). Culture is not solely about the national dish on the table. The fashionable clothing people wear, the gods they worship, or even the places they live; culture is an abstract concept that is mostly invisible. It also needs a long time for both parties to recognise and accept the cultural identity of each other. Just like Lane and Wagschal agrees that ‘cultural compactness may increase over time, as, for instance, when a group becomes increasingly conscious of its cultural identity. Such a process may involve several generations’ (Lane and Wagschal, 2005). Based upon the arguments from Ennaji, Lane, and Wagschal, cultural identity is of great significance in promoting mutual understanding. For those states with similar cultural characteristics and mutually recognised cultural identity, it might be much easier to create and maintain state trust through the ways of cultural diplomacy, even though it will take an extended period of time.

However, some particular challenges toward cultural identity might hinder the pace of state trust building, for example, differences of political system, religious differences, traditions and language barrier.
For instance, differences in political system could be regarded as the main factor that might have an influence on cultural diplomacy in state trust building. Zheng argues that international relations have some common characteristics with interpersonal relationship (Zheng, 2006). This argument is considered to be essential in this thesis. In the interpersonal relations, a rational trusting person would observe the moral quality and characteristics of the trustee in the first instance and then proceed to make a decision whether one can or cannot trust him/her. While in the international relations, Zheng argues that ‘states with the same political system, their similarities will facilitate their communication, and relative uncertainties and potential problems will be less than those states with different political systems’ (Zheng, 2006). For example, the notable difference of political system between China and the UK; both states have their distinct political systems ranging from the state level to the county level, from the election of governing party to the selection of public officers. This difference could well lead to mutual misunderstanding towards each state. Additionally, the difference in the political system might increase the potential risks of emergent conflict if the intention and strategy of them have been misinterpreted. In this case, if both states could have the mutually recognised cultural identity, then it would be easier for cultural diplomacy to create and maintain state trust.

Another challenge concerning the role of cultural diplomacy in creating and maintain state trust is religion. As an indivisible part of the culture, Walser considers that ‘religion defines how the community members interpret their role in the universe, with this teaching based on the local culture, so different religions arise out of different cultures’ (Walser, 2015, p.4). In the modern society, there are various religions throughout the world, such as Hinduism, New Age, Buddhism, Islam, Christianity, etc. Each of them has its unique features. However, it is also the sad case when religion is used as an excuse in time of conflict when most conflicts in international society today are, ostensibly, caused by religious differences. Although in reality, it is not necessarily so at all. There are some aspects of religion which make it susceptible to become a latent source of conflict. If a state has existing or potential disputes of religious differences, it might pose some kinds of threat towards other states, and then the state trust
might not be formed easily. Therefore, how to use cultural diplomacy to deal with the issues of religious difference and promote cultural dialogues correctly and more efficiently is a crucial question. Then, it would be easier for cultural diplomacy to create and maintain state trust.

Additionally, in comparison with the other two challenges, the language barrier is not a difficult issue to deal with. However, for the majority of people, mastering the language of other states would be beneficial for them to understand the culture of that state. If this problem cannot be solved well, it will directly influence the effectiveness of cultural diplomacy in state trust building. According to the questionnaire of this research, when the question was asked ‘do you think that mastering another language could help you to understand other state’s culture’, the result of responses is illustrated clearly as follows (see Figure X), around 79% of the respondents considers that mastering the language of other states could help them to understand more aspects regarding the culture of that state.

![Figure 5. Data of questionnaire “do you think that mastering another language could help you to understand other state’s culture?”](image)
When answering the question ‘what is the obstacle for you to understand Chinese culture’, and in the English version, 87.5% of the respondents agrees that Chinese language is the main obstacle (See Figure 5).

![Figure 6. Data of questionnaire “what is the obstacle for you to understand Chinese culture?”](image)

For the perspective of Chinese people, some personal interviews are specifically designed for them; the majority of them agree that understanding the language of another state might stimulate their interest in the culture of that state. The brief information regarding the interview towards this topic has been concluded in Table 4. 50 individuals who have been involved in this interview, and the summarised conclusion is listed as an appendix. Among these 50 interviewees, seven of them, the specific details of which are listed as follows, have started to learn another language due to the cultural attraction and interest. Additionally, some of them have given up learning another kind of culture due to the difficulty in understanding of another foreign language as well.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sheng Zhuo</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Engineer</td>
<td>Interested in the county culture of America, then started to learn English.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boyuan Lin</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Manager</td>
<td>Interested in the culture of France, then started to learn French.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yunong Han</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>PhD Student</td>
<td>Interested in the culture of Japan, then started to learn Japanese.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Reason for Learning a New Language</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sherry Wang</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Salesperson</td>
<td>Interested in the culture of Spain, then started to learn Spanish.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bo Chen</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Journalist</td>
<td>He would like to get the first-hand news, then started to learn English.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ziyun Zhao</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Lecturer</td>
<td>Mastering a language is beneficial for communication.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shenjie Wei</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Auditor</td>
<td>Mastering a language will stimulate him to explore more cultural issues of that state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jiehua Zhou</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Artist</td>
<td>Mastering the language of another state is quite important for working with other foreign artists and knowing their culture.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Song Yang</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Property Agent</td>
<td>Mastering another language is good to understand the requirements of foreign customers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harris White</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Dancer</td>
<td>Started to learn Chinese because she would like to learn Chinese Peking Opera.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johnson Lee</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Editor</td>
<td>Mastering another language is important in his job.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stefanie Smith</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>University Staff</td>
<td>Language barrier brought her difficulties in her overseas study career.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaden Cheung</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Undergraduate student</td>
<td>Interested in the South Korean culture, then started to learn the Korean language.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 4. Brief Summary of interviews in relation to the question “do you think the language barrier could be one of the obstacles when you would like to explore other culture?”**

From the table shown above, although it could not be a representation of all, it could, nevertheless, demonstrate the fact that language barrier might be one of the challenges that are influential in the understanding of foreign audiences towards the cultural identity issues of other states. More specifically, when the 50 interviewees were asked “what kind of method could be used to resolve the cultural identity dilemma”, the responses are summarised as followed: 1. Understand, respect and compromise; 2. Strengthen the communication; 3. Think positively about the differences. Therefore, conquering the three
challenges of cultural identity might accelerate the pace of cultural diplomacy in state trust building. Then, it would be easier for cultural diplomacy to create and maintain state trust.

**Proposition 3:** Assuming that when everything else being equal, when the reciprocal behaviours increase during the implementation process of cultural diplomatic activities, then cultural diplomacy can maintain, enhance and even create state trust.

As discussed in Chapter Three, one of the principal sources of trust is reciprocity. In the context of reciprocal behaviour, Rathbun considers that ‘trust is the belief that others will cooperate when one cooperates, that they will not exploit one’s vulnerability but rather respond in kind’ (Rathbun, 2012, p.10). Besides, Kydd also argues that ‘whether to trust involves an assessment of the likelihood that another has cooperative intentions’ (Kydd, 2005, p.23). It is noticeable that the significance of cooperation in the aspect of state trust building. However, cooperation cannot represent the whole aspects of reciprocity; it is only a manifestation of reciprocity. For example, if State A carries out its cultural diplomatic programs to State B, then State B implements its cultural diplomatic programs to State A. Even though both of State A and State B do not have any joint cooperative programs, this kind of interaction could also be considered as reciprocal behaviour. Just like an old Chinese proverb “li shang wang lai”\(^2\), which means courtesy calls for reciprocity. It is a virtuous cycle if the reciprocal behaviour could be assured within the interaction among states. If their reciprocal behaviour shows an uptrend, then cultural diplomatic efforts can create and maintain state trust. This reciprocity may take place over a relatively long period of time, and one cannot just follow every single successful reciprocal transaction or activity. Furthermore, when such successful experience of reciprocal actions is being considered as cumulative, it will facilitate cultural diplomacy in creating and maintaining state trust better.

\(^2\) 礼尚往来 (English translation: courtesy demands reciprocity)
The notion of state trust may appear to be a transitory quality. However, it is at the heart of relations between states; it can also be considered as one of the aims of cultural diplomacy. For example, according to the survey of the British Council, which finds that the connection between the reciprocal behaviour of cultural interaction and increased trust was especially significant in Pakistan, Russia and Turkey, those of which sometimes have problematic relationships with the UK (British Concil, 2012). Under the continuous efforts of cultural diplomacy by the British Council, people of those countries start to hold increasingly trusting attitude towards the government of the UK, the people of UK and holds a positive impression of the UK. Additionally, the results of this survey also indicate that the people of the UK are more trusted than Americans, often by a significant margin. In addition, the linkage between trust and interest in doing business and other cooperation illustrates the economic payoffs that can be a byproduct of cultural diplomacy (British Concil, 2012). From the practical experience of the British Council, it is obvious that reciprocal behaviour is quite significant in the efforts of cultural diplomacy.

3.6 The Game of State Trust
Six sources of state trust and the relationship of cultural diplomacy and state trust have been mentioned and discussed in the previous sectors. It can be seen from the detailed analysis that cooperation is considered with an enormous importance to these two concepts. Therefore, in order to simulate the potential situation regarding the cooperative outcomes, this part establishes a game model--the Game of State Trust. Theoretically, the relationship between cooperation and state trust can be demonstrated in this game. The inspiration for this model comes from the typical game and a standard example--“Prisoner’s Dilemma”, which shows the reasons why two completely “rational” individuals might not cooperate, even though it appears that it is in their best interests to do so. It was originally framed by Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher who worked at RAND3 in 1950 (Milovsky, 2014, p.12). Albert W. Tucker then formalised the game with prison sentence rewards and named it as ‘prisoner’s dilemma’.

3 The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decision making through research and analysis.
However, this game is primarily used in the domain of economics. In this chapter, it is a valiant attempt to take this game into the political arena to thereafter explain the potential outcomes regarding cooperation and state trust. As its name suggests, the game of state trust creates a situation where one player must decide whether to trust the other or not; and the other player must then decide whether to honour or abuse this trust.

In this game, two state actors who do not appear to be of the same “cultural norms” will only obtain the trust needed to cooperate if they enter into a reciprocal relationship and not one devised around a form of cognitive agreement (Gambetta, 1988, p.233; Huntington, 1996, p.850; Hoffman, 2002, p.384; Glaser, 2010, p.128). For Riker and Feger, the concept of trust could be conceived as equating to risk-taking (Riker, 1974, p.65; Feger, 1991, p.295). For the Game of State Trust, it is especially so to a certain extent, firstly, as far as Bachmann and Zaheer are concerned, ‘trust neither exists nor has any utility as long as there is no risk’ (Bachmann and Zaheer, 2013). Indeed, whenever both states are in a situation to trust another means they have to shoulder the risk, because they should determine to expose its vulnerability to another. In this scenario, the concept of trust will thus make little sense if either of them refuses to render itself vulnerable to another (Baier, 1986, p.235; Heimer, 2005, p.43). Secondly, at the initial stage, both states not only have to decide whether or not they will be better off when placing their trust in another, but the key question they have to ask themselves whether it is worth placing such trust or not.

Under the framework of this game tailored in this thesis, one player is identified as State A, while another player is identified as State B. State A is given some initial investment in the form of wealth allocation. At this time, both states need to calculate carefully about the potential risk. State A must decide how much it can ‘trust’ State B. In addition, State B can be considered as a potential investment and cooperative target of State A. State B also has the ability to help State A to turn its investment amount into a greater sum. Therefore, the amount received by State B is some multiple of the amount trusted to State B by State A.
Then, after receiving this amount, State B must make a decision as to how much amount of money that needs to be returned to State A.

This game simulates several situations in which the attractiveness to one party of a wealth-enriching investment hinges on the trustworthiness of another. For example, assuming a situation where State A has to decide how much money should be invested to State B. In the ideal situation, if both states trust each other, it can potentially yield greater rewards reaping not only economic benefits but also enhancing trust for Both State A and State B.

Additionally, assuming that State B would like to terminate the cooperation with State A when State B gains greater benefit from the cooperation; then State B would use the benefit to cooperate with another state. It will the push State A to a quite embarrassing situation because State A has already devoted a lot of effort and money to cooperate with State B. This situation is exactly the dilemma simulated by the game of state trust. State A should decide how much money could be allocated to State B so as to hedge the potential risks of State B's untrustworthy intentions or behaviours. Then State B needs to make a decision whether to honour this trust (for example, State B still continues to conduct cooperation) or abuse this trust (for example, State B agrees with State A to conduct related activities first, but once the money or resources are received as offered by State A, State B then uses the money to do other business or terminates the cooperation, yielding the highest payoff to State B itself but leaves the lowest reward to State A).

This state trust game can also be discussed with the mathematical manner. Provided State A is given some amount of money \( (M > 0) \) to be used by cultural diplomacy activities. This part of money State A can divide between one part of amount State A keeps for itself and one part of amount State A gives to State B. Labels the money State A gives to State B as \( x \), \( x \in [x|0 \leq x \leq M] \), the amount \( X \) is then multiplied by a constant \( c > 1 \), therefore State B will receive the greater amount, that could be \( cx \). State B must make a decision what proportion, labels as \( t \), \( t \) is the percentage of \( cx \), should be returned to State A, and then keeping the rest.
(1-t) * cx for State B itself. Assuming State B also receives some fixed sum f, f≥0, and then the following would be the payoff for this state trust game.

Payoff to State A:  \[ P_1 = (M-x) + tcx = M + (tc-1) * x \]
Payoff to State B:  \[ P_2 = f + (1-t) * cx \]

State B moves second and the choice of t does not affect x, which has already been determined. Therefore, as long as State B is maximising its benefit, State B might choose to let it almost close to zero. However, once State A knows the trick that State B makes t approximately equal to zero, their cooperation might be trapped in a dilemma. On the one hand, although State A will not lose the initial money invested in the end, what State B acts could probably ruin their cooperative relationship from now on. On the other hand, although State B would be glad to see a higher profit in the short term, it would be difficult to get further investment again from State A in the future. In order to make this formula clearer, this research establishes an experiment to test the results of this game. In the control condition, there are two subjects as the previous model settled, State A and State B. Then, State A and State B will play five times in this game. The hypothesis is that both State A and State B will be influenced by what they do in the game.

Assumption:
- State A was given an initial allocation of £100 at the beginning of this game
- State A then choose an amount of the allocation to send to State B.
  This amount could be £0, £50, £100
- State B received an amount equal to c times the amount sent by State A
- State B decided whether to return to State A either £0 or half of the amount received
- The trust level State A holds towards State B labels as T, T∈{0%, 50%, 100%}
- No trust level=distrust level: T=0%; Low trust level: 0%<T<50%; Medium trust level: T=50%; High trust level: 50%<T<100%; Absolute trust level: T=100%
These conditions are settled based on the previous model. Then, \( M=\£100, \\ x\in\{\£0, \£50, \£100\}, \ c\geq1, f=0, t\in\{0,1/2\}. \) Therefore, the payoffs for State A and State B will be shown as follows:

Payoff to State A: \( P_1 = 100+(ct-1) \times x \)

Payoff to State B: \( P_2 = (1-t) \times cx \)

The first situation, if State A holds lower trust level or distrust level (0\%\leq T<50\%) towards State B and does not want to cooperate with State B to fulfil the investment, then State A might decide to keep the amount by itself and give nothing to State B. At this time, \( x=\£0, \) then \( P_1=\£100, P_2=0. \)

The second situation, if State A holds the medium level of trust (T=50\%) towards State B, so State A gives £50 to State B, then State B will return 50\% of the received amount to State A. At this time, \( x=\£50, t=50\%=0.5. \) Then \( P_1= 50+25c, P_2= 25c \)

The third situation, if State A holds medium trust level (T=50\%) towards State B, therefore State A will give £50 to State B, but State B chooses to return 0\% of the received amount to State A. At this time, \( x=\£50, t=0\%. \) Then \( P_1=50, P_2=50c \)

The forth Situation, if State A holds high trust level (T>50\%) towards State B, therefore State A will give £100 to State B, State B will return 50\% of the received amount to State A. At this time, \( x=\£100, t=50\%=0.5. \) Then \( P_1= 50c, P_2= 50c \)

The fifth Situation, if State A holds high trust level (T>50\%) towards State B, therefore State A will give £100 to State B. However, State B decides not to return any amount to State A. At this time, \( x=\£100, t=0\%. \) Then \( P_1=0, P_2=100c \)

Therefore, from the five situations outlined above, it is not difficult to see both payoffs when State A holds the kind of trust level towards State B and what State B will do as reciprocity in return. One point should be mentioned that both State
A and State B are just simply determined by a rough guess about something which is related to the game. In the real world, there must be a lot of factors in existence between State A and State B. From the five hypothetical situations, it is not difficult to find that only the fourth situation could achieve the ideal win-win situation, which will, in essence, generates or improves state trust and will be beneficial for any future cooperation. But the rest four situations will not be the satisfactory outcomes for both State A and State B.

In general, this game model has some familiarities with the model of ‘Prisoners’ Dilemma’. But in that game, there is no communication and interaction between two prisoners. Their decisions are mainly in reliant on the trusting or distrusting attitudes towards each other. Additionally, two prisoners might prefer making decisions from the aspect of their own self-interest. It is also the issue for each sovereign state to care about. For the state, national interest is the core issue of state policies and guidelines for actions. In the real political arena, unlike the experimental game theory, states could have a much deeper communication channel and a lot more pro-active interactions to strengthen the understanding of each other so as to protect their own national interest. Sometimes, it might even be able to maximise the achievements with varies methods and means, and then the win-win situation could be achieved with a greater degree of certainty. In comparison with other methods to solve the dilemma between State A and State B, this game of state trust ignores the cultural factors and emotional factors between two states, while cultural diplomacy could act as a relatively stable method. It is because cultural diplomacy could make up the hole concerning the ignored cultural and social factors during the cooperative process.

In this game, theoretically, cooperation and state trust are mutually reinforced, and the benefit of both states can gain the expected outcomes. Furthermore, on the one hand, the game of state trust demonstrates that the win-win situation can be achieved if both state actors trust each other. On the other hand, it also further illustrates that if both states could explore the potential of cultural diplomacy to generate more cooperative opportunities and foster mutual
recognition or understanding, they will harvest not only about the economic benefit but also the improvement of state trust.

3.7 Conclusion

In the world today, the fast-developing globalisation process has hastened the speed of cooperation between states, which highlights the significance of trust. Many different views have been aired when exploring the notion of trust and definitions abound. The vast degree of uncertainty and the need for flexibility that characterises relationships within and between states is unprecedented. With the increasingly rapid pace of globalisation and frequent communication among states, how to resolve conflicts and how to build trust between states has increasingly become the crucial issues to all sovereignty states. In this respect, state trust is one of the most valuable assets that a state can possess; it is because that state trust represents a key indicator of how closely and how friendly that the states are in connection and tune with each other. The presence of state trust might help state actors to achieve a much more favourable diplomatic environment, efficient international services, and mutual understanding. Conversely, the absence of state trust might trigger conflicts among state actors.

This chapter has defined state trust as ‘a variety of phenomena that enable the actors of states to take risks in dealing with other states, solving problems with collective actions, or acting in other ways which might appear to be contrary to standard definitions of national interest’. This concept shows how the invisible chemistry or an abstract concept of trust could have such significant influences on the behaviours of states. Additionally, this chapter has argued that there are five key sources of such state trust: 1) people/institution, 2) cooperation, 3) shared norms, 4) shared obligation, and 5) inter-state network.

With the efforts on the definition of this concept, this will be used in the subsequent chapters to explore the relationship between state trust and cultural diplomacy. When all are said and done, trust among states is not the same as the trust that a toddler could put in its parents; the majority of the scholars and politician would dearly love to return to such form of the unconditional type of
trust. On the contrary, state trust is a kind of mature relationship among states, with each state treating the other respectfully, equally and truthfully. The message of this chapter is not difficult to understand—trusting relationships among states could be built with a greater chance through the following measures: seeking cooperation, finding or cultivating shared norms, establishing a strong inter-state network.

Furthermore, in order to examine the key argument of this thesis, this Chapter has also put forward three propositions concerning the relationship between cultural diplomacy and state trust. In these propositions, the term state trust is defined as a variable concept, which may change due to the following three factors: cultural relations, cultural identity, and reciprocal behaviour in the cultural diplomacy. Assuming that when everything else being equal, if cultural relations can be strengthened and improved, the challenges of cultural identity can be solved well, and reciprocal behaviour can be increased or maintained, then cultural diplomacy can maintain, enhance and even create state trust.

In the last part of this thesis, I established the Game of State Trust, which drew the essence from the classical game theory “Prisoners' Dilemma” as the experimental model support. In this game, theoretically, cooperation and state trust are mutually reinforced, and the benefit of both states can attain the expected outcomes. This game not only demonstrates that the win-win situation can be achieved if both state actors trust each other but also illustrates the importance of cultural diplomacy in this interaction.
Chapter 4
The Effectiveness of Cultural diplomacy in State Trust Building

4.1 Introduction
As for the two key concepts in this thesis, there have been very few attempts to measure the effectiveness of cultural diplomacy and state trust. Measuring effectiveness is an important aspect of explaining the behaviour of cultural diplomacy and its role in state trust building process. However, the lack of standardised methods of measurement presents a great challenge. For example, due to the wide variety of cultural diplomatic programs, it is impossible to measure all outputs with the same tools. Furthermore, due to the significant variation in goals, approaches, methodologies of cultural diplomatic programs and their evaluations; much of the evaluative data generated is not comparable.

At the moment, there are almost no obvious methods measuring the effectiveness of cultural diplomacy in state trust building, other relevant intangible effects that could be measured through some indicators and factors which may potentially be used to demonstrate the trusting relationship created by cultural diplomacy among states. Trust is based on perceptions, and its measurement is frequently fraught with many challenges; this is also a valid point for cultural diplomacy. This chapter first presents five indicators of existing state trust created by cultural diplomacy. Second, it suggests five factors that may influence the effectiveness of cultural diplomacy. Finally, it proceeds to broadly examine the effectiveness of cultural diplomacy in state trust building in the China-UK relationship.

4.2 The Indicators of Existing State Trust
With respect to the measurement of trust, sociologists have set up some standards of measurement to evaluate trust. For example, Arron Hoffman comes up with three rules for measurement of trust: 1) Discretion-granting policies and decision-making data, 2) Oversight indicators, and 3) Rule indicators. However, Hoffman does not agree that cooperation could be used as one of the indicators to measure trust. He argues that ‘the mere presence of cooperation is an
unreliable indicator of trust’ (Hoffman, 2002, p.376). Other scholars (e.g., Coleman, 1990; Deutsch, 1958; Gambetta, 1988; Larson, 1998) argue that measurement strategies based on predictive definitions of trust assume that trust is a precondition for cooperation.

However, although Hoffman is talking about trust among states, it is not the same as the concept of state trust. This thesis adopts the essence of two measurement rules in Hoffman’s methodology: firstly, this research agrees with the importance of discretion with the aspect of policy; secondly, this research takes on the rule indicators to examine the existence of state trust. What’s more, with respect to the relations between cultural diplomacy and state trust, this research also develops three further indicators: 1) the reciprocal benevolent policies, 2) advantageous orientation of policies, and 3) cooperation.

This chapter proposes multiple levels of state trust from low to high: minimal level of trust—cooperation among states; lower medium level of state trust—reciprocal benevolent policies; medium level of state trust—favourable orientation of policy; upper medium level of state trust—rules with leeway; high level of state trust—discretionary power in the policies.

**The first indicator**, cooperation among states indicates the minimal level of state trust.

As argued above, cultural diplomacy can create opportunities for cooperation. However, how to turn these opportunities into specific practical acts rather than remaining stagnant as an oral promise is quite crucial. Many scholars agree that trust is a pre-requisite for cooperation (e.g., Coleman, 1990; Deutsch, 1958; Gambetta, 1988; Larson, 1998). A sovereign state is not an exception. States that transfer some control of their interests to other states run the risk that those interests might be betrayed. All cooperation requires some degree of trust. In this circumstance, when states have increasing cooperative achievements, it could be said that there is some degree of state trust in existence between them, even though the state trust may be at the minimal level.
While Hoffman does not agree with this perspective, he argues that ‘trust involves risk, but cannot be reduced to risk—trust and risk are separable constructs. The implication is that the necessary link between trust and cooperation cannot be sustained because of some efforts to cooperate emerge for no other reason that the willingness of actors to gamble on favourable or even poor odds’ (Hoffman, 2002, p.400). He also offers the US-Soviet nuclear relationship as an example to explain cooperative risk-taking without trust. In this case, their cooperation was mainly because of other urgent military and security issues. He argues that the superpowers’ use of highly invasive and regular checks of each other’s nuclear weapons stockpiles to monitor compliance hardly seems like the kind of behaviour in which trusting partners engage.

Hoffman’s argument is reasonable to some extent, but in the first instance, there is no absolute 100% trust in the real political world. Therefore, it is impossible or virtually impossible to ask for 100% trust with respect to the cooperation between states. More specifically, Barton further argues that ‘cooperation is not only relevant as a path of bridging the political divide to avoid the unfavourable ramifications of competitive behaviour but it is also relevant since it is in the shared interest of both sides to help each other help themselves’ (Barton, 2016, p.41). To some degree, both states are equally vulnerable to the collateral effects of instability across the continent even if these effects may transpire differently in practice for both sides. What’s more, monitoring behaviour is not necessarily a representation of mistrust. Actually, it could also be considered as a way to maintain trust mutually. Monitoring behaviour could avoid identifiable risks as well as predict new potential hazards, especially when both state actors agree with these monitoring efforts. Hence, this is not evidence of mistrust, as it could enable state actors to have a better cooperation between them.

As discussed in previous chapters, some scholars use Prisoner’s Dilemma to explain the international cooperation among states. It could be seen clearly that cooperation between states within the structure of prisoners’ dilemma requires both parties to trust each other to thereafter implement the cooperative procedure and maximise the benefit, both economically and politically. Moreover, the concept of state trust is a derivative from the concept of social trust, and the
two concepts place emphasis on the notion of reciprocity. Cooperation is one of the several ways to make reciprocity come true.

For example, if State A chooses to cooperate with State B based on the cooperative opportunities created by cultural diplomacy; in this circumstance, State A has to treat State B as a trustworthy partner. If both states maintain trust without betrayal of the partnership, State A and State B could have a great opportunity to realise the reciprocal benefit. If both states do not betray each other, but still could not obtain any benefit from the cooperation, this is not necessarily a problem of trust but might be due to some mistakes of decisions. Additionally, greater cooperative achievements do not necessarily represent the higher level of state trust, because cooperative issues may be related to other factors which can be an issue of benefit or interest. On the other hand, greater cooperative results can maintain the current level of trust and provide opportunities for both states to have a better developmental opportunity in the future. Both states may further strengthen and deepen mutual understanding on the platform of cooperation. Thus, it is the reason that cooperation could be regarded as one of the indicators of existing state trust, although it is only at the minimal level.

**The second indicator;** reciprocal benevolent policies between states could indicate the lower medium level of state trust.

By definition, reciprocal benevolent policies are those governmental policies with favourable and beneficial content. For example, since the UK initiated its plan to exit the European Union, the UK government has already put forward a series of benevolent policies towards the Chinese government to thereafter strengthen the economic and cultural relationship between China and the UK (Department of International Trade, 2016). In return, the Chinese government has actively responded to the proposals of the UK government and has started to encourage Chinese domestic enterprises to invest in the UK. Firstly, it is conceivable that both governments have realised the benefit that could be gained through advancing a win-win situation, which is fully in line with maximal national interest. Secondly, the efforts of the 2015 UK-China cultural year and its
cultural diplomatic efforts arguably gave both states a better opportunity to communicate and strengthen mutual understanding. The UK government could have chosen to focus on other states with significant potential investment capacity, but the UK government chose China. The aforementioned is not only an indicator of national interest but arguably also a matter of state trust. The UK government firmly believes that the investment from China could achieve its expectation and that the forthcoming investment results could be predicted. Hence the UK government would proceed to enact and carry out benevolent policies towards China.

However, the benevolent policy of interest here is a reciprocal arrangement, which needs the efforts of both states' actors for the making and implementation of these benevolent policies. If one of the state actors refuses to carry out benevolent policies as reciprocity to its counterpart, it does not prove that there is no state trust between them, but one could assume that their state trust level is relatively lower. For example, if State A trusts State B, then State A would carry out and implement benevolent policies towards State B, but this would not indicate a medium level of state trust unless State B also does the similar job to State A, or at the very least positively responds to State A’s proposals. State trust does emphasise the reciprocity between states, therefore with both states having put efforts into cultural diplomacy with the enacting and implementation of benevolent policies, and then state trust can be thoroughly examined. In Chapter 7, it will examine the reciprocal behaviours between China and the UK.

The third indicator, the favourable orientation of policy indicates the medium level of state trust.

Unlike the second indicator, which mainly focuses on the benevolent content of policies. The word orientation here refers to favourable trend or unfavourable trend. The orientation of policies, for which it means within a relatively long period, state actors carry out a collection of government strategies, policy statements and committee reports that express the will of the respective governments. A favourable trend can also be called a promising trend, which means a trend of increasingly benevolent policies over a long period of time. In
an unfavourable trend, contrary to the favourable trend, state actors carry out increasingly hostile policies towards each other over a long period of time. With an unfavourable trend, it cannot be said that there is no state trust between two states, but it is highly likely to be harmful to their trusting relationship.

Another perspective might suggest that the favourable orientation of policies could also be interpreted as a way of creating trust rather than an indicator of existing trust. Without a doubt, when State A continuously carries out beneficial policies towards State B, this behaviour can be considered as an effort by State A to create state trust. In this situation, State A’s beneficial policies can be considered as a way to demonstrate its good will or friendly attitude towards State B, in order to create state trust. However, the essence of the orientation of policy does not equal one single policy alone. This lower medium level of state trust cannot be examined simply on the enacting and implementation of one particular policy, as its existence or otherwise should need a relatively extended period to be demonstrated. Whenever a state enacts and carries out disadvantageous policy its counterpart; as a result, the other state may not provide any reciprocity in return. Hence, state trust will be difficult to establish. That is why the orientation of policies with favourable trend could be regarded as an indicator concerning the medium level of state trust.

The fourth indicator, general written rules with leeway indicates an upper medium level of state trust.

The second indicator of existing state trust are rules, like joint statement or treaties that are typically given in written form and are not merely verbal promises. Such reciprocal arrangements come about when both states devote efforts to reach consensus to give each other a degree of freedom of action within the agreed rules. Hoffman argues that ‘different kinds of rules provide actors with varying degrees of decision-making freedom. All things being equal, rules that provide actors the most leeway indicate trusting relationship’ (Hoffman, 2002, p.380). One can illustrate this indicator by joint statements delivered by states, for example, the Joint Statement from Government of the People’s Republic of China & Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
Another example that will be discussed in a subsequent chapter is the 2015 China-UK Cultural Year where both governments agree to promote bilateral cultural, economic and other ties.

Some scholars contend that written agreements are thought to be a signal that partners are suspicious of one another (e.g., Baier, 1986; Zucker, 1986). They suggest that there is no need to publish such a written statement if both states treat each other as mutually trustworthy partners. One further argument is that the reason why state actors agree beneficial or reciprocal rules that mainly depends on the respective national interests. In short, they make agreements because they believe that the target state could bring significant benefits to them whether it is a matter of economic or military gain. Therefore, this is not an indicator of sincere trust between states.

As it has been emphasised previously, there is no absolutely sincere trust among states because various factors could have the potential influential effect on the level of trust: for example, the respective national interest, unexpected foreign affairs occurring and so on. However, the existence of state trust could not be eliminated with the production or otherwise of a written document. Arguably, this rule indicator is akin to the marriage certification: when both bride and groom have already announced their sincere oath to each other and believed that they could trust each other. In spite of that, they still need the certificate to protect their legal rights. Similarly, states will consider their respective national interests carefully in addition to other relevant factors prior to the public delivery of the joint statement.

The existence of a written document could help avoid risk between states. First, with statements being delivered publicly, most states are not likely to place their national image and reputation at risk. After all, states cannot behave like a toddler with frequent changes of their political and diplomatic attitudes without any specific reasons and notices. Second, written agreements provide state actors an implementation tool. In general, those who are in charge of implementing agreements are not usually the same persons that negotiated the initial agreements or contracts. In this circumstance, the written agreements and
records are essential tools to enable the communication of rights and responsibilities to those persons who are required to implement or to comply with the relevant agreements. Third, written agreements could act as a pillar of support for state actors when there are unexpected changes, for example, changes in office holders. At the organisational level, in order to be immune from personnel changes, it requires written records for future office holders so that they can be used as a reference after the principal negotiators have left their positions (Hoffman, 2002, p.390).

As for the issue of rule breaking and how to lower the possibility of potential risks, there are two kinds of agreements that could be applied. Hoffman identifies two types of agreements: 1. Framework-oriented agreements, which are dominated by constitutive rules that specify the basic structure, institutional forms, procedures and right, and these ‘constitutive rules’ (Dessler, 1989) create and define legitimate behaviour between parties. 2. Statute-oriented agreements, which are dominated by specific codes that regulate the behaviour of actors under particular circumstances (Hoffman, 2002, p.391). State actors could choose one or two of these after they have evaluated the potential risks involved. With respect to the discretionary option and possible leeway, framework-oriented agreements could offer state actors some additional latitude compared to statute-oriented agreements because the rules that it is dependent on to define the modes of interaction are drafted without a specified time frame when these modes must be employed. By contrast, statute-oriented agreements are similar to regulatory rules, which create specific prohibitions on behaviour, governing not only how state actors should behave but also when particular behaviour ought to be undertaken (or avoided). Framework-oriented agreements do tend to be more consistent with trusting relationships than statute-oriented agreements. However, if state actors were to choose statute-oriented agreements, this choice does not mean that there is no state trust between them.

An example of this type of framework-oriented agreement with leeway can be seen in the Mutual Defence Treaty between the USA and the Republic of Korea. In the first quarter of 2017, USA has forged ahead with the positioning of the
THAAD missile defence system in South Korea in response to North Korea’s ballistic missile and nuclear tests (Stewart and Ali, 2017). Thousands of armed forces of South Korea and USA started a military manoeuvre simulating an all-out attack by North Korea. According to Article IV of the Mutual Defence Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of Korea: ‘the Republic of Korea grants, and the United States of America accepts, the right to dispose United States land, air and sea forces in and about the territory of the Republic of Korea as determined by mutual agreement’ (US Department of State, 1954). This is an example of a framework-oriented rule with particular leeway. As such, ‘it is an indication that in the current situation, the USA has a relatively higher flexibility in the accommodation of their military personnel. South Korea also allows the USA to deploy two aircraft carriers group around Korean Peninsula’ (Durden, 2017). Without discussing the merits or otherwise regarding the USA’s military alliances, the action of South Korea is a demonstration of the existence of state trust. If South Korea does not trust the USA and considers that the USA may cause considerable damage to it when their military personnel step upon the territory of South Korea, it could seek another new protective solution rather than merely relying on the USA. This trust can also be linked to cultural diplomacy. Since the 21st Century, South Korea has started to explore the potential of soft power, especially in the area of cultural diplomacy (Kang, 2015, p.433). In the past decades, South Korea has established a solid cultural connection with the USA, especially in the field of education. With continuous efforts, the cultural relationship between these two states has been strengthened. State trust between South Korea and the USA cannot be completely explained by the efforts of cultural diplomacy, but the efforts of cultural diplomacy cannot be overlooked.

Another possible argument worth mentioning here is that ‘does state trust still exist if states have not developed any types of rules yet’. This is rather rare in international society today. Most states have political and diplomatic connections, although some may never issue joint statement together. The utilisation of just one indicator so as to judge the existence of state trust might be considered as biased because other indicators should be employed as well.
Perhaps this particular indicator can prove that the level of state trust has not quite reached the upper medium level, but other indicators may have the capacity to demonstrate the existence of state trust. Moreover, with respect to the relationship of cultural diplomacy and state trust, it is not difficult to understand the point: once a state initiates programs of cultural diplomacy towards another state or both states have agreed to conduct cultural diplomacy activities together, it is a common routine that they will publish a state-level official statement, although there are other ways to announce agreements without a written document. These rules thus serve as a reminder for both states to behave as they are laid down in the official statement. For instance, when State A and State B devote efforts of cultural diplomacy to each other and they usually will publish a joint statement or other rules with leeway. Furthermore, typically, the content of this statement primarily focuses on the common goals, joint efforts of improvement as well as other positive information rather than merely a proposal of requirements or limitations to each other. In this circumstance, it can be said that the upper medium level of state trust exists between State A and State B.

The fifth indicator, discretion in policy-making and its implementation is the high-level indicator of state trust.

In the political arena, policies could be regarded as the nonverbal expression of the will of a state, as well as serving as a guide to decisions for domestic governments and other states so as to achieve some desirable outcomes. In consideration for measuring the effectiveness of cultural diplomacy in state trust building, cultural policies and related foreign policies could not be neglected; this is particularly important in the process of policymaking and policy implementation. Due to the fact that cultural policies and related foreign policies are meant to be the essential aspects of cultural diplomacy, and it could be regarded as the potential builder of state trust; it can then be known that there is a strong connection between policies and state trust. Moreover, the ways that policies are made and implemented, especially when these are linked to the
Discretionary power, is considered to be an important sign in the examination of existing state trust.

Discretion is a term frequently used in the field of economy, finance, and law; it is seldom mentioned in the political arena, but except in the area of public administration. For instance, in macroeconomics, the discretionary policy is an economic tool based on the judgment of policy makers as opposed to the policy set by predetermined rules. For example, a central banker could make decisions on interest rates on a case-by-case basis instead of allowing a fixed rule to determine interest rates or money supply (Dinga, Ionescu, and Padurean, 2010). In politics, the term discretion matters more with the aspect of public administration or public management, grants them a specific scope of decision-making margins

Hoffman puts forward his view towards discretion and trust, ‘trusting interstate relationships emerge when leaders believe their counterparts are trustworthy and, based on this perception, enact policies that make their states vulnerable to the actions of their counterparts’ (Hoffman, 2002, p.376). Hoffman also argues that ‘they emerge when actors leave the fate of their interests to the discretion of others with the expectation that those actors will honour their obligation to avoid using their discretion in a manner harmful to the first’ (Hoffman, 2002, p.377). In accordance with Hoffman’s perspective, this definition suggests that measuring trusting relationships involves two important parts: 1) identifying policies that grant other states discretion over outcomes, which are previously controlled by the first state, and 2) demonstrating that the leaders responsible for enacting such policies, did so at least in part, because they believed that their counterparts were trustworthy (Hoffman, 2002, p.376-377).

It is frequently the case that leaders of states play a significant role in this kind of state trust relationship, as it involves connecting the perceptions of leaders to their choice of policies. The relevant state leaders normally represent the attitude and willingness of their countries. In this study, however, discretionary power is not limited to the privilege of state leaders, but it can also be used as a favour between trusting states. While discretion is not compulsory, it is
considered to be necessary. This is because it does not matter how precisely a policy is designed, there will always be the potential for unforeseen circumstances to take place that might result in unfair outcomes requiring further consideration. Here, I analyse the connection of policies and discretionary power from two viewpoints to thereafter demonstrate the existence of state trust: 1. discretionary power in policy-making; 2. discretionary power with non-actions in policy-implementation.

1. Discretionary power in policy-making
Discretionary power in policy-making refers to the power or right to decide or act for a state in policy-making; it is particularly of importance to have a certain amount of freedom to make policy. In the policy-making process, Boul and Vaughan consider that ‘in a discretionary framework, policymakers have wide latitude to design the best policy response to the given circumstances’ (Boul and Vaughan, 2003). Indeed, discretion in policy-making contains a relatively high level of risks. Hence, most state actors prefer to have set policy rules rather than grant discretionary power to the counterpart in the long term. Due to the fact that discretion usually involves high risks, whenever a state grants discretionary power to another state in policy-making, it is an indication of their high level of state trust.

Moreover, some scholars consider that ‘the level of discretion is higher when criteria for meeting standards and guidelines are vague, and when exceptions to the policy are tolerated’ (Mccubbins, 1985, p.721; Bawn, 1997, p.101; Balla, 1998, p.663; Torenvlied, 2000). This thesis agrees with this perspective. Therefore, the level of state trust could also be witnessed from the level of discretion. If State A trusts State B, State A will not come up with any requirements or limitations when State A transfers its authority of policymaking to State B. Furthermore, if State A and State B’s state trust level is high, then State A will allow State B’s policymakers to exercise a lot more discretion in defining the contents of relevant policy.
Another potential scenario is that if State A grants the power of discretion in policy making to state B, but there is a disagreement between State A and State B in terms of the policy made by State B. In this situation, State B’s behaviour might not destroy the trusting relationship with State A as other factors influence state trust, such as military resources, economic cooperation, etc. However, it may bring in a relatively negative atmosphere and heavily impact their trusting relationship.

In summary, if State A grants the discretion on foreign policies to State B when it transfers the capacity to determine the relevant political outcomes to State B, in this situation, it can be said that State A trusts State B. If the discretion level is high, it can be said that state trust between State A and State B is higher than usual when compared with other states without discretion-granting policies. State A will not be too worried about the political outcome if State B may carry out unfavourable policies towards State A in the future. This is why discretionary power in policy-making could be regarded as an indicator of a high level existing state trust.

2. Discretion with non-actions in policy-implementation.

During the process of policy-implementation, as states encounter unexpected factors which may influence the pre-determined policies, discretionary power can fill up the holes and gaps in policies where state trust exists between state actors. Usually, discretionary aspects in policy-implementation can be divided into two words: actions and non-actions. As Heyman argues, ‘discretion involves not only decisions about when, on whom, and on what legal grounds to act but also decisions about when and on whom not to act’ (Heyman, 2009, p.370). The term ‘non-action’ used here means having no intention of bringing punitive law enforcement to bear in a particular situation. That is, it means there is no specific action, but it requires a definitive decision of some sort at the organisational or official level, even if, in many cases, the reasons for not enforcing the law are taken for granted (Heyman, 2009, p.372-373).
For example, if State A finds out that some of State B’s behaviour seems to break or has already broken their agreement, then State A has two choices. Firstly, it might choose non-actions in this case. State A might turn a blind eye to State B’s improper behaviour and does not require State B to completely adhere to their agreed rules, as State A believes that State B would not betray their relationship even though State B’s behaviour is considered to be improper. In this situation, state trust is supposed to exist between State A and State B. Alternatively, State A might choose actions. In this case, State A might issue a warning to State B or even break the relationship with State B, as State B has the potential to betray or has already betrayed State A. Withdrawing discretionary power in this manner indicates a decrease in state trust. It might bring some negative influences on the status quo, and damage future state trust building.

Discretion in policy-making and policy-implementation can be illustrated by China setting its first naval base in Djibouti (Panda, 2017). China is not the first country to establish a naval base in Djibouti: the USA and Japan have already built naval bases there before China. Some scholars and journalists argue that China just wants to change its role as resource extractor in Africa (Dubé, 2016). However, Djibouti still allows China to set up the naval base in its territory. In comparison with the related naval base situations of Japan and the USA, Japan needs to pay $30 million per annum and has to share the base with the USA. In addition, both Japan and the USA are only offered a limited number of military personnel to accommodate within the bases. By comparison, China only needs to pay $20 million per annum but enjoys the utilisation of a full naval base (Xi, 2016). Furthermore, according to the news report, the Foreign Minister of Djibouti, Mahamoud Ali Youssouf states that there is no exact limit to the number of Chinese military personnel on the base (Xi, 2016).

It is apparent that in consideration of this particular case, Djibouti offers a privileged policy to China. If the intention of Djibouti is mere to obtain a profitable outcome from the naval base setting, Djibouti could choose to cooperate with Japan and USA, because they pay $10 million more per year each than what is being paid by China. Instead, Djibouti offers China a very good deal,
because China is consistently helping Djibouti to develop the construction of its infrastructure in recent decades. Additionally, there is arguably positive impact of cultural diplomacy. China has increased its cultural export to African countries and also helped Chinese enterprises to know more about African culture. For example, since 1986, China started to devote more cultural efforts into the aspect of the education of Djibouti. China has continuously provided scholarships for Djiboutian students and arranged cultural projects there. Currently, there are about 70 Djiboutian students of scholarship and approximately 200 private students studying in China (Embassy of Djibouti in China, 2017). As a result, Chinese staffs have learned how to respect local culture, how to avoid common misunderstanding and offer respect to local people. Efforts of cultural diplomacy help both states to know each other well and lay out the foundations in other aspects.

In consideration of this case, state trust appears to exist between Djibouti and China. On the one hand, Djibouti is implicitly trusting that military personnel from China would not intervene in its domestic affairs and perhaps could even help to protect its national interest: for instance, monitoring the merchant vessels passing the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, for naval refuelling and restocking (Manson, 2016). On the other hand, China also has sufficient trust in Djibouti, relying on it not to allow Japan and USA to interfere with the Chinese naval base. It is significant that Djibouti government has required that existing military personnel from the USA to relocate from the north to the south, hence, the USA has to share that area with Japan. As an indication of mutual trust between states, Djibouti offers China the discretionary power to deal with its maritime issues.

It is quite crucial that with respect to the issues of whether to act or not to act, the consideration of granting discretionary power to another state is supposed to be a cornerstone in the examination of their state trust level. If a State chooses the option of non-actions with another state, then their state trust is supposed to exist at a high level. According to the previous analysis about discretionary power, this type of state trust is considered to be higher than others. Of course, we cannot be absolutely sure that there is no state trust between states if they do
not provide each other discretionary power in policy-making. However, if they do provide a higher level of discretionary power in policy-making, their state trust should be considered to be at a high level.

4.3 Obstacles of Cultural Diplomacy in State Trust Building

If cultural diplomacy is as important for trust building among states as so many scholars and politicians claim, then additionally, state trust could become the means to avoid some kinds of conflicts and misunderstanding; why shouldn’t be the case for each state to put cultural diplomacy at the top of the state policy? The explanation proposed in this chapter is that trust is difficult to be built and then once built, it is far from straightforward to maintain. Moreover, a variety of cultures in existence is quite difficult to be recognised and to be respected, in particular for those states with long-standing grudges between them. Therefore, X main obstacle concerning the aspect of cultural diplomacy that is likely to hinder the building process and maintenance of state trust could be concluded as follows:

Firstly, the difficulty concerning the existence of misunderstanding and confusion--what state trust is and how can it be applied to the state operation via cultural diplomacy. Currently, one of the most difficult issues is that the concept of state trust in this thesis has not been recognised and formalised well in both academic and political fields. To put it in another way, there is almost no mature system of recognition and measurable practical results regarding this kind of state trust. In Chapter Three, the definition of state trust has been formulated, but for the observation of any expected result, there is still a paucity of sufficient studies. Furthermore, if the state government holds the opinion that cultural diplomacy is a means of “brainwashing”, which may have a dramatic impact and effective control on the minds of their people, then state trust building could not be established and even the previously established state trust level might encounter terrible damage as a result.

Secondly, the difficulty about if one state is not aware of the importance of joint effort, then state trust will not be formed as expected. State trust building is an
interactive process involving at least two state actors that need to learn how to obtain the trustworthiness of each other through cultural diplomacy. State trust building can only take place when one state is open to social influence and is willing to respect and accept the culture of another state. In simple terms, state trust building could not be established unilaterally. As mentioned in Chapter Two and this chapter, both cultural diplomacy and state trust place emphasis on the reciprocal behaviour. Trust building within state relations could be considered as the reciprocal process: it takes two to tango. Therefore, the actual behaviour of the two states is crucial to whether state trust can be built within that relationship or not. However, not every political behaviour can be predicted precisely; it then increases a significant amount of uncertainties within this relationship. Hence, even though a state would like to solve misunderstanding through cultural diplomacy while the other party is indifference in doing so and never shows its attitude in the aspect of reciprocity, the trusting relationship between these two states would not be likely to be positive. Theoretically, there are four situations about trust building shown as follows:

☑: willing to building trust through cultural diplomacy
❌: unwilling to build trust through cultural diplomacy

1. A: ☐
   B: ☐ = Viable Trust Building

2. A: ☐
   B: ❌ = Aborted Trust Building

3. A: ❌
   B: ☐ = Aborted Trust Building
Table 5. Effects of the states’ attitudes towards state trust building

From the table shown above, it clearly indicates that with the efforts of only one party alone, state trust building would not be able to achieve a level of relative success unless State A and State B could devote joint effort to it.

Thirdly, the difficulty of consistent and efficient operation can be regarded as one of the obstacles. Unlike military methods and strategies, for example, in the ancient times, launching a war might require the top generals and the rulers to judge the possible winner and loser within a relatively short period of time. While as soft power, the influence and results of cultural diplomacy might be shown within a long period of time. During this long period, just as the old Chinese proverb ‘no flower can bloom for a hundred days--an ideal state cannot last long’. Every and any potential risk might occur, and new unexpected mistrust may ruin all the efforts previously made. It is impossible to install the notion of trust in other states and then assume it would remain the same as expected many years down the line. Furthermore, during this long period of time, if the states could not properly examine the results and influence of cultural diplomacy, they might easily give up on the continuing efforts of cultural diplomacy.

Fourthly, the difficulty about the over-estimated higher expectation towards the role cultural diplomacy is another obstacle. In the political arena, not every conflict and misunderstanding can be resolved through cultural diplomacy. It is not difficult to understand and admit that there is no absolute 100% trust in the world at all due to a whole host of factors: interests, emotions, frictions, etc. The reason is that the essential core elements of trust deal with expectations, not probabilities. For example, if State A holds a higher expectation towards the cooperation of cultural diplomacy to improve the level of state trust so as to try
to attain certain political or economic goals, while State B considers that this kind of cooperation could not conceivably attain the level as State A expected. Then the problem will appear: as the expectation is higher, State A tends to care a lot more about the process as well as the implementation, the likely result would be a lot more frequent and intense conflicts with State B. Therefore, how to find appropriate balance for the results of state trust building through cultural diplomacy is an arduous and a delicate task.

Fifthly, the difficulty about how to combine the efforts of cultural diplomacy with economic development and political stability in a better way. Actually, it is a common problem that is in existence among the majority of the states. The nature of the relations among culture framework, economic development and political stability remains an open question for debate. However, Leiner argues that in accordance with historical and sociological research, especially cross-cultural studies, they demonstrate that these realms cannot be separated (Leiner, 2010). Cultural diplomacy, with its invisible impact as well as some surprising elements of unintended consequences, do tend to push some states towards their preferred choice on other controllable ways in order to maintain its political stability. Currently, most states have recognised the great potential power of cultural diplomacy and its influence on both economic and political field. However, when compared with a number of efforts in cultural diplomacy, it is particularly the case in the developing countries that most of them devote more in the aspect of economic development and infrastructure construction. For these countries, the potential of cultural diplomacy may not be explored well in state trust building.

4.4 Factors that are influential on the effectiveness of cultural diplomacy in state trust building

In both academic and political areas, a growing number of scholars and politicians are focusing on the relationship of cultural diplomacy and trust. Most of them merely talk about this relationship superficially while neglecting the issues concerning the practical actions on solving the problem of how to use culture as a powerful means so as to foster state trust building. To the current
academic field, it is a crucial issue in measuring the effectiveness of cultural diplomacy. As it has been commonly agreed, cultural diplomacy requires a relatively long period to demonstrate its effectiveness. For example, based on Richard T. Arndt’s argument, ‘cultural diplomacy is a cost-effective practice considering its outcomes and impacts on international ties between countries’ (Arndt, 2005, p.75). The remainder of this chapter reflects on the effectiveness of cultural diplomacy in the creation of state trust. High-level effectiveness could create or increase the level of state trust. If cultural diplomacy lacks effectiveness, then state trust would not emerge or would decrease. In this chapter, I combine the main components of cultural diplomacy as well as the indicators of existing state trust and I also suggest that five key factors that can provide effectiveness in state trust building:

The first factor, the content of cultural policies and foreign policies.

As elaborated above, the orientation of policy in inter-state relations can indicate the existence of state trust or otherwise. The content of specific cultural policies and foreign policies, in turn, influence the effectiveness of cultural diplomacy. One example can be seen in visa regimes. Legitimate travellers are often faced with cumbersome, lengthy and costly visa procedures, in particular for persons who need to participate in the cultural diplomatic programs. Sophisticated visa procedures tend to delay their scheduled arrangement and lower the efficiency of cultural diplomacy. While flexible or liberal visa policy of a state that could shorten and simplify procedures so as to actively promote the culture of a state on the world stage. Smarter visa policies will facilitate the operation of cultural diplomacy, such as the business visiting of related staffs, travelling of the artists and other cultural exchange programs. Those foreign policy rules that support and encourage cultural export and import are a channel for boosting the national image of a state abroad and attaining “soft power”. It is also a reciprocal path that could improve mutual understanding of each other as well as build or strengthen the trusting relationship. Moreover, it could also create other beneficial opportunities for both states, for example, the attraction for more
tourists, businesspersons, researchers, students, artists and cultural professionals.

However, in the area of international politics, foreign and cultural policy are not simply determined by good wishes or economic benefits, but also by military, security and other issues related to national interests as well. Here, a recent illustration can be found in the diplomatic row concerning the relationship between China and South Korea in 2016. In recent years, China and the Republic of Korea have already managed to hold a number of cultural events. Many musical artists, groups, and actors from the ROK regularly travel to China, which can be considered as the most profitable entertainment market for the ROK. However, in 2016, those pop stars of the ROK appear to have become unwitting pawns in an escalating diplomatic spat between Seoul and Beijing over the deployment of an American missile defence system. The political tension between China and the ROK has flooded into the entertainment industry, resulting in the ban of movies, dramas and variety shows from the ROK. Pop stars from the ROK have already been edited out of various kinds of entertainment issues in China. According to a commentator, ‘even though there have been no written bans from [the] administration, an article by the International Business Times reports that ban orders were passed verbally by the officials from the State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Television’ (Karen, 2016).

In response, At the same time, on the side of the ROK, the authorities have taken measures to ban Chinese tourists for entering Jeju Island in the ROK as a kind of ‘reciprocity’ to the actions of the Chinese government. According to a report in Beijing Times, ‘the tourists were held at Jeju airport, prevented from entering the island. Jeju immigration officials reportedly kept the Chinese visitors in a room at the airport, where they were waiting for flights to return them to China’ (Wang, 2016). Although currently, there is no research data showing that state trust between China and the ROK has decreased or otherwise, the behaviours of both states have already triggered unpleasant public reactions.
A lesson can be learnt from this case that the content of cultural policies and foreign policies, including any verbal statements, could influence the effectiveness of cultural diplomacy; just like a chain reaction, state trust building could occasionally be affected by some adverse events. Other issues in the aspect of trade, education, and retail industry have already become the unwitting tools in a political brinkmanship. Moreover, the majority of the public could not completely figure out what is behind the reality and what is the consideration of the states. Misunderstanding and conflicts are emerging among the public. Those frictions have caused certain degrees of damage on the cultural relationships and diplomatic relationships between states.

The Second factor, the clearly defined social roles, formal contract and well-established obligations between states.

In accordance with the discussion in Chapter Three, Tonkiss argues that trust tends to be a kind of feeling established on the privacy and confidential issues and ‘tends to be based on clearly defined social roles, formal contract or well-established obligations’ (Tonkiss, 2014a); those of which can be regarded as the parts of normative system. Under the framework of settled normative system, state actors might be able to align with the trustworthy partners when they gradually get to know each other through cultural diplomacy; therefore, as a consequence, they might be able to move together closer and closer to their common goals, the real mutual interests they expect with strong solidarity among trustworthy state actors. Hence, both states need to ensure that their programs of cultural diplomacy could be correctly and precisely guided by the clearly defined social roles, formal contract, and well-established obligations. Additionally, according to the argument of Frédérique Six with aspect to the methodology of trust building (Six and Verhoest, 2017), in order to consolidate the effectiveness of cultural diplomacy towards state trust building, state actors could not neglect five points as follows: firstly, suspend opportunistic behaviour in the implementation process of cultural diplomacy; secondly, stimulate system resonance, or create a trust-enhancing organisational context; thirdly, send positive cultural relational signals and avoid negative cultural relational signals
through cultural diplomacy; fourthly, strengthen the state cultural communication and interaction with other state actors; fifthly, open the civil society to social and cultural influence and learn about trustworthiness from other state actors.

The third factor, the quality of cultural diplomatic programs.

With respect to the cultural policies and foreign policies of a state, as more and more states join the tide to promote their cultures on the world stage, what type of cultural diplomatic programs could engage more attention from foreign audiences and be beneficial to state trust building? In reply to this question, not only the content, but the quality of these programs is an essential element of their efficiency. Most obviously, the quality of a cultural diplomacy program depends on whether it is going through as planned. Good quality programs can successfully manage cultural variables and meet expectations, develop the cultural strength of a state with mutual understanding, and be able to offer appropriate responses to different cultures. On the other hand, cultural diplomatic programs of inferior quality might damage the existing state trust or have an adverse impact on state trust building in the foreseeable future:

Firstly, a state is likely to have reduced cultural advantages when compared with high-quality cultural programs given by other states. Inferior quality programs are usually in need of systematic planning, the dedicated arrangement of cultural content, efficient implementation, etc. All these issues might have direct negative influences on the cultural advantages of a state and might have crucial possibility in turn advantages into disadvantages. For example, assuming that if foreign audiences compare the high-quality cultural programs with the inferior ones, in the future, they are likely to join in with the better programs and ignore the inferior ones. Programs of inferior quality could not help them to understand other cultures clearly and may even gradually lead foreign audiences to have reduced interest in learning about that particular culture. Without a better cultural communication and understanding, it would be quite difficult to strengthen state trust building between the respective states.
Secondly, inferior quality programs might lead to misunderstanding, for instance, by mishandling a language barrier, which is a common problem that exists in the inferior cultural diplomatic programs. Different languages within communication are akin to a process of coding and decoding of messages, even if they were to share a common language, sometimes simple semantic usage can go wrong as well. Being able to communicate effectively in a foreign language requires a deep understanding of slang, sarcasm, sense of humour and jargon. Especially, knowledge of a language does not automatically give you the background information of which native speakers may assume that you are aware. In addition, words do not always need to be translated from one language to the other in a clear one-to-one basis; even the same English wording may have different meanings to people from various cultures. Such language differences may be ignored in an inferior program. This problem may lead foreign audiences to the situation of misunderstanding and confusion. It is quite clear that there are many points in the cultural diplomacy process where the communication can break down. It would become a nightmare if a state could not ensure the quality of its cultural diplomatic programs, which might generate more misunderstandings afterwards. Therefore, the quality of cultural diplomatic programs could be regarded as one of the factors with influences on the effectiveness of cultural diplomacy in state trust building.

**The fourth factor**, coordination among other institutions within and across states.

Good coordination is necessary for ensuring quality, content, and delivery of cultural diplomatic programs. This applies in particular in the coordination with the respective departments of the partner state; then the quality of cultural diplomatic programs could be more or less guaranteed. Therefore, how to coordinate policy among departments of government and other institutions is quite crucial to the effectiveness of cultural diplomacy in state trust building. Such coordination takes place first in a proposal period and then in a policy implementation period.
In the policy proposal period, government departments normally have the essential expertise in their domains to prepare policy suggestions. However, most policies involve issues cutting across the domains of more than one department; this increases the difficulties of coordination. Furthermore, in the policy implementation period, technical expertise may not be sufficient in any one department but may depend on joint efforts of different departments to enable the efficient working of the various tasks towards a cooperative program of cultural diplomacy.

The common problem that exists in both periods is disorder in coordination, which can be reflected in the following aspects:

Firstly, it is quite difficult for different departments to reach consensus and conduct cultural diplomatic programs abroad. The program could not run as smoothly as expected if there is no agreement between the various departments. Conflict will inevitably take place when two different groups have competing goals or disagreed opinions. Any disagreement might disrupt the flow of work with impacts upon efficiency and productivity. Furthermore, this might not be the only issue leading to the failure of cultural diplomacy, but it can have an influence on other disputes, such as the cooperation in other areas.

Secondly, lack of certainty about behavioural issues may hamper coordination. It is a matter of the comprehensive strength of a state as well as the officers’ acting style of that state. A state with higher comprehensive strength will typically adhere to the implementation of agreed policies, while a state with inferior comprehensive strength may have overestimated its capacity to conduct a successful cultural diplomatic program. Governmental officers are another source of certainty. Take the officials of China and the UK as an example, different cultures cultivate unique styles, just like the old Chinese saying, “each place nurtures its own inhabitants”. The UK’s government officers prefer making detailed plans before activities and then follow through with the decided plan. Chinese government officers by contrary tend to make a general or macro plan
before implementation and then comes up with some other opinions in the implementation process. In China, this kind of behaviour may not be considered as a serious problem. However, in the eyes of foreign audiences, especially those states preferring specific preparation, this behaviour is not usually acceptable and may also be thought of as disrespectful. This erratic or irresponsible behaviour might lead to uncertainty with the result that, gradually, state trust could erode in the near future.

Thirdly, lack of alternative policy or program packages. Based on the two problems mentioned above, which might lead to another problem that the state does not have an alternative policy or program packages if the one proposed is rejected or encounters unsolvable difficulties during the implementation process.

In the coordination process, the complex procedural network and the three problems mentioned above have an enormous potential in leading directly to the abortion of cultural diplomatic programs, together with some other side effects. Often, policymakers might fail to recognise that they are facing critical disordered coordination issues across various objectives. Take China’s cultural diplomacy as an example, where diplomatic efforts are implemented by a complex network of actors, including the Ministry of Culture, the Ministry of Education and the Publicity Department of the Communist Party. The promotion of Chinese culture on the overseas stage is a joint endeavour between the Ministry responsible for cultural affairs with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, but from the official website and documents, it is quite difficult to find out which actor is in overall charge of the program. This has led to an embarrassing situation when foreign audiences would like to seek further information about the specific cultural diplomatic program. They have no idea to contact whom. When contacting the Ministry of Culture, the staff says it is the business of Ministry of Foreign Affairs; when contacting the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it suggests you get in touch with the Ministry of Culture. In such circumstances, coordination among different departments or other institutions can have a significant influence on the effectiveness of cultural diplomacy in state trust building.
The fifth factor, existing mistrust and conflictual issues between states

Most disputes usually arise when the communication or interaction among state actors break down or when there is a misunderstanding in existence among them. Unlike the methods of hard power, taking cultural measures to solve disputes would be an infinitely better method to prevent the complete breakdown of rational, normal relationship between states. If these problematic issues cannot be resolved, they will inevitably influence the effectiveness of cultural diplomacy in state trust building. Tough issues might be resolved when effective and constructive communication is restored, and then the effectiveness of cultural diplomacy would be increased.

A typical example in the political arena is the Sino-Japan relationship. Due to some significant and highly emotionally charged historical reasons, these two states have a lot of serious disputes, such as the issue of distorting history in the textbooks of Japan, sovereignty problems of Diaoyu Islands and other historical issues including the events during the second world war. If these disputes could not be resolved in a calm and rational way, then these kinds of national emotions with detestation and resentment within the civil societies of China and Japan might be evoked and maintained. In addition, existing issues of conflict between them might be multiplied with further exaggeration, and then the current conflicts would still be there gradually getting out of hand while new conflicts are likely to start to appear in abundance as though the Pandora’s box is opened.

As for this factor, if the mistrust or conflictual issues are not quite serious, then reconciling cultural dilemmas might be an effective linchpin to increase the effectiveness of cultural diplomacy in state trust building. It is not a strange phenomenon that states will surely come across diverse cultures in the international society. Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner once propose a model that can be used to reconcile what appear to be values that conflict with each other in the business context (Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, 1993, p.153). However, some points of Trompenaars could be used in the context of cultural
diplomacy and state trust building. They also argue that ‘when business crosses cultures there are many potential situations in which the reconciliation of differences may be both desirable and necessary. The success of the case being conducted may depend on it. Reconciliation is part of building national transcultural competence. There are three essential components of transcultural communication: awareness, respect and reconciling cultural differences’ (Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, 1993, p.157). Based on this model proposed by Trompenaars, three essential components can also be applied in the context of state interaction; none of them is dispensable. Additionally, among these three components, the method about reconciling cultural dilemma is of particular importance. Just as Trompenaars states that ‘without the confidence that reconciliation is possible, awareness can bring pain and frustration can emerge from respect’ (Trompenaars, 2000, p.160). Both awareness and respect could be considered as the essential booster engines for transcultural communication so as to reconcile the cultural difference.

Moreover, Marion Estienne proposes specific five stages towards the reconciliation process of cross-cultural conflict (Estienne, 1997) step by step, which is further developed by Trompenaars (Trompenaars, 2000). Both of Estienne and Trompenaars’ suggestions will then further influence the effectiveness of cultural diplomacy in state trust building. These five stages are demonstrated in Table X as follows:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>STAGES OF THE RECONCILIATION PROCESS</th>
<th>METHOD EMPLOYED TO ARRIVE AT NEXT STAGE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Reaffirm the commitment to the ongoing relationship and its benefit to both parties</td>
<td>Think ‘win-win’ and concentrate on the benefits of collaboration towards each culture</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 Recognise the differences of cultures</td>
<td>Develop a global mindset Legitimise diversity</td>
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| 3 | Continue by searching for similarities | Acquire knowledge of other culture  
|   |   | Display 'acceptance' when appropriate  
|   |   | Employ dialogue  
| 4 | Synthesize the solutions or create outcomes which utilise the most appropriate elements of the opposing cultural dimensions | Practice creative thinking  
|   |   | Demonstrate a willingness to learn  
|   |   | Dialogue  
| 5 | Review the learning process, capture it, and make it available for the future. | Practice experience-based learning  
|   |   | Articulate what has been seen and known  
|   |   | Act on learning at a later stage.  

**Table 6. Framework for the reconciliation of cross-cultural conflict**

Source from: (Estienne, 1997)

When applying this reconciliation model into the context at the state level, the first mandatory stage should involve the commitment of both states so as to develop their cultural resonance and then proceed to build state trust or maintain the level of state trust. After that, both states should carefully search for the existing cultural differences and similarities. In this process, efforts of cultural diplomacy would facilitate mutual cultural understanding among state actors, and then play a positive role in state trust building.

**The sixth factor**, use of funding for cultural diplomatic programs.

In order to promote national culture abroad and encourage cultural agencies or institutions to develop national culture overseas, state governments usually provide funds. Other related organisations also offer funds for launching cultural projects. These efforts create opportunities, help to highlight the creative and innovative ideas to promote culture across the world and greatly encourage the exchange of knowledge. This is likely to result in the finding of new collaborations, new inspirations and connection with other practitioners from different cultural sectors. Proper use of funds could strengthen trusting relationships and makes them more sustainable because sponsors trust applicants’ ability to take care of the intended use of the funds to promote
cultural development. However, some applicants might abuse their position of authority for personal financial gain when they have successfully received funds from the states or organisations destined for cultural projects.

Since the wave of cultural exchange has attracted the attention of states and an increasing number of cultural funds are made available for application; more and more applicants realise cultural funds are an excellent opportunity to be used not only for their own cultural projects but can also be used for personal gains. Embezzlement issue is not limited to external applicants, but it can also happen within a ministry or organisation providing the funds. Such cases have been reported across the world, for example, in Russia (Kinsella, 2016), Lithuania (Ward, 2016) and South Korea (Reuters, 2017).

Embezzlement and corruption cases can be seen in various fields. Such misappropriation of cultural funds naturally has a direct influence on the effectiveness of cultural diplomacy. Not only does it result in the decrease of cultural funds from governments, organisations and individuals, but also unfair or illegal gain from the cultural funds will irritate the public and gradually decrease their trust and support from them. When the funding received from other states, whether these originated from overseas governments or organisations, state trust may also be damaged by the introduction of the illegal and dishonest factors in the trusting relationship, once the embezzlement behaviour has been exposed.

**The seventh factor**, the operation of overseas cultural institutions.

Since states have endeavoured to develop the various branches of culture side by side and those cultural organisations are becoming truly global; both the number of governmental cultural organisations and non-governmental cultural institutions has increased dramatically. The common claimed purpose of them is to promote mutual understanding between nations through cultural and educational exchanges. In the area of cultural diplomacy, overseas cultural institutions have greater convenient access to approach foreign audiences than
domestic ones so as to assist states to complete their tasks of cultural diplomacy. An additional advantage of these overseas institutions is to establish a harmonious balance between different cultures and promote the greater civilizational advancement of human beings.

Overseas cultural institutions enjoy a lot of resources because they are usually familiar with the environment of both states, policies and cooperative opportunities, especially among different cultures between states. This advantage of overseas cultural institutions can facilitate the conduction and implementation of cultural diplomacy abroad. Therefore, the role of these kinds of institutions tends to be more outstanding. However, just because of the important role that many speculators start to think about gaining some improper profit when they are engaged in running the cultural institutions. Besides, other problems within the operation of overseas cultural institutions also exist, such as inferior service within the cultural institution and unprofessional promotion. All these problems will have an influence on the effectiveness of cultural diplomacy in state trust building, which can be reflected through the following analysis:

Among the factors that may have an influence on the effectiveness of cultural diplomacy in state trust building, taking cultural institutions for personal gain is the worst case that can definitively damage the trusting relationship between states. Some directors of the cultural institutions have the fraudulent behaviour with the establishment of the personal business empire under the cloak of charity so as to expand on their own profit. They are not operating for the public benefit; therefore, they would frequently fail to manage conflicts of interest. ‘Publicized fraudulent behaviour by key executives has negatively impacted the reputations, brands, and images of many organisations around the globe’ (Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, 2012). But these types of indecent behaviours bordering on criminal behaviour would not only have an impact on the reputation of institutions but also tainted the reputation of the state. For example, assuming that the cultural institution mainly focuses on promoting State A’s culture in State B and successfully obtained the funds from both governments. But the facts of its fraudulent use will lower or even destroy State
B’s trust level towards State A if State B discovers the evidence concerning the director’s fraudulent activities.

Another example is that some overseas cultural institutions have been registered as the form of charity in the local government. Under the non-profit cover of “charity”, it would be easier to take advantage of domestic tax policies and obtain donations from the public. In most cases, these cultural institutions even take full advantages of the kindness of volunteers without telling them the truth. They exist in every corner of the world, because of the “prime” condition of a charity is that they don’t have to pay high tax with lower labour costs, which tempts them to become a lot more unscrupulous.

Nowadays, increasing number of states has started to realise the seriousness of this problem. For instance, the Chinese government has published an extensive list of the offshore communities and institutions, which are usually titled with a grand prefix, such as China-UK, China-USA, China State Level, etc. (Xinhua News, 2016). They carefully designed the name to deceive the general public. These seemingly smart tricks gradually ruin the reputation of a state, while the fraudulent behaviours of such cultural institutions will damage the fair competition in the environment of the cultural market and pose an adverse impact on the social trend. Furthermore, great fraudulent actions of overseas cultural institutions can even lead to the downfall of other well-behaved cultural institutions.

In the overseas environment, not every cultural institution is established by professional experts who have the capacity to develop the culture of their mother state. Additionally, some staffs of overseas cultural institutions are in need of systematic training, professional guidelines and do not have enough knowledge about the culture of their mother state, when these weaknesses will lead to the inferior service as well as the inferior quality of cultural programs. Those who can speak mother tongue fluently do not necessarily mean that they have known the culture of their mother state well. Therefore, in the process of cultural development, foreign audiences will be easily trapped into the confused
situation, which comes with misunderstanding due to the issues listed above. Especially if the staff offers incorrect information about the history, politics and other sensitive issues to foreign audiences, this will broadly generate the misunderstanding among the culture of different states. The problems about the inferior quality of cultural diplomatic programs have been discussed in the previous part. If the overseas cultural institutions have not been made aware with proper correction of their greedy and fraudulent behaviours, then these problems would inevitably tend to become more widespread.

The eighth factor, publicity concerning the programs of cultural diplomacy.

As an important means of publicity to cultural diplomacy to foster state trust building, the power of mass media should not be overlooked. The mass media, especially the international mainstream media, plays a very important role as a vehicle in discovering the effectiveness of cultural diplomacy towards state trust building. For example, as the Foreign Ministry Spokesman of the Chinese government, Liu Jianchao states that⁴ ‘in order to enable China to have a better mutual understanding, mutual cooperation and mutual integration with the rest of the world, the mass media is a very important intermediary. Only when the government holds an open attitude towards the coverage of the mass media, provides more useful information and makes it more transparent; then the mass media could give the government a hand so as to foster implementation of cultural diplomacy’ (Liu, 2008). Without immediate news report regarding the particular program of cultural diplomacy, it would be difficult to the domestic and international audiences to participate in it. Furthermore, considerable publicity will help both states to strengthen the promotion of their national culture.

Additionally, state actors should also be minded that it cannot hold so much higher expectation that the media will only report good news, they should have

⁴要让中国同世界更好地相互了解，相互理解，相互合作，相互融合，新闻媒体是非常重要的媒介。只有你对媒体更公开，更透明，提供更多的信息，媒体才能帮助你。当然，不要指望媒体只报道中国好的、进步的和发展的一面，也要承受他们可能报道一些你不愿意被报道的问题
to bear the consequences of some of the unexpected negative issues which could be reported as well. Relying only on the propaganda of government, the effect of trying to cast a wider net with the greater dissemination of cultural diplomacy is naturally rather limited.

**The ninth factor**, monitoring the impact after cultural diplomatic activities.

In the process of evaluating the effectiveness of cultural diplomacy in state trust building, monitoring the impact especially after the cultural diplomatic event is an essential necessity. The important point is not about getting all things done, but how to continue and maintain the rapport. In the majority of the cultural programs, it is a common problem that quite a few state actors or organisations will monitor the impact when the program completes. Monitoring and evaluating the impact could assist with the implementation of remedial measures to get further programs back on track and remain accountable to the expected results towards the achievement of the goal of any further programs. Additionally, it could also help to determine how the budget should be distributed across the programs of cultural diplomacy. Moreover, collected information (such as data, feedback, reports, etc.) could be beneficial for both state actors and non-government organisations so as to evaluate the outcomes of cultural diplomatic efforts. All these advantages might be of great value to help to pave a better path towards the building of state trust.

**4.5 Conclusion**

The benefits of cultural diplomatic programs are large in number because cultural diplomatic programs create platforms for interaction between people of different countries, thus laying the groundwork for the forging of friendships and strong connections between people of different nationalities. Moreover, cultural diplomacy can help to create a foundation of trust among states.

Cultural diplomacy is a dynamic and complex process requiring ongoing efforts, and it is the same with state trust building. The long-term impact of cultural diplomacy in state trust building takes many years to show, as the associated
outcomes and impacts are often intangible. As previously established, state trust, in fact, refers to a variety of phenomena that enable the will of states to take risks in dealing with other states, solving problems of collective action or acting in other ways, which seem contrary to standard definitions of national interest. How to prove the existence of state trust, then states’ trusting relationships are behavioural demonstrations of trust. Therefore, this chapter has put forward five indicators of existing state trust as follows:

1. Minimal level of state trust--Cooperation among states
2. Lower medium level of state trust--Advantageous orientation of states’ policies
3. Medium level of state trust--Carrying out benevolent policies between states
4. Upper medium level of state trust--Types of written rules with leeway
5. High level of state trust--Discretionary power in the policy-making

When detecting the factors that may influence the effectiveness of cultural diplomacy in state trust building, the great diversity of cultural diplomatic programs and intangibility of state trust makes it impossible to measure all outputs with the same tools. Different programs have different missions and purposes, ranging from cultural promotion to political development, which will influence state trust in different ways. Because of the significant variation in goals, approaches, and methodologies of cultural diplomatic programs and their evaluations, much of the evaluative data generated is not comparable, which place more obstacles to measuring its effectiveness in state trust building.

Detecting existing state trust created by cultural diplomacy cannot merely rely on one indicator in a specific case, but can be combined by a combination of these five indicators. For example, when detecting the existence of state trust created by cultural diplomacy in the China-UK relationship, we may observe discretion-granting policies, other rules and the orientation of policies. To evaluate the effectiveness of cultural diplomatic programs in state trust building, for instance, through the China-UK Cultural Year, we need to make comparisons over time. In the initial stage, they should try to examine whether the policy is discretion-granting and what its orientation is. In the progressing stage, they
should try to examine the continuous policy and any unexpected issues that may need the power of discretion. After the event, they should examine the results of cooperation. Ideally, all these indicators can be integrated into a multi-measured strategy, which is designed to enhance the accuracy of empirical inferences.

When evaluating the effectiveness of cultural diplomacy in state trust building, these nine indicators could be regarded as a kind of measuring standard: a) some content of cultural policies and foreign policies; b) a clearly defined social roles, formal contract and well-established obligations between states; c) the quality of cultural diplomatic programs; d) coordination among different governmental departments and other institutions within and across states; e) existing mistrust and conflictual issues between states; f) misuse of funding for cultural diplomatic programs; g) the operation of overseas cultural institutions; h) publicity concerning the programs of cultural diplomacy; i) monitoring the impact after cultural diplomatic activities.

Generally speaking, trusting relationship between states cannot be established in one day, but it could be easily influenced by other aspects, which are not merely concerning cultural diplomacy. Sometimes trusting relationship is probably even destroyed with only a single case. Behaviours in other areas may have a significant impact on the effectiveness of cultural diplomacy in state trust building. Any fraudulent behaviours in states’ interaction would have an influence on the trusting relationships; therefore, how to monitor and avoid the appearance of fraudulent behaviours, other kinds of misconduct or mismanagement behaviours among states should be taken into consideration.
Chapter 5

China’s Application of Cultural Diplomacy in State Trust Building

5.1 Introduction
The surge of the Chinese economy has been recognised by the international communities. The rise of China has been significantly reshaping the current international order. Xi Jinping’s leadership, in particular, is more willing to promote China’s favourable changes in the international arena’ (Zeng, 2017). Especially, with the recent significant increase in the national expenditure within the cultural sector, China’s actions in soft power that is not merely a matter of verbal promise but solid practical actions with full implementations. Therefore, Chinese culture is considered as the essence of China’s soft power in developing cultural influence of China flying in the face of popular Western culture. It is particularly true in the 21st Century, China’s strategy in cultural diplomacy is not solely about promoting national culture on the world stage, but also a matter of exploring the potential of cultural diplomacy as well; for instance, building trust and friendship with other states.

In order to examine the effectiveness of China’s cultural diplomacy in state trust building, this chapter combines the concept of cultural diplomacy and state trust with the particular example of cultural diplomatic efforts in the 2014 APEC Beijing Summit. The first section outlines the historical origin of China’s cultural diplomacy. The second section illustrates the development of China’s cultural diplomacy in the contemporary era. The third section analyses the weakness of China’s cultural diplomacy.

5.2 The Historical Origin of China’s Cultural Diplomacy
Employing culture as a political tool of soft power to demonstrate its attitude and content of foreign policy that has a very long history in China. The period in Chinese history that most emphasised the spread of Chinese culture is the so-called Spring and Autumn era (771 BC–476 BC), which is famous for its ‘Hundred Schools of Thought’. At this time, Confucius stressed the limitation and
regulation of hard power, so his teachings focused mainly on the aspects of education and humanity. This era fostered outstanding cultural and intellectual development, the influential effects of which are still found even in society today, with firm imprints upon the ideology or practices of contemporary China.

The appreciation of this cultural influence comes out as a notable them in the interview\(^5\) conducted for this research project. For example, Professor Qingmin Zhang argues that\(^6\) “from the studies of cultural aspect, when analysing a state’s foreign policy, it is often associated with the study of the history and tradition of this country and that it is inseparable. Confucianism constitutes the essential core of Chinese culture and that it has been influential on Chinese people’s way of thinking, interaction with others, even China’s diplomatic behaviour until nowadays). This argument is also frequently found in academic texts by other Chinese scholars (Zhang, 2003, p.35). These historical influences are also reflected in the governing philosophy of Communist Party of China and its emphasis on cultural diplomacy through concepts, such as ‘harmonious world’, ‘peaceful development’, and establishing ‘friendship’ with other states. Thus, it can be seen that Confucianism plays a significant role in the developmental process of cultural diplomacy in China.

In the era of East and West (372 BC-289 BC), another great thinker, Mencius, also denounced wars and other means of hard power with the idea that benevolent kings who could easily win over masses had no enemies (Palit, 2013). Later, along with Confucianism and Mencius thoughts, the doctrine of Taoism and Mohism also concentrated on the notion of ‘universal love’, and the virtue of discussion and persuasion for solving problems among individuals and states. In this regard, ancient political and military thinkers in China were often sceptical of hard power. For example, the celebrated military strategist Sun Tzu’s (545 BC—470 BC) book The Art of War concerns the development of military strategy but also emphasises the great importance of a person’s ideology. Sun argues that

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\(^5\) This interview was conducted in Peking University, 24 September 2014.

\(^6\) 在从文化角度研究或分析一个国家的外交政策时往往与对这个国家的历史和传统的研究分不开，儒家思想构成了中国文化的基本内核，至今都影响着中国人的思维方式，为人处世，乃至中国的外交行为。
one should attack the enemy’s mind rather than his fortified cities (Sun, 2002, p.38). Sun Tzu’s writings suggest that using the means of soft power is easier and more efficient than using hard power.

After that, in the West Han period (202 BC—8 AD), Zhang Qian and Ban Chao started to visit the western regions of China and established what became known as the “Silk Road” (State Council of China, 2016). It was an ancient network of trade routes that can be considered as a central junction to cultural interaction originally through regions of Eurasia for centuries. By the time of Tang and Song Dynasties, the maritime ‘Silk Road’ was well developed due to seven maritime voyages of Admiral Zheng He. Additionally, in the modern period, from the Sino-Japanese cultural communication of Mr. Huang Xianzong to the Peking opera performance of Mr. Mei Lanfang in the USA, Chinese external cultural communication has been a never-ending stream of cultural activities that could be regarded as a part of cultural diplomacy. In general, Chinese ancient and modern philosophy, as well as the official written history of China, rarely endorse hard power, but mainly concentrate on cultivating friendship so as to avoid and solve conflicts and misunderstandings. This history arguably laid the foundations for Chinese cultural diplomacy in the last century.

5.3 The Development of China’s Cultural Diplomacy in the Contemporary Era

In the contemporary era, mixed notices have arisen towards the development of China’s cultural diplomacy in both domestically and internationally. For instance, Gary Rawnsley states that ‘it is not surprising that the government in Beijing has privileged culture and tradition in its soft power strategy as these should be the easiest themes to sell and they avoid giving further prominence to the political and social issues that undermine China’s soft power credibility’ (Rawnsley, 2013). Furthermore, Rawnsley also considers that the Chinese government have a clear abiding faith in the power of culture to overcome and possibly transform the attitudes and prejudices of audiences throughout the world. As Chinese investment in the overseas Confucius Institutes suggests, they are confident that
exposure to culture will have soft power rewards that intangibles can be converted into tangible benefits (Rawnsley, 2013).

When looks at the Chinese history, the philosophy of Confucius has taken up an important position in the Chinese cultural system. Confucianism regards intellectual workers as rulers and positions manual labourers as mere subjects. Similarly, one of Mencius’s famous sayings is that ‘those who work with their brain rule and those who work with their brawn are ruled’ (Mencius, 2006, p.58). This historical thinking even influences the policies of the Chinese Communist Party (CPC), especially in relation to their governing philosophy. As the sole party of governance in China, the attitude of CPC and its policies directly affect the development of cultural diplomacy in China.

In the academic arena, policies of the central government might influence academic focus in cultural diplomacy. Chinese policies are often delivered to the public speeches by top government leaders in most cases. After that, the local authorities and academic institutions conduct related practices with relevant research in responses to the “fresh” policy. As indicated by one anonymous professor in Beijing7, ‘currently, Chinese academic scholars prefer choosing the hotly-debated research areas, which are usually just following on the orientation of national policies. For those relatively rare or unique areas of research, which are not mentioned by the authority or outside the main national policies areas, even though you can publish a paper, but it could not attract enough attentions of the intended audience’ (2014). This part looks at some significant strategies within the five governing periods of CPC's influential leaders in the aspect of cultural issues; it then proceeds to outline a general analysis of the cultural policy of CPC and its influences on the development of cultural diplomacy in China:

In the Maoist era (1949-1976), China’s cultural relations aroused fierce argument among the public both domestically and internationally. One of the

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7 中国现在的学者都喜欢去研究热门领域，而热门领域往往都是跟着国家政策走的。一些相对冷门的研究，就算发表了文章，关注的人也不会多
controversial debates surrounded the Cultural Revolution, which caused huge damage and seriously hindered the development of traditional Chinese culture. Moreover, massive political pressure initiated by Cultural Revolution profoundly influenced the ideology of the public. During this period, Mao’s team was not positive to the Chinese traditional culture, particularly held negative attitude towards Confucius. For example, it launched a series of campaigns to undermine Confucius vales, destroy status of Confucius and dispose relevant literature products. However, the CCP started to gradually open the door of China to foreign friends, although with strict regulations and limitations. In 1956 alone, there were 5,200 foreign visitors from 75 countries coming to China. At the same time, the Chinese government sent more than 1,300 cultural representatives to some 39 countries (Passin, 1963, p.2-4). While the Chinese government were only open to short-period ceremonial and political visits and exchanges, long-term study and research remained rather rare (Passin, 1963, p.6). At that time, as Passin notes, ‘it was quite difficult to deviate or break away from an officially organised or arranged tour in order to establish direct contacts with people or experience an environment for which a visitor may have a particular affinity or research interest’ (Passin, 1963, p.10).

In the era of Deng Xiaoping (1978-1993), the domestic cultural situation and the environment of foreign communication tended to be better and more open than the era of Mao Zedong. Deng’s strategy ‘Reform and Opening Up’ (Gai Ge Kai Fang) led to increasing international interest in exploring various aspects of China, including Chinese culture, while creating incentives for Chinese leaders to expand the nation’s cultural influence (Gill and Huang, 2006).

In the era of Jiang Zemin (1994-2003), the Sixteenth National Congress could be regarded as a turning point of culture and soft power in the Chinese government and CPC’s policy plans (Xinhua Net, 2002). According to a statement from the Congress, ‘the country (China) should not only provide its people with an ample material life, but also a healthy and rich cultural life’, and ‘the (Chinese) government would devote more resources to boosting public cultural services and speed up the reform of the cultural industry’ (Xinhua Net, 2011).
In the era of Hu Jintao (2004-2013), the CPC’s the Sixth Plenary Session of the Seventeenth Central Committee discussed the ‘cultural system transformation’ and ‘socialist cultural development’ (CCTV, 2011). It passed the Statement on Deepening the Reform of the Cultural System to Promote Socialist Development and Prosperity of the Decision on Major Issues. Leaders of the CPC committed to boosting the soft power of China while maintaining ‘cultural security’ following the ongoing economic boom (Xinhua Net, 2011). Hu Jintao states that ‘culture is emerging as an important part of the country’s comprehensive competitiveness in today’s world, and China is facing a difficult task in protecting “cultural security” and feeling the urgency of enhancing its soft power and the international influence of its own culture’ (Xinhua Net, 2011).

Before the Sixth Plenary Session, a series of measures were taken to provide an international stage for Chinese culture so as to express the ideology of China or the governing philosophy of CPC. Such measures included holding 2008 Beijing Olympic Games and 2010 Shanghai EXPO, establishing Confucius Institute⁸ and China Culture Centres⁹ in other countries, organising cultural years and holding relevant cultural activities.

In the present era of Xi Jinping (2013-now), after the Sixth Plenary Session, the current leadership has also shown signs of pursuing an accommodating and pragmatic cultural policy. It emphasises that China’s cultural policy should keep with greater national interests of ‘holding high the banner of peace, development, cooperation, and mutual benefit’ (Xinhua Net, 2012). A resolution adopted at the 18th Congress of the Communist Party of China in November 2012 was emphatic about upholding China’s cultural heritage, arguing that ‘the country’s cultural soft power should be improved significantly for mutual understanding’ (Xinhua Net, 2012).

Furthermore, Xi has also vowed to promote China’s cultural soft power by disseminating modern Chinese values and showing the charm of Chinese culture.

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⁸ In December 2015, there were 500 Confucius in the 134 countries (Hanban, 2015)
⁹ China Culture Centre has established 9 overseas branches (in Paris, Berlin, Rome, Seoul, Tokyo, Malta, Cairo, Benin, Mauritius, Ulan Bator) until March 2016 (China Culture Centre, 2015).
to the world (Xi, 2014). At the same time, he also places much emphasis that ‘China should be portrayed as a civilised country featured with the rich history, ethnic unity, and cultural diversity. China should develop itself as an Asian power with the good government, developed economy, cultural prosperity, national unity and beautiful mountains and rivers’ (Xi, 2014). A guideline from the CPC concerning the strength of Chinese cultural development promotes various cultural activities, such as the 2015 China-UK Cultural Year (British Council, 2015), the cultural communication and cultural industry in the Belt and Road Initiative (State Council of China, 2016). Other national cultural display within the mega-events also can be considered as the efforts of China's cultural diplomacy, such as the 2014 APEC Beijing Summit, 2016 G20 Hangzhou Summit, 2017 Belt and Road Beijing Summit and 2017 BRICS Summit in Xiamen.

The principal general directions of policies development concerning the aspect of culture in the past twenty years are listed as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1997</th>
<th>The Fifteenth National Congress of CPC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“江泽民总书记在阐述中国文化建设时明确指出: '我国文化的发展, 不能离开人类文明的共同成果。要坚持以我为主、为我所用的原则, 开展多种形式的对外文化交流, 博采各国文化之长, 向世界展示中国文化建设的成就” (Shi, 2009). Translation: As for the aspect of China’s cultural construction, Jiang Zemin explained clearly and pointed out, ‘China’s cultural development cannot ignore the collective achievements of human civilisation, and China should adhere to the principles ‘take the initiative and for our use’. China should carry out various forms of international cultural exchanges and gatherings so as to show China’s achievements in cultural structure and to set to the world.</td>
<td></td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>2000</th>
<th>Jiang Zemin’s work inspection in Guangdong Province</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>江泽民提出了“三个代表”的重要思想, 其中代表先进文化的前进方向”的思想, 必然要求我们在对外开放和外交政策中, 体现中国伟大的民族精神、体现丰富的思想价值体系和坚定有力的主张, 以此来拓展文化外交和意识形态的吸引力(Shi, 2009). Translation: Jiang Zemin came up with the idea of ”Three Representatives”. One representative emphasises the orientation of advanced culture, which requires us to show China’s great national spirit, value system and firm propositions in the policy of opening up to the outside world and Chinese foreign policies so as to expand the attraction of ideology in the cultural diplomacy of China.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Event</td>
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<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>The 5th Plenary Session of the 15th Central Committee of CPC</td>
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<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>The Fourth Session of the Ninth National People’s Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Report of the Sixteenth National Congress of the CPC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs of P.R. C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>The 60th Anniversary of the Founding of the United Nations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 2006 | Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs | “胡锦涛：推动建设和谐世界，是我们坚持走和平发展道路的必然要求，也是我们实现和平发展的重要条件……要致力于促进不同文明加强交流、增进了解、相互促进，倡导世界多样性，推动人类文明发展进步 (Hu, 2006) Translation: Hu Jintao mentioned in the conference, ‘promoting the establishment of harmonious world is the inevitable requirement and condition for us to stick to
the road of peaceful development...we should be dedicated to promoting different civilisations to strengthen exchanges, enhance understanding and improve mutual promotion, and we propose to the diversity of the world and promote human civilisation development and progress’.

### 2007 The Seventeenth National People’s Congress of CPC

In the *Hu Jintao’s Report to the Seventeenth National Congress of the CPC*, the notion of cultural soft power has been proposed and accepted in the report (Hu, 2007b).

### 2009 The Eleventh Meeting of Ambassadors

“胡锦涛强调要加强公共外交和人文外交，开展各种形式的对外文化交流活动，扎实传播中华优秀文化” (Xinhua News, 2009) Translation: Hu Jintao emphasised to strengthen the development of public diplomacy and humanity diplomacy, and conduct various kinds of international cultural activities so as to cultivate the excellent Chinese culture better”.

### 2010 CPC Central Committee’s Suggestions on the Formulation of National Economic and Social development of the twelfth Five-year Plan (Document)

胡锦涛强调“加强对外宣传和文化交流，创新文化’走出去’模式，增强中华文化国际竞争力和影响力”;

“加强公共外交，广泛开展民间友好交往，推动人文交流，增进中国人民同各国人民相互了解和友谊” (Xinhua News, 2010) Translation: Hu Jintao emphasised that (China) should strengthen the external propaganda and cultural communication, and make the pattern of “Go Global Strategy” more innovative and increase China’s international influence. (China) should improve the development of public diplomacy, broadly conduct the friendly public diplomacy activities, foster the public communication and increase the mutual understanding and friendship with international society.

### 2012 Report of the Eighteenth National Congress of the CPC

习近平强调“建设社会主义文化强国，关键是增强全民族文化创造活力”(People’s Daily, 2012) Translation: Xi Jinping emphasised that in the aspect of constructing the powerful socialist culture state, the key is to enhance the cultural creativity of the whole nation.

### 2014 Twelfth Collective Study of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee

习近平强调建设社会主义文化强国着力提高国家文化软实力，所以要努力展示中华文化独特魅力; 注重塑造我国的国家形象; 要努力提高国际话语权 (China Daily, 2014). Translation: Xi Jinping emphasised the importance to improve national cultural soft power. Therefore, in this improving process, several points need to be focused: putting great efforts to show the charming power of Chinese culture; Emphasizing the building of China’s national image; holding international discourse power.
2015 The Conference of the Secretary of the National Cultural Authorities Organised by Ministry of Culture

“以提高文化开放水平为着力点，推动中华文化走向世界，力争到“十三五”末，形成更加完备的多渠道、多层次、宽领域的对外和对港澳台文化交流格局” (Xinhua News, 2015). Translation: We should regard the cultural level of opening up as the focus to promote Chinese culture to the world. We should try to create a complete multichannel, multi-level and wide-ranging cultural exchange pattern towards Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan and international society.

2016 Action Plans of Ministry of Culture in 2016

创新对外传播、文化交流、文化贸易方式，推动中华文化“走出去”(Ministry of Culture of PRC, 2016)
Translation: Improving the innovation of international cultural dissemination, cultural communication, and forms of cultural trade, and fostering Chinese culture to “go global”.

Table 7. The principal general directions of policies development in China concerning the aspect of culture in the past twenty years.

The summary result of main academic literature in the past twenty years is shown as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zhi Li</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>文化外交:一种传播学的解(Cultural Diplomacy: an Interpretive Mode of Communication)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H Lai</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>China’s cultural diplomacy: Going for Soft Power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qingmin Zhang</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>全球化环境下的中国文化外交 (China’s Cultural Diplomacy in the Context of Globalisation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaijin Miao</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>中国文化外交研究(Studies on China’s Cultural Diplomacy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mingling Yu</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>21世纪的中国文化外交措施研究 21 (Studies on Measures of China’s Cultural Diplomacy in the 21st Century)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naige Liu, Zhonghua Zhang</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>论中国文化外交的使命与选择(The Destiny and Choice of China’s Cultural Diplomacy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xinliang Peng</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>文化外交与中国的软实力: 一种全球化的视角(Cultural Diplomacy and China’s Soft Power—From the Globalisation Perspective)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pan Weijuan</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Cultural Diplomacy and a Harmonious World</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hui Liu</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>China-Africa Relations through the Prism of Culture–The Dynamics of China’s Cultural Diplomacy with Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xianchao Deng</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>新时期中国文化外交兴起的必然(The Rise of China’s Cultural Diplomacy in the New...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Title</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philip Seib</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>China’s Embrace of Cultural Diplomacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yue Liu</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Arts Exchanges in Contemporary U.S-China Cultural Diplomacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalika A. Tullock</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>China’s Soft Power Offensive in the United States: Cultural Diplomacy, Media Campaigning, and Congressional Lobbying</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gary Rawnsley</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Limits of China’s Cultural Diplomacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parama Sinha Palit</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>China’s Cultural Diplomacy: Historical Origin, Modern Methods and Strategic Outcomes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andrea Beck</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>The Shanghai Ballet: A Model for Chinese Cultural Diplomacy?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Su-Yan Pan</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Confucius Institute project: China’s cultural diplomacy and soft power projection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jay Wang, Han Chen, etc.</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Reshaping Cultural Diplomacy in a New Era: Confucius Institutes &amp; China’s Soft-Power Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ingrid d’Hooghe</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>China’s Cultural Diplomacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael Barr</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Chinese cultural diplomacy: old wine in new bottles?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yao Yung-Wen</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>The Void of Chineseness: Contemporary Art and Cultural Diplomacy in China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yu-Shan Wu</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Cultural Diplomacy through ‘China’s Year in South Africa’</td>
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<tr>
<td>Da Kong</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Imaging China: China’s Cultural Diplomacy Through Loan Exhibitions to British Museums</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Bilgsam</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>China’s Cultural Diplomacy and the “Chinese Cultural Year” in Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lan Mi, Xinyu Xing, etc.</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>中国周边国家和地区文化外交系列(Translation: China’s Cultural Diplomacy with the Neighbouring States Collection)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yaning Wang</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>中国文化外交可持续发展的基础(Translation: The Sustainable Development Foundation of China’s Cultural Diplomacy)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 8. The summary result of main academic literature concerning China’s cultural diplomacy in the past twenty years.

Many scholars studying on the aspect of China’s cultural diplomacy point out that ‘China, a country with a long history, after more than 30 years opening reform, its hard power has reached a relatively high level. If China wants to achieve the national culture rejuvenation, developing its soft power could attract more attention from international society’ (Li, 2012, p.47. see also Wang, 2015; Kong, 2015). Domestic academic research concerning the topic ‘cultural
diplomacy of China’ particularly outstanding in 2012 as can be seen in the following figure showing the number of articles that were published containing the term in each year, as determined by a search on the Chinese National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI) academic database.

![Academic Research in China’s Cultural Diplomacy Between 2000-2015](image)

**Figure 7. Academic search results on the topic of China’s cultural diplomacy from CNKI**

From this figure, it can be seen that in the first few years of the 2000s, the topic regarding the cultural diplomacy of China received little attention until the year 2005. After the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, the influence of Chinese culture received increasing public interest, domestically and internationally. At this time, about a hundred news and academic works discussed about Chinese cultural soft power during the period of the Olympic Games, with title such as “北京奥运会开幕式展示的中国文化让观众难忘” *The Opening Ceremony of Beijing Olympics Shows Chinese Culture, which Leaves a Deep Impression on the Audience* (Y. Liu, 2008), 北京奥运会助推汉语全球推 *Beijing Olympics Promotes the Globalisation of Chinese Language* (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, 2008), *Owning the Olympics: Narratives of the New China* (Price and Dayan, 2009), *The Beijing Games in the Western Imagination of China: The Weak Power of Soft Power* (Manzenreiter, 2010, p.29).
However, when compared with other hotly-debated topics, such as finance, economy, marketing, the number of published books, research papers and other news items about China’s cultural diplomacy are in a minority position. After the year 2012, academic works concerning China’s cultural diplomacy show a slightly decreasing trend. When looks for an explanation from the academic perspective, Andrew J. Nathan and Andrew Scobell argue that ‘China’s soft power in the early twenty-first century rose in conjunction with its economy, underscoring the reality that a significant accumulation of hard power is a precondition for generating appreciable soft power’ (Nathan and Scobell, 2012, p.321). Yao adds a supplementary argument to explain another motivation concerning the development of China’s cultural diplomacy. Yao considers that ‘when foreign cultural influences are internalised as part of everyday life and gradually reshape Chinese people’s ideology, exerting China’s cultural influence overseas became an imperative part of China’s global strategy’ (Yung-Wen, 2015, p.971). Palit also argues that ‘China considers culture essential in correcting adverse impressions created by its rapid strategic rise, that is why China endeavours efforts to develop its cultural diplomacy’ (Palit, 2013, p.17)

Furthermore, Professor Lihua Zhang, from Tsinghua University, argues that cultural diplomacy is one of the key pillars of China’s contemporary foreign policy. This argument reflects CPC’s policy where ‘culture has emerged as the third pillar of Chinese diplomacy after economics and politics, with the two endorsing its relevance and the Third Plenary in 2013 has reaffirmed its importance’ (Palit, 2013, p.18). Cultural diplomacy and soft power have gradually become the governing strategies for the CPC’s leadership in developing benign impressions about China and securing strategic dividends through ‘virtuous’ cultural diplomatic activities. All of these arguments and pieces of practical activities can be regarded as the motives and reasons that why CPC would like to promote the development of China’s cultural diplomacy.

5.4 The Weakness of China’s Cultural Diplomacy
Almost every Chinese people would like to say that they are quite proud of the profound and rich Chinese culture; however, it is a fact that Chinese culture remains as an abstract concept to international audiences, who continue to receive information about China largely from the sources of the mass media. In the global academic field, some scholars, journalists, and commentators often hold sceptical perspective towards the effectiveness of China's soft power, national image or trust building. These academic works and reports can be found through the various journals and news outlets. For example, David Shambaugh, argues that ‘since 2008 the Chinese government increasingly has recognised the importance of its international image and building “soft power” as part of the nation’s “comprehensive power”’. Various government and Communist Party agencies have been prioritising this effort and pouring billions into different activities abroad. In a short time, China has managed significantly to increase its “cultural footprint” overseas. But, the question remains: is all the investment producing dividends? Thus far, the answer must be “No” (Shambaugh, 2013).

Dongchang Liu, the chief executive officer of the National Soft Power Research Centre of Peking University, argues that\textsuperscript{10} ‘soft power is a power of support, creativity, impetus, and transmission. Particularly, it is a kind of spirit, faith, ideology, moral support, social material and spiritual civilisation of original strength. In order to form the powerful soft power, the key is to occupy the commanding heights of cultural values with the universally accepted conceptual system. However, cultural differences and various cultural backgrounds are bringing difficulties to the spread of culture’ (Chen, 2010). Therefore, according to Liu, in the international environment, culture could not be satisfactorily disseminated unless its weakness could be overcome. If China wants to use cultural diplomacy to either shape its global image or establish state trust with other states, the following weaknesses of its cultural diplomacy should be recognised and overcome.

\textsuperscript{10}软实力是一种支撑力、创造力、推动力、传承力，具体讲，它是一种巨大的精神、信仰、思想、道德的支撑，是社会物质文明与精神文明的原创力量。强大“软实力”的形成，关键是要形成占据文化制高点的能被普遍认同的价值理念系统。但是，文化的差异性与文化背景上的不同，为文化的传播带来种种困难.
To begin, compared to developed countries, the strategies of China’s cultural diplomacy are still immature, and effective system of cultural diplomacy has not been formed yet, which limits the relevant plans on cultural diplomacy and its implementation. This problem is reflected in a number of ways:

Firstly, China’s cultural diplomacy has over emphasised Chinese traditional culture while ignoring creativity and innovation.

China’s cultural diplomacy lacks creative and innovative content. Rawnsley argues that ‘locating culture and tradition at the forefront of soft power is that there is no guarantee that cultural interest will convert into tangible soft power outcomes’ (Rawnsley, 2013). As one of the four great ancient civilisations, China enjoys ample cultural resources indeed; however, contemporary culture is also the indivisible part of Chinese culture. Hence, in accordance with such an exceptional advantage of traditional culture and the emergence of contemporary culture, policy makers of Chinese government should be much better to think about what forms of culture could be demonstrated on the world stage and accepted well by international audiences.

As for the connection between traditional culture and cultural soft power, Hongxi Yang argues that excellent part of ancient Chinese culture and the reconstruction of contemporary core value system are closely related, but there is a vast amount of differences in existence. For a long time, people generally tend to promote the ancient Chinese culture and even take Confucianism as the main content to enhance the soft power. If one were to look at the issues objectively, the relationship of ancient Chinese culture and contemporary value system form a connecting link between the past and the present, but there are differences in the aspect of time, space, and content. It cannot just combine and simplify the two concepts together. Otherwise, it may lead to a state of monotony on the content of soft power and the channel for dissemination’ (Yang, 2013).

\[^{11}\text{中国古代的优秀文化与当今核心价值体系重建之间关系密切，但是也有极大的差异。较长时间以来，人们往往笼统地把推广中国古代文化甚至是孔子学说作为提升中国软实力主要内容和渠道。客观上，两者有前后的承接关系，但两者也有时空和内容上的差异。不能将两者简单地进行概念统一，否则就容易导致提升软实力的渠道和内容的单调}

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For example, every man has his hobby-horse, if China puts more emphasis on Confucianism and allows it to be perceived as the pioneer in the process of cultural diplomacy while ignoring the current cultural reality in contemporary China, it will cause a somewhat biased understanding towards Chinese culture.

In consideration of this weakness, the Chinese government should keep a balance between traditional Chinese culture and contemporary Chinese culture. As Kam Louie agrees that 1949 is taken to mark the beginning of the contemporary era of China (Louie, 2009). According to Prof. Lihua Zhang, Chinese culture consists of three main elements: traditional Chinese cultural resources represented mainly by Confucian culture as its main content, political culture represented by Marxist theory and thinking, and contemporary Chinese culture. In most cases of cultural diplomacy, traditional culture has occupied the centre stage in the process of cultural diplomacy for a long time and has an influence on the further development of contemporary Chinese culture. This phenomenon also has unintended consequences, contemporary culture has fewer chances to be improved on the domestic and international stage, and that international audience does not fully understand the current political, economic and cultural situation in China if their impression towards China is still moulded in the past period of China. Therefore, in the process of developing traditional cultural elements, boosting contemporary Chinese culture should be taken into further consideration.

Secondly, China’s cultural diplomacy has over-emphasised professional communication in the area of culture while ignoring perspectives and participation from the public.

In China, various kinds of cultural forums, conferences, and activities have been organised, where most attendants come from government, high-level academic or professional fields. In the development cultural diplomacy, whether it is in the aspect of cultural export or cultural import, the public need more opportunities to get to know about domestic and international culture. In the current stage of
China’s cultural diplomacy, this problem could be regarded as one of the blind spots ignored by event organisers including the government.

Thirdly, China’s cultural diplomacy has over-emphasised the control of the Chinese government while downplaying joint efforts by relevant non-government sectors.

As a single-party state, it is impossible to avoid the CPC’s management of cultural affairs completely. However, the strict management methods by the Chinese government regarding the cultural issues might undermine the credibility of its cultural soft power. Gary Rawnsley argues that ‘China’s authoritarian methods of political management undermine the credibility of its cultural soft power. In other words, China experiences problems within the political realm which prevent its soft power—including strategies privileging culture—being as attractive to international audiences as they otherwise might be’ (Rawnsley, 2013). Annukka Kinnari argues that ‘control brings along ideas of security and stability but at the same time it produces ideas of rigidity and inflexibility’ (Kinnari, 2014, p.157). The central government’s excessive political control towards the agenda of the cultural diplomatic activities might reduce the diversity of cultural contents and forms when meeting foreign audiences.

At the same time, government control of China’s cultural diplomacy may put constraints on the enthusiasm of private enterprises, social organisations and folk artists. Taking Hanban’s management of the Confucius Institutes as an example, which closely under the control of central government. However, the similar institutes in other states, such as British Council, the Alliance Francaise or the Goethe Institute, they could maintain more distance and autonomy from their respective governments. Recently, the situation with respect to the diversity of actors within the programs of cultural diplomacy is getting better. An increasing number of private enterprises are taking an active role in the activities of cultural diplomacy or other forms of international cultural communication. However, strict censorship and explicit or implicit manipulation by the Chinese government towards cultural issues is still a major challenge to
the development of China’s cultural diplomacy. For example, China is making a determined attempt to present itself with good state images like those within the framework of the 'Chinese Year of Culture' in Germany in 2012, or the 'EU-China Year of Intercultural Dialogue'. However, in the eyes of the international public, the state image of China still somehow remains tarnished by the repression and censorship targeted against dissident artists and writers like Ai Weiwei and Liu Xiaobo.

Moreover, problems concerning national cultural expenditure, which could hinder the development of China’s cultural diplomacy, are reflected in the two aspects as followed:

Firstly, in comparison with other aspects of national financial investment, funding for culture only accounts for a small proportion of the total amount being made available. In accordance with the statistics published by the Ministry of Culture of the PRC, culture expenses accounted for 0.4% or less of the country’s total fiscal expenditure and continued to fall in recent years. For example, in 2010, cultural expenses amount to was just 0.36% of the total fiscal expenditure, which attained the lowest level since the Reform and Opening began in the late 1970s.

Secondly, the growth of cultural expenses is relatively slow. Since the Eleventh Five-Year Plan, operating expenses on cultural issues have an average annual growth rate lower than the growth rate of fiscal expenditure, and it is dropping significantly behind other expenses of infrastructure issues. Therefore, the gap between culture and other social undertakings is widening rapidly. The following figure shows the current situation:

The Proportion of Cultural Expenditure in the National Fiscal Expenditure
In recent years, the problem of cultural expenditure is turning better. The economic dominance of China on the international stage is widely recognised, and recent expenditure in the cultural sector is assuming a larger proportion as well. For example, according to the estimation of the Chinese Ministry of Culture, which considers that cultural expenditure shall increase from the current 3% to 5% of the country's GDP by the end of “Thirteenth-Five Period” (2020)’ (Ministry of Culture of PRC, 2016). However, the expenditure of cultural diplomacy only accounts for a minor proportion of this amount. Therefore, it is an indication of the position of cultural diplomacy in the national strategy of China.
Moreover, the problem concerning the complex administrative system of the Chinese government that is the issue of overlapping responsibilities and lacks the specific administrative range of cultural diplomacy, which might lead to inferior overall working efficiency of cultural diplomacy.

For example, the project of “China Cultural Year” should be within the area of responsibility of the Ministry of Culture. However, no related information was available on its website. The Chinese government and related institutions did not publish summary reports concerning any projects of the cultural year. It is an obvious problem that no government departments or organisations summarise and collect relevant information. According to the information collected from Internet database, the general information about the cultural year could be listed as followed:

**Summary List of "China Cultural Year"**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Project Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Chinese Festival in Ireland (China Culture, 2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>China-France Cultural Year (in China) (People, 2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>China-France Cultural Year (in France) (People, 2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>China-Italy Cultural Year (People, 2006b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>China-Russia Cultural Year (in China) (People, 2006a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>China-Russia Cultural Year (in Russia) (People, 2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>China-South Korea Cultural Year (China Culture, 2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>China-Italy Cultural Year (Sohu Culture, 2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-2011</td>
<td>China-Australia Cultural Year (in Australia) (Baike, 2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011-2012</td>
<td>China-Australia Cultural Year (in China) (Baike, 2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>China-Germany Cultural Year (China-Botschaft, 2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>China-Turkey Cultural Year (CRI, 2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>2014 ASEN-China Cultural Exchange Year (China Culture, 2014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>China-United Kingdom Cultural Year (British Council, 2015)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 9. Summary List of “China Cultural Year”

As for publicity about the cultural years listed above, the Ministry of Culture of the PRC does not publish any details of related events. English language homepage of Ministry of Culture of the PRC offers some information about Chinese culture to the international audience but mainly exhibits general information about cultural activities domestically. It does not mention any aspects concerning the relevant duties and cultural diplomatic program of the Ministry of Culture. Therefore, international audiences could not possibly draw a better understanding of China’s cultural policies, and could not find current forthcoming events of cultural diplomacy in China or other countries.

In addition, China’s cultural diplomacy may be hampered by its Internet censorship. This aspect mainly concerning the firm control of Chinese government is the block issues of YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter, which are used by the most countries in the international community. Scholars rightly ask: “Can you really win hearts and minds of current and future generations when you are known as a country that blocks Facebook, Google, YouTube, and Twitter?” (Bishop, 2013). This question is still in the situation of hot-debate. David Shambaugh argues that ‘China’s global public image is mixed at best, although there do exist ‘pockets of favourability’ in Africa and Latin America. Elsewhere in the world, China’s national image generally is mixed to poor and declining’ (Shambaugh, 2013). In recent years, China also greatly try to project its positive national image in other countries as well, such as Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Myanmar. It is probably a natural part of becoming a global power, but Shambaugh considers that the czars of China’s ‘external propaganda’ would be better served to reflect on the kinds of activities that give China a negative image abroad than simply investing in programs for cultural exchange. ‘If the ‘message’ isn’t sellable, no well-resourced ‘messenger’ can sell it’ (Shambaugh, 2013). It might be a serious flaw in the government’s strategy, and it also could be
considered as the major structural and cultural issues that make it extremely difficult for China to push its soft power agenda over the Internet.

This weakness is widely recognised by other scholars as well. For instance, Bill Bishop argues that ‘China has planned the soft power effort as a multi-decade effort, but the lack of effective products for the medium of future generations may doom the government’s efforts. In addition, none of the major Chinese Internet social media--Baidu, Tencent, Sina, Sohu, Shanda and Netease--have either the DNA or the credibility to succeed materially in the main overseas markets’ (Bishop, 2013). Therefore, currently, this strategy might be flawed due to the worries about media soft power efforts in promoting China’s cultural diplomacy.

Furthermore, China’s cultural diplomacy usually give a relatively cold shoulder to foreign audiences in the aspect of their perceptions and understanding.

As the concept of cultural diplomacy has been discussed in Chapter Two, which places much emphasis on the purposes of cultural diplomacy: not only matter more with national image and cultural promotion but also change and influence the attitudes and behaviours of foreign audiences. However, those programs of China’s cultural diplomacy lack the experience concerning what can be accepted and perceived by international audiences. This weakness decreases the effectiveness of cultural diplomatic efforts. The reason leading to this weakness might rely on the current approaches to China’s cultural diplomacy, which concentrate quite a lot on the source and styles of the communication, while not providing enough focuses on the power of the receiver living within distinct political, social and cultural contexts.

Overall, cultural forms are quite subjective. What appeals to the public in this state might not necessarily appeal to the audience in other states, especially when cultural products and cultural projects are dispersed around the world for consumption by audiences who have little or no cultural appreciation of what they are seeing and feeling. Rawnsley considers that it is because ‘the audience
holds the power’ (Rawnsley, 2013). Joseph Nye also put up with his perspective towards this point, and he states that success in soft power means recognising that ‘outcomes, more in control of the subject than is often the case with hard power’ (Nye, 2008). That is to say, audiences for international communications and cultural flows decide whether and how they will accept, internalise and act upon the message.

Finally, these academic works and official reports problematically tend to abide by the Chinese saying to “Hui Ji Ji Yi”12. In other words, it means to hide one’s troubles and take no remedial measures.

Most academic works or government reports concentrate on the positive messages about the government while ignoring its weaknesses and mistakes. They collectively state how glorious China’s cultural diplomacy is and how many achievements have been reached through cultural diplomacy. However, in order to avoid touching the ‘sensitive’ topics, few scholars mention the specific disadvantages or weaknesses of action plans concerning cultural diplomacy designed by the Chinese government. Therefore, these papers and reports often fail to offer constructive suggestions for the development of China’s cultural diplomacy. With regard to this problem, state censorship could be another important cause. Chinese government maintains censorship over all media capable of reaching a wide audience. This includes television and radio programs, print media, film, theatre projects, text messaging, instant messaging of social communication tools, video games, literature, and the sources on the Internet. Therefore, it is not an easy job to find the negative messages towards China.

5.5 Practices of China’s Cultural Diplomacy in State Trust Building

When friction happens between China and other states, misunderstanding or hostile attitudes could easily emerge. One of the methods to ease such friction and build mutual trust is to broaden cultural exchanges among state actors further. To the Chinese government, mutual trust was meant to imply that all

12 病疾忌医 (English translation: hide one's troubles and take no remedial measures)
states should ‘transcend differences in ideology, social systems; discard Cold War mentalities and refrain from mutual hostility and suspicion; engage in frequent dialogue and briefings on each other's security and defence policies’ (People’s Daily, 2002). As a case in point, the notion of trust or “mutual trust” that has made a recurrent feature in Chinese foreign and cultural policy discourse. President Xi has repeated the significance of trust with emphasis from different aspects in the various mega-events. In the current academic and political field in China, most scholars and government officials have repeatedly confirmed the importance of cultural diplomacy in building trust among state actors. For example, Peng Yu, deputy director of the Ministry of Culture in China, suggests ‘despite the differences in cultural traits, traditions and values, China and the European countries, they share an active role in advocating for the maintenance of cultural diversity and hope to seek the best way to understand and build trust through equal exchange, cooperation and cultural consensus’ (Yu, 2012). But these supporters of cultural diplomacy seldom mention specific methods for building trust through cultural diplomacy and how to explore the power of cultural diplomacy so as to develop its potential to the full extent.

However, we can observe examples of efforts at state trust building with other states in events, such as the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, Projects of Cultural Year, 2014 APEC Summit in Beijing, the 2016 Conference of One Belt One Road Initiative, 2016 G20 Summit in Hangzhou and the project of Overseas Chinese Youth Root-seeking Cultural Tour. With reference to the 2014 APEC Summit in Beijing, the efforts of cultural diplomacy could be seen from the beginning to the end.

5.6 Case Study 1

The Application of China’s Cultural Diplomacy in the 2014 APEC Summit

General Background
This APEC Summit could be regarded as the premier platform for the APEC economic leaders and business executives to discuss economic issues, promote
trade, investment and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region. The Central Government of China also made cultural diplomatic efforts in the stage of preparation and the process of events. For example, the conference venue was decorated with classical features of China, Chinese style costumes were provided for state leaders and their spouses, and typical Chinese cuisine was offered. All these aspects are loaded with Chinese cultural elements, which are the attempts to demonstrate the culture and the ideology that the Chinese government wants to show foreign audiences.

The APEC Summit is an economically orientated summit, but the Chinese government seized this opportunity to exhibit Chinese culture and attempt to integrate it within economic cooperation at that time. Furthermore, this APEC Summit was a channel for the Chinese government to demonstrate the sublime culture of China by association with its economic successes. As for the previous APEC summits, cultural elements usually played a major role, and showing the unique culture of the host country seems to be an unwritten rule of APEC. During the whole week of the 2014 APEC summit, China took its chance to use elements of Chinese culture for the purpose of its cultural diplomacy. As a grand international event, this APEC Summit assembled a large grouping of influential international media, which provided an ideal platform for China to exhibit its national characteristics.

With the aspect of state trust building, Chinese leaders usually prefer to use the concept of friendship to express the will to build mutual trust with other state actors. For example, in this summit, Xi accordingly argued ‘we should make more friends with our neighbouring countries while abiding by the principle of non-alignment and building a global network of partnership’ (Xi, 2014b). Xi often draws political wisdom from traditional Chinese culture to articulate China’s contemporary diplomacy. Hence, Xi repeatedly stressed ‘establishing friendly relationships with other states’, quoting some famous lines from ancient Chinese poems. Furthermore, Xi used the term of 雁 (yan-meaning geese) throughout the summit, such as ‘overlooking the river, westerly winds reveal layers of whitecaps like one thousand falling flowers; look up to the sky, a line of geese
flying in the blue sky’ (风翻白浪花千片，雁点青天字一行); ‘a single flower does not herald the arrival of spring; a lonely goose cannot make a flying formation’ (一花不是春，孤雁难成行) (CCTV News, 2014). Additionally, the venue of this APEC Summit is located in the ‘Yanqi Lake’ (雁栖湖), which means the lake where the geese are usually having a rest. It contains the Chinese character ‘yan’, which is the same meaning as the two lines quoted. ‘Yan’ is a kind of wild geese and is symbolic in Chinese culture with reference to royalty, ambition, teamwork, and cooperation (Cao, 2014). Regarding the direction of China’s foreign policy and its diplomatic attitude, Xi used “geese” as a metaphor to express his perspective that it is quite significant to cultivate the awareness of a common destiny. In general, these represent the message of the Chinese government in the aspect of enhancing economic integration to thereafter shape a new vision for the development of the Asia-Pacific region. In the eyes of people who are not quite familiar with Chinese culture, it might be difficult to understand the profound meaning of ‘yan’; hence, the Chinese government may fail to deliver the relevant message with the efforts of cultural diplomacy in this event.

**Impacts of the Cultural Diplomacy in this Summit**

This APEC Summit can be perceived as a great improvement for China’s cultural diplomacy. However, some improvements and several weaknesses that influence the effectiveness of China’s cultural diplomacy can be noticed in this summit, those of which are discussed respectively in the following sections. Since the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing to the 2012 Shanghai EXPO, this 2014 APEC Summit in Beijing has grasped another chance to show Chinese culture. Three obvious improvements are listed as follows:

Firstly, this summit fosters a group of cultural industries’ rejuvenation and improves their competitiveness. This summit uses Chinese culture as its interaction channel, then a series of related cultural products have their day. For example, according to the interview, an anonymous officer in Beijing Government mentioned the contract bidding for APEC costume. During the first phase, there were 136 companies joining the costume sketches filtering process,
and then there were 4 companies being chosen to conduct the costume making: “Erdos 1946” was in charge of accessories; “NE TIGER” was in charge of male costume making; “Chuhe Tingxiang” was in charge of female costume making and “Dingsheng Silk” was in charge of fabric supply. They cooperated with each other through the strong competitiveness to create “xin zhong zhuang”, which had attracted the world’s attention. After the APEC Summit, some countries clothing companies come to Beijing to get more information and try to establish production line with China, and it also arises the “national costume research fever” both domestically and internationally, for instance, *Studies and Analysis on the Style of Xin Zhong Zhuang in 2014 APEC Summit* (Ge, 2015, p.17). It indicates that expression of costume culture in promoting cultural exchanges between the countries is a positive factor, and this is an important method for cultural and national philosophy transmission as well. Using costume as a method of cultural diplomacy is innovative when compared with the past cultural events. On the one hand, it is a direct way to exhibit Chinese costume and its embroidery technique. On the other hand, it is an indirect way to convey the message from the patterns embroidered on the costume.

Secondly, strengthen the cultural influence after the summit. According to the report from Beijing Daily and Travel Daily, after the APEC Summit, Water Cube launches the program of “APEC Depth Tour” (Travel Daily, 2014), which allows tourists to visit the dining venue and taste the desserts of the national banquet, and buy the APEC souvenirs. Water Cube also offers free tour guide service for visitors. According to the reply from the National Aquatics Centre, the deputy mentions that APEC Depth Tour attracts more than 8,000 visitors every day, which increases 5,000 visitors more than the same period of last year (Xinhua News, 2014). This tour provides an opportunity for both domestic and international public; the detailed tour explanation helps to broaden the public’s
knowledge of APEC and the cultural diplomatic efforts of the Chinese
government in this summit. Furthermore, this APEC Depth Tour unveils the
mask of leader’s high-level conference and dining venue and meets the curiosity
of the public. For both domestic and international audience, this tour offers them
an opportunity to observe the cultural products vividly in person. The
effectiveness of this cultural diplomacy will not merely terminate on the day of
the closing ceremony.

Thirdly, first lady’s cultural diplomacy propels Chinese culture to strengthen its
cultural influence. Promoting culture is a major task for a first lady, and Peng
Liyuan is the perfect example. According to Ruan Zongze, the vice-president of
the China Institute of International Studies, he argues that ‘people can discover
the beauty of Chinese culture through Peng’s dresses and her ideas’ (Wang, 2015). As the first lady and folk singer with almost zero negative gossips, Peng’s
appearance and behaviours in this Summit boost the power of Chinese cultural
communication. The benefit of first lady’s cultural diplomacy in APEC is that first
lady could easily pass on female’s soft and friendly image to the international
audience, and it is the most obvious manifestation of the contemporary idea
concerning soft power. According to the Report of China’s Public Diplomacy
Development (2015), the first lady’s diplomacy is one of the categories of public
diplomacy, which could help China to express its goodwill so as to shape China’s
good, peaceful and civilised image in the international society (Zhou, 2015, p.68).
Zhao Kejin, a professor of Tsinghua University, he argues that the interaction
among first ladies emphasise on the aspect of soft communication. For example,
culture and understanding, which can indirectly affect the relationship between
their husbands and then provide cooperation opportunity for the governments’
(Zhao, 2014). In the contemporary era (1949-now), when looks at the

\[\text{13第一夫人“们之间强调文化和了解的“软沟通”可以间接影响到她们丈夫之间的关系，为推动两国政府之间的合作提供机遇之窗。}\]
performance of first ladies in China, Peng is the extraordinary one to promote the development of China’s culture on the international stage. Additionally, Peng’s performance as a first lady can be considered as an effective supplement of China’s cultural diplomacy.

Those weaknesses will not only affect state trust building but also bring unfavourable impacts, such as misinterpretation of Chinese culture, inadequate understanding, doubtful attitudes towards China’s capability in similar cultural events, and other ignored factors. In accordance with the factors discussed in Chapter Four, this APEC Summit has following disadvantages in the aspect of cultural diplomacy:

Firstly, difficulties in understanding the metaphor in the Chinese language. For this APEC Summit, the Chinese government devoted a large amount effort in organising the cultural events for the opening ceremony and closing ceremony. Although the Chinese government had tried efforts to express its cultural message and show its sincerity and goodness to the world, due to the issues of cultural difference, Chinese culture tends to be more implicit. Sometimes even not all the Chinese people could grasp the “yu yi” (metaphor), hence, not to mention the international audience with different cultural backgrounds. It is one of the weaknesses of this APEC summit, how to convey the Chinese culture message and make other international participants understand quickly and easily, and how to well combine the traditional culture and contemporary Chinese culture need to be considered the Chinese government.

Otherwise, without better understanding, then the international audience would have some sort of misunderstanding. Especially, on this APEC stage, a significant amount of news and reports could be published by international media. For both domestic and international journalists, sometimes they may not feel the deep meaning behind some displays, for example, these foreign guests could not quite understand well about the selection of banquet venue, the dinnerware and the specially designed costume, they even may misinterpret the China’s
policy-making and the meaning of diplomatic plan. For example, a hot debate concerning the dinnerware used in the APEC banquet that has arisen mix attentions. In according with the official explanation, the dinnerware means “common prosperity”, while some news commenters considered it as “wan bang lai chao” (A collection of tribute gathering to the Central Kingdom). It is against the original message that the Chinese government would like to convey to the international community, and it even adds ingredients into the China Threat Theory. In this case, good intentions lead to the negative results.

Secondly, insufficient services after the summit. As discussed, this APEC costume has attracted significant attention. However, after the summit, there are no further exhibitions showing the details of “xin zhong zhuang”, except the private exhibition in the NE-Tiger Workshop. As a very crucial cultural factor in the summit, without further activities, the public’s impression towards the Chinese culture in “xin zhong zhuang” has been gradually decreasing, and then its cultural influence of this costume tends to be void. Additionally, once lose its cultural influence, it is difficult to rebuild it again.

Thirdly, the role of the First Lady lacks a certain of authorisation. As there is no clear diplomatic role of First Lady in the Constitution and laws of China, what the First Lady could do to some extent entirely depends on the requirements of state diplomatic regulation, which largely influences the potential of the First Lady's soft power. When compared with the role of First Lady of the USA, it has a clearly defined rule and specific regulations. The Office of the First Lady of the United States is accountable to the First Lady for her to carry out her duties as hostess of the White House, and is also in charge of all social and ceremonial events of the White House. Even though for China and the USA, distinctive political systems make the role of the First Lady quite different. For example, in this summit, Peng only could company other first ladies to visit cultural heritage and join some cultural activities, but how to promote Chinese culture to a higher level lacks a certain kind of efforts and arrangements. Moreover, Peng could be a capable assistant to President Xi in the international event, while Peng could not directly and fully engage herself into cultural cooperation issues or relative affairs. In
comparison with the First Lady of the USA, China’s First Lady lacks a certain authorisation and autonomy. This weakness decreases the role of Peng as the First Lady. Then, Peng’s potentials in cultural diplomacy cannot be explored to a certain extent.

Generally speaking, these similar efforts of cultural diplomacy in building state trust or friendship can be seen in a series of events organised by the Chinese government. However, due to the various factors that may generate the weaknesses and then influence the effectiveness of cultural diplomacy, the process of state trust building might not go as smoothly as expected. It needs a relatively long and stable period when the outcomes of state trust building might be demonstrated. Besides, other unseen evidence of state trust building by the cultural diplomatic efforts in this summit might emerge and might be demonstrated in any future interactions, such as increased cooperative opportunities, strengthening of confidential issues, and publication of positive policies.

In accordance with pieces of collected evidence, which firmly indicates the existence of the minimal level of state trust among member states, shows the sign of the medium level of state trust and the upper medium level of state trust. In this summit, the aspect of cooperative issues can be seen throughout the summit. All the member states actively promote the Blueprint of APEC Interaction, which brings numerous cooperation for them (People, 2014). The role of APEC in facilitating regional integration has proven essential to promote trade and economic growth in the Asia-Pacific. For instance, as the committee, ‘reducing trade barriers between members, harmonising standards and regulations, and streamlining customs procedures enable goods, services, investment and people to move easily across borders’ (APEC Secretariat, 2015, p.2).

Moreover, in 2014, ‘APEC members committed to taking a concrete step towards greater regional economic integration by endorsing a roadmap for the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific to translate this vision into a reality’ (APEC Committee, 2017). In 2015, APEC members continued its efforts towards achieving
the Bogor Goals of free trade and investment and carry forward the newly agreed roadmap for APEC's contribution to the realisation of the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific. This behaviour can be considered as the aspect of relevant reciprocal benevolent policies. However, within the short-term examination, the medium level of state trust cannot be merely affirmed, but it is surely a sign of the medium level of state trust.

Additionally, in the 2014 APEC Summit, the APEC Committee published a statement, which said it had set up the Network of Anti-Corruption Authorities and Law Enforcement Agencies (ACT-NET), which laid a foundation for member states to fight against transnational corruption. Actually, in the 2004 Santiago APEC Summit, State leaders endorsed the Santiago Commitment to Fight Corruption and Ensure Transparency (APEC Secretariat, 2016). It has been ten years passed by, then in the 2014 APEC Summit, setting up the ACT-NET among the APEC countries was proposed by the Chinese government. In this scenario, ACT-NET can be regarded as one type of rules that APEC state actors adopt. However, with the short-term examination and the shortage of evidence, it could only be considered as a sign of the upper medium level of state trust. State trust building cannot be built in one day because that high-level state trust is extremely difficult to obtain, and it is also quite difficult to be maintained by both sides, even multi-sides. In the formation process of state trust, state actors had better not ignore the power of cultural diplomacy. Besides that, how to ensure the effectiveness of cultural diplomacy needs a large amount of attention as well.

5.7 Conclusion
Human society is indeed a civilised cultural society with different cultures and cultural elements do exist within communication and interaction among people. There is a Chinese proverb "He Er Bu Tong"¹⁴ that could offer a Chinese featured explanation for this situation. It means the Chinese tradition keeps on living in harmony and smoothly with others while persisting in its own way going forward. Cultural diversity makes the world more charming and attractive,

¹⁴ 和而不同 (English translation: harmony in diversity)
but cultural diversity can also foster misunderstanding and cultural conflict among state actors. Therefore, the management of cultural differences through cultural diplomacy is considered to be a crucial issue. As Taylor argues, ‘cultural relations are our best hope of transmuting traditional prejudices into attitudes of understanding and cooperation. Culture has the advantage of being a possession, which all people can share’ (Taylor, 2013, p.5).

This chapter has looked at the development history of China’s cultural diplomacy and summarised the important cultural policy in different leaderships. Although the development of cultural diplomacy in China indicates a significantly increasing trend in China in recent decades, and the Central Government of China has grasped the significance of cultural diplomacy to thereafter support its purpose of peaceful rise, especially in the aspect of building trust and friendship with other state actors, the weaknesses of China’s cultural diplomacy is still a constraining factor in its development compared to other states. This chapter has outlined the weakness from six major aspects:

1) China’s cultural diplomacy is still immature, and there is no effective system, which can be reflected in the following three aspects: over-emphasising the Chinese traditional culture, over-emphasising professional communication in the cultural area, and over-emphasising the management and control of the Chinese government.
2) Problems of national cultural expenditure: cultural expenses only take a minor part in the total fiscal expenditure, and its growth is relatively slow.
3) The complex administrative system of the Chinese government.
4) China’s cultural diplomacy may be hampered by its Internet censorship.
5) China’s cultural diplomacy usually ignores the perception and understanding of foreign audiences.
6) Most academic works or government reports concentrate on the positive messages about the government.

This chapter has also taken the 2014 APEC Summit in Beijing to reflect China’s cultural diplomatic efforts and its effectiveness in state trust building. This
section outlines the improvements and weaknesses concerning the cultural diplomatic efforts in this summit, and then examine the outcomes of state trust building. This summit is a reflection of the new cultural diplomatic method, and has several visible improvements: firstly, this summit fosters a group of cultural industries’ rejuvenation and improves their competitiveness; secondly, strength the cultural influence after the summit; thirdly, first lady's cultural diplomacy propels Chinese culture to strengthen its cultural influence. However, it also demonstrates some shortages regarding the effectiveness: firstly, difficulties in understanding the metaphor in the Chinese language; secondly, insufficient services after the summit; thirdly, the role of the First Lady lacks a certain of authorisation. If these weaknesses could be solved in the future, then the effectiveness of China’s cultural diplomacy might be further developed in state trust building.

Besides that, this chapter also examined the state trust level among APEC member states. Due to the characteristics of state trust, it is impossible to take all the member states as a whole and then proceed to examine the existence of state trust. However, due to the emergent cooperative issues, the minimal level of state trust exists among the member states, while other pieces of evidence illustrate the sign of medium level and upper medium level of state trust. It needs further studies and practical evidence, and then the specific level of state trust can be examined. To conclude, generally, in the current status quo of cultural diplomacy in China, the intentions and will concerning state trust building that are practised unclearly and ambiguously to a certain degree. Even though the process of state trust building is full of thistles and thorns, efforts of cultural diplomacy cannot be suspended; otherwise, all the efforts and accumulated positive influences might be completely wasted.
Chapter 6
UK’s Application of Cultural Diplomacy in State Trust Building
Towards China

6.1 Introduction
The United Kingdom was one of the earliest countries to adopt the methods of cultural diplomacy and has committed to international cultural relations for decades. As a pioneer in the area of cultural diplomacy, the UK’s cultural diplomatic efforts have been influential worldwide. The British Council has played an important role in assisting the UK government to develop its cultural relations with other states, both academically and practically. The British Council has managed to take advantage of the rich cultural-historical heritage of the UK while maintaining and improving the breadth, the depth of expertise and the creativity of the UK’s cultural sectors.

Since both governments have declared the importance of a ‘golden relationship’ between the UK and China, an increasing number of joint cultural events are going to take place or have already taken place in both states. This study has examined the cultural efforts of the British Council in recent decades and made comparisons with the relevant organisations in China, for instance, the Ministry of Culture. It has raised questions, such as how have the cultural relations between China and the UK evolved? Why has the UK attached great importance to its cultural diplomacy towards China? What are the advantages of British Council? And in particular, how effective is the UK’s cultural diplomacy in state trust building with China?

This chapter answers these questions by analysing the general developmental situation of the UK’s cultural diplomacy and in particular, the role of the British Council in the UK’s cultural diplomacy. A case study of the 2015 China-UK Cultural Year is adopted to assess the effectiveness of the UK’s cultural diplomacy in state trust building.
6.2 Development of the UK’s Cultural Diplomacy in China

As argued by previous research, ‘the strength of the UK’s historical collections, their global reputation, long-term relationships with foreign institutions, the breadth and depth of expertise and the creativity of the cultural sector have all made the UK a forerunner on cultural diplomacy’ (Yin, 2014). The detailed examination of the historical relations between the UK and China is beyond the scope of this chapter, but analysis of this chapter will nonetheless benefit from a brief chronology between the UK and the People’s Republic of China.

On the 6th January 1950, the British government formally recognised the sovereign status of the People’s Republic of China and was the first major Western country to do so. Before the official recognition between two states, civilian groups from both sides, especially from the UK, had already started to visit each other for business, trade, cultural exchange, education and other purposes. For example, the first time the British Council came into the views of Chinese people was in 1943 (Fisher, 2009). In 1951, pressure on permit requirement of visas, which led to the suspension of most British Council’s cultural programs in China. Funding from the British Council originally allocated for China was redirected to Japan and activities were paused (Fisher, 2009). This hindered further cultural development between China and the UK.

On 17th June 1954, the UK and China established diplomatic relations at the level of charge d’affairs (Chinese Embassy in the UK, 2010). Around this period, the direction of the UK and China’s cultural relations mostly depended on the attitude of the Chinese government. At that time, China did not fully realise that the importance of cultural ties between two states could be used against the backdrop of the Cold War. The UK had in turn been shocked by the ideological interference of Communism, including in China (Fisher, 2009). Cold War is a major reason for the limited cultural ties between China and the UK. Therefore, during this period, political goals still remained the top priority of foreign relations between China and the UK. Cultural diplomacy was often considered to serve political purposes.
On 13th March 1972, diplomatic relations between China and the UK were upgraded to ambassadorial level (Chinese Embassy in the UK, 2010). The two sides later signed the *Joint Communiqué on the Agreement on an Exchange of Ambassadors*, which marked the formal establishment of diplomatic ties (Xinhua Net, 2003). In the 1970s, Chinese society was affected by the cultural revolution. While formal diplomatic relations were established in the 1970s, the cultural revolution had an extremely negative impact on cultural relations between China and the rest of the world, including the UK. Due to domestic turbulence, China had not got enough capacity to maintain its relations with other states, especially in the area of cultural relations.

In 1976, after the death of Mao Zedong, an alteration in China's economic system was introduced (Chinaorbit, 2014). The Chinese government started an open-door policy, which quickly warmed up cultural relations between China and the UK. Evidence of warmth could be seen in various signed agreements from the history that offered policy guidelines for facilitation of cultural exchanges. The British Council also took up and expanded cultural activities in China, which can be considered as a reflection upon the growing interaction between the two sides (Yin, 2014).

In November 1979, the first Agreement on Educational and Cultural Cooperation at the governmental level was signed. In this agreement, the UK and China agreed to boost dialogue and cooperation extensively in the aspects of arts, culture, education, social science, media, publishing, sports, and tourism, on the basis of equality and mutual benefit (Xinhua Net, 2003).

In the 1980s, the Ashington Group of the UK set up the first exhibition from the West in China since the cultural revolution (Artist Biographies, 2009). Since then, the British Council has expanded its work in China and has established information centres in the major cities already, such as Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Chongqing.
In the 1990s, after the smooth handover of Hong Kong to China on 1st July 1997, bilateral relations stepped onto a new stage of comprehensive development (Chinese Embassy in the UK, 2010). In 1998, China and the UK established a comprehensive partnership (Chinese Embassy in the UK, 2010). In 1999, the UK and China signed important agreements including the *Program of Cultural Exchanges from 1999 to 2002* (Xinhua Net, 2003).

In 2000, the UK and China signed the *Memorandum Concerning the Reciprocal Establishment of Cultural Centres* (Xinhua Net, 2003), and after 2004, the two countries established a comprehensive strategic partnership (Chinese Embassy in the UK, 2010). According to the published document from the Chinese Embassy in the UK, ‘in recent years, the UK has attached greater importance to advancing relations with China and has seen the progress of China from a pragmatic perspective. It works for deeper cooperation with China and hopes to see that China plays a greater role in international affairs (Chinese Embassy in the UK, 2010). Both of the Chinese Embassy and the UK government agree that the two countries have maintained frequent high-level exchanges and contacts, have established the mechanism of prime ministerial-level annual meeting, the economic and financial dialogue, the bilateral relations interaction groups, the strategic dialogue and the mechanisms for consultation and dialogue on strategic security, foreign policy, human rights and arms control (Chinese Embassy in the UK, 2010; The British Council, 2015). During former Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit to the UK, the two sides signed the 2009—2013 *China-UK Cultural Exchange Implementation Plan*. It includes the mid-term and long-term plans for exchange and cooperation in publishing, performing arts, radio, film and television, cultural heritage protection and many other fields (Xinhua Net, 2003).

In the 2010s, the British Council claims that ‘the UK Government has been leading the drive to build closer cultural and people-to-people relations with China as part of ongoing efforts to forge closer diplomatic and economic ties’ (The British Council, 2015). For example, the China-UK High-Level People-to-People Exchange Mechanism was launched. A Memorandum of Understanding was signed in 2012 to build mechanisms of high-level cultural
exchanges between the two states. In 2013, the then British Prime Minister’s visit to Beijing attracted heated discussion in the media of both China and Britain. During previous Prime Minister David Cameron’s visit, a new cultural agreement was signed by Maria Miller, the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport with Cai Wu, the Chinese Minister of Culture, aiming to give a boost to cultural and creative exchanges between the two states (Department for Culture, Media and Sport, 2013). Moreover, the 2015 China-UK Year of Cultural Exchanges (also named the “Cultural Year” in the following case study), which recognised that the economic trajectory of China is closely aligned with strengths of the UK in the creative industries and other cultural sectors.

From this brief chronology, four points are worth noting with regards to the contemporary cultural relations between the UK and China. Firstly, it could be witnessed, obviously, various factors have an influence on the implementation of cultural diplomacy, which is not only a matter of culture but also has connections with other aspects, such as the foreign policy and the internal policy of a state, domestic stability of a state and its external political environment. Secondly, the general orientation of China and the UK's cultural relations show a positive upward trend and is becoming increasingly close. Thirdly, cultural diplomatic efforts of the two states could facilitate the establishment of their economic dialogue and cooperation. Finally, the British Council has played a very significant role in China, whether it is in the past or contemporaneously. The next part of this chapter explores the role of the British Council in cultural diplomacy, especially in the area of state trust building with China.

6.3 The Role of British Council in Cultural Diplomacy
Cultural diplomacy involves the work of governments and organisations authorised by governments, as discussed in Chapter Two. When discussing cultural diplomacy of the UK, the British Council is usually the first organisation to come to the mind. Two other government departments should also be noted as well. The first one is the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, which is responsible for controlling and managing its cultural diplomacy, but with no role in domestic cultural services. The second one is within the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office, the Cultural Relations Department (CRD). The CRD is mainly responsible for the cultural diplomacy of the UK, including guiding cultural exchange programs of the British Council through funding and reviews, offering direct leadership of the Cultural and Education Section of the Embassies, and coordinating relations with the UN and UNESCO (Li, 2012, p.24). However, the British Council is the main governing body for the implementation of cultural diplomacy. Therefore, it is necessary to offer a brief background of the British Council if we are to understand the effectiveness of the UK’s cultural diplomacy.

The British Council is a registered charity governed by Royal Charter. As such, it is operationally independent of the UK government. However, the British Council works in close collaboration with the UK government at all levels and ensures strategic alignment with priorities of UK policy (the British Council, 2017). This unique position, as a non-governmental public body sponsored by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, gives the British Council significant space and freedom to carry out its cultural programs on the global stage.

The British Council was inaugurated in 1933 as a joint committee set up by the Board of Education and Board of Trade so as to promote British education, culture, science and technology (Taylor, 1978, p.249). Currently, the British Council has around 7,000 staff working in more than 100 countries with thousands of professionals, policy-makers, and millions of young people every year. Main activities focus on English language, arts, education, and society. As an important body for the implementation of the UK’s cultural diplomacy, the British Council is supported by the UK government through policy guidance and funding. It collaborates with other non-governmental organisations to promote cultural diplomacy, including the British Library, the Arts Council of England, the British Film Institute, the Arts and Crafts Board, the Museums and Galleries Commission and the British Museum (Li, 2012, p.24). The effective collaboration with government organisations and other non-governmental organisations contributes to the great success of the UK’s cultural diplomacy. Furthermore, the British Council works in close cooperation with the related embassies or
consulates in host countries, and its person in charge would also work as the cultural head-consultant in some countries.

6.4 Effectiveness of the UK’s Cultural Diplomacy in State Trust Building

Since the beginning of 21st century, the British Council has devoted increasing efforts to develop its role. It is not just trying to establish a brand or promoting British culture, but also making efforts in how to maximum cultural strength in other aspects, such as trust building, conflict management, business, and trade. Among these factors, trust building is the most important. As the British Council puts it, ‘we create friendly knowledge and understanding among the people of the UK and other countries. We do this by making a positive contribution to the UK and the countries we work with—changing lives by creating opportunities, building connections and engendering trust’ (the British Council, 2016b). Sir Roger Carr, the Chairman of Centrica and President of the CBI (Confederation of British Industry), says that ‘the UK has invested in building trust through the work of the British Council in English, education and culture for nearly 80 years’ (Carr and the British Council, 2012, p.20).

The official report Trust Pays published by the British Council in 2012 elaborates that ‘the British Council creates international opportunities for the people of the UK and other countries and builds trust between them worldwide’ (British Council, 2012, p.5). Moreover, this research shows that this relationship between trust and an increased openness to the UK and its people holds true, not just in Europe and in the Commonwealth, but also in many of the countries where we do not have such a strong traditional relationship and which will be vital to the UK’s future” (Carr and the British Council, 2012, p.4). In 2016, the British Council emphasised its role again ‘we create friendly knowledge and understanding among the people of the UK and other countries and build trust with them’ (the British Council, 2016a). These statements indicate that the British Council considers that it has already made the cultural efforts to build trust with the rest of the world.
China is one of the primary cultural diplomatic targets of the UK. As the UK’s international organisation for educational opportunities and cultural relations, the British Council in China is also known as the ‘Cultural and Educational Section of the British Embassy/Consulate’, which shows that it is not entirely independent from governmental influence. Its present Director, Carma Elliot, is also the Consul-General in Shanghai (the British Council, 2014). In order to build a long-term trust-based relationship with China, the UK agrees that cultural efforts cannot be ignored. According to the research of the British Council, ‘Chinese people’s level of trust in people from the UK also rose significantly with the number of cultural relations activities they engaged in’ (British Council, 2015).

The five indicators of state trust elaborated in Chapter Five can now be used to evaluate the level of state trust between China and the UK.

Firstly, the highest-level indicator of state trust is discretion in policy-making and implementation. This level of state trust between China and the UK has not yet materialised to some significant degree.

As for the British policy towards China, Kerry Brown argues that ‘British policy towards China has always been ambiguous, and that is unlikely to change’(Brown, 2015). Ambiguity can be defined as either deliberate ambiguity or unintentional ambiguity. Usually, a state would adopt a policy of deliberate ambiguity towards another state if it is not sure about the political situation, or it wants to leave spaces for excuses in case something unexpected happens. Deliberate ambiguity, also called strategic ambiguity, is the practice by a state of being intentionally ambiguous on certain aspects of its foreign policy or whether it possesses certain weapons of mass destruction. It might be useful if the state has contrary foreign and domestic policy goals, or if it wants to take advantage of risk aversion to abet a deterrence strategy. Such a policy can be very risky as it may cause misinterpretation of a nation’s intentions, leading to actions that contradict that nation’s wishes.
To a certain extent, this kind of ambiguity in policy is similar to discretion in policy. Both deliberate ambiguity and discretion leave an appropriate margin for unforeseen circumstances and needs. But whether the deliberate ambiguity derives from state trust or not will need further attention and examination, which depends mainly on the content of the policy wording. The foreign policy of the UK towards China is indeed as ambiguous as Kerry Brown argues, and the UK’s puzzling behaviour in foreign policy towards China makes the task of measuring the state trust a lot more complex. Therefore, currently, this indicator of state trust between China and the UK is not sufficiently present. Hence, there is not sufficient evidence to suggest a high level of state trust between China and the UK. Maybe under both states’ continuing cultural diplomatic efforts, the higher level of state trust might be reached in the future.

The second indicator of state trust is the presence of written rules with leeway to regulate relations between two states. Unlike discretionary power in policy-making and implementation, this indicator can be shown in communication between China and the UK.

Chapter Four has mentioned the ‘2015 UK-China Joint statement’, which is an example of written rules with leeway. Another example is the 2015 UK-China Co-production Treaty, which has greatly boosted the opportunities for the UK film in China but also contains high risks (Berger, Lorimer and Guo, 2015). Chinese authorities have a reputation for being particularly cautious in protecting domestic industry and guarding against influence from foreign cultures. Moreover, Chinese Media is famous for its strict censorship, the provision of which has been controlled by Chinese State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Television (SARFT). This time around, while the Co-production Treaty contains important rules and creative hurdles, the good news for UK film producers is that, in the interest of stimulating productivity, the qualifying criteria are relatively simple. As to the UK side, the final standard of the treaty that is vaguely defined and with leeway. It is open to the interpretation of SARFT and as such may serve to stifle creativity while there is also no guarantee that SARFT will determine that the Chinese content of the film is
adequate. Therefore, Berger and other two lawyers consider that in this treaty British film producers still face the risk that a film will not be approved for the exemption, despite on the face of it complying with the treaty.

The potential risks of the treaty can be taken as evidence of existing state trust between China and the UK. Firstly, in this co-production treaty, the UK side has left some leeway for the SARFT, which indicates that the UK trusts that China would not unilaterally breach the treaty by setting up barriers when reviewing the eligibility of co-productions. Secondly, simplifying the criteria can be interpreted as a way for China to show a level of sincerity when cooperating with the UK film industry and welcome the UK film into the Chinese market. Arguably, it also shows that China respects and appreciates British culture, otherwise, China would not easily allow it to become a competitor in their domestic market. Finally, the key factor of state trust, reciprocity, can be seen in the attitudes and behaviours on both sides. In this case, it can be said that the upper medium level of state trust exists between China and the UK. Although one case alone does not provide conclusive evidence, it is a good sign of state trust between China and the UK.

Thirdly, the implementation of benevolent policies between China and the UK indicates a medium level of state trust.

Looking at the development of cultural relations between China and the UK, from 1949 onward, most policies carried out by both states are benevolent policies. Some important policies have improved mutual understanding and better communication between China and the UK. The implementation of these policies plays a significant role in state trust building.

On the UK side, its visa requirement for people with a Chinese passport is getting more relaxed. At the beginning of the 2010s, the UK government started to loosen tough visa rules for Chinese citizens (Anderson, 2014), and the government has announced a number of measures to speed up the visa application process for Chinese visitors. The Home Office has also made it easier
for Chinese suppliers to visit the UK on business. Currently, Chinese visitors who travel to the UK on business only need to provide a completed application form, an invitation letter and a letter of employment to support their visa application. However, previously, that privilege was only open to Chinese staff that registered on the payroll of a UK company. Suppliers or partners also had to provide bank statements and household registration books along with other paperwork to visit the UK on business (Anderson, 2014).

Previously, Chinese tourists travelling to Europe with connecting flights at British airports were required to obtain an expensive UK visa even though, quite often, they did not have to leave the terminal building of a British airport. This resulted in many Chinese visitors going directly to other European countries without even touching down in the UK, as Schengen visas give Chinese tourists access to 26 countries in Europe, but not the UK. In June 2015, the UK government extended a pilot scheme that allowed certain Chinese tour operators to use the Schengen form to apply for the UK visas as well. The changes were designed to encourage a greater number of Chinese tourists to include the UK as one of their visiting destinations when planning to visit Schengen area.

From 2016, new visitor visas for tourists from China are valid in the UK for two years (Prime Minister’s Office, 2015). Furthermore, new visa rules also offer an extension of standard visitor visas from 6 months to 2 years multiple entries and plan to introduce a new 10-year multiple entry visit visa for the same price. Mobile fingerprinting service has been extended to an additional 50 cities to make it easier to apply for a visa. These initiatives are a part of the UK government’s ambition to strengthen the UK-China relations, for the benefit of the whole of Britain’ (Prime Minister’s Office, 2015).

Relaxing the visa policy means that the UK tends to become more open to China, which indicates the trust that Chinese visitors will pose a problem to the UK. Some members of the public have questioned why American tourists can enter the UK without a visa for short stays, while Chinese visitors need to apply for permission and have their fingerprints recorded. This issue perhaps indicates
that state trust between the UK and the USA is relatively higher than the state trust between the UK and China. However, this does not contradict the argument here that there has been a significant improvement in trust between China and the UK. Due to the continuing efforts of cultural diplomacy, there are increasing indications of trust between the two states, and this visa issue is another such indication. If the UK government did not trust China and still holds the old-fashioned impression about the ideology of Chinese communism, it would be impossible for the UK to relax its visa policy. Openness on the visa issues will encourage more Chinese visitors and investors to come to the UK and boost its economy. If the UK did not trust China, this openness might be considered as a problem. If the UK merely wanted to find financial supporters and investors, it could devote more efforts to establishing closer ties with the US, which has a number of convenient factors than China, such as visa-free travelling, same written and spoken the language and relatively affluent economic resources. However, the UK chooses China as its partner, not only because of the economic strength of China but also due to the long-term cultural efforts that have enabled the UK to understand China better and progress toward the generation of state trust within their relationship.

On the Chinese side, although China has not taken any measures to relax its visa application procedures for UK visitors, China also does not offer this type of privilege to any other state. With respect to reciprocity, China has instead carried out some benevolent policies to the UK in other fields. For instance, according to the UK government reports Policy Outcomes of the 8th UK-China Economic and Financial Dialogue, ‘welcomes the UK’s continued openness to trade and investment, [and] the UK government will continue to encourage Chinese companies to strengthen their investment to the UK, and reaﬃrms that the UK continues to be China’s leading economic partner in Europe’ (UK-China Global Comprehensive Strategies, 2016, p.1). In this case, as the old proverb goes ‘action speaks louder than words’. Before the UK launched the Brexit referendum in 2015, President Xi’s state visit confirmed almost £30 billion in trade and investment deals, making it inevitable that Chinese companies would launch a new wave of investment in the UK. Even after the decision of the UK to exit the
European Union, China has not cancelled confirmed orders or withdrawn any investment from the UK. Roderic Wye, also argues that ‘though Beijing favours remaining and sees some benefits in the UK’s membership, a Leave vote is unlikely to lead to an exodus of Chinese investment and interest in Britain’ (Wye, 2016).

There are other examples of benevolent policies, which are fairly common in the UK and China. For instance, the UK is among the first European economies to embrace the China-initiated Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in the earlier period of 2015, earning it a sharp rebuke from its ostensibly most important diplomatic ally, the USA (Brown, 2015). In return, China has not disappointed the UK’s economic expectations.

There is an argument that ‘Britain’s cultural diplomacy towards China, as part of wider diplomacy, is also subject to the economic goals and national interests as a whole’ (Yin, 2014, p.51) This cannot be entirely denied, as the advantages of good economic relations with China are clear. This is especially so for the UK as it needs a much greater economic support to assist its economic recovery from the 2008 financial crisis. This can also be confirmed by the annual report of the British Council, which says that the British Council’s goal, for instance, is to improve awareness and understanding of Britain in order to encourage people to visit, study and do business in the UK, so contributing to long-term prosperity and security (British Council, 2016, p.20-26). However, although the economy of China has dramatically surged, particularly in the last two decades, if the UK did not trust the capacity of China and its benevolent policies towards the UK, it would not devote such considerable amount of effort to building closer ties with China.

As seen from these examples, though the effectiveness of cultural diplomatic efforts of both states cannot be directly proved by the aspect of benevolent policy-making, it is, nevertheless, the case that after 2015 China-UK Cultural Year, both states’ governments have carried out a series of benevolent policies
towards each other. Therefore, we can conclude indicators of a medium level state trust can be confidently confirmed.

Fourthly, the favourable orientation of policies demonstrates a lower medium level of state trust between China and the UK.

Most realists and liberal-institutionalists consider that China has attained the position of the global superpower, and the UK is adjusting to the reality of a dramatic relative power shift since the late 1990s (Lin, 2015). As for the relations between China and the UK, the handover of Hong Kong could be regarded as a turning point in their contemporary relations. Before 1997, Kerry Brown argues that ‘Hong Kong was the reason why Britain was amongst the earliest to recognise the PRC’ (Brown, 2016). In order to preserve its interests in Hong Kong and maintain at least some semblance of dialogue with the Communist government in Beijing, the UK kept a liaison office with a charge d’affaires in the PRC’s new capital (Brown, 2016).

After 1997, under the newly elected leadership of Tony Blair and the Labor party, Brown thinks that these two states’ relations have changed to ‘engagement’. Like friends who knew each other well, the UK and China could be open, honest and frank with each other (Brown, 2016). British officials of a particular generation had learned about how their Chinese counterparts negotiated, what was their attitudes to the outside world and their expectations of opening up to it. The Chinese had also learned a lot about the UK. In the 2010s, generally speaking, the UK government has shown its sincerity towards Chinese government, from the hospitality of royal family to the state visit of the Chinese President in 2015, to the implementation of benevolent policies towards China, such as relaxed visa policies and the memorandum of cooperation in the various areas. All these events exhibit the favourable orientation of policies between China and the UK.

Before Xi’s state visit, the Chinese government proposed Belt and Road Initiative in 2013, to revitalise the old Silk Road, hoping to generate huge investment
opportunities in more than 60 countries. Seeing London as a global financial
centre and a bridge to the Euro Zone, the Central Bank of China made its first sale
of debt on London’s markets, drawing orders of more than £3 billion (Liu, 2016).
In 2015, Xi’ state visit to the UK resulted in both states signing a large project of
up to 40 billion pounds involving a number of Chinese enterprises, including
China Guangdong Nuclear Power, China Investment Corporation, China
Shipbuilding Group, China Huadian Group, China National Petroleum
Corporation, HNA Group and CITIC Group. Xi’s leading role in this state visit
demonstrated the trend of the policies of China and its diplomatic attitude
towards the UK. In the Joint Statement from Government of the People’s Republic
of China & Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland, both states agree to the comprehensive global strategic partnership in
the 21st Century. The official term ‘comprehensive global strategic partnership’
indicates that through a long history of interaction, the UK has identified China
as an increasingly important partner in all aspects and regarded China’s rise as
an opportunity rather than a threat (Shi and Liu, 2014, p.7).

This trend is quite significant, with the economic benefit for both states.
However, without long-lasting cultural efforts, the current mutually beneficial
situation of China and the UK may not have been achieved. With respect to the
indicator concerning the favourable orientation of policy, there is a clear
indicator that the lower medium level of state trust exists between China and the
UK.

Fifthly, cooperation between China and the UK demonstrates the minimal level
of state trust.

China and the UK have long-history cooperation in various fields, with the
common goal to make an economic profit while realising other benefits. These
cooperative opportunities and trust have been generated through cultural
diplomatic efforts. For instance, the British Council claims that ‘there is an
evidence of a link between participation in cultural activities with another
country and higher levels of trust in that country and its people, in turn leading to greater enthusiasm to do business with that country’ (British Council, 2015). On the one hand, cooperative opportunities can be obtained through cultural diplomacy. On the other hand, cooperation is one of the indicators of state trust. Therefore, cooperation between China and the UK could have been influenced by the cultural diplomatic efforts. For example, both China and the UK have attached importance to cooperation on energy and transport in each other’s countries (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2015). This cooperation took place after the 2015 China-UK Cultural Year.

According to a report of the British Council, ‘the use of culture to underpin a wider economic and diplomatic drive makes sense in the context of the UK’s stature—increasingly recognised in China—as a world leader for the creative industries, as well as China’s own moves towards building a more creative, consumer-driven economy, with Chinese creative industries currently growing annually at almost 17%’ (British Council, 2015). For China, it needs to cooperate with the UK in the field of intellectual imports and high-technology communication. Recently, in the UK, ‘companies emerging from China like the telecoms provider Huawei and the internet company Alibaba started to have a presence from 2007: the former secured a major supply deal with the British Telecom despite security fears; the latter had set up an office in London’ (Brown, 2016, p.20).

In addition, a Chinese company bought the cereal brand Weetabix, and there are Chinese investments in the Heathrow Airport, Anglia Water, and other utility companies. With respect to the UK, it presented itself as a more open, convenient and flexible place to do business than anywhere else in Europe. In China, besides the economic cooperation, the Chinese government also warmly welcomes British universities to extend their reach with Chinese domestic universities as can be seen in collaborative issues, such as Xi’an Jiaotong Liverpool University and Nottingham Ningbo University, which have received great support from the Chinese government at all levels. These examples explain why the UK chooses China as its cooperative partner. With this regard, both states have the reciprocal
process and devoted themselves to achieving the expected outcomes of their cooperation. Therefore, it indicates that a minimal level of state trust between China and the UK.

In the previous sections, an example of the 2015 China-UK Cultural Year has been mentioned so as to examine the effectiveness of cultural diplomacy in state trust building. The next part introduces a case study about the details of an event in this cultural year and then examine the effectiveness in state trust building between China and the UK.

6.5 Case Study 2

China-UK Cultural Diplomacy: 2015 UK-China Year of Cultural Exchange
Is it the Icing on the Cake or the Idle Work?

Abstract
Using culture as a tool in international politics has attracted considerable attention while many states employ cultural diplomacy as a tool of soft power in the world. The United Kingdom was one of the earliest countries to carry out cultural diplomacy and gained many outstanding achievements in the previous decades. China is catching up with this cultural trend to promote Chinese culture on the world stage as well. The 2015 UK-China Year of Cultural Exchange (usually called “cultural year”) appears to be a sprawling collection of events and activities across several cities in China and the UK. This part aims to explore the effectiveness of this cultural year as an approach to cultural diplomacy, and then proceeds to examine whether the cultural year is the icing on the cake or just the idle work.

Introduction
Soft power has been rejuvenated in China recently and has been accepted as a core concept into Chinese cultural development framework (Zhang, 2010, p.383). China, as a country with a history of more than 5000 years, which has been regarded as an emerging country with powerful status. Its culture is certain to
become an important part of worldwide culture. As a result of years of the twin effects with debates by political and academic elites’, together with extensive dissemination by the popular media, the term soft power was eventually incorporated into the highest-level policy documents on 15 October 2007. In the keynote report, issued by the then President of China Hu Jintao, on behalf of the Central Committee of the 16th Chinese People’s Congress to the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, he stressed the necessity to promote Chinese culture to thereafter develop the soft power of a state on the international stage (Hu, 2007a). The United Kingdom, as a pioneer in developing cultural diplomacy, has already conducted a series of cultural diplomatic activities in China for many years. 2015 is a significant year for both UK and China; “2015 promises to be a flagship year for the UK in China and China in the UK, with the first ever UK-China Year of Cultural Exchange”, which is claimed by the Chinese Government.

**General Overview of the 2015 China-UK Cultural Year**

As both states claimed, 2015 is a significant year for the development of the relationship between China and the UK. Liu Xiaoming, who is the current serving Chinese ambassador in the UK, mentions that “this cultural year is of great significance, both China and the UK enjoy quite long history and splendid culture, cultural cooperation between the two countries will significantly contribute to the process of human civilisation. At the same time, culture is one of the three pillars of UK-China comprehensive strategic partnership. This culture year could deepen mutual knowledge and understanding between the Chinese and British people and lay a more solid foundation for the public communication” (China Embassy, 2015). Liu’s comment is correct to some extent, but the important premise is that both UK and China could have a well-conducted cultural year, from the planning stage of the program through to the practical activities later on. The cultural background of China and the UK is quite different, and this is especially so when it is reflected in the following aspects: unique political systems of China, institutional bureaucracies, specific strategic demands and different cultural resources. All these features distinctively showed the cultural
diplomacy of China with its own unique characteristics, which have a huge impact on this cultural year.

This cultural exchange was formally announced when Premier Li Keqiang visited the UK in June 2014 (British Council, 2015). Then Prince William, Duke of Cambridge, added a final touch to the sculpture of the “Sheep Shaun” (画羊点睛) in a traditional Chinese eye-dotting ceremony in the British Embassy in Beijing as a major event so as to launch the cultural event in an official capacity. This study starts with the observation of related events in the 2015 UK-China cultural exchange and then raise a research question: is it “锦上添花” (icing on the cake) or “事倍功半” (idle work; getting the half results with double efforts) in the UK-China cultural relation? This study examines this cultural exchange from the following aspects: theoretical analysis, empirical settings, any relevant organisations, events, its overall evaluation, and achievements. It then continues to analyse the merits and defects of this state-level cultural exchange from two sections: the UK cultural season in China and the Chinese cultural season in the UK. Currently, there is no precise definition of “cultural year”. According to the elaboration of Chinese scholars, Zhifei Li and Haifen Yu, cultural year refers to “a kind of diplomatic form serving to the country's overall diplomatic strategy and is in accordance with the overall national pattern and deployment of external relations. In the specific time and specific area agreed by the bilateral countries, using culture as the expression carrier and holding the public favourite and acceptant cultural activities in a country or between two countries” (Li and Yu, 2007).

Taking the 2015 UK-China Cultural Year as an example, this cultural year includes two parts: the first half (from March to June 2015) is the UK cultural season in China, themed Next Generation; and the second half (from July to October 2015) is China’s cultural season in the UK, themed Creative China, and launched in the UK to present Chinese culture and creativity to the British public. They are supported by two state governments, both of which desire to see their nations as cultural leaders and learn from one another. Both UK and China
exchanged cultural seasons to showcase the diversity and creativity of each other.

In the UK cultural season, which is mainly organised by the British Council and other public associations, as mentioned previously; the theme is called *Next Generation*. Marchant, the director of Tate Museum, claims that “we use that term in a very broad sense, it’s not just about the next generation of people. We are talking about the next generation of audiences, next generation of artists, next generation of delivery when it comes to the arts” (Marchant, 2014). There are 30 events in total, and digital arts are in strong focus, pushing creative boundaries while actively engaging audiences through a variety of integrated platforms. Xin, a commentator from *Beijing Today*, argues that ‘its ground-breaking digital arts will push creative boundaries, and the launch of a new online arts portal will give viewers a chance to engage through a variety of integrated platforms’ (Xin, 2015).

Various exhibitions, dramas, and other cultural events have been taking place in China, and the art wave stretches well beyond the major cities of Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou. Some cultural events have been held in other cities with strong artistic foundations, such as Chongqing, Wuhan, Shenzhen, and Chengdu. China cultural season, which is primarily organised by the Ministry of Culture in China and other related organisations, provides more innovative presentational methods and contemporary cultural works, such as fashion week, creative industry events, training program and opera, rather than merely promoting traditional Chinese culture for overseas audiences. These events stretched out to some main cities of the UK, such as London, Liverpool, Edinburgh, Newcastle, etc.

Both of the UK cultural season in China and China cultural season in the UK had so many outstanding cultural events and performances in towns and cities across Britain. These two seasons were featured with a broad range of cultural projects, exhibitions, and performances encompassing art, design, cuisine, culture, science, business, technology, and education.

Before this cultural year, China has already hosted similar events in other countries, such as China-France Cultural Year (2003-2005), China-Italy Cultural
Year (2006), China-Russia Cultural Year (2006), etc. It can be seen from these events that cultural year has become one of the essential means of China’s intercultural communication and a channel to be used for its cultural propaganda overseas. The 2015 UK-China Cultural Year is not an exception, with more than 30 creative and cross-boundary modern art programs. The cultural season of UK offers the Chinese audience a rich and diversified experience of contemporary cultural and creative development of the UK, which can be regarded as a new attempt in the history of cultural relations between the UK and China. Furthermore, although the state visit of President Xi to the UK took place in October 2015, which is not on the program list of this cultural year; it indeed makes 2015 to be the “no ordinary year” and “golden time” for both states to have a further communication and cooperation due to the highest-level state visit and reception (Canton, 2015).

**Impacts of the 2015 UK-China Year of Cultural Exchange**

**Advantages:**

Behind a surface that can seem hard to navigate, the activities organised by both China and the UK prove to be a dynamic strategy to encourage innovation and to build new creative networks and partnerships. They are supported by two governments, both of which desire to see their nations as cultural leaders and learn from one another. Creativity and cultural exchange can be seen at the heart of the relationship between the two countries, both with long and rich but very divergent cultural histories. Therefore, this cultural year can be reckoned as a forward for improving the political and cultural relations between both states.

This cultural year follows a period of strong cultural ties between the UK and China. The current phase started in 2008 with the *China Now* festival in conjunction with the Beijing Olympics. Since then, much of the work took the form of bilateral activities such as one-off exhibitions and tours. London’s Hayward Gallery exhibition “Art of Change: New Directions from China” was presented as an aspect of these arrangements. Unlike the previous cultural events, the current Cultural Year has an emphasis on the exchange, creating
opportunities for artists from UK and China to meet, share experiences and build working relationships. This cultural year also provided a range of events, including conventional exhibitions and performances but behind these facades, new frameworks were built for individuals and organisations to work together. Once established, these frameworks would still be in operation even after the specific events have ended. It was intended that the cultural year would create ongoing opportunities for artists to work together. This is not a set of isolated events, but a focus on possibilities that have grown from a long and productive period of meetings where people in China, the UK have worked together and shared their insights. The present period is an exciting time for culture in both countries. This cultural year also offered the sustainable future where new cross-fertilisation provides the perspective to strengthen the infrastructure and encourage the innovation.

Unlike the previous patterns of cultural exchange, this time Chinese government started to recognise the weakness and would like to learn the excellent aspects of the UK. For example, management of Chinese museums lacks innovation and professional methods when compared with the UK (Kong, 2015, p.45). In this cultural year, Chinese government offers some opportunities for museum staffs to attend training programs in the UK. Carma Elliot, the Cultural & Education Minister of British Embassy, makes a comment concerning this cultural year, ‘If we look at culture at its wider sense around cultural relations, then the people relationships, the opportunities there are for education and the core elements that fit into the culture relations there, whether it’s learning about museum management, culture skills, looking at culture tourism, and ultimately enjoying the very best of other people’s cultures... It’s very important that we capture that richness and strong connections between our two countries’ (CCTV News, 2015).

This cultural year creates a chance for both states to boost the creative industry, especially for China. “The growth of the UK creative industries has outstripped other parts of the economy. The creative industries contributed £71.4 billion to the economy in 2014” (Department of Culture, Media and Sport, 2014). The UK is renowned for its experience and reputation in fostering creativity across all
industrial sectors to drive growth and investment. In fact, the UK’s creative industries generate a staggering £8 million pounds an hour, and grew almost 10% in 2012, outperforming all other sectors (British Council, 2015). As for the side of China, it would like to see a similar expansion of the cultural industries, to account for five percent of the economy by 2016. Culture is one of the ‘five pillars’ of Chinese economic growth. The creative industry is a newly emerging industry, which could also provide more inspiration and innovative ideas for cultural diplomacy.

The dialogue of this cultural year from diplomatic level and down to intimate meetings between individuals is a reflection on the convergence of national ambitions. The recognition of the diversity of cultural approaches and the richness of the two respective countries’ artistic traditions will be experienced in the opportunities created through exchange visits. It is the difference between the two cultural traditions that make these exchange visits a lot more rewarding. For instance, the cultural exchange is designed to include a broad assortment of art forms along with involvement across the creative and cultural sectors in the two countries. The program in China has involved contrasting experiences: from pioneers of the fashion and design industry to museum directors and visits from individuals. For example, the Gentle Good, a British singer, brings other Welsh musicians to Chengdu, which is a city that not conventionally on the cultural map from the perspective of the UK.

Media is one of the hot spots in this cultural year. The differences between the cultures of these two nations meant that much of the work that will be on a travelling exhibition would confound expectations and introduce people to new experiences. The British Council and their Chinese counterpart, the Ministry of Culture, were using a blend of media to extend the reach of events when the visits were going to take place. The new websites UK Now and China Now provide a platform to sample and learn more about the artists and events from these two countries. These sites will also provide materials on festivals and traditional cultural celebrations so that the background of the two cultures can
be understood. These materials are all free and can be downloaded for use in schools.

**Weakness:**
The problem of information update and transparency, which will have a significant influence on the participation rate by the public. With regard to the Chinese government at the beginning of the cultural year, it claims that the media would be used extensively in the cultural year. However, in April 2015, when trying to discover some related information from the official website\(^\text{15}\)--Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, it did not mention the details about the China-UK Cultural Year until 20\(^{\text{th}}\) July 2015. This cultural year is a typical way of cultural diplomacy, but the Chinese Embassy did not grasp this opportunity to fully develop it well. Instead, the main news published on the website are mostly reporting on the ambassador’s attendance in some events. Most Chinese people in the UK usually will catch a glimpse of information from the official website of Chinese embassy; it is also one of the services that the embassy should provide to let others know what kind of events regarding China will take place in the UK, rather than just publish a news report at the end of the event.

More specifically, when searching for the related information from the website of the Ministry of Culture in the P.R.C, the speed of information update is quicker than the Chinese Embassy. But, it seldom mentions the details of this cultural year. As the chief organiser of this cultural year, the Ministry of Culture should publish more information about the Year and let the public know the relevant details so that they could engage with the interesting events in this cultural year. Otherwise, the cultural year could not be considered as a successful program if only with less attention and participation from the public.

However, on the side of the UK, the British Council did a great job in promoting this Cultural Year. From the British Council’s official website\(^\text{16}\), which showed in

\(^{15}\) http://www.chinese-embassy.org.uk/
\(^{16}\) http://www.britishcouncil.cn/programmes/arts/2015yoce
detail, the activities of the cultural year with related information in both English language and Chinese language versions. Moreover, the British Council also launch a website\textsuperscript{17} offering exclusive use for this Cultural Year. This is an excellent method of the British Council to provide a platform for the public to engage themselves in this cultural year better, and offers a base for both academic research and the public's participation to have access to the cultural year.

In contrast, one aspect that Chinese government had ignored in the Cultural Year was how to attract the attention and participation of the British public. Usually, overseas Chinese people will be involved in the Cultural Year through the channel of local Chinese community or society. After a street interview in the Chinatown of London, it was shown that even some Chinese students and people who are living or working in London were not aware of this cultural year. Due to the lack of publicity, not so many British people know the events of the Cultural Year except those who are working in the cultural fields or having the specific interest in the Chinese culture. The same problem is also evidenced in the UK cultural season in China. When interviews were conducted with those people who are living in Beijing and Shanghai, most of them had no idea about the cultural year and did not get involved with the cultural events. This problem will largely influence the effectiveness of the Cultural Year, because one of the purposes of cultural diplomacy is to exchange different ideology and cultural perspectives. But without good reaching to both British and Chinese people, this kind of invisible cultural connection is difficult to be established.

China has a lot of dramatic improvement in many aspects of diplomatic strategies. However, there are some deficiencies in this cultural year, such as a. lack of full preparation; b. lack of specific cultural promotion; c. lack of comprehensive program plans. As listed on the website of Chinese Embassy in the UK, there were 21 events in total. However, some programs were not well implemented in both the UK and China. For example, for the UK cultural season

\textsuperscript{17} http://www.uknow.org.cn
in China, the power of advertising and broadcasting effects of the media had not been used to the full. Only the major cities like Beijing, Shanghai, and Chengdu joined this cultural year, while the public in other cities does not even know about this mega-event. Hence, the participation rate could not possibly be high at all. Whenever there is a plan to roll out the cultural events, other cities should be taken into consideration as well. Although it is virtually impossible to encourage every city to host related events, various means of media could reach to more cities and evoke the public participation. For example, Wechat’s information push, Weibo’s interaction, etc. Spreading the news of the cultural events by means of these Internet media could provide significant opportunities for those people who have no interest in the culture of UK but could not personally go to other cities to join the cultural event due to the limitation of their working time, personal budget and other reasons.

Another problem with influence on the effectiveness of the cultural year is the “services after the event”. When the mega-event finished, organisers will seldom put further human resources with further funding to cover for the subsequent issues. For example, when written inquiries are sent to the related governmental departments in China asking for some information and data about the cultural year, the usual answer is “no reply”. In this respect, the UK is much better than China. The officers of the Britain Council always provide a reply within 2-3 working days on receipt of your e-mail. Holding an event is not that easy, but without further ongoing efforts after the event, the results achieved may be lost gradually soon afterwards.

In general, this chapter uses the 2015 UK-China Cultural Year as an example so as to compare and analyse the effectiveness of the methods of China and the UK in their respective ways of conducting cultural diplomacy during this Cultural Year. Considering what is happening in China and the UK right now, such cultural events assist in the challenge of stereotypes and provides new perspectives for understanding the China and the UK contemporaneously, which can have a positive contribution to the cultural diplomacy of both the China and the UK. The intention of the cultural exchanges during this year is not specifically meant to
create new work, but for the provision of opportunities so that creative people can meet as well as to share their experiences, to gain an insight into a different context with different ways of working. The organisers had created opportunities for those artists with an appetite for challenge plus curiosity in order to make new connections that might have a result in a change in their works. The meetings can well end up in the making of ongoing and lasting creative partnerships. This Cultural Year looked at culture in the broadest sense and sought to make business connections with the emphasis on opportunities that would be likely to be taken forward in the near future.

As elaborated previously, some problems of the China-UK Cultural Year have been exposed, such as immature diplomatic strategy, incomplete publicity, and the vague position of Chinese culture in the international cultural system and the low level of public engagement. The Cultural Year is not just a slogan or a chance for China to stage a catwalk show in the UK. The central role of this platform has been recognised by both states, grasping this rare opportunity to thereafter enhance the power of its cultural diplomacy or just treating it as a normal stage show will ultimately lead to the overall performance with results for the year. Both China and UK are in possession of a profound culture respectively, and they are exceptionally keen on protecting and developing their own national culture. The China-UK Cultural Year could promote mutual understanding between people of two countries and offer a platform for the integration and development of two civilisations so as to maintain the cultural diversity of our world.

However, both China and the UK just appeared to put some more positive formal art presentations for audiences on both sides while ignoring the contemporary art, which may unwittingly expose the darker and indecent side of the two states. Therefore, this cultural year was more like a governmental cultural propaganda year. If attention were to focus on this point, then the Cultural Year would be a very valuable format to serve for the national reputation and image of both China and UK. In addition, it could have been used as a tool to preserve human cultural diversity and promote the deep mutual understanding between two states as well.
All these problems mentioned above does seem to have no connections with state trust building between China and the UK because neither state has ever mentioned as to which particular programs were being used to target the issue of state trust building. However, according to the five indicators that may influence the effectiveness of cultural diplomacy in state trust building, these problems have, nonetheless and to a large extent, been considered to be influential on the effectiveness of cultural diplomacy. As a result of these problems encountered, it is highly likely that it will lead to the reduction of efficiency concerning state trust building between China and the UK.

6.6 Conclusion
This Chapter mainly includes three parts: the first part outlines the general development of the cultural relations between China and the UK; it then provides the analysis on the role of British Council in the cultural diplomacy of the UK. In this part, the chronology concerning the development of two states’ cultural relationship is a necessary and important issue. This part offers the historical background to the analysis. This is due to the fact that if there is no clue on historical events and statement, then some quoted examples cannot be understood fully. The analysis on the roles of British Council in the cultural diplomacy of the UK shows the reasons that the cultural diplomatic efforts of the UK could be more of a showcase with greater success than other states. Moreover, the comparisons between the British Council, China’s Ministry of Culture and China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs also provide the suggestion concerning the advantages of the British Council when the programs of cultural diplomacy are implemented.

The second part combines the previously proposed indicators, which have been discussed in Chapter Five with real examples of foreign affairs so as to examine the existence or otherwise of state trust between two states. When applying these indicators into examining the current state trust level between China and the UK concerning the high level of state trust, there is no significant evidence, which is strong enough to prove the existence throughout the available public files and resources. It may be possible that these two states have confidential
deals and agreements with discretion, but it is not known to the public. With regard to the upper medium level of state trust, this study has already adopted an example to show the existence of the facts. However, there is no any quantifiable and qualified examples, hence the power of persuasion is relatively weak here. As a result, this upper medium level of state trust between two states is not considered to be tenable at this moment, although it does show the signal for the time being. As for the medium level and lower medium level of state trust, a lot of evidence can be collected and confirmed when checking through the public records on the policies between China and the UK. Therefore, in the current situation, the existence of state trust between China and the UK has attained the medium level and that the minimal level of state trust is clearly in existence between two states with the facts on the aspects of cooperation. However, one point that must be mentioned is that the level of state trust is transitory and it may vary due to other factors as well. Therefore, one cannot simply judge the level of state trust by merely applying these indicators mechanically when the measurement is being made. On some occasions, it might be necessary to combine all the indicators and take the status quo into consideration; it then draws a conclusion and attempts to predict the future trend.

In the third part, as both China and the UK claim that 2015 is the important year for both states, it then introduces the 2015 China-UK Cultural Year as a case study to comment on the effectiveness of cultural diplomatic efforts by both states. From the period of preparations till the stage of implementation, two different ways of conducting cultural programs by these two states are clearly shown. Though the economy of China grows faster than the UK, the continuous efforts in promoting national culture by the UK have received many rounds of applause in China. It is an explicit recognition concerning the culture of the UK, and this is also one of the purposes of the cultural diplomacy by the UK. As for China, it needs to have a serious discussion and consideration on the way when cultural policy guidelines are being made as well as on how to conduct the cultural programs domestically and internationally. It is no longer a moot point that the role of the Chinese government officers is a crucial issue in cultural diplomacy.
diplomacy. Cultural diplomacy is a platform for another country to obtain the knowledge on the culture of another state. It is not a stage show or an exhibition for political officers to present their charming personal characteristics. The effectiveness of cultural diplomacy is connected to state trust building. Effective cultural diplomacy may promote state trust building while ineffective cultural diplomacy may not generate or maintain state trust, and it may even destroy the existing state trust. Even though the significant potential outcomes of this Cultural Year might not be seen in any immediate tangible ways and that it even might not be seen in the forthcoming years, the essential role of these cultural efforts is an obvious factual issue which cannot be denied.

Generally speaking, the clear evidence of a positive result concerning the effectiveness of the cultural diplomacy by the UK in trust building that can be seen clearly, particularly concerning the trust among the public. In accordance with the research report by the British Council, which shows that young persons from China who had been involved in cultural activities with the UK, such as attendance for major art exhibitions and cultural events organised by institutions from the UK, where 15% more likely to trust the people coming from the UK and 8% more likely to be interested in opportunities to do business with the people and organisations of the UK. The level of trust by the Chinese towards people coming from the UK also increases significantly with the number of cultural activities they engaged in (British Council, 2012).

The British Council has intentionally launched cultural programs with young people in China as a target audience, and it has a conceptual map in which the young generation is considered to have a great potential to develop their talents in the political, economic and other fields. It is a good sign to improve state trust between states as well. For the UK, it is conceivable that it must have known that cultural efforts need a long time for its effectiveness to show through and that some benefits of cultural diplomacy have been gradually brought into the UK. The British Council claims that the trust built by its cultural diplomatic programs between people of different background has the resultant effect that it can bring economic benefits for the UK eventually and then the British Council contributes
to the feedback positively with increased cultural exchanges (British Council, 2012). The partnership between UK and China could still be seen in cultural relations as it has become a highlighted, pivotal area in bilateral relations. With respect to any potential outcomes in the future, the state trust between two countries could be examined through the process of detailed and in-depth assessments on many extensive cultural events hosted by these states.
Chapter 7

Conclusion

7.1 Postscript

In the current academic area, cultural diplomacy and state trust are two concepts that have remained rather unexplored in the field of social science. Particularly, the concept of state trust, which is a new idea and with great significance when linking with cultural diplomacy. The absence of reliable information about the intentions of other state actors, the shortage of deeper forms of cooperation, and the specific cultural norms embodied in connecting state actors have made the concepts of state trust and cultural diplomacy seem difficult to discuss in the academic field. Moreover, lack of reliable resources and intentions of states make the concept of state trust seem incompatible with other concepts, for instance, cultural diplomacy. While at the same time, some scholars agree that can maintain, enhance and even create state trust. This research places much emphasis on this perspective, and this thesis is built up with the supportive analysis firmly and mainly based upon this argument. Therefore, this research develops a conceptual and measurement framework for understanding cultural diplomacy and state trust respectively, and in relation to one another.

When looking at the two subjects of this research—China and the United Kingdom, both states are experiencing historical change. In today's international arena, the role of China playing has sufficiently attracted other state actors. With increasingly strained relations with neighbouring states, such as Japan, North Korea, South Korea and Philippine, the majority disputes are reflected in various areas, economically, politically and militarily. Merely this negative political environment could stamp unfavourable labels towards the reputation and national image of China. Such uncertainties might result in negative publicity regarding China’s national images through the mass media. Gradually, growing conflicts and misunderstanding would appear and even deteriorate. These disadvantageous factors, the common point is that they might lower the trusting attitude of other states towards China. Meanwhile, the Chinese government
claims that China shall peacefully rise and create a harmonious environment domestically and externally.

Some hostility may be caused by lacking understanding of China and its culture. One of the methods to help China jump out of the dilemma is to offer the opportunities for other states to know more about China and understand China’s culture with various aspects. It is because that clear understanding and recognition could be regarded as the original recipe for states to solve their domestic and external problems. Another concern is that even though some state actors have already known more about Chinese culture and development of CPC if their perspectives are jammed in the past times and without the updated knowledge and fresh information, that might greatly influence the interaction between states. For example, in the 1940s-1990s, China’s diplomacy had a clearly defensive purpose due to its weak national strength and a series of historical disputes with other states. However, nowadays, under the influence of soft power developed by Joseph Nye, although China is not the first runner to notice the positive influences of soft power, Chinese authorities and scholars have gradually realised the necessity for reformulating its old image. Therefore, one of the aims of China’s cultural diplomacy is to create an image of the state as civilised, innovative, open, peaceful and responsible.

According to the state quo of China, taking cultural diplomacy can be considered as a good way to resolve these conflicts. As Da Kong puts it, ‘in the past decade, China’s economic, political and military rise has caused mounting external concerns and a crisis of trust and credibility just as the US did after its 2003 invasion of Iraq. In both cases, cultural diplomacy has been pursued to repair damaged reputations and shape a favourable image’ (Kong, 2015, p.66). As for the United Kingdom, its excellence in developing cultural diplomacy has set a good example for China. However, at this particular time of Brexit, the Sino-UK relationship seems more significant than ever since. China’s rapid development consists both of successful achievements and mistakes, the aspect of cultural diplomacy is not an exception. Even though both states have devoted many cultural diplomatic efforts in promoting mutual cultural understanding, when
compared with the developmental level of cultural diplomacy by the UK, it can be seen that it might be quite hard to build or maintain a high level of state trust between these two states within the environment of relatively unequal abilities. Therefore, this thesis has asked several crucial questions: How to define the concept of cultural diplomacy? How to define the concept of state trust? How to improve the effectiveness of China’s cultural diplomacy? What are the advantages of the UK’s cultural diplomacy? How to evaluate the effectiveness of China’s cultural diplomacy in state trust building within the China-UK relationship?

These questions have exercised the central project in this thesis of building a model to evaluate the effectiveness of cultural diplomacy in state trust building. The following part recapitulates the results of this research, briefly discussing them to highlight the major findings before discussing its limitations. Lastly, it will point out the directions for future studies.

### 7.2 Summary of Findings

Chapter One is the preliminary but important part of this thesis. It set out the aims and objectives, outlined the main argument, method, and structure of the thesis. With these efforts, both primary and secondary data have been collected; multiple interviews have been conducted in the both academic and political fields, which have provided an in-depth understanding of this research. Additionally, extensive literature reviews offer solid theoretical support that can be seen throughout the thesis.

Chapter Two is the second cornerstone that paves the way towards the central argument. This chapter distinguished a host of definitions of cultural diplomacy and then categorised these definitions into three schools. Based on the results of questionnaire and interviews, it argues that: 1) state actors cannot be dismissed in the activities of cultural diplomacy; 2) non-government actors are quite necessary for the cultural diplomacy, but they need to be authorised and recognised by the state actors; 3) cultural diplomacy is not merely about “cultural propaganda” and “national image” privileged by governments, it also
concerns cultural respect and mutual cultural understanding among different states. The next section of this chapter differentiated the similar terms so as to avoid some sort of semantic confusion among these concepts, such as cultural soft power, public diplomacy, foreign cultural relations and intercultural communication. This chapter also discussed the limits and merits of cultural diplomacy. The critical analysis in this section helps to produce a better understanding towards the concept of cultural diplomacy.

In Chapter Three, the concept of state trust provided an original contribution to the academic field. This chapter has clarified theoretical and empirical misconceptions regarding trust, confidence, social capital, social trust, and then conceptualised the term state trust. State trust is a kind of mature relationship among states, with each state treating the other respectfully, equally and truthfully, while five important elements of state trust including 1) people/institution; 2) cooperation; 3) shared norms; 4) shared obligation; 5) Network among states (inter-state network). This chapter also analysed the relationship between cultural diplomacy and state trust. Since these two concepts have been discussed explicitly in the foremost chapters, the relationship of cultural diplomacy and state trust then becomes not difficult to discuss. This research provides an innovative interlinking of these two concepts, and three propositions are put forward in this part to discuss the key argument of this thesis, assuming that when everything else being equal, if cultural relations can be strengthened and improved, the challenges of cultural identity can be solved well, and reciprocal behaviour can be increased or maintained, then cultural diplomacy can maintain, enhance and even create state trust. Furthermore, in the last section, in order to explore how cooperation, state trust and cultural diplomacy can reinforce with each other, the last section introduces and discusses the Game of State Trust, explicitly and arguably.

Chapter Four is one of the significant parts of the whole thesis. There is a dearth of literature with regard to trust indicators in various disciplines and areas; after the specific selection and numerous discussion, some of these indicators could be further developed and then applied into proving the existence of state trust.
This chapter combined theoretical and empirical analyses to provide five indicators of different levels of state trust created by cultural diplomacy, directly and indirectly. These indicators are: 1) minimal level of state trust—cooperation among states; 2) lower medium level of state trust—advantageous orientation of states’ policies; 3) medium level of state trust—benevolent policies between states; 4) upper medium level of state trust—types of rules that state actor employ in the written forms and with leeway; 5) high level of state trust—discretionary power in policy-making.

Furthermore, this chapter has discussed five obstacles of cultural diplomacy in state trust building: 1) the difficulty concerning the existence of misunderstanding and confusion—what state trust is and how can it be applied to the state operation via cultural diplomacy; 2) the difficulty about if one state is not aware of the importance of joint efforts, then state trust will not be formed as expected; 3) the difficulty of consistent and efficient cultural diplomacy; 4) the difficulty concerning over-estimated higher expectation towards the role of cultural diplomacy; 5) the difficulty concerning how to combine the efforts of cultural diplomacy with economic development and political stability in a better way. If these obstacles can be resolved, then it will accelerate the speed for cultural diplomacy in creating or maintain state trust.

This chapter also identified five factors that may cast significant influences on the effectiveness of cultural diplomacy in state trust building. These factors are 1) some content of cultural policies and foreign policies; 2); a clearly defined social roles, formal contract and well-established obligations between states; 3) the quality of cultural diplomatic programs; 4) coordination among different governmental departments and other institutions within and across states; 5); existing mistrust and conflictual issues between states; 6) misuse of funding for cultural diplomatic programs; 7) the operation of overseas cultural institutions; 8) publicity concerning the programs of cultural diplomacy; 9) monitoring the impact after cultural diplomatic activities.
Chapter Five and Chapter Six went into much detail about the practices of cultural diplomacy in state trust building. I used these indicators and factors discussed in Chapter Four to evaluate China’s and the UK’s application of cultural diplomacy in state trust building, separately and comparatively. Chapter Five discussed the application of China’s cultural diplomacy based on the historical origin of China’s cultural diplomacy, Chinese government official promotion of cultural diplomacy, and the practice of China’s cultural diplomacy in state trust building. It argued that cultural diplomacy could help other state actors to have a better understanding about China, and thereby made their own judgments on China’s political behaviours, whether positive or negative. This will increase mutual understanding between China and other states. In order to support these arguments, this chapter took the 2014 APEC CEO Summit as a case study to examine the effectiveness of cultural diplomacy in state trust building. As discussed in Chapter Five, the minimal level of state trust can be witnessed while there is a sign showing the potential emergence of the medium level and the upper medium level of state trust.

Chapter Six concentrated on the UK’s application of cultural diplomacy, especially the role of British Council, as a leading actor of cultural diplomacy on the international stage, the much more useful experience could be drawn from the British Council’s cultural programs. Besides that, British Council has also encouraged scholars to explore the effectiveness of its cultural diplomacy’s operation. This chapter examined the UK’s application of cultural diplomacy through the case of the 2015 China-UK Cultural Year, which showed the efforts of both China and the UK in operating cultural diplomacy and promoting their unique cultures. In the relationship between China and the UK, it can be seen that opportunities and challenges do co-exist. Under the efforts of cultural diplomacy by both states, when examining the state trust level between China and the UK, cooperation between China and the UK demonstrates the minimal level of state trust; the favourable orientation of policies demonstrates a lower medium level of state trust between China and the UK; the implementation of benevolent policies between China and the UK indicates a medium level of state trust. The upper medium level of state trust is the presence of written rules with
leeway to regulate relations between two states; this indicator can be shown in communication between China and the UK, while the highest-level state trust has not yet been materialised to some significant degree.

### 7.3 Contribution to Scholarship

From the point of academic studies, research on cultural diplomacy shows an increasing trend with numerous hot debates. However, fewer academic works mention the connection towards these two seemingly non-correlated concepts, and there are almost no existing studies concerning the effectiveness of cultural diplomacy in state trust building, academically and practically. In order to bridge this gap, this study has provided comparative cultural diplomacy and state trust with a conceptual framework, and contributed to developing a better understanding of these two concepts—cultural diplomacy and state trust. In particular, this research has made an original contribution to knowledge by proving insights into the concept of state trust, evaluating the how the effectiveness of cultural diplomacy can influence state trust building.

As such, this research will benefit academics and practitioners regarding the development of cultural diplomacy and its effectiveness in state trust building. For instance, when evaluating the effectiveness of cultural diplomacy in state trust building between China and the UK, the approaches adopted in Chapters Five, Six and Seven could be enhanced by applying different national and cultural contexts.

### 7.4 Prospects for Future Research

The main body of this thesis sets out an overview of the research to date, including information gathered from an extensive literature review. The analysis part remains provisional and needs to be refined in further studies. As this thesis has exhibits, cultural diplomacy has been an under-studied practice of both academic filed and government area. But as a practice, the role and effectiveness of cultural diplomacy it has not been as well understood, or researched, as it warrants, particularly in the aspect of building trust with other states.
This study has prompted many areas that could be explored in further research; it has not been entirely conclusive, and further study is recommended. With increasing interest in soft power, particularly in regard to cultural diplomacy, this study exhibits a beginning rather than an end to an opportunity for exploring further indicators to prove the existence and more distinct levels of state trust. Two key questions for future research stand out.

Firstly, successful programs of cultural diplomacy should be examined to determine whether their success hinges on control by the government or the combination of government and private sectors. Secondly, researchers should consider the question of how to sustain cultural diplomacy in state trust building. Aspect concerning the interactive structure increases the likelihood of cultural diplomatic behaviours. It should make a contribution to the academic field and political practices if the question that 'how to keep the sustainability of cultural diplomacy in building state trust' could be solved. Additionally, this thesis provides a foundational point of reference for such future research. It shows a beginning rather than an end to an opportunity of exploring further factors concerning the relationship between cultural diplomacy and state trust or levels of state trust.
Appendix 1

List of interviewees in the Field Research

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13rd December 2013</td>
<td>Mark Donfield</td>
<td>CEO of Institute of Cultural Diplomacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14th December 2013</td>
<td>Hallodór Ásgrimsson</td>
<td>Former prime minister of Iceland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th December 2013</td>
<td>Petru Luchinsky</td>
<td>Former President of the republic of Moldova</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th December 2013</td>
<td>Ntahira Thérence</td>
<td>Permanent Secretary and Advisor of President's Office in the Republic of Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27th August 2014</td>
<td>Rt Hon Lord McConnell</td>
<td>Lord of Glenscorrodale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th September 2014</td>
<td>Prof. Lihua Zhang</td>
<td>Professor at Institute of International Studies, Tsinghua University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18th September 2014</td>
<td>Prof. Fan Wang</td>
<td>Vice President of China's Foreign Affairs University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22nd September 2014</td>
<td>Prof. Bo Qu</td>
<td>Professor of China’s Foreign Affairs University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23rd September 2014</td>
<td>Dr. Rulei Dong</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs Office of Beijing Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th September 2014</td>
<td>Pro. Qingmin Zhang</td>
<td>Dean of the Diplomacy and Foreign Affairs Management Department in Peking University</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Appendix 2

### Supplementary Interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15th Sep 2015</td>
<td>Yue Sun</td>
<td>PhD student of Essex University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th Sep 2015</td>
<td>Ran Tao</td>
<td>PhD student of Essex University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th Sep 2015</td>
<td>Xuan Du</td>
<td>PhD student of Essex University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th Sep 2015</td>
<td>Jason Zhang</td>
<td>PhD student of Essex University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th Sep 2015</td>
<td>Xiuyu Liu</td>
<td>PhD student of Cambridge University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th Sep 2015</td>
<td>Cedric Pulluman</td>
<td>PhD student of Cambridge University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28th Sep 2014</td>
<td>Tianye Tian</td>
<td>PhD student of Peking University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28th Sep 2014</td>
<td>Zhifeng Zhang</td>
<td>Chairman of NE-Tiger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21st Oct 2015</td>
<td>Xiawei Liao</td>
<td>PhD student of Oxford University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21st Oct 2015</td>
<td>Yunyun Zhou</td>
<td>PhD student of Oxford University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th Feb 2016</td>
<td>Brian Cai</td>
<td>Freelance artist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th Feb 2016</td>
<td>David Jason Cattrell</td>
<td>Writer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th Feb 2016</td>
<td>Xiaowei Lu</td>
<td>Singer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th May 2016</td>
<td>May Li</td>
<td>Writer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th May 2016</td>
<td>Julia Taylor</td>
<td>Undergraduate student of Royal Holloway, University of London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th May 2016</td>
<td>Mengjia Wei</td>
<td>Undergraduate student of Royal Holloway University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th May 2016</td>
<td>Xiaoqing Zhang</td>
<td>Staff of Education Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th May 2016</td>
<td>Erin Huang</td>
<td>Staff of Education Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th June 2016</td>
<td>Yan Li</td>
<td>Staff of Colchester Chinese Culture Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th June 2016</td>
<td>Chao Liang</td>
<td>Staff of Colchester Chinese Culture Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th July 2016</td>
<td>Qiulin Gui</td>
<td>Director of Traditional Chinese Culture Research Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th July 2016</td>
<td>Mohe Li</td>
<td>Staff of Media Company</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 3    Questionnaire

Consent Form

Research Title: The Role of Cultural Diplomacy in Improving International Social Capital of China

This questionnaire is being conducted on behalf of PhD student Liang Xu and her supervisor Dr. Martin Steven at the Lancaster University, UK. You will be asked to answer a few questions concerning the research. The questionnaire may take you approximately 10 minutes. You could withdraw at any time without giving a reason and without penalty.

As well as your response to the questionnaire, we will ask you to provide demographic information and your name in case we need to contact you and to make sure that the same person does not take part more than once. We will be able to link this information to your responses on this questionnaire, and may use your responses on this questionnaire to decide your suitability for future studies.

The data you provide will normally only be accessed by the investigators, Dr. Martin Steven and Liang Xu. We will not share your personal information with anyone else. Your data will be stored on PCs and lockable in university offices, although we cannot completely guarantee their security.

For participants:

1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet for the above study and have had the opportunity to ask questions.

2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time, without giving reason.

3. I freely give my consent to participate in this research questionnaire.

*Please sign below to indicate that you have read and understand the information above.
Participant Information

*Name: __________________ _ *Nationality: ________________ *Age: _______

*Gender: _______

*Contact Email: _______________ Contact Tel.: _______________ (optional)

1. What is your “mother tongue” (first language) _________________

2. If you are a student, please list your major, your degree, and university.
   ____________________________________________________________________________

3. If you are not a student, please list your occupation and job position.
   ____________________________________________________________________________

Questions

1. Do you think different cultures cause conflicts?
   O Yes       O It depends       O No

2. Do you think “culture” can be used as a means of diplomacy?
   O Yes       O It depends       O No

3. Do you know about the concept of Cultural Diplomacy?
   O Quite familiar       O A little bit       O Totally unknown       O Don’t know

4. Do you think normal citizens rather than government or diplomats can also be part of cultural diplomacy?
   O Yes       O It depends       O No       O No Don’t know
5. Do you think cultural diplomacy can be used to promote “mutual understanding and trust”?

O Yes  O It depends  O No  O Don't know

6. Do you think “Mutual Trust” can promote the development of state diplomacy?

O Yes  O It depends  O No  O Don't know

7. Do you think “Trust” plays a significant role in states' interaction?

O Yes  O It depends  O No  O Don't know

8. Do you know about the concept of Social Capital?

O Quite familiar  O A little bit  O Totally unknown

8.1 If you are familiar with the concept of social capital, do you think social capital is important for a state?

O Yes  O It depends  O No  O Don't know

Which word(s) do you think can be used to describe social capital?

9. Do you know about the concept of state social capital?

O Quite Familiar  O A little bit  O Totally unknown

10. Do you care about Chinese Foreign Affairs?

O Yes  O It depends  O Totally unknown

11. Do you care about international politics?

O Yes  O It depends  O Totally unknown

12. Are you interested in Chinese culture?

O Yes  O It depends  O Totally unknown

13. What is the main obstacle for you to understand more about Chinese culture?

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14. What types of activities concerning Chinese culture you would like to join?

15. What is your opinion towards the Chinese government’s cultural diplomacy? 16. Do you think that China poses a threat to the world?

   0 Yes   0 It depends   0 No   0 Don’t know

17. What is your impression of Chinese people?

18. Do you know about the Confucius Institute?

   0 Yes   0 It depends   0 No   0 Don’t know

18.1 If you know about the Confucius Institute, what is your opinion towards it?

19. In your view, what is the best way for you to understand foreign culture?

20. Do you think that mastering another language could help you to understand another state’s culture?

---

**Debrief Form**

Thank you very much for agreeing to participate in this study!

The general purpose of this research is to investigate people's knowledgeable level towards cultural diplomacy and social capital, and people's impression toward China, its international image and international influences.
We invited people who are in different occupation fields: professors, students, lecturers, diplomats, government officers and others. In this questionnaire, you were asked to answer some questions towards the research topic. The results from this questionnaire will provide researchers the general idea about people’s attitude towards this research.

If you have further questions or interesting ideas about the study, or If you feel especially concerned about your personal information and the information you provide, please feel free to phone Liang Xu (+44(0)7845042991) or email Liang Xu (l.xu3@lancaster.ac.uk). Alternatively, you could also phone the Politics, Philosophy and Religion Department (+44(0)1524 594260) In addition, if you have any concerns about any aspect of the research you may contact Dr. Martin Steven, the supervisor of Liang Xu, his contact email is: m.steven@lancaster.ac.uk

Testing for this research is on-going, therefore Please Do Not Discuss This Study or Its Purpose With Others, as it might compromise future data.

Thanks again for your cooperation and participation!

问卷同意书

首先非常感谢参与此次“关于中国文化外交与社会资本关系”的问卷调查。本次问卷是由英国兰卡斯特大学国际外交学博士生徐量与其导师马丁·史蒂芬博士共同设计与执行的。
在此次问卷调查中，您将需要回答一系列关于“中国文化外交与社会资本关系”的问题。问卷时长约为10分钟左右，如果此问卷内容让你感到任何的不愉快，您可以随时无理由终止答卷。

由于需要确保“一人一答卷”的原则，必要时可能需要您提供一张照片来确定本次问卷调查参与人员的唯一性。我们也会根据您所提供的信息来确定在今后的研究调查中是否继续跟你合作。

同时，您所提供的个人资料和答卷通常来说只会被研究员徐量和其导师马丁·史蒂芬博士所掌握，且只用作为此课题的研究。绝对不会与任何人分享，更不会给予任何盈利机构或非盈利机构用作商业用途，所以希望您能认真负责地参与此次问卷调查。另外，必须要声明的是所有的问卷信息的电子版将会存档在研究员的电脑中，纸质版的问卷会保存在学校的办公室中，我们会尽力去确保所有信息的私密性和完整性，但是不能做到绝对地保证。

以下是答卷者须知：
1. 我确定我已经完全了解问卷说明的内容。
2. 我确定我是自愿参加此次问卷调查的，我也明白我可以无理由随时终止答卷。
3. 如果需要录音采访或者录像采访，我同意参加。

您的姓名：______________ 您的性别：__________ 您的年龄：__________

您的受教育程度（ ）
A. 初中及以下 B. 高中及技校 C. 大专及本科 D. 硕士 E. 博士

您的职业（ ）
A. 公务员 B. 企事业单位职员 C. 企事业单位管理人员 D. 离退休人员 E. 学生务农人员 F. 个体工商户 G. 其他

您的邮箱：__________________

1. 你觉得不同的文化会引起矛盾和冲突吗？（ ）
A. 会 B. 视情况而定 C. 不会 D. 不知道

2. 你觉得“文化”可以被用来作为外交的一种手段吗？（ ）
A. 可以 B. 视情况而定 C. 不可以 D. 不知道
3. 你对文化外交的了解程度是多少？（ ）
   A、非常了解  B、了解  C、不太了解  D、完全不了解

4. 您如何理解文化外交的概念？[多选题]（ ）
   A、文化外交以文化表现形式为载体或手段，围绕国家对外关系展开工作与部署，
   B、文化外交有明确的外交目的
   C、文化外交是在在特定时期、针对特定对象开展的国家或国际间公关活动
   D、文化外交在增进人民间的了解与友谊，促进国与国之间关系发展的过程中发挥着积极推动作用

5. 您认为文化外交所涉及的领域有哪些？[多选题]（ ）
   A、历史发展  B、风俗习惯  C、政治主张  D、特色饮食  E、传统服饰  F、影视娱乐  G、音乐
   H、书籍    I、竞技体育  J、名人轶事  K、其他------(请填写)

6. 你认为除了政府外交官以外，普通公民能够参与到文化外交中呢？（ ）
   A、可以  B、视情况而定  C、不可以  D、不知道

7. 您对中国文化中最感兴趣的是哪一项？[多选题]（ ）
   A、历史发展  B、风俗习惯  C、政治主张  D、核心价值观  E、特色饮食  F、传统服饰
   G、影视娱乐  H、音乐    I、书籍    J、竞技体育  K、名人轶事
   L、其他------(请填写)

8. 您认为文化在外交过程中对一个国家起到的作用有多重要？（ ）
   A、非常重要  B、比较重要  C、一般重要  D、不太重要  E、不重要

9. 您认为文化外交可以促进国与国之间对“相互理解和相互信任”吗？（ ）
   A、可以  B、视情况而定  C、不可以  D、不知道

10. 你觉得国与国之间的相互信任很重要吗？（ ）
    A、重要  B、视情况而定  C、不重要  D、不知道

11. 您认为中国文化外交有没有突出的地方？[多选题]（ ）
    A、没有
    B、在弘扬传统文化的同时宣传流行文化，实现传统与现代文化的完美结合
    C、在促进文化出口的同时，以一种不对等的文化贸易方式，使中国文化处于文化出超地位
    D、以政府为主体的文化外交，积极成立相应机构，从战略高度谋划文化外交
    E、借助世界文化多元化发展趋势，充分利用荧屏和网络等传播媒介
    F、其他(请填写)------

12. 您认为目前我国的文化外交是否到位？（ ）
    A、很到位，我国的文化外交无论是内容还是形式都非常有效
    B、一般很到位，文化外交取得了一定的成绩，但仍存在不可忽视的问题
    C、完全不到位，无论是外交内容还是形式仍有很大欠缺
D、没有了解过，不感兴趣

13. 您认为目前我国的文化外交存在哪些不足之处？ [多选题] （ ）

A、宣传力度不够  B、宣传内容欠佳
C、文化本身无特点，不能得到外国人认同  D、宣传的对象选择有偏差
E、其他（请填写）

14. 您认为针对我国文化外交的不足，从哪些方面进行改进？ [多选题] （ ）

A、加强传统文化的保护，坚持文化创新，注重文化的渗透性
B、大力发展文化产业，提高文化贸易的能力，实现文化产业“走出去”
C、注重草根文化，注重政府与民间的合作
D、重视教育和科技发展，加强人才储备
E、重视文化对国家安全的影响，加强国家文化安全建设

15. 你了解“社会资本”的概念吗？ （ ）

A、非常了解  B、了解  C、不太了解  D、完全不了解

16. 你觉得什么才是社会资本？ [多选题] （ ）

A、为实现工具性或情感性的目的，透过社会网络来动员的资源或能力的总和
B、社会财富
C、跟社会信任，社会网络有关
D、通过研究人际关系结构、位置、强度等，可以对社会现象提供更好的解释

17. 如果你比较了解社会资本的概念，你觉得社会资本对一个国家的发展而言重要吗？（ ）

A、重要  B、视情况而定  C、不重要  D、不知道

18. 你知道“国家社会资本”这个概念吗？（ ）

A、非常了解  B、了解  C、不太了解  D、完全不了解

19. 你平常关心中国的外事事务吗？比如说中国与别国的国际关系发展情况等。（ ）

A、非常关心  B、一般关心  C、不关心  D、没兴趣

20. 你对国际政治感兴趣吗？（ ）

A、非常感兴趣  B、一般感兴趣  C、不感兴趣  D、视情况而定

21. 你对中国文化感兴趣吗？（ ）

A、非常感兴趣  B、一般感兴趣  C、没兴趣  D、不知道

22. 如果你有机会，你会愿意向外国人介绍中国文化吗？（ ）

A、非常愿意  B、一般愿意  C、不愿意  D、不知道

23. 你觉得，外国人了解中国文化的主要障碍会是什么呢？ [多选题] （ ）

A、语言（中文）  B、信仰  C、兴趣  D、负面报道  D、其他
24. 你觉得中国会对世界安全形成威胁吗？
   A. 完全不会   B. 不会   C. 会   D. 不知道
   如果你认为中国不会对世界安全形成威胁，请陈述一下你的理由：__________

25. 你觉得西方人是怎么看待中国以及其发展的呢？【多选题】( )
   A. 中国会称霸世界，成为第二个美国
   B. 中国会改变世界格局
   C. 中国的发展会对世界形成威胁
   D. 中国的整体发展是不健康的发展态势
   E. 中国的发展是可持续的发展
   F. 中国是一个有着悠久历史文化的国家
   G. 其他

26. 你觉得外国人对中国人印象会是什么呢？【多选题】（ ）
   A. 友好  热情  好客   B. 谦虚
   C. 大款  有钱  土豪   D. 有素质  文化程度高
   E. 少涵养，素质欠佳   F. 其他

27. 你有登陆过中国外交部的官方网站吗？（ ）
   A. 经常登陆   B. 偶尔   C. 一次而已   D. 没有

28. 你知道“孔子学院”吗？（ ）
   A. 非常了解   B. 一般了解   C. 不太了解   D. 完全不了解

29. 你觉得那种方式能够让你更好的去了解其他国家的文化呢？

30. 你觉得掌握一个国家的语言能够让你更好的了解那个国家吗？（ ）
   A. 绝对可以   B. 可以   C. 视情况而定   D. 不可以

31. 你觉得国家间的相互信任能够提高你对那个国家的信任度吗？（ ）
   A. 完全可以   B. 可以   C. 视情况而定   D. 不知道

32. 你觉得“国与国之间的交往”同“人与人之间的交往”相似吗？（ ）
   A. 非常相似   B. 相似   C. 视情况而定   D. 不知道

33. 如果有机会，你比较愿意参加政府组织的文化外交活动还是民间组织文化外交活动？（ ）
   A. 政府组织的文化外交活动   B. 民间组织文化外交活动   C. 都可以
   D. 视情况而定   E. 不知道

34. 你觉得留学生能否促进国家之间的交流？（ ）
35. 你觉得一个国家“人与人之间的信任指数”高的话，是否有利于中国的国际发展？（ ）
A、完全可以  B、可以  C、视情况而定  D、不可以  E、不知道

问卷结束语

非常感谢您能够抽出宝贵的时间来协助我们完成此次的问卷调查！

这份问卷的主要目的为了解中国人对文化外交和社会资本这两个概念的认知程度以及
相关的看法。我们邀请来自不同国家，不同行业，不同年龄段的人来参与此次问卷调查。所得的数据能够帮助研究员更好的了解中国文化外交和社会资本的发展水平。

如果您对问卷有疑问，或者对这个课题非常感兴趣，非常欢迎您能跟此课题的研究员徐量联系，联系方式：l.xu3@lancs.ac.uk 由于此问卷调查的测试会一直持续，所以希望您在完成答卷之后，不要与其他研究机构的研究员讨论此课题，更不得用作其他的用途。

再次衷心感谢您的合作：）


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